Devarim (Deuteronomy) 24:1-4 – Marriage, divorce, marriage to a second husband, divorce/ death, re-marriage to first hubby, not

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 24:1-4 records that if two people get divorced and the woman subsequently remarried, then the initial couple cannot remarry if the woman becomes single again either through divorce or the death of the second husband. 24:4 refers to this second marriage to the first husband as a toevah, an abhorrence (Alter, 2004, p. 996) or an abomination to G-d. Why should the couple not be able to remarry again? If the wife had not married a second time to another man, then the couple would be able to remarry, why should the second marriage, which was perfectly legal, stop the couple from re-marrying after the second marriage ended?

Ramban (on 24:4, also see Seforno, Luzzatto and Hoffman on 24:4) explains that the reason for the prohibition is the Torah does not want people to swap wives by being able to freely divorce and then remarry again. Hirsch (1989, p. 480) varies this idea slightly as he writes, “The Torah evidently sees, and wishes to forestall, the possibility of a reprehensible misuse of the seriousness of legal marriage and divorce to hide and gloss over an intended adultery, which by the connivance of all the parties could be accomplished under the cloak of complete legality.” Tigay (1996, p. 220) notes that such a course of action would be similar to practices in some Islamic countries (Iran) that allow temporary marriages as a cover for prostitution. Yet, he rejects this idea since he notes that 24:3 states that the reason for the divorce is because the second husband disliked the wife, which means that he did not intend for a temporary union as by the case of wife swapping.

Instead, Tigay writes, “Perhaps, the law was prompted by a concern that if husbands take their wives back after the wives had voluntary sexual relations with other men, adultery might begin to seem less objectionable.” While this is possible, 24:4 implies that the re-marriage itself is problematic and not some future action. Raymond Westbrook (1986) reviews various suggestions for the law and offers his own interesting theory.

One suggestion he quotes is from Philo who seems to imply that the second marriage was adulterous. Yet, how can this be if the first marriage ended in divorce? It seems that Philo is suggesting that the fear is that the wife committed adultery with the second husband during her first marriage. However, this idea is also problematic since the law applies to all second marriages and not just to cases where there is a fear that the women committed adultery with the second husband.

A second suggestion, from S.R. Driver (1902, p. 272), is that the prohibition is to deter people from a hasty divorce. Westbrook rejects this idea since it is unlikely that the first husband when divorcing his wife is going to be concerned that his wife might remarry, become single and then he might want to marry her again. Furthermore, again the strong language of 24:4 which refers to restoring the first marriage as an abhorrence indicates that the second marriage is the source of the problem, and not some fear of people divorcing too quickly.

A third idea, from Yaron (1966), is that the prohibition is to stop the wife from breaking up her second marriage in order to return to her first husband. Westbrook rejects this idea since he notes that the initial couple cannot remarry even if the second husband died, but according to Yaron, in this case the wife did not end the second marriage and she should be free to remarry her first husband.

Instead, Westbrook focuses on the different reasons for the divorce of the first and second marriages. With regard to the first divorce, the Torah records that the divorce was due to a finding of ervat davar, 24:1, suspicious behavior of the wife, while with regard to the second marriage, the Torah records that the divorce was because the husband began to hate his wife, 24:4. Westbrook suggests, based on other Ancient Near East law codes, that when a wife was divorced for suspicious behavior, she did not receive any divorce money (her dowry), while if she was divorced because the husband hated her or was widowed, she would receive divorce money. Thus, he suggests that the fear is that the first husband desires to remarry his wife since she became wealthy from the divorce settlement from the second husband, and hence the law is then to stop the first husband from profiting twice, “first by rejecting his wife and then by accepting her.”

While Westbrook’s idea is interesting, I am not convinced due some of the same problems mentioned above. Westbrook himself notes that the statement in the Torah that the second marriage to the first husband is an abhorrence (abomination) “seems somewhat harsh for a case of unjust enrichment,” but he notes the term abomination is also used for a falsifier of weights, (24:16). However, a falsifier of weights is a thief, while here the first husband is not a thief. Secondly, according to Westbrook, the whole law is when the wife would become wealthy from the second marriage, which is not necessarily the most likely outcome of the second marriage. Finally, I am not sure if the rationales for divorce are a crucial issue in this case. It could be that the rationale for the first divorce, the suspicious behavior of the wife as opposed to the hatred of the husband is to explain how it could happen that the first husband wanted to remarry his wife. He never hated her, and once he resolved his suspicions to his satisfaction, then he would want to remarry his wife.

My hypothesis (variation on Philo?) is that the restoration of the marriage to the first husband retroactively abrogates the divorce from the first husband, which means that the second marriage would then be considered a form of adultery. This idea explains the use of the term abhorrence since the case involves a form of adultery. Also, 24:4 uses the word hutama, which Westbrook notes literally means “she (the wife) has been caused to be tamei,” and this could mean that the restoration of marriage to the first husband causes the wife to be tamei due to the marriage to the second man. Yet, how can one say the first divorce is abrogated by the marriage to the second husband?

