Shemot 21:4-6 and Vayikra 25:10 – Can a Jewish slave voluntarily remain a slave forever?

Shemot 21:4 record that a slave owner can give his single slave a wife, who is apparently a non-Jewish slave, and then after the end of six years of slavery, the slave goes free, while the wife and if there are any children, stay with the slave owner. 21:5 then records that the slave can say that that he loves his master, wife and/ or children, and that he does not want to go free. The idea being that if he would go free, then he would not see his wife and children again, or that he prefers life as a slave than being a free person. 21:6 then records that his request is granted. The master puts a hole in his ear, and the person would remain a slave forever, le-olam. (One wonders if the master has to agree to the slave remaining?) A similar law is recorded in Devarim 15:17, but Vayikra 25:10 records that all Jewish slaves go free in the yovel year, which seems to mean that there is no such thing as a permanent Jewish slave.

The traditional answer to reconcile Shemot 21:6 and Vayikra 25:10 is that when the Torah uses the word le-olam in Shemot 21:6 and Devarim 15:17, the meaning is until the yovel year because fifty years is a long period of time (Talmud Kiddushin 21b, quoted by Rashi on 21:6 and on Devarim 15:17). Yet, this is not the meaning of the word le-olam, and the Rashbam (12th century, France, on Shemot 21:6, also see Rashba, towards the end of Responsa 9) writes that the simple reading of 21:6 is that a slave could choose to remain a slave forever. Furthermore, when a slave chose to be a slave "forever" a hole was bored in his ear, which Rashbam (on 21:6) explains was a sign that the person was a slave. This sign only makes sense, if the person was a slave until he died, as otherwise he would have a mark that he was a slave when he would be free.

The Rashbam is following his revolutionary idea that he states in his introduction to parashat Mishpatim, that he intends to explain the simple reading of the Torah, even when it does not accord with the halachik understanding of the Torah. To the best of my knowledge, this change only began with the Rashbam, as for instance, Rashi and Ibn Ezra do not offer explanations that counter the halachik interpretations. Prior to the Rashbam, there were many opinions that one does not have to follow Midrashim in reference to non-halachik texts, but not to follow the halachik interpretations is potentially more dangerous since people can argue that one can act based on the person’s understanding of the text. To counter this possibility, the Rashbam in his introduction to parashat Mishpatim, writes that the primary interpretation is the halachik interpretation. Touitou (2005, pp. 177-188) suggests that the Rashbam developed his new approach due to arguments with Christians in 12th century France. While many people do not accept the Rashbam’s approach, this blog (commentary) adheres to it.

Hoffmann (1953, p. 236, on Vayikra 25:40) notes that the Gra (1727-1797) wrote that this case is one of the instances where the legal tradition uproots the simple reading of the text. The idea being that we follow the tradition that a Jewish slave cannot be a permanent slave even though the simple reading of the Torah is that a slave could choose to remain a slave forever. Yet, while this rule tells us how to practice, still the contradiction would remain for understanding the Torah, as Shemot 21 and Devarim 15 imply that it is possible for a Jewish slave to be a slave forever while Vayikra 25 rules out this possibility as all Jewish slaves became free during the yovel year. I did not see that the Rashbam addressed this question.

Hoffmann (1953, pp. 236, 237) suggests that the meaning of le-olam in Shemot 21:6 and Devarim 15:17 is that the slave can never claim his freedom from his owner. However, during the yovel year, all slavery is ended without the slave having to claim his freedom and hence even a slave who cannot claim his freedom goes free in the yovel due to the national abolishment of slavery.

Barry Eichler (1985) seems to suggest that the laws of Shemot and Devarim refer to slaves who are sold because of debt, and these slaves could remain forever slaves, while the laws of Vayikra refers to slaves who choose to be slaves because of poverty, and these slaves cannot remain as slaves forever. I am not sure if this distinction between the types of slaves in the different chapters accords with the simple reading of the Torah since the Torah does not state or even imply that the slave being referred to in Shemot 21:4-6 was sold into slavery due to debt. Also, while Vayikra 25 refers to a person who is so poor that he/ she sells himself to be a slave, these passages (Vayikra 25:39-44) are after the Torah stated that all slaves go free in the yovel year (Vayikra 25:10).

I would suggest that when the slave declares that he wants to stay a slave, then he has annulled the possibility of going free in the yovel year. The reason is that Vayikra 25:10 states that all slaves are to be freed to return to their ancestral property and to their family. However, by the case of the slave who wants to remain a slave for more than six years, he is stating that his family is the wife the master gave him, his children, and/ or the master. This statement by the slave means that he is legally replacing his biological family from his birth and his claim to the ancestral property with his new family, the wife, his biological children or the master. Thus, the slave does not go free in the yovel years since in his case to return to his family means to stay a slave.  

Note the word kol, all, in Vayikra 25:10, does not mean literally all, but a majority, and this is the definition of the word kol in many verses in the Torah. 

Bibliography:

Eichler, Barry, 1985, On slavery, Harper's Bible Dictionary. edited by Paul J. Achtemeier, San Francisco: Harper & Row, p. 959.

Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Touitou, Elazar, 2005, Exegesis in perpetual motion: Studies on the Pentateuchal commentary of Rabbi Samuel ben Meir, Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press.

Shemot 21:1-23:19 – The order and connections of the laws in parashat Mishpatim

Shemot 21:1 – 23:19 records numerous laws. In this discussion, I will attempt to explain the order and the connections of these laws. These connections can be due to the ideas behind the laws and also the sounds and associations of the words of the law, see our discussion on Devarim 21:10-25:16, "The order of the laws of parashat Ki Teitzei" and our discussion on "The order and connection of the laws of parashat Re'eh," and "The order and connections of the laws of parashat Shoftim."

21:1-1 records two sets of laws about slaves, 21:1-11, and then afterwards there are laws involving capital punishment, 21:12-17. Why does the set of laws begin with laws about slavery? One would have thought that the laws would start with the most heinous crime, murder, and then proceed in descending severity with other laws.

Many have noted that the reference to slavery corresponds to the beginning of the Decalogue where G-d refers to taking the people out of slavery, 20:2, but what is the message of this connection? Ramban (on 21:2) writes that the laws begin with slavery since the slave goes free after seven years (21:2) and this recalls the Exodus from Egypt which is recorded in the beginning of the Decalogue, 20:2. Furthermore, he writes that going out after seven years also recalls the creation of the world since the slave would then be resting on the seventh year.

