Vayikra 18:25, 28; 20:22 – The metaphor of the land of Canaan/ Israel vomiting in the book of Vayikra

Vayikra 18:25 records that due to the sins of the inhabitants of the land of Canaan/ Israel, the land vomited them out. 18:28 (also 20:22) continues this metaphor of the land being able to vomit like a person, and records a warning that the Jewish people should not sin since if they would, then they would be vomited out the land just like the land had vomited out the inhabitants of the land of Canaan. What does the term vomit in reference to land mean? What is the meaning of the metaphor?

I believe the standard explanation of the phrase that “the land will vomit out its inhabitants” is that the people will go into exile (see for example, Rashi on 18:28, quoting the Sifra and the Targum). 18:25 and 20:22 are then warnings to the Jewish people not to sin since they would be punished with exile.

Threats of punishments for sins are recorded towards the end of the book of Vayikra 26:14-43, and one of these threats is that the people will go into exile if they sin, 26:33,34. I have heard (do not recall from whom) that the punishment of the land vomiting out people differs from the similar punishment of exile in chapter 26 that the punishment relating to vomiting is an automatic exile from the land, while the punishment of exile as recorded in 26:33,34 is dependent on G-d deciding to send the people into exile.

Does the metaphor of vomiting really correspond to the idea of people going into exile? Even if a person vomits immediately after eating, still around half of the food remains in the body. Thus, if a person wants to understand that the land vomiting means that the land will somehow force the people into exile (low agricultural productivity?), this can only mean that half the people will go into exile, which significantly reduces the warning not to sin. Note in this case in Vayikra, one cannot say that the land of Canaan had low agricultural productivity at this time since the spies brought fruit that was enormous, Bemidbar 13:21,27.

Another difficulty with the idea that the metaphor of the land vomiting means that the people will go into exile is that 18:25,28 seem to explain that the Canaanites were vomited out the land of Canaan, but the Canaanites were still living in the land, as the end of 18:24 records that the Canaanites will be sent out of the land when the Jewish people come to the land.

With regard to the last difficulty, the Ramban (end of comments on 18:25) explains that the vomiting can refer to going into exile and be referring to the Canaanites since once G-d had determined that the Canaanites were to be exiled, then it is like it already occurred. A variation of this idea is that a friend of mine, Ram Elboim, suggested that since the Jewish people were about to enter the land of Israel (if there had not been the sin of the spies), so then one can understand that 18:24,28 are saying that the Canaanites are being thrown out in the present, which would include the upcoming months.

David Hoffmann (1953, vol. 2, p. 23) notes that since the Canaanites were still living in the land of Canaan/ Israel when G-d was speaking to Moshe, then it cannot be that the metaphor of vomiting means that the people will go into exile. Instead, he notes that before people vomit, they feel uncomfortable, and then the idea is that the vomiting by the land is referring to a stage where the land is making the people on the land feel uncomfortable (again, low agricultural productivity?) prior to the people being thrown out of the land (or leaving on their own?).

A different idea is that the vomiting signifies a partial exile, like a partial spewing out of food, and a partial exile could mean that while the people were living in the land, they were not the legal owners of the land. With this idea, once Avraham captured the land from the four kings (Bereshit 14:14,15), he became the legal owner of the land of Canaan. The Canaanites remained in possession of the land and lived in the land (like squatters), but they were no longer considered the legal owners of the land. With this idea, the vomiting out of the Canaanites in the past would refer to the Canaanites losing their legal ownership of the land, and then the threat of the Jewish people being vomited out in the future is that they would lose ownership of the land, which would mean that they would be living under the control of other people and/ or living with an ever-present threat of being expelled. This threat is different than the threat of exile in chapter 26, and hence the Torah uses different terms to describe the different punishments.

A variation of this third approach with regard to the Canaanites is that for approximately three hundred years the Egyptians controlled the land of Canaan/ Israel, 1468 BCE to 1140 BCE (?). Thus, the Canaanites had been ruled by a foreign ruler for quite some time or were still being ruled by a foreign ruler depending on when chapters 18 and 20 were told to Moshe. This could be the reference to the Canaanites who had been vomited out in the past in 18:20,24, as in the past, from the perspective of the time when the book of Vayikra was told to Moshe, the Canaanites had experienced a partial exile of living under foreign Egyptian rule.

