The 2024 version of Andrew Schein's commentary on Haggadah is now available

 Hello,

While admittedly it is a little late, the 2024 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (116 pages, 1.5 spacing) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections / revisions from the previous versions.  If you are interested in receiving the file, send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file.  I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech and good health.  

In addition, unrelated to my commentary, as part of the Seder, we should all add a prayer for the safety of our soldiers and the return of all of the captives from Gaza.

Andrew Schein

Vayikra 11:2 - The definition of the words behamot and hayyot in the Torah

Vayikra chapter 11 records different animals that can be eaten (that is to say they are kosher) and animals that cannot be eaten. After the introductory sentence, Vayikra 11:2 records, “These are the hayyot that you can eat from all the behamah that are (is) on the land. Which animals are classified as hayyot and which animals are classified as behemot?

In modern Hebrew the definition of hayyot are wild animals and behamot are large domesticated animals. I believe that this definition derives from the halakhah of kosher animals. Devarim 14:4,5 record, "These are the behamot that can be eaten: ox (cows), sheep and goats, gazelle, deer, roebuck, bison, antelope, wild goat, ibex, and mountain sheep." The Rambam (Laws of forbidden foods, 1:8) writes that the animals listed in Devarim14:4, the ox, sheep and goats are behamot, while the other seven animals listed in Devarim 14:5 are hayyot. The Rambam (Laws of forbidden foods, 6:1, also see Rashi on Devarim 14:4) also writes that hayyot are a sub-category of behamot. This definition has important practical implication. Vayikra 17:13 records that if a person hunts (kills) a chaya (or a bird), then the blood of the animal has to be covered with dirt. Based on this verse, the blood of an animal that is classified as a behama does not have to covered with dirt.

I do not understand this distinction between hayyot and behamot since Devarim 14:4 records "These are the behamot that you can eat" before the list of all ten animals, and there is no mention of hayyot in the verses. It seems obvious that the ten animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 are behamot. In addition, hayyot, based on the name, living things (see also Vayikra 11:47), refers to all animals, and then behamot are a subcategory of hayyot. With regard to Vayikra 17:13, according to my more expansive definition of the term behamot, the blood of all the animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 do not have be covered, which would be a leniency. Note with regard to which animals can be eaten, the difference between my understanding and the traditional understanding is just a question of semantics since there are still just ten land animals that can be eaten. It is just that I think that all ten animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 are behamot, while the traditional view lists three as behamot and seven as hayyot. However, the different definitions of the term behamot lead to some differences how to understand various verses in the Torah.

If we return to 11:2, the verse means these are the hayyot, the animals, that can be eaten: (Example one:) With regard to the behamah, a sub-category of hayyot, (animals that move) on the land. And then 11:3 explains that “with regard to the behamah” means those behamot that have split hooves and bring up their cud can be eaten. Thus, some behamot can be eaten, while others cannot be eaten. Afterwards, 11:9 records a different sub-category of hayyot, example two, animals that move in the water that can be eaten, and 11:13 records a third sub-category of hayyot, example three, animals that fly that cannot be eaten.

Another example is Vayikra 7:25, which records “for whoever eats helev (fat) from the behamah that is offered as a sacrifice…” This verse means that there are some behamot which can be offered as a sacrifice and some that cannot be. If the term behamot refers to the ten animals (or more) listed in Devarim 14:4,5, then there exists the possibility that some behamot are offered as sacrifices and some are not. However, if behamot are only ox, sheep and goats, then all behamot can be offered as sacrifices, and Vayikra 7:25 cannot be understood in its simple sense.

In addition, Vayikra 11:26 records that any behama that has hoofs but the hoofs are not split and does not chew its cud is tamei. Yet, if behamot are only ox, sheep and goats, then all behamot have split hoofs. Instead, 11:26 is noting that some behamot do not have split hoofs, such as horses, donkeys, zebras (see Luzzatto on 11:26) and these behamot differ from animals whose hoofs are split and chew the cud who are kosher and not tamei. This distinction between behamot that are tamei and those that are tahor is also recorded in 20:25.

11:27 then records that any animal that walks on its paws among the hayyot that walk on four legs is tamei. This implies that an animal that walks on paws (bears, cats, dogs?) is a type of hayya, but it is not a behama. This means that a behama is a hoofed animal (ungulates) and all the animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 seem to be ungulates. (Note that Rashi on Shemot 14:7 seems to define horses as being behamot, which supports the idea that animals that have hoofs are behamot.)

