Monday, March 25, 2024

Vayikra 11:2 - The definition of the words behamot and hayyot in the Torah

Vayikra chapter 11 records different animals that can be eaten (that is to say they are kosher) and animals that cannot be eaten. After the introductory sentence, Vayikra 11:2 records, “These are the hayyot that you can eat from all the behamah that are (is) on the land. Which animals are classified as hayyot and which animals are classified as behemot?

In modern Hebrew the definition of hayyot are wild animals and behamot are large domesticated animals. I believe that this definition derives from the halakhah of kosher animals. Devarim 14:4,5 record, "These are the behamot that can be eaten: ox (cows), sheep and goats, gazelle, deer, roebuck, bison, antelope, wild goat, ibex, and mountain sheep." The Rambam (Laws of forbidden foods, 1:8) writes that the animals listed in Devarim14:4, the ox, sheep and goats are behamot, while the other seven animals listed in Devarim 14:5 are hayyot. The Rambam (Laws of forbidden foods, 6:1, also see Rashi on Devarim 14:4) also writes that hayyot are a sub-category of behamot. This definition has important practical implication. Vayikra 17:13 records that if a person hunts (kills) a chaya (or a bird), then the blood of the animal has to be covered with dirt. Based on this verse, the blood of an animal that is classified as a behama does not have to covered with dirt.

I do not understand this distinction between hayyot and behamot since Devarim 14:4 records "These are the behamot that you can eat" before the list of all ten animals, and there is no mention of hayyot in the verses. It seems obvious that the ten animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 are behamot. In addition, hayyot, based on the name, living things (see also Vayikra 11:47), refers to all animals, and then behamot are a subcategory of hayyot. With regard to Vayikra 17:13, according to my more expansive definition of the term behamot, the blood of all the animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 do not have be covered, which would be a leniency. Note with regard to which animals can be eaten, the difference between my understanding and the traditional understanding is just a question of semantics since there are still just ten land animals that can be eaten. It is just that I think that all ten animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 are behamot, while the traditional view lists three as behamot and seven as hayyot. However, the different definitions of the term behamot lead to some differences how to understand various verses in the Torah.

If we return to 11:2, the verse means these are the hayyot, the animals, that can be eaten: (Example one:) With regard to the behamah, a sub-category of hayyot, (animals that move) on the land. And then 11:3 explains that “with regard to the behamah” means those behamot that have split hooves and bring up their cud can be eaten. Thus, some behamot can be eaten, while others cannot be eaten. Afterwards, 11:9 records a different sub-category of hayyot, example two, animals that move in the water that can be eaten, and 11:13 records a third sub-category of hayyot, example three, animals that fly that cannot be eaten.

Another example is Vayikra 7:25, which records “for whoever eats helev (fat) from the behamah that is offered as a sacrifice…” This verse means that there are some behamot which can be offered as a sacrifice and some that cannot be. If the term behamot refers to the ten animals (or more) listed in Devarim 14:4,5, then there exists the possibility that some behamot are offered as sacrifices and some are not. However, if behamot are only ox, sheep and goats, then all behamot can be offered as sacrifices, and Vayikra 7:25 cannot be understood in its simple sense.

In addition, Vayikra 11:26 records that any behama that has hoofs but the hoofs are not split and does not chew its cud is tamei. Yet, if behamot are only ox, sheep and goats, then all behamot have split hoofs. Instead, 11:26 is noting that some behamot do not have split hoofs, such as horses, donkeys, zebras (see Luzzatto on 11:26) and these behamot differ from animals whose hoofs are split and chew the cud who are kosher and not tamei. This distinction between behamot that are tamei and those that are tahor is also recorded in 20:25.

11:27 then records that any animal that walks on its paws among the hayyot that walk on four legs is tamei. This implies that an animal that walks on paws (bears, cats, dogs?) is a type of hayya, but it is not a behama. This means that a behama is a hoofed animal (ungulates) and all the animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 seem to be ungulates. (Note that Rashi on Shemot 14:7 seems to define horses as being behamot, which supports the idea that animals that have hoofs are behamot.)

Some other verses where the two terms, hayyot and behamot appear are in Bereshit 2:19,20, by the Garden of Eden.  In Bereshit 2:19 the Torah uses the word hayya when referring to all land animals. In the following verse, 2:20, the Torah separates out the behamot (deer? sheep?), the sub-category of hayyot, from all the other hayyot in the Garden of Eden. 2:20 also refers to the behamot before the remaining land animals, hayyot, maybe because Adam was more likely to have found help (ezer) from these animals, the ungulates, who are relatively tamer than the hayyot.

Another case is in Bemidbar 35:3, where first the behamot are listed since they are more likely to be in one's field since some of them are raised for food or work, and then the general term for all animals, who may happen to be in one's fields (i.e., dogs? birds?), hayyot is recorded.

There is a third term in the Torah for a group of animals, mikneh, livestock, cattle, sheep, pigs and horses(?). Behamot are a larger category of animals than mikneh, as all mikneh are behamot but not all behamot are mikneh. Thus, Bereshit 36:6 starts with the smallest group, the mikneh, then it becomes more expansive, the behamot, all ungulates, which would be horses and donkeys, and then it refers to all possessions. In Bemidbar 31:9, the Torah first refers to women and children, then to behamot, the larger group of animals, and then to mikneh, the smaller group of animals.

In Tanakh, Micah 5:7 records that lions will eat behamot in the forest, but farm animals like cows, sheep and goats usually are not living in the forest. On the other hand, deer, antelopes and gazelle do live in forests and are eaten by lions.

After writing this, my son Yishai, pointed out to me that this discussion of what animal is defined as a behama is not new. Ibn Ezra in his commentary on Tehillim 8:8 quotes from the Karaite commentator Yefet that behamot refer to animals who eat grass, which would be ungulates, but Ibn Ezra rejected this interpretation since Mishlei 30:30 refers to a lion as being a behamah. Note Ibn Ezra in his comments on Bemidbar 31:30 refers to camels as behamot, and if a lion is considered a behama, then this would also contradict the traditional definition of the word behama. I am not convinced by this refutation from Mishlei since a verse from a prophetic writing is not sufficient to overturn the simple understanding of the verses in the Torah. It could be that the definition of the word behama changed from the time of the Torah to when Mishlei was written. Also, maybe, one can understand Mishlei 30:30 that it means that lions, who are not behamot, are stronger than behamot, which includes rhinoceros and hippopotamuses.

Thursday, February 29, 2024

Shemot 32:11-35 – Sin and forgiveness by the sin of the golden calf

Shemot 32:7-10 record that when Moshe was up on Mount Sinai, G-d told Moshe that the people sinned with the golden calf, and then 32:11-13 record that Moshe prayed for the people to be forgiven. These verses indicate that Moshe prayed for the people immediately upon hearing about their sin when he was on Mount Sinai. G-d quickly agreed to forgive the people, 32:14. Yet, even though G-d forgave the people, when Moshe came down from the mountain, he broke the tablets, 32:19, told the Levites to kill the people, 32:27, and then on the following day he told the people that he had to go pray for them that maybe G-d would forgive them, 32:30. Why did Moshe break the tablets, have the Levites kill people and need to pray again when 32:14 records that G-d forgave the people? Also, 32:33-35 indicate that G-d did not accept Moshe’s prayers in 32:31,32, but had not G-d already accepted Moshe’s prayers in 32:14?

Ibn Ezra (on 32:11) explains that really Moshe only prayed (once) on the day after he came down from Mount Sinai. This appears to accord with Moshe's account of the sin of the golden calf in the book of Devarim, that there he said that he first went down from the mountain, broke the tablets and only afterwards began to pray for the people, Devarim 9:15-18. Ibn Ezra argues that Moshe could not have prayed before he destroyed the golden calf. With this approach, Ibn Ezra is forced to argue that the verses 32:11-14, which indicate that Moshe prayed on the mountain immediately upon hearing of the people's sin, are recorded out of their chronological order and really follow 32:30. Yet, still there remains the problem that 32:14 (even recorded out of order) indicates a complete pardon for the people, and 32:33-35 indicate that there was only a partial pardon for the people.

Ramban (on 32:11) asks that if Moshe really only prayed once, why would the Torah split the prayers by recording half the prayer sixteen verses before the other half of the prayer? Furthermore, Ibn Ezra's proof from Moshe's account in Devarim is not so convincing. Devarim 9:19 records that G-d listened to Moshe for a second time, which implies that there were two prayers. Also, in Devarim, Moshe was not giving a complete recording of the events, and hence maybe he skipped mentioning his first prayer since he did not want the people to know that they had been forgiven so quickly for their sins. 

Ramban argues that Moshe had to pray immediately for the people's welfare when he heard of their sins since he believed that there was a possibility that the people would have been destroyed at that moment. Thus, he claims that Moshe prayed twice, once as recorded in 32:11-14, when he heard about the sin on Mount Sinai, and then again as recorded in 32:30-34, after he had come down from Mount Sinai. Why was there a need for two prayers?

The Ramban (also see Hoffmann on Devarim 9:18,19) suggests that when 32:14 records that G-d agreed to Moshe's prayer on the mountain this just meant that the people would not be wiped out at that moment, but the people had not been truly pardoned and they could be punished later for the sin with the golden calf. Hence, Moshe had to pray again on the day after he came down from Mount Sinai. This approach is difficult since 32:14 seems to mean that G-d renounced punishing the people, and not that G-d might punish the people a few days later.