This idea also accords with another aspect of vomiting since when people vomit, they are not in control of themselves, as usually the body forces them to vomit, and if a foreign ruler has control of the land, then the people are forced to do what the foreign ruler decides. The warning to the Jewish people of being vomited out in the future would then be that they would sin in the future, then they would lose control of the land of Canaan/ Israel, even if they still would be living in the land of Canaan/ Israel. 

Also, this idea that the vomiting refers to the people losing control of the land is also a measure for measure punishment for the sins described in chapters 18 and 20, many of whom relate to a lack of sexual self-control.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (Germany, 1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Vayikra 20:27 – Ghostbusters

Vayikra 20:27, the last verse in parashat Kedoshim, records, “And any man or woman who has within themselves a ghost or a familiar spirit is to be killed by stoning.” (Are ghosts unfamiliar or scary spirits?)

20:27 is difficult for two reasons. One, the placement of this verse is difficult since it appears after the concluding sentences of chapter 20, 20:22-26, but also it is not part of the next chapter that begins with the phrase, "G-d spoke to Moshe," 21:1. A possible answer is that Devarim 18:11 refers again to this prohibition and Devarim 18:13 records that one is to be tamim with G-d. While the word tamim in Devarim 18:13 is understood to mean that a person should be whole with G-d and not turn to ghosts or spirits, still the literal idea of tamim is to be physically whole. In the following chapters in the book of Vayikra, 21:16-23 records the law of the priest who is physically blemished, and 22:19,21 refers to being tamim by the sacrifices, that one cannot offer a blemished sacrifice. Thus, maybe 20:27 is connected with the ensuing laws through the idea of being tamim by not turning to ghosts and spirits and that both the priests and the animals being sacrificed have to be physically whole.

A second difficulty in 20:27 is that this law of a person attempting to contact ghosts or spirits is mentioned twice within chapters 19,20. 19:31 records that one should not turn to ghosts or familiar spirits since they cause one to become tamei, and 20:6 records that if one turns to these ghosts or familiar spirits, then the person receives the punishment of karet. The fact that the Torah repeats this injunction in 20:27 is not surprising because people need to understand the severity of not turning to ghosts and spirits, as apparently many people believed (still?) in ghosts and spirits. However, why in 20:6 is the punishment for turning to ghosts and spirits karet, while in 20:27 it is death by stoning? Several answers have been suggested to answer this question. 

Rashi (on 20:27) explains that 20:6, where the penalty is karet, is the case where the person willfully turned to ghosts or spirits, but was not warned about the prohibition. On the other hand, 20:27 is the case where the person turned to ghosts and spirits when he or she was warned and there were witnesses that saw the person violate this law. Similarly, Ibn Ezra (on 20:27) writes that 20:27 is dealing with the case where one turns to ghosts or spirits publicly.

Abravanel (on 20:27, 2005, p. 224) notes that 20:27 records the phrase “within themselves,” which leads him to suggest that 20:27 is referring to a person who claims that the ghost or spirit is within him or herself. I understand the Abravanel to mean that 20:6 differs from 20:27 that 20:6 (also 19:31) is the prohibition for a client, a person who goes to another person for that person to make contact with ghosts and spirits and who would then act based on the information “learned” from this contact, while 20:27 is referring to the “service provider,” of the client who (pretends) makes the actual “contact” with the ghost and spirits, and who does not necessarily act based on this “contact.” For example in the case of Shaul and the witch of Endor, Samuel I 28:3-25, Shaul was the client as he went to the witch, the “service provider” in order to use her “powers” so that he could speak to Shmuel’s ghost. According to this understanding of 20:6,27, Shaul would have violated 20:6 and the witch who made the contact would have violated 20:27. The difference in penalties in the verses is that 20:27 records the death penalty for those people who claim to make contact with ghosts and spirits since killing them would end the problem of people turning to ghosts and spirits since then there would be no more “service providers” (see also Shemot 20:27), while the penalty of karet would be for the clients. (Note, in this field of making contact with ghosts and spirits, there are many fewer people who are “service providers” than there are clients.) This understanding of 20:27 also suggests an answer to the first difficulty of 20:27.