Some other verses where the two terms, hayyot and behamot appear are in Bereshit 2:19,20, by the Garden of Eden.  In Bereshit 2:19 the Torah uses the word hayya when referring to all land animals. In the following verse, 2:20, the Torah separates out the behamot (deer? sheep?), the sub-category of hayyot, from all the other hayyot in the Garden of Eden. 2:20 also refers to the behamot before the remaining land animals, hayyot, maybe because Adam was more likely to have found help (ezer) from these animals, the ungulates, who are relatively tamer than the hayyot.

Another case is in Bemidbar 35:3, where first the behamot are listed since they are more likely to be in one's field since some of them are raised for food or work, and then the general term for all animals, who may happen to be in one's fields (i.e., dogs? birds?), hayyot is recorded.

There is a third term in the Torah for a group of animals, mikneh, livestock, cattle, sheep, pigs and horses(?). Behamot are a larger category of animals than mikneh, as all mikneh are behamot but not all behamot are mikneh. Thus, Bereshit 36:6 starts with the smallest group, the mikneh, then it becomes more expansive, the behamot, all ungulates, which would be horses and donkeys, and then it refers to all possessions. In Bemidbar 31:9, the Torah first refers to women and children, then to behamot, the larger group of animals, and then to mikneh, the smaller group of animals.

In Tanakh, Micah 5:7 records that lions will eat behamot in the forest, but farm animals like cows, sheep and goats usually are not living in the forest. On the other hand, deer, antelopes and gazelle do live in forests and are eaten by lions.

After writing this, my son Yishai, pointed out to me that this discussion of what animal is defined as a behama is not new. Ibn Ezra in his commentary on Tehillim 8:8 quotes from the Karaite commentator Yefet that behamot refer to animals who eat grass, which would be ungulates, but Ibn Ezra rejected this interpretation since Mishlei 30:30 refers to a lion as being a behamah. Note Ibn Ezra in his comments on Bemidbar 31:30 refers to camels as behamot, and if a lion is considered a behama, then this would also contradict the traditional definition of the word behama. I am not convinced by this refutation from Mishlei since a verse from a prophetic writing is not sufficient to overturn the simple understanding of the verses in the Torah. It could be that the definition of the word behama changed from the time of the Torah to when Mishlei was written. Also, maybe, one can understand Mishlei 30:30 that it means that lions, who are not behamot, are stronger than behamot, which includes rhinoceros and hippopotamuses.

Shemot 32:11-35 – Sin and forgiveness by the sin of the golden calf

Shemot 32:7-10 record that when Moshe was up on Mount Sinai, G-d told Moshe that the people sinned with the golden calf, and then 32:11-13 record that Moshe prayed for the people to be forgiven. These verses indicate that Moshe prayed for the people immediately upon hearing about their sin when he was on Mount Sinai. G-d quickly agreed to forgive the people, 32:14. Yet, even though G-d forgave the people, when Moshe came down from the mountain, he broke the tablets, 32:19, told the Levites to kill the people, 32:27, and then on the following day he told the people that he had to go pray for them that maybe G-d would forgive them, 32:30. Why did Moshe break the tablets, have the Levites kill people and need to pray again when 32:14 records that G-d forgave the people? Also, 32:33-35 indicate that G-d did not accept Moshe’s prayers in 32:31,32, but had not G-d already accepted Moshe’s prayers in 32:14?

Ibn Ezra (on 32:11) explains that really Moshe only prayed (once) on the day after he came down from Mount Sinai. This appears to accord with Moshe's account of the sin of the golden calf in the book of Devarim, that there he said that he first went down from the mountain, broke the tablets and only afterwards began to pray for the people, Devarim 9:15-18. Ibn Ezra argues that Moshe could not have prayed before he destroyed the golden calf. With this approach, Ibn Ezra is forced to argue that the verses 32:11-14, which indicate that Moshe prayed on the mountain immediately upon hearing of the people's sin, are recorded out of their chronological order and really follow 32:30. Yet, still there remains the problem that 32:14 (even recorded out of order) indicates a complete pardon for the people, and 32:33-35 indicate that there was only a partial pardon for the people.

Ramban (on 32:11) asks that if Moshe really only prayed once, why would the Torah split the prayers by recording half the prayer sixteen verses before the other half of the prayer? Furthermore, Ibn Ezra's proof from Moshe's account in Devarim is not so convincing. Devarim 9:19 records that G-d listened to Moshe for a second time, which implies that there were two prayers. Also, in Devarim, Moshe was not giving a complete recording of the events, and hence maybe he skipped mentioning his first prayer since he did not want the people to know that they had been forgiven so quickly for their sins. 