Abravanel accepts the Ramban's answer (1997, p. 542) and then he suggests (p. 546, also see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, p. 579) that the second prayer was for those people who did not participate in the sin but who did not attempt to stop the people from sinning. I doubt this since 32:14 seems to mean that everybody had been forgiven.

In his comments on Devarim, Abravanel (1999, p. 162) suggests two additional reasons why Moshe prayed twice.  One, while the Torah records that G-d renounced punishing the people in 32:14, he suggests that this information was not told to Moshe. And, then if Moshe did not know that the punishment was rescinded, Moshe had to pray a second time. This approach is difficult since there is no reason to think that Moshe was not informed that G-d renounced punishing the people, and if Moshe did not know this fact then he would have kept on praying before descending from the mountain.

Abravanel's other answer in his comments on Devarim is a variation on the Ramban's approach.  This suggestion is that when G-d renounced punishing the people, this meant that G-d would not directly kill the people, but G-d was still going to indirectly destroy the people by leaving them to fend for themselves in the desert. With this idea, one would understand that the threatened destruction recorded in Devarim 9:19 was indirect and not complete. Yet, the word in Devarim 9:19, le-hashmid, means to destroy and not simply to let the people fend for themselves, and again 32:14 seems to mean that the people would not be punished at all for their sin of the golden calf. Also 32:35 records that G-d would send a plague on the people, which is not just letting the people fend for themselves.

A different approach is that Moshe had to pray a second time due to the events that occurred after Moshe came down from Mount Sinai. When Moshe came down from Mount Sinai, he saw not only the golden calf but the dancing (around the idol?) and he broke the tablets, 32:19. N. Leibowitz (1976a, pp. 610,611) quotes Isaac Arama and the Netziv that Moshe broke the tablets to shock the people. This makes sense to me since there was pandemonium in the camp and he needed to do something to restore order in the camp. However, N. Leibowitz rejects this approach since she claims that with this approach Moshe's act was premeditated while 32:19 implies that it was a "spontaneous reaction sparked off by indignation." Yet, afterwards she writes (p. 612), "It is difficult to accept that Moshe deliberately planned to break the tablets. But the alternative – that it happened in a spontaneous fit of anger without any thought at all is equally implausible."

I would understand that after Moshe heard that G-d had forgiven the people, 32:14, he took the tablets with the idea that he would speak to the people and tell them that G-d had forgiven them. He did not intend to break the tablets when he was going down the mountain. However, when he came down, he was angry since he had not realized the mad frenzy scene that was occurring and he had to think of a way to get the people to stop. Moshe's solution was to break the tablets in front of the people, Devarim 9:17. However, this plan did not succeed.

32:25 records that even after Moshe broke the tablets and destroyed the golden calf, still the people were going wild. Accordingly, he went to plan B. He asked the people "Who is with G-d, come to me," 32:26. However, only the Levites responded. They compromised approximately 4% (22,000 males/603,000 men 20 years and up) of the population, which meant that 96% of the population was not with G-d. Moshe then sent out the Levites to kill the people who sinned, and as we discuss on 32:20-28, "Spiked water and the aftermath of the sin of the golden calf," they only killed people who had marks on their bodies which indicated that they had sinned. These people were not being killed for their actions with the golden calf, which no longer existed and for which they had been forgiven, but because they had not responded to Moshe when he asked who was with G-d. By not responding to Moshe’s call, this showed that they rejected G-d and were in essence continuing with the sin by golden calf even though the idol had been destroyed. Note, it could be that the Levites had also sinned by the golden calf, but once Moshe called to them, then they repented and answered Moshe’s call.

After this killing by the Levites, it seems that the pandemonium in the camp ended, and on the following day, Moshe told the people that they had sinned greatly and that he would pray for them, 32:30. What was the need for this prayer?  One possibility is that G-d's forgiveness of the people in 32:14 was no longer relevant since the people continued to sin by not responding to Moshe when he asked who was with G-d, 32:26. A second possibility is that in 32:14, G-d forgave the people for their worship of the golden calf, a full scale idolatry, while in 32:30, Moshe needed to pray for the people for making the golden calf independent of their worship of the golden calf. Thus, in Moshe prayer’s he refers to the making of the golden calf, 32:31, and in G-d’s response that there would be a plague for the people’s sin, again the reference is to making the golden calf, 32:35. Moshe also refers to this sin as being a great or large sin, chataah gedolah, when he spoke to the people, 32:30, in his prayer, 32:31, and when he questioned Aharon about his actions, 32:21. The reason for this designation is that people might have thought that just making the golden calf was not such a terrible action since the goal might have been to use the idol to worship G-d, and hence to impress on Aharon, the people, and readers of the Torah, Moshe uses the phrase great sin to teach that even just making the golden calf was a terrible sin.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (1437-1508), 1997, Commentary on Shemot. 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Wednesday, January 31, 2024

Shemot 20:5 – The term kanah in reference to G-d in the Decalogue

Shemot 20:5 records the prohibition of idolatry, and within this prohibition, the Torah states that G-d is kel kanah. This same description of G-d also appears in Shemot 34:14, Devarim 4:24, 5:9 and 6:15. What does this phrase kel kanah mean? The word kel means G-d, but what does the work kanah mean? Also, Pirkei Avot 4:28 records that R. Elazar ha-Kappar said that ha-kinah takes a person out the world, which implies that it is a negative trait, why would G-d be described as a G-d of kanah?

Rashi (on Bemidbar 25:11, also has similar comments on Devarim 29:19) writes that the term kinah always refers to a person taking vengeance. Does this mean that kel kanah means that G-d is the G-d of vengeance? While vengeance might be appropriate on some occasions, this would not seem like a flattering description of G-d.

Rashi (on Bemidbar 11:29) gives a slightly different definition that kinah means that a person sets their heart on doing something, whether to help or to take revenge. This would be the idea of being zealous or ardent, and has a potential positive element to the term.

Rashi on our verse, 20:5, offers a third variation of the definition of the word kanah or kinah, that G-d is determined to punish people who worship idolatry. Does Rashi here think this term kanah only refers to idolatry? Does this definition in reference to G-d differ from when the term kanah is used by people unrelated to idolatry? For example, Bereshit 26:14 records that Philistines were kaneh of Yitzhak, and Bereshit 37:11 records that Yosef’s brothers were kaneh of Yosef, and both cases seem unrelated to idolatry.

Even-Shoshan (1988, p. 1020) explains that this description of G-d as kel kanah means that G-d is very strict and exacting, but this seems to contradict the idea that G-d is merciful, 34:6. Also, again, can this same definition apply to other cases of the word in the Torah? For example, when the Philistines were kaneh of Yitzhak, were they being strict? Or, were Yosef’s brothers being strict with Yosef?

Robert Alter (2004, p. 430) writes on 20:5 that “the leading edge of the word here may in fact be jealousy.” If jealousy is interpreted to mean envy, could one say that G-d is envious?

I think we need to understand the word kanah in the same way in reference to G-d and in reference to regular people. As we discussed on Bereshit 26:14-33, “Yitzhak and the wells: True grit,”  in the Torah the word, kanah, means that a person will act in aggressive manor to defend a perceived attempt to limit or end a person’s rights. This same definition applies to G-d. Once the Jewish people entered into a covenant with G-d, and this process was beginning with the Decalogue, then the obligation of the people was just to worship G-d. This was a right of G-d. All the verses that refer to G-d as being kanah are cases where the people are either worshipping idolatry (Bemidbar 25:3,11,13) or they are being warned not to worship idolatry, like in 20:5. The point of 20:5 is to warn the people that G-d will act aggressively to punish them if they commit the sin of idolatry, as the verse ends that G-d will punish idol worshippers for up to four generations. Thus, both by G-d and people, the term kanah refers to acting to defend an attempt to limit or end a person’s right, but by G-d, the limiting or ending the right is referring the right of G-d to be worshipped and then the term kanah is only in reference to G-d acting against people who worship idolatry, but by people the limiting or ending rights can refers to various rights that a person claims. Accordingly, in Pirkei Avot, R. Elazar ha-Kappar can be referring to all types of rights that people make up and then fight about them since they believe their rights are being limited or ended. This fighting will take people out of the world, but his statement does not refer to G-d, where the kinah is only in reference to the sin of idolatry.

References

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Even-Shoshan, Avraham, 1981, A new dictionary (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer Publishing House.

Wednesday, December 20, 2023

Bereshit 41:25-44, 47-49, 54-57; 42:5,6; 47:13-26: Yosef’s economic and administrative policies in Egypt

Bereshit 41:25-32 records that Yosef interpreted Pharaoh’s dreams that there would be seven good years of agricultural abundance and seven years of famine in Egypt. Yosef then gave Pharaoh advice how Egypt could survive the seven years of famine, and Pharaoh appointed Yosef to administer Egypt, 41:33-44.