Hizkuni (on 21:2) suggests that the laws of slavery are recorded first to teach that one should not be overly harsh on slaves because G-d redeemed the people out of slavery. This idea (though not in Hizkuni's name) is recorded by Abravanel, 1997, p. 344, Sarna, 1991, p. 118, and Amos Chacham, 1991, vol. 2, p. 90. Abravanel adds another idea that the laws of slavery are recorded first since slavery is also a form of murder.

Cassuto (1967, p. 266, see also Bekhor Shor on 21:2) writes that the connection with the beginning of the Decalogue is to teach that the slave goes out free after his years of service just as the Jewish people went out free from Egypt.

Notwithstanding the popularity of the connection between the beginning of the Decalogue and the beginning of the set of laws in chapter 21, I doubt this connection. If there was really such a connection then the laws of slavery should have been the first laws that were recorded after the Decalogue, but they are not, as 20:20-23 record the first laws after the Decalogue.

Luzzatto (on 21:2, see also Hertz, 1960, p. 306) suggests that the set of laws begin with laws about slaves since slaves were the weakest members of society, and this shows the Torah's concern for the downtrodden people in society. Maybe one can add that the placement of the laws of slavery first in the set of laws of parashat Mishpatim is to teach a lesson about the purpose of the ensuing laws.

The point of any justice system is to protect the weak in society since if there are no laws the strong would be able to impose their will on the weaker members of society. Again, the weakest members of society are slaves, and in the first two sets of laws concerning slaves, the Torah records how the master cannot take advantage of slaves. 21:2 records that the slave goes free after six years without any payment to the master, which means that his master cannot force him to remain a slave. Also, 21:8-11 record that a master must allow a slave girl to be redeemed, that she cannot be sold to foreigners, and if the master does not provide her with her basic rights then she goes free. The Torah is not just teaching the laws of slavery, but also the placement of the laws of slavery edifies the basic idea that the ensuing laws are to help the weaker members of society. This idea occurs again in 22:20-23, and 23:9.

The two sets of laws regarding slavery each begin with the word ki, 21:2,7, and this word ki will appear in the beginning of many laws until 22:15. This word connects the laws of slavery with the ensuing laws.

The first section after the laws of slavery, 21:12-17, records cases of capital punishment starting with laws of murder, and 21:12,15,16,17 all have the phrase mot yumat, put to death. The first law, 21:12, does not begin with the word ki, but 21:12 has the same word, ish, as in the beginning of the second law of slavery, 21:7. 21:13,14 follow 21:12 since they qualify the law of 21:12 of striking another person dead. 21:15 is then connected to 21:12 through the word makeh. 21:16 records the law of kidnapping, and is connected with 21:13, through the word yado, hand, in both verses. 21:17 then records the laws of cursing one’s parents, which is less severe than kidnapping, and this verse is connected with 21:15 through the words father and mother. (Note that the end of this section probably should have been the end of the first Torah reading in parashat Mishpatim, but since it ends on a “bad” note, the cursing of one’s parents, so the first two verses from the next section are included in the first aliyah.)

The next section is 21:18-32, which deals with four cases of doubt whether to apply capital punishment, which is less severe than the case of when the capital punishment Is not in doubt, the previous section. Each section of laws begins with the word ki, 21:18,20,22,26, like in the previous sections, 21:2,7,14. The word ish is in three of the cases in this section, 21:18,20,26, like in the previous section, 21:12,14,16, and also the similar word isha is in the other case of the section, 21:22. Also, the word to hit, hikkah appears three times in this section, 21:18,19,26, which connects with 21:15, one of the laws in the previous section. The last two laws in this section are connected through the words, teeth, shen, and eyes, ayin, 21:24, 26,27. Finally this section has the structure of a general law, 21:18,19, 22-25, and then a law of a similar case by a slave, 21:20,21,26,27. The two general laws begin similarly by referring to anashim, 21:18,22, and the laws by the slave cases refer to the male and female slaves, eved and amato, 21:20,26,27.

The next set of laws 21:28-32 deal with an ox, shor, who kills a person. This case is less severe than the previous section since here an animal is killing, while in the previous section a person struck another person. This section also begins with the word ki, 21:28, and has the same general structure of the previous section of a general law and then a law in the similar case by a slave. Also, the first two laws, 21:28,29 refers to the ish and isha, like in the previous section and in 21:7,12,14,16.

The next set of laws, 21:33-21:36 record three cases involving an ox, which connects to the previous set of laws, which also dealt with oxen, 21:28-32. The third law refers to the goring ox, nagach, 21:36, just like in 21:29 in the previous section. The word met, dead, referring to the dead animal, appears in all three cases, 21:34,35,36. The three cases all begin with the word ki, 21:33,35,36. Finally, in two of three cases, the word to pay, yeshalem, appears, 21:34,36.

The next set of laws, 21:37 and 22:1-3 relate to each other since both refer to stealing an ox or other items. This section connects with the previous section through the words yeshalem, 21:37; 22:2,3, met, 22:1, ox, 21:37; 22:3, chamor in 21:33; 22:3, and the word ki, 21:37.

The next section contains two laws of damages to the fields, 22:4,5, and both begin with the word ki. 22:4 is understood to refer to animals damaging a field, which connects to the previous sections of the ox, see Ibn Ezra on 22:4. These two laws are connected through the words be-er in both verses, though in 22:4 the word is understood to refer to animals and in 22:5 it refers to a fire. Each of the two laws also have the word yishalem like the laws in the previous sections.

The next section 22:6-13 are laws when a person watches an item for somebody else, and again the laws start with the word ki, 22:6,9,13. Furthermore, the first two cases begin with the phrase ki yeten ish, 22:6,9, and have the phrase im lo shlach yado bemelechet reahu, 22:7,10. All three laws have the word yishalem, 22:6,8,10,11,12,13,14 just like in the previous sections. Also, 22:6,7,11 refer to theft just like in 21:37; 22:1,2,3.

22:8 might seem to interrupt these two sets of laws since the verse does not involve giving an item to somebody else, but maybe it was included between 22:6,9 because of the word elokim in 22:7 and 22:8, and the phrase yeshalem shenayim which appears in 22:6,8. Also, the opening phrase of 22:8, "an ox, a donkey a sheep" is very similar to the opening phrase in 22:9, "a donkey, an ox, a sheep," see Sarna, 1991, p. 132.

The next set of laws, the last of the "ki" section, the laws of seduction, 22:15,16 also deal with financial restitution for damages but here the damages are personal, and this signals a change that the ensuing laws deal with personal status and offenses. This reason might be why this law is the last law in “ki” section. Ibn Ezra (on 22:14) suggests that this law follows the previous section since that section deals with laws of theft of money, and this section deals with theft of a person’s heart. Another possibility is the word imah, in 22:15, which appears in the previous laws 22:13,14 (imo).

