Kohelet (Ecclesiastes) 3:1-8 – To everything there is a season

Ashkenazim have a custom to read the book of Kohelet (Ecclesiastes) on Sukkot (Rama, Orah Chayyim 490:9) and this is a “late” custom as compared to the reading of the other four Megillot. Masechet Soferim (8th century?, 14:3,18 and 18:7) refers to reading the other Megillot but does not mention reading the book of Kohelet. (In my edition of Masechet Soferim, Slotki, 1965, p. 276, footnote 6, records that the Gra (18th century) added in the text of Masechet Soferim to read Kohelet on Sukkot.) 

It seems that by the Middle Ages, Ashkenazim were reading Kohelet on Sukkot. Most likely this delay was because the message of Kohelet is very troubling and for a long time it was thought not appropriate to be read. However, eventually it was added probably just for the reason that once the other four Megillot (Esther, Shir ha-Shirim, Rut and Eicah) were read, then it was thought appropriate to read the fifth Megillah, Kohelet.

One of the most well-known set of verses in Kohelet (Ecclesiastes) is 3:1-8.  3:1 records, “To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the shamayim” (translation from Reichert and Cohen, 1946, p. 123). Note, many (all?) people translate the word shamayim as the heavens which I think they think is some undefined place that G-d and angels live, but I think it is the air starting from above people, animals and vegetation.

The next seven verses, 3:2-8, elaborate on 3:1 with regard to the words everything, time and purpose mentioned in 3:1. Each of these seven verses refer to a time to do four actions. The four actions in each verse are split into two groups of opposite actions, and the four actions relate to each other. Overall, there are 28 actions, 14 actions to do something and 14 actions which undo or end the previous action.

The first action mentioned in 3:2 is the first possible action, a time to be born, (1a) and the opposite action is a time to die (1b), which ends the life that was born. The second half of 3:2 continues this theme but by vegetation. First there is a time to plant (2a) vegetation, which from the plant’s perspective is like being born, and then the opposite action is that there is a time to uproot (2b) the plant, which is dying from the perspective of the plant.

The next verse 3:3 is problematic. It begins by stating that there is a time to kill (la-harog) and then a time to heal (lirpoah), but healing does not undo or end the killing as the person is still dead. In addition, the second half of 3:3 refers to opening (liphrotz) and building (livnot), which seemingly have nothing to do with killing or healing. Furthermore, killing is prohibited (Bereshit 9:6; Shemot 20:13), how could Kohelet write that there is a time for killing? People have told me that the killing is by a war, but this is mentioned in 3:8, and does not explain how the killing relates to opening/ building and how the healing undoes the killing. Instead, based on Melachim I 18:30, which records that on Mount Carmel (near Haifa) Eliyahu repaired (va-yirapeh) the altar which had been demolished (he-harus), Arnold Ehrlich (1848-1919, quoted by Ginsberg, 1963, p. 49) has suggested that the word la-harog in 3:3 should really be la-haros switching the gimmel in the end of the word for a samaech. With this change, 3:3 would refer to demolishing (3a) and repairing (3b), opening (4a) and building (4b), and 3:3 then accords with the structure of 3:2-8. The repairing (3b) ends or stops the demolishing (3a) and all four actions in the verse refer to one process, the building process, as almost inevitably when a person builds something, first the person needs to demolish and open things up to rebuild it. (When we did renovations in our house in Modiin, the work began by demolishing walls and making openings in the house before the house was re-built.)

The next verse, 3:4 refers to a time to cry (5a), a time to laugh (5b), which ends the crying, a time to mourn (6a) and a time to dance (6b), which ends or signals the end of the mourning.

The next verse 3:5 refers to a time to throw stones (7a), to gather stones (7b), to hug (8a) and to refrain from hugging (8b). This reference to throwing and gathering stones is odd. This action does not appear to be a significant action in a person’s life and how can it relate to hugging? The answer is that Kohelet Rabbah (3:3) explains that the phrase refers to marital relations when the wife is not a niddah (when sexual relations are permitted) and when the wife is a niddah (when sexual relations are prohibited). Reichert and Cohen (1946, p. 124) explain that the term stones in the verse is a euphemism for the testes, and the throwing of the stones is a euphemism for sexual intercourse. Note also in Rut 3:4,8,14 there is a euphemism, albeit a different word, margelotav, for the same male anatomy. It could be that Kohelet is not referring to the laws of niddah, but instead he (?) means there is time for sexual profligacy and a time for sexual restraint (see Machinist, 2004, p. 1607). With either possibility, the first half of 3:5 then relates to the hugging and not hugging in the second half of the verse.

The first half of the next verse, 3:6 refers to a time to seek/ demand (9a), and a time to lose something (9b), as when a person acknowledges that something is lost, then this stops one from seeking or demanding the item. The second half of 3:6 records that there is a time to keep/ store (10a, li-shmor, not the definition of the word shamor in the Torah, which is to remember, see our discussion on Devarim 4:6, “The definition of the word shamor in Moshe’s speeches in the book of Devarim - To remember”) and a time to discard (10b), and the discarding ends the keeping of an item. While these four actions could be referring to material items, I think that all the actions refer to a person seeking a partner/ friend, losing a partner/ friend, keeping the partner/ friend and separating from one’s partner/ friend.

The next verse 3:7 refers to a time to tear (11a), a time to sew (11b), as the sowing ends or removes the tear, and a time to keep quiet (12a) and a time to speak (12b), as the speaking ends or stop the person from being quiet. It is not clear how these four actions are connected. Hartom (1999, p. 76) suggests that all of these actions refer to mourning. The tearing was the common way for a person to express his/ her grief, and then after the mourning was over, the tear was sewn. (Today we still tear our garments at the funeral, but it has become a formal act and I think very few people sew their clothing which they tore.) Similarly, initially when a person is in mourning, they are quiet and pensive, and then when the mourning ends or become less intense, they start to talk.

The last verse in this set of verses, 3:8 records that there is a time to love (13a), a time to hate (13b), as the hate ends the love, and a time for war (14a) and time for peace (14b), as the peace ends the war. This verse breaks the pattern of the previous six verses since in 3:2-3:7 the first action (the “a” action) in the first half of the verse corresponds to the first action (again the “a” action) in the second half of the verse. For example, in 3:2, action 1a is being born and action 2a is being planted. However here the action to love (13a) does not correspond to fighting a war (14a). One would have thought that the first action in 3:8 would be to hate which corresponds with fighting a war or that the second action in the second half of the verse would be to fight a war. Maybe Kohelet did not want to put to hate before to love since while it happens that people who hate each other fall in love (Beauty and the Beast?), the more common occurrence is that people who hate each other initially loved each other (most cases of divorce?), and hence hate would be mentioned after love. (Note this does not imply that all cases of love lead to hate or that hate only happens after love, but that it is more likely that hate will happen after love, then love will develop from hatred.) A different idea is that maybe Kohelet did want to list to hate before to love to not be too rose-colored to imply that all cases of hate lead to love in the end. In addition, maybe Kohelet did not want to end this series of verses on fighting, so he ended with there is a time for peace. Or maybe Kohelet wanted to end the series of verses with a verse that has a chiastic structure, 13a with 14b and 13b with 14a.

Looking at the eight verses as one unit, excluding the first verse, 3:2, which is the totality of life, being born and dying, there is an approximate chiastic structure to the verses. 3:3, the demolishing and building of physical structures roughly matches with 3:8, the forming and ending of human relationships, 3:4 is similar to 3:7 since both relate to mourning and 3:5 and 3:6 both relate to a person and his/ her partner, which, other than the fear of G-d (12:13), is the pivotal part of a person’s life.

Bibliography:

Ginsberg, H. L. 1963, The quintessence of Kohelet, in Biblical and other studies, edited by Alexander Altmann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hartom (Artom), Elia Samuele (1887-1965), 1999, The five Megillot, Tel Aviv: Yavneh Publishing House.

Machinist, Peter, 2004, Kohelet/ Ecclesiastes, in the Jewish Study Bible edited by Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1603-1622.

Reichert, Victor and A. Cohen, 1946, Ecclesiastes, in The Five Megilloth: Hebrew text, English translation and commentary, edited by A. Cohen, Hindhead, Surrey: The Soncino Press, pp. 103-191.

Slotki, Israel W., 1965, Masseketh Soferim, translated, in The Minor Tractates of the Talmud, Vol. 1, edited by A. Cohen, London: Soncino Press.

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 24:1-4 – Marriage, divorce, marriage to a second husband, divorce/ death, re-marriage to first hubby, not

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 24:1-4 records that if two people get divorced and the woman subsequently remarried, then the initial couple cannot remarry if the woman becomes single again either through divorce or the death of the second husband. 24:4 refers to this second marriage to the first husband as a toevah, an abhorrence (Alter, 2004, p. 996) or an abomination to G-d. Why should the couple not be able to remarry again? If the wife had not married a second time to another man, then the couple would be able to remarry, why should the second marriage, which was perfectly legal, stop the couple from re-marrying after the second marriage ended?

