The kinah Zekhor et asher asah tzar be-finnim - הקינה זכר את אשר עשה צר בפנים

The kinah Zekhor et asher asah tzar be-finnim is again by R. Elazar haKalir. The first word of each line corresponds to the first word of each verse in chapter five of Eicah and the second word of each line follows the aleph bet. Two exceptions are that since the fifth chapter in Eicah has 22 verses and there are 24 lines to the kinah, so lines 22 and 24 do not begin with the first word of a verse from Eicah chapter five. (If one wants to, they can argue that lines 21 and 23 are double lines, and then the kinah only has 22 lines, as line 23 becomes line 22.) In addition, each set of two lines ends with a rhyme by both the end of each line and by the end of the first half of each line, in total four rhymes. Also, each pair of lines usually has the same theme.

In the first line of the kinah, the aleph line, we ask G-d to remember that the enemy (tzar) drew his sword in the Holy of Holies. The enemy is referring to Titus, the Roman general and later Caesar, who was in charge of the Roman army that destroyed the second Bet ha-Mikdash. Josephus (re-print 2004, pp. 359-362) records that Titus did not desire for the Bet ha-Mikdash to be burnt, but one soldier on his own set fire to the Bet ha-Mikdash. Josephus also claims that Titus tried to stop the fire, but in the bedlam his orders were not heard. Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 369, see also Rav Soloveitchik, 2006, p. 205) is quoted as saying “that Josephus’ account is clearly false.” In any event, one might wonder how could or would Titus enter the Bet ha-Mikdash if it was burning? According to his kinah, he entered before it was burning, but even according to Josephus, he went in to the Holy of Holies when it was burning.

The second line of the kinah, the bet line, describes what Titus did when he went into the Holy of Holies, he defiled the show bread and pierced the curtain, the parokhet, that separated the inner room and the outer room of the Bet ha-Mikdash. This latter act is recorded in Gittin 56b and Bereshit Rabbah 10:7. The end of the line follows the idea that the curtain was embroidered on two sides, which as Goldschmid (2002, p. 72) notes is based on the Yerushalmi Shekalim, 8:4, 51b.

The third line of the kinah, the gimmel line, is that Titus disgraced the Jewish people, called orphans in the kinah, by entering the Holy of Holies with a bloody shield and then by making marks in the Holy of Holies with his bloody sword.

The fourth line of the kinah, the daled line, seems also to refer to Titus that he defaced the Bet ha-Mikdash with blood. Maybe Titus here represents all the Romans who defaced the Bet ha-Mikdash.

The fifth and sixth lines of the kinah, the heh and vav lines, note how Titus bragged that he could fight G-d that he was able to enter the Holy of Holies and left unscathed. Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 365) notes that this line is based on Gitten 56b.

The seventh line of the kinah, the zayin line, records the wonderment that how was Titus able to enter and leave the Holy of Holies unscathed? The kinah notes that when the people were in the desert, Nadav and Avihu were killed instantaneously when they sinned, Vayikra 10:1,2, but Titus was not harmed at all. Note it seems that R. Elazar haKalir is following the idea that Nadav and Avihu brought their fire inside the mishkan/ ohel moed, but I think they sinned in front of the mishkan, see our discussion on the verses. The second half of the seventh line claims further impudence of Titus that he even brought a prostitute with him into the Holy of Holies. Goldshmidt (2002, p. 73) notes that this idea is based on Vayikra Rabbah 22:3.

The eighth line of the kinah, the chet line, continues with the wonderment, but now the question is more general, how could G-d allow or even cause to burn the place where sacrifices had been burnt to G-d? R. Elazar haKalir does not yet offer any answers to these questions.

The ninth line of the kinah, the tet line, changes the theme of the kinah as the line refer to Titus and all the Romans taking the vessels from the Bet ha-Mikdash and sending them to Rome on ships. Evidence of this can be seen today in Rome by the Arch of Titus. When I was by the Arch in the summer of 1982, somebody had etched in the words, am yisrael chai, the Jewish people live, but when I came back in 2007, the Arch was fenced off (maybe to stop people from etching on it).

The tenth line of the kinah, the yud line, notes the shock (horror ?) of the people when the High Priest awoke and he could not find the 93 vessels of the Bet ha-Mikdash, which had been taken away, as mentioned in line nine of the kinah. Rav Soloveitchik (2002, p. 367) notes that this line is puzzling. How could the High Priest have not known that the vessels had been taken away and that the Bet ha-Mikdash had been destroyed? What could it mean that he awoke? Did he go to sleep oblivious to what was happening in the Bet ha-Mikdash? Maybe R. Elazar haKalir does not just refer to the High Priest but to all the priests, and he was not referring to the literal morning after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, but to when the people had recovered sufficiently to survey the damage, and then the priests were shocked at the extent of the robbery by Titus and the Romans.

The eleventh line of the kinah, the chaf line, returns to the first theme of the kinah, Titus entering the Holy of Holies, and refers to women being scared of him. Were women in the Bet ha-Mikdash battling the Romans? Possibly, this reference to women is because R. Elazar haKalir was “forced” to refer to women since he was following the fifth chapter of Eicah and the first word in Eicah 5:11 is women. The second half of the eleventh line claims that Titus scarred the floor of the Bet ha-Mikdash with his boots, as maybe there was blood on the boots.

The twelfth line of the kinah, the lamed line, begins with a reference to leaders, following Eicah 5:12, and that they were scared of Titus, but it is not clear which leaders are being referred to. Could be the Jewish leaders of the rebellion who were scared of being killed by Titus? The second half of the twelfth line reverts back to Titus’ action in the Holy of Holies with the prostitute. The connection between these two half lines and with the eleventh line (its pair) is not clear.

The thirteenth line of the kinah, the mem line, begins a new theme unrelated to Titus, but maybe related to R. Elazar haKalir’s question in line eight, how could G-d allow the Bet ha-Mikdash to be destroyed? The thirteenth line refers to a Midrash (Devarim Rabbah 1:17) that there were 600,000 demons who were going to defend the Bet ha-Mikdash, and the young people were counting on them. The idea being that the people knew that they could not defeat the Romans militarily, but they believed that G-d would do a miracle to save them. It is possible that R. Elazar haKalir refers to these angels again in the kinah that begins (depending on different versions) Al elah ani bociyah or Tesater lealam.

In the fourteenth line, the nun line, the kinah continues the theme of the thirteen line (its pair) as it states that the elders knew that G-d had allowed for the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, so the demons could not act and G-d, as it were, was chained, asur ba-zikkim. Thus, G-d did not stop the Romans. This phrase, asur ba-zikkim is from Yirmiyahu 40:1 but there it did not refer to G-d, as it is a daring concept in the kinah that G-d could be “in chains.” Rav Soloveitchik (2006, p. 174) explains that the phrase that G-d was asur ba-zikkim means that G-d “arrested the attribute of mercy and allowed the attribute of judgment to prevail.” The combination of lines 13 and 14 is that idealistic young people tend to act rashly without concerning themselves of the consequences of their actions, but they cannot depend on G-d to save them from their folly, as G-d could be “in chains.” This lesson from the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash is very important today in Israel, but it seems that it is being ignored.

The fifteenth line of the kinah, the samech line, notes that the Romans (admon) were repeating what Nebuchadnezzar (soten) had done, which just raises the question how could G-d twice let the Bet ha-Mikdash be destroyed? Maybe R. Elazar haKalir was not enthralled with the idea that G-d could be “in chains,” so he raised the question again.

The first half of the sixteenth line of the kinah, the ayin line, refers to the Jewish people as the descendants of Yaakov, who peeled branches when working for Lavan to get more spotted sheep and goats, Bereshit 30:37,38, that G-d let His anger vent against the Jewish people. The second half of the line explains that G-d’s anger led Him to abandon the Bet ha-Mikdash. This line is different than the idea of G-d being “in chains” (line 14) that here the idea is that G-d was upset with the people for their sins and that is why the Bet ha-Mikdash was destroyed.

The seventeenth line of the kinah, the peh line, momentarily reverts back to Titus, that he had a meeting with his commanders telling them to destroy the Bet ha-Mikdash. Josephus (re-print 2004, p. 359) also reports that Titus met with his commanders prior to the final battle for the Bet ha-Mikdash, though as mentioned above, Josephus claims that Titus did not want the Bet ha-Mikash to be destroyed. R. Elazar haKalir clearly did not accept this claim of Josephus.

The eighteenth line of the kinah, the tzaddi line, notes that even though the Romans were determined to destroy the Bet ha-Mikdash, G-d limited them, and kept the western wall, the Kotel, from being destroyed. This idea also differs from the idea of G-d being in chains (line 14) and that G-d completely abandoned the Bet ha-Mikdash (line 16).

Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 370) makes the interesting point that this line of the kinah is the earliest reference to the Western Wall, as it is not mentioned in the Talmud Bavli and Yerushalmi, and even by the Rambam when he visited Yerushalayim. He notes that the Kotel is referred to in the Midrash Shemot Rabbah 2:2 explaining the verse in Shir ha-Shirim 2:9. Goldschmidt (2002, p. 74) notes that this same reference to the Kotel is recorded in Midrash Tehillim 11:3 and in a version (not my version) of Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 2:4. However, Rav Soloveitchik (see also 2006, p. 207) thinks these references to the Kotel are late additions to the Midrash. Rav Soloveitchik (2006, p. 138) seems to be following the idea that R. Elazar haKalir lived in the 10th century and the Midrash(im) were written beforehand. However, more likely R. Elazar haKalir lived prior to when the Midrashim were written, and then this kinah would be the earliest written reference to the Kotel that we have.

The nineteenth line of the kinah, the kuf line, returns to the idea from line ten of the Romans taking valuables from the Bet ha-Mikdash and shipping them to Rome, but now the valuables are young children, more like teenagers.

The second half of the twentieth line of the kinah, the resh line, records how the children were sent to Rome (the land of utz, see Eicah 4:21) in three boats. The first half of the twentieth line, similar to lines seven and eight, is a question how could G-d allow this destruction of the people, especially children? This question is particularly poignant with the continuation of the kinah.

The twenty-first line of the kinah, the shin line, records that the children pleaded with G-d to have the boats turn back, but when their prayers went unheeded, they jumped into the sea. The source for this sad story is Gittin 57b and Eicah Rabbah 1:16. These sources explain that there were 400 children, and that they realized that they were going to be sold as slaves for immoral purposes, see the kinah Ve-et naveh chatati, which has this same idea in reference to the children of Rebi Yishmael. Thus, they committed suicide to thwart the Romans.

The twenty-second line of the kinah, the taf line, records how the children sang songs of praise as they jumped into the sea, and R. Elazar haKalir compared their singing to the singing of the people after the splitting of Yam Suf by the Exodus from Egypt, Shemot chapter 15.

The first half of twenty-third line of the kinah, a taf line again, records that the children died at sea. The second half of the line starts with a phrase from Tehillim 44:18 and records that even with all the suffering, we have not forgotten G-d.

The last two words of the first half of the twenty-fourth and last line of the kinah, again a taf line, is based on Tehillim 68:23. According to the Talmud, the children asked one of the more knowledgeable ones in their group whether they would have a share in the world to come if they committed suicide, and he answered by quoting this verse from Tehillim, that some people will return from Bashan from the depths of the ocean, which was understood to mean that they would have a share in the word to come. This answer led them to jump in the sea.

Clearly, R. Elazar haKalir looked upon it positively that the children committed suicide, and it could be that this kinah by R. ha-Kalir was part of the culture that led many Ashkenazi Jewry to commit suicide in the Middle Ages rather than submit to Christian tormentors. However, Haym Soloveitchik (2004, pp. 83, 84, 86) notes that according to the halachah, it is not clear if the children were correct in their actions. In any event, this incident of the children jumping into the sea became a source for Rabbenu Tam to argue that it is permissible for a person to kill him/ herself if one fears that he/ she will be driven to apostasy by torture or the threat of a painful death. However, Haym Soloveitchik claims that Rabbenu Tam was relying on this episode as an ex post justification for the martyrdom of Ashkenazi Jewry in the Middle Ages, who were and still are viewed as the holy ones for their actions. Several of the ensuing kinot (Hacharishu mimeni, Mi yeten roshi mayim and Amarti sheu meni) deal with these tragedies.

The last three words of second half of the twenty-fourth line, and the end of the kinah is from Tehillim 44:24, but R. Elazar haKalir has transformed the verse to be a call for us to pray to G-d, and this corresponds to the second half of the twenty-third line. The idea could be that after reciting this kinah which includes references to almost all the tragedies by the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, we have an obligation to pray, and specifically to recite kinot.

Bibliography:

Goldschmidt, Daniel (1895-1972), 2002, first printed 1972, The kinot of Tisha B’av: Following the custom of Poland and Ashkenazi communities in the land of Israel, 2nd edition, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Josephus, Flavius (37-100?), re-print 2004, The great Roman-Jewish war, The William Whiston translation as revised by D. S. Margoliouth, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Soloveitchik, Haym, 2004, Halakhah, Hermeneutics, and Martyrdom in Medieval Ashkenaz (Part I of II), The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 77-108.

Soloveitchik, Joseph (1903-1993), 2006, The Lord is righteous in all of his ways: Reflections on the Tish`ah be-Av kinot, edited by Jacob J. Schacter, New York: The Toras Harav Foundation by Ktav Publishing House.

Soloveitchik, Joseph, 2010, The Koren mesorat harav kinot: Commentary on the kinot based on the teachings of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, edited by Simon Posner, Jerusalem: Koren Publishers; New York: OU Press.

Bemidbar 29:13-32 - The musaf sacrifices on the holiday of Sukkot: Seventy bulls

Bemidbar chapters 28 and 29 record additional sacrifices (korban musaf) that are to be brought on different festivals/ special days. One oddity in the list is that on all the special days referred to in chapters 28 and 29, except Sukkot, either one bull or two bulls are to be brought as a sacrifice, but on Sukkot, a total of seventy bulls are offered on the seven-day festival, 29:13-32. The Bekhor Shor (on 29:13) suggests that the large quantity of animals is due to the extra happiness of the Sukkot festival. Yet, why 70 bulls? For example, why not seven bulls each day, 49 bulls in total, or three bulls each day, 21 bulls in total?

Rashi (on 29:18) quotes from the Talmud Sukkah 55b that the seventy bulls symbolize the seventy nations, i.e., the seventy children of Shem, Ham and Yefet, Bereshit chapter 10. 

Hizkuni (on 29:32) suggests that the number of bulls relate to the seventy special days during the year, not including Rosh Chodesh.

My guess is that the seventy bulls relate to the seventy families in the count of the people in Bemidbar 26:5-49, which relates to the seventy descendants of Yaakov who went to Egypt with him, Bereshit, 46:27, also Devarim 10:22. This connection might explain why the sacrifices are recorded soon after the count of the seventy families.

In fact, each of the three festivals has a sacrifice of the people, which connects them to the mishkan/ ohel moed/ Bet ha-Mikdash. By the festival of Matzot, the korban pesach is brought by each person prior to the festival of Matzot. This connection could be why the korban pesach is recorded in 28:15, even though there are no additional sacrifices on this day. With regard to the festival of Shavuot, 28:26 records that the day has a new minhah offering, and Vayikra 23:17 records that this minhah offering is to be brought from the people’s farms. By Sukkot, the sacrifice that relates to the people would be the seventy bulls following the idea that they represent the seventy families of the Jewish people. My son Yishai added that the main law of Sukkot is living in the booths for seven days, which is because the people lived in booths during the desert, Vayikra 23:43, and it was these seventy families who lived in these booths, so then the seventy families are recalled through the sacrifices of the seventy bulls on Sukkot.

The sacrifices by Sukkot are also unique that the number of bulls offered each day declines by one a day (from 13 bulls to 12 bulls to 11 bulls to 10 bulls to 9 bulls to 8 bulls to 7 bulls). Why is there a decrease in the number of bulls each day? If in total seventy bulls are offered why were not ten bulls offered each day? Or, why not start with seven bulls and go up to 13 bulls by the seventh day? This enters pure speculation, but here goes three reasons. 

One, by going down on the number of bulls being offered as sacrifices instead of increasing the number of bulls each day or offering ten bulls a day means that at least for one day, the seventh day, the number of bulls match the day of the festival, seven. 

Two, as suggested by the Bekhor Shor, the large number of bulls relates to the obligation to be happy on Sukkot, Vayikra 23:40 and Devarim 16:14,15, and the decline in the number of bulls being offered each day is a recognition that there is a decrease in the happiness on each successive day of the holiday. This would not be due to something intrinsically negative about the later days, but due to the difficulty in maintaining the same level of happiness over time. This would accord with the principle of diminishing marginal utility, that each additional good, here days of the holiday, provide less utility to a consumer. This would differ by the sacrifices by the holiday of Matzot which do not decline, but there is no commandment to be happy on the festival of Matzot unlike by Sukkot.

A third idea is that the countdown in the number of bulls informs us that there is something coming which is the last special day, the eighth day, Shemini Azeret, 29:35-38. In addition, maybe the countdown stops at seven bulls by the seventh day of Sukkot and then jumps to one bull by Shemini Azeret to inform us that even though Sukkot leads into Shemini Azeret still the two holidays are distinct in some ways, see our discussion in the file on Jewish holidays and customs, “Shemini Atzeret: A separate holiday from Sukkot?”

Bemidbar 8:1-4 - Two laws about the menorah in the book of Bemidbar

Bemidbar 8:1-4 (the beginning of parashat Beha`alothekha) record two laws relating to the menorah that was situated in the mishkan/ ohel moed. 8:1,2 record that G-d told Moshe to tell Aharon that when he would set up the lights (wicks?) on the menorah to light the menorah, he should set up the lights/ wicks in such a way that the light would illuminate the area in front of the menorah facing toward the table of bread, which was opposite the menorah in the mishkan/ ohel moed (see Rashbam and Hizkuni on 8:2). 8:3 records that Aharon fulfilled this command.

