The Mishnah (Sotah 3:2) quotes an argument as to when the woman drinks, before or after the offering of the sacrifice, but both opinions agree that she only drinks once. Tikva Frymer-Kensky (1984, see also Milgrom, 1990, p. 351) agrees as she argues that the apparent repetition is a literary technique of repetitive resumption. Nevertheless, my understanding is that the woman drank the water twice (5:24 and 5:26) or even three times if the beginning of 5:27 is not referring to the same drinking as in the end of 5:26.
This effect of the woman drinking the water was quite powerful since the water could either cause marks on the woman, 5:21, which would indicate her guilt, or increase her fertility, 5:27,28. This effect of the water is clearly miraculous, and hence the sotah ordeal is unique in that it relies on miracles to be effective. It is true that a miracle is needed to find the woman guilty, but still why in this case does G-d provide a miracle as part of the judicial process?
The Talmud (Baba Metsia 59b) records the argument between R. Eliezer ben Hyracanus and R. Yehoshua ben Hananiah concerning the oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer invoked numerous miracles to prove his point, but R. Yehoshua rejected them since he argued that miracles cannot determine the law. The case of the sotah seems to support R. Eliezer, but I believe that R. Yehoshua's opinion has become the accepted opinion (excluding Kabbalists?). Furthermore, even if R. Eliezer is correct, is G-d is promising to provide this miracle for all time?
If the reason for the sotah ordeal is to reduce the incidents of adultery, then it could be that G-d provides a miracle because G-d is just providing "facts" and not determining the law, and in this case, these facts are needed since on many occasions a human legal system cannot determine if the woman committed adultery. Yet, by murder, there are also many times that we cannot find the murderer, and G-d does not provide a miracle to find the guilty person. For instance, a suspected murderer could also be forced to drink the water to determine his or her guilt.
One might argue that adultery is a "worse" sin than murder since it is also a sin against G-d (see Bereshit 20:6) and not just against man, and hence G-d intervenes to stop the sin. Yet there are other sins against G-d such as idolatry where we do not have an ordeal that depends on a miracle to determine the guilt of a person. It is true that by the sin of the golden calf there was a similar ordeal as the people had to drink the water with the ashes of the golden calf, but that was a onetime event (see our discussion on Shemot 32:20-28, "Spiked water"). However, one could argue that adultery is worse than other sins since the children of adulterous unions are mamzerim, and they suffer due to the sins of their parents.
Emanuel Rackman (1988) argues that there is a view in Chazal that believed that the sotah ordeal was a “sophisticated psychological test” designed to extract a confession or if the woman did not confess to demonstrate her innocence, which would either create domestic harmony and/ or stop the jealous husband from killing or striking his wife. It is clear that Chazal viewed this ordeal from a psychological perspective, as the Mishnah (Sotah 1:4, see also Rambam, Moreh, 3:49) quotes that several attempts were to be made to have the woman confess and stop the process. However, Rackman goes further than this viewpoint to claim that the water never had any effect, as the whole process was a "bluff" to get the woman to confess or to convince the husband that his wife was innocent. With this idea, G-d does not intervene at all in the sotah procedure.
One of Rackman's arguments is that the oath seems to be irrelevant since the ordeal could go on even without the oath, and hence the oath is just there for the psychological element. Yet, while it is true that the oath adds a psychological element that does not mean that the ceremony is a "bluff." Also, while Chazal stress the idea of getting the woman to admit, this possibility is never mentioned in the Torah. Furthermore, one can understand the oath as being a type of information and the woman's amen to be showing her consent/ and or understanding. (I thank my daughter Talia for the last point.)
Another proof for Rackman's argument, which he does not mention, is that the Mishnah (Sotah 9:9, see also Tosefta Sotah 14:2) records that the sotah ordeal was stopped since there were too many adulterers. This is difficult. Why should Chazal annul a law from the Torah? Furthermore, if there was a period of many people committing adultery, then this should have been all the more reason to have the ordeal to stop people from committing adultery.