Ramban (on 24:4, also see Seforno, Luzzatto and Hoffman on 24:4) explains that the reason for the prohibition is the Torah does not want people to swap wives by being able to freely divorce and then remarry again. Hirsch (1989, p. 480) varies this idea slightly as he writes, “The Torah evidently sees, and wishes to forestall, the possibility of a reprehensible misuse of the seriousness of legal marriage and divorce to hide and gloss over an intended adultery, which by the connivance of all the parties could be accomplished under the cloak of complete legality.” Tigay (1996, p. 220) notes that such a course of action would be similar to practices in some Islamic countries (Iran) that allow temporary marriages as a cover for prostitution. Yet, he rejects this idea since he notes that 24:3 states that the reason for the divorce is because the second husband disliked the wife, which means that he did not intend for a temporary union as by the case of wife swapping.

Instead, Tigay writes, “Perhaps, the law was prompted by a concern that if husbands take their wives back after the wives had voluntary sexual relations with other men, adultery might begin to seem less objectionable.” While this is possible, 24:4 implies that the re-marriage itself is problematic and not some future action. Raymond Westbrook (1986) reviews various suggestions for the law and offers his own interesting theory.

One suggestion he quotes is from Philo who seems to imply that the second marriage was adulterous. Yet, how can this be if the first marriage ended in divorce? It seems that Philo is suggesting that the fear is that the wife committed adultery with the second husband during her first marriage. However, this idea is also problematic since the law applies to all second marriages and not just to cases where there is a fear that the women committed adultery with the second husband.

A second suggestion, from S.R. Driver (1902, p. 272), is that the prohibition is to deter people from a hasty divorce. Westbrook rejects this idea since it is unlikely that the first husband when divorcing his wife is going to be concerned that his wife might remarry, become single and then he might want to marry her again. Furthermore, again the strong language of 24:4 which refers to restoring the first marriage as an abhorrence indicates that the second marriage is the source of the problem, and not some fear of people divorcing too quickly.

A third idea, from Yaron (1966), is that the prohibition is to stop the wife from breaking up her second marriage in order to return to her first husband. Westbrook rejects this idea since he notes that the initial couple cannot remarry even if the second husband died, but according to Yaron, in this case the wife did not end the second marriage and she should be free to remarry her first husband.

Instead, Westbrook focuses on the different reasons for the divorce of the first and second marriages. With regard to the first divorce, the Torah records that the divorce was due to a finding of ervat davar, 24:1, suspicious behavior of the wife, while with regard to the second marriage, the Torah records that the divorce was because the husband began to hate his wife, 24:4. Westbrook suggests, based on other Ancient Near East law codes, that when a wife was divorced for suspicious behavior, she did not receive any divorce money (her dowry), while if she was divorced because the husband hated her or was widowed, she would receive divorce money. Thus, he suggests that the fear is that the first husband desires to remarry his wife since she became wealthy from the divorce settlement from the second husband, and hence the law is then to stop the first husband from profiting twice, “first by rejecting his wife and then by accepting her.”

While Westbrook’s idea is interesting, I am not convinced due some of the same problems mentioned above. Westbrook himself notes that the statement in the Torah that the second marriage to the first husband is an abhorrence (abomination) “seems somewhat harsh for a case of unjust enrichment,” but he notes the term abomination is also used for a falsifier of weights, (24:16). However, a falsifier of weights is a thief, while here the first husband is not a thief. Secondly, according to Westbrook, the whole law is when the wife would become wealthy from the second marriage, which is not necessarily the most likely outcome of the second marriage. Finally, I am not sure if the rationales for divorce are a crucial issue in this case. It could be that the rationale for the first divorce, the suspicious behavior of the wife as opposed to the hatred of the husband is to explain how it could happen that the first husband wanted to remarry his wife. He never hated her, and once he resolved his suspicions to his satisfaction, then he would want to remarry his wife.

My hypothesis (variation on Philo?) is that the restoration of the marriage to the first husband retroactively abrogates the divorce from the first husband, which means that the second marriage would then be considered a form of adultery. This idea explains the use of the term abhorrence since the case involves a form of adultery. Also, 24:4 uses the word hutama, which Westbrook notes literally means “she (the wife) has been caused to be tamei,” and this could mean that the restoration of marriage to the first husband causes the wife to be tamei due to the marriage to the second man. Yet, how can one say the first divorce is abrogated by the marriage to the second husband?

Possibly the idea is that once the husband desires to remarry his wife, then he is admitting that the basis for the initial divorce was in error and hence the divorce was unwarranted. The restoration of the first marriage makes it as if the couple were always married, and then the second marriage would be considered a form of adultery. This same idea of retroactivity exists by the annulment of vows that in some cases when vows are annulled the initial vows are viewed retroactively as having never been made, Bemidbar 30. 

 (Note, my understanding does not accord with the halakhah, Shulchan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 10:1, see also Yevamot 11b, that if wife had sexual relations after the first divorce, then she can re-marry her first husband. Yet, according to my understanding that the second marriage to the first husband retroactively abrogates the first divorce, then the sexual relations with a different man would be a type of adultery, if the woman would be able to remarry the first husband, just like the marriage to the second husband, and hence the first marriage should not be allowed to be restored. My guess is that the Torah only refers to the case where the wife marries again, 24:2,3, not to exclude the case where the woman had sexual relations with a second man, to make the point that even in the woman marries, the woman cannot re-marry the first husband.)

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Driver, Samuel Rolles, 1902, A critical and exegetical commentary on Deuteronomy, third edition, Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, translated by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Westbrook, Raymond (1946-2009), 1986, The prohibition on restoration of marriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, in Scripta Hiersolymitana, Studies in Bible, edited by Sara Japhet, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 31, pp. 387-405.

Yaron, Reuven, 1966, The restoration of marriage, Journal of Jewish Studies, 17, pp. 1-11.

דברים טז: כב - ולא תקים לך מצבה

For this discussion in English, see our discussion on Asherot and Matzevot in the Torah.  I thank my daughter Talia for translating the English discussion to the Hebrew below.  

בפרשת שופטים, לאחר רצף של מצוות שנוגעות לשלושת הרגלים ולאחריו מינוי שופטים ושוטרים, אנו מצווים במצווה שמעלה שאלות רבות:

"לֹא תִטַּע לְךָ אֲשֵׁרָה כָּל עֵץ אֵצֶל מִזְבַּח ה' אֱלֹקיךָ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה לָּךְ. וְלֹא תָקִים לְךָ מַצֵּבָה אֲשֶׁר שָׂנֵא ה' אֱלֹקיךָ" (דברים טז, כא-כב).

מצווה זו, שלא לבנות מצבה, היא מתמיהה במיוחד, לא רק מצד מיקומה בסדר המצוות בפרשה, אלא גם ניכר על פני הדברים שהיא עומדת בניגוד לפרקטיקה של בניית מצבה שבוצעה לא אחת בתורה. כך, אברהם אבינו נטע אשל בבאר שבע (בראשית כא, לג), יעקב אבינו הקים מצבת אבן בבית אל והכריז כי היא תהיה "בית האלוקים" (בראשית כח, יח; לה, יד), ואפילו משה רבנו עצמו הקים שתים עשרה מצבות למרגלות הר סיני בעת כריתת הברית (שמות כד, ד). גם יהושע הקים מצבה בשכם, וזאת למרות שכבר ניתן הציווי האמור שלא להקים מצבה (יהושע כד, כו-כז).

חריגות המצווה נלמדת גם מהשפה הקשה שמאמץ הפסוק: "אשר שנא ה'". זהו ביטוי יוצא דופן שמופיע שוב רק לעניין הקרבת הילדים בעבודת המולך: "כִּי כָל תּוֹעֲבַת ה' אֲשֶׁר שָׂנֵא עָשׂוּ לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם, כִּי גַם אֶת בְּנֵיהֶם וְאֶת בְּנֹתֵיהֶם יִשְׂרְפוּ בָאֵשׁ לֵאלֹהֵיהֶם" (דברים יב, לא). נראה כי התורה מעמידה את המצבה בקו אחד עם הקרבת ילדים, ועוד כאשר האבות השתמשו בפרקטיקה זו.

עלינו להבין אם כן מהי חומרתה הגדולה של הקמת מצבה ואיך חומרת האיסור מתיישב עם כך שדומה שהאבות כן הקימו אותן.

הפרשנים הציעו הסברים שונים לשוני שחל ביחס של הקב"ה להקמת מצבות. על פי רש"י (על ט"ז: כב) בזמן האבות המצבה הייתה אהובה לפני ה', אך לאחר שהכנענים אימצו אותה לחלק מרכזי בפולחן האלילי שלהם, היא הפכה לשנואה. על כך יש לשאול האם הכנענים באמת לא עשו שימוש במצבות ובאשרות לפולחן עבודה זרה כבר בימי אברהם ויעקב. לא נראה כי זוהי פרקטיקה חדשה שהתפתחה בין זמן האבות ועד למתן תורה.

הרמב"ן (על ט"ז: כב) מפתח את הפירוש של רש"י, אך מבחין בין עבודת הקורבנות שעל פניו הייתה גם היא חלק מעבודת האלילים הכנענית, ובכל זאת המזבח הינו מרכזי בעבודת ה', לבין המצבות שנאסרו לכאורה בשל המרכזיות שלהן בעבודת האלילים הכנענית. הוא מסביר שבעוד המזבח הוא כלי הכרחי ובלתי נפרד מהקרבת הקרבנות ולכן לא ניתן לבטלו, המצבה אינה חיונית להקרבה – ולכן, ברגע שהושחתה על ידי הכנענים, נאסרה. גם פירוש זה מניח שחל שינוי מסוים לאורך השנים בעבודת האלילים, אך סיבה להניח שהתפתחות שכזו אכן התרחשה.