The next law is 22:17 that “a sorceress you are not to let live,” which connects with the law of the previous section since both laws relate to the personal status of a female. Ibn Ezra (short comments on 21:1) suggests that it follows the law of seduction (22:15,16) since the man might use magic to attract the girl. Another possibility is that the connection is based on the similar sounds of the root of the word mecheshefa in 22:17, "ch, sh and f" with the word kesef, in 22:16; ch and k, sh and s, and f in both words.

The next law of 22:18 has the same word, shochev, as in 22:15, and the death penalty as by the mecheshefa in 22:17.

The next law, 22:19, is that a person is only to offer sacrifices to G-d and maybe it is related to 22:18 through the reference to an animal in 22:18, the item which is sacrificed in 22:19.

The next law, 22:20, not to torment the stranger, forms a new unit of moral laws, which ends with a similar law, 23:9. Maybe, 22:20 connects with 22:19 since 22:20 refers to the exodus and this is the reason why a person should not offer sacrifices to other gods, the law of 22:19, see 20:1-5.

The next laws, 22:21-23 are the laws not to harass widows and orphans and these laws are similar to the law in 22:20 not to torment the stranger. Also, similar words appear in both laws, lo toneh in 22:20 and lo te-anun in 22:21.

Afterwards 22:24-26 records laws about lending money. 22:24 connects with 22:16 through the word kesef which appears in both verses. Also, 22:24,25 begin with the word im, as does 22:22. In addition, 22:25,26 refer to a garment, simlah, just like in 22:8. Finally, 22:25,26 also record that when lending to the poor, one should not take as a collateral the person's clothing since the poor person will cry out to G-d, which connects with the crying out to G-d recorded in the previous law in 22:22.

This crying out might also be the connection with the following law, 22:27, where a person curses or cries out inappropriately. A different possibility is from Ibn Ezra (on 22:27, see also Sarna, 1991, p. 140) who quotes the Karaite commentator Yefet that the poor person who does not get his cloak back at night will not only call out to G-d but will also curse judges. Another possibility is that the word amcha in 22:27 connects with the word ami and imach in 22:24.

It is not clear the connection between the next law, 22:28, and the previous law, but maybe it is the similar sound of the phrase lo te-acher in 22:28 with the phrase in the end of 22:27, lo ta-or, see Cassuto, 1967, p. 294.

22:29 continues the idea of 22:28 of donating something to G-d, the first of the crops, the firstborn sons and the firstborn of the flock.

22:30 connects with 22:28,29 through the word lee, which appears in 22:28, 22:29 and 22:30, see Cassuto, 1967, p. 295. Note also that 22:30 ends with a reference to a dog, and this might connect back to 22:24, the prohibition of interest, neshekh, that a dog bites. This connection appears also in Devarim 23:19,20.

The next law, 23:1, the law of giving a false report, can connect to the words hearing in 22:22,26 through the word shema in 23:1.

The next set of laws, 23:2,3 seem to refer to judges and witnesses which connect thematically to 23:1 as all the verses refer to court cases. Within this section, 23:3 refers to riv, and this connects with 23:2 where the same word appears (without the yud).

The next laws, 23:4,5 both start again with the word ki, and record laws that one is to aid your enemy's animals. It is not clear how these laws relate to the previous laws, see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, pp. 425-427. Maybe the connection is the word riv again, since 23:4,5 refer to animals of a person who is hated and is your enemy, and usually the reason why one person hates another is due to a fight, riv.

The next law, 23:6 is very similar to 23:3, and the word riv appears in both verses. Is 23:3,6 a tiny bookend around 23:4,5?

23:7 uses the word rasha, and this connects with 23:1, which also has this word.

23:8 has the word tzadik and this word is mentioned twice in 23:7.

23:9 ends the bookend or unit from 22:20. Cassuto (1967, p. 298) suggests that this sentence is connected with 23:7,8, through the similar sounds of the words tirchak (23:7), tichach (23:8) and tilchatz (23:9).

The following laws, 23:10,11 record the laws of shemitta, and explain that in the seventh year, the poor will be able to eat of the fields. This connects with the prohibition of 23:6 not to subvert the rights of the poor, and in both cases the word evyon appears (Ibn Ezra, long commentary on 23:10, and Cassuto, 1967, p. 300).

The next law, 23:12, records the laws of Shabbat, which associates with the laws of shemitta in 23:10,11 by working six (years, days) and resting on the seventh (year, day). Ibn Ezra notes that 23:12 refers to the bondman and the stranger, ger, who are usually poor like the evyon. Sarna (1991, p. 144) also notes that there is chiastic relationship between the animals and the poor people in 23:11,12. In addition, the word ger in 23:12 matches up with the words ger and gerim in 23:9. Finally, the words shor, ox, and hamor, donkey, in 23:12 appear in 23:4, and hamor also appears in 23:5.

The next law, 23:13, records the prohibition of mentioning the names of foreign gods, and this introduces a new section of the festivals, that on the festivals one is to only worship G-d and not other gods, see Ibn Ezra short commentary on 23:14.  23:13 connects back to 23:1, through the words shema and yishama.

The next set of laws, 23:14-17, record laws relating to the festivals, Matzot, Shavuot and Sukkot, and begins and ends with the phrase "three times a year," 23:14,17. 23:18 then records laws of the holiday of Pesach, the bringing of the korban pesach, which connects with the holiday of Matzot, which occurs the day after the holiday of Pesach. These laws, 23:14-18, connect with the laws of Shabbat in 23:12 similar to Vayikra chapter 23 where the laws of Shabbat is recorded prior to the laws of the festivals and of the holiday of Pesach. Furthermore, by the first of the festivals, chag ha-matzot, the number seven appears, 23:15, and this number also occurs in 23:11,12 by shemitta and Shabbat. In addition, by the other two festivals, the reaping (Shavuot) and the harvest (Sukkot) festivals, there are references to working in the field, tizrah and asif, 23:16, and both words appear in 23:10. Similarly, the word sadeh occurs both in 23:11 and 23:16. Also, 23:12 records that people do their actions, maasecha, for six days, as the lead in to Shabbat, and 23:16 refers to the people’s actions, maasecha by both the holiday of the beginning of the harvest (Shavuot) and the holiday at the end of the harvest (Sukkot). Other connecting words with the previous sections, are shanah, year, in 23:10,14,16,17, the word mitzrayim, Egypt, in 23:9 and 23:15, the word shamor in 23:13 and in 23:15, and the word remember, zachor in 23:13,17. Also, within the short section of 23:14-18, the word chag appears five times in 23:14,15,16 and 23:18.