Possibly the idea is that once the husband desires to remarry his wife, then he is admitting that the basis for the initial divorce was in error and hence the divorce was unwarranted. The restoration of the first marriage makes it as if the couple were always married, and then the second marriage would be considered a form of adultery. This same idea of retroactivity exists by the annulment of vows that in some cases when vows are annulled the initial vows are viewed retroactively as having never been made, Bemidbar 30. 

 (Note, my understanding does not accord with the halakhah, Shulchan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 10:1, see also Yevamot 11b, that if wife had sexual relations after the first divorce, then she can re-marry her first husband. Yet, according to my understanding that the second marriage to the first husband retroactively abrogates the first divorce, then the sexual relations with a different man would be a type of adultery, if the woman would be able to remarry the first husband, just like the marriage to the second husband, and hence the first marriage should not be allowed to be restored. My guess is that the Torah only refers to the case where the wife marries again, 24:2,3, not to exclude the case where the woman had sexual relations with a second man, to make the point that even in the woman marries, the woman cannot re-marry the first husband.)

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Driver, Samuel Rolles, 1902, A critical and exegetical commentary on Deuteronomy, third edition, Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, translated by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Westbrook, Raymond (1946-2009), 1986, The prohibition on restoration of marriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4, in Scripta Hiersolymitana, Studies in Bible, edited by Sara Japhet, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 31, pp. 387-405.

Yaron, Reuven, 1966, The restoration of marriage, Journal of Jewish Studies, 17, pp. 1-11.

Bereshit 25:25,26 – The basis for the names Esav and Yaakov and one aspect of the treatment of the captive woman in Devarim 21:12

Bereshit 25:25 records that Esav was born red, and he had an aderet of hair all over him, and he was called Esav. How does the name Esav relate to Esav being red and/ or hairy?

Rashi (on 25:25, seemingly based on Targum Yonaton, also see Rashbam on 25:25) suggests that the basis for the name of Esav is that he was born made (the word aseh) and developed (nigmar) as his hair was like a grown up. This idea seems to be based more on the word developed then on the word made, and if true, it would imply that Esav was born with facial hair like a grown developed man has. However, 25:25 describes Esav’s hair as being like an aderet, which seems to imply that the hair was like a cloak that Esav was born covered with the hair on his back and arms (stomach, legs?), which accords with a cloak that covers a person’s body but does not cover a person’s mouth and nose, as a cloak has an opening for the face.

In a fascinating article, David Yellen (1927, pp. 453-455) notes that when Hebrew was a living language, some words which had two meanings were known by everyone who spoke the language, but after Hebrew stopped being spoken on a daily basis, only the main definition of a word was remembered, while the secondary meanings of word were forgotten. Yellin gives twenty-two examples, and one of them is the word aseh. He shows from several passages in Tanakh that the word aseh had a secondary meaning of to cover, and then he explains that the name Esav refers to him being born covered with hair.

This same idea is also relevant to understanding Devarim 21:12, which Yellin did not mention, and which records instructions how the captive woman is to be treated. Devarim 21:12 records that the nails of the captive foreign woman were to be done, asah. What does this mean? Rashi and Ibn Ezra (on 21:12) write that this means that the captive woman was to let her nails grow which would make the woman repulsive. How can the word asah, which refers to doing something, mean to let the nails grow since that is a passive action? It is also not clear how letting the nails grow for a month will make the woman repulsive since they will not grow that much.  Instead, following, Yellen's idea, the idea could be that the nails of the captured woman were to be covered, which might make her less attractive. 

Bereshit 25:26 then records that when Yaakov was born, he was holding onto the heel (ekev) of Esav, and he was called Yaakov. In this case, it seems that the name Yaakov is related to the heel, see Rashi on 25:26. Yet, then the yud in the beginning of the name is left unexplained. Cassuto (1965, p. 717) notes that variations of the name Yaakov, such as Ya-akh-qu-ub-il(um) have been found on tablets in 18th century BCE in Mesopotamia and in Egypt at around the same time when Yaakov was living. He writes that Yaakov is a short version of the term Yaakov-kel, and the name Yaakov has the meaning of a prayer that the person should go with/ follow G-d, which has the idea of a prayer that G-d should protect Yaakov. This beautiful reason for the name Yaakov, as suggested by Cassuto, might explain why the Torah continues to use the name Yaakov, even after G-d gave Yaakov the additional name of Yisrael, 35:10. 

Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1965, Yaakov, in Encyclopedia Mikrait, edited by Naftali Hertz Tur-Sinai, Shmuel Yavin and Binyamin Mazer, Vol. 3, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, pp. 716-722.

Yellin, David, 1927, Forgotten meanings of Hebrew roots in the Bible, in Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams, New York: The Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, Press of the Jewish Institute of Religion, pp. 441-458.

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 23:25,26 – Maximizing the use of ownerless land

Devarim 23:25,26 record that if a person passes through a vineyard or stalks of wheat, then the person is allowed to eat the grapes or wheat in the field but the person is not allowed to gather the grapes in a bucket or use a sickle to cut down the wheat.

