Devarim 11:26 -16:17 – The order and connections of the laws of parashat Re'eh

Parashat Re’eh (Devarim 11:26-16:17) has many laws and we will attempt to find connections between the verses based on the content of the laws and sometimes a literary connection based on similar words and sounds. For similar discussions on other large law sections in the Torah, see our discussions “The order and connection of the laws in parashat Mishpatim,” "The order and connections of the laws of parashat Shoftim and "The order and connections of the laws of parashat Ki Teitzei.”  

Parashat Re’eh begins with Moshe’s statement to the people that he was going to noten, give, the people blessings and curses, 11:26-28. (These verses appear to refer to the blessings and curses in chapter 28.) Moshe then gave instructions to the people that when the people would get to the land of Israel, they were to recite blessings on Mount Gerizim and curses on Mount Eval, 11:29,30, see our discussion on 27:11-26, “Curses, blessings and curses.”

11:29,30 connect with 11:26-28 through the words, beracha (11:26,27,29), kelalah (11:26,28,29) and noten (11:26,29). 11:29,30 also form a bookend with the corresponding verses 27:11-13, later in the book of Devarim. The large intervening section consists of the laws of the covenant that was made on the plains of Moav, 28:69.

Prior to the large list of laws, there are two verses, 11:31,32, which conclude chapter 11. 11:31,32 each has the word noten, like in 11:26,29. Also, 11:31 records that the people will inherit the land, using the words la-reshet and ve-rishtem, and the same words appear in the end of parashat Ekev, 11:23. The next verse, 11:32, is the final verse from the exhortation part of Moshe’s speech to the Jewish people that began in 5:1. After 11:32, Moshe continues with his speech, but focuses on telling the Jewish people various laws, which continues until 27:10. (Note that according to the division of the reading of the Torah on Monday and Thursday morning and Shabbat afternoon, 11:32 is the opening verse to the law section of Moshe’s speech.) 

12:1, while technically a new chapter is a continuation of 11:32. In 11:32 and 12:1 there are the words tishmerun la-asot, chukim and mishpatim. Also, the word le-rishta appears in 12:1 like in 11:31, and word noten appears in 12:1 as in 11:26,29,31,32.

The first law recorded in 12:1-3 is that the Jewish people were to destroy the places of idolatry in the land of Israel when they would come to the land of Israel. This law connects with the warning not to worship idolatry in the land of Israel in the previous chapter, 11:16. 

The next set of laws is 12:4-14, the law of the chosen place(s?), which is in contrast to the need to destroy the idolatrous places of worship that existed in the land of Israel prior to the Jews coming into the land, 12:4. The next set of laws, 12:15-28, relate to the implication of the law of the chosen place. 

The next set of laws is 12:29-31 again relate to idolatry and these verses are linked to the opening laws of chapter 12, 12:1-3. These two small sections form a type of bookend around the laws of the chosen place.

13:1 records an introductory section to a set of three laws all of which relate to idolatry in some form, and this connects to the laws of idolatry at the end of chapter 12, see Ibn Ezra on 13:2. The first three cases in chapter 13, 13:2-6, 13:7-12 and 13:13-18, all begin with the work, ki, and build upon each other. Note the word ki appears numerous times in the parasha: 11:29, 31, 12:5, 9, 12, 14, 18, 20 (twice), 21, 23, 25, 28, 29 and 12:31 (twice). In the ensuing chapters in the parasha, the water ki appears in 14:2, 7, 8, 21, 24 (twice), 27, 29; 15:2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 (twice), 18, 21; 16:1, 3, 6, 12.

The first case in chapter 13 is the wayward prophet who tells people to worship idolatry, the second case is a person who also gets people to worship idolatry but the person was never considered a prophet and the third case is when the whole city decides to worship idolatry. Chapter 13 ends with a concluding sentence, 13:19, which with 13:1 frames the intervening laws in the chapter. Also 13:19 refers to do what is right, yashar, and this same word appears in 12:8,25,28.

14:1, the following verse, refers to the Jewish people as G-d's son, and records two laws, one a prohibition to gash one’s self and two, a prohibition to remove hair on the head to make one’s self bald. Ibn Ezra (on 14:1, in some versions on 13:18) suggests that this reference to sons connects with chapter 13 where sons are referred to three times, 13:7(2) and 13:14, and then in 14:1 the idea is that one cannot mourn for these relatives since they committed idolatry. My guess is that 14:1 is connected with 12:31, which notes that some of the inhabitants of the land of Israel would burn their sons and daughters as part of their religious worship (the worship of Molech). In contrast, 14:1 records that because the Jewish people are G-d’s sons, they cannot damage their bodies. These verses, 12:31 and 14:1, are the immediate verses surrounding chapter 13.

The two laws in 14:1 relate to each other since they involve a person damaging their body, and the following verse, 14:2, explains the law in the second half of 14:1.14:2 explains that the people are not to remove their hairs on their head as part of mourning, the law in the second half of 14:1, since they are a kadosh nation, and this corresponds to the rationale for this law by the priests in Vayikra 21:6,7.