האבן עזרא (על ט"ז: כב) עומד על השוני בין המצבות של האבות למצבות שנאסרו, ומציע שהאיסור על מצבה חל רק כאשר היא נעשית במטרה לעבוד עבודה זרה. אם היא נבנית לשם עבודת ה' – היא מותרת. אלא, שנדמה שפירוש זה אינו מדייק באיסור, שלא מופיע בו רמז להבחנה בין מצבה "טובה" למצבה "רעה". ההבחנה הזו כלל אינה מצויה בפסוק, ואין כל מקור המבסס אותה.

כדי ליישב את הסתירות הלכאוריות נציע שיש לערוך אבחנה יסודית בין שני תפקידים שונים ששימשה בהם המצבה:

מצבת הנצחה וזיכרון (אנדרטה): מצבה שנועדה לציון אירוע היסטורי, כריתת ברית או זיכרון על קבר. דוגמאות מובהקות לכך הן המצבות שהקים משה למרגלות הר סיני (שמות כד:ד), המצבה שהקים יעקב לרחל (בראשית לה:כ) והמצבה הגדולה שהקים יהושע בן נון בשכם לאחר כריתת הברית עם העם (יהושע כד:כו-כז). מצבות ממין זה אינן מיועדות לביצוע אקט דתי או פולחני, ולכן יש לחלק ולומר שהן למעשה לא נאסרו מעולם.

מצבת פולחן: אבן או עץ המשמשים כחלק מן הטקס הדתי עצמו (לניסוך, הקרבה או עבודה רוחנית ישירה). רק קטגוריה זו, גם אם היא נעשית כחלק מעבודת ה', היא שנאסרה מפורשות בספר דברים.

אבחנה זו חיונית במיוחד: בלעדיה, מעשהו של יהושע בן נון בשכם – שהקים מצבה לאחר מתן תורה ואיסור ספר דברים – היה עומד בסתירה ישירה לחוק המקראי. ההבחנה מבהירה שיהושע הקים מצבת זיכרון מותרת, ולא מצבת פולחן.

אך אין בהסבר זה די, מאחר והדבר אינו נותן מענה למקרה שבו הקמת המצבה משמשת לעבודת ה', למשל בראיית יעקב את המצבה כבית ה' וכשער השמיים. לפיכך יש לחדד מדוע בימי האבות איפשר ה' את השימוש במצבות ואשרות לשם עבודתו, ואילו בערבות מואב בספר דברים אסר אותן כליל ואף הגדירן כדבר שהוא "שונא"?

כדי לתת מענה לכך ניעזר בגישתו של הרמב"ם במורה נבוכים בנוגע למוסד הקרבנות (חלק ג', פרק לב). לעניין עבודת הקורבנות, הרמב"ם מסביר שאלוקים אינו משנה את טבע האדם בבת אחת, ואינו גומל חברה מהרגלים תרבותיים מושרשים ביום אחד. כאשר ניתנים ציווים הנוגעים לעבודה פולחנית, ה' מתייחס לפרקטיקות הנהוגות בעולם העתיק, ונלקח בחשבון כי התודעה האנושית לא מסוגלת הייתה לתפוס עבודת אלוהות ללא קרבנות ופרקטיקות פיזיות. על כן, ה' הסכים לעבודת הקרבנות מתוך התחשבות ביכולת הקליטה של האנושות באותה עת.

בדומה, יש להסביר לעניין איסור האשרות והמצבות, שיחסו של הקב"ה לא השתנה למצבות, וגם בתקופת האבות "שנא" את הפרקטיקות הללו. ואולם, כיוון שאברהם ויעקב פעלו מתוך כוונה טהורה לעבודתו, ובשל נורמות הפולחן שהיו נהוגות בזמנם, ה' לכאורה קיבל והכיל פרקטיקות אלו. אלא, שעם התפתחות התודעה הרוחנית של עם ישראל ובעקבות קבלת התורה, משה מודיע לעם כי מה שהיה נסבל בעבר מתוך התחשבות במצבם הראשוני – אינו נסבל עוד. -השימוש בלשון החריפה "אֲשֶׁר שָׂנֵא" נועד לזעזע ולהבהיר כי המשך השימוש בתודעה פולחנית מיושנת לאחר מתן תורה נתפס כמעוות ומאוס.

יש עדיין לשאול מדוע אפוא הקרבנות נותרו מותרים, ואילו המצבות והאשרות נאסרו כליל. התשובה נעוצה בפסיכולוגיה החברתית של בני האדם שנאמרה בפרשנותו של הרמב"ן, שהציבור בתקופה המקראית תפס את הקרבנות כליבת עבודת האלוקים שאי אפשר בלעדיה. איסור גורף על הקרבת קרבנות היה נתפס בעיניהם כביטול עצם הדת והקשר עם ה'. על כן, הקרבנות הושארו, אך תוחמו ורוכזו במזבח ובמקדש. לעומת זאת, המצבות והאשרות נתפסו כאלמנטים משניים ונלווים בלבד לעבודה הדתית. כיוון שהעם לא ראה בהן מרכיב קיומי והכרחי לעבודת ה', הציבור יכול היה לעמוד בגזירה זו ולספוג את איסורן המלא.

The kinah Eichah yashva havezelet haSharon - איכה ישבה חבצלת השרון

This kinah, again from R. Elazar haKalir, also follows the aleph bet, as the first word of each stanza is the first word in the verses in chapter one of Eichah, and these verses follow the order of the aleph bet. In addition, the kinah has 24 stanzas to match with the twenty-four priestly families, whose names are recorded in Divrei Ha-Yamim I 24:7-18 and the end of each stanza in the kinah refers to a city/ town/ village in the Galilee, where apparently priestly families were living. The rhyme of each stanza, with the possible exception of the fourth stanza, is based on the name of the place in the Galilee. Since there is a need for twenty-four stanzas, the letters shin and taf each have two stanzas. Goldschmidt (2002, p 52) notes that really there are two more stanzas to this kinah, one which has an acronym of R. Elazar haKalir’s name, but theses stanzas are usually skipped. It is believed that R. Elazar haKalir was a priest, cohen, since in this kinah he shows great knowledge of the families and an affinity to them. Maybe, he based the kinah on the first chapter of Eichah since Eichah 1:4 refers to the suffering of the priests.

This kinah raises a historical question concerning the 24 priestly families. These families existed in the time of the second Bet ha-Mikdash as evidenced from the verses in Divrei Ha-Yamim, but did they continue to exist after the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash? Shmuel Klein (1909, in German) used this kinah and other piyyutim to create a baraita that states that the 24 families left the area from around Jerusalem and moved to the Galilee either after the destruction of the first Bet ha-Mikdash or after the Bar Kokhba revolt. According to this idea, the 24 priestly families remained intact after the two tragedies, and many people have accepted this historical recreation. However, in a fascinating article Trifon (1990) notes that there is no evidence for this movement of families at those times or for the continuation of the families, except for two statements in Yerushalmi Ta’anit chapter 4 (see below) which refer to two of the priestly families, but it is from the third century. Instead, she suggests that in the middle of the third century or later, priests who were living in various cities/ town/ villages in the Galilee either associated themselves with the priestly families from the second Bet ha-Mikdash or other people made this association.

This historical question is crucial for how one understands this kinah. If one believes that there was a movement of the priestly families around the time of the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash or after the end of the Bar Kokhba revolt from the center of the country to the north of the country, then one can understand the kinah as lamenting this change of location (within the land of Israel) of the priestly families. However, if this movement never happened, then the references to the 24 places in the kinah should be understood as a way or prayer to re-institute the families.

In my reading of the kinah I follow the second approach, not just because of Trifon’s arguments, but if the priestly families had really continued, then it is odd that R. Elazar haKalir does not refer to the names of the 24 families from Divrei ha-Yamim only to places in the Galilee. Also, the kinah ends on a positive note (stanza 24), so this suggests that the mention of the 24 areas where the priests lived is part of this prayer to re-institute the families. Also, in each stanza there is a rhyme based on name of the place in the Galilee, but there are five words that rhyme in each stanza, when one would have thought that four rhymes would form the stanza. The fifth rhyme in the stanza is the name of the place in the Galilee, which suggests that the name of the place is independent of the four previous lines in the stanza, and then unrelated to the sorrows that are hinted to or mentioned in the first four rhymes of each stanza. In fact, there seems to be almost no connection or a tenuous connection at best between most of the ideas in each stanza with the particular priestly family, with the possible exception of the first stanza. For example, many of the stanzas do not refer to the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, which means that R. Elazar haKalir is not lamenting events from the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash and then R. Elazar haKalir is not referring to some sad events that occurred to the priestly families at that time. I will now explain some of the different stanzas.

The first stanza is based on the town of Maron, and in theory the priestly family of Yehoyariv, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:7, but as mentioned above the name is not mentioned in the stanza. The line with the fifth rhyme and the name Maron is based on a cryptic statement from R. Levi in the Yerushalmi Ta’anit, chapter 4, law 5, that refers to the place Maron, the priestly family Yehoyariv and another person, Mersarbei, who is referred to in the kinah before the place Maron. It could be that R. Levi was stating that the family of Yehoyariv was the priestly family working in the Bet ha-Mikdash when it was destroyed and that is what R. Elazar haKalir means when in write in the fifth line of the stanza, kinimsar ha-bayit, they gave over the Bet ha-Mikdash.