Why did the Torah have to tell us at this point in the Torah that Aharon set up the lights/ wicks on the menorah? This command seems to repeat Shemot 25:37, and Shemot 40:25 records that Moshe fulfilled this command of how to place the lights/ wicks in the menorah. Shemot 25:30 records that bread was to be placed on the table in the mishkan/ ohel moed, and the only time the Torah records that this instruction was fulfilled was also by Moshe in Shemot 40:23.

Why is there is a specific commandment to Aharon how to set up the lights/ wicks on the menorah and why does the Torah record that he fulfilled this command? The Torah does not record that Aharon brought the incense offering every day. Also, it is surprising that this information concerning Aharon’s role by the menorah is not recorded in the book of Vayikra which records the work of the priests. Various answers have been proposed to these questions, see Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ramban and Hizkuni all on 8:2.

My thought is that the importance of 8:1-3 is that the setting up of the lights/ wicks in the menorah was considered part of the building of the menorah, and this could be why the instructions how to place the lights/wicks were included within the instructions to build the menorah, Shemot 25:37, and not at the end of Shemot 25. With this idea, by Aharon placing the lights/ wicks in the menorah, he completed not only the building of the menorah, but also the construction of the mishkan/ ohel moed since this was the last item in the mishkan/ ohel moed to be built. Moshe had already placed the lights/ wicks in the menorah but the idea of 8:2,3 was for Aharon to set (re-set?) up the lights/ wicks on the menorah to make him the person to complete the building of the mishkan/ ohel moed. 8:2 is a new commandment for how the lights/ wicks were to be set up in the menorah separate from the instructions in Shemot 25:37, and 8:3 records the fulfillment of this new commandment.

The significance of Aharon fulfilling this command, which meant that Aharon completed the building of the mishkan/ ohel moed, was that this act symbolized that Aharon, and the priests who he represented, were the “owners” of the mishkan/ ohel moed, and hence responsible for running the mishkan/ ohel moed. The act of placing the lights/ wicks in the menorah was recorded after the lengthy list of gifts and sacrifices of the tribal leaders in chapter seven to show that the priests were “taking control” of the mishkan/ ohel moed from the people. While the people were connected to the mishkan/ ohel moed though their gifts and sacrifices, they were not the “owners” of the mishkan/ ohel moed and they had no say in the running of the mishkan/ ohel moed.

After the Torah records that Aharon set up the lights/ wicks in the menorah, 8:4 records the law that the menorah was to be made from one piece of gold. Presumably this means that pieces of gold were to be combined (melted) to form a large slab of gold (via a mold), and then the slab of gold would have been chipped away/ hammered, mikshah, to form the menorah. Why was this information recorded here? This information is already recorded in Shemot 25:31-40 and Shemot 37:17-24. Also, 8:3 records that Aharon lit the menorah, so obviously it existed already. Why now was the Torah again recording how the menorah was to be constructed?

Maybe this particular law was recorded in the book of Bemidbar because the menorah with its flower designs was fragile, and this could have led to some of the petals and decorations chipping or even breaking, especially when it was being transported. 8:4 is then telling us that when the menorah needed to be fixed, one could not just add a part back to the menorah. Instead, the whole menorah was to be turned back into a slab of gold and then remade as one unit.

Note, this idea is not obvious. From the instructions in Shemot 25 with regard to the menorah, one might have thought that the menorah only had to be one piece of gold when it was first constructed, but afterwards, if needed, pieces could be added to it. Accordingly, 8:4 informs us that the menorah always had to consist of one piece of gold, and since this law is pertinent only after the menorah was completed, the law in 8:4 is recorded after we read of the menorah being used in 8:3.

 

Vayikra 16:7-10, 21, 22 – To azazel, to where?

Vayikra 16:7-10 record that as part of the service, avodah, on Yom Kippur, Aharon, the high priest, would take two goats and by lottery choose one for/ to G-d and one for/ to azazel. Afterwards, 16:21,22 record that Aharon would confess the sins of the people on the goat that was for/ to azazel, and the goat was then sent to the desert, possibly to die.  What does the term azazel mean? The term appears four times in the chapter, 16:8, 10(2), 26, but nowhere else in Tanakh. There are at least four definitions to the word, all of them educated guesses.

Before reviewing the various definitions of the word azazel, we need to review the reason why this goat is part of the ceremony of Yom Kippur altogether. The point of the ceremony of Yom Kippur was to le-taher, purify, the ohel moed/ mishkan, 16:30, see our discussion on 16:3-34, “The avodah on Yom Kippur.” This means that all the elements of the ceremony were to contribute to this taharah, purification, process. With regard to the goat that was sent to azazel, 16:22 records that the goat was to carry the sins of the people to eretz gezerah in the desert, which seems to refer to a remote desolate place in the desert. Clearly, the goat could not literally carry away sins, but even symbolically, how is this carrying to be conceived? The goat “received” the sins from Aharon’s confession, but could Aharon really confess the sins of other people he did not even know? Instead, the problem on Yom Kippur of the sins of the people is that they caused the ohel moed/ mishkan to be tamei. The goat was then “carrying” away the tumah that derived from the sins of the people, and since this tumah is symbolic, the whole process of Aharon placing the sins of the people on the goat and the goat carrying away the tumah from sins works on the symbolic level. This process parallels the sending away of the bird in the purification ceremony of the person with tsara’at that the bird carried away the tumah of the person with tsara’at, 14:7. (The parallelism between these cases has been noted by many people.)

Indeed, the purification process of the person with tsara’at with two birds is exactly the same as the process with the two goats on Yom Kippur but on a lower level since the person with tsara’at generated less tumah than the sins of the people. Thus, on Yom Kippur a goat was used to send away the tumah, while by the person with tsara’at, a bird was sent away. Also, while the bird was sent out on the field, the goat was sent to a remote desolate region (16:22) since it encompassed more tumah. In both cases, the animal can take away the tumah since tumah is a symbolic concept and symbols can be “moved.”

To return to a review of the various definitions that have been proposed for the word azazel. One definition is based on the goat's destination. Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on 16:8,10) suggests that azazel refers to the name of a mountain in the region of the people. Ibn Ezra (the beginning of his comments on 16:8) adds that maybe this was a name of a mountain near Mount Sinai, which was a mighty peak, and then this became the name for the goat even if the name was not relevant in future generations. Similarly, Rashi (on 16:8, based on Yoma 67b, also Bekhor Shor on 16:8) explains that azazel means a mighty peak that the goat was to be sent to a mighty peak. Milgrom (1991, p. 1020) quotes a variation of this idea that according to this approach, the term azazel means "a rough and a difficult place," without any reference to a peak or mountain. With this approach, the preposition lamed before the word azazel means to, to the mountain or to a remote and desolate place.

These explanations are based on the phrase, eretz gezerah in 16:22, since this phrase, eretz gezerah, can be understood as a synonym for azazel. Notwithstanding this textual support, still the lottery is then between G-d and a place, which is not parallel. Possibly to answer this question, Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on 16:8,9) writes that when the Torah records that the lottery was to G-d, this was to the house of G-d. With this understanding, the two possibilities in the lottery are both to places. We will return to this approach since it has the most textual support of any of the other suggestions.

The second interpretation of the term azazel is that the term refers to the act of sending away the goat that the term azazel means the one or the animal to be sent away. This explanation can be found in the Septuagint, corresponds to the term in the Mishnah (Yoma 6:2) sair ha-mishtalleah, the goat that is sent away, and is the basis for the term scapegoat in English translations. However, this interpretation is difficult since it is not clear what the lamed, the preposition to/ for, before the term azazel means unless, the lamed is part of the word, and the term should be lazazel.

The third explanation, which is mentioned by Ramban (on 16:8), Hizkuni (on 16:8) and maybe by Ibn Ezra (end of comments on 16:8, though see alternative explanation of Ibn Ezra’s cryptic comment by R. Isaac Mehler, quoted by Klein, 2005, p. 194) is that the term azazel is a name of a demon that the goat was sent to a demon. With this idea, the preposition lamed can mean for, for the demon. However, Hertz (1960, p. 481) notes that once 17:7 denounces sacrifices that were offered to satyrs, goat demons, how could something, even if not a sacrifice, be given to demons as part of the service on Yom Kippur?

Maybe one can vary the third approach and argue that the term azazel was an anachronism even in the time of the Torah. The idea is that while people once believed in demons, the term had already lost its original meaning to the people in the desert, but by using the term the people could easier understand the idea of sending tumah away, see Luzzatto on 16:8, quoted in Bulah, 1992, footnote 11 on chapter 16. The problem with this explanation is that in 17:7 we see that some people still believed in demons, so if azazel refers to a demon, it was not an anachronism to all the people living at that time in the desert.

Or, maybe the idea of referring to a demon on Yom Kippur was to deny the powers of demons indirectly. Yehezkel Kaufmann (1972a, p. 114, quoted by Jacobson, 1986, p. 130) argues that the sending of the goat to azazel was a transformation of a pagan ritual. He claims that the original pagan ritual was an expulsion of the satyr azazel to the desert, but in the Torah, “the Azazel of chapter 16 is not conceived of either as (being) among the people or as the source of danger or harm; he plays no active role at all. He is merely a passive symbol of impurity, tumah… The world of old gods has become transformed into the desolate haunts of dancing satyrs who keep company with wild animals. All decisive power, divine and demonic, has been taken from them and given to the messengers of G-d.” The idea here is that while the term azazel might refer to a demon, the Torah gives azazel no power since azazel just receives the goat sent to it. This idea could accord with our explanation of Shemot 20:3 that the Torah does not prohibit belief in other gods, as it only prohibited to believe that they are equal or greater to G-d, see our discussion on Shemot 20:3, "Forces and gods."