The next set of laws, 14:3-21, record laws relating to eating, which relate to the laws of eating that were discussed in chapter 12. For example, 12:15,22 refer to eating the deer and the gazelle and these animals are referred to in 14:5. The last verse in this section on eating, 14:21 also refers to the Jewish people as a kadosh nation, and this phrase in 14:2,21 frame the laws relating to eating. Furthermore, the theme of kedusha relates both to the laws of eating, 14:3-12, and to not plucking out one’s hair in mourning, 14:1. Similarly in the book of Vayikra these laws are part of the large sections relating to kedusha, Vayikra 11:44-47; 20:25, 21:1-22:33.

The next set of laws, 14:22-29 record the laws of ma'aser (tithes), and these laws refer to eating, 14:23,26,29, and to the law of the chosen place(s?)14:23, which relate the laws of ma’aser to the laws of chapter 12. These two concepts, eating and the chosen place, are mentioned in 12:5,7,11,14,15,18,20,21. Even more explicitly, 12:6,11,17, refer to bringing ma’aser to the chosen place or not eating ma’aser by the local city gates. Furthermore, 14:27,29 refer to remembering the Levi and the Levi is also referred to in 12:12,18,19.

Tigay (1996, p. 453) notes that starting from 14:22 through 16:17, the laws all relate to a certain number of years or times during the year. The word shanah, year, appears in 14:22 (twice), 14:28, 15:1, 15:9 (twice), 15:12 (twice), 15:18, 15:20 (twice), and 16:16.

The following set of laws is the law to abolish loans after seven years, 15:1-6. The Torah makes a literary connection between the laws of ma'aser and law of annulling loans, as 14:28 records the phrase, miktseh shalosh shanim, and 15:1 records the phrase, miketz sheva shanim. Ibn Ezra (on 15:1) also notes that the law of abolishing loans helps the poor and the law of ma'aser (sheni) is also to help the poor.

The next set of laws, 15:7-11 records the laws of lending to the poor. These laws are connected to 15:1-6 since the Torah (15:9) is concerned that a person may not lend to the poor because of the law of annulling debts in 15:1-6. Furthermore, the same word evyon, the poor, is used in both sections, 15:4,9,11. Also, 15:9 refers to a person who does not want to lend as bli-yaal and this relatively rare word, is also in 13:14.

Afterwards, 15:12-18 records the laws that slaves must be given a gift, severance pay, when they are freed, and this also relates to helping the poor. In addition, both in the previous section, 15:9, and this section, 15:18, there is reference to the eye of the person who is supposed to give the money, eincha. Also, both 15:10 and 15:18 refer to G-d blessing the person who gives the money either to the poor or to the newly freed slave. Finally, both 15:1 and 15:12 refer to the seventh year, and these references to the seventh year by the law of abolishing loans and giving money to the poor might be considered a type of envelope to the law of lending to the poor.

The next set of law is the law of the bekhor, the firstborn animal, 15:19-23. This law connects with the law of giving gifts to the freed slave, the previous law, because 15:15 records that a person should give money to the slave since a person should remember that the Jewish people were once slaves in Egypt and G-d freed them, and the law of bekhor, is to remember the exodus from Egypt, Shemot 13:14,15, see our discussions on Shemot 11:5; 12:29, “The deaths of the firstborn Egyptians in the tenth plague.”  The laws of chapter 12 are also relevant to the laws of bekhor, since if the animal is not blemished, then it is to be brought as a sacrifice to the chosen place, 15:20. Finally, the laws of ma'aser and bekhor are referred together in 12:6,17, and the two sections, 14:22-29 and 15:19-23 can be viewed as a bookend around 15:1-18. Accordingly, 14:22-15:23 form one unit. The outer envelope is the laws of ma’aser, 14:22-29, and bekhor, 15:19-23, who both relate to laws of chapter 12. The inner units are the three laws of charity, with main focus being the middle law to lend to the poor. Thus, in 14:22-15:23 there is a chiasmus structure of ABXBA.

The next set of laws, 16:1-8, records laws of the holidays of Pesach and Matzot. 16:2,6,7 refer to the chosen place, which is also mentioned by the law of bekhor, 15:20, and as noted above, numerous times in chapter 12. The word shaar, gate, also appears by the laws of bekhor and the korban pesach, 15:22 and 16:5. Also, the word zevach appears by both laws, 15:21 and 16:2,5,6. In addition, as noted above, the law of bekhor is due to the Exodus from Egypt, and hence relates to holidays of Pesach and Matzot. Probably for that reasons, the laws are recorded together also in Shemot 34:18-20. Tigay (1996, p. 453) also notes that in the laws of bekhor, 15:21 refers to the animal being lame, piseach, and this is the same sound of the pesach sacrifice in 16:1,2,5,6. See Ibn Ezra on 16:1 (or in some versions on 15:22) for other connections.

The next set of laws are the laws of two other festivals, Shavuot, 16:9-12, and the laws of Sukkot, 16:13-15, who are described in very similar manner of celebrating, 16:11 and 16:14. These laws also connect to the law of chosen place, 16:11,15, and they refer to helping the Levites, the orphans and the widows, like by the laws of ma'aser, 14:27,29, and 16:11,14. Also, they both have the word, shaarecha, your gates, 16:11,14, which connects both with the laws of the firstborn animal, 15:22, and the korban pesach, 16:5. In addition, the number seven is referred to by the end of the laws of the holiday of Matzot, 16:8, and this number is referred to twice both by the law of Shavuot, 16:9 (twice), and by the holiday of Sukkot, 16:13 and 16:15.