The idea of the first stanza is state how good everything was at the start, that the people and/ or the Bet ha-Mikdash were like a rose, but then all was lost as the singers of the people or of the Bet ha-Mikdash were silenced and the priests stopped working in the Bet ha-Mikdash.

The second stanza is based on the town of Tzipori, and in theory the priestly family of Yedayah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:7. This town and the priestly family are also referred to in Yerushalmi Ta’anit, after the quote from R. Levi, by an even more cryptic statement by R. Berekhia about how the people rebelled against G-d. This rebellion might be why R. Elazar haKalir referred to the people sinning by killing a cohen and a prophet on Yom Kippur in the second line of the stanza.

It is very confusing which prophet was killed and when. The popular understanding is that the incident being referred to is that the people killed Zechariah ben Yehodaya (Divrei ha-Yamim II 24:21), who was both a cohen and a prophet. Note, Zechariah ben Yehodaya is not the prophet Zechariah from the book of prophets, see Blank (1937-38). It is also claimed that this killing is referred to in Eicah 2:20, but as noted by the Ibn Ezra on the verse, the simple reading of Eicah 2:20 is that the verse is saying how terrible it was that the Babylonians killed priests and prophets in the Bet ha-Mikdash. If Zechariah ben Yehodaya is the correct reference in this kinah, then the killing happened in the kingdom of Jehoash (Joash) around the years 796 BCE to 835 BCE, many years before the destruction of the first Bet ha-Mikdash. This killing is mentioned in other kinot, as for example the kinah “Yom achpi hikbadeti” (not by R. Elazar haKalir) and in the kinah “Im tochalnah nashim” (from R. Elazar haKalir) in the nun line, the ayin line and the last line of the kinah. Presumably, R. Elazar haKalir mentioned the killing in this kinah since it relates to the priests.

The third line of the stanza refers to people killed because of the killing of the cohen. These deaths are mentioned in the Yerushalmi, Ta’anit chapter 4, law 5, that quotes R. Yochanon that 80,000 young priests were killed after Zechariah (ben Yehodaya) was killed. It is hard to believe that so many priests died at that time.

The third stanza of the kinah is based on the town of Mafsheta, and in theory the priestly family of Harim, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:8. The first line in the stanza refers to the exile from the land, which means that R. Elazar haKalir is referring to the events after the destruction of the first Bet ha-Mikdash where most of the population was exiled, and would not refer to the priests after the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash, where there was no forced exile of the priests or the general population to outside of the land of Israel.

The third line in the stanza refers to four judgments on the people since they did not follow the laws of shemitta and ma’aser. Goldschmidt (2002, p. 48) notes that the connection between these punishments and the sins is mentioned in Pirkei Avot chapter five, and that these four punishments are plague (dever), war (herev), famine and captivity. Is this similar to the symbolism of the four horsemen in the Book of Revelation 6:1-8, which most likely was written by a Jew.

The fourth stanza is based on the town of Ayatah, and in theory the priestly family of Seorim, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:8. This stanza might be unique in the kinah since the place name, Ayatah, is the second to last word in the stanza, not the last word in the stanza, and the rhyme of the stanza is based on the following word, lo. However, maybe the name of the town is really Ayatahlo.

The fifth stanza is based on the town of Beth Lehem (in the Galilee, not south of Jerusalem), and in theory the priestly family of Malciyah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:8. In this stanza, R. Elazar haKalir refers to sins, thought it is not clear if R. Elazar haKalir is referring to the sins of the people or the sins of the priests. In any event, this means that R. Elazar haKalir is also placing the blame for the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash on the people or the priests.

The sixth stanza is based on the town of Yodfat and in theory the priestly family of Meyamun, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:9. In the second to last word of the stanza, it could be that R. Elazar haKalir is referring to the fall of Yodfat to the Roman army in 67 prior to the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash after a 47-day siege. Josephus was the commander of the Jewish forces. In the end of the battle, all the soldiers committed suicide, while Josephus surrendered to the Romans and went on to be a chronicler of the battles against the Romans. Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 280) makes an interesting point about Josephus:
It is interesting that Josephus is not mentioned at all in the Gemara, although Rashi does refer to him (Baba Bathra 3b)... It is hard to know what the attitude of our sages was, but I suspect that while they disapproved of what Josephus did (at Yodfat), they felt that they did not have the right to condemn him. As a result, they ignored him. The Gemara would have mentioned him if they considered him a traitor.

The seventh stanza is based on the town of Elvu and in theory the priestly family of Hakotz, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:10. In the third rhyming word in the stanza there is a possible reference to the name Hakotz, and in the fourth rhyming word, there is a reference to the town, Elvu. In this stanza, R. Elazar haKalir contrasts the change in the people from Mount Sinai where they willingly agreed to follow the Torah to when the people sinned.

The eighth stanza is based on the town of Uziel and in theory the priestly family of Aviyah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:10. In this stanza, in the first line, R. Elazar haKalir continues the reference from the people in the desert as he seemingly refers to the sin of the golden calf (Shemot 32:4) and in the second line, R. Elazar haKalir states that the people continued to not listen to G-d’s prophets.

The ninth stanza is based on the town of Arbel and in theory the priestly family of Yeshuah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:11.

The tenth stanza is based on the town of Kabul and in theory the priestly family of Shicnayahu, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:11. Rav Soloveitchik (2010, pp. 282,283) suggests that in this stanza, R. Elazar haKalir is saying that really the people were supposed to all be killed, but instead the Bet ha-Mikdash was destroyed instead of people being killed. He explains that this understanding is the basis for a strange practice that we have that even though according to the Talmud (Ta’anit 29a), the Bet ha-Mikdash only began to be destroyed in the afternoon of Tisha B’av, still we reduce some of our mourning in the afternoon, as for example we sit on chairs after mid-day (Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim 559:3). Rav Soloveitchik suggests that this reduction in mourning is because once the Bet ha-Mikdash was beginning to be destroyed, then it was understood that not everybody would be killed. While it very well could be that R. Elazar haKalir was saying in this stanza that the Bet ha-Mikdash was destroyed instead of all the people being killed, I doubt that this is the basis for this minimization of the mourning in middle of the day of Tisha B’av. More likely this change is due to the influence of the Mourners of Zion, who were probably Karaites, since they (the Karaites) developed the idea of the redemption starting in the afternoon, an idea which is not in the Talmud. The Karaites would split their day of mourning for the Bet ha-Mikdash (the tenth of Av) into two parts, mourning in the morning and then in the afternoon, there was a time of comfort and consolation, see Yaakov Gartner, (1981).

The eleventh stanza is based on the town of Kanah and in theory the priestly family of Elyashiv, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:12.

The twelfth stanza is based on the town of Tzfat and in theory the priestly family of Yakim, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:12.

The thirteenth stanza is based on the town of Bet Maon and in theory the priestly family of Huppah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:13. In the third line, R. Elazar haKalir refers to the killing of the priests by Nov (Shumel I 22:17-19) and the killing of the Givonim (Shmuel II 21:1) both in the times of King David. Presumably R. Elazar haKalir wanted to mention the killing by Nov since it involved suffering by priests, and possibly he then mentioned Givon since it was around the same time and it fit into the rhyme.

The fourteenth stanza is based on the town of Yeshbeav and in this case the name of the town is the same name in theory of the priestly family of Yeshbeav, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:13. Is that a coincidence?

The fifteenth stanza is based on the town of Mearyah and in theory the priestly family of Bilgah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:14. In the second line of the stanza, R. Elazar haKalir notes that by the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, the merit from the akedah did not help the people. In contrast, in the selihot prayers, many of the piyyutim are based on the idea that G-d should answer out prayers due to the merit of the akedah.

The sixteenth stanza is based on the town of Yevanit and in theory the priestly family of Emer, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:14.

The seventeenth stanza is based on the town of Mamlach and in theory the priestly family of Chezir, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:15.

The eighteenth stanza is based on the town of Natzrat (Nazareth) and in theory the priestly family of Hapeetetz, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:15. In the first line of the stanza, R. Elazar haKalir quotes the verse from Eicah 1:18 that G-d is righteous, which he has Yoshiyahu saying when he is dying in the next kinah, “Eicah eli konenu,” and he partially quotes the verse at the end of the kinah, “ve-atah amarta.”

The nineteenth stanza is based on the town of Arav and in theory the priestly family of Hapitchiyah, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:16.

The twentieth stanza is based on the town of Nunia and in theory the priestly family of Yechezkel, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:16.

The twenty first stanza is based on the town of Yochnah and in theory the priestly family of Yachin, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:17.

The twenty second stanza is based on the town of Bet Hoviyah and in theory the priestly family of Gamul, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:17.

The twenty third stanza is based on the town of Tzalmin and in theory the priestly family of Delayahu, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:18.

The twenty fourth stanza is based on the town of Hamat Ariah and in theory the priestly family of Mazayahu, Divrei ha-Yamim I 24:18. In this stanza, R. Elazar haKalir prays for the healing and the re-birth of the people and of the Bet ha-Mikdash, which ends the kinah on a positive note. He includes a positive ending also in other kinot such as “Az bemelot safek,” and “Eich tanchamuni hevel.” This type of ending would become standard with later paytanim, but not so much with R. Elazar haKalir.

Bibliography:

Blank, Sheldon H., 1937-38, The death of Zechariah in Rabbinic literature, Hebrew Union College Annual, Vol. 12-13, pp. 327-346.