Yet, if azazel refers to a powerless demon, why is it mentioned altogether? Maybe the idea is that it is better to acknowledge demons but to make them powerless since some people believed in them, than to leave demons to people’s imagination. Thus, maybe azazel is mentioned for those people who think demons exist that they should know that the supposed demons are powerless. I used to follow this idea, but from the actions with regard to the goat to azazel in the service on Yom Kippur, we see that the goat that was for/ to azazel was also to/ for G-d. This point was made by Rav Shmuel ben Hofni, the Gaon of Sura from 998 to 1012, quoted by Ibn Ezra on 16:8.

Firstly, the point of the lottery is that either goat could be for G-d or azazel, so then if azazel refers to a demon, then this would be making G-d equivalent to the demon and not making the demon powerless. Secondly, even after the goat was selected for azazel, 16:10 records that the goat was to stand before G-d, which shows that it too was to/ for G-d. Thirdly, the two goats work together. The blood of the goat that was selected to/ for G-d was sprinkled in the mishkan/ ohel moed to le-taher the mishkan/ ohel moed, and the goat that was selected to/ for azazel carried away the sins that caused the tumah which had to be purified. If the mishkan/ ohel moed was just sprinkled with the blood of goat to/ for G-d, then the problem of tumah would have remained if the sins of the people had not been carried away (symbolically) by the goat for/ to azazel. Fourthly, by the sprinkling of the blood by the goat selected to/ for G-d, and the carrying away of the sins by the goat selected to/ for azazel, the Torah uses the exact same words, 16:16,21, which shows that the goats are a team, and cannot be separated, as both are for/ to G-d.

A fourth definition of the term azazel is quoted by Hertz (1960, p. 481, also Hoffmann, 1953, p. 305 and Hartom, 1999, p. 53) that the term is based on the purpose of the sending away of the goat, and means "dismissal or entire removal." Hertz explains that the word azazel "is the ancient technical term for the entire removal of the sin and guilt of the community, that was symbolized by the sending away of the goat into the wilderness." The problem with this explanation is that it is an odd word to signify destruction and the term is not parallel with G-d by the lottery.

In the end, my guess is to slightly vary the first approach that the term azazel means a desolate forlorn place based on the phrase eretz gezerah in 16:22, but it was not a specific place. Anywhere in the desert which was particularly desolate and lacking any possibility of life would be called azazel.

The idea of the lottery is that the goat which would be for/ to G-d symbolized/ represented taharah since its blood was sprinkled in the inner room of the mishkan/ ohel moed, and the goat which was for/ to azazel, symbolized/ represented tumah due to the sins of the people being “placed” upon it. Both tumah and taharah are symbolic concepts and both are determined by G-d. Thus, both goats are before G-d in 16:7,9,10, and either goat could have been chosen to symbolize or represent the two concepts. The randomness of the lottery shows that G-d decides who and what are considered tamei and who and what are considered tahor. The goat which symbolized/ represents taharah goes to G-d since being tahor is a symbolic movement towards G-d, while the goat that symbolized/ represented tumah goes to a forlorn place, eretz gezerah, since tumah is a symbolic movement away for G-d to nothingness.  The parallelism of the lottery is a movement towards G-d or a movement away from G-d, but both goats remain symbolically before G-d, just a question of how distant. A variation of this idea is, following Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon, that the preposition, lamed, both in reference to G-d and azazel by the lottery, 16:8, means to a place, either a place associated with G-d, the Holy of Holies, by the goat which symbolized taharah, or to a place that is associated with desolation or nothingness by the goat which symbolized tumah.

My son-in-law Yuri Lubomirsky has pointed out to me that if azazel is referring to a specific place (like some of the proponents of the first definition claim), then the Torah should not have used the preposition lamed, before the term, and instead should have written azazelah, like midbarah in 16:10,22 and Sedomah in Bereshit 19:1, see Rashi on Bereshit 32:3. Also, he claims that when something is sent to a place, then there is no need for a preposition at all. However, if azazel is not a defined place, but a description of any forlorn place that occurs in the desert, then the preposition lamed could be appropriate. The idea being that the person who took the goat to azazel was to search in the desert to find a particularly remote and desolate area, azazel, in the desert to release the goat, 16:10,22.

Bibliography:

Bulah, Menachem, 1991, 1992, Vayikra: Da'at Mikra, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Hartom, E. S. 1999, Commentary on Vayikra, Tel Aviv: Yavne Publishing House.

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press.

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Kaufmann, Yehezkel (1889-1963), 1972, The Religion of Israel, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute and Tel Aviv: Dvir Co.

Klein, Alexander, 2005, The law of the scapegoat, in in Professors on the Parashah: Studies on the weekly Torah readings, edited by Leib Moskowitz, Jerusalem: Urim Publications.

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.

2023 version of commentary on the Haggadah

Hello,

While admittedly it is a little late, the 2023 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (114 pages, 1.5 spacing) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections (found some mistakes)/ revisions from the previous versions. If you are interested in receiving the file, send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file. I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech and good health.

Andrew Schein

How is one to sit at the Seder: Hasibah - הסבה

משנה פסחים י:א - אפילו עני שבישראל לא יאכל עד שיסב.

The Mishnah (Pesachim 10:1) records that even a poor person should not eat on the first night of Pesach (the Seder) until she-yesev. This requirement in the Mishnah is recorded by the Shulchan Arukh (16th century, Orah Chayyim 472:3), but what does it mean to yesev? Apparently because the term yesev was a known practice, the Mishnah did not explain what the term means. Also, this could explain why the Mishnah (Pesachim 10:4) did not include a question concerning hasibah within its list of the mah nishtanah, though it is now part of the mah nishtanah, see our discussion on the Haggadah “Mah nishtanah: How many questions compromise the mah nishtanah?” Note, we will refer to different conjugations of the word yesev, such as mesev, mesubin, hasibah and hasabah interchangeably.

The Mishnah Berurah (end of 19th century, beginning of 20th century, comments on Shulchan Arukh 472:7) explains that hasibah means to turn one’s head towards the left with a pillow under one’s head. Presumably this means also that one’s body is to be turned towards the left as a person slouches somewhat to the left. Note it is not clear why a person needs a pillow for hasibah, and the Shulchan Arukh does not refer to a pillow.

The Rambam (13th century, Laws of hametz and matzah, 7:8) records that hasibah is required when one eats matzah and drinks the four cups of wine at the Seder. The Rambam adds that for the remainder of the meal if one is hesev, then this is preferable but not obligatory, see also Rama on 472:7 who quotes from R. Yaakov Weil (15th century, Germany) that it is best to yasev throughout the entire meal.

The Shulchan Arukh records that one does hasibah when drinking the wine (473:2, 479:1, 480:1) when eating the matzah (475:1, 477:1, see also Be'er Hetev 472:8), but not when eating the maror (475:1, see Talmud Pesachim 108a). (The Shulchan Arukh does not mention hasibah by the second cup of wine but presumably once he wrote to mesev by three of the cups of wine, he also meant that one was to mesev by the second cup of wine, see Mishnah Berurah 472:23.) Encyclopedia Talmudit (1981, vol. 9, on Hasibah, footnotes 134 and 150) quotes the Meiri (13th century) that one should mesev even when reciting the Maggid, but as the Meiri was lost for generations this opinion is not quoted by later authorities.

This understanding of the word yesev, to turn to the left (what is commonly referred to as leaning), is problematic since it is an odd and an uncomfortable way to eat and drink. Why by the meal of the year, when we fulfill the biblical mitzvah of eating matzah, do we eat in a strange manner? The Rambam (Laws of hametz and matzah 7:7) writes that this way of eating and drinking signifies freedom, but how does eating in a strange manner signify freedom? The answer I have been told is that this way of eating was the way the wealthy Greeks/ Romans ate, even if it is/ was uncomfortable. This answer raises more questions. Why are we copying the Greeks/ Romans? The Romans destroyed the second Bet ha-Mikdash, and we are supposed to eat like them by the Seder?

Two, did Greeks/ Romans really eat and drink by turning to the left and slouching? Why would they eat in an uncomfortable manner? I happened to be at a museum in Sicily, which showed Greeks having a feast where they were reclining on couches with their legs extended, but they were sitting upright to drink in the picture. In fact, this was the reason for the pillow to prop up their backs in order that they could sit upright to drink. In other pictures of Romans that I have seen on the internet, they also were not eating and drinking leaning to the left.

A separate question is that the understanding that the word yesev refers to turning to one’s left when eating the matzah and drinking the four cups of wine does not accord with the Mishnah Pesachim 10:1. The Mishnah is referring to preparation a person makes before the meal, and records that even a poor person is to yesev before eating. This means that the action associated with yesev happens before one eats or drinks and not when one eats and drinks. One might be tempted to understand that the Mishnah means to prepare to yesev before one eats, like by putting out pillows to recline on, but the Mishnah records that a person should not eat until he is yesev, which means the person has done this action before eating and not that one is preparing to do the action.