The final two verses in parashat Re'eh, 16:16,17, are concluding verses to the festivals discussed in the chapter, and refer to the three holidays mentioned in the chapter 16, chag ha-Matzot, chag Shavuot and chag Sukkot. The final verse, 16:17, also refers to G-d’s blessings, berakah, which also appears by the holiday of Shavuot, 16:10, and by the holiday of Sukkot, 16:15.

Bibliography:

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Devarim 13:2-4 – The false prophet and the process of creation of the world

Devarim 13:2-4 records that even if a person gives (predicts, announces) a sign or wonder (ot and mofet) and the sign or wonder occurs, still the people must not listen to this person to worship idolatry since by telling the people to worship idolatry, the person has self-identified him or herself as a false prophet. What is the sign and wonder (ot and mofet) that the false prophet is giving?

The terms ot and mofet appear almost always in reference to the exodus from Egypt, either with regard to proving that Moshe was G-d’s messenger (Shemot 3:12, 4:8,9,17,21,28,30) or proving G-d’s power (Shemot 7:3,9, 10:1,2, 11:10; Bemidbar 14:11,22; Devarim 4:34, 6:22, 7:19, 11:3, 26:8, 29:2). In all of these cases, the ot and mofet are miraculous in nature, but on one occasion, Devarim 28:46, by the curses when the people would not fulfill the laws, the phrase ot and mofet does not refer to the exodus and does not appear to relate to any miraculous event. In addition there are other cases, where the word ot is a non-miraculous sign like by the Shabbat (Shemot 31:13,17) and by tefillin (Shemot 13:9,16; Devarim 6:8, 11:18). The conjunction of both words ot and mofet would then seem to mean that 13:2,3 is referring to a case where the false prophet announced that some miraculous event would happen, and it occurred. This would differ from the case in Devarim 18:21,22, where the person predicts the future but does not forecast any miraculous event, see Tigay, 1996, pp. 129,178. Yet, how could the person be able to give a miraculous sign or wonder if the person was going to tell the people to worship idolatry? Would G-d enable a false prophet to be able to perform miracles as a sign?

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 90a, also in Sifrei 84) quotes an interesting argument regarding the ability of the false prophet to give the signs or wonders. R Yossi ha-Galili explains that G-d grants false prophets the ability to predict or even do these signs, but that people should not pay attention to their powers since G-d gave the person these powers to test the people. Rabbi Akiva responded to this claim by stating "G-d forbid" that G-d would give great powers to false prophets. Instead, R. Akiva explains that initially when the person gave the signs, he/ she was really a true prophet, but then later he/ she became a false prophet.

R. Akiva makes sense that it is incomprehensible that G-d would give a “bad” person the power to predict or do signs or wonders to test other people since that would be entrapment. However, R. Akiva's approach is also difficult since would a true prophet really turn so bad? I once said this explanation in my synagogue and somebody said that R. Akiva knew of Acher (Elisha ben Abuyah) who was a great scholar but he turned into a heretic. Yet, Acher was not a prophet beforehand. (With regard to Bil’am’s status, who was not initially a true prophet but he did become a prophet, see our discussion on Bemidbar chapters 22-25, “The bad, the good and the ordinary?” https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/07/bemidbar-chapters-22-25-balak-bad-good.html)

Another question on R. Akiva’s approach is why would G-d choose to grant these powers to give these signs and wonders to a person of bad character who would turn into a false prophet? Was there nobody else who G-d could have been given the powers to know these signs and was of better character? Presumably, R. Akiva would answer that there must have been a great need to make this particular person a prophet at the particular time even though G-d either knew that the person would become a false prophet (according to the idea that G-d knows the future) or that G-d knew that the person's character was such the person had a good chance of becoming a false prophet (according to the idea that G-d does not know the future). 

Abarbanel (1999, p. 213, also see Luzzatto on 13:4) offers a third approach to explain the person’s ability to give signs and wonders. He writes that it only seems that the person was able give a sign or wonder, but really he/ she had no power at all. Nehama Leibowitz (1982, p. 128) does not like the Abarbanel's explanation since she argues that the simple meaning of the Torah is that the person was able to predict a sign or wonder. Yet, the point of the Abarbanel's explanation is that some people truly believe that the false prophet performed the sign, and the Torah is writing from their perspective, that even if you believe in the powers of the false prophet, still you should not listen to the person to worship idolatry. According to the Abarbanel (and R. Akiva for a different reason), 13:2-4 is not entrapment since no sign or wonder happened, and the statement that G-d is testing you is an explanation for those people who (mistakenly) believe that the false prophet has real powers. However, for the person who knows the act is a charade then this was not a test at all.

N. Leibowitz (1982, pp. 131-133), who follows R. Yossi he-Galili, uses this case to support her general view that miracles are no proof of faith. I disagree with this understanding. My understanding is that in the Torah, miracles are a proof for the belief in G-d and Moshe, but that our verses are telling us that in the future after Moshe dies, then miracles will no longer be a source for faith since people are so easily fooled by charlatans.

The three views concerning the false prophet might also be relevant to questions about the creation of the world. The universe has billion of stars, and the question is why would G-d need to create so many stars? Also there are many animals that existed and went extinct. Why did G-d create these animals?

