The Rambam (Mishnah Torah, Laws of kings, 5:1) writes that there are two types of wars in Jewish law, a war that fulfills a mitzvah, milchmet mitzvah, and an optional war, milchmet reshut. The Rambam gives three examples of a war that is a mitzvah to fight: To fight the seven nations who lived in the land of Canaan, to fight Amalek and to defend the Jewish people from enemies who attack the Jewish people. There is support for each of these examples from the Torah. For example, Devarim 7:1,2 refers to fighting the seven nations, Devarim 25:17-19 refers to fighting Amalek and Bemidbar 10:9 refers to fighting a nation that attacks the Jewish people. Note, the wars with Arad (Bemidbar 21:1-3), Og (Bemidbar 21:33-35) and the war with Midyan (Bemidbar 25:17,18; 31:1-8, see our discussion on Bemidbar 25:14-18, “The battle with Midyan: Kozbi”) also were wars to stop these nations from attacking the Jewish people. Also, Avraham’s war with the four kings to save Lot (Bereshit 14) would fall into this category of being a war that is a mitzvah. On the other hand, the war with Sihon (Bemidbar 21:21-31) was under the category of a war with the seven nations, the Amori, but since the war was fought outside the land of Israel, Moshe was able to offer Sihon peace, which he refused, see Nachshoni 1987, pp. 657, 659.
The Rambam then gives two examples of an optional war, to increase the boundaries of the nation and to add prestige to the king. These wars do not seem to have any source in the Torah.
The Mishnah (Sotah 8:7, Talmud Sotah 44b) takes it as a given that there is a concept of an optional war, and in the discussion about the types of war, the Talmud quotes Rava that for sure an optional war was the wars fought by David to expand the borders of his kingdom. (Shmuel Rubinstein, 1975, p. 374, in his notes on Rambam 5:1, explains that the wars by David was when he fought with Aram Tzova, which I think is the reference to the wars recorded in Shmuel II chapter 10. Could it also refer to the war mentioned in Shmuel II 7:3-5 or is this the same war as in chapter 10? Other optional wars by David could be his war with Moav, Shmuel II 7:2, and/ or his wars before he was a king, Shmuel I 27:8,9.)
One possible source in the Torah for an optional war is the laws of warfare recorded in 20:10-15, as Rashi (on 20:10) writes that the laws in these verses are applicable to optional wars. Yet, as noted by Luzzatto (on 20:11), the Torah does not give any explanation for the source of the war referred to in 20:10-15. Luzzatto suggests that the context of the war in 20:10-15 can be known from the beginning of chapter 20, 20:1, which refers to the people going to fight an enemy, and Luzzatto argues that an enemy is a nation that harmed the Jewish people either by trying to conquer the land of the people to take possessions of the people. Accordingly, Luzzatto argues that the war referred to in 20:10-15 was not an optional war, but one to defend the people, the third example of the Rambam’s example of obligatory wars. One could add to his argument by noting that the last law in the section on wars, the law of the captive women, also begins with the phrase when you fight your enemy, 21:10. Thus, both the beginning and the ending of the section on war refer to fighting an enemy and not some peaceful nation, and then all the laws within the section, which includes 20:10-15, are also referring to fighting an enemy. Note Shimon and Levi’s massacre of the people of Shekhem (Bereshit 34) was a case where they were “fighting” a war with a peaceful “nation” since the people of Shekhem made a deal with the family of Yaakov and this can explain why Yaakov was so furious with them, see our discussion on Bereshit 34:25-35:5, “The brothers of Dina go amok.”
If there is no source for an optional war, then participating in such a war should be forbidden since a person is killing other people for money or prestige. This “right” to fight such a war was the common understanding until the 20th century, but should people be allowed to kill for material gain or glory? My guess is that this concept in Judaism either derives from the culture and mind set of ancient times or to defend the actions of King David, as occurs in his actions with Uriah and Bat Sheva (see Shabbat 56a), but has no basis in the Torah.
Bibliography
Nachshoni, Yehuda, 1987, Notes on the parashot of the Torah, Tel Aviv: Sifrati.
Rubinstein, Shmuel, 1975, Commentary on Rambam’s Mishnah Torah, Rambam La’am, Vol. 17, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Hello. The goal of this blog is to enhance our understanding of the Torah and the practice of Judaism. The discussions in the blog are a portion of a more extensive commentary on the Torah, which I will be happy to send to you. You can contact me at ajayschein@gmail.com. Please feel free to send comments. Also, if you want to receive an email with a link to the new posts, send me a request, and I will add you to the email group. Best wishes, Andrew Schein
Showing posts with label Devarim: Shoftim. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Devarim: Shoftim. Show all posts
Friday, August 29, 2025
Monday, September 2, 2024
Devarim 16:18-21:9 – The order and connections of the laws of parashat Shoftim
Parashat Shoftim, 16:18-21:9, continues the law section that began in 12:1, and a question, just like by the other laws section in the Torah, is whether there is an order to the laws and/ or what is the connection between the laws in the section, in this case parashat Shoftim? We will try to answer this question by looking both at the content of the laws and the literary connections between the laws via words that appear in the various laws or even words that sound similar that are mentioned in the various laws, see Rofe (1988a, pp. 159-177, 1988b and 2002) and Cassuto (1973, pp. 1-6). We have used this methodology to suggest the order and connections of the laws of parashat Mishpatim, parashat Re’eh and parashat Ki Teitzei.
Parashat Shoftim begins with laws referring to judges, that the people need to appoint judges and the judges are to judge righteously, 16:18-20. The word tsedek, righteously, appears in 16:18 and 16:20 (twice) to frame 16:19, and the word tsadikim, the righteous, appears in the end of 16:19. These verses begin a section which runs through chapter 18 that deals with the leadership roles (political, theological and judicial) of the people, and seems to be necessary with the impending death of Moshe.
Tigay (1996, p. 453) suggests that maybe this administrative section is recorded at this point since some of the laws in the section refer to the chosen place, 17:8,10 and 18:6, which relate to laws from chapters 12, 14:22-27, and 15:19-16:17. Other possible connections just with reference to 16:18-20 are that 16:18 refers to shaarecha, your gates, and this word appears in 15:22, 16:5,11,14. Also, 16:18, 20 have the phrase, that G-d gave you, noten lecha/ natan lach, and the same phrase appears in the last verse of parashat Re’eh, the previous verse, 16:17, natan lach, and in 16:5. In addition, 16:19 refers to bribes that blind the judge, ye-aver, and this relatively rare word in the Torah (8 times) appears by the law of the firstborn animal, 15:21, e-ver. Note, 15:21 refers to two specific types of disabilities to the firstborn animal that make the animal inadmissible as a sacrifice, and the first type connects the law of firstborn animal to the law of the korban pesach in the beginning of chapter 16, peseach (see Tigay, 1996, p. 453) and the second type, e-ver, the blind animal, connects the law of the firstborn animal to the laws in reference to judges, the end of chapter 16.
Another more distant connection is that 16:18-20 might refer back to the laws of idolatry in chapter 13. The prime idea in 16:18-20 is to pursue justice, and by the last case in chapter 13 to kill the inhabitants of the wayward city, the Torah stresses that one must make a thorough investigation, 13:15. This thorough investigation must be based on the principle of pursing justice, as stressed in 16:18-20, and not by falsifying the evidence. Going even further back, the end of 16:20, refers to the people inheriting the land and this idea appears in 12:1 and 12:29(?).
The next laws in parashat Shoftim, 16:21,22 record the prohibitions of asherot and matzevot. What is the connection between 16:18-20 and 16:21,22? Why are the prohibitions of asherot and matzevot recorded after the injunctions to appoint judges and for judges to judge objectively?
The Talmud (Sanhedrin 7b) quotes Resh Lakish that the conjunction of 16:18-20 with 16:21 teaches us that whoever appoints a judge who is unworthy is like one who planted an ashera. The Abravanel (1999, p. 59) extends this idea, and claims that 16:21,22 and 17:1, all teach lessons concerning the appointment of judges.
Ibn Ezra (on 16:21) suggests that the conjunction of the verses is because a judge’s first job is to eliminate public idolatry. Similarly, Bekhor Shor (on 16:21) notes that Gideon (Shoftim 6:28) destroyed the pagan altar and asherot when he became a judge.
Dennis Olsen (1994, pp. 81,82) argues that all of the laws of Deuteronomy (chapters 12-26) are based on the order of the Decalogue. In this case, he argues that the appointment of judges relates to the fourth commandment concerning parents and authority, and the conjunction of the law of appointing judges with the laws prohibiting asherot and matzevah is join the first commandment not to have other gods with the fourth commandment. He writes, “One can properly understand the issue of honoring authorities and leaders only in conjunction with the laws prohibiting false worship of other gods… no human leader is infallible and worthy of worship.”
In class, Meir Mor Yosef suggested that the laws by not making an asherah and matzevah, 16:21,22, were akin to not giving bribes by the judges, 16:19, since the asherah and matzevah can be considered as an attempt to bribe G-d.
Rofe makes the striking literary point that by the instructions to the judges to judge righteously, 16:19 records three prohibitions, lo tateh, lo takir, and lo tikah and then 16:21,22, by the asherot and matsevot, and 17:1, the next law not to sacrifice an animal with a blemish, have a similar pattern and almost identical language, lo titah, lo takim and lo tizbah. This suggests that the conjunction of the verses 16:12,22 and 17:1 with the appointment of the judges is due to this triple association of words. However, Rofe himself argues that this association is insufficient to explain the conjunction of verses since he believes that 16:21,22 and 17:1 should really have been recorded in the end of chapter 12.
The connections between 16:21,22 and 17:1 and chapter 12, the beginning of the law section, is that 16:21,22 is similar to the law in 12:3, which records the requirement to destroy the pagan matzevot and asherot. In addition, 12:31 has the word saneh, which appears in 16:22, and 17:1 (and 17:4) has the word toevah, which also appears in 12:31. However, the matzevot and asherot referred to in chapter 12 are not the same matzevot and asherot referred to in chapter 17. 12:3 refers to matzevot and asherot that were used for idolatry, while 16:21,22 refer to matzevot and asherot in reference to worshipping G-d (also prohibited). This difference might be why the two sets of laws were not recorded together (to answer Rofe’s question).
The next set of laws in parashat Shoftim, 17:2-7, record laws about punishing a person who does idolatry, and is associated with 17:1 since both sections have the phrase, davar ra (17:1,5) and toevah (17:1,4), see Tigay (1996, p. 453). 17:2-7 is also connected with 16:18-20 since 17:2,5 have the word shaarecha, which appears in 16:18, and this word connects 17:2-7 to the laws starting from the firstborn animal, 15:22. Also, 17:2 has the phrase noten lach as in 16:18,20. In addition, 17:2-7 discusses judging and investigating people, which is thematically connected to the laws by the justices of 16:18-20 based on the goal of arriving at a correct judgement. Going further back, 17:2-7 is also similar to the laws of chapter 13, which also has laws relating to idolatry through the similar verses 17:4 and 13:15, the phrase u-berata hara mi-kirbecha in 17:7 and 13:6, the phrase u-sekaltem ba-avanim va-metu in 17:5 and 13:11 (in the singular), the phrase tehiyeh bo barishonah in 17:7 and 13:10.
The ensuing section, 17:8-13, record laws about the high court, which continues with the judicial theme of 17:2-7, and has several similar words with 17:2-7, drashata, 17:4,9; al pi, 17:6(2),10,11, u-bearta hara, 17:7,12, and shaarecha, 17:2,5,8. (This last literary connection connects 17:8-13 to all the previous laws going back to the firstborn animal). In addition, both sections refer to capital punishment, 17:5 and 17:12. Also, 17:9,12 have the word shofet, judge, which appears in 16:18 and 17:9,11 have the word mishpat and this word appears in 16:18,19. Again, 17:8,10 refer to the chosen place, which associates with the references to the chosen place in chapters 12, 15 and 16. Also, the end of this section, 17:13, concludes the section with the words, yishmiu ve-yirau, and this phrase appears in 13:12. Finally, 17:8-13, also points forward to the ensuing leadership section by referring to national judges of the people, 17:9.