Yosef’s plan was for Egypt to collect the food from the good years and then dispense it in during the seven years of famine. The advice to store up food is not surprising because this would seem to be the obvious implication of Yosef’s interpretation of the dream. How was the food to be collected? It could have been collected through force (Rashbam on 41:34,35), as with taxes, or the Egyptian government could have bought the food (Ibn Ezra on 41:34). The implication of 47:24, which records that Yosef imposed a tax on the Egyptian people, is that the taxation appears to have been something new. If this is true, then Yosef’s advice was to buy the food in the seven good years and this can be understood with basic economics. During the seven good years, there would be an increase in the supply of grains (the supply curve would switch right), which would drive the price of wheat down. The government could buy the grain at the lower price knowing that the costs would be recuperated during the bad years since then the price would rise due to the shortages (the supply curve would shift left). Yosef‘s advice was then based on him having perfect information about future prices due to Pharaoh’s dream.

One potential problem with Yosef’s plan to store the food, was that the food could go bad until the seven years of famine. Can wheat be stored so long (see Ibn Ezra on 41:35 and Rashi on 41:48), or was this a miracle in the story that G-d made sure that there was enough wheat for Yosef’s plan to succeed and for Yosef to meet his brothers?

41:47-49 record how Yosef gathered up all of the produce in Egypt. This surely required a large government bureaucracy to coordinate all of the purchasing (or taking), storing and distributing the food. Interestingly, MacGregor (2012, pp. 88-95) in his discussion of the Rhind mathematical papyrus, a papyrus from Egypt from around 1550 BCE that listed 84 mathematical questions which are believed to be preparations for the Egyptian civil servant exams at that time, noted how the papyrus shows the well-developed and mathematically well-trained bureaucracy in Egypt. It is not clear when Yosef lived, a little before 1550 BCE or maybe a little afterwards, but we see that in Egypt there was a talented bureaucracy at his time that could have implemented his policies.

Instead of having this large government bureaucracy, Yosef could have informed the people of the coming famine, and relied on the people themselves to store up their food. Did Yosef think that the people would not have listened since they would not trust him or because people in general are short-sighted? Or, maybe Yosef needed to have the government apparatus in order that he would be able to “catch” his brothers?

Yosef’s policies were an example of big government. Government policies usually suffer from two problems. One, government officials usually do not have sufficient information to solve problems, and two, many times the officials are more concerned with their own welfare than the welfare of the people. However, these problems did not exist in this case since Yosef was a fearer of G-d (39:9, 41:38, 42:18), and through the dreams Yosef had all the necessary information. Yet, while Yosef solved the problem of famine, in the end his solution caused the Jewish people to be in Egypt, where they eventually ended up as slaves. Yosef only had information for fourteen years, and he could not foresee the consequences of his actions after the fourteen years.

41:54-57, 42:5,6 and 47:13-26 record the implementation of Yosef’s plan during the seven years of the famine. Yosef’s actions in these years can be divided into several stages. Firstly, as we discuss on 41:54,56,57; 42:5-7; 47:15, “Was Egypt the breadbasket of the world in the time of Yosef?” I believe that there were three stages to Yosef selling the wheat. Initially, for a short time, he sold the food to anybody who came to Egypt, then for two years or so, he sold wheat both to people from Canaan and of course the Egyptians, and then in the end he only sold/ distributed the wheat to the Egyptians.

Secondly, Yosef’s policies just with regard to the Egyptians had four stages. First, Yosef acquired all of the people's money, then Yosef acquired their animals, and then when the people offered to sell themselves and their land, he bought their land as well. After the famine was almost over, in the fourth stage, Yosef gave the Egyptian people seeds to start over, but he instituted a tax of twenty percent which he justified since he had bought them and their land. The net result of the famine was that the people survived due to Yosef, which they acknowledged, 47:25, and then afterwards they had to pay an annual income tax of 20%.

One question about these policies during the seven years of famine is why did the Torah record them as the section of 47:13-26 seems peripheral to the main focus of the story of Yosef and his brothers? The Torah could have recorded in one sentence that the Egyptians survived the famine due to Yosef and they were thankful to him, without recording all the details of Yosef’s actions.

A second question is while we can understand why Yosef sold the wheat to foreigners (from the Egyptian perspective), should Yosef have given the Egyptians the food for free? Benno Jacob (1974, p. 318) argues that it was just for the Egyptians to pay for the food since they had received money when they sold the grains to Yosef during the good years. Yet, after the Egyptians ran out of money, Yosef made them pay for the food by the Egyptians giving him their animals and their land. Why did Yosef not give the Egyptians the food for free after their money was gone? It is true that when people get things for nothing, they waste them, and during the famine the goal was to conserve the food, which implies that the food should have not been distributed completely free, but was it necessary for Yosef to take all of the Egyptians’ money, animals and their land? Maybe Yosef's goal was to have the people agree to a tax of 20% (47:24). With this idea, after the people gave Yosef their lands, then the food was given freely since there was nothing left for the people to pay. Furthermore, with this understanding, maybe the reason why the Torah records the details of the implementation of Yosef’s polices was to provide proof of Pharaoh's statement in 41:39 that Yosef was brilliant, as Yosef was able to institute a tax of 20% with complete acceptance by the public.

A third question is, was the 20% tax reasonable or fair? The answer here, as in many cases by the question of fairness, depends on one’s perspective. A tax of 20% is reasonable to a person who pays more than 20% in taxes (see Ramban on 47:19), but for somebody who did not pay any taxes before the famine to pay 20% after the famine was surely a lot.

A fourth question is why would the people trade their animals for food when they could eat the animals? The answer could be that the nourishment from the wheat they received was much greater than what they would have attained by eating their animals. This could be because they received comparably more grains than the value of their animals, and it could have been that the animals had become quite scrawny (like in Pharaoh’s dream) during the famine.

After the Egyptians sold their lands to Yosef, he moved the people throughout the country to the cities, 47:21. Not only is this a difficult process logistically, but it also would have increased the suffering of the Egyptians in those years, who were already suffering from the famine. Why did Yosef do this? (A fifth question.)

Rashi (on 47:21) explains that Yosef moved the people from one city to another city in order that they should realize that they had sold their land and that they should not look upon Yaakov's family as foreigners. This is a difficult since the verse just states that the people were moved to the city and not that they were moved from city to city. Also, is this second rationale of helping his family in some minor way sufficient to justify uprooting people from their homes?

Luzzatto (on 47:21) tries to mitigate the suffering of the Egyptians from this action by Yosef by arguing that Yosef maintained the initial groupings of the people. The idea is that all the people from each town were moved together to a new town in order that there were no problems of social adjustment. Furthermore, since the Egyptian people were willing participants in selling the land, there probably was no need to forcibly move the people. Yet, the Egyptians were probably not happy to be moved from their homeland.

Ibn Ezra (on 47:21) first writes that Yosef moved each person from his place, and then he adds a second opinion that Yosef moved all the people from the rural areas to the cities. This second opinion accords with the words of the verse, but why would Yosef do this? Ibn Ezra writes that by moving the people, then the land could be worked. This seems unlikely since during a famine there was no farming at all, 45:6.

Bekhor Shor (on 47:21, also see Rashbam on 47:21) first quotes Rashi's first explanation, and then the Bekhor Shor adds a second possibility that Yosef moved the people from city to city after each city ran out of food. The idea here is that the cities were the places where the food was sold/ distributed, and then when there was no more food to give out, the people moved to another city to get food. The Bekhor Shor writes that Rashi’s explanation is more correct, but Hertz (1960, p. 177) follows the second approach, as he writes "the cities became depots for facilitating the distribution of the food." This idea that the cities were the points of distribution accords with 41:48 that the food was gathered in the cities during the seven good years.

There was no reason for the Egyptian people to remain in the fields during the famine since due to the famine there was no possibility to farm the lands, so, following Hertz's understanding, Yosef moved the people to the cities where it would be easier to feed them. Maybe the people worked at crafts in the city during the famine, and then when the famine ended the Egyptian people would have returned to their lands. Thus, Yosef’s action to move the Egyptians was only temporary until the famine was over, and was to ease the lives of the Egyptians during the famine.

Another (sixth) question is that the Torah makes a point of specifying that Yosef did not buy the land of the Egyptian priests, which implies both that they paid either less or nothing for the food that they received from Yosef and that the tax was not instituted on them, 47:22,26. Independent of why the Torah records all the details of Yosef’s action by the Egyptian population in selling them food, why did the Torah mention Yosef’s special policies with regard to the Egyptian priests?

N. Leibowitz (1976, pp. 520-529, also in Jacobson, 1986) offers two explanations. One, the Torah is ridiculing the Egyptian system of justice that allowed a difference in land ownership between the elite, the priests, and the common people. However, it was Yosef who caused the Egyptians to lose their land and who made this difference in land ownership.

N. Leibowitz’s second answer is that the Torah mentions that the Egyptian priests owned their land to contrast the future Jewish law that the Jewish priests would not own land. This point is not entirely correct since while the Jewish priests did not have land in the countryside, they did have their own cities in which presumably they owned property, Bemidbar 35:2. Also, what is to be learned from this contrast? N. Leibowitz writes that it is to show that “the Levites were not chosen in order to enable them to accumulate wealth and exploit their flock” but to work for G-d. It is true that the Torah attempts to prevent the religious elite, the priests, from being the economic elite, and this separation may not have occurred in Egypt, but I doubt this is the point of this section. Here, we do not see the Egyptians priests benefiting at the expense of the people, rather we see the Egyptian people losing their land due to Yosef.