Ramban argues that Moshe had to pray immediately for the people's welfare when he heard of their sins since he believed that there was a possibility that the people would have been destroyed at that moment. Thus, he claims that Moshe prayed twice, once as recorded in 32:11-14, when he heard about the sin on Mount Sinai, and then again as recorded in 32:30-34, after he had come down from Mount Sinai. Why was there a need for two prayers?

The Ramban (also see Hoffmann on Devarim 9:18,19) suggests that when 32:14 records that G-d agreed to Moshe's prayer on the mountain this just meant that the people would not be wiped out at that moment, but the people had not been truly pardoned and they could be punished later for the sin with the golden calf. Hence, Moshe had to pray again on the day after he came down from Mount Sinai. This approach is difficult since 32:14 seems to mean that G-d renounced punishing the people, and not that G-d might punish the people a few days later.

Abravanel accepts the Ramban's answer (1997, p. 542) and then he suggests (p. 546, also see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, p. 579) that the second prayer was for those people who did not participate in the sin but who did not attempt to stop the people from sinning. I doubt this since 32:14 seems to mean that everybody had been forgiven.

In his comments on Devarim, Abravanel (1999, p. 162) suggests two additional reasons why Moshe prayed twice.  One, while the Torah records that G-d renounced punishing the people in 32:14, he suggests that this information was not told to Moshe. And, then if Moshe did not know that the punishment was rescinded, Moshe had to pray a second time. This approach is difficult since there is no reason to think that Moshe was not informed that G-d renounced punishing the people, and if Moshe did not know this fact then he would have kept on praying before descending from the mountain.

Abravanel's other answer in his comments on Devarim is a variation on the Ramban's approach.  This suggestion is that when G-d renounced punishing the people, this meant that G-d would not directly kill the people, but G-d was still going to indirectly destroy the people by leaving them to fend for themselves in the desert. With this idea, one would understand that the threatened destruction recorded in Devarim 9:19 was indirect and not complete. Yet, the word in Devarim 9:19, le-hashmid, means to destroy and not simply to let the people fend for themselves, and again 32:14 seems to mean that the people would not be punished at all for their sin of the golden calf. Also 32:35 records that G-d would send a plague on the people, which is not just letting the people fend for themselves.

A different approach is that Moshe had to pray a second time due to the events that occurred after Moshe came down from Mount Sinai. When Moshe came down from Mount Sinai, he saw not only the golden calf but the dancing (around the idol?) and he broke the tablets, 32:19. N. Leibowitz (1976a, pp. 610,611) quotes Isaac Arama and the Netziv that Moshe broke the tablets to shock the people. This makes sense to me since there was pandemonium in the camp and he needed to do something to restore order in the camp. However, N. Leibowitz rejects this approach since she claims that with this approach Moshe's act was premeditated while 32:19 implies that it was a "spontaneous reaction sparked off by indignation." Yet, afterwards she writes (p. 612), "It is difficult to accept that Moshe deliberately planned to break the tablets. But the alternative – that it happened in a spontaneous fit of anger without any thought at all is equally implausible."

I would understand that after Moshe heard that G-d had forgiven the people, 32:14, he took the tablets with the idea that he would speak to the people and tell them that G-d had forgiven them. He did not intend to break the tablets when he was going down the mountain. However, when he came down, he was angry since he had not realized the mad frenzy scene that was occurring and he had to think of a way to get the people to stop. Moshe's solution was to break the tablets in front of the people, Devarim 9:17. However, this plan did not succeed.

32:25 records that even after Moshe broke the tablets and destroyed the golden calf, still the people were going wild. Accordingly, he went to plan B. He asked the people "Who is with G-d, come to me," 32:26. However, only the Levites responded. They compromised approximately 4% (22,000 males/603,000 men 20 years and up) of the population, which meant that 96% of the population was not with G-d. Moshe then sent out the Levites to kill the people who sinned, and as we discuss on 32:20-28, "Spiked water and the aftermath of the sin of the golden calf," they only killed people who had marks on their bodies which indicated that they had sinned. These people were not being killed for their actions with the golden calf, which no longer existed and for which they had been forgiven, but because they had not responded to Moshe when he asked who was with G-d. By not responding to Moshe’s call, this showed that they rejected G-d and were in essence continuing with the sin by golden calf even though the idol had been destroyed. Note, it could be that the Levites had also sinned by the golden calf, but once Moshe called to them, then they repented and answered Moshe’s call.