The next set of laws, 17:14-20, record laws relating to kings, and these laws continue the section on leadership that previously was focused on the judges. This section is connected with the previous section, 17:8-13, since that section refers to the necessity of people to listen to judicial authorities, which is also a form of leadership. In addition, there is the connecting word, sur, in 17:11 and in 17:17,20, and the connecting phrase, yamin or semol in 17:11 and 17:20. Also, 17:8 and 17:15 have the same phrase, asher yivchar Hashem your G-d bo. Furthermore, 17:18 has the phrase ha-cohanim ha-Leviiim and this phrase appears in 17:9 by the section on the high court. In addition, 17:14, the first verse in this section about kings, has the phrase, noten lach as in 17:2 (the first verse in the section on idolatry) and in 16:5,17,18, 20. Also, 17:14 has the word, ve-rishtaha, which is similar to the word, ve-yarashata in 16:20.
The following section, 18:1-8, refers to laws about the priests and Levites since they were also leaders in reference to the work in the mishkan/ ohel moed. Note the word helek appears both in reference to the priests, 18:1 and in reference to the Levites, 18:8 (twice). Ibn Ezra (on 18:1) suggests that this section follows the section on kings since the king is a judge (not mentioned in the Torah) and the priests are the teachers of the Torah. Alter (2004, p. 968) varies this slightly that the king is required to write a Torah, 17:18, and the priests and the Levites are to teach the Torah.
18:1-8 also have a literary connection with the previous section through the phrase cohanim ha-Leviim that appears in 17:18 and in 18:1 (and 17:9). Also, the ending phrase in the sections concerning the kings and the priests is hu u-banav, 17:20 and 18:5. In addition, this section connects with the section 17:8-13, through the words le-sheret and omed in 17:12 and 18:5, and the word mishpat, 17:9,11 and 18:3. Furthermore, the phrase bachar Hashem your G-d, appears in 18:5, similar to, but in a different word order, to 17:8,15.
The next section, 18:9-22 can be divided into two sub-sections. One, 18:9-14, is that one is not to listen to various magicians, and this means that they are not to be considered as leaders. And, two, 18:15-22 that one is to listen to authenticated prophets.
In the first sub-section, the opening verse, 18:9 is almost identical with the beginning section by the laws with regard to kings, 17:14, and the word ba, appears in 18:6 by the Levi and in 18:9. Also, 18:9 has the phrase noten lach and 18:14, the end of this sub-section, has the similar phrase natan lecha, which corresponds to 17:2, 14; 16:5, 17, 18 and 20. In addition, 18:8 ends the previous section on the priests and the Levites by using the word avot, fathers, and 18:10 refers to the (horrible) actions by a parent in reference to their son or daughter.
The second sub-section connects thematically with the previous sub-section through the contrast of not listening to magician/ false prophets but yes listening to true prophets. The end of this sub-section, 18:19-22 refers directly to this contrast. A literary connections of this sub-section with the previous sub-section and prior sections is that the last verse of this sub-section, 18:22, has the word ya-ba which appears in 18:6,9. Also, in this sub-section the word dibber figures prominently, 18:17,18(twice), 19(twice), 20(three), 21(three) and the word appears in 18:2. There is also a literary connection between 18:22 and 17:12,13 through the word zadon.
Chapter 19 records laws that relate to the functioning of the law system. The first set of laws is the establishment of cities of refuge, 19:1-13. The opening verse, 19:1 refers to the people coming into the land of Israel, which is also the opening verse in the previous section, 18:9 and in the section on having a king, 17:14. In addition, the word, goyim appears both in 18:9 and 19:1 and the phrase noten lach, is in 19:1 and 18:9,14. This phrase noten lach also appears in 17:2, 14; 16:5, 17, 18 and 20. Also, the words ve-yerashtem ve-yashvata in 19:1 are in 17:14. Similarly, the following verse, 19:2 has the phrase noten lecha (as does 19:10) and the word le-rishtaha, as in 19:1.
The next section is just one verse, 19:14, the law of moving a boundary marker. Why is the law of moving landmarks recorded at this particular place in the Torah?
Ibn Ezra (on 19:14) suggests that the law relates to the ensuing law of witnesses since moving landmarks will lead to fights and the claimant will need to bring witnesses to support his claim. In addition, the ensuing law of witness ends with a reference to violence, "an eye for an eye."
Tigay (1996, p. 454) quotes three possible reasons for the placement of 19:14. One, the law relates to the division of land, which is also mentioned in 19:3. Two (see Rofe, 1988, p. 271), the word gevul, boundary, appears in 19:14 and twice in the previous section, 19:3,8. Three, the moving landmarks is a way to steal land and hence there is a law of murder (the city of refuge), theft (moving landmarks) and perjury (witnesses) which corresponds to the order of these laws in the Decalogue.
Abravanel (1999, p. 309) suggests two other reasons for the placement of the law of not moving landmarks. One, the possibility of moving landmarks necessitates judges who know the division of land and are able to ensure that people do not lose their land. The law then relates to both the city of refuge (the previous section, 19:1-13) and laws concerning witnesses (the following section, 19:15-21) since these laws also necessitate judges. Two, by the city of refuge, there was a danger that a person would move the landmarks of the city of refuge to steal "public land" or that after the designation of the city of refuge, the public would steal land from individuals.
One could vary Abravanel's first reason from judges to the legal system. The landmarks were a proof of ownership of land in ancient times, and a person who moved landmarks destroyed the way society documented ownership of the land. The landmarks were part of the formal property system of society, which allows for legally enforceable transactions with regard to property, and hence the landmarks were elements of the legal system. Similarly, the city of refuge and laws concerning witnesses were also part of the legal system of the Torah.
Other literary connections, beside the word gevul, between 19:14 and the previous section is the phrase noten lach le-rishtah in 19:2 and 19:14. Also the word nachlah in 19:10 is similar to the words nachlatcha and tinchal in 19:14.
The third section in chapter 19 records laws concerning false testimony, 19:15-21. This relates to the law of the city of refugee through the words, lo tachos in 19:13,21, and the word u-bearta, 19:13,19. Also, the word three, shalosh, in 19:15 and 19:2,7,9 (2). A further back reference is the word ha-riv in 19:17 and rivot in 17:8, and the phrase yishmioo ve-yiraoo in 19:20 and 17:13 (and 13:12). Also, 19:17,18 have the word shoftim, which re-calls the first word of the parasha, shoftim (in 16:18 and in the singular in 17:8,12).
The next section, 20:1 through 21:14 records laws relating to war. Both 20:1, by the beginning of the section of warfare, and 21:10, the first verse by the last set of laws on warfare, begin with the same words, ki tezet la-milchama al ovecha, when you go out to war with your enemy. Also, 20:1 and 21:11, the second verse is the last set of laws of the war section, both have the word ve-raita, “and when you see.”
Why is this section on laws relating to wars recorded after the laws of witnesses, 19:15-21? Rashi (on 20:1) suggests two reasons for the connection between chapters 19 and 20. One reason is that the end of chapter 19, 19:21, records that if a person maimed somebody so then the person is also maimed, “an eye for an eye.” The juxtaposition of this law with the drafting of soldiers is then to tell us that a person missing a limb does not go out to fight. The second reason is that the act of maiming the guilty person is part of the execution of justice, and the juxtaposition of two sections teaches us that if a person executes just judgments, then he will be victorious in war.
Ibn Ezra suggests a different reason based on the same law as mentioned by Rashi. 19:21 records that a person must not take pity on the guilty person, but must punish the person. This is juxtaposed with the drafting of soldiers to teach us that one should not take pity on somebody who is supposed to go fight and exempt the person from being a soldier.
Tigay (1996, p. 454) suggests three reasons for the connection between the section of warfare and the previous sections. One, war involves military leadership, and this is a primary role of government along with judging, chapter 19. Two, 19:12, refers to capital punishment, and war is another case where the taking of human life is permitted. Three, the law of the cities of refugee refers to cutting down trees with an axe, 19:5, and within the war section, there is the prohibition of cutting down trees with an axe during a siege, 20:19.
There is also an association of words between the first set of laws relating to warfare and the laws of a false witness, the previous section. 19:20 records that people should not continue (yosefu) to do evil and 20:8 records that shotrim will continue (yasfu) to speak to the people. Also, 19:20 has the word, yiraoo and the word appears in 20:2, tiraoo. Furthermore, 19:16 refers to a fight (riv) between people, and this is what happens on a larger scale when two nations fight.
In addition, the first set of laws relating to warfare, the drafting of soldiers, connects to the beginning of parashat Shoftim, as within the drafting of soldiers, a priest and certain officials, shotrim, had to make pronouncements to the people, 20:8,9, and these shotrim are referred to in 16:18. After the drafting of the soldiers, 20:9 records that officers were appointed to command the soldiers. The priest, shotrim and officers were assuming some of the leadership roles of the people, and then the war section, also relates to the leadership section in 16:18-18:22.
The laws of the war section follows the order of conducting a war. First, the troops are mustered, 20:1-9, and then there are laws to offer or not to offer peace before beginning the battles, 20:10-18. Afterwards, there are laws how to act during the battles, a siege, 20:19,20, and then there are laws after the battle is over, 21:10-14 (in parashat Ki Teitzei). Yet, breaking up this section on war, 21:1-9 records the ceremony of the broken neck heifer, eglah arufa.
Why is the law of eglah arufa recorded within the laws of warfare? Tigay (1996, p. 534) quotes Rofe that there is a literary connection between the word sadeh (field) in 20:19 and in 21:1. This connection is not just that the word appears in both verses, but 20:19 refers to cutting down the tree in the sadeh and 21:1 refers to the dead person who fell in the sadeh. Tigay also quotes a person, C. Carr that both verses have similar sounds, 20:19, ki ha-adam etz ha-sadeh and 21:1, ki…ba-adamah...nofel ba-sadeh.
My thought is that the connection between the laws of eglah arufa and warfare is conceptual. War entails killing, which sometimes is necessary, but other times is just murder. The case of eglah arufa, where the murderer is unknown and the body is found in the field, is similar to many of the deaths that occur in wartime. At the end of the law of eglah arufa the people call upon G-d to punish the murderer, 21:9, and this law then serves as a warning to soldiers that even in wars one can only kill when it is necessary. With this understanding, the laws of eglah arufa accord with the order of conducting a war as recorded in the laws of the war section, as after a siege, 20:19,20, there is the actual fighting, 21:1-9, and then 21:10-14 records laws after the fighting is over.
Note this connection between 21:10-14 and parashat Shoftim raises the question why 21:10-14 was not included in parashat Shoftim. Possibly the answer is that Chazal based the division of the parashot on the drasha quoted by Rashi on 21:11. Now (2024) think that more likely it was desired to end the parasha on the very nice phrase, ki ta’aseh ha-yashar be-enyei Hashem, for we will do what is right in the eyes of G-d. Two very similar phrases are also the end of the second and third aliyot of parashat Re’eh, 12:28 and 13:19.
Bibliography:
Abarbanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing.
Parashat Shoftim begins with laws referring to judges, that the people need to appoint judges and the judges are to judge righteously, 16:18-20. The word tsedek, righteously, appears in 16:18 and 16:20 (twice) to frame 16:19, and the word tsadikim, the righteous, appears in the end of 16:19. These verses begin a section which runs through chapter 18 that deals with the leadership roles (political, theological and judicial) of the people, and seems to be necessary with the impending death of Moshe.
Tigay (1996, p. 453) suggests that maybe this administrative section is recorded at this point since some of the laws in the section refer to the chosen place, 17:8,10 and 18:6, which relate to laws from chapters 12, 14:22-27, and 15:19-16:17. Other possible connections just with reference to 16:18-20 are that 16:18 refers to shaarecha, your gates, and this word appears in 15:22, 16:5,11,14. Also, 16:18, 20 have the phrase, that G-d gave you, noten lecha/ natan lach, and the same phrase appears in the last verse of parashat Re’eh, the previous verse, 16:17, natan lach, and in 16:5. In addition, 16:19 refers to bribes that blind the judge, ye-aver, and this relatively rare word in the Torah (8 times) appears by the law of the firstborn animal, 15:21, e-ver. Note, 15:21 refers to two specific types of disabilities to the firstborn animal that make the animal inadmissible as a sacrifice, and the first type connects the law of firstborn animal to the law of the korban pesach in the beginning of chapter 16, peseach (see Tigay, 1996, p. 453) and the second type, e-ver, the blind animal, connects the law of the firstborn animal to the laws in reference to judges, the end of chapter 16.
Another more distant connection is that 16:18-20 might refer back to the laws of idolatry in chapter 13. The prime idea in 16:18-20 is to pursue justice, and by the last case in chapter 13 to kill the inhabitants of the wayward city, the Torah stresses that one must make a thorough investigation, 13:15. This thorough investigation must be based on the principle of pursing justice, as stressed in 16:18-20, and not by falsifying the evidence. Going even further back, the end of 16:20, refers to the people inheriting the land and this idea appears in 12:1 and 12:29(?).