The next laws and the end of the law section are the laws of donating the first crops to G-d and not to boil a goat in its mother's milk, 23:19. It is not clear the connection between these two laws but these laws parallel the laws of 22:28-30 and form a type of bookend around the section of 23:1-18. The first law of 23:19 connects with the laws of the festivals through the word bekurei in 23:16,19, and the idea of offering something to G-d. The Rashbam (on 23:19, quoted by Hizkuni on 23:19 and Sarna, 1991, p. 147) suggests that the second law of 23:19 also relates to the festivals since on the festivals many animals are killed and people might have been tempted to cook the animals in their mother’s milk. A word connection with the previous section, 23:18, is that the word for milk, helev in 23:19 is also in 23:18, though there it refers to fat. Another case of two words that sound similar but have different meanings is boker in 23:18 and bekurei in 23:19.

Afterwards, 23:20-33 record a brief synopsis of the rewards and punishments for following and not following the laws, and this type of section always appears in the covenantal process.

The final set of instructions that Moshe received during this conversation with G-d was about the ceremony that was to occur the following day, and this was recorded in 24:1,2, see Luzzatto on 24:1 and Benno Jacob, 1992, p. 739.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (1437-1508), 1997, Commentary on Shemot. 1999, Jerusalem: Horev.

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1991, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Shemot 22:17 (Mishpatim) – The prohibition of magic and witchcraft in the Torah: Bewitched

Shemot 22:17 records, "no witch shall you let live," (Alter, 2004, p. 445, translation). This short verse raises several questions. Does the fact that witches are not to be tolerated imply that witches have real power? What harm is there if they do nothing? What is the difference between magic and science, as both are trying to change nature? Magic would seem to be bad science.

Does the Torah accept the efficacy of magic? One possible proof that it does is that the Egyptian magicians were able to turn their staffs into crocodiles and perform the first two plagues, Shemot 7:11,22; 8:3. Ramban and Ibn Ezra (on 7:11) explain that their ability was due to witchcraft. On the other hand, Seforno (on 7:12,23; 8:3) explains in all three cases that it only appeared that they performed magic. 

I believe that these two instances were unique since G-d gave the Egyptian magicians these powers as part of G-d’s plan to harden Pharaoh’s heart. My guess is that the Egyptian magicians were surprised themselves that they were able to do these actions, and hence on the third plague, which was the first plague that they were unable to repeat, they immediately recognized the plague as being from G-d, 8:15. However, Pharaoh was not convinced by the third plague since he assumed that the magicians really did the plagues. For Pharaoh, the third plague was the first time the magicians had been refuted and one incident is never enough to convince doubters. 

The medieval commentators argued whether witchcraft is efficacious. Rambam (Laws of Idolatry 11:17, translation from Twersky, 1972, pp. 75,76) writes regarding magic that “whoever believes in these and similar things and in his heart, holds them to be true and scientific and only forbidden by the Torah is nothing but a fool deficient in understanding… Sensible people who possess sound mental faculties, know by clear proofs that all these practices which the Torah prohibited have no scientific basis but are chimerical and inane; and that only those deficient in knowledge are attracted by these follies.” This strong statement would seem to end the issue, but nothing is ever so simple.

Ramban (on Devarim 18:9, see also the Ran towards the very end of the fourth derasha, in the middle/towards the end of the eleventh drasha and in the second half of the twelfth derasha in his 13 derashot and Abravanel's comments on Devarim 18) seems to refer to Rambam as he writes that many do not believe in witchcraft, but he accepts their efficacy since he claims that "their powers have been seen by many." Ramban explains that really witchcraft demonstrates wisdom, but it is only to be used by non-Jews. Jews are supposed to listen to prophets and that is why they are forbidden to do witchcraft. Not only is the Ramban’s acceptance of witchcraft difficult, but it seems to contradict the Torah. Devarim 18:12 refers to these practices as an abomination, which cannot accord with his idea that they show wisdom. Ramban argues that only some of the practices listed in Devarim 18:9-11 are abominations, but the simple sense of the text is that all the practices, including witchcraft are abominations.

It is fascinating that H. R. Trevor-Roper (1967, pp. 92,93) points out that until the 12th century, Christian Europe rejected the idea that witches had any power. However, starting in the 13th century Christian Europe began to accept as an objective fact the powers of witches, and it reached a point that whoever disbelieved of them was considered of unsound mind. This suggests that maybe the views of the Rambam, who lived in the 12th century though not in Christian lands, and the Ramban, who lived most of his life in the 13th century under Christian rule, were influenced by the views of the general society. This correspondence is further strengthened since, as mentioned above, one reason the Ramban accepted witchcraft was that he claimed that many people saw their powers.

To return to our verse, Encyclopedia Judaica (1971, 11:703) mentions the possibility that the Torah was only prohibiting mischievous or “black” magic, so then one could understand 22:17 as only referring to "evil" witches. However, as Cassuto (1967, p. 290) points out, the Torah forbids all magic even when used for good purposes. Cassuto argues that any use of magic is an “attempt to prevail over the will of G-d, who alone has dominion over the world.” Yet, if witches cannot change anything in the world, then they are showing no dominion in the world. Again how is magic different from science? Why should 22:17 outlaw witches?

In order to understand this prohibition, we need to define what is witchcraft. Thrower (1999) notes that anthropologists have accepted that one cannot separate magic from religion. He quotes Eric Sharpe, who writes, “magic involves the harnessing and the manipulation of forces from ‘beyond,’ from the ‘parallel world’ of gods, ghosts and spirits. Magic does not assume that effect follows cause without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. On the contrary, it sees such agencies everywhere, and does its best to use them, either with or without acknowledgment.” For example, Trevor Roper (1967, p. 94) records the descriptions of the sabbat (gathering) of the witches, and writes “with them were scores of demons… and above all, dominating them all, was the Devil himself.”

I did not find a definition of witchcraft in Chazal, but the Talmud (Sanhedrin 67b) quotes a Rav Ibyu the son of Nagri who quoted R. Hiyya the son of Abba, that there is a difference between witchcraft and actions involving demons. The Tur (early 14th century, Yoreh Deah, end of 179), after listing and differentiating between many acts of magic, writes that witchcraft covers all these acts. Afterwards he quotes the Ramah (R. Meir Abulafyia) that actions involving demons are included in the definition of witchcraft. The Bach (in his comments on the Tur), writes that from the Talmud we see that witchcraft is different than actions with demons. 