One "answer" to these questions is that all the stars and extinct animals are to test a person's faith, and this would correspond to R. Yossi ha-Galili's approach by the false prophet. A second answer is that it only appears that there are many stars and that animals became extinct as G-d created the world to appear to be much older and bigger than it really is. These answers would correspond to the Abarbanel's opinion that it only appeared that the false prophet could know and do the signs and wonders. The third opinion is that the billions of stars are real and truly many animals became extinct, but each of the stars and the animals had some necessary reason for being created, even if it is not obvious. This approach would correspond to R. Akiva's approach that for some reason G-d had to give a person of bad character great powers even though later on he/ she would become a false prophet.

In the book Just Six Numbers by Martin Rees (2000), he explains that all the stars and galaxies are necessary for our existence since it was needed for stars (supernovas) to explode over and over again until enough atoms were created to make our world, as initially there were just hydrogen and helium atoms, and though the explosions, carbon, oxygen and iron atoms were created.  Rees writes (pp. 49,52) “These ancient stars made the atoms of which we and our planet are composed… Accounting for the proportion of different atoms- and realizing that the Creator didn’t need to turn 92 different knobs- is a triumph of astrophysics.” Furthermore, he notes that the number of years this exploding, reforming and re-exploding were needed to make our solar system corresponds to how many years are believed to have transpired from the first stars until our solar system was founded. He writes (p. 10):

The very hugeness of our universe, which seems at first to signify how unimportant we are in the cosmic scheme, is actually entailed by our existence! This is not to say that there couldn’t have been a smaller universe, only that we could not have existed in it. The expansion of cosmic space is not an extravagant superfluity; it’s a consequence of the prolonged chain of events, extending back before our Solar System formed, that preceded out arrival on the scene.

In conclusion, I think the Abarbanel is correct in his reading of the Torah regarding the ability of the false prophet to give signs and wonders, but in reference to these questions concerning the creation of the world, I believe that R. Akiva's approach makes the most sense. For more questions on the creation world with regard to the Torah see our discussion on Bereshit chapter one, "Concordism," https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2018/10/bereshit-120-30-description-of-creation.html, and https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/10/bereshit-11-19-bereshit-some-thoughts.html.

Bibliography:

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1982, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Rees, Martin, 2000, Just six numbers: The deep forces that shape the universe, New York: Basic Books.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Video of lecture at Chabad at Oxford University on Judaism and economics

Hello,

On May 9, 2019, I spoke at a conference on economic history at Oxford University, and when I was in Oxford, the Chabad Rabbi, Rabbi Eli Brackman asked me to speak on Judaism and economics. He videoed the presentation and I have posted it below. (Need to double click.)

Parts of the talk were based on discussions that I have posted in the past, in 2009, “The end of poverty,” (Re’eh), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/08/devarim-15411-reeh-end-of-poverty.html,
in 2010, “Equality vs. efficiency,” (Behar), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2010/05/vayikra-254-18-behar-equality-vs.html and
in 2011, “Shemitta, yovel, communism and capitalism,” (Behar), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2011/05/vayikra-254-18-shemitta-yovel-communism.html.

Also, during the talk, I was asked questions about slavery in the Torah, and now I realize that I need to correct one of my answers in reference to Vayikra 25:46.

Please feel free to send comments to me, Andrew Schein, ajayschein@gmail.com, and not to the the blog.

Best wishes to all.

https://www.chabad.org/multimedia/media_cdo/aid/4390461/jewish/Does-the-Torah-Support-Any-One-Economic-System.htm

                  

Devarim 15:19-23 (Re'eh) – Two types of firstborn animals

Devarim 12:6 records that a firstborn animal, bekhor, is sacrificed and Devarim 12:17,18 and 14:23 record that the bekhor is to be eaten before G-d in the chosen place. Devarim 15:19-23 clarifies that this requirement is only for a firstborn animal that has no blemishes. If a firstborn animal has a blemish, then it can be eaten anywhere like regular meat. These laws about the firstborn animal are surprising since they make no distinction between priests and regular people, and the implication is that non-priests are the ones eating the firstborn animal. However, Bemidbar 18:18 states that the priests eat the firstborn animal. How can Devarim 12-15 allow a regular person to eat the firstborn animal?

In Jewish law, (Rambam, Laws of Firstborns, 1:1,2) the firstborn animal of a pure unblemished animal (cow, sheep) is offered as a sacrifice and the priests eat the part of the animal that is not put on the altar. This law accords with Bemidbar 18:18, but what about the laws from Devarim 12-15? The traditional answer is that all the cases in Devarim 12-15 that refer to a person eating a sacrificed firstborn animal are only addressed to the priests and not to the general population (Rashi on 12:17, 15:20, Ibn Ezra on 12:17, 14:23 and 15:20). This is difficult since there is no indication in the Torah that the laws in Devarim 12-15 are only for priests. In addition, even in Jewish law, a non-priest can eat the blemished firstborn animal. The blemished firstborn animal must still be given to the priest, but based on 15:21,22, the priest can give it away or sell it to anybody (Rambam, Laws of firstborns, 1:3, Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 306:5). This means that 15:21,22, the law of a blemished firstborn animal, is understood as being addressed to the general population, and hence it is difficult to argue that the previous verse, 15:20, concerning the unblemished firstborn animal was only addressed to the priest.