The next laws in parashat Shoftim, 16:21,22 record the prohibitions of asherot and matzevot. What is the connection between 16:18-20 and 16:21,22? Why are the prohibitions of asherot and matzevot recorded after the injunctions to appoint judges and for judges to judge objectively?
The Talmud (Sanhedrin 7b) quotes Resh Lakish that the conjunction of 16:18-20 with 16:21 teaches us that whoever appoints a judge who is unworthy is like one who planted an ashera. The Abravanel (1999, p. 59) extends this idea, and claims that 16:21,22 and 17:1, all teach lessons concerning the appointment of judges.
Ibn Ezra (on 16:21) suggests that the conjunction of the verses is because a judge’s first job is to eliminate public idolatry. Similarly, Bekhor Shor (on 16:21) notes that Gideon (Shoftim 6:28) destroyed the pagan altar and asherot when he became a judge.
Dennis Olsen (1994, pp. 81,82) argues that all of the laws of Deuteronomy (chapters 12-26) are based on the order of the Decalogue. In this case, he argues that the appointment of judges relates to the fourth commandment concerning parents and authority, and the conjunction of the law of appointing judges with the laws prohibiting asherot and matzevah is join the first commandment not to have other gods with the fourth commandment. He writes, “One can properly understand the issue of honoring authorities and leaders only in conjunction with the laws prohibiting false worship of other gods… no human leader is infallible and worthy of worship.”
In class, Meir Mor Yosef suggested that the laws by not making an asherah and matzevah, 16:21,22, were akin to not giving bribes by the judges, 16:19, since the asherah and matzevah can be considered as an attempt to bribe G-d.
Rofe makes the striking literary point that by the instructions to the judges to judge righteously, 16:19 records three prohibitions, lo tateh, lo takir, and lo tikah and then 16:21,22, by the asherot and matsevot, and 17:1, the next law not to sacrifice an animal with a blemish, have a similar pattern and almost identical language, lo titah, lo takim and lo tizbah. This suggests that the conjunction of the verses 16:12,22 and 17:1 with the appointment of the judges is due to this triple association of words. However, Rofe himself argues that this association is insufficient to explain the conjunction of verses since he believes that 16:21,22 and 17:1 should really have been recorded in the end of chapter 12.
The connections between 16:21,22 and 17:1 and chapter 12, the beginning of the law section, is that 16:21,22 is similar to the law in 12:3, which records the requirement to destroy the pagan matzevot and asherot. In addition, 12:31 has the word saneh, which appears in 16:22, and 17:1 (and 17:4) has the word toevah, which also appears in 12:31. However, the matzevot and asherot referred to in chapter 12 are not the same matzevot and asherot referred to in chapter 17. 12:3 refers to matzevot and asherot that were used for idolatry, while 16:21,22 refer to matzevot and asherot in reference to worshipping G-d (also prohibited). This difference might be why the two sets of laws were not recorded together (to answer Rofe’s question).
The next set of laws in parashat Shoftim, 17:2-7, record laws about punishing a person who does idolatry, and is associated with 17:1 since both sections have the phrase, davar ra (17:1,5) and toevah (17:1,4), see Tigay (1996, p. 453). 17:2-7 is also connected with 16:18-20 since 17:2,5 have the word shaarecha, which appears in 16:18, and this word connects 17:2-7 to the laws starting from the firstborn animal, 15:22. Also, 17:2 has the phrase noten lach as in 16:18,20. In addition, 17:2-7 discusses judging and investigating people, which is thematically connected to the laws by the justices of 16:18-20 based on the goal of arriving at a correct judgement. Going further back, 17:2-7 is also similar to the laws of chapter 13, which also has laws relating to idolatry through the similar verses 17:4 and 13:15, the phrase u-berata hara mi-kirbecha in 17:7 and 13:6, the phrase u-sekaltem ba-avanim va-metu in 17:5 and 13:11 (in the singular), the phrase tehiyeh bo barishonah in 17:7 and 13:10.
The ensuing section, 17:8-13, record laws about the high court, which continues with the judicial theme of 17:2-7, and has several similar words with 17:2-7, drashata, 17:4,9; al pi, 17:6(2),10,11, u-bearta hara, 17:7,12, and shaarecha, 17:2,5,8. (This last literary connection connects 17:8-13 to all the previous laws going back to the firstborn animal). In addition, both sections refer to capital punishment, 17:5 and 17:12. Also, 17:9,12 have the word shofet, judge, which appears in 16:18 and 17:9,11 have the word mishpat and this word appears in 16:18,19. Again, 17:8,10 refer to the chosen place, which associates with the references to the chosen place in chapters 12, 15 and 16. Also, the end of this section, 17:13, concludes the section with the words, yishmiu ve-yirau, and this phrase appears in 13:12. Finally, 17:8-13, also points forward to the ensuing leadership section by referring to national judges of the people, 17:9.
The next set of laws, 17:14-20, record laws relating to kings, and these laws continue the section on leadership that previously was focused on the judges. This section is connected with the previous section, 17:8-13, since that section refers to the necessity of people to listen to judicial authorities, which is also a form of leadership. In addition, there is the connecting word, sur, in 17:11 and in 17:17,20, and the connecting phrase, yamin or semol in 17:11 and 17:20. Also, 17:8 and 17:15 have the same phrase, asher yivchar Hashem your G-d bo. Furthermore, 17:18 has the phrase ha-cohanim ha-Leviiim and this phrase appears in 17:9 by the section on the high court. In addition, 17:14, the first verse in this section about kings, has the phrase, noten lach as in 17:2 (the first verse in the section on idolatry) and in 16:5,17,18, 20. Also, 17:14 has the word, ve-rishtaha, which is similar to the word, ve-yarashata in 16:20.
The following section, 18:1-8, refers to laws about the priests and Levites since they were also leaders in reference to the work in the mishkan/ ohel moed. Note the word helek appears both in reference to the priests, 18:1 and in reference to the Levites, 18:8 (twice). Ibn Ezra (on 18:1) suggests that this section follows the section on kings since the king is a judge (not mentioned in the Torah) and the priests are the teachers of the Torah. Alter (2004, p. 968) varies this slightly that the king is required to write a Torah, 17:18, and the priests and the Levites are to teach the Torah.
18:1-8 also have a literary connection with the previous section through the phrase cohanim ha-Leviim that appears in 17:18 and in 18:1 (and 17:9). Also, the ending phrase in the sections concerning the kings and the priests is hu u-banav, 17:20 and 18:5. In addition, this section connects with the section 17:8-13, through the words le-sheret and omed in 17:12 and 18:5, and the word mishpat, 17:9,11 and 18:3. Furthermore, the phrase bachar Hashem your G-d, appears in 18:5, similar to, but in a different word order, to 17:8,15.
The next section, 18:9-22 can be divided into two sub-sections. One, 18:9-14, is that one is not to listen to various magicians, and this means that they are not to be considered as leaders. And, two, 18:15-22 that one is to listen to authenticated prophets.
In the first sub-section, the opening verse, 18:9 is almost identical with the beginning section by the laws with regard to kings, 17:14, and the word ba, appears in 18:6 by the Levi and in 18:9. Also, 18:9 has the phrase noten lach and 18:14, the end of this sub-section, has the similar phrase natan lecha, which corresponds to 17:2, 14; 16:5, 17, 18 and 20. In addition, 18:8 ends the previous section on the priests and the Levites by using the word avot, fathers, and 18:10 refers to the (horrible) actions by a parent in reference to their son or daughter.
The second sub-section connects thematically with the previous sub-section through the contrast of not listening to magician/ false prophets but yes listening to true prophets. The end of this sub-section, 18:19-22 refers directly to this contrast. A literary connections of this sub-section with the previous sub-section and prior sections is that the last verse of this sub-section, 18:22, has the word ya-ba which appears in 18:6,9. Also, in this sub-section the word dibber figures prominently, 18:17,18(twice), 19(twice), 20(three), 21(three) and the word appears in 18:2. There is also a literary connection between 18:22 and 17:12,13 through the word zadon.
Chapter 19 records laws that relate to the functioning of the law system. The first set of laws is the establishment of cities of refuge, 19:1-13. The opening verse, 19:1 refers to the people coming into the land of Israel, which is also the opening verse in the previous section, 18:9 and in the section on having a king, 17:14. In addition, the word, goyim appears both in 18:9 and 19:1 and the phrase noten lach, is in 19:1 and 18:9,14. This phrase noten lach also appears in 17:2, 14; 16:5, 17, 18 and 20. Also, the words ve-yerashtem ve-yashvata in 19:1 are in 17:14. Similarly, the following verse, 19:2 has the phrase noten lecha (as does 19:10) and the word le-rishtaha, as in 19:1.
The next section is just one verse, 19:14, the law of moving a boundary marker. Why is the law of moving landmarks recorded at this particular place in the Torah?
Ibn Ezra (on 19:14) suggests that the law relates to the ensuing law of witnesses since moving landmarks will lead to fights and the claimant will need to bring witnesses to support his claim. In addition, the ensuing law of witness ends with a reference to violence, "an eye for an eye."
Tigay (1996, p. 454) quotes three possible reasons for the placement of 19:14. One, the law relates to the division of land, which is also mentioned in 19:3. Two (see Rofe, 1988, p. 271), the word gevul, boundary, appears in 19:14 and twice in the previous section, 19:3,8. Three, the moving landmarks is a way to steal land and hence there is a law of murder (the city of refuge), theft (moving landmarks) and perjury (witnesses) which corresponds to the order of these laws in the Decalogue.
Abravanel (1999, p. 309) suggests two other reasons for the placement of the law of not moving landmarks. One, the possibility of moving landmarks necessitates judges who know the division of land and are able to ensure that people do not lose their land. The law then relates to both the city of refuge (the previous section, 19:1-13) and laws concerning witnesses (the following section, 19:15-21) since these laws also necessitate judges. Two, by the city of refuge, there was a danger that a person would move the landmarks of the city of refuge to steal "public land" or that after the designation of the city of refuge, the public would steal land from individuals.
One could vary Abravanel's first reason from judges to the legal system. The landmarks were a proof of ownership of land in ancient times, and a person who moved landmarks destroyed the way society documented ownership of the land. The landmarks were part of the formal property system of society, which allows for legally enforceable transactions with regard to property, and hence the landmarks were elements of the legal system. Similarly, the city of refuge and laws concerning witnesses were also part of the legal system of the Torah.
Other literary connections, beside the word gevul, between 19:14 and the previous section is the phrase noten lach le-rishtah in 19:2 and 19:14. Also the word nachlah in 19:10 is similar to the words nachlatcha and tinchal in 19:14.
The third section in chapter 19 records laws concerning false testimony, 19:15-21. This relates to the law of the city of refugee through the words, lo tachos in 19:13,21, and the word u-bearta, 19:13,19. Also, the word three, shalosh, in 19:15 and 19:2,7,9 (2). A further back reference is the word ha-riv in 19:17 and rivot in 17:8, and the phrase yishmioo ve-yiraoo in 19:20 and 17:13 (and 13:12). Also, 19:17,18 have the word shoftim, which re-calls the first word of the parasha, shoftim (in 16:18 and in the singular in 17:8,12).
The next section, 20:1 through 21:14 records laws relating to war. Both 20:1, by the beginning of the section of warfare, and 21:10, the first verse by the last set of laws on warfare, begin with the same words, ki tezet la-milchama al ovecha, when you go out to war with your enemy. Also, 20:1 and 21:11, the second verse is the last set of laws of the war section, both have the word ve-raita, “and when you see.”
Why is this section on laws relating to wars recorded after the laws of witnesses, 19:15-21? Rashi (on 20:1) suggests two reasons for the connection between chapters 19 and 20. One reason is that the end of chapter 19, 19:21, records that if a person maimed somebody so then the person is also maimed, “an eye for an eye.” The juxtaposition of this law with the drafting of soldiers is then to tell us that a person missing a limb does not go out to fight. The second reason is that the act of maiming the guilty person is part of the execution of justice, and the juxtaposition of two sections teaches us that if a person executes just judgments, then he will be victorious in war.
Ibn Ezra suggests a different reason based on the same law as mentioned by Rashi. 19:21 records that a person must not take pity on the guilty person, but must punish the person. This is juxtaposed with the drafting of soldiers to teach us that one should not take pity on somebody who is supposed to go fight and exempt the person from being a soldier.