Gartner, Yaakov, 1981, Tefillat Nachem, time of comfort and the Karaites, (Hebrew) Sinai, 89, pp. 157-164.

Goldschmidt, Daniel (1895-1972), 2002, first printed 1972, The kinot of Tisha B’av: Following the custom of Poland and Ashkenazi communities in the land of Israel, 2nd edition, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Klein, Shmuel, 1909, Beiträge zur Geographie und Geschichte Galiläas, Leipzig.

Soloveitchik, Joseph (1903-1993), 2010, The Koren mesorat harav kinot: Commentary on the kinot based on the teachings of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, edited by Simon Posner, Jerusalem: Koren Publishers; New York: OU Press.

Trifon, Dalia, 1990, Did the priestly courses (mishmarot) transfer from Judaea to Galilee after the Bar Kokhba revolt? Tarbiz, 59:1-2, pp. 77-93.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 34:16-29 –The significance of the fifth list of tribal leaders in the book of Bemidbar (Numbers)

The book of Bemidbar has five lists of tribal leaders. The first time is the opening words of Bemidbar, 1:5-15, and these same names are mentioned in chapter two within the count of the four parts of the camp. Afterwards, chapter 7 records the sacrifices of these same people and then 10:14-27 records again the list of tribal leaders. The fifth and last time there is a list of the tribal leaders is 34:16-29. Note there is another list of tribal officials, the spies, 13:4-16, who were not the leaders of the tribe. Also, see Olson (1996, p. 189) who suggests that these five lists can be used to form a literary division of the book of Bemidbar.

The fifth list of tribal leaders differs from the other four lists since it only has ten tribes, as opposed to twelve in the other lists, because the tribal leaders of Reuven and Gad are not mentioned in the fifth list because those tribes were receiving land outside of the land of Israel. 

Another difference is that within the ten tribes, the order of the tribal leaders does not follow the usual pattern in the other four lists of tribal leaders, as all the other lists are based on the birth order of the progenitors of the tribes and/ or the place in the camp of the tribes. For example, in the fifth list, the leader of the tribe of Binyamin is mentioned before the tribal leaders of Menashe and Efrayim, 34:21-23. Also, in the fifth list, the tribal leaders of the tribes of Zevulun and Yissachar are not mentioned in conjunction with the tribe of Yehuda, who camped together, and Zevulun is mentioned before Yissachar, his older brother (also in Devarim 33:18, maybe for the same reason), 34:25,26.  Also, in the fifth list of tribal leaders, Dan is listed separate from the other tribes who descended from Bilha and Zilpa, 34:22.

Instead, as noted by many (see Milgrom, 1990, p. 288) the order of the fifth list of tribal leaders follows the geographical distribution of the tribes in the land of Israel starting from the south and moving northwards. The list does not follow the exact pattern, but if one views each pair of tribes as a group, then the pairs move up in five “levels” in the land of Israel. Note, within each pair, the tribe with the larger population as recorded in Bemidbar 26 is mentioned first.  Also, the listing of the tribe of Dan is based on where they were supposed to get land, what roughly today is called Gush Dan, the center of Israel by the coast.

We see from the order of the fifth list of tribal leaders in the book of Bemidbar that before the Jewish people entered the land of Israel, it was known the general area where the tribes would be in the land. This would seem to be obvious since people would need to know where to go when they reached the land and there would not be fights with each person grabbing some particular land. Furthermore, it could be that as part of the investiture of Yehoshua, 27:18-23, the general division of the land was determined with the urim.

 
This change in the order of the tribes by the fifth list of tribal leaders signals the change in the people that had transpired from the beginning of the book of Bemidbar to the end of the book of Bemidbar. The first four lists of tribal leaders in the beginning of the book of Bemidbar revolved around the camp of the people in the desert/ wilderness, but the fifth list of tribal leaders, based on where the people were going to live in the land of Israel, shows that at the end of the forty years of the people's stay in the desert/ wilderness, the people were primed and ready to take possession of the land of Israel. Note, also the surrounding text of 33:50-36:13 record laws and narrative which indicate that the settlement of the land was imminent. 

Bibliography:

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Olson, Dennis, 1996, Numbers: Interpretation- A Bible Commentary for teaching and preaching, Louisville: John Knox Press.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 27:12,13 – The command for Moshe to go up to Mount Avarim: A short break for Moshe?

במדבר כז: יב,יג - ויאמר ה' אל־משה עלה אל־הר העברים הזה וראה את־הארץ אשר נתתי לבני ישראל. וראיתה אתה ונאספת אל־עמיך גם־אתה כאשר נאסף אהרן אחיך.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 27:12,13 record that G-d told Moshe to go up to Mount Avarim to see the land of Israel, and then afterwards Moshe would be gathered to his people. This command to go up to Mount Avarim is recorded again in Devarim 32:48-52, prior to Moshe’s ascent and death. Afterwards, 27:14-23 records that Moshe appointed Yehoshua to be the next leader of the Jewish people.

The command for Moshe to go to Mount Avarim is surprising since Moshe did not die until the end of the book of Devarim, which was approximately in another two months. Does 27:12 mean that Moshe was to go up to Mount Avarim two months before he died or, as argued by the Ramban (on 27:12, see also explanation by Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon on 27:12, and comments by Rav Kapach on R. Saadiah’s commentary, 1984, p. 162), the command in Bemidbar 27:12,13 was not for Moshe to go up immediately, but later when he was about to die in approximately two months. 

The Ramban also argues that the command to appoint Yehoshua was also only applicable before Moshe died, and not in the book of Bemidbar. Yet, if the command to go up the mountain was only relevant two months later, why is it recorded in 27:12? Why would G-d give this command for Moshe to ascend the mountain at this point in the Torah if it was not relevant to the events in the book of Bemidbar? In addition, the language of 27:12-23, especially with regard to the appointing of Yehoshua, 27:22,23, seems to be referring to some present action and not to the future.

Abravanel (2008, pp. 230-232) differs from the Ramban and suggests that the command to go up on Mount Avarim in 27:12,13 was for Moshe to go up (and down) immediately when Moshe heard the command and, afterwards on several occasions, to give Moshe several opportunities to see the land of Israel. However, Moshe was not to die immediately since 27:12,13 does not state that Moshe would die on the mountain. On the other hand, Devarim 32:50 does refer to Moshe dying, but this is because Devarim 32:50 is referring to the last time that Moshe was to go up on the mountain.

Elhanan Samet (2004, pp. 278-298) rejects Abravanel’s approach for several reasons. One, 27:13 refers to Moshe being gathered to one’s people, which indicates that the verse is referring to Moshe’s death, i.e. the future, and not the present. Two, Samet asks what need was there for Moshe to have several opportunities to see the land of Israel since it was sufficient for Moshe to have one vision of the land? Three, the Torah does not state that Moshe fulfilled this command at this time, as he argues that 27:22 does not state that Moshe went up, only that he appointed Yehoshua.

Samet, following the Ramban and Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon, maintains that Moshe only fulfilled this command to go up Mount Averim two months after he was commanded, but he suggests that the Torah recorded this command in the book of Bemidbar, to help the future readers of the Torah understand why Moshe requested for G-d to appoint Yehoshua as the next leader in the ensuing narrative, 27:15-23. This answer is difficult. If Moshe did not go up on Mount Avarim in the “book of Bemidbar,” as Samet claims, then there was no need to transfer any authority to Yehoshua. One might argue that Yehoshua had to be designated as the heir apparent to Moshe even when Moshe was alive, but it was obvious that Yehoshua was to be the people’s future leader since he had not sinned by the spies and he was Moshe’s top aide. Even if one believes that this was not obvious, and Yehoshua had to be designated as the heir apparent, still there was no need to include the command for Moshe to go up on Mount Avarim (27:12) in the Torah just for the sake of the future reader of the Torah. From 20:12, the reader knows that Moshe was not going to accompany the people into Israel, and hence the reader would not be surprised that a future leader would be designated.

In addition, this “extra information” (27:12-14) for the reader, as argued by Samet, actually confuses the reader as to why Moshe made this request for new leader. According to Samet, the true sequence of events, is that Moshe asked for G-d to appoint a leader before he was told to go on the mountain and die, while from the sequence of events as recorded in the Torah, the reader will think (and rightly so) that Moshe only asked for a leader to be appointed after he was told to go up on the mountain. (Even Samet, footnote 25, acknowledges that his explanation could confuse the reader, though for a different reason, but he claims in the end the reader will not be confused.)

I like Abravanel’s approach. The simple reading of 27:12-14 is that Moshe was to go up on Mount Avarim in the book of Bemidbar immediately when he was commanded since otherwise there is no reason for the command to be recorded in the book of Bemidbar. Also, 27:15-23 implies that Yehoshua was appointed the leader of the people in the book of Bemidbar.

I would change the rationale for Moshe’s ascent of the mountain. The ascent was to give Moshe a short break from being the leader of the people before he died, either because he needed some time to himself before he died, or he needed time to prepare his great speech of the book of Devarim. 27:12,13 refers to Moshe going up on the mountain to see the land of Israel, which might be considered a “cover” for Moshe to separate from the people, but more likely, when a person can see great distances, this can cause a person to reflect and ponder. (This experience has happened to me when hiking by myself to beautiful vistas.) If Moshe did not have this break, then he would have worked up to the last day of his life (Devarim 31:2) without any break.