Ibn Ezra (on 12:17) quotes a logical answer from the Karaites, but he rejects it without providing a reason. He writes that the deniers (Karaites) explain that there are two types of firstborn animals in the Torah, the firstborn animal of the womb and the firstborn animal each year of the flock. The law in Bemidbar 18:18 is referring to the firstborn animal of the womb, which goes to the priest, while Devarim 12-15 refer to the annual firstborn animal of the flock, which was eaten by the general population.

Alexander Rofe (1988a, p. 34), writes that this distinction between the two types of firstborn animals is from the Karaite work, Keter Torah. He calls it elegant since there is textual support for it, but he also does not accept it, again without providing a reason. The textual support is that Bemidbar 18:14 uses the word womb when discussing the firstborn animal, while Devarim 15:19 does not mention the term womb. Also Devarim 12-15 refer to firstborn of all the animals, which could mean from the entire flock. This explanation of the Karaites clearly contradicts normative Jewish law, but this is not a reason to reject it as an explanation of the text. The Rashbam (Introduction to parashat Mishpatim) writes that while the traditional interpretation is primary and is how we practice, still one can interpret the text differently.

There is another proof for this distinction between two types of firstborn animals, which I do not know if the Karaites already mentioned. Devarim 15:20 records that the firstborn animal is to be eaten “year after year.” What does it mean “year after year?” Rashi (on 15:20) writes that the phrase requires the unblemished firstborn animal to be brought as a sacrifice in its first year. However, this does not seem to be the sense of the phrase “year after year.” Also, it contradicts Shemot 22:29 that the firstborn animal should be brought to G-d on its 8th day. The traditional answer (Rambam, Laws of Firstborns, 1:8) is that the firstborn animal can be given to G-d from the 8th day onwards until it is one year old.

With the distinction between the two types of firstborn animals, the phrase "year after year" is not difficult at all. If Devarim 12-15 is referring to the firstborn of the entire flock, then each year there would be a new firstborn something that does necessarily occur when the firstborn is the first of the womb. Thus, Devarim 15:20, just means simply that each year the sacrifice is to be offered, and is not referring to how soon after the animal was born is it offered as a sacrifice.

This distinction between the two types of firstborn animals also better explains the change in the law from a non-blemished firstborn animal to a blemished firstborn animal that a non-priest can eat the blemished firstborn animal, 15:21,22. This law of the blemished firstborn animal is in reference to the annual firstborn of the flock, which has a lower level of kedusha than the firstborn of the womb. The annual firstborn of the flock has a lower level of kedusha, that even when the firstborn animal is non-blemished a regular person can eat it, just in the chosen place, so when the animal is blemished, a regular person can eat it anywhere ("one jump down"). However, for the a firstborn animal of the womb, which can only eaten by priest when it is non-blemished, so one would think that if blemished, while it cannot be offered as a sacrifice, it could also not be eaten by a non-priest ("two jumps down").

Finally, Rashi (on 15:19) notes that the word to dedicate, takdish, the firstborn animals in 15:19 seems to contradict Vayikra 27:26, which records that the firstborn animal is not to be dedicated since it already G-d's. An answer based on the distinction between the two types of firstborn animals could be that Vayikra 27:26 is referring to a firstborn animal from the womb and this firstborn animal cannot be dedicated, while 15:19 is referring to the annual firstborn of the flock and these firstborn animals can be dedicated.

Devarim 15:7,8 (Re'eh) - The idea of charity in the Torah

Rambam (Laws of gifts to the poor, 7:1) writes, “It is a positive commandment to give charity to the poor according to what the poor requires…as it says, “You shall open your hand to him, Devarim 15:8, and “When your brother sinks down and his hand falters beside you, than shall you strengthen him as a sojourner and resident-settler, and he is to live beside you… your brother shall live beside you, Vayikra 25:35,36. Whoever sees a poor person and does not give charity violates a negative commandment as it says, “You are not to toughen your heart, you are not to shut your hand to your brother, the needy one, Devarim 15:7.” 

While all the verses quoted by Rambam clearly refer to helping the poor, it is striking that all the verses are referring to lending money to the poor and not to giving money outright as one normally thinks of charity. Rambam quoted Vayikra 25:35,36, but deleted the beginning of Vayikra 25:36 which records that one must not charge the poor interest. This warning shows that the case of helping the poor is a loan, and not an outright gift. Similarly, Devarim 15:7,8 record that one must give to the poor, but the end of 15:8 explains that the giving is through a loan. The following verse, Devarim 15:9, records that one should not think that because the seventh year is coming one will not give to the poor. The concern for the seventh year is only because a loan is annulled in the seventh year. This issue of annulling a loan is irrelevant if one gives a gift to the poor because one has no obligation to return a gift. Accordingly, 15:9 shows that the giving to the poor mentioned in 15:7,8,10 is a loan and that is why the advent of the seventh year is problematic for the giver/ lender since he expects to receive his money back from the poor and now he would not. 

All the verses quoted by the Rambam to support the obligation to give charity as a gift only refer to giving a loan to the poor and not an outright gift. To the best of my knowledge there is no verse in the Torah that requires one to give charity as a gift to the poor on a regular basis. There is an obligation to give to the poor during the festivals, Devarim 16:11,14, and there is an obligation to give ma’aser oni, Devarim 14:28,29, but that is only once every third year. Also, a freed slave receives a gift from his previous owner, 15:12-18 but that is a one time payment to the freed slave. Finally, there are laws that obligate one to let the poor work in the fields, shemitta, gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and the corner of the field, but all these cases are not gifts, since the poor is allowed the opportunity to work. 