The simple explanation of these verses is that any person can enter anybody's fields and eat their crops. This is the approach of Isi ben Yehuda (Baba Metsia 92a). However, as noted by Rav (on Baba Metsia 92a) this permission would ruin a farmer since he/ she would never get to harvest his/ her crops, and hence he/ she will not plant any crops. Thus, the Mishnah (Baba Metsia 7:2, Talmud Baba Metsia, 87a, 87b, and all the mishnayot Baba Metsia 7:2 through the beginning of 7:8) explains that this allowance to eat the crops only applies to a worker working in the field. Luzzatto (on 23:26) expands this allowance to include any person who is permitted to be in the field. While this approach limits the damage to the farmer from the law, it contradicts 23:25,26 since the verses imply that all people have the right to eat the crops.

How can people pass through somebody else's fields? Why is this "passing" not considered trespassing? The poor are allowed to come into fields only after the field has been harvested (Vayikra 19:9; 23:22, Devarim 24:19), while here all people are seemingly allowed carte blanche into other people's fields and can eat until they are satiated.

A different perspective is that instead of viewing the case as one where the passerby is entering the private property of the farmer, it is the farmer who is attempting to plant in ownerless land that is public property. With this understanding, the reference to reecha in 23:25,26, your neighbor, which seemingly indicates that the property in question is private property, should be interpreted to mean that only the vines or stalks of grains is the farmer's property but not the land the crops are situated on. A proof for this is that 23:26 does not use the word fields, as it refers just to the stalks of grains as being the farmer's since the land is not owned by the farmer. With regard to the word vineyard, kerem, in 23:25, the idea would be that kerem could also mean the vines and not necessarily the land on which the vines are situated. Other possible instances where the term kerem means vines are 24:21, Bemidbar 22:24 and Shemot 23:11.

The idea would then be that since the land is ownerless land, any person is allowed to walk in the fields and eat the crops of the field. However, how could a person be allowed to plant his private crops in the public domain?

I believe the laws of 23:25,26 are an attempt to maximize the use of ownerless land. If the ownerless land is land which people use, then it will not be worthwhile for the farmer to plant any crops since the public will either trample and/ or eat his/ her crops. The land will then remain only for the public use. However, some ownerless land is wasted that nobody uses the land either for productive purposes or to pass through. In this case, the most efficient allocation of the land would be to allow a farmer to use the land for planting. The farmer would calculate the number of people who would eat from the crops versus the gain from planting the field, and only use the field if it was worthwhile to develop the field. If the farmer gained from using the field after taking into account the number of people who would eat of the crops, then the field would be used productively, the quantity of food in the country would increase, and any person could eat of the crops.

Note 23:25,26 does not allow the passerby to use a bucket or a sickle to gather the crops since the goal is to balance the production of the farmer with the public needs. If a bucket or sickle is allowed, then one person can take all the crops of the field, which will cause the farmer to let the land lie fallow and the field will not be developed due to the efforts of one person. However, if many people use the land, and they eat a large percentage of the field without needing to use a bucket or a sickle, then the farmer will not plant the land since the benefit from the land to the public is greater than the benefit from growing crops on the land.

In addition, the permission for anybody to enter the fields insures that the farmer would not be able to claim the land as his private property. Furthermore, the permission is only given to plant fields on the ownerless land but not to build buildings.

This idea of balancing between the public and private interests is similar to the Coase theorem in economics, see my article, Schein, A biblical precedent for the Coase theorem? Journal of Markets and Morality, 2004, 7:2, pp. 495-503..

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 22:6,7 – Sending away the mother bird

Devarim 22:6,7 records that if a person is going along a road, and happens to find a nest with a mother bird and her young (either eggs or babies), then he/ she cannot take all of the birds. He/ she must send away the mother bird, and then takes the eggs or the baby birds. Upon speaking to people, I realize that there has developed a misunderstanding concerning this law. Some people believe that the law is that whenever one comes upon a nest, he/ she must send away the mother bird. This is not the law, just an act of cruelty. A person only sends away the mother bird if he/ she wants to take the young birds. If the person has no desire to take any of the birds, then he/ she can keep right on walking without sending off the mother bird.

The law also only applies if the person happens to find this nest, but does not apply if the person raises birds, as then a person can take both the mother and her young together. It is not clear to me if the law applies if a person specifically goes searching to find nests, and he/ she wants all of the birds in the nest. In this case, the birds are wild birds, but then his/ her finding is not a chance occasion.

Why is the mother bird released or chased away? Rashbam (on 22:6) compares this law to the law in Vayikra 22:28, not to kill a mother cow or sheep with their young, and writes that taking both the mother and her young is cruel and gluttonous. With regard to the second idea, this might be gluttonous, but this cannot be the reason it is forbidden since one can eat the mother and young together if one raises them.

Ibn Ezra (on 22:6) and the Rambam (Moreh III:48) also write that it is cruel to take the mother with her young. The Rambam writes "if then the mother is let go and escapes of her own accord, she will not be pained by seeing that the young are taken away (Pines' translation, 1963, p. 600). Yet, does she really go away? Most likely she flies above and still sees her young being taken away. Finally, the sending away itself is also cruel, and if the mother bird really goes away, when she comes back and sees the empty nest, she will be "sad." In addition, if this act is really so cruel that it is forbidden, why then can one take the mother and her young when they are being raised in a bird coop?

Ramban writes that the law is not for the sake of the birds, but to teach people not to be cruel. Presumably the idea is that if one is concerned for the feelings of the mother bird, then one will be concerned for humans. Yet, again the act of sending away the mother bird is cruel and the mother bird can continue to see her young being taken away from above. Furthermore, again why then is it allowed to take the mother and young when you raise the birds in a bird coop?