Instead, it could be that this differentiation that Yosef made between the general Egyptian population and the priests is to explain how it was that the Egyptian people seemingly easily agreed to Pharaoh to enslave the Jewish people, Shemot 1:8-10, and then to murder the male Jewish children, Shemot 1:22. Pharaoh must have had popular support from at least a majority of the population when he enslaved and tried to kill the Jewish male children. Yet, why would the people have given Pharaoh this support if 47:25 records how thankful the Egyptians felt towards Yosef? Did all the Egyptians have amnesia? One might argue that Egyptians would have had no compunctions against enslaving the Jewish people since that was normal in those times and it provided free labor, but I think to commit genocide there needed to be some underlying antagonism.

Maybe the answer is Yosef’s policies during the famine. Initially the people were happy with Yosef, but what happened after the famine was over? The people were left without their money, animals and with a new tax of 20%, and they would have forgotten how perilous their existence was during the famine. Yosef would have quickly changed from a hero to a villain. A mere 17 years after Yaakov came to Egypt, Yosef had to have Pharaoh’s officials intercede with Pharaoh to get Yosef permission to bury Yaakov in the land of Israel, 50:4,5. Furthermore, the fact that the priests were given food (either for free or cheaper), did not lose their land and did not have to pay the tax would only have increased the resentment of the Egyptians towards Yosef and his family, the Jews, since this showed that it was not necessary for Yosef to have sold the food to them. Only Pharaoh would have had a reason to remember Yosef since he was the only person who benefited in the long run after the famine was over from Yosef’s plans. Thus, once Shemot 1:8 records that a new king came to Egypt who did not know Yosef, there was nothing to stop the Jewish people from suffering at the hands of the Egyptians. Accordingly, it could be that Yosef's polices was partially responsible for the Jewish people being enslaved in Egypt, see Lerner (1989) and Wildavsky (1993, p. 8).

To conclude, were Yosef’s policies in Egypt good or bad? From a short-term perspective, during the 14 years of the good and bad years, they were successful both in saving Egypt and in re-uniting Yosef with Yaakov and his brothers, but from a long-term perspective, it is not clear if Yosef implemented the best policies during the years of the famine.

Bibliography:

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press.

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1974, The first book of the bible: Genesis, commentary abridged, edited and translated by Earnest I. Jacob and Walter Jacob, New York: Ktav Publishing House.

Jacobson, B. S. 1986, Mediations on the Torah, Tel Aviv: Sinai Publishing.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Lerner, Berel Dov, 1989, "Joseph the unrighteous," Judaism, 38:3, pp. 278-281.

MacGregor, Neil, 2012, A history of the world in 100 objects, London: Penguin Books.

Wildavsky, Aaron, 1993, Assimilation versus separation: Joseph the administrator and the politics of religion in biblical Israel, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Sunday, November 12, 2023

Bereshit 26:12-33 – Yitzhak and the wells: True grit

Bereshit 26:6 records that Yitzhak went to live in Gerar, and 26:12 -14 record that he became successful in Gerar. This success led the inhabitants of Gerar, the Philistines, to be jealous of him. In the Torah the term jealousy means that a person will act in an aggressive manor to defend a perceived attempt to limit or end the person’s rights. In this case, the Philistines believed or claimed that Yitzhak’s success was taking away their right to water. Thus, the following verse, 26:15, informs us that the Philistines filled in the wells that Avraham had dug, which was an action by the Philistines to protect their water rights.

26:16 then records that the king of Gerar, Avimelekh, told Yitzhak to leave. Presumably, this was because the filling in of the wells was viewed as being insufficient by the Philistines. 

26:17 then records that Yitzhak complied with this request (order?) and moved to Nahal Gerar.

26:18 then records that Yitzhak opened the wells up that the Philistines had filled in. What was the purpose of this act as he already left the area? Also, the following verse, 26:19, records that his servants dug a well in Nahal Gerar, why did he open the wells that Philistines had filled in (26:18)? Why did his servants have to dig new wells (26:19), after he had opened up the wells of Avraham?

Sarna (1989, p. 186) explains that the new wells were found accidentally when re-digging the wells of Avraham. I find this idea difficult since most likely the wells of Avraham were in Gerar, while the new wells were in Nahal Gerar (see Rashi on 26:17). Also, I doubt that new wells would be found accidentally when just re-digging old wells.

Rashi (on 26:18) explains that Yitzhak dug the wells (mentioned in 26:18) right before he left Gerar and Rashbam, Radak and Bekhor Shor (on 26:18) point out that Yitzhak renamed the wells based on Avraham’s names to show his ownership of the wells. This suggests that Yitzhak’s digging up of the wells of Avraham as recorded in 26:18 was a protest and not for deriving water from the wells.

Yitzhak left Gerar seemingly without a fight (26:17), but either before he left or he returned to re-dig the wells without Avimelekh’s permission to show that the wells were his and not the Philistines. He knew the Philistines would not let him stay and use the water, but this was his protest against the Philistines. Thus, as the digging of the wells of Avraham did not give Yitzhak any water, he had to dig new wells, as recorded in 26:19.

The Torah continues that local shepherds disputed the first well that his servants had dug in Nahal Gerar, so they dug another well (still in Nahal Gerar?), 26:20,21. The local shepherds also fought over this well, so Yitzhak moved (the second or third time) and dug another well in a new locale, 26:21,22. Even though there is no record in the Torah of a fight over this well, Yitzhak left the area and went to Beer Sheva, 26:23. 

Why do we have to know that Yitzhak dug three wells that he abandoned? Ramban (on 26:20) writes that this section by the wells shows no credit to Yitzhak, and that really the wells symbolize the Bet ha-Mikdash. Ramban claims that by the third well there was no dispute between Yitzhak and the Philistines, and so too the third bet ha-Mikdash will also exist without strife.

I have never understood this explanation since not only do I not see any intrinsic connection between wells and the Bet ha-Mikdash, but also Yitzhak abandoned the third well, 26:23, and dug another well, 26:25,32. Does this mean that according to Ramban’s logic, the third Bet ha-Mikdash will also be abandoned (G-d forbid) and we will have to wait for the fourth Bet ha-Mikdash? Also, when Yitzhak left for Be’er Sheva after digging the third well, G-d told him not to be afraid, 26:24. This means that while the Philistines (or other people) did not fight over the third well, still there was some reason why Yitzhak was scared, and presumably this is why he abandoned the third well (see Rashbam on 26:23). According to the Ramban, does this mean that in the time of the third Bet ha-Mikdash, the people will also be in fear?

I think the point of the story of the wells is to portray Yitzhak in a very positive light. In the beginning of chapter 26, 26:2-5, G-d blessed Yitzhak and Yitzhak did his best to succeed by planting and digging wells. However, even with all his determination, he constantly had to move on and never was permanently successful. After Yitzhak moved to Beer Sheva, G-d then blessed him again, 26:24, but Yitzhak had a different response to this second blessing. He continued his work by digging another well, but now he also built an altar and called out the name of G-d, 26:25. Not only did Yitzhak work to fulfill the blessings, but he also publicly stated his recognition of G-d. This action by Yitzhak showed his religious development and finally he had permanent success by the last well in Be'er Sheva (26:32,33). 

26:26 then records that Avimelekh, and two other Philistines came to see Yitzhak in Be'er Sheva.  Yitzhak was quite surprised by their visit, and asked them why they came to see him? They answered that they realized that Yitzhak was blessed by G-d and that they wanted to make a treaty with Yitzhak, 26:27,28,29.  26:30,31 then record that Yitzhak made a treaty with them, and then this episode ends, as 26:32,33 record how Yitzhak's servants found a well in Be'er Sheva. 

This recognition by other people that Yitzhak was blessed indicates that Yitzhak was a respected figure that people wanted to make a treaty with him. Also, it is likely that this idea is important not only for our understanding of Yitzhak, but also for the narrative concerning Esav and Yaakov. Before the events that transpired in chapter 26, we read that Esav despised the birthright of Yitzhak, 25:34. However, in chapter 27 we see that Esav was crying that he did not get Yitzhak’s blessing, 27:38. What caused this change in Esav? Maybe the treaty between Avimelekh and Yitzhak changed his attitude towards his father. Once Esav saw that other important people wanted to make a treaty with Yitzhak then he changed his evaluation of Yitzhak and wanted to get Yitzhak’s blessings.

Bibliography:

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Monday, October 9, 2023

Bereshit 5:3,4 – Longevity and the aging process in the Torah

Bereshit 5:3 records that Adam had a child when he was 130 years old, something that is not possible in the 21st century. 5:4 then records that Adam lived another 800 years afterwards. This also is not physically possible. The remainder of chapter 5 lists ten more individuals who also lived extremely long lives. Similarly, 11:10-32 lists nine more individuals who had extremely long lives. The people listed in chapter 11 lived less years than all the people listed in chapter five, except for Chanoch (5:23), but still eight of them lived more than 200 years, which again does not seem possible. Afterwards the lifespans continued to decrease, but still the Torah lists many people who lived longer than humanely possible in the 21st century, Sara, 127 years (23:1), Avraham, 175 years (25:7), Yishmael, 137 years (25:17), Yitzhak, 180 years (35:28), Yaakov, 147 years (47:9, 48:28), Levi and his descendants’, 137 years, 133 years and 137 years, (Shemot 6:16-20), Aharon, 123 years (Bemidbar 33:39) and Moshe lived 120 years (Devarim 31:2). Yosef also lived 110 years (Bereshit 50:26), which also seems incredible for the period of the Torah.