Possibly, the confusion of the term yesev developed since there are two ways to understand the term in the Torah. Bereshit 42:24 uses the term to refer to turning, that Yosef turned from his brothers, which would be the source for the definition of yesev to mean to lean, but in other verses, such as Bereshit 19:4, Shemot 13:18, 28:11, 39:6, the term means to circle around something. Note even the definition of to turn away is related to the second definition of circling since turning away is the beginning of the circling around.

This second definition of yesev gives a very simple understanding of the Mishnah, which accords with the Greek/ Roman practice. The crucial point of the Greeks and the Romans by their feasts with regard to the Seder was not that they ate with their feet raised and extended but that they sat in a circle. The Greek would put the couches along the edges of the room, to circle the room, while the Romans in their triclinium, (three couches) would arrange the couches in a U shape, which would be a three-quarter circle around the table. Thus, the meaning of hasibah is to sit in a circle. The Mishnah in Pesachim 10:1 means that the poor person was to arrange to sit with other people in a circle by the Seder, as apparently during the entire year he/ she ate by him/herself. This seating arrangement was to be done before the meal began since the Mishnah is referring to preparations before the meal.

This same understanding also occurs in the Mishnah Berachot 6:6, which records that if people hesebo, then one person can recite a blessing for the other people. Rav Hai Gaon (quoted in the commentary of the Melechat Shelomo on the Mishnah) explains that the Mishnah means that the people are seating in a circle together, which shows that they joined together to eat. Similarly, Tosefta Berachot 5:5 asks how does one arrange the order of hisav? The Tosefta does not answer to turn to one’s side, but it discusses how to arrange the beds and who sits where. Note also that the Yerushalmi (Pesachim 37b), which records that mesubin is a sign of freedom, does not indicate that one is to turn or lean or slouch when one eats, but rather it just contrasts mesubin with slaves, who it claims ate standing up.

This same term hasibah also appears later in the Haggadah, which records that five scholars were mesubin in Bnei Brak, which means that they were sitting in a circle in the town of Bnei Brak. I would think this is the definition of term whenever it appears in the Talmud, as for example in Pesachim 100a and 113b.

Today if we sit around a table at the Seder, then this should be considered hasibah even if we do not sit with our legs raised and extended on couches like the Greeks and Romans did, but we do not have to copy everything they did. Also, from a practical point of view to recline on couches around a table either requires a very big room or very few people at the Seder. With this understanding we do hasibah for the entire meal, which is the simple understanding of the Mishnah, and not just by the matzah and the four cups of wine. With this approach, is it right or appropriate for a person to follow the understanding that hasibah means to turn/ lean when eating in addition to seating around the table since then one is performing the mitzvot of eating matzah and drinking the wine in a strange manner?

Regardless of how the term hasibah is defined, in the Middle Ages, some opinions stated that there is no obligation at all to do hasibah at the Seder. The Ravan (1090-1170, Germany, Katzenelnbogen 1998, p. 28, also quoted in Safrai and Safrai, p. 114), following the understanding that hasibah means to eat turning to one’s left, writes that the obligation to do hasibah was only because in the times of the Mishnah important officials (the Greeks/ Romans) would eat in such manner, but in his time since important officials did not eat that way when they had fancy banquets, there was no longer a requirement to do hasibah at the Seder. Thus, the Ravan's grandson, the Ravyah (1140-1225, Germany, quoted by the Tur 472, and the Rama on 472:4,7) writes that one sits regularly by the Seder following his grandfather’s ruling. This opinion of the Ravan and the Ravyah is fascinating since they were arguing that our custom can change due to changes in the culture of the non-Jews.

The Ravan and Ravayah’s opinions were so revolutionary that it led to a large backlash. The Rosh (Rabenu Asher, Germany 1250-1327, quoted in the Shulchan Arukh 472:7), who was also a descendant of the Ravan, was so upset by his relatives’ view that he claimed that if a person ate the matzah and/ or drank the four cups of wine without doing hasibah, then the person did not fulfill the mitzvot and had to repeat the eating or drinking. This view is incredible since it makes the fulfillment of the biblical mitzvah of eating matzot dependent on Greek and Roman practices! Apparently, for the Rosh, hasibah had become one of the rituals of Seder, while for the Ravan and the Ravyah, hasibah was not a ritual of the Seder, and hence could be changed.

Rav Yosef Caro (1488-1575) in the Bet Yosef (472) follows the Rosh and quotes the Haghot Maimonides that the Ravyah's position was a singular opinion, and he makes no mention of it in the Shulchan Arukh. This was clearly not true, as at a minimum it was stated by the Ravan and the Ravyah, and quoted by the Tur, but most likely he was so bothered by the idea that one could change the law based on non-Jewish practices, that he wanted to minimize it. However, the Rama (on the Shulchan Arukh 472:4,7) writes that women need not do hasibah due to the opinion of the Ravyah and that if a man did not do hasibah when eating the matzah or drinking the four cups of wine, then he is not obligated to drink wine or eat matzah again because of the Ravyah’s opinion. (However, the Rama re-tracts a little bit from his acceptance of the Rabyah’s opinion since he adds that it is best to eat matzah again and drink the first two cups of wine a second time if on the first occasion, they were done without hasibah.)

The Bach (1561-1640, Poland, 472) is more accepting of the Ravyah’s opinion. He writes that while the law is like the Ravyah, still according to the Ravyah one can do hasibah, so he thinks it is preferable to do hasibah. Also, he writes that if one ate matzah without doing hasibah one has fulfilled his obligation, but still if one can, he should eat more matzah. However, if one drank the four cups of wine without hasibah, then he thinks one should not drink again.

The Arukh Hashulchan (1829-1908, 472:6) is bothered why the Rama wrote that women do not do hasibah because they rely on the Ravyah since he notes that based on this logic, men should also rely on the Ravyah and not be mesev. Thus, he suggests a new reason for hasibah following the understanding that hasibah means to turn towards one’s left and eat and drink in an uncomfortable manner. He suggests (472:3) that we do hasibah today to show a difference between the Seder and other nights, and he claims the hasibah is obligatory. Yet, if the rationale is to just to make differences then it cannot be obligatory, as otherwise anybody can do anything weird (summersaults at the Seder?) and claim it is obligatory. It seems that the Arukh Hashulchan realizes that the Ravyah is correct that today hasibah does not show freedom, but he does not want to accept the Ravyah since he believes that most Rabbis did not accept the Ravyah's opinion. (Aharon Israel, a friend, told me, maybe in jest, that people still do hasibah, lean, since the practice of hasibah is now one of the four questions in the mah nishtanah.)

In conclusion, the term hasibah really means to sit around in a circle, and most people do this at the Seder when they eat together as a family. Even if one believes, for reason not clear to me, that hasibah means to lean, then as noted by the Ravan and the Ravyah, leaning by the Seder has lost its initial meaning of signifying a fancy meal, and there is no need to do it today, except that one wants to be traditional even though it lessens the celebration at the meal since one is eating and drinking in an uncomfortable manner.

Bibliography:

Encyclopedia Talmudit, 1947 – present, first edited by R. Zevin, Jerusalem: Yad Harav Herzog.

Katzenelnbogen, Mordechai, 1998, Haggadah Torat Chayyim, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Safrai, Shmuel and Zev Safrai, 1998, Haggadah of the Sages, Jerusalem: Carta,

Shemot 28:30 (also Vayikra 8:8) – The priestly clothing: The urim and tummim

שמות כח:ל - ונתת אל חושן המשפט את האורים ואת התמים והיו על לב אהרן בבאו לפני ה' ונשא אהרן את משפט בני ישראל על לבו לפני ה' תמיד.

Shemot 28:30 records that the urim and tummim were to be placed al (to? on? in?) the hoshen (a priestly garment that Aharon was to wear on his chest) on his lev (not his heart), and the Aharon was to carry the judgment of the people on his lev. The urim and tummim are mysterious since it is unclear what they were and what was their purpose. Are they clothing? 

Many claim, based on Bemidbar 27:21, that the urim and tummim were to enable the high priest to ask G-d questions, and then there are various suggestions as to how this was to be done. Rashi (on 28:30) explains that the urim and tummim was a parchment with G-d's name which was inserted into a pouch of the hoshen, and this would cause the stones on the hoshen to light up to answer the questions. Luzzatto (on Vayikra 8:8) suggests that the urim and tummim were twenty-two letters, and the high priest would pull out the letters to answer the question. Modern scholars (see for example Sarna, 1991, on 28:30 and maybe Ibn Ezra, long comments on 28:6) believe that the urim and tummim were two items which functioned as lots to answer yes and no questions. Benno Jacob (1992, p. 920) suggests that the urim and tummim were some text (24:7?) that accompanied the luchot, and they gave a sign to Aharon when it was time for the people to march in the desert. All of these suggestions are based on the idea that the urim and tummim were placed or put into the hoshen.