Ramban (also see Abravanel) adds that maybe the goal is maintain the species since the mother bird can reproduce elsewhere. However, this seems to be quite coincidental that the person happened to come across a species that was on the verge of being extinct. Furthermore, with this reason it is not clear why the person can eat the young.

My understanding is that the goal of the law is that a person should not act like an animal. If an animal is walking along and saw the nest, the animal, say a cat, would pounce on the mother bird, and then afterwards eat the young. A person is commanded to act in manner different from animals to show that people are not animals since people have G-d's image within them (Bereshit 1:26). With this idea, we understand why it is permitted to take the mother and young when they are being raised in a bird coop since when a person raises birds, he/ she is not acting like an animal.

Devarim (Ki Teitzei) 21:18-21 – The defiant son?

Devarim 21:18-21 record that parents can take their son to the elders of a city, claim that he is being disobedient and then all the people of the city are to stone the boy to death. This law is very troubling. How could the Torah allow parents to be so cruel to their children? Furthermore, why is the law just by sons and not by daughters? Also, 21:18 records that the problem is that the son is not listening to the parents, but then 21:20 adds that the parents have to also claim that their son is a "glutton and a drunkard." What is the need for this additional claim? Is the boy being killed for eating and drinking too much?

Tigay (1996, p. 196) writes "the law seeks to deter filial insubordination, but by requiring that the case be judged by the elders, it also places limits on parental authority, as does the previous law." Similarly, Barry Eichler (2010, p. 451) writes, "the essential purpose of the Torah is to protect the child from the absolute and capricious authority of the father even as it seeks to strengthen parental authority by deterring filial insubordination." According to these scholars, the law has two goals, limiting the power of the parents, and deterring rebellious children, but these goals are contradictory. If the power of the parents is limited, then this encourages children to be more insubordinate. Furthermore, how is the power of the parents limited if they can have their son killed?

Eichler reviews several laws in ancient times to show "that patriarchal authority over one's wife and minor children was a potent force in ancient Near Eastern societies." We see this absolute power in the Torah by the story of Yosef. When the brothers of Yosef returned without Shimon and told Yaakov that they could only return to Egypt if they brought Binyamin with them, Reuven offered to kill his two sons if he did not bring Binyamin back to Yaakov (Bereshit 42:37). How could Reuven offer to kill his sons? What had they done to deserve to die? The answer is that it appears that in biblical times the parents had absolute power over their children and could kill their kids without even having to make any claims.

Accordingly, since Devarim 21:20 requires the parents to speak to the elders and to explain why they want to have their son killed, this law is a limitation on their powers. The elders do not appear to act as judges, but just the requirement to make a public declaration has the potential to stop the parents from acting capriciously. Furthermore, as noted by Tigay (p.197) the parents do not participate in the stoning, which means the parents must be convincing enough that the other people of the city are willing to stone their son.

This need to prove the parent's claim might be the reason why the parents have to also state that their son is a glutton and a drunkard. Other people cannot really determine if a son is listening to his parents, but they can observe him to see if he is a glutton and drunkard. The boy is not being killed for drinking and eating excessively, but this is the minimal proof that is needed to convince people to accept the parent's claim that their son is not listening to them. Relatively speaking this minimal proof was significant since in those days no proof was needed at all for parents to kill their sons for disobedience.

Therefore, the point of the law was only to limit the powers of the parents. Even though the Torah allows the parents to have their son killed, still in the context of the absolute power wielded by parents in ancient times, the law limits their powers in some ways. In addition, maybe there was only a need to limit the powers of parents in reference to disobedient sons and not daughters, if in those days daughters were not sufficiently independent to rebel to the extent that parents would want to kill them.

If the Torah was trying to reduce the power of parents over their children, why did the Torah not just abolish the power altogether? The answer to this question follows the Rambam's (Moreh 3:32, see also our discussions on Shemot 20:3 "Other gods," and Bemidbar 15:32-36 "Sticks and stones") explanation as to why the Torah commands people to offer sacrifice even though according to the Rambam, G-d does not really desire sacrifices, that the Rambam argues that in those days people could not conceive of a religion not having sacrifices. Similarly, in those days the culture was so ingrained that parents have absolute powers over their children that the most the Torah could do was to limit these powers.

This idea can explain the development of this law in the rabbinic period. While some opinions (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:5, R. Yose ha-Galili, Sanhedrin 72a, quoted in Rashi on 21:18) attempted to justify the killing of the son that it was better for him to die innocent than to be guilty of real crimes later on, other Rabbis effectively neutralized the law by adding numerous conditions that it could never happen. For example, R. Yehuda (Sanhedrin 71a) stated that the son can only be judged a disobedient son if the voice, looks and heights of both parents are equal. Why did the Rabbis add these conditions to abrogate the biblical law? The answer might be that they realized that the Torah was trying to limit the power of the parents, but could not completely end this practice due to the cultural background of the people. However, when the Rabbis realized that people were able to accept that parents do not have complete absolute power over their children, then they added these conditions to end this ability of parents to kill their children.