This break by going up to Mount Avarim was not very long, a week or so, but it was the beginning of Moshe’s separation from the people. While Moshe remained the leader of the people, and he would come down from the mountain when needed, as for example by the war with Midyan (Bemidbar 31) and the case of the children of Gad and Reuven, (Bemidbar 32), he was no longer to be in charge of the day-to-day issues in the camp. Instead, Yehoshua would be in charge of the day-to-day issues, and this gave a small overlap to help Yehoshua become the next leader.

This variation of Abravanel’s approach answers Samet’s questions. One, the phrase “gathering to one’s people” in 27:13 indicates that in Bemidbar, Moshe was starting the process of dying since he was beginning his separation from the people, and starting to step down from his role as the leader of the people. Note the phrase “like you brother Aharon” could be because maybe Aharon also had a short break before he died when he was no longer the high priest, see our discussion on 20:26-29, “Where did Aharon die?” Two, Moshe did not really need many opportunities to see the land. Only when Moshe was commanded to go to the peak of the mountain range, Mount Nevo, Devarim 3:27, 32:49, was he specifically going to see the land of Israel because from the peak he would have the best view of the land. Three, 27:22, which states that Moshe did as he was commanded by G-d, can be understood that Moshe went up on Mount Avarim. Even if one argues that 27:22, refers only to appointing Yehoshua, this appointment implies that there was a transfer of some authority to Yehoshua, which in turn implies that Moshe could take a break. Furthermore, once the Torah records that Moshe did what G-d commanded him and appointed Yehoshua, 27:22, this presumes that Moshe also fulfilled G-d’s other command and went up on the mountain.

This idea that by Moshe going up the mountain he was relinquishing the day-to-day responsibilities of being a leader can explain Moshe’s request to G-d to appoint the next leader of the people in 27:16,17. 27:16,17 records that Moshe wanted a successor to be appointed since otherwise he thought, "the people would be like a flock that had no shepherd." While many commentators understand that Moshe was concerned that the people needed a military leader, I doubt this since the metaphor of sheep does not conjure up military actions. (Friedman, 2003, p. 521, notes that the reference to a shepherd corresponds to Moshe's vocation prior to being the leader of the Jewish people.)

A different idea is that his request for a successor was because he feared that without a leader the people would disperse, just as sheep do without a shepherd. Yet, was it not obvious that the people would need a leader to take them into the land of Israel? Instead, maybe Moshe’s request of G-d should be understood to mean that Moshe was asking for G-d to appoint someone to be the administrative head of the people, while Moshe took his break from the people. Moshe was still the leader of the people, but he was concerned that there would be nobody to take care of the day-to-day issues that might arise. This was not an obvious request since in theory there could have been no leader when Moshe was on the mountain, as Moshe could descend from the mountain when needed. G-d agreed to Moshe’s request, and in 27:18-22 Yehoshua was appointed as the administrative head of the people in the book of Bemidbar. Later, in Devarim 31, when Moshe was just about to die, Yehoshua’s leadership roles were expanded, as then he was appointed as the political and religious leader of the people.

This idea of Moshe taking a break before he dies also suggests a connection between 27:12-14 and the previous verses that record the daughters of Tzelofhad’s request for land in the land of Israel, 27:1-11. My guess is that within the Torah, Moshe’s happiest moment was by the crossing of the Yam Suf, when he sang his song, Shemot 15:1-18. Afterwards, the Torah records complaints and sins of the people, as for example by the golden calf, when he came down with the tablets, and when the people sinned by the spies. Also, when he finished building the ohel moed, the ceremony was marred by the deaths of his nephews, Vayikra 10:1,2. After he finally brought the people to the verge of going into the land of Israel, they sinned with the women of Moav, 25:1. Even when he finishes his speech in Devarim, it ends pessimistically that he knows that the people are going to sin in the future, Devarim 31:29. Moshe might have doubted if the people would ever go into the land of Israel, and then whether his life’s work had been futile. The most positive act that the people were preparing to go into the land of Israel, and wanted to go into the land of Israel, was when the daughters of Tzelofhad requested to have land. This was a brave request since they had to make this request before the leaders of the people and whole assembly, 27:2, and they exhibited this bravery since they wanted to go to the land of Israel. For Moshe, their request might have brought him great satisfaction since he knew that his life’s work would succeed after he died. Thus, immediately after he had this good feeling, G-d told him to go to Mount Avarim to take a break from being the leader of the people. Moshe was then leaving on a “high” which would give him a positive feeling when he would think about his life and prepare for his speech in the book of Devarim.

Bibliography:

Abravanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 2008, Commentary on Bemidbar, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing.

Friedman, Richard Elliott, 2003, Commentary on the Torah with a new English translation and the Hebrew text, New York: HarperSanFrancisco.

Kapach, Yosef, 1984, Commentary of Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon on the Torah, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Samet, Elchanan, 2004, Studies in the Weekly Parasha, Mitzpeh Nevo: Machon Maliyot.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 13:2, 15:39 – The definition of the word tur in the Torah

במדבר יג:ב - שְׁלַח־לְךָ אֲנָשִׁים וְיָתֻרוּ אֶת־אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן אֲשֶׁר־אֲנִי נֹתֵן לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אִישׁ אֶחָד אִישׁ אֶחָד לְמַטֵּה אֲבֹתָיו תִּשְׁלָחוּ כֹּל נָשִׂיא בָהֶם

במדבר טו:לט - וְהָיָה לָכֶם לְצִיצִת וּרְאִיתֶם אֹתוֹ וּזְכַרְתֶּם אֶת־כׇּל־מִצְוֺת יְקוָק וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְלֹא־תָתוּרוּ אַחֲרֵי לְבַבְכֶם וְאַחֲרֵי עֵינֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר־אַתֶּם זֹנִים אַחֲרֵיהֶם.

The word tur appears in the Torah in three different contexts: One, by the travelling of the cloud of G-d before the people, Bemidbar 10:33 and Devarim 1:33, two, by the twelve people (spies) who went to the land of Israel, (ten times in chapters 13 and 14), and three, by the laws of tziztit, 15:39. What does the word mean?

It is curious that commentators translate the word tur differently in the various verses. For example, Alter (2004, pp. 732, 745, 760, also see footnote on page 760) on 10:33 and 13:2 translates the word as scout, while on 15:39, he translates the word as stray. The problem or the reason for the change in the definition, is that the definition of the word tur as to scout does not accord with 15:39 since the verse does not mean that one should not scout with one’s heart and eyes. In addition, the word scout does not accord with Bemidbar 10:33 since the cloud of G-d was not scouting for the people, as it did not report back to the people, and it was also not exploring land, it just led the way.

Another definition, a variation of the definition to scout, is that I have heard people translate the word tur by the English word tourist, but this is a complete inversion of the terms. Shimon Sharvit (2023) notes that in modern Hebrew, some words had to be created since when there was no word in Hebrew for a modern term. One method was to match a pre-existing Hebrew word which had the same sound as an English word and then apply the definition of the English word to the pre-existing Hebrew term. He quotes three examples. One, the word mechonah, which in biblical Hebrew mean base, but since it sounds similar to the English word machine, in modern Hebrew, mechonah means machine. A second example is the word masechah, which in biblical Hebrew means idol, but since it sounds similar to the English word mask, in modern Hebrew, masechah means mask. A third example is the word tayar, which in Chazal (see Sifrei Bamidbar 82) means a guide, but since it sounds similar to the English word tourist, in modern Hebrew, tayar became tourist.

To return to the question, what is the definition of the word tur? A reasonable approach is to follow what I believe is the common translation of the term in 15:39, to go, and apply it all the other cases. When I discussed this idea in a class, Binyamin Hoffman told me that the word tur in Arabic can refer to a bird and airplane, and then he suggested that the word could mean to go fast. This is a wonderful suggestion since it distinguishes the term tur from the usual term lalechet, which is going at a regular pace, and accords with all the occurrences of the word in the Torah. In addition, since the word does not mean to scout or spy or to explore it is not surprising that Moshe did not the use the word tur when he recalled the sin of the spies in Devarim 1. I will now go through all the examples of the war tur in the Torah.

Bemidbar 10:33 means that the aron and the cloud of G-d travelled in a fast manner before the people to arrive at the next resting place. Similarly, Devarim 1:33, should be understood to mean that the cloud of G-d went before people moving fast for the people to get to the next resting place. These verses are recording how wonderful the situation was prior to the sin of the spies, and the idea is that when the people travelled, they followed the cloud (and the aron) which was moving fast, which enabled the people to also travel quickly from one point to their next resting point. Also, the verses are contrasting a regular cloud, which moves slowly, with the cloud of G-d that could move relatively fast.

Bemidbar 13:2 means either that G-d told Moshe to send people (spies) to go fast to the land of Canaan (Israel) or that the spies were to go through the land of Canaan quickly. Similarly, 13:17 means that Moshe sent the spies to go fast to the land of Canaan or that the spies should travel quickly through the land.

Bemidbar 13:21 means that the spies went quickly through the land from the south all the way to the north.

Bemidbar 13:25 means that the spies returned from their fast journey to the land (of Canaan, Israel) at the end of forty days, which truly was fast.

Bemidbar 13:32 first records the words of the “narrator” who refers to the bad spies as having gone fast through the land, and then 13:32 records the words of the bad spies, who also mentioned that they travelled fast through the land. The bad spies added the phrase “the land that we passed through” since if they travelled very quickly, then one might have discounted their negative report, hence they added that “we passed through the land.” They were saying even though we moved quickly, still we passed through the land and our claims are correct since we were able to see what was happening in the land.