The welfare obligation in the Torah is mainly a loan based charity system. This point might not only seem to contradict all standard assumptions about religious practice, but also would seem to make the Torah very callous towards the poor. How could it be that the Torah does not obligate one to give to the poor gifts on a regular basis? One is obligated to give loans to the poor, but why should the poor be under some obligation to return money they received? It is very possible that the poor will not be able to return the money since they need the money for consuming goods, and there is nothing to return. This is a legitimate question, but the loans are annulled every seven years, which means that the poor did not remain in debt forever. Thus, the annulling of the loans is a crucial part of a loan-based system of charity because this law makes the loan into a gift and removes the potentially crushing burden of debt. This is why, as argued above, the annulling of the loans had to be recorded in conjunction with the obligation to lend to the poor. Yet, if the annulling of the loans makes every loan into a gift, why have a loan in the first place, why not just obligate people to give gifts to the poor whenever the poor need money? 

The answer to this question is that while charity is considered a virtuous act, it has at least two negative results. One, charity lowers the dignity of the receiver, but a loan has the minimum amount of loss of dignity. (See Rambam’s eight levels of charity, Laws of gifts to the poor, 10:7-14.) The second problem is that receiving charity tends to induce people to stop trying to help themselves and they remain beneficiaries of further charity. This attitude means that a person will remain permanently poor and always in need of assistance.  Rambam recognizes this problem, as within the laws of charity he writes (Laws of gifts to the poor, 10:18) “A man should always exert himself and should sooner endure hardship than throw himself as a dependent upon the community. The Sages admonished, ‘Make your Sabbath a weekday, sooner than become dependent.” (Translation from Twersky, 1972). Yet, notwithstanding these moral statements, still the tendency remains for people to get too comfortable with receiving charity.

The loan based charity system might be an attempt to remove this problem. Even thought all loans eventually become annulled, when every loan is given, there is an obligation to pay back the money. Clearly if the person receiving the money is physically unable to work and pay back the money, then both parties know there is no way the money will be returned. However, if the receiver is able-bodied, then the obligation to return the money exists, and this obligation serves as a stimulus for the receiver to work to payback the loan. Thus, the Torah requires one to loan freely lend to the poor, but as the money is a loan and not a gift, then the goal is for the poor to use the money to get out of poverty and not to become life-long recipients. The above rationale for the loan based charity system can explain other laws in the Torah relating to charity. 

Why only on festivals and only once every third year by maaser oni is one obligated to give to the poor? Tigay (1996, p.144) writes that the food donated once every third year would “presumably suffice for the intervening years” and that ‘presumably certain public locations were designated for the deposit, distribution and long-term storage of the produce.” These assumptions are because he argues that “it is unlikely that the poor were to be fed only two years out of seven.” His assumptions that the food would suffice for so many years depends on the amount produced and donated versus the number of poor people and their needs. While certainly possible, this would seem to presume large quantities of food being donated. Yet, if it is correct, then the poor should have had no need for food during the shemitta year, which was one of the intervening years, but we know that the during the shemitta year the poor were allowed to work the fields, Shemot 23:11. It seems more likely that the food for the poor would suffice for a short period of time at best, and then one must explain why the poor were only given food once every three years? 

The answer is that the Torah does not want the poor to expect gifts on a regular basis, and thus these obligations are limited. When they are given, they serve as a merciful break to the poor, but as they are limited, the poor know they have to work as they cannot come to depend on these gifts on a regular basis. Similarly, the gifts to the freed slave are one-time gifts to help the slave start again, but since it is one time payment, as the slave cannot depend on more money. Finally, the laws that allow people to work in the fields do not encourage dependency since the people have to work to get their food. 

For a more complete discussion of these issues, see my article, Of biblical interest, brotherhood and charity, International Journal of Social Economics, 2003, vol. 30 pp. 788-797.

Sukkot: The reason for the holiday: Be happy?

Shemot 23:16, 34:22, Vayikra 23:34-36, 39-43, Bemidbar 29:12-38 and Devarim 16:13,14 record that the Jewish people are to celebrate the holiday of Sukkot, but it is not obvious what is the reason for the holiday.

Vayikra 23:43 appears to provide a rationale for the holiday. The verse explains that the commandment to live in the sukkah is to remember that the Jewish people dwelled in booths when G-d took them out of Egypt. This commandment would seem to establish a historical basis for the holiday of Sukkot, but this connection raises several questions. 

One, once the holiday of Matzot is to remember the Exodus, why is there a need for a second holiday to remember the Exodus? 

Two, why is the holiday celebrated in the fall and not in the spring when the Exodus occurred? (See Ibn Ezra on Vayikra 23:43 for one answer.)

Three, the Torah never ever referred to living in a sukkah with regard to the Exodus. Devarim 1:27, 5:27, and Bemidbar 11:10, 16:27 imply that the people lived in tents (ohel) and not booths (sukkot), though one could argue that in principle there is no difference between tents and booths, see Rashbam on Shemot 23:16. 