The standard explanation of the Mishnah (see Talmud Sotah 47b) is that since the husbands were also guilty of adultery, then the waters would not check the women. (The Ramban, on Bemidbar 5:20, offers a slightly different idea, that the people would not appreciate the miracle.)
This effect of the woman drinking the water was quite powerful since the water could either cause marks on the woman, 5:21, which would indicate her guilt, or increase her fertility, 5:27,28. This effect of the water is clearly miraculous, and hence the sotah ordeal is unique in that it relies on miracles to be effective. It is true that a miracle is needed to find the woman guilty, but still why in this case does G-d provide a miracle as part of the judicial process?
The Talmud (Baba Metsia 59b) records the argument between R. Eliezer ben Hyracanus and R. Yehoshua ben Hananiah concerning the oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer invoked numerous miracles to prove his point, but R. Yehoshua rejected them since he argued that miracles cannot determine the law. The case of the sotah seems to support R. Eliezer, but I believe that R. Yehoshua's opinion has become the accepted opinion (excluding Kabbalists?). Furthermore, even if R. Eliezer is correct, is G-d is promising to provide this miracle for all time?
If the reason for the sotah ordeal is to reduce the incidents of adultery, then it could be that G-d provides a miracle because G-d is just providing "facts" and not determining the law, and in this case, these facts are needed since on many occasions a human legal system cannot determine if the woman committed adultery. Yet, by murder, there are also many times that we cannot find the murderer, and G-d does not provide a miracle to find the guilty person. For instance, a suspected murderer could also be forced to drink the water to determine his or her guilt.
One might argue that adultery is a "worse" sin than murder since it is also a sin against G-d (see Bereshit 20:6) and not just against man, and hence G-d intervenes to stop the sin. Yet there are other sins against G-d such as idolatry where we do not have an ordeal that depends on a miracle to determine the guilt of a person. It is true that by the sin of the golden calf there was a similar ordeal as the people had to drink the water with the ashes of the golden calf, but that was a onetime event (see our discussion on Shemot 32:20-28, "Spiked water"). However, one could argue that adultery is worse than other sins since the children of adulterous unions are mamzerim, and they suffer due to the sins of their parents.
Emanuel Rackman (1988) argues that there is a view in Chazal that believed that the sotah ordeal was a “sophisticated psychological test” designed to extract a confession or if the woman did not confess to demonstrate her innocence, which would either create domestic harmony and/ or stop the jealous husband from killing or striking his wife. It is clear that Chazal viewed this ordeal from a psychological perspective, as the Mishnah (Sotah 1:4, see also Rambam, Moreh, 3:49) quotes that several attempts were to be made to have the woman confess and stop the process. However, Rackman goes further than this viewpoint to claim that the water never had any effect, as the whole process was a "bluff" to get the woman to confess or to convince the husband that his wife was innocent. With this idea, G-d does not intervene at all in the sotah procedure.
One of Rackman's arguments is that the oath seems to be irrelevant since the ordeal could go on even without the oath, and hence the oath is just there for the psychological element. Yet, while it is true that the oath adds a psychological element that does not mean that the ceremony is a "bluff." Also, while Chazal stress the idea of getting the woman to admit, this possibility is never mentioned in the Torah. Furthermore, one can understand the oath as being a type of information and the woman's amen to be showing her consent/ and or understanding. (I thank my daughter Talia for the last point.)
Another proof for Rackman's argument, which he does not mention, is that the Mishnah (Sotah 9:9, see also Tosefta Sotah 14:2) records that the sotah ordeal was stopped since there were too many adulterers. This is difficult. Why should Chazal annul a law from the Torah? Furthermore, if there was a period of many people committing adultery, then this should have been all the more reason to have the ordeal to stop people from committing adultery.
The standard explanation of the Mishnah (see Talmud Sotah 47b) is that since the husbands were also guilty of adultery, then the waters would not check the women. (The Ramban, on Bemidbar 5:20, offers a slightly different idea, that the people would not appreciate the miracle.)
I cannot believe that there were no husbands who were faithful and then the waters would have worked. Rackman's explanation accords better with the Mishnah. If there were many people committing adultery, and the test was done many times, then people would realize that it was a bluff since nothing happened to the women according to Rackman.