20:27 is clearly connected to chapters 19,20 based on 19:31 and 20:6, but now we can suggest another reason how it can be related to the ensuing chapters. As suggested above, 20:27 is referring to the person who pretended to contact the ghosts and spirits and in many societies this person was (is?) frequently thought of as being a religious figure. The ensuing laws, 21:1-22:16 record laws relating to the priests. The priests are the legitimate religious figures in contrast to the people who claim to speak to ghosts and spirits who are illegitimate religious figures. Thus, 20:27 rules out the illegitimate religious figures, who are to be killed, and then chapter 21 continues with a discussion of the laws concerning the true religious figures. Similarly, Devarim 18:1-8 records laws about priests and Levites, Devarim 18:15-22 records the laws of the prophets, and sandwiched between these two sections, Devarim 18:9-14, records the prohibitions of magicians and people who turn to ghosts and spirits. Again, the Torah contrasts the legitimate religious figures with the illegitimate religious figures. Vayikra 20:27 would then be a connecting sentence between chapters 19 and 20 (also chapter 18 which is part of the same unit as chapters 19 and 20) and the following chapters, 21 and 22.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (Abarbanel), Yitzhak, (1437-1508), 2005, Commentary on Vayikra, Jerusalem: Horev.

Vayikra 19:11,12 – The prohibition of lying in the Torah

Vayikra 19:11,12 record, "You shall not steal, you shall not deal falsely (lo tichahashu) or lie (ve-lo tishakroo). You shall not swear falsely (le-shaker)…." What is the difference between dealing falsely and lying?

The Rashbam and Ibn Ezra (on 19:11) explain that dealing falsely means denying that you have money that was given to you and the Rashbam quotes as a proof 5:22 which also has the phrase not to deal falsely (ve-kichesh) in reference to a pledge. Ibn Ezra adds that dealing falsely is also when somebody knows some information but does not testify.

With regard to lying, the Rashbam writes that it refers to lying about a loan, while the Ibn Ezra writes that the lying refers to making a false claim for money. These commentators seem to be explaining that the difference between dealing falsely and lying is whether the case concerns a pledge or a loan. This is a difficult distinction since the verse does not refer to different items but to different prohibitions.

This same term for dealing falsely also appears by Sara when she was accused of laughing and she denied laughing, va-tichachesh, Bereshit 18:15. Similarly, the case in Vayikra 5:21 is when a person denies having a pledge. 

I would suggest that the prohibition in 19:11 of dealing falsely is passive lying, that a person is falsely denying an accusation, while the prohibition of lying is active lying, to fabricate something that never happened or is not true.

Rashi (on 19:11) quotes from Torah Cohanim, that the prohibitions recorded in 19:11,12 form a sequence of events: if one steals, then this will lead one to deal falsely, then to lie and then to swear falsely. In our discussion on Vayikra 5:21,22, “False claims, gezel and genevah,” I propose that genevah was where one stole an item and could not claim ownership of the item, as opposed to gezelah where one stole an item and also falsely claimed ownership of the item. Following this idea, maybe one could understand the sequence of prohibitions in 19:11,12 in the following manner. First one steals and as he/ she cannot claim ownership of the item, then one "deals falsely" that he/ she denies that he/ she stole the item. Afterwards he/ she lies by fabricating a story to show that he/ she could not have stolen the item, a false alibi, and then finally he/ she swears to "prove" that he/ she did not steal the item.

Vayikra 19:16 – The prohibition of lo telekh rakhil

ויקרא יט:טז - לא תלך רכיל בעמיך ולא תעמוד על דם רעך אני ה'.

19:16 records that "lo telekh rakhil among your countryman. Do not stand over the blood of your fellow. I am G-d." What is the prohibition of lo telekh rakhil?