The Rambam (Moreh 11:47) writes, apparently in reference to all the people who had long lives in the Torah, that only these people lived so long, as the other people who are not named as having long lives, lived regular lives. The Rambam suggests that the long lives of these individuals could have been due to their diet and behavior or due to a miracle. The Ramban (on 5:4) rejects this approach and claims that the people listed in chapters five and eleven were not unique in their lifetime. He notes that if the Rambam’s suggestion of diet and behavior was correct, then many people should have followed their behavior. Also, he claims that not all of these people were worthy of G-d making them miracles. It seems to me that even the Ramban relies on miracles for the long lives of the patriarchs. The Ramban also seems to claim that until the period of the sin of the Tower of Bavel people would naturally live long lives, which again appears to be impossible.

A different approach is that the years listed in the Torah are not full solar years. Ha-Ketav Ve-haKabbalh (on 5:5) notes that some people claim that the years in chapter five are based on a one-month lunar cycle which he rejects. Beck (1967, pp. 25-29) suggests that a year in the Torah is a six-month period, and then the lives of the patriarchs would be half of what is recorded in the Torah.

My guess is that the years in the Torah are similar to our years, that the Rambam is correct that only those people who are listed as having had a long life, had a long life and that this was a miracle that G-d did for them. It is not clear why it was necessary for these people to have long lives, and my guess is that it is a literary way of marking a large passage of time with a relatively limited number of people.

In addition, with regard to the people who had long lives, it must be that their aging process was a much slower process than our aging in the 21st century. David Tzvi Hoffmann (1969, p. 383, introduction to chapter 25) follows this idea when discussing how old was Avraham when he had more children apparently after Sara had died, 25:2. He writes that even though Avraham was officially 140 then (if these children were born right after Yitzhak married Rivka), he was really 56 years ago. This calculation would be that 140/175, his present age divided by the age when he died, equals 0.8 and 0.8*70 = 56. Thus, he claims Avraham was able to father the children recorded in 25:2. While I think Avraham had the ability to father the children recorded in 25:2 due to a special blessing from G-d (see our discussion on 24:1, “To be virile again”), it must be that Hoffmann is correct that the aging process for the people who had very long lives in the Torah was at a proportional rate.

I think that even by the early years of the people who had long lives in the Torah that their development was at a slow pace, and then they reached puberty later than modern people. Thus, the youngest age that people in chapter five began to have children was 65. In chapter 11, the aging process had quickened to some extent compared to the people in chapter five, as the youngest age that people had children in chapter 11 was twenty-nine years (11:24), and their life span had shortened from between 400 years to 148 years, but still their aging was slower than people in modern times. Afterwards by the age of the patriarchs until, and including, Moshe, the development and aging of the people with long lives were proportional to a person who lived seventy/ eighty years.

Thus, Sara was considered beautiful when she came to Egypt (12:11,15), even though she was sixty-five years old, since she had not yet aged that much because she was going to live until 127, 23:1. Hence, she was around 35 years old based on a lifespan of seventy years. This slower proportional aging is also why the Torah had to tell us that Sara had stopped menstruating when she was 89/90, 18:11, which should have been obvious, but with proportional aging, one might have thought that at 89/90 (17:17), which was proportional to 49 years ((89/127)*70), that she was still menstruating, but she was not.

Avraham was equivalent physically to a 30-year-old ((75/175)*70) when he left Haran and fought with the four kings and not to a seventy-five year old (12:4), which in antiquity and today was/is possible, but it is very unlikely for a seventy five year old to have the strength to fight a war. In addition, Sara thought that there was a good possibility that Avraham would be able to have a child with Hagar even though he was 85 years old then, since if it was not possible, she would not have been willing for him to have another wife, 16:1-3. Also, Avraham agreed to her proposal and did not claim that he could not have a child when he was 85 since really he was physically around 34 years old (86/175)*70).

14 years later, when Avraham was officially 99 years old, both Avraham and Sara doubted whether Avraham could father another child, 17:17,24; 18:10,12; 21:1-7. 18:11 (also 21:2), which is information provided by the “narrator” records that Avraham and Sara were old when they were told that Sara was to have a child, but also adds the phrase “and advancing in years.” This phrase is qualifying the previous word, that they were old, that while they were getting older, they were not necessarily not “functioning” and then the verse continues to inform us that Sara was post-menopausal since, as mentioned above, this was not obvious. Yet, according to this theory of proportionate aging, Avraham was then equivalent to being 40 years old (99/175)*70), so why did Sara and Avraham doubt that he could have a child? Maybe Avram and Sara were considered old even in their 40s, since in those days, life expectancy was around 40, even for people who did not die at childhood. In addition, maybe Avraham’s and Sara’s doubt that Avraham could have a child just “six years” after fathering Yishmael was because they did not think that a person at Avraham’s age (physically equivalent to 40 years) would be able to recover sufficiently from the circumcision, which G-d had just commanded him to do, 17:10-14, and he had done, 17:23,24, to have a child. Maybe then, Avraham’s ability to have Yitzhak was due to a miracle. 

This idea of proportionate aging could also explain why Yishmael seems to have been small when he and Hagar had to leave Avraham’s house, even though he was 14-years-old, 21:14-20. Also, while Yishmael was officially 13 years old when he was circumcised this would have been equivalent to being six and a half (17:25; 25:17 (13/137)*70).

In addition, with this idea, Yitzhak was in modern terms around 15.5 years old when he married Rivka, (25:2, (40/180)*70)) and Yaakov was in modern terms around 40 years old when he married Lea and Rahel ((84/147)*70).

Also, with this understanding, Yosef was not mentally or physically 17 years old (37:2) when he tattled on his brothers, but around 12 years in modern terms, and he was equivalent to an 18-year-old ((28/110)*70) when Potifar’s wife tried to seduce him, 39:7-12. This might explain why Reuven also refers to him as the child, 37:30 and 42:20. This would also mean that when Yaakov sent Yosef to look for his brothers in Shekhem, 37:13, Yosef was equivalent to a ten-year old in modern times, which might be considered as being too young for such a mission. However, as we explain in our discussion on 37:3-14, “Yaakov's parenting,” Yaakov accepted that the dreams of Yosef were a prophecy, and hence he probably felt that Yosef would be protected.

This slow aging process might also help explain the conversation between Pharaoh and Yaakov when they met, 47:8,9. First, Pharaoh asked Yaakov how old he was since he knew that Yosef was not aging in the normal manner. Secondly, this proportional aging can explain why Yaakov knew that he would not reach the lives of his father and grandfather since he knew at 130 years that he was aging faster than they had been aging at the same age, 47:9. 

The net result is that since the long lifespans recorded in the Torah of various people was a miracle, the miracle was also that the development and the aging process of the different people were also a slower process than in modern times, and starting in the time of the patriarchs, the development and aging process of the people with long lives was proportional to the lifespan of each person.

Bibliography:

Beck, Samuel, 1967, From Sinai to Navo, Jerusalem: Raphael Chayyim Hacohen Publishing.

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1969, Commentary on Genesis, Bnei Brak: Nezach.

Monday, September 18, 2023

Devarim 32:10 – Who did G-d find and protect in the desert?

Devarim 32:10 records “He (G-d) found him in the wilderness land, in the waste of the howling desert. He encircled him, gave mind to him, watched him like the apple of his eye.” Alter, 2004, p. 1040, translation. This verse is part of the beginning section of the song of Hazinu (Devarim 32:1-43), which records that the people are to learn from their history to see that G-d was good to the people.

One question concerning this verse is who did G-d find in the howling desert? I believe that the standard explanation is that the someone is the Jewish people that G-d found them in the desert. With this approach the singular pronoun in the verse is understood as referring to the plural, them, but did G-d find the people in the desert? G-d "found" the people in Egypt, which was not the desert, and then G-d took the people to the desert. Seemingly to answer this question, Rashi (on 32:10) argues that the finding is that G-d found that the people were loyal, faithful to Him by the Decalogue at Mount Sinai. This is difficult since the people were not so loyal at Mount Sinai as forty days after the Decalogue, they committed the sin of the golden calf (see Shemot 32:1-6 and Devarim 9:8).

Rashi himself seems bothered by this approach and towards the end of his comments on the verse, he quotes a second explanation from Targum Onkelos (also quoted by the Rashbam on 32:10), that based on Bemidbar 11:22 one can claim that the word find means that G-d provided the people with food. N. Leibowitz (1982a, p. 342) notes that this explanation is "rather strained linguistically" and she prefers Rashi's first explanation that the finding is by the Decalogue since this approach accords with the following verse, 32:11, which has a connection with the events at Mount Sinai, see our discussion on 32:11, “On the wings of eagles.”

Another problem with the idea that 32:10 is referring to the time of the giving of the Torah is that the implication of 32:10 is that prior to this finding by G-d, someone or some people was/ were on the verge of dying in the barren desert. Were the people on the verge of dying at Mount Sinai? G-d had already given them the mahn, Shemot chapter 16. Also, Devarim 9:21, seems to refer to some river/ creek by Mount Sinai when the people were there, which implies that the people were not in a barren desert at the time of the giving of the Torah.