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 23:4,5 – The economic relations between Moav and the Jewish people when the Jewish people were in the desert: Too late

Devarim 23:4,5 records that people from Ammon and Moav could not join the Jewish people. The Torah explains that this restriction was “on account that they did not greet you with food and with water on the way, at your going out from Egypt, and because he hired against you Bil’am son of Be’or from Petor, (in) Aram of-the-Two Rivers, to curse you” (Fox, 1995, translation).

This verse (23:5) is difficult for two reasons. One, why does the Torah provide two reasons for the prohibition, the fact that they did not greet the Jewish people with food and that Bil’am was hired to curse the Jewish people? Only Moav hired Bil’am (Bemidbar 22:2-5), and hence a person from Ammon was prohibited from joining the Jewish people solely due to the reason that they did not greet the Jewish people with food and water, so why was this same reason not sufficient with respect to Moav? Two, Devarim 2:29 records that Moav sold the people food and water, how could Devarim 23:4 state that they did not greet the Jewish people with food and water?

Ibn Ezra (on Devarim 2:29) records two answers to the second question. One, “in the name of the many,” is that while Moav sold the people food and water as indicated in 2:29, the problem in 23:5 was that they did not give the food freely to the people. Two, Ibn Ezra’s own approach, is that he argues that 2:29 does not state that Moav sold food to the people. 2:27,28 record that Moshe asked Sihon to allow the Jewish people to pass through his territory and Moshe offered that the Jewish people would buy food and water from Sihon. Afterwards, 2:29 records that Moshe asked Sihon to do to the Jewish people as Edom and Moav had done to the Jewish people. It is usually understood that the phrase “to do as Edom and Moav had done” in 2:29 refers back to Moshe’s offer to buy food and water in 2:28, that Moshe was asking Sihon to sell food and water to the Jewish people like Edom and Moav had sold food to the people. However, Ibn Ezra argues that the phrase “to do as Edom and Moav had done” refers back to 2:27 that Moshe was asking Sihon to let the Jewish people pass through his land as Edom and Moav had let the Jewish people pass through their lands.

The Ramban (on 23:5) rejects both answers quoted by the Ibn Ezra. He rejects the idea that the problem with Moav was that it sold food instead of giving the food away for free since selling the food is also reasonable and could not be sufficient cause to prohibit a person from Moav of joining the Jewish people. Ramban’s question seem cogent to me, but Hoffmann (on 2:29) also likes this distinction between selling and giving away, as he argues that Moav should have been like Malki-Tzedek who brought food to Avram (Bereshit 14:19). Yet, this example is not applicable here, as Malki-Tzedek brought food as tribute and thanks for Avram, while Moav did not owe the Jewish people any thanks. Furthermore, Malki-Tzedek bought food for one person, would one expect that Moav should feed the entire Jewish nation for free? Finally, again even if they should have fed all the people for free, still as the Ramban asked was selling food so horrible a crime that they could never join the Jewish people?

The Ramban also rejects Ibn Ezra’s approach that 2:29 does not imply that Moav sold food to the people. According to Ibn Ezra’s reading of 2:29 Moshe asked Sihon to let the people pass through Sihon’s lands just as Edom and Moav had let the people pass through their lands. However, as pointed out by Ramban, the Jewish people did not pass through Moav’s land. Thus, the phrase in 2:29 “to do as Edom and Moav had done” must mean that Moshe asked Sihon to sell the people food as Edom and Moav sold the people food.

The Ramban suggests a different answer based on the fact that two reasons are recorded in 23:5 for the prohibition of Ammon and Moav to join the Jewish people. His suggestion is that one reason refers to Ammon and one to Moav. A person from Ammon could not join the Jewish people since they did not sell the people food, while a person from Moav could not join the Jewish community since they hired Bil’am. This approach answers both of the questions raised above: the Torah had to record two reasons, and 23:5 does not contradict 2:29 because with this reading 23:5 only implies that Ammon did not sell food and water to the Jewish people not Moav.

The Abravanel rejects Ramban’s answer for a grammatical reason. 23:5 switches from the plural to the singular, that “they did not greet the people” as opposed to “he hired Bil’am.” Abravanel argues that the plural in 23:5 means that both Moav and Ammon did not greet the people, while the singular in 23:5 means that only Moav hired Bil'am. Abravanel notes that also in Nehemiah 13:2,3, the plural is used to indicate that both Moav and Ammon did not greet the people. Instead, Abravanel offers a different reading of 2:29 which is not clear to me.

My guess is that the questions can be answered if we understand the geography of where the people marched in the 40th year in reference to Moav. While 2:29 records that Moav sold food to the Jewish people, the verse does not refer to all of Moav but rather to those people of Moav who lived in Ar. What and where is Ar? Tigay (1996, p. 526, footnotes 6,7) writes that Ar was a city of Moav, and from 2:18 it seems that it was “situated near the border on the Wadi Arnon.” Wadi Arnon was the border between Moav and the Amorites, with Moav south of the Wadi, and the Amorites, whose king was Sihon, north of the Wadi. This means that Ar was situated in northern Moav just south of the Wadi Arnon. When the Jewish people marched in the 40th year, they skirted around Moav, and then they had to pass through the Amorite land to get to the land of Israel. The people crossed Wadi Arnon and then Moshe sent messengers to Sihon, Bemidbar 21:13-23. Moshe was already in the land of Sihon (the periphery) when he sent the messengers to Sihon, and the people were north of Moav. However, they were still close to Ar, the Moav city by the Wadi Arnon, and this offered the people of the city the opportunity to sell food and water to the Jewish people as indicated in 2:29.