On the other hand, the Ran’s (14th century, derasha 12) explanation for why magical practices are forbidden, what Chazal call darkei ha-emori, is that it is because the non-Jewish nations would try to invoke their gods when doing their magic, and then this would be a form of idolatry. Following this, it is simpler to understand that witchcraft involves some action to invoke demons to do something, and every time the Torah uses the word witches, this means an action to invoke demons. (Is this the Rambam's understanding of witchcraft? The Rambam in the Mishnah Torah lists the prohibition of magic within the laws of idolatry, 6:1,2, 11:6-16, and see his discussion in the Moreh 3:37, 1963, p. 542.)

We can now understand why witchcraft is forbidden. In our discussion on Shemot 20:3, "Forces and gods," (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2013/01/shemt-203-yitro-forces-and-gods.html) we argued that the Torah does not forbid one from believing that other gods or forces exist, but it is forbidden to worship them, mention their names, and think they are equal to G-d. Witchcraft is not just a belief in demons, but an attempt to use these demons for some purposes, which is tantamount to worshipping demons. Thus, witchcraft is forbidden even if their acts are ineffective since they are worshipping demons. On the other hand, science is not forbidden since science rejects the existence of demons.

With this understanding, is it forbidden for a person to perform an action, such as twitching one’s nose due to a belief that this action will cause something to happen magically but without attempting to invoke demons? Even if no, still maybe it is wrong to read or talk about demons, even nice ones like the tooth fairy? Or, maybe reading about demons (in the Harry Potter series?) is okay in the modern era where everybody knows that demons do not exist. Maybe not, further thought is needed.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Thrower, James, 1999, Religion: The Classical Theories, Georgetown University Press.

Trevor-Roper, H. R. 1967, The European Witch-Craze of the 16th and 17th Centuries and Other Essays, New York: Harper & Row.

Twersky, Isadore, 1972, A Maimonides reader, New York: Behrman House.

Vayikra 22:27 – An animal that is sacrificed must be at least eight days old

ויקרא כז:כב - שור או כשב או עז כי יולד והיה שבעת ימים תחת אמו ומיום השמיני והלאה ירצה לקרבן אשה לה'.

Vayikra 22:27 records that an animal must be at least eight days old to be acceptable as a sacrifice, as for the first week it should be with its mother. Similarly, Shemot 22:29 records that the firstborn animal can only be offered as a sacrifice when it is eight days old. Why does an animal have to be at least eight days old to be a sacrifice?

Milgrom (2000, p. 1883) writes that the most popular rationale is that the law is based on humanitarian concerns not to be cruel to the animal. However, he rejects this since the animal can be offered as a sacrifice on the eight day. Why is killing the animal on the eighth day more humane than on the seventh day?

I prefer R. Shimon ben Gamliel’s approach (Shabbat 135b, quoted by the Bekhor Shor on 22:27) that if the animal lives eight days then it is not considered an aborted fetus. Why should it matter whether the animal is considered an aborted fetus or not? The Hinukh (positive mitzvah 267, also quoted by N. Leibowitz, 1980, pp. 206,207) writes that prior to eight days the animal has no value. The Abravanel (2005, p. 239) writes that prior to the eighth day, the animal is considered as blemished.

I would slightly vary this idea. During the animal's first week there is a higher probability that that it will not live, as opposed to after the first week. Even if the animal appears to be healthy from the outside, maybe there are some internal problems that will cause it to die. Accordingly, if a person is not sure whether the animal is viable maybe he is offering it as a sacrifice since he thinks it will die anyway. This is an unacceptable sacrifice, just like when a person offers a blemished animal as a sacrifice since then possibly the animal is being offered to remove a “defective animal.” However, once the animal has lived a full week, then the animal is considered viable, and the person is not trying to offer a “free” sacrifice.

Shemot 22:1,2 (Mishpatim) – To kill a thief

שמות כב:א,ב - אם במחתרת ימצא גנב והכה ומת, אין לו דמים. אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו, שלם ישלם אם אין לו ונמכר בגנבתו.  

Shemot 22:1,2 record that if a thief is found while tunneling into a house he can be killed, but if he is found when "the sun rises on him," then he cannot be killed. The case here is that the thief was not yet apprehended, as the owner is confronting the thief, and the question is can the owner kill the thief? As noted by Rava (Sanhedrin 72A, quoted by Rashi on 22:1), the permission to kill the thief in 22:1 is because there is a presumption that the thief will try to kill if he/ she is confronted, but what is the difference between when the thief is tunneling that he/ she can be killed and when the "sun rises on him" that he/ she cannot be killed? This law has been understood in four ways.

The most literal approach is from the Bekhor Shor (on 22:1,2), who explains that the phrase "the suns rises on him" means that the thief came out of the tunnel and then the sun could shine on him. Bekhor Shor explains that the thief can only be killed when he/ she is in the tunnel, which implies that the presumption that the thief will attempt to kill is only when he/ she is the tunnel, but when he/ she leaves the tunnel, then there is no longer the presumption that the thief will kill.

A second approach (Rabbenu Hananel, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Ramban, Raavad?) is that the permission to kill the thief depends on the time of day of the theft. This approach is based on Job 24:16, "in the dark they dig through houses," which implies that the tunneling in 22:1 is at night, and the phrase "the sun shines on him" in 22:2 refers to the daytime. With this approach, the thief can be killed if he/ she is found at night but not in the daytime. The idea here is that at night there is a presumption that the thief will kill (he/ she can get away without being seen?), while in the daylight, there is no such presumption and he/ she cannot be killed. This distinction between day and night implies that at night the thief can be killed even if one knows the thief will not kill since at night one cannot definitely know that the thief will not kill, while in the daytime even when one thinks that the thief is willing to kill, he/ she cannot be killed, since in the daytime one cannot definitely know that the thief is going to kill. This is not logical.

A third approach (Rabbi Yishmael, Mechilta, Sanhedrin 72A, Rashi, Rambam, Laws of stealing 9:8-11, Ralbag) is that the phrase "the sun shines on him" means that if it is clear to you as the sun that the thief does not intend to kill then the thief cannot be killed. With this approach, if one knows that the thief will not kill, whether he/ she is in or out of the tunnel or it is daytime or night, he/ she cannot be killed. But, if it cannot be ascertained the intentions of the thief, then the presumption is that the thief might kill and then the thief can be killed even in the daytime or outside of the tunnel.

The fourth approach (Raavad?, S.R. Hirsch) combines the second and third approaches. With this approach, if one knows for sure that the thief is not going to kill, then he/ she cannot be killed even at night, and in the daytime even if one thinks the thief will kill, he/ she cannot be killed. With this approach, following the second approach, the presumption is that the thief would never kill in the daytime, and hence there is never permission to kill the thief in the daytime. Yet, this presumption is not always correct, as the owner might know that the thief will kill when he/ she is challenged.