Four, what is so significant of the people's dwellings in the desert that warrants a holiday to remember them? Possibly to answer this question, one view (R. Eliezer in Sukkah 11b, though in the Sifra, Emor 17:11 it is Rabbi Akiva’s view, quoted by Rashi on Vayikra 23:43) explains that the reference to sukkot in 23:43 is to the clouds of glory that accompanied the people in the desert, which was certainly a miracle that is worthy of being remembered. However, this view is not the simple understanding of Vayikra 23:43, see Rashbam on Vayikra 23:43. Also, the Torah should have explicitly referred to the clouds of glory if that was the intent of the verse. Instead, maybe one could say that Vayikra 23:43 refers to the actual booths or tents that the people lived in the desert and they symbolize not the Exodus per se, but that the people survived in the desert through G-d’s help. 

Five, this understanding leaves unexplained the other commandment of the holiday of Sukkot, the taking of the four species, Vayikra 23:40. Possibly to answer this question it has been suggested (Sadducees?) that the sukkah is to be built by using the four species, but these items do not seem to be good building materials and the Torah only records that one is to take the four species but not that a person is to build with them.

A different approach to understanding the holiday of Sukkot is that it is an agricultural holiday to thank G-d for the crops that are harvested in the fall. Proof for this viewpoint is that the holiday is referred to as the holiday of the gathering of the crops in Shemot 23:16 and 34:22 (also see Devarim 16:13). Also, the four species taken on the holiday, the lulav, etrog, hadasim and aravot are agricultural items and even the roof of the sukkah, which is the most important part of the sukkah, has to be something that grows from the ground, Shulchan Arukh 629:1. Tigay (1996, p. 469) notes that modern scholars explain that the sukkot also relate to the agricultural theme since booths were used by workers when they harvested the field. Yet, the four species do not represent the main agricultural products of the land, grains, oil and grapes, and most of them are not even edible. Also, the Torah does not relate the sukkah to agriculture but to the exodus from Egypt.

Can the sukkah be connected with an agricultural theme? Hoffmann (1953, p. 207) explains that the people should remember that there was a time when they did not work but were provided for by G-d. The idea is that this reminder of the past should stop people from becoming conceited by their bountiful crops and forget G-d (see also Rashbam on Vayikra 23:43). The booths are connected with the exodus not due to their miraculous nature, but as a reminder of G-d’s goodness to the people during the desert, which should lead the people to thank G-d for their crops. With this approach, the primary reason for celebrating the holiday of Sukkot is to thank G-d for the harvest, and the connection with the exodus is to help one remember to thank G-d. With this rationale the holiday of Sukkot is another example of the law of the bikkurim.

We see that there are two aspects to the holiday of Sukkot, one historical, the exodus from Egypt, and two agricultural, the time of the harvest. Yet, there is a third possibility that both themes are expressions of a third distinct idea, which is the reason for celebrating the holiday.

The third possible reason for the observance of the holiday of Sukkot is the requirement to celebrate and be happy. There are three sources for this idea. One, Bemidbar 28,29 records the sacrifices of each holiday, and within the discussion of each holiday, there is a brief mention of the law that is the theme of the holiday. With regard to Sukkot, Bemidbar 29:12 just refers to celebrating a holiday. Two, within the discussion of the rituals of Sukkot, Vayikra 23:40,41 record that one is to be happy and celebrate for seven days on the festival of Sukkot. Three, Devarim 16:13-15 discusses the holiday of Sukkot, and twice mentions that one is to be happy on the holiday. This is unique as in Devarim 16 in reference to the holiday of Matzot (today called Passover), there is no mention to be happy and by the holiday of Shavuot, the Torah refers only once to being happy on the festival, Devarim 16:11. These three references (Vayikra 23, Bemidbar 29, and Devarim 16) suggest that the main idea of Sukkot is happiness and celebration. Furthermore, the theme of happiness is associated with the agricultural motif since usually the harvest time is a time of happiness.

In addition, maybe the historical motif from Vayikra 23:43 also contributes to the theme of happiness if the verse is understood as referring literally to the exodus from Egypt because most likely the time of the exodus was the happiest moment for the Jewish people in all of their stay in the desert. Interestingly, the very first place the people traveled to when they left Egypt was called Sukkot (Shemot 12:37), which strengthens the connection between the holiday of Sukkot and the happiness at the time of the exodus. This idea can explain why Vayikra 23:43 refers to booths and not tents. If the focus is on the moment of the exodus and not the 40 years in the desert, then it is possible that at that time the people only used booths, and only later when the people came to Mount Sinai, did they make tents.

We see from the prayers that Chazal thought that happiness was the main motif of Sukkot. In the Shemoneh Esrei for each festival, a brief reference is made to the theme of the day; by Pesach it is freedom, by Shavuot it is the giving of the Torah and by Sukkot (and Shemini Atseret) it is happiness, “the time of our happiness.”

The theme of happiness might also explain why on Sukkot there are different sacrifices for each day as opposed to the holiday of Matzot, where the same sacrifices are brought each day, Bemidbar 28:24, 29:12-34. The different number of sacrifices each day mark each day as being unique, which means that each day is another occasion to celebrate, for more on these sacrifices see our discussion on Bemidbar 29:13-32, “The seventy bulls of Sukkot.” Thus, we also say a full Hallel on each day of Sukkot. This idea of happiness is also found in Chazal. The Mishnah (Sukkah 5:1) discusses the joyful happenings that occurred on Sukkot, the simchat bet ha-sho`evah, and records “whoever do not see the celebration of the simchat bet ha-sho`evah, never saw happiness in his lifetime.”