After this killing by the Levites, it seems that the pandemonium in the camp ended, and on the following day, Moshe told the people that they had sinned greatly and that he would pray for them, 32:30. What was the need for this prayer?  One possibility is that G-d's forgiveness of the people in 32:14 was no longer relevant since the people continued to sin by not responding to Moshe when he asked who was with G-d, 32:26. A second possibility is that in 32:14, G-d forgave the people for their worship of the golden calf, a full scale idolatry, while in 32:30, Moshe needed to pray for the people for making the golden calf independent of their worship of the golden calf. Thus, in Moshe prayer’s he refers to the making of the golden calf, 32:31, and in G-d’s response that there would be a plague for the people’s sin, again the reference is to making the golden calf, 32:35. Moshe also refers to this sin as being a great or large sin, chataah gedolah, when he spoke to the people, 32:30, in his prayer, 32:31, and when he questioned Aharon about his actions, 32:21. The reason for this designation is that people might have thought that just making the golden calf was not such a terrible action since the goal might have been to use the idol to worship G-d, and hence to impress on Aharon, the people, and readers of the Torah, Moshe uses the phrase great sin to teach that even just making the golden calf was a terrible sin.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (1437-1508), 1997, Commentary on Shemot. 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Shemot 20:5 – The term kanah in reference to G-d in the Decalogue

Shemot 20:5 records the prohibition of idolatry, and within this prohibition, the Torah states that G-d is kel kanah. This same description of G-d also appears in Shemot 34:14, Devarim 4:24, 5:9 and 6:15. What does this phrase kel kanah mean? The word kel means G-d, but what does the work kanah mean? Also, Pirkei Avot 4:28 records that R. Elazar ha-Kappar said that ha-kinah takes a person out the world, which implies that it is a negative trait, why would G-d be described as a G-d of kanah?

Rashi (on Bemidbar 25:11, also has similar comments on Devarim 29:19) writes that the term kinah always refers to a person taking vengeance. Does this mean that kel kanah means that G-d is the G-d of vengeance? While vengeance might be appropriate on some occasions, this would not seem like a flattering description of G-d.

Rashi (on Bemidbar 11:29) gives a slightly different definition that kinah means that a person sets their heart on doing something, whether to help or to take revenge. This would be the idea of being zealous or ardent, and has a potential positive element to the term.

Rashi on our verse, 20:5, offers a third variation of the definition of the word kanah or kinah, that G-d is determined to punish people who worship idolatry. Does Rashi here think this term kanah only refers to idolatry? Does this definition in reference to G-d differ from when the term kanah is used by people unrelated to idolatry? For example, Bereshit 26:14 records that Philistines were kaneh of Yitzhak, and Bereshit 37:11 records that Yosef’s brothers were kaneh of Yosef, and both cases seem unrelated to idolatry.

Even-Shoshan (1988, p. 1020) explains that this description of G-d as kel kanah means that G-d is very strict and exacting, but this seems to contradict the idea that G-d is merciful, 34:6. Also, again, can this same definition apply to other cases of the word in the Torah? For example, when the Philistines were kaneh of Yitzhak, were they being strict? Or, were Yosef’s brothers being strict with Yosef?

Robert Alter (2004, p. 430) writes on 20:5 that “the leading edge of the word here may in fact be jealousy.” If jealousy is interpreted to mean envy, could one say that G-d is envious?

I think we need to understand the word kanah in the same way in reference to G-d and in reference to regular people. As we discussed on Bereshit 26:14-33, “Yitzhak and the wells: True grit,”  in the Torah the word, kanah, means that a person will act in aggressive manor to defend a perceived attempt to limit or end a person’s rights. This same definition applies to G-d. Once the Jewish people entered into a covenant with G-d, and this process was beginning with the Decalogue, then the obligation of the people was just to worship G-d. This was a right of G-d. All the verses that refer to G-d as being kanah are cases where the people are either worshipping idolatry (Bemidbar 25:3,11,13) or they are being warned not to worship idolatry, like in 20:5. The point of 20:5 is to warn the people that G-d will act aggressively to punish them if they commit the sin of idolatry, as the verse ends that G-d will punish idol worshippers for up to four generations. Thus, both by G-d and people, the term kanah refers to acting to defend an attempt to limit or end a person’s right, but by G-d, the limiting or ending the right is referring the right of G-d to be worshipped and then the term kanah is only in reference to G-d acting against people who worship idolatry, but by people the limiting or ending rights can refers to various rights that a person claims. Accordingly, in Pirkei Avot, R. Elazar ha-Kappar can be referring to all types of rights that people make up and then fight about them since they believe their rights are being limited or ended. This fighting will take people out of the world, but his statement does not refer to G-d, where the kinah is only in reference to the sin of idolatry.

References

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Even-Shoshan, Avraham, 1981, A new dictionary (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer Publishing House.