These problems suggest that the reference to G-d finding someone in 32:10 is referring to a specific person who was in trouble in the desert, but who could be this person? One possibility could be Moshe when he ran away from Pharaoh, Shemot 2:15, but was Moshe on the verge of dying in the desert before he found the wells by Midyan? Maybe yes, but 32:10 also implies that this finding signaled the beginning of the people, and the Jewish people existed prior to Moshe.

Another possibility is that the verse is referring to Avraham that some time prior to G-d's call in Bereshit 12:1, he had got lost in the desert. Could this be the reference to Bereshit 20:13? 

Another possibility is that the verse is referring to Yaakov, who was mentioned in the previous verse, 32:9, that maybe at some point when Yaakov was running away from Esav, he was on the verge of dying in a desert.

A fourth possibility is that the verse is referring to Terah, who was the progenitor of the Jewish people both on the male line (Avraham) and the female line (Rivka, Rahel and Leah, and maybe Sara). The verse would then be telling us that there was an incident when Terah was on the verge of dying in the desert and G-d saved him and then protected his descendants.

There is no explicit reference to such an incident in the Torah, but there are two hints that this might have happened. One, Bereshit 11:31 records that Terah, on his own, decided to go the land of Canaan/ Israel from Ur Kasdim (southern Iraq?) but he did not make it and ended up in Haran (Northern Syria). What is the significance of this verse? Why is it important that that he wanted to go to the land of Canaan/ Israel but did not make it? The Torah is giving him credit for his effort even though he did not make it, why? Our verse might suggest an answer. Maybe when he was trying to get to the land of Canaan/ Israel, he got lost and ended up in the Syrian Desert near death. At this point G-d found him and saved him, but after this experience he did not want to try again and he lived out the rest of his life in Haran. However, this moment was crucial since maybe this is when the Jewish people were founded in the sense that at that point, G-d decided to watch over Terah’s family and this is why Bereshit 11:31 recorded Terah’s effort to get to the land of Canaan/ Israel.

A second hint is that Bereshit 12:1 records that G-d told Avraham to "go to the land that I will show you." Why did G-d not say explicitly the land of Canaan? A possible answer is that since Avraham had travelled with Terah (Bereshit 11:31) when Terah had been saved by G-d, he knew which land G-d was referring to, but he also knew how dangerous was the trip that he could get lost again in the desert, so G-d had to tell him that I will show you the way in order that you will not get lost this time.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1982a, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Tuesday, August 29, 2023

Devarim 31:20, 21 - G-d’s last message in the Torah to Moshe concerning the people

Devarim 31:20,21 record that G–d explained to Moshe (and seemingly also Yehoshua) that the people were going to worship other gods when they would come to the land of Israel since G-d knew "their yetser even before they entered the land that I promised them." The word yetser is usually translated as devisings, but as we discuss on Bereshit 8:21 "Is man evil?" I think it means people’s selfish nature. In any event, these verses raise several questions, and maybe answer a question from the flood in the beginning of the Torah.

One question is do these verses state that the people were destined to sin when they would come into the land of Israel? Note, this same question would seem to apply to 30:16, 29; also 4:25. If the answer is yes, then the people have no free will. However, Moshe seems to affirm the principle of free will at the end of his speech by the establishment of the covenant on the plains of Moav, 30:15,19. Yet, if people have free will, then how could G-d state the people were destined to worship other gods? Thus, either one must understand these verses as being conditional that if the people would sin, which seems difficult, or that in these verses G-d was saying that there was a high probability, but not 100%, that the people would sin. Note, as one refers to more and more generations of people, then the cumulative odds would get higher and higher that some generation would sin.

A second related question is do these verses imply that G-d does not know the future? 31:21 states that G-d knew the people would sin since He knew their yetser, but if He knows the future, then there is no reason to relate G-d’s knowledge of the future to the people’s yetser in the present. Ibn Ezra (on 31:21) writes that the verse means that even if G-d did not know the future, still G-d would have known that the people were going to sin. My impression is that the Torah (see Bereshit 6:6) is written based on the idea that G-d does not know the future, and hence 31:20,21 should be understood that since G-d knew that people are selfish, He could predict with a very high certainty that the people would worship idolatry in the future. One might wonder how being selfish would lead a person to worship other gods, but it could be that people would worship other gods in order to get the “benefits” they would think come from worshipping these other gods, that the person would think that he/ she is “covering his/ her bases.” With regard to the basic question of does Judaism believe that G-d knows the future, this might depend on how one understands Pirkei Avot 3:19.

A third unrelated question is if there was a high probability that the people would sin when they would come into the land of Israel, why would G-d give the people the land of Israel? One answer could be there was still a small chance the people would not sin. A second answer is that they received the land of Israel based on their present status, and while they had the yetser even before they entered the land of Israel, it had not yet caused them to sin. A third answer is that they received the land since G-d had promised it to the patriarchs, which is re-called in 31:20.

The connection between these verses and the flood is that the word yetser only occurs three times in the Torah, here, before the flood, Bereshit 6:5, and after the flood, Bereshit 8:21. Alter (2004, p. 1035) writes, "This relatively unusual word, yetser, is surely a pointed allusion directing us to G-d's bleak words about human nature after the Flood: For the yetser of the human heart is evil from youth." This word establishes a connection between the beginning of the Torah and the end, but what is the connection?

Why did G-d re-start the world after the flood if people have this yetser which can cause them to be evil? Maybe, the entire Torah is to answer the question can people be good even though people have this yetser? If the answer is a categorical no, then there was no point to re-starting the world after the flood. However, G-d did re-start the world after the flood, which means that even though people have this yetser, this selfishness, a (the) point of the Torah was to teach man to overcome/ modify or channel his yetser to become a good person.

When it is all said and done at the end of the Torah, does G-d think that people will succeed or not in overcoming/ modifying or channeling their yetser to do good? The answer from 30:20,21 is not a resounding yes, as otherwise G-d would not have stated that the people were going to sin in the future. However, since we have argued that the verses are speaking in probable terms, even highly probable that the people will sin, still there is some chance that people will not sin. Some people at some time, will be able overcome/ modify or channel their yetser and be good people, but others, maybe the majority, will fail. This possibility leaves people with the free will to be good or bad even though we have this yetser.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company

Wednesday, August 2, 2023

The definition of the word shamor in Moshe's speeches in the book of Devarim - To remember

Most of the book of Devarim records Moshe’s speeches to the Jewish people at the end of his life. One of the key words in Moshe’s speech in the book of Devarim is shamor, and there is great confusion about the meaning of this word since the word in the Torah has a different meaning than its meaning in modern day Hebrew. In modern Hebrew it means to watch, guard, protect, but in the Torah, the word shamor means to remember. I will now give several examples.

The first time the word shamor appears in the book of Devarim is 2:4, when Moshe was re-telling the people G-d’s instructions to the people when they had circled around Edom/ Esav. 2:4 records that the people were told that even though Edom was scared of them, ve-nishmartem meod. Tigay (1996, p. 24) translates the phrase as “be very careful” that the people were to be careful not to provoke Edom, the following verse. This definition follows the idea that shamor relates to guarding but does it accord with the definition of keeping, which is how the word shamor is explained in most cases in the book of Devarim? Instead, the phrase should be understood to mean that people are to strongly remember that Edom/ Esav is considered their brother, which is mentioned in the beginning of the verse, and hence they should not provoke Edom, the following verse.

The next case of the word shamor is Devarim 4:2, which records that Moshe told the people that they are to lishmor the mitzvot of G-d. Can this phrase mean to guard or protect the mitzvot? Instead, the usual explanation/ translation is to keep the mitzvot (see for example Alter, 2004, p. 897) which can fit the context, but it is not the idea of guarding. Instead, the phrase should be interpreted to mean that Moshe told the people to remember the mitzvot.  This same idea appears in 5:10,26, 8:2, 10:13, 12:28, 13:5, 26:17, 18, and 28:9.

Devarim 4:6 records that Moshe told the people, u-shemartem va-asitem. Alter (2004, p. 898) translates the phrase as meaning that Moshe said “you shall keep and do,” as again he translates the word shamor as meaning keep. How does keep differ from do? It is redundant to say to do, to do. Instead, the word shamor means to remember, and Moshe was telling the people to remember the laws to do them. Similarly, 5:1, 5:29, 6:3, 6:25, 8:1, 11:32, 12:1, 13:1,19, 16:5,12, 17:10,19, 19:9, 24:8 (the second and third times the word appears in the verse), 26:16, 28:1,13,15, 28:58, 29:8, 31:12 and 32:46 have the phrase of shamor la-asot, which again means to remember to do.

Devarim 4:9 then records that Moshe told the people “But, he-shamer lecha, ushemor nafeshcha moed, pen tishkach.” In this phrase, the word shamor appears twice. Alter (2004, p. 898) explains the phrase as meaning “Only be you on the watch and watch yourself closely lest you forget.” In this phrase, Alter is translating the word shamor to mean on the watch. Is this the same meaning as keep, his translation of the word shamor in 4:6? What does it mean for a person to be on their watch? Instead, Devarim 4:9 means, “But, you should remember, remember greatly with your nefesh, do not forget.” This double language of remembering stresses the importance of the people remembering. 6:17 and 11:22, also record the word shamor twice, which again is to stress to the people to remember. 9:18 also had the double language of remembering, though with the word zachor, the synonym of shamor. In addition, 4:15 records remembering with regard to a person’s nefesh.