Rackman's idea is very interesting, but I find it hard to accept that G-d was intentionally fooling everybody, by saying that He would do a miracle, but that G-d had no intention of doing the miracle. The Torah records that the bitter waters would punish the woman if she was guilty, but this is a false statement according to Rackman.
I think the Ramban's (on Bemidbar 5:20) argument that G-d would only do this miracle when the people were worthy of the miracle is correct. Thus, when the law was first given (in the beginning of the people's second year in the desert?), G-d was willing to do this miracle on a regular basis for the people. This would be to limit the incidents of adultery with the subsequent mamzerim and to protect a wife from a jealous husband. However, once the people were no longer worthy of this miracle, then G-d would stop performing this miracle.
When were the people no longer worthy of this miracle of the waters of the sotah? Was it sometime in the distant future when there were many adulators in the population as the Ramban maintains? My guess is that when the people sinned by refusing to go into the land of Israel after the spies came back with their report, then they were no longer worthy of the miracle. The people were all supposed to die, 14:12, and while G-d agreed that the people could live, there is no reason to believe that G-d would continue to do extra miracles for them. This sin by the spies occurred a short time after the law of sotah was promulgated. Thus, when the sotah law was instituted G-d was willing to intervene with regular miracles by the sotah process, like by other miracles in the desert (the mahn), but this intervention ended after a short period of time. The sotah ordeal continued, but only as argued by Rackman, as either a threat to have the woman confess or to calm the husband. However, once there were too many adulterers, then even on the psychological level, the process was ineffective and was ended. Chazal could stop this law since really G-d had already stopped it after the sin by the spies, and hence they were only annulling a "rabbinic law."
Bibliography:
Frymer-Kensky, Tikva, 1984, The strange case of the suspected sotah (Numbers V 11-31)” Vetus Testamentum, 34:1, pp.11-26.
Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Rackman, Emanuel, 1988, The Case of the Sotah in Jewish Law: Ordeal or Psychodrama, National Jewish Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 49-64.
Rackman's idea is very interesting, but I find it hard to accept that G-d was intentionally fooling everybody, by saying that He would do a miracle, but that G-d had no intention of doing the miracle. The Torah records that the bitter waters would punish the woman if she was guilty, but this is a false statement according to Rackman.
I think the Ramban's (on Bemidbar 5:20) argument that G-d would only do this miracle when the people were worthy of the miracle is correct. Thus, when the law was first given (in the beginning of the people's second year in the desert?), G-d was willing to do this miracle on a regular basis for the people. This would be to limit the incidents of adultery with the subsequent mamzerim and to protect a wife from a jealous husband. However, once the people were no longer worthy of this miracle, then G-d would stop performing this miracle.
When were the people no longer worthy of this miracle of the waters of the sotah? Was it sometime in the distant future when there were many adulators in the population as the Ramban maintains? My guess is that when the people sinned by refusing to go into the land of Israel after the spies came back with their report, then they were no longer worthy of the miracle. The people were all supposed to die, 14:12, and while G-d agreed that the people could live, there is no reason to believe that G-d would continue to do extra miracles for them. This sin by the spies occurred a short time after the law of sotah was promulgated. Thus, when the sotah law was instituted G-d was willing to intervene with regular miracles by the sotah process, like by other miracles in the desert (the mahn), but this intervention ended after a short period of time. The sotah ordeal continued, but only as argued by Rackman, as either a threat to have the woman confess or to calm the husband. However, once there were too many adulterers, then even on the psychological level, the process was ineffective and was ended. Chazal could stop this law since really G-d had already stopped it after the sin by the spies, and hence they were only annulling a "rabbinic law."
Frymer-Kensky, Tikva, 1984, The strange case of the suspected sotah (Numbers V 11-31)” Vetus Testamentum, 34:1, pp.11-26.
Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Rackman, Emanuel, 1988, The Case of the Sotah in Jewish Law: Ordeal or Psychodrama, National Jewish Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 49-64.