If the urim and tummim were something written, then I would think it was the priestly blessing that the high priest would have carried parchment that consisted of these verses. Note, silver amulets were found from the 7th century BCE which consisted of the priestly blessings (see Barkay 2009), but in one of the amulets, the beginning of the second blessings, yaer Hashem panav eilecha, and the end of the third blessings, ve-yasem lecha shalom, were combined. Maybe this combined blessing was the urim and tummim, as the blessing of yaer would correspond to the urim and the blessing of shalom would correspond to the tummim.

Nonetheless, this idea that urim and tummim were parchment or stones is problematic since it is never recorded in the Torah that a person constructed or made the urim and tummim. Chapter 39 records how the people made all the items of the priests’ clothing, but nothing is mentioned of the people making the urim and tummim. The Ramban (on 28:30) writes that this absence of someone making the urim and tummim shows that Moshe wrote the urim and tummim and according to one version of the Ramban, that G-d wrote the urim and tummim. Both of these suggestions are difficult since if Moshe wrote the urim and tummim then the Torah should have recorded this action. Also, if G-d wrote the urim and tummim, then this also could have been recorded and it would counter the whole idea that the people constructed the mishkan/ ohel moed and made all the clothing of the priests.

Apparently due to the absence of the Torah describing the making of the urim and tummim, Chacham (1991, pp. 202,203) suggests that the urim and tummim were the twelve stones that were on the hoshen. He then explains that 28:30 (and Vayikra 8:8) can be understood to mean that the stones were to be fixed into the hoshen.

I would expand Chacham’s idea and suggest that the urim and tummim were the two sets of stones on the high priests, the stones on his shoulders on the efod (another item wore on the chest with straps over the shoulders) and on the hoshen.  The beginning of 28:30 and Vayikra 8:8 then mean that the hoshen was to be secured or tightly connected to both sets of stones by securing the connection between the hoshen and the efod.  The Torah records with great detail how these two items of clothing were to be connected, 28:13,14; 22-28. 28:30 is then a concluding sentence to both sets of stones, which form the urim and tummim. In Vayikra 8:8, the urim and tummim are the last items recorded by Moshe dressing Aharon in reference to the clothing relating to the body (not the clothing relating to Aharon's head) since Moshe’s last action was to tighten the cords connecting the hoshen to the efod, which then connected the two set of stones, the urim and tummim.

This idea might also explain the terms urim and tummim. The term urim probably refers to light, which would be the reflection of light from the stones. The term tummim might refer to completeness, as both sets of stones signify the twelve tribes of the people. Both sets of stones have both ideas, and the plural of each term, urim and tummim, could then signify the double reflection and the double completeness.

This idea does not explain the purpose of the urim and tummim. I doubt that urim and tummim were to ask questions of G-d, and the reference to the urim in Bemidbar 27:21 was that they were used once by the division of the land. 

One interesting possibility is the Seforno’s (on 28:30, also Tzror haMor, quoted by Menachem Kasher, Torah Shelemah, footnote 90 on 28:30) suggestion that the urim and tummim would help or remind the high priest to pray for the people in order that G-d would judge them favorably. 

A different possibility is that in our discussion on 28:6-29, “Stones of remembering,” we suggested that each set of stones was to cause either the high priest or the people to remember, and then this could have been the purpose of the urim and tummim, the two sets of stones.  

Also, following the idea that the word lev in the Torah means mind or brain, 28:30 can be understood to mean that Aharon should have in mind the urim and tummim, the two sets of stones which were connected to the hoshen, when he went before G-d and that he should have in mind the judgement (or the means to judge) of the people before G-d all the time.

Bibliography:

Barkay, Gabriel, 2009, The riches of Ketef Hinnom, Biblical Archaeology Review, Vol. 200, pp. 23-35.

Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Sarna, Nahum, (1923-2005), 1991, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Shemot 11:4 – The timing of Moshe and Pharaoh’s conversation after the ninth plague and the narrative order of Shemot 10:24 (21?) – Shemot 12:28

Shemot 10:24-11:8 record a conversation between Moshe and Pharaoh after the ninth plague, the plague of darkness, and within this conversation, 11:4-8 records that Moshe told Pharaoh about the tenth plague, that G-d would kill the firstborn sons and firstborn animals of Egypt. How did Moshe know of this plague? It is not recorded that G-d had told Moshe about the plague. G-d had referred to the plague in 4:23, but that verse only refers to G-d killing the firstborn son of Pharaoh and not to all the firstborn male Egyptians and the firstborn animals. 11:1 records that G-d told Moshe that there would be one more plague, but the verse does not record any specifics about the plague. Another question about Moshe’s statement in 11:4-8, is that 11:4 records that Moshe told Pharaoh that the tenth plague would be at midnight. Was Moshe referring to a specific night?

Benno Jacob (1992, p. 288) explains that in 11:4 Moshe was referring to the upcoming night that tenth plague was going to happen that night. (Hoffmann, 2010, p. 114, mentions this as a possibility.) This understanding of 11:4 means that Moshe told Pharaoh the conversation of 11:4-8 on the morning of the 14th of Nisan since the tenth plague was on the night of the 14th/15th of Nisan, and the Jewish people left Egypt on the 15th of Nisan, Bemidbar 33:3, see also Vayikra 23:5,6. Furthermore, since it is generally assumed that 11:4 is a continuation of the conversation in 10:24-29, this would mean that the entire passage from 10:24-11:8 occurred on the morning of the 14th of Nisan. If this is true, then 10:24-11:8 is not recorded in chronological order since 12:2 records G-d's instructions to Moshe about the tenth plague, at least from the 10th of Nisan and maybe even on the 1st of Nisan, 12:1-20. Moshe relayed this information to the Jewish people no later than the tenth of the month, 12:21-28. With this understanding, the events recorded in 12:1-28, transpired prior to the conversation between Moshe and Pharaoh in 10:24-11:8.

In addition, it could be that the conversation of 10:24-11:8 transpired immediately after the end of the plague of darkness, 10:21-23, which means that the plague of darkness was on the 11th, 12th and 13th of Nisan, as suggested by Benno Jacob (1992, p. 301). This would mean that also 10:21-23, is recorded not in chronological order.

On the other hand, it could be that the conversation between Moshe and Pharaoh recorded in 10:24-11:8 did not occur immediately after the plague of darkness. Instead, following the idea that 12:1-28 occurred before 10:24-11:8, maybe Pharaoh saw the Jewish people had taken their sheep on the tenth of Nisan, and this prompted him to speak to Moshe and Aharon. With this latter possibility, the plague of darkness could have been earlier than the 11th of Nisan, and then only the passage from 10:24-11:8 is recorded out of chronological order.

A possible reason for the Torah recording 10:24 (21?) – 11:8 prior to 12:1-28, even though the conversation recorded in 10:24 (21?) -11:8 occurred afterwards is that had the passage of 10:24 (21?) -11:8 been recorded in its chronological order, then this section would have interrupted between the instructions for the tenth plague, 12:1-28, and the tenth plague, 10:29.

With this understanding, we now know how Moshe told Pharaoh about the tenth plague in 11:4-8. G-d told Moshe about the tenth plague in 12:12,13, and this conversation occurred before the conversation between Moshe and Pharaoh that is recorded in 11:4-8.

In addition, this timing of 10:24 (21?) – 12:28 can explain Moshe’s statement to Pharaoh in 10:29, that they would not see each other again. If the conversation of 10:24-11:8 occurred before 12:1-28, how did Moshe know that he would not see Pharaoh again? The answer is that since the conversation of 10:24-11:8 was on the morning of the 14th of Nisan, Moshe knew that the Jewish people were leaving the next day, so Moshe could tell Pharaoh that they would not see each other again.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 2010, Commentary on Shemot, translated by Asher Vestreel, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Bereshit 42:9 – The beginning of the game between Yosef and his brothers

בראשית מב:ט - ויזכר יוסף את החלומות אשר חלם להם ויאמר אלהם מרגלים אתם לראות את ערות הארץ באתם.

 

When the ten sons of Yaakov went to Egypt to buy food, Yosef recognized them, 42:7, but instead of acknowledging that they were his brothers, he began to play a game with them. He accused them of spying, and then he told them that to prove their innocence, they would need to bring Binyamin, his “full brother,” 42:9-20. It is likely that Yosef had this plan in mind beforehand since he knew that they would be forced to come to Egypt due to the famine, see Bekhor Shor on 42:7. 

Why did Yosef not reveal himself to his brothers? A related question is why did Yosef not seek out his father when he had become head of Egypt?

N. Leibowitz (1976, pp. 457-461) reviews three possible reasons for Yosef’s behavior towards his brothers. One possibility is that he was acting out of revenge, and from 50:15 we see that this was the brothers' understanding even seventeen years after Yosef had revealed himself to them, see our discussion on 50:15-21 "A happy ending?" Yet, she doubts this possibility since Yosef cried immediately after he released them from jail, 42:24 (also 43:30), and a person seeking revenge does not usually cry when he is successful in his revenge.