This selling does not contradict 23:5 that the people of Moav did not greet the Jewish people with food and water since the people of Ar only sold the Jewish people food after the Jewish people had passed them by. When the people were marching around Moav, the people of Moav did not sell them any food or water. Accordingly, Moav did not greet the Jewish people with water and food, as greeting means to go out to a person, while Moav waited until the Jewish people passed them by to sell them food. Therefore, both Moav and Ammon did not greet the Jewish people to sell them food or water. Yet, still one could ask that if in the end some people of Moav sold food to the Jewish people, then this should have been sufficient to allow them the opportunity to enter the Jewish people? The answer is that Moav had a double sin that they also hired Bil’am to curse the Jewish people. Thus, the Torah had to mention two reasons why Ammon and Moav could not enter the Jewish community.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 21:10-25:19 – The order and connections of the laws of parashat Ki Teitzei

Devarim 21:10-25:19, parashat Ki Teitzei, records numerous laws, but it is not clear the connections between the different laws. It is possible that the Torah specifically wants there to be no connection, but more likely there is an order but it is not self-apparent.

Amongst Medieval commentators, Rashi, occasionally, and Ibn Ezra and Hizkuni (many times he quotes Ibn Ezra) more frequently, attempt to explain the connection between the laws in parashat Ki Teitzei. Generally, their approach is to find thematic connections between the laws.  Cassuto (1973, pp. 1-7) suggested a different approach that sometimes the order of the laws in the Torah is based on sounds or associations of words and phrases.  This idea was crucial when there were very few sifrei Torah, which meant that people had to memorize the Torah, and it was certainly difficult to memorize lists of laws. The sounds and association are a way to aid people to memorize the Torah. (See Boorstin, 1983, pp. 480-484, who briefly discusses the prodigious memory skills that existed in antiquity, and how people developed tricks to aid their memory.)  

Cassuto did not relate his method to the book of Devarim, but this method had been utilized by Yosef Heinemann (1965) and by Alexander Rofe (1988b, 2002, pp. 55-78) in order to explain the order of the laws in parashat Ki Teitzei. Stephen A. Kaufman (1978, see also Olsen, 1994) also offers some examples of this method as part of his argument that the laws of Devarim follow the order of the Decalogue.  We will review the different suggestions along with some of our own to hopefully shed more light on the order of the laws in 21:10-25:19.  We have used this methodology to also try understand the order and connections of the laws of parashat Mishpatim, parashat Re'eh and parashat Shoftim. 

The first law, 21:10-14, is the laws of the woman captured in war, and this is the last law in the war section that began in chapter 20. 

The next law, 21:15-17, records the law that a father cannot favor a son from a beloved wife as opposed to a son from a hated wife.  Rashi (on 21:11) quotes from the Midrash that this law relates to the previous law of the woman captured in battle since the man will come to hate this captured woman, and this will lead to a disobedient son, the following section. Ibn Ezra (on 21:15) suggests that the connection is that initially the captured woman is loved and then hated, which relates to a man who has a wife he loves and a wife who he hates. Rofe varies this slightly. The law of the captured woman ends with a type of divorce, and 24:3 relates divorce in general to a woman being hated.  Thus, as 21:14 refers to divorcing the captured woman, this leads to the association of the term hatred, and 21:15-17 refer to the hated wife.  Heinemann suggests that the connection is that the two laws concern a man and his household, his wives and kids.  Wenham and McConville (1980, p. 251) note that the section on the captured woman ends with the unloved woman receiving her freedom, and 21:15-17 record that the unloved son receives his inheritance.

Another possibility is that 21:16,17 record that the father must acknowledge the son from his hated wife, and 21:12,13 record that the captured woman must shave her head, cut her nails, change her clothes and be allowed to cry for her parents for one month. After one month, the soldier must decide to either acknowledge the captured woman to be his wife or to disassociate from her and send her away, 21:13,14. Thus, both sections have an element of acknowledgement.

Another possible connection is that the law of not favoring the son of the beloved wife over the son of the hated wife reminds us of the case of Yaakov, Rahel, Leah, Yosef and Reuven, and 21:17 uses the same language, reshit ono, as in Bereshit 49:3 when referring to Reuven. Also, both Rahel (Bereshit 29:17) and Yosef (Bereshit 39:6) are described as yefat toar, the same description as the captive woman, 21:11.  Thus, the law of the captured woman could lead to an association with Rahel and Yosef, which would connect to the sons of beloved and hated wives, the law of 21:15-17.

The next law, 21:18-21, records the law of the disobedient son. Rofe notes that this section begins the same way as the previous section, "if a man has."  Heinemann notes that this law also refers to the household, and more specifically, both laws relate to sons.  Some connections with the laws in the previous war section is that 21:19,20 refer to the ziknei iro, and 21:3,4,6, (also with some difference 21:2) by the law of eglah arufa, has the same phrase ziknei ha-ir, and mikirbecha is in 21:21 and 21:9. Also, 21:19 has the word ve-tafsu, and this same word appears in 20:19, le-tafsah. Going further back, 21:21 records the phrase u-bearta hara mikirbecha, and this appears in 19:19 (19:13 in a shortened version) also in 17:7 (17:12 again in a shortened version). Also, the phrase yishmioo ve-yiraoo in 21:21 appears in 19:20.