Bemidbar 14:6 means that Yehoshua and Caleb were amongst the people who went quickly through the land.

Bemidbar 14:7 then records that Yehoshua and Caleb used the same language as the bad spies from 13:32, that we (Yehoshua and Calev) also went quickly thought the land and the phrase “the land that we passed through” to substantiate their repudiation of the bad spies.

Bemidbar 14:34 matches the days that the spies went quickly through the land with the punishment of the people, that the number of years (40) the people had to stay in the desert was based on the number of days (40) it took the spies to go through the land of Canaan (Israel). Thus, it was good the spies travelled quickly through the land to minimize the punishment to forty years.

Bemidbar 14:36,38 contrasts the bad spies who travelled quickly though the land, and were punished with Yehoshua and Caleb, who also had travelled fast through the land, but they had given a good report and were not punished.

The next time the word tur appears in the Torah is Bemidbar 15:39, and the idea of the verse is that people should not go after their hearts (which in the Torah is one’s thoughts) and one’s eyes to sin (zonah, to act inappropriately).

Does 15:39 mean that a person is never to follow one’s thoughts and eyes? Do all cases where a person acts based on what a person thinks and sees lead a person to sin? Yet, seeing and thinking is how people learn new information. If people do not follow their thoughts and eyes, then they end up doing what other people tell them to do, which sometimes leads to horrible actions, and if there is no one to tell a person what to do, then a person is not to do anything? No, the point of the verse is that a person should not act hastily (go fast) based on one’s thoughts and sights. Sometimes, when people act hastily, driven by impulses, which derive from their thoughts and sights, they sin. Instead, after seeing a situation, especially a case where a person is tempted to sin, a person needs to contemplate what is the proper way to act. In the context of 15:39, the seeing of the tzitzit or maybe just the techelet cord, is supposed to help a person contemplate on how one is to act that the person should not sin.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Sharvit, Shimon, 2023, Literary points in parashat tzitzit, Bar Ilan weekly parasha sheet from the faculty of Judaism, Parashat Shelach, no. 1523, pp. 1,2.

Vayikra (Leviticus) 10:8-11 – Why did G-d tell Aharon not to drink wine after the deaths of Nadav and Avihu?

ויקרא י:8-11 - וידבר ה' אל־אהרן לאמר. יין ושכר אל־תשת  אתה  ובניך אתך בבאכם אל־אהל מועד ולא תמתו חקת עולם לדרתיכם. ולהבדיל בין הקדש ובין החל ובין הטמא ובין הטהור. ולהורת את־בני ישראל את כל־החקים אשר דבר ה' אליהם ביד־משה.

Vayikra (Leviticus) 10:1,2 records that Nadav and Avihu died in the ceremony of the eighth day. Afterwards, Moshe gave various instructions to Aharon, Nadav and Avihu’s father, Elazar and Itamar, Nadav and Avihu’s surviving brothers, and Mishael and Eltzafan, cousins of Nadav and Avihu, 10:3-7. Afterwards, 10:8,9 records that G–d told Aharon not to drink wine when they would enter the ohel moed, which I think refers to both the courtyard of the mishkan and the mishkan, see our discussion on 1:1, “The terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Vayikra.” 

Afterwards 10:10,11 explain why Aharon and his sons cannot drink wine since they need to be able to separate from what is considered kadosh or not, what is considered tamei or tahor, and they need to teach the people the laws. Presumably the idea is that when a person drinks, then this clouds their judgement. Note the Torah did not say not to get drunk, but simply not to drink. (This law while technically not applicable to contemporary Jewish practices, still raises questions how a person can marry, mekadesh the Shabbat, and say havdalah when drinking wine?)

These four verses, 10:8-11, mark the first time in the Torah that G-d spoke only to Aharon concerning laws. (The only other prior time that G-d spoke only to Aharon was in Shemot 4:27, when G-d told Aharon to meet Moshe.) Why at this time after his sons just died, did Aharon have to know that he and his two living sons could not drink wine in the ohel moed? Was Aharon, a grieving father, really able to focus on what G-d was telling him?

In addition, after this conversation between G-d and Aharon, Moshe gave further instructions to Aharon, Elazar and Itamar, 10:12-18. Why did G-d speak to Aharon in the midst of Moshe’s instructions to his family?

Various answers have been suggested to suggest why the verses 10:8-11 are recorded in the midst of the tragedy of the deaths of Nadav and Avihu.

Rashi (on 10:2) quotes R. Yishmael that Nadav and Avihu violated this law of not drinking wine, which might have caused them to sin (see Ramban on 10:9), and this is why the law was recorded immediately after they died. This could be, but it is very unlikely. Firstly, one wonders how much wine the people had in the desert? Secondly, 8:35,36 records how in the previous seven days, Nadav and Avihu had undergone a seven-day initiation process where they had to be in or near the ohel moed, which suggests that they would not have access to wine during this process.

A second approach is that the Bekhor Shor (on 10:9) and Hoffmann (1953, on 10:8) write that it was then the practice of mourners to drink wine, and hence the law was needed to tell Aharon that even though he was devastated by the loss of his sons, he should not drink wine. This could have been the practice of mourners, but again, did the people have wine in the desert? Also, still why were the instructions about not drinking wine in the middle of Moshe’s instructions to the survivors? The instructions could not have waited until after all of Moshe’s instructions at the end of chapter 10?

Ramban (on 10:9) suggests a conceptual connection between the law of not drinking wine and Nadav and Avihu’s sin. Nadav and Avihu sinned because they thought erroneously, for whatever reason, how to worship G-d, and so too wine is prohibited since it leads one to think speciously. One could add to this idea that 10:8 records that drinking wine can lead to a lack of separation between kodesh and the profane, and this is similar to Nadav and Avihu’s sin that their fire, which was co-existent with G-d’s fire, reduced the separation between G-d and mankind, see our discussion on 10:1,2, "Nadav and Avihu." Again, this could be true, but why in the day of the great tragedy of the deaths of Nadav and Avihu did G-d have to tell Aharon about not drinking wine? The instructions could not have waited for another day?

A different idea is that these verses are an example where the Torah, acting like a narrator, inserts information into the narrative that initially seems out of place, but that this information can give a greater understanding of the ensuing narrative. I believe these narrative inserts occur at least 14 times in the Torah.  Some examples are Bereshit 2:25; 3:1; 11:30; 18:11, 25:27,28, 27:1, 29:16,17, 31:19; 39:6; 48:10; Shemot 9:31,32; Bemidbar 12:3 and 13:20, and Devarim 3:29. In this case, the Torah wants to add information to the very important ensuing argument between Moshe and Aharon concerning whether the hatta’t sacrifice should have been eaten or burnt, and the argument was related to the deaths of Nadav and Avihu. The prelude to this argument is recorded in 10:12-15 and the argument itself is recorded in 10:16-20. For a discussion of the significance of this argument, see our discussion on 10:16-20, “Moshe and Aharon’s argument after the death of Aharon’s sons: An argument for the sake of heaven.”

How do G-d’s instructions to Aharon not to drink wine enhance one’s understanding of the argument between Moshe and Aharon? It does this in two ways.

One, a person reading this story might wonder who was Aharon to argue with Moshe, even if Aharon was Moshe’s older brother? Moshe had been on Mount Sinai forty days with G-d, two or three times, and had come as close to G-d as any human being, Shemot 34:5,6. The answer from 10:8-11 is that G-d also spoke directly and only to Aharon about laws.

Two, while Moshe agreed with Aharon in the end, maybe Moshe’s first argument was correct that the sacrifice should have been eaten. Maybe Moshe only agreed to Aharon since the sacrifice was already burnt and could not have been eaten anymore.  Thus, 10:8-11 inform us that Aharon was empowered to separate from kadosh and chol, which means that Aharon could decide if the sacrifice was truly kadosh or not. Accordingly, the insert of the laws of 10:8-11 are to tell us that Aharon’s argument that the sacrifice should have been burnt was truly the correct approach.

This suggestion that 10:8-11 is a narrative insert to explain the argument recorded in 10:16-20 means that this conversation between G-d and Aharon about not drinking wine did not have to occur on the day when Aharon’s sons died, but could have been some time afterwards. Yet, when the Torah was written, the insert was recorded in the aftermath of their deaths to help the reader understand the argument between Moshe and Aharon that did happen on day when Nadav and Avihu died.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

The 2026 version of Andrew Schein's commentary on the Haggadah is now available

Hello,

As I have been doing annually since 2014, I offer anyone a free copy of my commentary on the Haggadah. No adds or requests for donation, though I would be happy for feedback how to improve the commentary (typos, mistakes, etc.). The commentary is 120 pages, 1.5 spacing with a bibliography. If you are interested in reading the commentary, please send me an email at ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file. 

I wish everyone a chag kasher ve-samaech and pray for peace in the land of Israel.