Tigay (1996, p. 454) suggests three reasons for the connection between the section of warfare and the previous sections. One, war involves military leadership, and this is a primary role of government along with judging, chapter 19. Two, 19:12, refers to capital punishment, and war is another case where the taking of human life is permitted. Three, the law of the cities of refugee refers to cutting down trees with an axe, 19:5, and within the war section, there is the prohibition of cutting down trees with an axe during a siege, 20:19.
There is also an association of words between the first set of laws relating to warfare and the laws of a false witness, the previous section. 19:20 records that people should not continue (yosefu) to do evil and 20:8 records that shotrim will continue (yasfu) to speak to the people. Also, 19:20 has the word, yiraoo and the word appears in 20:2, tiraoo. Furthermore, 19:16 refers to a fight (riv) between people, and this is what happens on a larger scale when two nations fight.
In addition, the first set of laws relating to warfare, the drafting of soldiers, connects to the beginning of parashat Shoftim, as within the drafting of soldiers, a priest and certain officials, shotrim, had to make pronouncements to the people, 20:8,9, and these shotrim are referred to in 16:18. After the drafting of the soldiers, 20:9 records that officers were appointed to command the soldiers. The priest, shotrim and officers were assuming some of the leadership roles of the people, and then the war section, also relates to the leadership section in 16:18-18:22.
The laws of the war section follows the order of conducting a war. First, the troops are mustered, 20:1-9, and then there are laws to offer or not to offer peace before beginning the battles, 20:10-18. Afterwards, there are laws how to act during the battles, a siege, 20:19,20, and then there are laws after the battle is over, 21:10-14 (in parashat Ki Teitzei). Yet, breaking up this section on war, 21:1-9 records the ceremony of the broken neck heifer, eglah arufa.
Why is the law of eglah arufa recorded within the laws of warfare? Tigay (1996, p. 534) quotes Rofe that there is a literary connection between the word sadeh (field) in 20:19 and in 21:1. This connection is not just that the word appears in both verses, but 20:19 refers to cutting down the tree in the sadeh and 21:1 refers to the dead person who fell in the sadeh. Tigay also quotes a person, C. Carr that both verses have similar sounds, 20:19, ki ha-adam etz ha-sadeh and 21:1, ki…ba-adamah...nofel ba-sadeh.
My thought is that the connection between the laws of eglah arufa and warfare is conceptual. War entails killing, which sometimes is necessary, but other times is just murder. The case of eglah arufa, where the murderer is unknown and the body is found in the field, is similar to many of the deaths that occur in wartime. At the end of the law of eglah arufa the people call upon G-d to punish the murderer, 21:9, and this law then serves as a warning to soldiers that even in wars one can only kill when it is necessary. With this understanding, the laws of eglah arufa accord with the order of conducting a war as recorded in the laws of the war section, as after a siege, 20:19,20, there is the actual fighting, 21:1-9, and then 21:10-14 records laws after the fighting is over.
Note this connection between 21:10-14 and parashat Shoftim raises the question why 21:10-14 was not included in parashat Shoftim. Possibly the answer is that Chazal based the division of the parashot on the drasha quoted by Rashi on 21:11. Now (2024) think that more likely it was desired to end the parasha on the very nice phrase, ki ta’aseh ha-yashar be-enyei Hashem, for we will do what is right in the eyes of G-d. Two very similar phrases are also the end of the second and third aliyot of parashat Re’eh, 12:28 and 13:19.
Abarbanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing.
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1973, Biblical and oriental studies, vol. 1, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, pp. 1-6. Initially printed in Hebrew in 1952, Connections of sections and their order in Tanakh, World Congress of Jewish Studies, vol. 1, pp. 165-169.
Olsen, Dennis, 1994, Deuteronomy and the death of Moses, Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Rofe, Alexander, 1988a, Introduction to Deuteronomy, Hebrew, Jerusalem: Akademon Publishing House.
-----, 1988b, The arrangement of the laws in Deuteronomy, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 64:4, December, pp. 265-287.
-----, Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation, London: T & T Clark, 2002.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1973, Biblical and oriental studies, vol. 1, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, pp. 1-6. Initially printed in Hebrew in 1952, Connections of sections and their order in Tanakh, World Congress of Jewish Studies, vol. 1, pp. 165-169.
Olsen, Dennis, 1994, Deuteronomy and the death of Moses, Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Rofe, Alexander, 1988a, Introduction to Deuteronomy, Hebrew, Jerusalem: Akademon Publishing House.
-----, 1988b, The arrangement of the laws in Deuteronomy, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 64:4, December, pp. 265-287.
-----, Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation, London: T & T Clark, 2002.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Wednesday, August 31, 2022
Devarim 21:1-8 – The eglah arufa ceremony: The rationale?
Devarim 21:1-8 records a set of rituals that are to take place, the eglah arufa ceremony, if a corpse, which was presumed to have been murdered, was found in the field but the killer is unknown. The ceremony involves actions by the elders, judges and the priests, and the killing (decapitating) of a heifer in or near a wadi. Note, it is not clear if 21:9 is part of the ceremony or a charge of Moshe to the people when he was relating to them the laws of the eglah arufa ceremony.
What is the reason for this ceremony? 21:8 refers to the some of the participants of the ceremony asking for kapparah for the Jewish people, but kapparah for what? Also, why was the ceremony only done if the corpse was found in a field and not in the city?
One approach to understanding the eglah arufa ceremony is that it is to "neutralize" the effect of the murder on the land, see Patai 1939, Milgrom 1971, and maybe the Ramban on 21:5-8. Bemidbar 35:33 records that murder defiles the land, and that the land needs to be atoned when there is a murder. Bemidbar 35:33 also records that the atonement of the land is supposed to result from punishing the murderer, but in this case the murderer is unknown so according to the adherents of this approach the ceremony is a replacement to bring atonement or to purify the land, the kapparah referred to in 21:8. Yet, with this rationale, the ceremony should also have been required if the corpse was found in the ground in a city or town, which probably is more likely than finding a dead body in the field since more people live in cities and towns, though maybe in antiquity more people lived in the country.
A second approach is that the local authorities have a responsibility to ensure the safety of the public and in this case they failed. Rashi (on 21:7), quoting from the Talmud Sotah 45b, writes that the local authorities might have been indirectly responsible for the death of the person since maybe they let the victim leave their city without an escort. For this failure to provide public security, the local authorities and the public as a whole need atonement, kapparah, and this explains why the elders, the judges and the priests are involved in the ceremony.
The approach can explain some of the details of the ceremony. 21:3,4 record that the heifer that is killed had never worked, and that the ceremony takes place by a wadi which had never been tilled or could not be tilled afterwards, which emphasizes the loss of life due to the murder, see Rashi on 21:4. The seeing of the dead heifer and the wadi by the local authorities and the priests might make them aware of their failure in not maintaining public security. Maybe one can then claim that this ceremony was only done for a murder in the fields since in the city the local authorities would take responsibility to provide public security, but they might be tempted to shirk responsibility for people outside of their jurisdiction. Yet, can one really fault the elders for not escorting the victim, does every person who leaves a city need an escort? Can local authorities protect every person from being killed?
The Rambam (Moreh, 3:40) suggests a third approach that the ceremony was in order to help catch the murderer. He writes, “there will be many stories and discussions among the people because of the investigation, the going-forth of the elders, the measurements, and the fact that the heifer is brought there.” The talk will lead to the discovery of the murderer. Furthermore, since the land where the heifer was to be killed could never be used, the owner of the land would make every possible effort to ensure that the murderer is caught. I do not understand this last point since I understand that the heifer was killed in a deserted area. It would seem to me that doing the ceremony in the land of a person unconnected with the crime would be stealing, see our discussion on 21:4, "The eglah arufah ceremony: A wadi in the land of Israel."
With this approach the prayer for kapparah in 21:8 would be for the local authorities and the people who did not find the murderer. A possible proof for this idea is that 21:9, whether it was part of the ceremony or not, stresses the importance of purging the innocent blood shed, which means to punish the murderer, see 19:13. (The Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 9:6, suggests that maybe the guilt of the local authorities is that they let the murderer go free and failed to punish him, though this seems to be a very low probability event.)
N. Leibowitz (1980a, pp. 201-208, see also Ramban on 21:5-8, and Abravanel 1999, p. 324) rejects the Rambam’s suggestion since she doubts that “all this elaborate ritual was designed merely as a device for detecting the murderer.” Yet, it could be that the killing of the heifer was a sign for the penalty the murderer was supposed to receive (Driver, 1902, p. 242), and the fact that heifer had never been worked highlights the innocent blood that was shed, as by the second approach. Also, the going to a wadi in a deserted area would make the ceremony more burdensome for the local authorities, which would give them an incentive to work hard to catch the murderer to avoid having to do the ceremony. Furthermore, it could be that for the Rambam the crucial issue is the ceremony itself and not the details of the ceremony.
Would the ceremony really lead to that much more knowledge of the murderer? 21:1 implies that an investigation was done to find the murderer before proceeding with the ceremony (see Tigay 1996, p. 191, quoting Josephus, Antiquities 4.220). If the investigation failed it would be unlikely that the ceremony would produce more evidence. Yet, maybe it is important to mark an end to the investigation and then one can learn from the failures. If one just allows an investigation to drift off, then there is no accounting for how to improve an investigation for the next murder. According to this idea, could one claim that a murder investigation in a city never ends and/or is usually fully investigated, while by a murder in a field where nobody lives, there is barely any investigation at all. Accordingly, the eglah arufa ceremony was by the finding of the corpse in the field to increase the incentive to have an investigation and to help find the murderer in this case and other cases.
A different idea is that it is well known that if one repeats a ceremony even if it is meaningful, too many times, the ceremony loses its specialness, and people become annoyed with the ceremony. Maybe the same idea is relevant here. Really, the ceremony is appropriate wherever the body is found, but if it is done in every case where a murder is unknown, then the ceremony will lose its impact. Just doing the ceremony when a corpse is found in the field makes the ceremony a unique event, which will impart the participants with a greater sense of responsibility. With this idea, the prayer of 21:8 (and 21:9?) that the Jewish people should be forgiven would not be just for the corpse found in the field that necessitated the ceremony, but for all cases of unsolved murders. This idea would only be relevant to the second and third approaches, as with the first approach even if the ceremony had no meaning to the people involved still the land “needs” the ceremony to attain kapparah, to be purified.
A historical curiosity of the eglah arufa ceremony is that the Mishnah (Sotah 9:9) writes that the ceremony was discontinued when there were many murderers in the country. Yet, one would think that specifically when there were many murders, then the ceremony was more crucial. The Rambam (Laws of murder and preservation of life, 9:12) seems to explain that when there were many murders, then there was always somebody who had information about the murder, and the ceremony was not done even if there was just one witness to the event. Yet, even if the ceremony was not done when there existed one witness, still the ceremony should still occur when there is no known witness because if this is not true, then the ceremony could never have occurred since one could always say maybe there is some witness out there. Instead, maybe the idea is that when there were many murders, there were many unsolved murders, and then the ceremony became too frequent and lost its effect, so Chazal discontinued the ceremony.
Bibliography:
Abarbanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing
Driver, Samuel Rolles, 1902, A critical and exegetical commentary on Deuteronomy, third edition, Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980a, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.
Milgrom, Jacob, 1971, Eglah Arufah, in Encyclopedia Judaica, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, Vol. 6, pp. 475-477.
Patai Raphael, 1939, The 'egla 'arufa or the expiation of the polluted land, Jewish Quarterly Review, 30, pp. 59-69.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society
What is the reason for this ceremony? 21:8 refers to the some of the participants of the ceremony asking for kapparah for the Jewish people, but kapparah for what? Also, why was the ceremony only done if the corpse was found in a field and not in the city?
One approach to understanding the eglah arufa ceremony is that it is to "neutralize" the effect of the murder on the land, see Patai 1939, Milgrom 1971, and maybe the Ramban on 21:5-8. Bemidbar 35:33 records that murder defiles the land, and that the land needs to be atoned when there is a murder. Bemidbar 35:33 also records that the atonement of the land is supposed to result from punishing the murderer, but in this case the murderer is unknown so according to the adherents of this approach the ceremony is a replacement to bring atonement or to purify the land, the kapparah referred to in 21:8. Yet, with this rationale, the ceremony should also have been required if the corpse was found in the ground in a city or town, which probably is more likely than finding a dead body in the field since more people live in cities and towns, though maybe in antiquity more people lived in the country.
A second approach is that the local authorities have a responsibility to ensure the safety of the public and in this case they failed. Rashi (on 21:7), quoting from the Talmud Sotah 45b, writes that the local authorities might have been indirectly responsible for the death of the person since maybe they let the victim leave their city without an escort. For this failure to provide public security, the local authorities and the public as a whole need atonement, kapparah, and this explains why the elders, the judges and the priests are involved in the ceremony.