The standard translation of the word rakhil is talebearer, that a person should not be a talebearer, but this is a difficult translation. Rashi (on 19:16, also see Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon and Hoffmann) bases this translation on the word spying. Rashi argues that one changes the letter kf to a gimil, and then the phrase becomes not to spy. Yet, changing letters is a difficult approach. Rashi also quotes, as does the Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Ramban, that the word rakhil is from rokhel which means a merchant. Yet, not only are these two separate words, but also there is no obvious connection between merchants and talebearing. Finally, what is the connection between this prohibition and the following prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow? Ibn Ezra, Bekhor Shor and Rambam (Laws of opinions, 7:1) explain that people have died due to talebearing, yet this is quite a stretch.

It seems to me that Jeremiah 9:3 offers an explanation for the word rakhil. The verse records that a person should be careful of other people/ and one should not trust one's brother/ because brothers act with guile/ and other people go with rakhil. The parallelism of the verse suggests that the definition of rakhil is guile. Furthermore, from Jeremiah 6:28 and Ezekiel 22:9 we see that rakhil is not referring to some innocent pranks but deceit that leads to murder. Accordingly, 19:16 prohibits one from being maliciously deceitful and devious.

How does this prohibition relate to the prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow, the following phrase in the verse? Levine (1989, p.129) notes that this phrase "do not stand over the blood of your fellow" has been explained in three ways. One (see Rashi), is not to be inactive when another person's life is in danger, two, is not to conspire against others, and three, is not to "pursue one's livelihood in a manner that endangers another or at the expense of another's well-being." Levine likes the third approach since it "best fits the immediate context" which I understand to mean the approach that rakhil refers to a merchant. Yet, as pointed out above rakhil has nothing to do with being a merchant. The third approach does not fit into the context at all, and seems to be based on some anti-capitalist feelings. Levine notes that the second approach has support in several biblical verses and is the Ibn Ezra's explanation that "one should not join forces with murderers." I prefer the second approach and it accords with the suggestion above concerning rakhil. 19:16 would then mean that one is not to go about being maliciously deceitful and one should not join other people (gangs) who act in such a manner even if one does not participate (just stands around) in their evil acts.

Bibliography:

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Vayikra 19:2 (Kedoshim) – Kedusha

The idea of kedusha is highlighted in 19:2 “you shall be kadosh for I, the Lord your G-d am kadosh." Kedusha means separation not holiness, but what is 19:2 referring to? What is a person supposed to separate from?

Rashi explains that the kedusha is to separate from illicit sexual relations, and this idea connects 19:2 with the previous chapter.

Ramban notes that from the Sifra we see that kedusha is more general than just separating from sexual relations. He argues that one must limit some actions that are permitted, such as permitted sexual relations and drinking wine. Ramban argues that if we act in this way we will become attached to G-d, and this is what is meant by the phrase that G-d is kadosh.

Rambam (Moreh, 3:47) quotes a different explanation, (two Sifras- on 11:44 and 19:2) that kedusha develops by doing the commandments, and if one transgresses the law he is tamei. (Again we see the connection between tumah and sin.) I do not know how the Rambam interprets the phrase because “G-d is kadosh.” Maybe it means that just as the Jewish people are separate from the nations of the world due to the commandments, so too G-d is separate from the world.

Possibly the difference between the Ramban and the Rambam is how to understand the relationship between 19:2 and the rest of the chapter. While the verse is an introductory general statement, does it add to the specific laws that follow (Ramban) or does it express the idea of the laws (Rambam, also Rashbam) that by fulfilling the laws of the chapter, a person becomes kadosh?

A second way of understanding the argument is how does one acquire knowledge- objectively or subjectively, with knowledge being the commandments? Ramban follows the subjective approach since subjectively one knows that even some things which are permitted are really forbidden, but each person would have a different notion what is forbidden. Rambam follows the objective approach, as one only knows the commandment from what was commanded, but one does not add to these commandments.

A third approach to understanding the argument is how does one worship G-d, by doing what is commanded (Rambam) or by trying to do more (Ramban)? This argument between the Ramban and the Rambam is identical to their argument by the nazir. Ramban (on Bemidbar 6:11) claims that the nazir brings a hatta’t when he finishes being a nazir since it is a sin to stop being a nazir. Rambam (Shemonah Perakim and Laws of Opinions 3:1) writes that the act of becoming a nazir is a sin. Ramban is claiming that it is meritorious to add restriction and the Rambam thinks it is wrong.