The most logical approach is the third approach since if one knows that the thief is not going to kill, then how can it be permitted to kill him whether it is nighttime or he/ she is in a tunnel? Also, if one knows for sure that the thief will kill, then why cannot the thief not be killed in self-defense even when he/ she leaves the tunnel or when it is daylight? However, the third approach is also the furthest from the text since it is difficult to argue that the phrase "the sun rises on him" means as clear as the sun.

Cassuto writes (1967, p. 283), "It is self-understood that if witnesses were to testify that the killing in the night was not necessary or was necessary in the daytime, the law would be different; the Bible only presents the case in the usual circumstances." Following Cassuto, 22:1,2, is only referring to the case when the intention of the thief as to whether he intends to kill is unknown, which is the usual situation. If one knows for sure that the thief is not going to kill anybody, then the thief cannot be killed no matter whether it nighttime or he/ she is in the tunnel. On the other hand, if one knows for sure that the thief will kill, then he/ she can be killed to protect one's self, whether it is daytime or the thief left the tunnel.

The question of 21:1,2 is how is the owner of the house to act when the owner truly cannot be sure what are the intentions of the thief? The answer is that when the owner is in doubt and the thief is in the tunnel or it is nighttime, then he/ she can be killed since the owner can follow the presumption that the thief would kill. However, if it is daytime and the thief is not in the tunnel, and the owner is in doubt as to the intention of the thief, then the thief cannot be killed since the presumption is that the thief would not try to kill during the daytime outside the tunnel.

Shemot 24:3-17 (Mishpatim) – The covenantal process

Shemot 24:3-11 records the ceremony for the establishment of the covenant between G-d and the Jewish people. This ceremony fulfills Moshe's statement to Pharaoh in 5:1 that the people were to go to the desert to make a feast for the G-d of Israel, and G-d’s statement to Moshe in 3:12 that the Jewish people would worship G-d by the mountain near the burning bush.

I believe that there were three stages in the making of this covenant. First, there are the general principles of the covenant, then there are the details of the covenant and then there is a ceremony celebrating the ratification of the covenant.

The general principles are that the people agree to worship G-d and that G-d accepts the people as his nation. These principles were agreed upon at the exodus from Egypt, and more specifically at the 10th plague. In preparation for that plague, the people had to offer the korban pesach, and this sacrifice showed the people’s acceptance of G-d. (Note this sacrifice is referred to as G-d’s sacrifice, 12:11, 23:18 and 34:25.) When G-d protected or passed over the people during the 10th plague and took them out of Egypt, this showed that G-d was accepting the people. Furthermore, when the people came to Mount Sinai, before they learned of the laws, they verbally accepted the covenant, 19:8.

The second stage begins with the Decalogue, chapter 20 and continues until the end of chapter 23. In this section, the people are told numerous laws that are the details of the covenant. 23:20-33 serves to seal the covenant, as the section records a warning to obey the laws, and a promise of reward for disobeying the covenant.

The third stage occurs in chapter 24:3-17. 24:3 records that Moshe told the laws to the people and the people accepted them. Afterwards, there is a ceremony involving sacrifices and sprinkling blood, and during this ceremony the people accepted the laws, 24:4-8. Afterwards Moshe and the leaders ate a meal and they experienced a revelation or theophany of G-d, 24:9-11. The people experienced a different revelation of G-d later when Moshe ascended alone to the top of Mount Sinai, 24:17. Rashbam (on 24:11) notes that revelations accompany the establishment of a covenant and Luzzatto (on 24:8) writes that the eating here was the eating that occurs at the making of covenants, see our discussion below on 24:11, “Eating in conjunction with a vision of G-d?” These two elements, the revelation and the eating, are part of the third stage in the covenantal process, the celebration of the ratification of the covenant.

Shemot 24:7 (Mishpatim) - The book of the covenant

שמות כד:ז - ויקח ספר הברית ויקרא באזני העם ויאמרו כל אשר דבר ה' נעשה ונשמע.

Shemot 24:7 records that during the ceremony to establish and celebrate the covenant Moshe read to the people the book of the covenant, 24:7. What was this book?

In Ezra (on 24:3,4,7 also see Seforno) is that the book of the covenant is 20:22-23:33. The basis for this idea is that the book of the covenant seems to relate to 24:4 which records that Moshe wrote down the words of G-d, and 24:4 follows 24:3, which records that Moshe told these words, presumably 20:22-23:33 to the Jewish people.

Cassuto (1967, p. 312) rejects the idea that the book of the covenant was chapters 21-23, since when Moshe read the book to the people, 24:7, he would then have been repeating to the people what he had told them the previous day, 24:3. Similarly, once the people had already stated that they accepted what Moshe told them in 24:3, then why did the people again state in 24:7 that they accepted what Moshe read to them, if 24:7 refers to the same message as 24:3?

Cassuto suggests that either the book of the covenant was a “short general document” about the covenant which was not recorded in the Torah, or it was chapters 20-23, which includes the Decalogue. Yet, why would this important document not have been included in the Torah and 24:3 could also refer to the Decalogue, which means that 24:7 would still be repeating 24:3.

Rashi (on 24:7) suggests that the book of the covenant was the Torah from the book of Bereshit until Shemot chapter 20. Rashi (on 24:3,4) accepts that the writing in 24:4 is referring to the book of the covenant, but he argues that 24:4 is not connected to 24:3. While this is possible, this understanding would make for a quite lengthy reading.

Haketav Vehakabbalah (on 24:7) suggests that the book of Bereshit alone could have been considered the book of the covenant since the book of Bereshit records numerous covenants between G-d and Noah and the patriarchs.

Maybe the book of the covenant could be further limited to just the covenants that G-d made with Avraham, and maybe also the akedah. This could mean that that Moshe wrote and read to the people Bereshit 12-22 or just Bereshit 15, the covenant of the pieces, Bereshit 17, the covenant of circumcision, and Bereshit 22, the akedah. These chapters would be appropriate messages for the people, especially the covenant of circumcision. They would inform the people that the earlier covenant between G-d and Avraham was still binding on them, even though they were making a new covenant.

The people’s response to hearing the book of the covenant as recorded in 24:7 “to do and to accept” could then refer to their acceptance of the earlier covenant to perform circumcision. This acceptance would then have differed from the people's acceptance recorded in 24:3, which referred to the laws recorded in chapters 20(?),21-23. If these two acceptances differ, then this implies that the writing in 24:4 was separate from the book of the covenant. The writing in 24:4 was part of the ceremony to celebrate the covenant between G-d and the Jewish people, and was just in reference to the laws in chapters 20-23, while the book of the covenant could then have been written prior to the Decalogue and/ or the ceremony to celebrate the covenant.