The approach can explain some of the details of the ceremony. 21:3,4 record that the heifer that is killed had never worked, and that the ceremony takes place by a wadi which had never been tilled or could not be tilled afterwards, which emphasizes the loss of life due to the murder, see Rashi on 21:4. The seeing of the dead heifer and the wadi by the local authorities and the priests might make them aware of their failure in not maintaining public security. Maybe one can then claim that this ceremony was only done for a murder in the fields since in the city the local authorities would take responsibility to provide public security, but they might be tempted to shirk responsibility for people outside of their jurisdiction. Yet, can one really fault the elders for not escorting the victim, does every person who leaves a city need an escort? Can local authorities protect every person from being killed?
The Rambam (Moreh, 3:40) suggests a third approach that the ceremony was in order to help catch the murderer. He writes, “there will be many stories and discussions among the people because of the investigation, the going-forth of the elders, the measurements, and the fact that the heifer is brought there.” The talk will lead to the discovery of the murderer. Furthermore, since the land where the heifer was to be killed could never be used, the owner of the land would make every possible effort to ensure that the murderer is caught. I do not understand this last point since I understand that the heifer was killed in a deserted area. It would seem to me that doing the ceremony in the land of a person unconnected with the crime would be stealing, see our discussion on 21:4, "The eglah arufah ceremony: A wadi in the land of Israel."
With this approach the prayer for kapparah in 21:8 would be for the local authorities and the people who did not find the murderer. A possible proof for this idea is that 21:9, whether it was part of the ceremony or not, stresses the importance of purging the innocent blood shed, which means to punish the murderer, see 19:13. (The Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 9:6, suggests that maybe the guilt of the local authorities is that they let the murderer go free and failed to punish him, though this seems to be a very low probability event.)
N. Leibowitz (1980a, pp. 201-208, see also Ramban on 21:5-8, and Abravanel 1999, p. 324) rejects the Rambam’s suggestion since she doubts that “all this elaborate ritual was designed merely as a device for detecting the murderer.” Yet, it could be that the killing of the heifer was a sign for the penalty the murderer was supposed to receive (Driver, 1902, p. 242), and the fact that heifer had never been worked highlights the innocent blood that was shed, as by the second approach. Also, the going to a wadi in a deserted area would make the ceremony more burdensome for the local authorities, which would give them an incentive to work hard to catch the murderer to avoid having to do the ceremony. Furthermore, it could be that for the Rambam the crucial issue is the ceremony itself and not the details of the ceremony.
Would the ceremony really lead to that much more knowledge of the murderer? 21:1 implies that an investigation was done to find the murderer before proceeding with the ceremony (see Tigay 1996, p. 191, quoting Josephus, Antiquities 4.220). If the investigation failed it would be unlikely that the ceremony would produce more evidence. Yet, maybe it is important to mark an end to the investigation and then one can learn from the failures. If one just allows an investigation to drift off, then there is no accounting for how to improve an investigation for the next murder. According to this idea, could one claim that a murder investigation in a city never ends and/or is usually fully investigated, while by a murder in a field where nobody lives, there is barely any investigation at all. Accordingly, the eglah arufa ceremony was by the finding of the corpse in the field to increase the incentive to have an investigation and to help find the murderer in this case and other cases.
A different idea is that it is well known that if one repeats a ceremony even if it is meaningful, too many times, the ceremony loses its specialness, and people become annoyed with the ceremony. Maybe the same idea is relevant here. Really, the ceremony is appropriate wherever the body is found, but if it is done in every case where a murder is unknown, then the ceremony will lose its impact. Just doing the ceremony when a corpse is found in the field makes the ceremony a unique event, which will impart the participants with a greater sense of responsibility. With this idea, the prayer of 21:8 (and 21:9?) that the Jewish people should be forgiven would not be just for the corpse found in the field that necessitated the ceremony, but for all cases of unsolved murders. This idea would only be relevant to the second and third approaches, as with the first approach even if the ceremony had no meaning to the people involved still the land “needs” the ceremony to attain kapparah, to be purified.
A historical curiosity of the eglah arufa ceremony is that the Mishnah (Sotah 9:9) writes that the ceremony was discontinued when there were many murderers in the country. Yet, one would think that specifically when there were many murders, then the ceremony was more crucial. The Rambam (Laws of murder and preservation of life, 9:12) seems to explain that when there were many murders, then there was always somebody who had information about the murder, and the ceremony was not done even if there was just one witness to the event. Yet, even if the ceremony was not done when there existed one witness, still the ceremony should still occur when there is no known witness because if this is not true, then the ceremony could never have occurred since one could always say maybe there is some witness out there. Instead, maybe the idea is that when there were many murders, there were many unsolved murders, and then the ceremony became too frequent and lost its effect, so Chazal discontinued the ceremony.
Bibliography:
Abarbanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing
Driver, Samuel Rolles, 1902, A critical and exegetical commentary on Deuteronomy, third edition, Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980a, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.
Milgrom, Jacob, 1971, Eglah Arufah, in Encyclopedia Judaica, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, Vol. 6, pp. 475-477.
Patai Raphael, 1939, The 'egla 'arufa or the expiation of the polluted land, Jewish Quarterly Review, 30, pp. 59-69.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society
Sunday, August 16, 2020
Devarim 18:6,7 – The Leviim in the mishkan/ ohel moed: To stand before G-d
דברים יח:ו,ז - וְכִי-יָבֹא הַלֵּוִי מֵאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ, מִכָּל-יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲשֶׁר-הוּא, גָּר שָׁם; וּבָא בְּכָל-אַוַּת נַפְשׁוֹ, אֶל-הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר-יִבְחַר ה'. וְשֵׁרֵת בְּשֵׁם ה' אֱלֹקיו כְּכָל-אֶחָיו הַלְוִיִּם הָעֹמְדִים שָׁם לִפְנֵי ה'.
Devarim 18:6,7 record that a Levi from anywhere in the country had a right to serve G-d in the chosen place with all of his Levite brothers who stand there before G-d. What does it mean that the Levi can serve in the chosen place? What work is he able to do? What is the meaning or importance of standing before G-d?
The traditional answer (see Rashi, Rashbam and D. Hoffmann on 18:6) is that the Levi here is not just a Levi but also a priest and his service is offering the sacrifices in the chosen place. Yet, it seems odd that the Torah would use the general term Levi if it only meant the priests, especially since the law of the previous verses refers specifically to priests, 18:3. Also, the phrase “all of the tribe of Levi” in 18:1 would not be related to any of the following verses.
The Talmud (Erechin 11a) quotes R. Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that the verses are referring to a regular Levi, and the service is their singing in the chosen place. This could be, and while in modern times singing is considered a basic part of the worship of G-d, the Torah never refers to any singing in the mishkan/ ohel moed or in the future chosen place.
Ibn Ezra (on 18:6, also quoted by Hizkuni on 18:6, see also Rambam, Laws of shemitta and yovel, 13:12)) follows the idea that the verses are referring to a Levi, and he suggests that the service is that the Levi was to teach Torah, presumably in the chosen place. This idea might be hinted at in Devarim 33:10, but the Ibn Ezra claims the proof is from Divrei ha-Yamim II 17:7-9. Again this is possible, but Devarim 33:10 and the verses in Divrei ha-Yamim do not refer to the Levites teaching Torah in the chosen place.
None of these approaches relate to the word standing in 18:7. My understanding is that the verses refer to the Levites, as Shmuel and the Ibn Ezra maintained, but the service of the Levites was literally to stand in the chosen place. This standing in reference to the Levites is mentioned two other times, Devarim 10:8 and Bemidbar 16:9, again in reference to the work of the Levites. It also applies to the priests, 17:12 and 18:5, just that the priests would also bring the sacrifices. The standing by the Levites and the priests would give respect to the chosen place that there would always be an honor guard in the chosen place. Furthermore, when the Levites were standing they could do many tasks, such as clean up if there was a mess or dirt in the chosen place, they could offer assistance to the priests or to people coming to offer sacrifices, and they could function as guards.
Furthermore, it seems from 18:7 that the Torah envisions that in the land of Israel some Levites would take these tasks upon themselves and specialize in this work. Other Levites would live in their cities throughout the country and work regular jobs. However, if a Levi who lived in the cities throughout the country was having a hard time supporting himself, or if he just wanted to help in the worship of G-d, then 18:6,7 record that he would have the option of going to the chosen place to stand there with his fellow Levites.
Monday, February 20, 2017
Shemot 22:17 (Mishpatim) – The prohibition of magic and witchcraft in the Torah: Bewitched
Shemot 22:17 records, "no witch shall you let live," (Alter, 2004, p. 445, translation). This short verse raises several questions. Does the fact that witches are not to be tolerated imply that witches have real power? What harm is there if they do nothing? What is the difference between magic and science, as both are trying to change nature? Magic would seem to be bad science.
Does the Torah accept the efficacy of magic? One possible proof that it does is that the Egyptian magicians were able to turn their staffs into crocodiles and perform the first two plagues, Shemot 7:11,22; 8:3. Ramban and Ibn Ezra (on 7:11) explain that their ability was due to witchcraft. On the other hand, Seforno (on 7:12,23; 8:3) explains in all three cases that it only appeared that they performed magic.
It is fascinating that H. R. Trevor-Roper (1967, pp. 92,93) points out that until the 12th century, Christian Europe rejected the idea that witches had any power. However, starting in the 13th century Christian Europe began to accept as an objective fact the powers of witches, and it reached a point that whoever disbelieved of them was considered of unsound mind. This suggests that maybe the views of the Rambam, who lived in the 12th century though not in Christian lands, and the Ramban, who lived most of his life in the 13th century under Christian rule, were influenced by the views of the general society. This correspondence is further strengthened since, as mentioned above, one reason the Ramban accepted witchcraft was that he claimed that many people saw their powers.
To return to our verse, Encyclopedia Judaica (1971, 11:703) mentions the possibility that the Torah was only prohibiting mischievous or “black” magic, so then one could understand 22:17 as only referring to "evil" witches. However, as Cassuto (1967, p. 290) points out, the Torah forbids all magic even when used for good purposes. Cassuto argues that any use of magic is an “attempt to prevail over the will of G-d, who alone has dominion over the world.” Yet, if witches cannot change anything in the world, then they are showing no dominion in the world. Again how is magic different from science? Why should 22:17 outlaw witches?
In order to understand this prohibition, we need to define what is witchcraft. Thrower (1999) notes that anthropologists have accepted that one cannot separate magic from religion. He quotes Eric Sharpe, who writes, “magic involves the harnessing and the manipulation of forces from ‘beyond,’ from the ‘parallel world’ of gods, ghosts and spirits. Magic does not assume that effect follows cause without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. On the contrary, it sees such agencies everywhere, and does its best to use them, either with or without acknowledgment.” For example, Trevor Roper (1967, p. 94) records the descriptions of the sabbat (gathering) of the witches, and writes “with them were scores of demons… and above all, dominating them all, was the Devil himself.”
I did not find a definition of witchcraft in Chazal, but the Talmud (Sanhedrin 67b) quotes a Rav Ibyu the son of Nagri who quoted R. Hiyya the son of Abba, that there is a difference between witchcraft and actions involving demons. The Tur (early 14th century, Yoreh Deah, end of 179), after listing and differentiating between many acts of magic, writes that witchcraft covers all these acts. Afterwards he quotes the Ramah (R. Meir Abulafyia) that actions involving demons are included in the definition of witchcraft. The Bach (in his comments on the Tur), writes that from the Talmud we see that witchcraft is different than actions with demons.
We can now understand why witchcraft is forbidden. In our discussion on Shemot 20:3, "Forces and gods," (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2013/01/shemt-203-yitro-forces-and-gods.html) we argued that the Torah does not forbid one from believing that other gods or forces exist, but it is forbidden to worship them, mention their names, and think they are equal to G-d. Witchcraft is not just a belief in demons, but an attempt to use these demons for some purposes, which is tantamount to worshipping demons. Thus, witchcraft is forbidden even if their acts are ineffective since they are worshipping demons. On the other hand, science is not forbidden since science rejects the existence of demons.
With this understanding, is it forbidden for a person to perform an action, such as twitching one’s nose due to a belief that this action will cause something to happen magically but without attempting to invoke demons? Even if no, still maybe it is wrong to read or talk about demons, even nice ones like the tooth fairy? Or, maybe reading about demons (in the Harry Potter series?) is okay in the modern era where everybody knows that demons do not exist. Maybe not, further thought is needed.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.