4:23 records that Moshe told the people, “he-shamru lachem pen tishkachu.” Alter (2004, p. 901) translates the phrase as "Be you on the watch, lest you forget," similar to his translation of the word shamor in 4:9. However, the phrase means that Moshe told the people to remember, do not forget. This phrase has both the positive injunction to remember and the negative injunction not to forget, as in 4:9, 6:12, 9:7 (with the word zachor) and 8:11.  This charge to remember, hishamer, in order not to do something wrong also appears in 11:16, 12:13,19,30, 15:9, and 24:8 (the first time the word appears in the verse and this remembering connects with the remembering in 24:9).

4:40 records that Moshe ended his first (?) speech in the book of Devarim by saying “ve-shamarta et chukov ve-et mitzvotov.” Alter (2004, p. 904) translates the word shamor here as keep as he did in 4:6, but Tigay (1996, p. 39) writes that the word shamor should be translated as “take to heart.” This is similar to idea of remembering, and 4:40 should be understood to mean that Moshe was telling the people to remember G-d’s laws. This same idea appears in 7:11, 8:6, the end of 8:11, 9:13, 11:1, and 11:8.  Similarly, 27:1 records that Moshe told the people to remember to follow his instructions when they would cross the Jordan River.  Also, in 33:9, the idea is that the tribe of Levi remembered G-d’s words.

In Moshe’s second speech to the people in the book of Devarim, he re-calls the Decalogue and he stated, shamor et yom ha-Shabbat le-kadsho, 5:12. On this phrase, Tigay (1996, p. 68) writes, “the verb shamor is commonly used for keeping a holiday and fulfilling obligations.” This understanding creates an inconsistency with the Decalogue in the book of Shemot (20:8), which records the phrase, “zachor et yom ha-Shabbat lekadsho.” However, as should be clear from all the examples above, the words shamor and zachor are synonyms, and in both cases the phrase has exactly the same meaning, that the people are to remember the Shabbat to make it kadosh (to separate it from the other days of the week), see our discussion on Devarim 5:6-18, “The Decalogue in Shemot 20 and Devarim 5.”  This similar idea also occurs in 16:1, that the people are to remember (shamor) the month of Aviv.

The beginning of 6:2 records that the people should fear G-d, which will lead lishmor all the laws, and the beginning of 6:3 records that the people should hear, shamarta, to do. Tigay (1996, p. 75) explains that the beginning of 6:3 means “literally, obey and faithfully do,” as now he is explaining the word shamor to mean faithfully. However, again the word shamor means to remember. The beginning of 6:2 means that Moshe told the people that they should fear G-d and this fear will lead them to remember the laws, as in 4:40, and the beginning of 6:3 means that Moshe was telling the people to listen, to remember (shamor) and to do (la-asot).

Towards the end of parashat Va-ethannan, Moshe told the people that G-d shomer the covenant, 7:9, and this idea is repeated in the second half of the first verse of parashat Ekev, 7:12. In between these verses, 7:11, records that the people are ve-shamarta et ha-mitzvah and the first half of 7:12 record that if the people shemartem va-asitem, then G-d will shomer the covenant. In these four verses, 7;9-12, the word shamor appears four times, twice in reference to G-d and twice in reference to people. Tigay (1996, p. 88) writes that in reference to the people, the word shamor means to observe, while in reference to G-d, the word means to keep or maintain, maybe since he did not want to say that G-d observes the covenant. Again, the simplest explanation is that shamor means to remember that the people are to remember the covenant, and G-d will remember the covenant, see Vayikra 26:42,45.

One case that is not clear is 23:10. This verse records that when the people go to war, ve-nishmarta from all bad things. In this case, one might be tempted to interpret the word shamor as guard, that when the people go to war, the soldier should guard himself from all bad things. What are the bad things? Something dangerous, but then the soldier would have known this on his own. Also, how does this verse relate to the ensuing verses which refer to a person having a nocturnal emission? I think the verse is usually understood to mean that a soldier should not do bad things, that is to say to keep from bad things. These bad things are undefined and then the verse is unrelated to the following verses. A different possibility based on the definition of shamor meaning to remember, is that the verse is stating that when a soldier in the war camp remembers some bad things, something sexual, then this can lead the soldier to have a nocturnal emission, see Talmud Avodah Zara 20b.

One interesting case in the section of laws is 23:24 which records that what comes out of one’s lips, tishmor. The usual translation is that a person should keep the promises that he/ she makes, but really it means that a person needs to remember his/ her promises and vows.

This understanding that the word shamor means to remember is not unique to the book of Devarim.  In the story of Yosef, Bereshit 37:11 records that after Yosef told his second dream to his father and brothers, that Yaakov shamor the words, and this means that Yaakov remembered the dream, see Rashi on 37:11.  My impression is that the majority of cases where the word appears in the Torah, the definition it to remember and not to watch.  Hopefully in the future, I will add posts about the word in the other four books of the Torah.

I did not examine the word shamor in Neviim and Ketivum, but in Tehillim 121:3,4,5,7,8 the word shamor has the meaning to watch and protect, the modern interpretation of the word. However, Tehillim 130:3, follows the meaning of the word shamor in the Torah that the verse records a plea to G-d not to shamor, not to remember, the sins of the people. Three verse later, Tehillim 130:6, the word shamor (twice) also probably refers to remembering.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Wednesday, July 26, 2023

The kinah Zekhor et asher asah tzar be-finnim - הקינה זכר את אשר עשה צר בפנים

The kinah Zekhor et asher asah tzar be-finnim is again by R. Elazar haKalir. The first word of each line corresponds to the first word of each verse in chapter five of Eicah and the second word of each line follows the aleph bet. Two exceptions are that since the fifth chapter in Eicah has 22 verses and there are 24 lines to the kinah, so lines 22 and 24 do not begin with the first word of a verse from Eicah chapter five. (If one wants to, they can argue that lines 21 and 23 are double lines, and then the kinah only has 22 lines, as line 23 becomes line 22.) In addition, each set of two lines ends with a rhyme by both the end of each line and by the end of the first half of each line, in total four rhymes. Also, each pair of lines usually has the same theme.

In the first line of the kinah, the aleph line, we ask G-d to remember that the enemy (tzar) drew his sword in the Holy of Holies. The enemy is referring to Titus, the Roman general and later Caesar, who was in charge of the Roman army that destroyed the second Bet ha-Mikdash. Josephus (re-print 2004, pp. 359-362) records that Titus did not desire for the Bet ha-Mikdash to be burnt, but one soldier on his own set fire to the Bet ha-Mikdash. Josephus also claims that Titus tried to stop the fire, but in the bedlam his orders were not heard. Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 369, see also Rav Soloveitchik, 2006, p. 205) is quoted as saying “that Josephus’ account is clearly false.” In any event, one might wonder how could or would Titus enter the Bet ha-Mikdash if it was burning? According to his kinah, he entered before it was burning, but even according to Josephus, he went in to the Holy of Holies when it was burning.

The second line of the kinah, the bet line, describes what Titus did when he went into the Holy of Holies, he defiled the show bread and pierced the curtain, the parokhet, that separated the inner room and the outer room of the Bet ha-Mikdash. This latter act is recorded in Gittin 56b and Bereshit Rabbah 10:7. The end of the line follows the idea that the curtain was embroidered on two sides, which as Goldschmid (2002, p. 72) notes is based on the Yerushalmi Shekalim, 8:4, 51b.

The third line of the kinah, the gimmel line, is that Titus disgraced the Jewish people, called orphans in the kinah, by entering the Holy of Holies with a bloody shield and then by making marks in the Holy of Holies with his bloody sword.

The fourth line of the kinah, the daled line, seems also to refer to Titus that he defaced the Bet ha-Mikdash with blood. Maybe Titus here represents all the Romans who defaced the Bet ha-Mikdash.

The fifth and sixth lines of the kinah, the heh and vav lines, note how Titus bragged that he could fight G-d that he was able to enter the Holy of Holies and left unscathed. Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 365) notes that this line is based on Gitten 56b.

The seventh line of the kinah, the zayin line, records the wonderment that how was Titus able to enter and leave the Holy of Holies unscathed? The kinah notes that when the people were in the desert, Nadav and Avihu were killed instantaneously when they sinned, Vayikra 10:1,2, but Titus was not harmed at all. Note it seems that R. Elazar haKalir is following the idea that Nadav and Avihu brought their fire inside the mishkan, but I think they sinned in front of the mishkan, see our discussion on the verses. The second half of the seventh line claims further impudence of Titus that he even brought a prostitute with him into the Holy of Holies. Goldshmidt (2002, p. 73) notes that this idea is based on Vayikra Rabbah 22:3.

The eighth line of the kinah, the chet line, continues with the wonderment, but now the question is more general, how could G-d allow or even cause to burn the place where sacrifices had been burnt to G-d? R. Elazar haKalir does not yet offer any answers to these questions.