The second possibility is mentioned by the Ramban (on 42:9) that Yosef acted to have his dreams fulfilled. With this idea, Yosef purposely did not seek out his father because he was waiting to have his dreams fulfilled. The bowing recorded in 42:6 was not the fulfillment of even the first dream since he needed Binyamin to also bow down for the first dream to be fulfilled. When the brothers returned with Binyamin and bowed down to Yosef, 43:26,28, the first dream was fulfilled, and the Netziv (on 43:27) explains that Yosef wanted to keep Binyamin as a hostage in order that Yaakov would come and bow down to him, which would fulfill the second dream. Yosef did not make a condition that Binyamin would go free if Yaakov came to Egypt, but maybe he was going to but Yehuda's speech (44:18-34) stopped him. Or, it could be that Yosef thought that Yaakov would figure out on his own to come to Egypt if Binyamin was being held as a slave.

N. Leibowitz (1976, p. 460) doubts this approach since she claims that Yosef could have had his dreams realized without making his brothers and father suffer. I am not sure what she has in mind and we will return to this approach below.

The third possibility, which is also mentioned by the Ramban (see also S. R. Hirsch 1989), is that Yosef wanted the brothers to repent from their actions towards him. True repentance is when the former sinner is in the same situation as before and does not sin. Thus, Yosef recreated the situation when he was thrown into the pit, but used Binyamin instead of himself. This time the brothers offered to be slaves with Binyamin, 44:16, and Yehuda offered to take Binyamin’s place so that Binyamin could return home, 44:33. According to this approach Yosef accomplished his goal.

While it is true that the brothers repented, the approach is highly problematic. Even if Yosef wanted his brothers to repent, this noble goal was causing great pain to his father. If he thought this repentance was more important than his father’s suffering, then he should have been happy or at least content when the brothers passed his test, yet, he could not control his crying, 45:1,2. Also, twice they admitted their guilt, once explicitly, 42:21, and once obliquely, 44:16. They also offered to be slaves to Yosef, 44:16, which was an acknowledgment of Yosef's "superiority," see our discussion on 44:16, "The middle of the game between Yosef and his brothers: You win." This showed their repentance, but Yosef did not accept their offer, 42:17, and did not reveal himself. This shows that Yosef wanted something more than their repentance. In addition, from 50:15, we see that they did not think of themselves as having repented and that Yosef had forgiven them since they were still worried that Yosef would take revenge on them. My wife, Yonina, also doubts this repentance approach since they only “repented” according to this approach under duress, but they could have looked for Yosef for many years, and it is never recorded that they made any effort to locate Yosef after they returned home without Yosef. (For other questions on this approach, see Yoel Bin-Nun quoted below.)

A fourth approach (not mentioned by N. Leibowitz) is that Yosef acted as an abandoned child. (I thought this was a "modern" approach, but Eli Silverman pointed out to me that a commentator on the Yerushalmi referred to as ha-Meassef, suggested this idea.) Elie Wiesel (1976) writes that who can blame Yosef for breaking with his family since Yosef felt abandoned by his father who had sent him to his brothers. Furthermore, Yosef must have wondered why did Yaakov not search for him? Wiesel explains that Yosef identified himself only when he was able to vanquish his bitterness, but Wiesel does not explain how Yehuda’s speech (44:18-34) vanquished this bitterness.

David Henshke (1987) follows this idea and suggests that Yosef acted not out of bitterness, but that he simply wanted to forget his history and assimilate into Egyptian society. However, once he saw his brothers, then he thought that he could get them to bring him Binyamin and have Binyamin stay with him to build a family together in Egypt. However, Yehuda’s speech brought back strong memories of his father, and then he was forced to acknowledge his past history, which meant identifying himself as Yosef. This is an appealing approach, but did Yosef intend to force Binyamin to separate from Yaakov and his family? Binyamin already had 10 children (46:21), did Yosef not know and/ or did he not care? If Yosef really wanted to forget his past, then this meant forgetting about Binyamin and not trying to force him to stay in Egypt.

Yoel Bin-Nun (1986) develops this idea of Yosef as an abandoned child slightly differently. He argues that Yosef was seeking information about Yaakov’s involvement with the brothers because Yoel Bin-Nun believes that Yosef thought that Yaakov might have been part of a conspiracy to send Yosef away. Accordingly, Yosef wanted Binyamin to stay with him so he could speak to Binyamin and find out whether Yaakov abandoned him. However, in his speech to Yosef, Yehuda said that Yaakov said “Yosef had been ripped to pieces and I have not seen him again,” 44:28. According to Yoel Bin-Nun, Yosef understood these words to mean that Yaakov was depressed about not seeing him, which meant that Yaakov was not part of any conspiracy to send him away and also that Yaakov thought that he was dead, so he should not have expected Yaakov to look for him. With this new information, according to Yoel Bin-Nun, there was no need for Yosef to hold Binyamin to get information from him and also Yosef was no longer an abandoned child, so he revealed himself.

Yaakov Medan (1987) raises numerous problems with this approach. If Yosef’s goal was to get information, then there were many others ways to do so. For instance he could have sent spies to find and speak to Yaakov. Yosef could have investigated the brothers when they first came down to Egypt. Even when Binyamin came to Egypt, Yosef could have kept all the brothers in Egypt until he had time to speak to Binyamin alone, without threatening to make Binyamin a slave. Furthermore, Yosef could have revealed himself earlier, and spoke directly to Yaakov. Also, Yoel Bin-Nun’s approach ignores the main idea of Yehuda’s speech, the suffering Yosef was causing Yaakov. In addition, according to Yoel Bin-Nun, Yosef should have stopped Yehuda after he heard that Yaakov thought he was dead, but Yehuda continued on for another six verses.

One of Yoel Bin-Nun's arguments is the name Menashe, that the name implies that Yosef wanted to forget his past. Yet, while one could argue that the name indicates that Yosef felt abandoned, it is quite a jump to argue that Yosef really thought that Yaakov sent him to his brothers to send him away.

Yoel Bin-Nun also points out that Yishmael was sent away (21:14), so there was a precedent in the family to send away one of the sons. (Also Yitzhak sent Yaakov away, see our discussion above on 28:11, "The wealth test.") Yet, not only is the precedence not exact since Yishmael was sent out of the house, while Yosef was sold into slavery and was almost killed by his brothers before they “sent” him off. Also, Yosef was Yaakov's favorite son, so if one brother was going to be chosen from the family, then Yosef was going to be the chosen one and all the other brothers would have been sent away.

I find it inconceivable that Yosef really suspected that Yaakov sent him to his brothers in order that they would send him away as a slave. Did Yosef really think that Yaakov intended for him to be thrown into the pit? Even if Yaakov criticized Yosef when Yosef announced his second dream (37:10), still this would not contradict 37:3, that Yosef was the beloved son of Yaakov. (I told this to Yoel Bin-Nun, but I do not think my question made an impression on him.)

The best explanation for Yosef’s behavior is the Ramban's explanation that Yosef wanted to fulfill the dreams and this is the only explanation that is supported by the Torah. 42:9 states explicitly that Yosef remembered the dreams and it is implausible that Yosef ever forgot his dreams. 42:9 is an insertion by the Torah to explain the ensuing narrative like by 2:25, 3:1a, 25:26, 29:17, end of 39:6, Bemidbar 12:3, the end of Bemidbar 13:20, and numerous other verses. In all cases, the insertion is to explain the ensuing narrative.

In this case, the insertion in 42:9 is to explain that Yosef was acting to have his dreams fulfilled, and in fact, the word zachor in the Torah means not just to remember but to act based on the memory, see 8:1. Furthermore, just as the brothers immediately re-called the dreams and acted upon them when Yosef went to meet them in Shekhem, 37:19,20, so too Yosef took the initiative to have his dreams fulfilled when he saw the brothers in Egypt. In addition, when he interpreted Pharaoh’s dreams, Yosef said that the repetition of Pharaoh’s dream meant that it was about to occur, 41:32, and for sure Yosef was also referring to his own dreams, which he never forgot.

Akedat Yitzhak (quoted by N. Leibowitz, 1976, p. 459) argues that Yosef should have left the fulfillment of the dreams to G-d and not have caused his father to suffer. Maybe he is correct, but only if one assumes that Yosef was acting righteously would this imply that Yosef did not act to fulfill the dreams. More likely, Yosef was so absorbed by his dreams that in his determination to fulfill the dreams that he sinned in his actions towards his brothers and father. This determination might have been due to Yosef’s personality and/ or because he viewed himself as an abandoned child. Maybe he did not realize the pain he was causing his father by not revealing himself, and once he started his plan, the fulfillment of the dreams took on a life of their own. We also see that by Yosef's interaction with the Egyptian public when they came to buy food that he took a very tough position that they had to sell all their animals and then all their land to get food, 47:15-21. A friend of mine, Yossi Moskowitz has suggested that after all the events in his life of going from a slave to being the second in charge in Egypt, Yosef might felt that he had some special destiny, which prompted him to attempt to have the dreams fulfilled. This determination does not necessarily mean that Yosef did not feel bad about how he was treating Yaakov and his brothers.