The next law, 21:22,23 is that if a person is hung by the court, then he is to be buried by nightfall. This law connects with the previous law of the disobedient son since both laws refer to capital punishment. Rashi (on 21:22) makes this connection more explicit (and more chilling), as he writes that if the parents are merciful on their wayward child, 21:18-21, then the child will grow up to be a sinner to such an extent that he (she?) will be guilty of a capital offense, and then the beit din will kill him, 21:22. Rofe (quoted by Tigay, 1996, p. 455) notes that this law relates to the previous laws of the disobedient son and not favoring the son of the beloved wife since all three laws have a similar opening, ki yihiyeh le-ish, "if a man has," 21:15 (has tihiyena), 18, 22 (has be-ish). This law also connects with the war section through the word etz in 21:22,23 and 20:19, 20,21.

The next law, 22:1-4, is that one cannot ignore another person's animals if they are lost or have fallen on the road.  Heinemann suggests that the placement of this law is that after the Torah discusses a person's household it discusses his possessions.  Rofe suggests that the connection is due to the word used by the disobedient son, swr, and the word used by the animal, ndh, which are used as synonyms in Devarim in reference to idolatry, see 4:19 and 11:15. Maybe the connection is due to the word "ignore," that just like one cannot ignore another person's animals but must return it (22:1,3,4), so too a person cannot ignore the body that was hanged but it must be buried, even if people want to let the body hang as a way of venting their anger at the deceased. Furthermore, the criminal was hanged, which means a person has fallen down and corresponds to finding an animal that fell down on the road, 22:4.

The next law, 22:5, is that it is prohibited to cross-dress.  Rofe notes that this law is connected with the previous law based on the word clothing, simlah. 22:3 records that that a person must return another person's clothing, and 22:5 records that a man can not wear women's clothing.

The next law, 22:6,7, is that a person cannot capture a mother bird along with her young.  Ibn Ezra (on 22:6) writes that the connection is the word derech, which is recorded in 22:6 and in 22:4, two laws beforehand.  Rofe follows this idea and adds that both the animal and the bird are found on the way. Kaufman (p. 136) notes that both laws refer to falling, the animal fell down, 22:4, and the bird's nest is before you on the road since it too fell down, 22:6.  Another connection is the word tree, etz, mentioned here, 22:6, and in 21:22,23.

The next law, 22:8, is that one must put a railing around a roof. Rofe suggests that the connection is because birds nest on the roof.  However, more likely the connection is that people put bird coops on the roofs of their homes, and this is the opposite of the case of 22:7, where one finds the nest on the road or in the tree since if the coop is on the roof then a person can take the mother and her young together.  Another possibility (Kaufman) is that the law is connected with the law of the animal falling, 22:4, because here the fear is that a person will fall from the roof without a guardrail, 22:8.

22:9 begins the next short section (22:9-11) of laws prohibiting the combining disparate items, when planting, plowing and wearing clothing. Ibn Ezra (on 22:9, also on 22:10,11) suggests that these laws follow the law of the railing since after one builds a house, then one plants fields. Heinemann notes that again we return to a person's possessions, which connects with a person's house in 22:8.  Rofe suggests that the connection is that if a person falls and dies because there is no railing on the house, the house becomes impure and if one violates the law of 22:9, the produce because forbidden.  My guess is that 22:9 is part of the trilogy of a woman, 22:5, house, 22:8, and vineyard, 22:9, as occurs in 28:30 (in the same order), 20:5-7 (different order) and 5:18 (field instead of vineyard). 

22:10,11 continue the law of 22:9 of not combining disparate items. In addition, 22:10 refers to an ox and the donkey, who are mentioned in 22:1,3,4.  

The next law, 22:12, is to put fringes, tsitsits on one's four corned garment. This law connects with the previous law, 22:11, which also discusses clothing. Furthermore, Rashi and Ibn Ezra (on 22:12) explain that juxtaposition of 22:11,12 is to teach that tsitsit can be made from shantez, the forbidden mixture of wool and linen recorded in verse 22:11, and in ancient times the tsitsit were usually made from wool and linen.  Yet, why should tsitsit be an exception to the law of not wearing wool and linen together?  I would think that the point of the verse 22:12 is to inform us that the fringes are not considered as part of the clothing. The verse states that they are put on the four corners of your garment, and the garment, which covers a person, is considered as clothing but not the fringes. Thus, 22:12 is to inform us that having fringes of wool and linen do not constitute a violation of 22:11, not because they are an exception to the rule, but because fringes are not clothing.  