Thrower, James, 1999, Religion: The Classical Theories, Georgetown University Press.
Twersky, Isadore, 1972, A Maimonides reader, New York: Behrman House.
Does the Torah accept the efficacy of magic? One possible proof that it does is that the Egyptian magicians were able to turn their staffs into crocodiles and perform the first two plagues, Shemot 7:11,22; 8:3. Ramban and Ibn Ezra (on 7:11) explain that their ability was due to witchcraft. On the other hand, Seforno (on 7:12,23; 8:3) explains in all three cases that it only appeared that they performed magic.
I believe that these two instances were unique since G-d gave the Egyptian magicians these powers as part of G-d’s plan to harden Pharaoh’s heart. My guess is that the Egyptian magicians were surprised themselves that they were able to do these actions, and hence on the third plague, which was the first plague that they were unable to repeat, they immediately recognized the plague as being from G-d, 8:15. However, Pharaoh was not convinced by the third plague since he assumed that the magicians really did the plagues. For Pharaoh, the third plague was the first time the magicians had been refuted and one incident is never enough to convince doubters.
The medieval commentators argued whether witchcraft is efficacious. Rambam (Laws of Idolatry 11:17, translation from Twersky, 1972, pp. 75,76) writes regarding magic that “whoever believes in these and similar things and in his heart, holds them to be true and scientific and only forbidden by the Torah is nothing but a fool deficient in understanding… Sensible people who possess sound mental faculties, know by clear proofs that all these practices which the Torah prohibited have no scientific basis but are chimerical and inane; and that only those deficient in knowledge are attracted by these follies.” This strong statement would seem to end the issue, but nothing is ever so simple.
Ramban (on Devarim 18:9, see also the Ran towards the very end of the fourth derasha, in the middle/towards the end of the eleventh drasha and in the second half of the twelfth derasha in his 13 derashot and Abravanel's comments on Devarim 18) seems to refer to Rambam as he writes that many do not believe in witchcraft, but he accepts their efficacy since he claims that "their powers have been seen by many." Ramban explains that really witchcraft demonstrates wisdom, but it is only to be used by non-Jews. Jews are supposed to listen to prophets and that is why they are forbidden to do witchcraft. Not only is the Ramban’s acceptance of witchcraft difficult, but it seems to contradict the Torah. Devarim 18:12 refers to these practices as an abomination, which cannot accord with his idea that they show wisdom. Ramban argues that only some of the practices listed in Devarim 18:9-11 are abominations, but the simple sense of the text is that all the practices, including witchcraft are abominations.
The medieval commentators argued whether witchcraft is efficacious. Rambam (Laws of Idolatry 11:17, translation from Twersky, 1972, pp. 75,76) writes regarding magic that “whoever believes in these and similar things and in his heart, holds them to be true and scientific and only forbidden by the Torah is nothing but a fool deficient in understanding… Sensible people who possess sound mental faculties, know by clear proofs that all these practices which the Torah prohibited have no scientific basis but are chimerical and inane; and that only those deficient in knowledge are attracted by these follies.” This strong statement would seem to end the issue, but nothing is ever so simple.
Ramban (on Devarim 18:9, see also the Ran towards the very end of the fourth derasha, in the middle/towards the end of the eleventh drasha and in the second half of the twelfth derasha in his 13 derashot and Abravanel's comments on Devarim 18) seems to refer to Rambam as he writes that many do not believe in witchcraft, but he accepts their efficacy since he claims that "their powers have been seen by many." Ramban explains that really witchcraft demonstrates wisdom, but it is only to be used by non-Jews. Jews are supposed to listen to prophets and that is why they are forbidden to do witchcraft. Not only is the Ramban’s acceptance of witchcraft difficult, but it seems to contradict the Torah. Devarim 18:12 refers to these practices as an abomination, which cannot accord with his idea that they show wisdom. Ramban argues that only some of the practices listed in Devarim 18:9-11 are abominations, but the simple sense of the text is that all the practices, including witchcraft are abominations.
It is fascinating that H. R. Trevor-Roper (1967, pp. 92,93) points out that until the 12th century, Christian Europe rejected the idea that witches had any power. However, starting in the 13th century Christian Europe began to accept as an objective fact the powers of witches, and it reached a point that whoever disbelieved of them was considered of unsound mind. This suggests that maybe the views of the Rambam, who lived in the 12th century though not in Christian lands, and the Ramban, who lived most of his life in the 13th century under Christian rule, were influenced by the views of the general society. This correspondence is further strengthened since, as mentioned above, one reason the Ramban accepted witchcraft was that he claimed that many people saw their powers.
To return to our verse, Encyclopedia Judaica (1971, 11:703) mentions the possibility that the Torah was only prohibiting mischievous or “black” magic, so then one could understand 22:17 as only referring to "evil" witches. However, as Cassuto (1967, p. 290) points out, the Torah forbids all magic even when used for good purposes. Cassuto argues that any use of magic is an “attempt to prevail over the will of G-d, who alone has dominion over the world.” Yet, if witches cannot change anything in the world, then they are showing no dominion in the world. Again how is magic different from science? Why should 22:17 outlaw witches?
In order to understand this prohibition, we need to define what is witchcraft. Thrower (1999) notes that anthropologists have accepted that one cannot separate magic from religion. He quotes Eric Sharpe, who writes, “magic involves the harnessing and the manipulation of forces from ‘beyond,’ from the ‘parallel world’ of gods, ghosts and spirits. Magic does not assume that effect follows cause without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. On the contrary, it sees such agencies everywhere, and does its best to use them, either with or without acknowledgment.” For example, Trevor Roper (1967, p. 94) records the descriptions of the sabbat (gathering) of the witches, and writes “with them were scores of demons… and above all, dominating them all, was the Devil himself.”
I did not find a definition of witchcraft in Chazal, but the Talmud (Sanhedrin 67b) quotes a Rav Ibyu the son of Nagri who quoted R. Hiyya the son of Abba, that there is a difference between witchcraft and actions involving demons. The Tur (early 14th century, Yoreh Deah, end of 179), after listing and differentiating between many acts of magic, writes that witchcraft covers all these acts. Afterwards he quotes the Ramah (R. Meir Abulafyia) that actions involving demons are included in the definition of witchcraft. The Bach (in his comments on the Tur), writes that from the Talmud we see that witchcraft is different than actions with demons.
On the other hand, the Ran’s (14th century, derasha 12) explanation for why magical practices are forbidden, what Chazal call darkei ha-emori, is that it is because the non-Jewish nations would try to invoke their gods when doing their magic, and then this would be a form of idolatry. Following this, it is simpler to understand that witchcraft involves some action to invoke demons to do something, and every time the Torah uses the word witches, this means an action to invoke demons. (Is this the Rambam's understanding of witchcraft? The Rambam in the Mishnah Torah lists the prohibition of magic within the laws of idolatry, 6:1,2, 11:6-16, and see his discussion in the Moreh 3:37, 1963, p. 542.)
We can now understand why witchcraft is forbidden. In our discussion on Shemot 20:3, "Forces and gods," (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2013/01/shemt-203-yitro-forces-and-gods.html) we argued that the Torah does not forbid one from believing that other gods or forces exist, but it is forbidden to worship them, mention their names, and think they are equal to G-d. Witchcraft is not just a belief in demons, but an attempt to use these demons for some purposes, which is tantamount to worshipping demons. Thus, witchcraft is forbidden even if their acts are ineffective since they are worshipping demons. On the other hand, science is not forbidden since science rejects the existence of demons.
With this understanding, is it forbidden for a person to perform an action, such as twitching one’s nose due to a belief that this action will cause something to happen magically but without attempting to invoke demons? Even if no, still maybe it is wrong to read or talk about demons, even nice ones like the tooth fairy? Or, maybe reading about demons (in the Harry Potter series?) is okay in the modern era where everybody knows that demons do not exist. Maybe not, further thought is needed.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.
Thrower, James, 1999, Religion: The Classical Theories, Georgetown University Press.
Trevor-Roper, H. R. 1967, The European Witch-Craze of the 16th and 17th Centuries and Other Essays, New York: Harper & Row.
Twersky, Isadore, 1972, A Maimonides reader, New York: Behrman House.
Sunday, August 16, 2015
Devarim (Deuteronomy) 20:2-8 - Draft exemptions in the Torah
Devarim 20:3,4 record that before going to war, the priest is to announce that the people should not fear the enemy since G-d will help them win. Afterwards, 20:5-8 record that the shotrim (officials) were to list four reasons for people to be exempt from fighting in the war. It is clear from the exemptions in 20:5-8, that some soldiers will die in the war even thought 20:4 records that G-d will help the people. We see that even if G-d will intervene to help the people, still the laws of nature apply, and people will die in the war.
In addition, we see that a person's lifespan is not pre-determined since if the person returns home and does not fight then he has a greater chance of living. Hoffmann (1961, p. 379, on 20:7) writes that for sure the person was destined to die, but just like the law by putting up a guardrail (22:8), we do not want the person's death to be the responsibility of the officials who send the people to war. Yet, this analogy is not correct since the guardrail stops everybody from falling off the roof and dying, while here the exemptions only stop a few people from dying. The simple understanding of 20:2-8, and of the law of putting up a guardrail, is that if a person acts in a dangerous manner, then he/she has a greater chance of dying, and when possible people should take precautions to increase their chance of living.
The four draft exemptions can be divided into two groups, based on the break in 20:8, "and the shotrim continue to speak." The first group, 20:5-7, record exemptions for a person who has built a house but has not yet dedicated it, planted a vineyard but did not harvest it or was engaged but did not yet marry. The second group, 20:8, is for a person who is scared of dying and/ or of attacking the enemy (Ibn Ezra and Hizkuni on 20:8).
It is striking that these exemptions do not include the most popular draft exemption today in Israel, learning Torah. If this is a legitimate exemption, why was it not mentioned in the Torah with the other exemptions? In fact, the examples of planting a vineyard and building a house are probably completely removed from the life of the typical person today who does not serve in the Israeli army. As S. R. Hirsch writes, (1989, on 20:5-7) “Clearly here the Torah… strikingly lays value on these peace-time tasks being accomplished by every individual personally.” The list of draft exemptions is another case where the Torah indicates the importance of working.
The Torah explains that the reason for the exemption in 20:8 (the second group) is in order that these people who are exempt do not harm the morale of the people fighting, but what is the reason for the exemptions in 20:5-7 (the first group)? One curiosity within the first group of exemptions is that for each of the three cases, the Torah stresses that there is fear that somebody else may either dedicate the house, harvest the vineyard or marry the woman. Why is this possibility relevant to granting the exemption to a person from fighting? Why is it important who dedicates the house or harvests the vineyard?
The three possibilities mentioned in 20:5-7 are also referred to in the section of curses, 28:30, which is understandable since it is a misfortune if a person cannot enjoy his/ her efforts by the house and the fields and if a person who is engaged loses the prospective spouse to somebody else. However, here the fear is that a person will die in battle, why is it worse that the soldier dies without dedicating his house, eating the grapes of his vineyard or getting married?
One approach (see Rashi on 20:5 and Bekhor Shor on 20:7) is that the exemptions are because it is very sad for somebody who has worked so hard at a project to be unable to complete the project. This sadness compounds the sadness of a soldier dying in battle. Is this true even by a vineyard? Is the death of a soldier sadder if somebody else lives in the house he built? Also, if one accepts this idea, that the goal is to reduce the sadness of a death of a soldier, why are there no exemptions to soldiers who have pregnant wives or very young children?
Another approach (see Ibn Ezra on 20:5 and Ramban end of comments on 20:1) is that because a person is so pre-occupied with thinking about his house, vineyard and wife, he will flee the battle. Again, I do not understand why this concern should also not be for a soldier with a pregnant wife or young children? Also, with this idea, what difference does it make if another person is going to enjoy the vineyard or the house? Furthermore, if a person is really so worried about his house, vineyard and wife, maybe he would fight harder to get back to them. Paul Kloot (congregant of shul in Modiin) suggested to me that in battle everybody has to be together, so if a person is worried that another person will take his house, vineyard or wife, then the person will not be willing to sacrifice to help out his fellow soldiers.