Shemot 24:8 (Mishpatim) - Sprinkling blood during the ceremony to establish the covenant at Sinai

שמות כד:ח - ויקח משה את הדם ויזרק על העם, ויאמר הנה דם הברית אשר כרת ה' עמכם על כל הדברים האלה.

During the ceremony to establish the covenant, Moshe took half of the blood from the sacrifices of the ceremony, sprinkled the blood on the people, and stated, 24:8, “here is the blood of the covenant that G-d has cut with you by means of all these words,” (Fox 1995 translation). It seems that Moshe literally sprinkled blood on the people, though the Abravanel (1997, p. 395) claims that the blood was sprinkled on the pillars mentioned in 24:4, since the verse explicitly states that the pillars represented the twelve tribes.

What was the purpose of the sprinkling of blood? When the covenant was renewed after the sin of the golden calf or by the additional covenant in Devarim, there is no mention of sprinkling blood on the people, so why here is this part of the ceremony of establishing the covenant? Furthermore, why was only half the blood from the sacrifices sprinkled on the people, while the other half was sprinkled on the altar (24:6)?

One possible explanation for the sprinkling of the blood is that it was a form of imprecation to the people not to violate the covenant, that they were pledging their blood, their lives, to uphold the covenant. Bekhor Shor (on 24:4,8, see also Hizkuni on 24:8, and Rabbenu Hananel on 24:8) points out that the splitting of the blood between the altar and the people was similar to the splitting of the animals in the covenant of the pieces in Bereshit 15, that a covenant was literally cut between two items. Thus 24:8 states that G-d cut the covenant with the blood. Bekhor Shor further suggests that the sprinkling of the blood substituted for the cutting up animals since both demonstrate what would happen from disobedience to the covenant. Furthermore, most likely this sprinkling of the blood reminded the people of putting of the blood from the korban pesach on their doorposts, just a few months earlier, 12:7,22,24.

Ibn Ezra (short comments on 24:8) notes that Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon, also suggested that the sprinkling of the blood was a form of imprecation, but he dismisses it as drush. Instead, he suggests that the sprinkling could have been either to purify the people or to make them kadosh with the establishment of the covenant. These two possibilities are not exclusive. Maybe the sprinkling of the blood on the altar was to purify the people, and then after the people said they would do and accept in 24:7, then they were sprinkled with blood to make them kadosh.

Abravanel (1997, p. 395, also Cassuto, 1967, p. 312) offers a different suggestion, that the sprinkling of the blood, half on the altar and half on the people, was to show the joining together of G-d and the people, which would be an appropriate symbolism for the ceremony of the covenant. Modern bible scholars like this explanation since they found other cases of blood pacts in different cultures, and some have also connected this symbolism with the idea (above) of imprecation. (See Malul, 2002, though Nicholson, 1982, disputes these analogies.) I doubt this idea because one of the crucial ideas in the Torah is that there are limits to how close a person can get to G-d. For example 24:1,2 allows only Moshe to come near G-d, and a blood pact, even symbolically, I think is over the borderline. (For more on this problem see our discussion on Shemot 20:19-23, “Establishing boundaries after the Decalogue.”)

Maybe the sprinkling of the blood was a temporary sign of the covenant. Following the idea of the Bekhor Shor, the splitting of the blood between the altar and the people was to show the people the act of making the covenant, and the blood remained as a sign of the covenant. The blood was not the real sign of the covenant, which was the luchot, the tablets, but a temporary sign until the luchot would exist, and hence it was not repeated by the other covenants. Why was there a need for a temporary sign? Maybe Moshe was worried what would happen when he went up to the thick cloud again after the ceremony was over. He understood from 24:1,2 that he would be gone for some time, and he was worried about the people’s allegiance to the covenant when he was gone. Hence he left a sign of the covenant, the blood, which was to remind the people of the covenant when he was away, but alas this sign was not successful as the people broke the covenant when they committed idolatry with the golden calf.


Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Malul, Meir, 2002, The ceremony of blood, in The World of the Bible: Shemot, edited by Shemaryahu Talmon and Yitzhak Avishur, Tel Aviv: Divrei Hayamim, Yediot Achronot, pp. 148,149.

Nicholson, Ernest W., 1982, The covenant ritual in Exodus 24:3-8, Vetus Testaentum, 32:1, 1982, pp. 74-86.

Shemot 24:10 (Mishpatim) - The great vision by the ceremony to establish the covenant at Sinai

The end of Shemot chapter 24 records two revelations of G-d. Towards the end of the ceremony to establish the covenant, Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and 70 of the elders of the people went up on the mountain (presumably Mount Sinai), 24:9. This going up on the mountain means that the ensuing vision was only for them and not for the entire nation. 24:10 then records, “And they saw the G-d of Israel: under His feet there was the likeness of a pavement of sapphire tiles, livnat ha-saphir, like the very sky for purity” (JPS translation in Sarna, 1991, pp. 152,153). 24:11 also records that the group of 74 people saw G-d. Afterwards, 24:17 records that the entire nation saw the glory of G-d.

The Rashbam (on 24:11 and 33:18, see also Ramban on 24:10) explains that the revelation of G-d is part of the establishment of the covenant. Possibly the idea is that when a covenant is made both parties to the covenant have to agree and the revelation was G-d’s way of telling the people that G-d accepted the covenant. Still, what did the 74 people see?

With regard to the saphir, it seems to have been a type of rock, but there is a disagreement as to what was its color. Ibn Ezra (on 24:10) notes that R. Saadiah Gaon thinks it was a white rock (see also Rashbam on 24:10), while he says it was red, as he argues that the word livnat refers to bricks. Sarna (p. 153) writes that it was a blue stone, lapis lazuli, or it could have been a blue sapphire. The last phrase of the verse “like the very sky for purity” would seem to be referring to the livnat ha-saphir, and this would support the idea that the saphir was the color blue.

The more difficult aspect of 24:10,11 is that the verses seem to record that the group of 74 people saw G-d. Is that possible? The Rambam (Mishnah Torah, Laws of Repentance 3:7) maintains very strongly that G-d is incorporeal, but even for those people who do not follow the Rambam (the Raavad on the Mishnah Torah(?), Rashi (?, see his comments on Shemot 7:4, and many Jews who lived prior to the Rambam?), how could the people see G-d if 33:20 records that if a person saw G-d he/ she would die? What did Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders see, why did they not die, and why does the Torah describe what was beneath G-d?