The ninth line of the kinah, the tet line, changes the theme of the kinah as the line refer to Titus and all the Romans taking the vessels from the Bet ha-Mikdash and sending them to Rome on ships. Evidence of this can be seen today in Rome by the Arch of Titus. When I was by the Arch in the summer of 1982, somebody had etched in the words, am yisrael chai, the Jewish people live, but when I came back in 2007, the Arch was fenced off (maybe to stop people from etching on it).

The tenth line of the kinah, the yud line, notes the shock (horror ?) of the people when the High Priest awoke and he could not find the 93 vessels of the Bet ha-Mikdash, which had been taken away, as mentioned in line nine of the kinah. Rav Soloveitchik (2002, p. 367) notes that this line is puzzling as how could the High Priest have not known that the vessels had been taken away and that the Bet ha-Mikdash had been destroyed? What could it mean that he awoke? Did he go to sleep oblivious to what was happening in the Bet ha-Mikdash? Maybe R. Elazar haKalir does not just refer to the High Priest but to all the priests, and he was not referring to the literal morning after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, but to when the people had recovered sufficiently to survey the damage, and then the priests were shocked at the extent of the robbery by Titus and the Romans.

The eleventh line of the kinah, the chaf line, returns to the first theme of the kinah, Titus entering the Holy of Holies, and refers to women being scared of him. Were women in the Bet ha-Mikdash battling the Romans? Possibly, this reference to women is because R. Elazar haKalir was “forced” to refer to women since he was following the fifth chapter of Eicah and the first word in Eicah 5:11 is women. The second half of the eleventh line claims that Titus scarred the floor of the Bet ha-Mikdash with his boots, as maybe there was blood on the boots.

The twelfth line of the kinah, the lamed line, begins with a reference to leaders, following Eicah 5:12, and that they were scared of Titus, but it is not clear which leaders are being referred to. Could be the Jewish leaders of the rebellion who were scared of being killed by Titus? The second half of the twelfth line reverts back to Titus’ action in the Holy of Holies with the prostitute. The connection between these two half lines and with the eleventh line (its pair) is not clear.

The thirteenth line of the kinah, the mem line, begins a new theme unrelated to Titus, but maybe related to R. Elazar haKalir’s question in line eight, how could G-d allow the Bet ha-Mikdash to be destroyed. The thirteenth line refers to a Midrash (Devarim Rabbah 1:17) that there were 600,000 demons who were going to defend the Bet ha-Mikdash, and the young people were counting on them. The idea being that the people knew that they could not defeat the Romans militarily, but they believed that G-d would do a miracle to save them. It is possible that R. Elazar haKalir refers to these angels again in the kinah that begins (depending on different versions) Al elah ani bociyah or Tesater lealam.

In the fourteenth line, the nun line, the kinah continues the theme of the thirteen line (its pair) as it states that the elders knew that G-d had allowed for the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, so the demons could not act and G-d, as it were, was chained, asur ba-zikkim. Thus, G-d did not stop the Romans. This phrase, asur ba-zikkim is from Yirmiyahu 40:1 but there it did not refer to G-d, as it is a daring concept in the kinah that G-d could be “in chains.” Rav Soloveitchik (2006, p. 174) explains that the phrase that G-d was asur ba-zikkim means that G-d “arrested the attribute of mercy and allowed the attribute of judgment to prevail.” The combination of lines 13 and 14 is that idealistic young people tend to act rashly without concerning themselves of the consequences of their actions, but they cannot depend on G-d to save them from their folly, as G-d could be “in chains.” This lesson from the destruction of the second Bet ha-Mikdash is very important today in Israel, but it seems that it is being ignored.

The fifteenth line of the kinah, the samech line, notes that the Romans (admon) were repeating what Nebuchadnezzar (soten) had done, which just raises the question how could G-d twice let the Bet ha-Mikdash be destroyed? Maybe R. Elazar haKalir was not enthralled with the idea that G-d could be “in chains,” so he raised the question again.

The first half of the sixteenth line of the kinah, the ayin line, refers to the Jewish people as the descendants of Yaakov, who peeled branches when working for Lavan to get more spotted sheep and goats, Bereshit 30:37,38, that G-d let His anger vent against the Jewish people. The second half of the line explains that G-d’s anger led Him to abandon the Bet ha-Mikdash. This line is different than the idea of G-d being “in chains” (line 14) that here the idea is that G-d was upset with the people for their sins and that is why the Bet ha-Mikdash was destroyed.

The seventeenth line of the kinah, the peh line, momentarily reverts back to Titus, that he had a meeting with his commanders telling them to destroy the Bet ha-Mikdash. Josephus (re-print 2004, p. 359) also reports that Titus met with his commanders prior to the final battle for the Bet ha-Mikdash, though as mentioned above, Josephus claims that Titus did not want the Bet ha-Mikash to be destroyed. R. Elazar haKalir clearly did not accept this claim of Josephus.

The eighteenth line of the kinah, the tzaddi line, notes that even though the Romans were determined to destroy the Bet ha-Mikdash, G-d limited them, and kept the western wall, the Kotel, from being destroyed. This idea also differs from the idea of G-d being in chains (line 14) and that G-d completely abandoned the Bet ha-Mikdash (line 16).

Rav Soloveitchik (2010, p. 370) makes the interesting point that this line of the kinah is the earliest reference to the Western Wall, as it is not mentioned in the Talmud Bavli and Yerushalmi, and even by the Rambam when he visited Yerushalayim. He notes that the Kotel is referred to in the Midrash Shemot Rabbah 2:2 explaining the verse in Shir ha-Shirim 2:9. Goldschmidt (2002, p. 74) notes that this same reference to the Kotel is recorded in Midrash Tehillim 11:3 and in a version (not my version) of Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 2:4. However, Rav Soloveitchik (see also 2006, p. 207) thinks these references to the Kotel are late additions to the Midrash. Rav Soloveitchik (2006, p. 138) seems to be following his idea that R. Elazar haKalir lived in the 10th century and the Midrash(im) were written beforehand. However, more likely R. Elazar haKalir lived prior to when the Midrashim were written, and then this kinah would be the earliest written reference to the Kotel that we have.

The nineteenth line of the kinah, the kuf line, returns to the idea from line ten of the Romans taking valuables from the Bet ha-Mikdash and shipping them to Rome, but now the valuables are young children, more like teenagers.

The second half of the twentieth line of the kinah, the resh line, records how the children were sent to Rome (the land of utz, see Eicah 4:21) in three boats. The first half of the twentieth line, similar to lines seven and eight, is a question how could G-d allow this destruction of the people, especially children? This question is particularly poignant with the continuation of the kinah.

The twenty-first line of the kinah, the shin line, records that the children pleaded with G-d to have the boats turn back, but when their prayers went unheeded, they jumped into the sea. The source for this sad story is Gittin 57b and Eicah Rabbah 1:16. These sources explain that there were 400 children, and that they realized that they were going to be sold as slaves for immoral purposes, see the kinah Ve-et naveh chatati, which has this same idea in reference to the children of Rebi Yishmael. Thus, they committed suicide to thwart the Romans.

The twenty-second line of the kinah, the taf line, records how the children sang songs of praise as they jumped into the sea, and R. Elazar haKalir compared their singing to the singing of the people after the splitting of Yam Suf by the Exodus from Egypt, Shemot chapter 15.

The first half of twenty-third line of the kinah, a taf line again, records that the children died at sea. The second half of the line starts with a phrase from Tehillim 44:18 and records that even with all the suffering, we have not forgotten G-d.

The last two words of the first half of the twenty-fourth and last line of the kinah, again a taf line, is based on Tehillim 68:23. According to the Talmud, the children asked one of the more knowledgeable ones in their group whether they would have a share in the world to come if they committed suicide, and he answered by quoting this verse from Tehillim, that some people will return from Bashan from the depths of the ocean, which was understood to mean that they would have a share in the word to come. This answer led them to jump in the sea. Clearly, R. Elazar haKalir looked upon it positively that the children committed suicide and one wonders if this kinah contributed to other Jews, especially in the times of the Crusaders to kill themselves, or their children.

The last three words of second half of the twenty-fourth line, and the end of the kinah is from Tehillim 44:24, but R. Elazar haKalir has transformed the verse to be a call for us to pray to G-d, and this corresponds to the second half of the twenty-third line. The idea could be that after reciting this kinah which includes references to almost all the tragedies by the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, we have an obligation to pray, and specifically to recite kinot.

Bibliography:

Goldschmidt, Daniel (1895-1972), 2002, first printed 1972, The kinot of Tisha B’av: Following the custom of Poland and Ashkenazi communities in the land of Israel, 2nd edition, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Josephus, Flavius (37-100?), re-print 2004, The great Roman-Jewish war, The William Whiston translation as revised by D. S. Margoliouth, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Soloveitchik, Joseph (1903-1993), 2006, The Lord is righteous in all of his ways: Reflections on the Tish`ah be-Av kinot, edited by Jacob J. Schacter, New York: The Toras Harav Foundation by Ktav Publishing House.

Soloveitchik, Joseph, 2010, The Koren mesorat harav kinot: Commentary on the kinot based on the teachings of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, edited by Simon Posner, Jerusalem: Koren Publishers; New York: OU Press.