Why should there be a holiday for the purpose of making people happy? Were people’s lives so depressing that they needed a stimulant? My guess is that the theme of happiness relates to the idea of thanking G-d and celebrating the covenantal relationship between G-d and the Jewish people, see our discussions on the book of Vayikra, Vayikra 23:24, 26, 34 “Two sets of mikrei kodesh” and our discussion on Vayikra 23:39-44, “The four species and the sukkah.”

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society

Devarim 15:4,11 (Re`eh) - The end of poverty?

Devarim 15 records several laws with regard to one’s obligation to the poor. One example is 15:4, which records that a lender should not be upset with the law of remission of loans since G-d has blessed the people that there would be "no needy among the people." Possibly the idea is that nobody should claim that the remission of loans will make the lender poor as there will be no poor.

A second law is that one must lend to the poor, 15:7-11, and within this law, 15:11 records that "there will never cease to be poor people." The idea here is that a person cannot decline to lend money to the poor by denying that there are poor people. Thus, the Torah states there will always be poor people, that one is always obligated to lend money as a form of charity.

 
Both verses, 15:4,11, are consistent with the respective laws that they refer to, but, as has long been noted, they appear to contradict each other. How can 15:4 state that there will be no needy amongst the people while 15:11 records that there will always be poor people?

The standard answer (see Rashi on 15:4) to understanding 15:4,11, is that the blessing that there will be no poor amongst the people is conditional on the behavior of the people. If the people obey the laws, then there will be no poor people. However, as there will never be a time when all the people will follow all the laws, then the blessing that there will be no poor people will not be fulfilled, and hence 15:11 is correct that there will always be poor people. This answer is troubling since it means that the blessing of 15:4 will never be actualized, as there will always be poor people.

Furthermore, the Ramban (on 15:11) is bothered that this answers implies that the people are always destined to sin, and hence he modifies the approach to suggest that 15:11 means that only sometimes in the future the people will sin and then there will be poor people. This modification is difficult since 15:11 seems to imply that there will always be poor people, while according to the Ramban, 15:11 only means that there is always the potential for there to be poor people. In addition, I am bothered by this approach as it stigmatizes the poor that they are sinners, and this would encourage people not to lend to the poor.

In order to understand 15:4,11, one must define the term poor. Poverty can be defined into two ways, absolute poverty or relative poverty. Absolute poverty is when a person does not have enough money to live according to some minimum standard, as for example the World Bank commonly uses 2$ and 1$ a day as its standard. Relative poverty is when a person has less money to purchase goods than other people in society. For example, in Israel the poverty line is 50% of the median income, which means the poverty line fluctuates based on the income of the total population. Thus, in year one A can be considered not poor, but in year two, even with no change in A's income or prices in Israel, an increase in the median income of the country can put A below the poverty line. These two definitions lead to different implications whether a person is considered poor. For example, if everybody in a country lives on less than 2$ a day, then using an absolute standard every person in the country is poor, but from a relative perspective there are no poor people in the country. Or, it could be that the income level of the country is unequal, but nobody in the country has an income level of less than 2$ a day. In this case, there would be relative poverty in the country, but no absolute poverty. I believe this latter case is the key to understanding 15:4,11.

15:4 refers to absolute poverty, while 15:11 refers to relative poverty. 15:4 means that if a person follows the laws, then a person will never be reduced to absolute poverty that one cannot purchase the minimum amount of goods needed to survive. Thus, a person should not be bothered by the remission of loans in the seventh year. 15:4 concludes by recording that G-d would bless the land that it would be fruitful enough that no person would be poor, but there is no promise of equality. On the other hand, 15:11 means that there will always be relative poverty, as the national income will never be distributed completely equal in society, and hence there is an obligation to lend to the poor who are less fortunate even if the poor have enough money to survive on a minimal basis. Thus, 15:8 records that one must lend "for whatever he needs," which means that the lending is for all the needs of a person and not just to maintain a minimum level of subsistence.

The Talmud (Ketuvot 67b) explains that while 15:8 does not obligate one to make a person wealthy, yet one is required to give a person whatever he needs, which includes a horse to ride on and to a slave to run before the horse. The horse and the runner are not needed for the poor person to reach a minimal level of existence, and hence we see that the Talmud understands 15:8 as referring to relative poverty.

In the glory days of communism, many people were (still are?) enchanted by the claim that communism would lead to complete equality in society and the end of poverty. I have also heard it claimed that the communist ideal is in accordance with the Torah. The approach suggested above completely rejects this supposed connection between communism and the Torah. If there will always be relative poverty, then the communist ideal of complete equality will never be attained. Furthermore, there is no indication in the Torah that the goal is to remove all inequality in society. The blessing of 15:4 is that there will be no absolute poverty, but there would remain different income levels. This outcome accords better with a capitalist system where income differences are needed as an incentives for people to work harder, and it would be hoped that there would be sufficient economic growth to eradicate absolute poverty for all people.

For a more complete discussion of these issues, see my article, "The vision of Deuteronomy 15 with regard to poverty, socialism and capitalism" in Markets and Morality, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 2006, pp.251-259.