My guess is that the draft exemptions are to slightly reduce the tragedy of war. In war, many people die and there is no recollection of them at all, as at times even the bodies cannot be identified. In all three cases of the draft exemption of 20:5-7, the person is on the verge of making a name for himself, either by his house, vineyard or wife, that people would say this is his house, vineyard or wife. This is the point of dedicating the house that it will be called his house, and this is the fear of another person appearing, that the house, vineyard or wife will be called after the other person. The Torah gives this person an exemption in order that he can make a name for himself in some small way, and not suffer the fate of a solider to be a nameless causality. With this logic, we understand why no exemption was granted for a soldier whose wife was pregnant or who had young children since his name and memory would be remembered by the wife, children or potential child.
Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, translated by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1961, Commentary on Deuteronomy, translated by Tzvi Har-Shefer, Tel Aviv: Nezach.
In addition, we see that a person's lifespan is not pre-determined since if the person returns home and does not fight then he has a greater chance of living. Hoffmann (1961, p. 379, on 20:7) writes that for sure the person was destined to die, but just like the law by putting up a guardrail (22:8), we do not want the person's death to be the responsibility of the officials who send the people to war. Yet, this analogy is not correct since the guardrail stops everybody from falling off the roof and dying, while here the exemptions only stop a few people from dying. The simple understanding of 20:2-8, and of the law of putting up a guardrail, is that if a person acts in a dangerous manner, then he/she has a greater chance of dying, and when possible people should take precautions to increase their chance of living.
The four draft exemptions can be divided into two groups, based on the break in 20:8, "and the shotrim continue to speak." The first group, 20:5-7, record exemptions for a person who has built a house but has not yet dedicated it, planted a vineyard but did not harvest it or was engaged but did not yet marry. The second group, 20:8, is for a person who is scared of dying and/ or of attacking the enemy (Ibn Ezra and Hizkuni on 20:8).
It is striking that these exemptions do not include the most popular draft exemption today in Israel, learning Torah. If this is a legitimate exemption, why was it not mentioned in the Torah with the other exemptions? In fact, the examples of planting a vineyard and building a house are probably completely removed from the life of the typical person today who does not serve in the Israeli army. As S. R. Hirsch writes, (1989, on 20:5-7) “Clearly here the Torah… strikingly lays value on these peace-time tasks being accomplished by every individual personally.” The list of draft exemptions is another case where the Torah indicates the importance of working.
The Torah explains that the reason for the exemption in 20:8 (the second group) is in order that these people who are exempt do not harm the morale of the people fighting, but what is the reason for the exemptions in 20:5-7 (the first group)? One curiosity within the first group of exemptions is that for each of the three cases, the Torah stresses that there is fear that somebody else may either dedicate the house, harvest the vineyard or marry the woman. Why is this possibility relevant to granting the exemption to a person from fighting? Why is it important who dedicates the house or harvests the vineyard?
The three possibilities mentioned in 20:5-7 are also referred to in the section of curses, 28:30, which is understandable since it is a misfortune if a person cannot enjoy his/ her efforts by the house and the fields and if a person who is engaged loses the prospective spouse to somebody else. However, here the fear is that a person will die in battle, why is it worse that the soldier dies without dedicating his house, eating the grapes of his vineyard or getting married?
One approach (see Rashi on 20:5 and Bekhor Shor on 20:7) is that the exemptions are because it is very sad for somebody who has worked so hard at a project to be unable to complete the project. This sadness compounds the sadness of a soldier dying in battle. Is this true even by a vineyard? Is the death of a soldier sadder if somebody else lives in the house he built? Also, if one accepts this idea, that the goal is to reduce the sadness of a death of a soldier, why are there no exemptions to soldiers who have pregnant wives or very young children?
Another approach (see Ibn Ezra on 20:5 and Ramban end of comments on 20:1) is that because a person is so pre-occupied with thinking about his house, vineyard and wife, he will flee the battle. Again, I do not understand why this concern should also not be for a soldier with a pregnant wife or young children? Also, with this idea, what difference does it make if another person is going to enjoy the vineyard or the house? Furthermore, if a person is really so worried about his house, vineyard and wife, maybe he would fight harder to get back to them. Paul Kloot (congregant of shul in Modiin) suggested to me that in battle everybody has to be together, so if a person is worried that another person will take his house, vineyard or wife, then the person will not be willing to sacrifice to help out his fellow soldiers.
My guess is that the draft exemptions are to slightly reduce the tragedy of war. In war, many people die and there is no recollection of them at all, as at times even the bodies cannot be identified. In all three cases of the draft exemption of 20:5-7, the person is on the verge of making a name for himself, either by his house, vineyard or wife, that people would say this is his house, vineyard or wife. This is the point of dedicating the house that it will be called his house, and this is the fear of another person appearing, that the house, vineyard or wife will be called after the other person. The Torah gives this person an exemption in order that he can make a name for himself in some small way, and not suffer the fate of a solider to be a nameless causality. With this logic, we understand why no exemption was granted for a soldier whose wife was pregnant or who had young children since his name and memory would be remembered by the wife, children or potential child.
Bibliography:
Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, translated by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1961, Commentary on Deuteronomy, translated by Tzvi Har-Shefer, Tel Aviv: Nezach.
Monday, August 29, 2011
Devarim 21:4 (Deuteronomy) – The eglah arufa ceremony: A wadi in the land of Israel
Devarim 21:4 records that by the eglah arufa ceremony a heifer is to be brought to a nahal eitan and killed, see our discussion, The eglah arufa ceremony: The rationale?
A nahal is a wadi but it is not clear what is meant by the word eitan. The Mishnah (Sotah 9:5, also see Rashi and Luzzatto on 21:4) writes that it was hard ground, a dry wadi. On the other hand, the Rambam (Laws of murder and preserving life, 9:2) explains that nahal eitan means a strong flowing creek, and this is followed by modern translators. For example, Fox (1995, p. 942) and Alter (2004, p. 980) translate the phrase as an "ever flowing or swift running wadi." Tigay (1996, p. 192) explains that eitan is a wadi with a perennial stream, and that this translation is based on an Arabic word.
Tigay questions the interpretation of a perennial wadi "since there are not many perennial wadis in Israel," and hence "it would be difficult to carry out this ceremony in most parts of the country." This question appears to be based on the assumption that the ceremony was held near the place where the victim was found, but the Torah only states that the elders were to be from the city that was closest to the victim, but nothing is stated about where the wadi was. The wadi could have been quite far from the where the corpse was found.
21:4 records that the wadi was not tilled or sown. Tigay (1996, p. 142) notes that this could mean "either that it was never tilled or sown or cannot be" in the future tilled or sown, see Mishnah Sotah 9:5. Either possibility makes it difficult to find a wadi for the ceremony. Any wadi near a city would naturally be used to irrigate the land around it and if a wadi could not be used after the ceremony, then many eglah arufa ceremonies would decrease the available land for farming.
My guess is that there were just a few wadis or even just one wadi that was to be used for the ceremony and it did not matter where the wadi was since the elders would have to travel to the wadi. In addition, the priests, who joined the ceremony in the middle, were not from the city closest to the victim but were more likely from the chosen city where they officiated. The chosen wadis could have been some of the few perennials wadis in the country. Also, as the Torah did not specify any length to the wadi, it could have been that only one part of one wadi was used over and over again for the ceremony.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Tigay questions the interpretation of a perennial wadi "since there are not many perennial wadis in Israel," and hence "it would be difficult to carry out this ceremony in most parts of the country." This question appears to be based on the assumption that the ceremony was held near the place where the victim was found, but the Torah only states that the elders were to be from the city that was closest to the victim, but nothing is stated about where the wadi was. The wadi could have been quite far from the where the corpse was found.
21:4 records that the wadi was not tilled or sown. Tigay (1996, p. 142) notes that this could mean "either that it was never tilled or sown or cannot be" in the future tilled or sown, see Mishnah Sotah 9:5. Either possibility makes it difficult to find a wadi for the ceremony. Any wadi near a city would naturally be used to irrigate the land around it and if a wadi could not be used after the ceremony, then many eglah arufa ceremonies would decrease the available land for farming.
My guess is that there were just a few wadis or even just one wadi that was to be used for the ceremony and it did not matter where the wadi was since the elders would have to travel to the wadi. In addition, the priests, who joined the ceremony in the middle, were not from the city closest to the victim but were more likely from the chosen city where they officiated. The chosen wadis could have been some of the few perennials wadis in the country. Also, as the Torah did not specify any length to the wadi, it could have been that only one part of one wadi was used over and over again for the ceremony.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
Devarim 16:21,22 (Shoftim) - Asherot and matzevot in the Torah
Devarim 16:21,22 record the following two prohibitions, “You are not to plant yourself an asherah (or) any-kind of tree beside the altar of G-d that you make yourself. And, you are not to raise yourself a matzevah (stone pillar) that G-d hates,” (adaptation of Fox 1995 translation). The asherah would be a carved tree, while the prohibition of any tree would be to a natural tree that had not been worked on.
These prohibitions are troubling since Avraham appears to have planted an ashera, Bereshit 21:33, and Yaakov, Bereshit 28:18, 35:14, and Moshe made matzevot, Shemot 24:4.
Rashi (on 16:22) explains that in the time of the patriarchs G-d liked them, but after the Canaanites adopted them as part of their pagan ritual, G-d hated them. Yet, did the Canaanites really not use these items for idolatry in the times of the patriarchs?
The Ramban (on 16:22, also see comments on Bereshit 26:5) notes that the Canaanites also had altars as part of their pagan worship, but altars did not become prohibited. Ramban suggests that the altars could not have been prohibited since they were essential to offering sacrifices, while the matzevot are not needed to offer sacrifices, which means that they could be abolished once they were adopted by the Canaanites.
Ibn Ezra (on 16:22) suggests that the prohibition of matzevot (also asherot?) was only when the matzevot were made with the intention of using them for idol worship. However, if they were made to worship G-d as by Yaakov (and by Moshe?), then they would be permitted. Yet, there is no indication in 16:21 of a distinction between permitted and forbidden matzevot, or good and bad worship that is associated with the pillars.
My guess is that first one has to distinguish between pillars that are used for worship at all and others that are types of monuments to re-call events, that the latter case would be permitted. Most likely this was the case by the pillars that Moshe put up, the pillar that Yehoshua put up, Yehoshua 24:26,27, and Yaakov’s matzevah for Rahel, Bereshit 35:20. The prohibitions in 16:21,22 are then referring to a pillar or a tree that is used in some ways for religious actions, certainly idol worship but even worship of G-d.
In addition, maybe by Avraham and Yaakov, G-d always hated their ashera and matzevot, but He tolerated them since he knew that they were using them to worship Him. However, before Moshe died the people had to be told that asherot and matzevot were no longer going to be tolerated, even if they were intended to be used for the worship of G-d.
This explanation is similar to the Rambam’s approach by sacrifices, Moreh 3:32, that G-d “suffered the above mentioned kinds of worship (sacrifices) to remain” (Pines, 1963, p. 526) since mankind could not conceive of a worship of G-d without sacrifices. Likewise, in this case, G-d initially did not prohibit the asherot and matzevot since they were used with good intentions. However, by the asherot and matzevot, they were eventually prohibited, possibly because they were not considered by the people as being crucial to the worship of G-d as opposed to sacrifices, and hence the people could accept their prohibition.
Bibliography:
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
These prohibitions are troubling since Avraham appears to have planted an ashera, Bereshit 21:33, and Yaakov, Bereshit 28:18, 35:14, and Moshe made matzevot, Shemot 24:4.
Rashi (on 16:22) explains that in the time of the patriarchs G-d liked them, but after the Canaanites adopted them as part of their pagan ritual, G-d hated them. Yet, did the Canaanites really not use these items for idolatry in the times of the patriarchs?
The Ramban (on 16:22, also see comments on Bereshit 26:5) notes that the Canaanites also had altars as part of their pagan worship, but altars did not become prohibited. Ramban suggests that the altars could not have been prohibited since they were essential to offering sacrifices, while the matzevot are not needed to offer sacrifices, which means that they could be abolished once they were adopted by the Canaanites.
Ibn Ezra (on 16:22) suggests that the prohibition of matzevot (also asherot?) was only when the matzevot were made with the intention of using them for idol worship. However, if they were made to worship G-d as by Yaakov (and by Moshe?), then they would be permitted. Yet, there is no indication in 16:21 of a distinction between permitted and forbidden matzevot, or good and bad worship that is associated with the pillars.
My guess is that first one has to distinguish between pillars that are used for worship at all and others that are types of monuments to re-call events, that the latter case would be permitted. Most likely this was the case by the pillars that Moshe put up, the pillar that Yehoshua put up, Yehoshua 24:26,27, and Yaakov’s matzevah for Rahel, Bereshit 35:20. The prohibitions in 16:21,22 are then referring to a pillar or a tree that is used in some ways for religious actions, certainly idol worship but even worship of G-d.