Onkelos, followed by Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (both on 24:10), explains that Moshe, Aharon, Nadav and Avihu and the 70 elders saw the glory of G-d, and the description of the floor beneath G-d was the throne of the glory of G-d. This glory of G-d is also unclear, but since the glory of G-d is not G-d, the glory of G-d allows for Moshe, Aharon, Nadav and Avihu and the 70 elders to have seen something, and the difficulty from 33:20 is also solved since Moshe, Aharon, Nadav and Avihu and the 70 elders did not see G-d. Note, I think the idea of G-d or the glory of G-d having a throne is difficult, see our discussion on Shemot 17:16, “In the right time in the future.”

A second approach is from Ibn Ezra, followed by the Ramban (both on 24:10), that the seeing here was a prophetic vision, and this would make this seeing different than 33:20 where Moshe wanted a "real" vision of G-d. Both commentators explain that this seeing was similar to the vision of the chariot of Yechezkel. This approach markedly reduces the significance of this vision here since many people in the Torah have prophetic visions.

The Rambam offers a third approach. He refers to 24:10 in five different chapters in the Moreh Nevuchim, (Moreh 1:4,5,28; 2:26; and 3:4), and as the Rambam believes that G-d has no body, then according to the Rambam, Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders did not see anything. Instead, the Rambam argues that the verse is referring to an intellectual apprehension of G-d, and G-d’s relationship to matter in the world. This intellectual apprehension was an understanding how created the world as the Rambam (Moreh 1:28) writes that saphir was symbolic of the first material in the world.

Hirsch (1989, p. 423) offers a fourth approach. First, he writes, “Who would be presumptuous enough to try to specify what it was that they saw!” However, then he also tries to explain what Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders saw. He writes that the revelation was "the phenomenon by which G-d announces his presence in the world." If I understand this correctly, it means that whenever the Torah records that G-d appeared to somebody or was seen this would mean the person saw G-d’s powers in some way. For example, 3:6 records that Moshe turned away from seeing the burning bush since he was scared to look upon G-d, as Moshe had been seeing the powers of G-d in the burning bush.

What then were these powers of G-d that the group of 74 people saw? Rambam, in the end of chapter 1:5 in the Moreh Nevuchim, writes that if an individual of insufficient capacity understands seeing G-d as the sensual perception of created lights then there is no harm in this thinking. Following this idea maybe the seeing of G-d's power here was that G-d created a light that appeared in a vertical direction, which was only seen by the 74 people, and when the light hit the ground (G-d’s feet in the verse) it turned the ground into a geometric pattern (the idea of bricks) of blue lights. The 74 people were mesmerized by this sight, and this is what 24:11 records that they stared at G-d, i.e., they stared at this geometric pattern of blue lights. This was a peaceful and very impressive demonstration of G-d’s powers to signal G-d’s partnership in the covenant with the Jewish people.

With this idea, the 74 people were not killed since they had only seen G-d’s power and not G-d, but it is possible that still they were negatively affected by this vision similar to the story of the four ta’anaim who entered “Pardes” (Tosefta Hagigah 2:3,4; Talmud Hagigah 14b-15b). Moshe, like R. Akiva, was unaffected, but Aharon would help build the golden calf, 33:4, Nadav and Avihu would sin by the dedication of the outer altar, Vayikra 10:1,2, and the seventy elders are not heard from again, as the seventy people in Bemidbar 11:16 seem to be a new group of seventy people. This is especially poignant by Hur, who likely was one of the elders since when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai, he told the elders, “Hur is with you,” 24:14. Hur was an important person prior to this event, 17:12, 24:14 (also 31:2?), but he is not heard from him again. Note even if this idea is correct, then Yehoshua would not have been part of this group since he would not have been considered as being an elder, see 33:11. Also, if this idea is correct, then we see the great danger of people having a vision of G-d.

Shemot 24:11 (Mishpatim) - Eating in conjunction with a vision of G-d?

שמות כד:יא - ואל אצילי בני ישראל לא שלח ידו ויחזו את האלקים ויאכלו וישתו.

Shemot 24:9-11 record that Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders went up, most likely a little bit up on Mount Sinai, had a vision of G-d and ate and drank. R. Lamm (2013, p. 117) writes, “The juxtaposition of these two activities (the vision of G-d and eating), so disjointed and antithetical, so inappropriate to each other, presents us with what is probably the most painful paradox in all the Torah.” Was it wrong for Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the elders to have eaten at that time?

Onkelos views Moshe’s, Aharon’s, Nadav’s, Avihu’s and the 70 elders’ behavior very positively. He writes “that they be held G-d’s glory and rejoiced in their offerings which were accepted as though they were eating and drinking.” This means that he thinks that they did not eat. The Talmud (Berakhot 17a) gives similar explanation and learns from this sentence what the life in the afterlife will be like. This implies that these people at this time had a comparable status in this world to the righteous in the next world. However, this approach does not accord with the simple understanding of the text that Moshe, Aharon, Nadav and Avihu and the 70 elders ate and drank.

Rashi (on 24:11) and the Rambam (Moreh 1:5, see Levine, 2002-03) view the eating as real and they both write that Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders should have been punished for their actions. Yet, the fact that they were not punished immediately would seem to indicate that their eating should be viewed positively. Also, why should Moshe and Aharon have been different from Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders that they were not punished?

A third approach is that Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders ate and it was a positive experience. The Ramban (on 24:11, also see Seforno on 24:11) writes that Moshe, Aharon, Nadav, Avihu and the 70 elders ate the sacrifices referred to in 24:6 and their eating and drinking was because they made a holiday to celebrate receiving the Torah. Similarly, Luzzatto (on 24:8,11) views the eating in a positive fashion. He writes that the eating was the meal that typically accompanies the establishment of the covenant, and he believes (also Cassuto, 1967, p. 315) that they ate after they had their vision when they came down from the mountain. A minor proof for this idea that the people ate after they had come down from the mountain is that the following verse, 24:12, records that G-d told Moshe to go up on Mount Sinai, which implies that he had come down from the mountain at some point. With this approach, the juxtaposition of seeing the great vision of G-d and eating was not a paradox.

Bibliography:
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Lamm, Norman, 2013, Derashot Ledorot, A commentary for the Ages: Exodus, Edited by Stuart W. Halpern, Jerusalem: Maggid Books and New York: OU Press.

Levine, Michelle, 2002-03, Maimonides’ philosophical exegesis of the nobles’ vision (Exodus 24:10): A guide for the pursuit of knowledge, The Torah u-Madda Journal, 11, pp. 61-106.