Andrew Schein

Shemot (Exodus) 26:9, 31-33, 36; 27:21, 36:35,36; 40:3, 21 – The parochet in the mishkan/ ohel moed: A pavilion and a screen

 שמות כו: ז- יב: וְעָשִׂיתָ יְרִיעֹת עִזִּים לְאֹהֶל עַל־הַמִּשְׁכָּן עַשְׁתֵּי־עֶשְׂרֵה יְרִיעֹת תַּעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם׃  אֹרֶךְ  הַיְרִיעָה הָאַחַת שְׁלֹשִׁים בָּאַמָּה וְרֹחַב אַרְבַּע בָּאַמָּה הַיְרִיעָה הָאֶחָת מִדָּה אַחַת לְעַשְׁתֵּי עֶשְׂרֵה יְרִיעֹת׃ וְחִבַּרְתָּ אֶת־חֲמֵשׁ הַיְרִיעֹת לְבָד וְאֶת־שֵׁשׁ הַיְרִיעֹת לְבָד וְכָפַלְתָּ אֶת־הַיְרִיעָה הַשִּׁשִּׁית אֶל־מוּל פְּנֵי הָאֹהֶל׃ וְעָשִׂיתָ חֲמִשִּׁים לֻלָאֹת עַל שְׂפַת הַיְרִיעָה הָאֶחָת הַקִּיצֹנָה בַּחֹבָרֶת וַחֲמִשִּׁים לֻלָאֹת עַל שְׂפַת הַיְרִיעָה הַחֹבֶרֶת הַשֵּׁנִית׃ וְעָשִׂיתָ קַרְסֵי נְחֹשֶׁת חֲמִשִּׁים וְהֵבֵאתָ אֶת־הַקְּרָסִים בַּלֻּלָאֹת וְחִבַּרְתָּ אֶת־הָאֹהֶל וְהָיָה אֶחָד׃ וְסֶרַח הָעֹדֵף בִּירִיעֹת הָאֹהֶל חֲצִי הַיְרִיעָה הָעֹדֶפֶת תִּסְרַח עַל אֲחֹרֵי הַמִּשְׁכָּן׃

שמות כו:לו: וְעָשִׂיתָ מָסָךְ לְפֶתַח הָאֹהֶל תְּכֵלֶת וְאַרְגָּמָן וְתוֹלַעַת שָׁנִי וְשֵׁשׁ מׇשְׁזָר מַעֲשֵׂה רֹקֵם.

שמות כז: כא: בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד מִחוּץ לַפָּרֹכֶת אֲשֶׁר עַל־הָעֵדֻת יַעֲרֹךְ אֹתוֹ אַהֲרֹן וּבָנָיו מֵעֶרֶב עַד־בֹּקֶר לִפְנֵי יְהֹוָה חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתָם מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל.

שמות מ:ג: וְשַׂמְתָּ שָׁם אֵת אֲרוֹן הָעֵדוּת וְסַכֹּתָ עַל־הָאָרֹן אֶת־הַפָּרֹכֶת.

שמות מ: כא: וַיָּבֵא אֶת־הָאָרֹן אֶל־הַמִּשְׁכָּן וַיָּשֶׂם אֵת פָּרֹכֶת הַמָּסָךְ וַיָּסֶךְ עַל אֲרוֹן הָעֵדוּת כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה אֶת־מֹשֶׁה׃ 

Shemot (Exodus) 26:31-33 records instructions from G-d to Moshe to build a parochet, that was to be on four pillars and underneath the claps that connected the two parts of the covers of the mishkan. 36:35,36 record the fulfillment of these instructions. Afterwards, 40:3 records that G-d instructed Moshe to put the parochet within the mishkan and 40:21 records that Moshe fulfilled these instructions. What was the parochet?

The standard/ traditional understanding (see Rashi on 26:31) is that the parochet was a screen that hung over four pillars that were standing in a row and the parochet divided the special building (mishkan/ ohel moed) into two parts, an inner and outer room. Yet, this understanding does not accord with 27:21, which records that the parochet was to be on the  tablets (luchot, edut), while according to the traditional interpretation the parochet was in front, not on, the tablets. Similarly, 40:3 and 40:21 record that the parochet was to cover the aron which contained the luchot, but according to the traditional understanding the parochet did not cover the aron at all. Rashi (on 40:3) is aware of the difficulty of 40:3 and tries to defend the traditional understanding that the parochet was just a screen by claiming that the word to cover means to protect and the screen can be thought of as protection of the aron. Similarly, the Talmud (Menachot 94a) quotes Rebi that the word on, al, does not really mean on, but near. These two attempts are very difficult.

Friedman (2003, p. 263) makes the fascinating suggestion that really the parochet was a pavilion that rested on the four pillars that were standing not in a row but as a box. The aron would then be within this box or pavilion. This suggestion accords with 27:21 that the parochet was on the luchot and 40:3,21 that the parochet covered the aron. Hurowitz (1995) discusses this idea by Friedman, which Friedman had first suggested in 1992, and notes that it is supported by the Sumerian word BARAG and its Akkadian cognate par- akku, which are believed to baldachins, a canopy on top of an altar or throne. He notes that the connection between these two terms and the word parochet was made in 1874 by Delitzsch. Hurowitz also notes that if this suggestion is correct, then the curtains that rested on the four pillars must have continued to the floor to stop anyone from seeing the aron that was within the parochet, so it was also a masach, screen.

Friedman notes that his suggestion accords with Bemidbar 4:5 that when the priests had to pack up the mishkan, they would take down the parochet and the parochet covered the aron, and the idea would be that once the four poles were removed, the curtain would fall and cover the aron.

This understanding also explains the term ohel edut in Bemidbar 9:15, 17:22,23 and 18:2, as well as the reference to the tent, ha-ohel, in Bemidbar 18:3. The idea being that with the parochet hanging over the four pillars, the parochet was a tent (ohel) covering the aron, which had the tablets (the luchot, the edut), within the mishkan.

This idea that the parochet was a pavilion and not a screen also suggests a new interpretation of Shemot 26:9. 26:9 records that with regard to the second cover of the mishkan, the cover made of goat hairs, which consisted of eleven segments, each four amot (cubits) by thirty amot (cubits), the sixth segment was to be folded towards the ohel. All the explanation that I have seen (for example Rashi on 26:9 and Hurowitz, p. 137), understand that half of the first segment of this cover, namely two amot of the first segment, was to hang in some form over the entrance to the mishkan. Presumably the basis for this idea is that as the length of the mishkan was 30 amot and the heigh of the mishkan was 10 amot, then 40 amot was sufficient to cover the mishkan and its back. Yet, the second cover had 44 (11*4) amot, an extra four amot. We also know that the second cover had an extra two amot in the back of the mishkan, 26:12, and then it “must be” that the remaining extra two amot were in the front of the mishkan. Yet, 26:9 refers to the sixth segment of the cover, while this explanation claims the first segment of the cover was folded over. Also, according to this explanation, there is no folding since the two amot just hang down in the front of the mishkan.

A simple reading of 26:9 is that the second cover of the mishkan starts at the beginning of the mishkan, just like the first cover of the mishkan, and then the sixth segment of the second cover would begin at the twentieth amah of the mishkan. This would be the same spot where the sixth segment of the first cover of the mishkan would begin, but by the first cover, the beginning of the sixth segment would be attached by loops and claps to the fifth segment. However, by the second cover, the sixth segment is attached to the seventh segment, and not the fifth segment, with loops and clasps, 26:10,11.

26:9 is then informing us that after the five segments of the second cover of the mishkan, the sixth segment was folded over, which means that it would cover two amots of the mishkan and not four amot. This doubling of the sixth segment, would establish the measurements of the pavilion of the parochet that it would have two poles at the twentieth amot of the mishkan, and two poles at the twenty second amot of the mishkan. Within this two amot and undetermined length (ten amot?), the aron, which had a depth of one and half amots (25:10), was situated, 26:33. After the sixth segment was folded over, the loops and clasps of the second cover were attached to the end of sixth segment and the beginning of the seventh segment, at the twenty-second amot of the mishkan. The parochet was then under both sets of clasps of the two covers of the mishkan (26:33), the first two pillars were under the clasps of the first cover of the mishkan, and the back two pillars were under the clasps of the second cover of the mishkan. (Note this configuration would have occurred even according to the traditional interpretation of 26:9, see Cassuto, 1967, p. 352.) After the loops and clasps were attached to the sixth and seventh segments of the second cover, there would be another five segments to the second cover, segments seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven, twenty more amot, which would give an extra two amot beyond the end of the mishkan, 22+20 = 42, 26:12.

The end of 26:9 records that the folding of the sixth segment was facing or towards the front of the tent, ohel. The ohel is the tent that was made by the parochet, and the end of 26:9 is stating that when one folded the sixth segment, the coming together of the folded segment was at the edge (vertically above) from where the front two poles of the parochet and the curtains of the parochet were situated. This means that the edge of the folded over part of the sixth segment of the second cover was facing (downwards) the front of the tent that was made by the parochet.

The idea that the parochet was a pavilion also suggests a simple reading of 26:36 (and 36:37 and 39:38), which records that there was a masach, which was just a screen, and it was by the entrance to the ohel (the tent).  What ohel? 

According to the traditional understanding it is not clear what is the reference to the ohel in 26:36. However, once one understands that the parochet made a tent, ohel, above the aron within the mishkan, then, as in 26:9, the term ohel in 26:36 (and in 36:37 and 39:38) is referring to the tent that was created by the parochet, and the masach, screen, was in front of the area that led to the parochet.

Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Friedman, Richard Elliott, 2003, Commentary on the Torah with a new English translation and the Hebrew text, New York: HarperSanFrancisco.

Hurowitz, Victor Avigdor, 1995, The form and fate of the Tabernacle: Reflections on a recent proposal, Jewish Quarterly Review, 86: 1-2, pp. 127-151.