In addition, maybe by Avraham and Yaakov, G-d always hated their ashera and matzevot, but He tolerated them since he knew that they were using them to worship Him. However, before Moshe died the people had to be told that asherot and matzevot were no longer going to be tolerated, even if they were intended to be used for the worship of G-d.
This explanation is similar to the Rambam’s approach by sacrifices, Moreh 3:32, that G-d “suffered the above mentioned kinds of worship (sacrifices) to remain” (Pines, 1963, p. 526) since mankind could not conceive of a worship of G-d without sacrifices. Likewise, in this case, G-d initially did not prohibit the asherot and matzevot since they were used with good intentions. However, by the asherot and matzevot, they were eventually prohibited, possibly because they were not considered by the people as being crucial to the worship of G-d as opposed to sacrifices, and hence the people could accept their prohibition.
Bibliography:
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Pines, Shlomo, 1963, Translation of Guide to the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Devarim 19:1-10 (Shoftim) - How many cities of refuge?
19:1-10 records laws concerning the establishment of the cities of refuge. These cities were discussed in Bemidbar 35:9-34, which raises the question, why is there another discussion of these cites?
A possible answer is that the sections have different purposes. One clue of the difference purposes of Devarim 19:1-10 and Bemidbar 34:9-34 are the concluding verses to the two sections. Devarim 19:10 records that the accidental killer must be able to get to the city of refuge in order that he will not be killed by the relative of the victim because the community is responsibility for his life. On the other hand, Bemidbar 35:33 records that the accidental killer must go to the city of refuge in order that the land will not be polluted with his presence. The concern in Bemidbar 35:9-34 is to punish the accidental killer while in Devarim 19:1-10 the goal is to protect the accidental killer from the relative of the victim. Therefore, Devarim 19:3 stresses the importance of preparing the roads and dividing the country evenly in order to facilitate access to the city of refuge. Also, 19:4 includes the word “live” in reference to the accidental killer.
This duality of the city of refuge explains why the laws are recorded separately. The punishment of the killer, the theme of Bemidbar 35:9-34, is to ensure the sanctity of the land, and Bemidbar 35 is recorded within a discussion of the people's inheritance of the land, Bemidbar 33 and 34. Conversely, the leaders of the nation are responsible for ensuring that the accidental killer is not killed, and hence Devarim 19:1-10 is recorded within the section that refers to the political, religious and judicial leaders of the people.
One difficulty in Devarim 19:1-10 is that it is unclear how many cites of refuge were to be established. Bemidbar 35:13,14 record that there were to be six cities, three on the eastern side of the Jordan River and three on the western side of the River. Devarim 4:41-43 record that Moshe designated three cities on the eastern side, which would mean that only another three more cities were to be established. Thus, 19:2 records that the people were to establish another three cities, which makes six. Afterwards, 19:8,9 records that when the people would receive more land, another three cities would be established apparently making nine in total, see Rashi on 19:9. Were there supposed to be six or nine cities of refuge?
Another question is that 19:3 and 19:9 appear to ignore the three cities designated by Moshe. 19:3 states that the accidental killer could run to the three cites that were to be established on the western side of the Jordan River, but if Moshe had already designated three cites of refuge then the accidental killer really had a choice of six cities. 19:9 seems to states that the last three cities would be in addition to the three cities that were to be established when the people would come into the land of Israel, as recorded in 19:2. Yet, 19:9 should have stated that these three cities would be in addition to the six cities, the three designated by Moshe and the three that were to be established when the people would come into the land of Israel.
In order to answer these questions we need to understand 19:6. This verse states the rationale for establishing the three cities of refugee on the western side of the Jordan River was because without these cities it would be difficult for the accidental killer to reach asylum because the distance would be too great. What does the phrase “a great distance” refer to? A great distance from where?
Some modern Bible scholars have suggested that the altar was also to serve as a place of refuge, and then the phrase “a great distance” means too far away from the altar. However, the Torah never states that the altar was a place of refuge, see Jeffrey Stackert (2006). For example, 19:3 states that the accidental killer could run to the three cities, but if the altar was also a place of refuge, then the verse should have stated that the accidental killer could run to four places, the three cities and the altar.
The reference of the phrase “a great distance” in 19:6 is to the three cities of refuge established by Moshe on the eastern side of the Jordan River. When the people would come into the land of Israel, on the western side of the river, it would be too far and difficult to cross the river to get to the three cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River. (Today the Jordan River is barely a creek because Israel and Jordan stop water from flowing down the Jordan. However, in the past it was a much more powerful river. In 1848, the head of a US Naval expedition of the river, William Frances Lynch (1849, p.264) reported to the Secretary of the US Navy, "Too my consternation, I soon found that Jordan was interrupted in its course by frequent and most fearful rapids.") Thus, another three cites had to be established on the western side of the Jordan River as indicated by 19:6.
Once it is recognized that the three cities established by Moshe were not accessible to the overwhelming majority (80%) of the people, then they were irrelevant to most of the people. Thus, 19:3 only states that the accidental killer could run to the three cities that were to be established on the western side of the Jordan River since these were the only relevant cities.
Even when the people would receive more land, 19:8, still the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River would remain geographically inaccessible since the increase in land was to be in north and a little in the south, but not in the east, which is all desert. Thus, 19:6-9 state that just as the people were to establish three cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River since the three cities designated by Moshe on the eastern side of the Jordan river were not accessible, so too another three cities would have to be established in the future on the new land since the three accessible cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River would no longer be accessible with the new land. 19:9 means that when the people received more land they would need three more accessible cities of refuge in addition to the three already existing accessible cities. The verse ignores the cities established by Moshe since these were geographically inaccessible to all the people living on the western side of the Jordan River. There would be nine cities of refuge, but only six would be relatively accessible. In addition, the reference to the six cities of refuge in Bemidbar 35:13,14 could be to the cities that were to be established upon the conquest of the land which would be the three that Moshe established and the three referred to in 19:2.
The net result is that altogether there would be nine cities of refuge. This number was not based on an equal division of the country but on the three zones of the country that each zone had three cities. The first zone was the land of Israel proper, the second zone was the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River, and the third zone was the land that eventually would become part of the land of Israel in the north.
Note, it is possible that within each zone the land was divided equally. According to 19:3, the land in the first zone was to be divided equally (see Ibn Ezra on 19:3), and the Talmud (Makkot 9B) states that the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River, zone two, was also to be divided evenly. Yet, it is also possible that the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River were not divided geographically, and instead each tribe “received” a city.
Bibliography:
Lynch, William Francis, 1849, Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, Reprint in 1977, New York: Arno Press.
Stackert, Jeffrey, 2006, Why Does Deuteronomy legislate Cities of Refuge? Asylum in the Covenant Collection (Exodus 21:12–14) and Deuteronomy (19:1–13), Journal of Biblical Literature, 125:1, pp. 23-49.
A possible answer is that the sections have different purposes. One clue of the difference purposes of Devarim 19:1-10 and Bemidbar 34:9-34 are the concluding verses to the two sections. Devarim 19:10 records that the accidental killer must be able to get to the city of refuge in order that he will not be killed by the relative of the victim because the community is responsibility for his life. On the other hand, Bemidbar 35:33 records that the accidental killer must go to the city of refuge in order that the land will not be polluted with his presence. The concern in Bemidbar 35:9-34 is to punish the accidental killer while in Devarim 19:1-10 the goal is to protect the accidental killer from the relative of the victim. Therefore, Devarim 19:3 stresses the importance of preparing the roads and dividing the country evenly in order to facilitate access to the city of refuge. Also, 19:4 includes the word “live” in reference to the accidental killer.
This duality of the city of refuge explains why the laws are recorded separately. The punishment of the killer, the theme of Bemidbar 35:9-34, is to ensure the sanctity of the land, and Bemidbar 35 is recorded within a discussion of the people's inheritance of the land, Bemidbar 33 and 34. Conversely, the leaders of the nation are responsible for ensuring that the accidental killer is not killed, and hence Devarim 19:1-10 is recorded within the section that refers to the political, religious and judicial leaders of the people.
One difficulty in Devarim 19:1-10 is that it is unclear how many cites of refuge were to be established. Bemidbar 35:13,14 record that there were to be six cities, three on the eastern side of the Jordan River and three on the western side of the River. Devarim 4:41-43 record that Moshe designated three cities on the eastern side, which would mean that only another three more cities were to be established. Thus, 19:2 records that the people were to establish another three cities, which makes six. Afterwards, 19:8,9 records that when the people would receive more land, another three cities would be established apparently making nine in total, see Rashi on 19:9. Were there supposed to be six or nine cities of refuge?
Another question is that 19:3 and 19:9 appear to ignore the three cities designated by Moshe. 19:3 states that the accidental killer could run to the three cites that were to be established on the western side of the Jordan River, but if Moshe had already designated three cites of refuge then the accidental killer really had a choice of six cities. 19:9 seems to states that the last three cities would be in addition to the three cities that were to be established when the people would come into the land of Israel, as recorded in 19:2. Yet, 19:9 should have stated that these three cities would be in addition to the six cities, the three designated by Moshe and the three that were to be established when the people would come into the land of Israel.
In order to answer these questions we need to understand 19:6. This verse states the rationale for establishing the three cities of refugee on the western side of the Jordan River was because without these cities it would be difficult for the accidental killer to reach asylum because the distance would be too great. What does the phrase “a great distance” refer to? A great distance from where?
Some modern Bible scholars have suggested that the altar was also to serve as a place of refuge, and then the phrase “a great distance” means too far away from the altar. However, the Torah never states that the altar was a place of refuge, see Jeffrey Stackert (2006). For example, 19:3 states that the accidental killer could run to the three cities, but if the altar was also a place of refuge, then the verse should have stated that the accidental killer could run to four places, the three cities and the altar.
The reference of the phrase “a great distance” in 19:6 is to the three cities of refuge established by Moshe on the eastern side of the Jordan River. When the people would come into the land of Israel, on the western side of the river, it would be too far and difficult to cross the river to get to the three cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River. (Today the Jordan River is barely a creek because Israel and Jordan stop water from flowing down the Jordan. However, in the past it was a much more powerful river. In 1848, the head of a US Naval expedition of the river, William Frances Lynch (1849, p.264) reported to the Secretary of the US Navy, "Too my consternation, I soon found that Jordan was interrupted in its course by frequent and most fearful rapids.") Thus, another three cites had to be established on the western side of the Jordan River as indicated by 19:6.
Once it is recognized that the three cities established by Moshe were not accessible to the overwhelming majority (80%) of the people, then they were irrelevant to most of the people. Thus, 19:3 only states that the accidental killer could run to the three cities that were to be established on the western side of the Jordan River since these were the only relevant cities.
Even when the people would receive more land, 19:8, still the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River would remain geographically inaccessible since the increase in land was to be in north and a little in the south, but not in the east, which is all desert. Thus, 19:6-9 state that just as the people were to establish three cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River since the three cities designated by Moshe on the eastern side of the Jordan river were not accessible, so too another three cities would have to be established in the future on the new land since the three accessible cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River would no longer be accessible with the new land. 19:9 means that when the people received more land they would need three more accessible cities of refuge in addition to the three already existing accessible cities. The verse ignores the cities established by Moshe since these were geographically inaccessible to all the people living on the western side of the Jordan River. There would be nine cities of refuge, but only six would be relatively accessible. In addition, the reference to the six cities of refuge in Bemidbar 35:13,14 could be to the cities that were to be established upon the conquest of the land which would be the three that Moshe established and the three referred to in 19:2.
The net result is that altogether there would be nine cities of refuge. This number was not based on an equal division of the country but on the three zones of the country that each zone had three cities. The first zone was the land of Israel proper, the second zone was the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River, and the third zone was the land that eventually would become part of the land of Israel in the north.
Note, it is possible that within each zone the land was divided equally. According to 19:3, the land in the first zone was to be divided equally (see Ibn Ezra on 19:3), and the Talmud (Makkot 9B) states that the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River, zone two, was also to be divided evenly. Yet, it is also possible that the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River were not divided geographically, and instead each tribe “received” a city.
Bibliography:
Lynch, William Francis, 1849, Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, Reprint in 1977, New York: Arno Press.
Stackert, Jeffrey, 2006, Why Does Deuteronomy legislate Cities of Refuge? Asylum in the Covenant Collection (Exodus 21:12–14) and Deuteronomy (19:1–13), Journal of Biblical Literature, 125:1, pp. 23-49.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)