Was it possible for Yosef to fulfill the second dream, which refers to a sun and a moon? It is not clear who is the reference to these items (see our discussion on 37:9,10, "Yosef’s second dream: The sun, the moon and the stars"), and hence one cannot know definitely if they were fulfilled. Most likely, Yaakov was either the sun or the moon, and then maybe Yosef wanted Yaakov to bow down to him to fulfill the dream as much as possible.

It is also possible that Yosef was not really concerned about Yaakov bowing down to him since for Yosef the crucial issue was his fight with his brothers and it was enough that his brothers fulfilled their part of the dreams by twice bowing down to him, 43:26,28. In fact, 42:9 states, that Yosef remembered he dreams that he dreamed for his brothers, which implies that Yosef was acting just in reference to his brothers and not his father.

With this idea, after his brothers bowed down to him a second time, they sat down to eat, 43:34, and this was Yosef's "victory" party. Furthermore, as part of the party, he seated them according to their birth order, 43:33, which was his way of indicating to them that they had bowed down to him, see our discussion, on 43:23-34, "The middle of the game between Yosef and his brothers: Know thy opponent."

If the dreams were fulfilled enough for Yosef, why did Yosef not reveal himself to his brothers after they bowed down to him a second time? Was he getting "greedy" and then trying to get Yaakov to come down and bow down to him? Or, maybe, at this point the issue of being an abandoned child arose, not that Yosef thought that Yaakov had sent him away to be sold into slavery, but still maybe Yosef was bothered why did Yaakov not find him? Was it because Yaakov did not look or because Yaakov thought that Yosef was dead? Possibly, Yosef always gave Yaakov the benefit of the doubt, but he must have been troubled by Yaakov's inaction with regard to Shimon. Shimon was locked up and Yaakov knew that he was alive, but he did nothing to try to free him. This raised the question in Yosef's mind did Yaakov abandon him? Thus, maybe at this point, after his "victory" over his brothers, Yosef decided to test Yaakov if he would abandon Binyamin. Accordingly, he continued his deception of his brothers until Yehuda's great speech moved him to reveal himself.

Bibliography:

Bin-Nun Yoel, 1986, A tragic misunderstanding: Why did Yosef not send word to his father? Megadim, 1, pp. 20-31.

Henshke, David, 1987, Response to articles by R. Yehuda Shaviv and Rabbi Yoel bin Nun, Megadim, 2, pp.106-108.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Medan, Yaakov, 1987, In the place where repentants stand (Yosef and his brothers), Megadim, 2, pp. 54-78.

Wiesel, Elie, 1976, Messengers of God: Biblical portraits and legends, New York: Random House.

Bereshit 27:11-14,19 – Why did Yaakov fool his father Yitzhak?

Bereshit 27:6-10 records that Rivka told Yaakov how he could fool Yitzhak and receive Yitzhak’s blessing instead of Esav. 27:11,12 then record that Yaakov was concerned that the plan would fail since Esav was very hairy and he apparently had smooth skin. 27:13 then records that Rivka told Yaakov not to worry that if the plan failed the blame would fall on her, which was either because she was confidant in the plan or because she was willing to take the chance that it would fail. 27:14-30 then records that Yaakov proceeded to follow Rivka’s instruction, Yaakov lied to his father and Yaakov succeeded in fooling his father Yitzhak. Why did Yaakov agree to fool his father?

One possibility is that Yaakov agreed with Rivka that it was crucial for him to receive the blessing from Yitzhak even if he was not the intended recipient of the blessing. Yet, as noted by many (see N. Leibowitz, 1976, 266-267 and Sarna, 1989, p. 262), Yaakov later suffered by his intended wife, Rahel, being switched, 29:25, and for his sons claiming that Yosef was dead, 37:32,33. In both cases the Torah connects the events to Yaakov fooling Yitzhak. After Yaakov complained to Lavan about not being married to Rahel, Lavan said that in our place we do not switch the older for the younger, 29:26, and Yaakov’s sons fooled him about Yosef by using the same animal, goats, 37:31, that he used to fool Yitzhak. Also, there is a literary connection through the word se'ir. 27:23 (also 27:11) records that Yitzhak was fooled since Yaakov’s hands/ arms were seirot, and the Torah refers to the goat that was used to fool Yaakov as being a hairy goat, se'ir izim, 37:31.

These connections indicate that Yaakov was being punished when Rahel was switched for Lea, and for thinking that Yosef was dead, and this indicates that Yaakov acted wrongly by fooling Yitzhak. Yaakov (and Rivka) should have accepted that Yitzhak would bless Esav to be the dominant brother, and let G-d determine what would actually happen. Yet, still one could claim that Yaakov (and Rivka) were mistaken that they thought that they had to act to fool Yitzhak to receive the blessings or maybe they mistakenly thought that by receiving the blessings then this would serve as some type of immunity for fooling Yitzhak.

A different possibility for why Yaakov participated in the trick on his father is that really he did not want to fool his father, but he felt compelled to listen to his mother Rivka. The Midrash (Bereshit Rabbah 65:16) seems to follow this idea.

Another possibility is that maybe Yaakov thought that he was entitled to the blessing since he bought the title of being the firstborn from Esav, 25:33. The problem with this idea is that then he should have told Yitzhak that he had bought the title of being the firstborn and was entitled to the blessings. However, he never made this claim. Also, from Esav’s statement in 27:36, it appears that being the firstborn and receiving the blessing were independent of each other. Hence, when Yitzhak summoned Esav to bless him, Yitzhak did not refer to Esav as the firstborn but as his older son, 27:2.

A fourth possibility is that Yaakov acted simply out of spite for Esav. Maybe he did not like Esav, and he knew that if he received the blessings Esav would be upset. With this idea, Yaakov was willing to fool Yitzhak to annoy Esav.

A fifth possibility is that Yaakov thought that this was another opportunity to show that it is wrong to favor one son simply because the son was born first. This is what Yaakov tried to show when he bought the title of the firstborn son (see our discussion on Bereshit 25:29-34, “Code red”), and Yaakov would demonstrate this belief in the end of his life when he placed his right hand on Efrayim instead of Menashe, 48:14.

In this case and when Yaakov bought the title of the firstborn son, it appears that Yaakov did not plan to point out the unfairness of the concept of the firstborn, but when the opportunity presented itself, he jumped on it. In this case, it is not just that Yaakov, the younger son receives the blessing, but the crucial aspect was for Yaakov to receive the blessings first before Esav. Yaakov knew that Yitzhak and Esav would figure out that he had fooled Yitzhak, but then they would also realize that it was unfair or even ridiculous that one son should receive the blessings just because Yitzhak said the blessings first in front of one son before the second son arrived. This is the same idea that it is wrong that the firstborn child is favored simply because he was born first.

The Torah gives a clue that there is a connection between Yaakov receiving the blessing first and the birth of Esav and Yaakov though the double word ya-so yasa in 27:30, which records that after Yitzhak finished blessing Yaakov, Yaakov left Yitzhak, and Esav came back from his hunting. These are the same words in 25:25,26, which record that Esav first left Rivka’s womb (was born first) and then Yaakov left the womb afterwards. When Yaakov left Yitzhak after Yitzhak’s blessing there is a reversal of the births of Esav and Yaakov, as at the time of their births, Yaakov went out from his mother after Esav, while by Yitzhak’s blessing, Yaakov left his father before Esav.

An indication that Yaakov participated in the deceit of Yitzhak to show the silliness of the firstborn title can be seen from the word me-tateah in 27:12. In this verse, Yaakov is telling Rivka what Yitzhak will think if Yitzhak figures out that Yaakov was trying to impersonate Esav to get the blessings. It is well known that when a person projects the thoughts of somebody else, then this hints what the person is actually thinking. In this case, Yaakov said that Yitzhak will think that Yaakov is me-tateah. What does this word mean? Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on 27:12, also Benno Jacob, 1974, p. 179) explains the word as mocking. Yaakov was worried that Yitzhak would think that Yaakov was mocking him. We do not see that Yaakov mocked his father, but Yaakov’s thoughts about what his father was thinking, shows that he was participating in this deception to mock. He was not intending to mock his father, but to mock the idea that just because a person is born first or receives the blessing first, then that person should be blessed.

Based on this idea, I imagine that when Yaakov told his father, that he was Esav the firstborn, 27:19, he was laughing inside. Yaakov did not have say the word firstborn, as he could have just said that he was Esav. Instead, Yaakov might have imagined to himself that all he had to do to become the firstborn was to wear some clothing, and say that he was the firstborn son. This shows again how silly is the idea that a person is treated more special since he is born first. 

Even with this rationale, Yaakov should not have participated in the deceit of his father, but we can understand why he did it. This moral issue of repudiating the special status of the firstborn sons was so important to him, that he could not grasp that it was wrong to fool his father and that fooling his father would pain his father. Also, he would not have been bothered that his actions would be very upsetting to Esav. A similar issue would arise by Yosef that he was so determined to have his dreams fulfilled that he was unaware of the pain it was causing Yaakov that he did not contact Yaakov after he became a ruler in Egypt. This would then be anther way that Yaakov was punished measure for measure for fooling Yitzhak.

Bibliography:

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1974, The first book of the bible: Genesis, commentary abridged, edited and translated by Earnest I. Jacob and Walter Jacob, Hoboken City, NJ: Ktav Publishing House.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.