The next law, 22:13-19, is when a husband falsely accuses his new wife of not being a virgin. Ibn Ezra (on 22:13) writes that the connection is that the law follows the  flow of life, first one has a house, then one finds clothing and then one finds a wife. Tigay (1996, p. 456) writes that the connection is because the proof of the virginity is with a garment, the simlah in 22:17 and this connects to law by cross-dressing in 22:5. Maybe, 22:13-19 also connects back to 22:1-4, the law of returning the lost animal. 22:3 refers to finding, u-metsatah, the animal and 22:14 (also 22:17) records that the husband states that he cannot find, matsati, a sign that his wife was a virgin. In addition, after the false accusation the husband cannot send away his wife, 22:19, which connects with the word send (recorded twice) by the mother bird, 22:7. 

The next law, 22:20,21, is when the husband's accusation is correct, and continues the case of 22:13-19.

The next law, 22:22, is the punishment for adultery, and this is thematically the same as the previous law. When the new wife is found not to have been a virgin, then this can be thought of as a type of adultery since the husband was deceived by her sexual misconduct.  Also, both 22:21, and 22:22 end with the phrase, "remove evil from the Jewish people."  

The next law, 22:23,24 is that sexual relations between a man and an engaged woman (to another man) is also considered adultery, and again the law ends with the phrase "remove evil from the Jewish people."  

The next law, 22:25-27, is where the sexual relations between the man and the engaged woman took place in the field, and then it is assumed not to have been consensual.  This case continues the case of 22:23,24, but differs as to where the sexual relations transpired. 

The next law, 22:28, is a case of rape, and this connects with the previous law since in this case it is known for sure that the sexual relations were not consensual.

The next law, 23:1, is that a person cannot marry his father's former wife (not his mother).  Rofe notes that this law connects with the laws of the tsitsit since 22:12 refers to the corner, kanfot, of the garment, and 23:1 explains that one is not to reveal one's father's kenaf.  Another possibility is that sexual relations between the son and his father's former wife impinges on his father, just as the case of the new wife who was found not to be a virgin impinges on her father, 22:21.  In addition, the father is mentioned prominently in the laws of the bride whose virginity is under question, 22:15,16, and when there is sexual relations between a man and single woman, 22:29, the previous verse to the law of 23:1.  Finally, the law of 23:1 continues the idea of the laws by the engaged woman, 22:23-27, since there the woman is "off-limits" to other men even though she is not married, and so too here, the father's former wife is "off-limits" to the son even though now she is single.   

The next law, 23:2, is that a man who is castrated cannot enter G-d's congregation. Alter (2004, p. 991) notes, "The prohibition, then, is thematically related to the immediately preceding prohibition against uncovering one's father's skirt, both expressing a horror of violation of the body of the father."  Or, to vary this idea, when a son marries his father's former wife, he has in a sense castrated his father. 

The next two laws, 23:3-7 begin with phrase "X shall not be admitted, lo yavoh, into G-d's congregation," which is the same opening statement of the previous law of 23:2.  Rofe also suggests that 23:3, the prohibition not to allow a mamzer into G-d's congregation, is connected with 23:1 since a child from a forbidden sexual relationship such as the one recorded in 23:1 is considered a mamzer. 

Alter (2004, p. 991) adds another possible connection between the law of 23:4-7 not to marry an Ammonite and Moavite with 23:1. He quotes David Cohen-Zemach that the case of 23:1 of not uncovering a father's garment alludes to Ham seeing his father Noah's nakedness (Bereshit 9:22). Furthermore, several commentators have related this incident between Ham and Noah to incest, and then 23:1 is associated with 23:4-7 since Moav and Ammon derive from the incestuous relationship of Lot and his daughters, Bereshit 19:30-38. 

The next set of laws, 23:8,9, is not to abhor an Edomite or an Egyptian. These laws follow 23:4-7 since they deal with foreigners, just as 23:4-7 refers to Moavites and Ammonites.  Again the word yavoh, appears, 23:9, that the third generation Edomite and Egyptian can join G-d's congregation, and this word was in 23:2,3,4, though there the phrase is lo yavoh.  

The next law, 23:10-13 record that the law of the sanctity of a military camp that a person who has an emission of semen has to leave the camp at night, lo yavoh, and in the morning he can return, yavoh, to the camp after washing.  Rofe notes that the word yavoh in 23:11,12 connects this law with the laws of 23:2-9, which also use this word, as mentioned above.  

The next law, 23:14,15, is that when a person is in the military camp, he must go to the bathroom outside the camp.  This law connects with the previous law since both refer to the laws of the sanctity of the military camp, and the word machaneh, camp, appears seven times in these two laws.   

The next law, 23:16,17, is that a person must grant asylum to an escaped slave. Ibn Ezra (on 23:16) claims that this case is also dealing with war, that the slave is running away during the war, which connects the law with the previous laws of the military camp.  Rofe notes that 23:14 refers to sitting outside, shavta, and 23:17 also refers to sitting with you, yeshev.  This same sound, albeit with a different meaning, shav, also appears in 23:15.  In addition, there is the contrast that one must go outside the camp to go to the bathroom, while the slave stays with you.  Another connection is that the same word save, tsl, appears in both laws.  23:15 states that "G-d moves in the camp to save you, le-hatsilcha," and 23:16 records that you are to not to return the slave who has turned to you to be saved, "yenatsel." 

The next set of laws, 23:18,19, forbid prostitution, and prohibit the prostitute to donate her (and his?) income to the worship of G-d. Ibn Ezra (on 23:18) suggests that the connection with the previous law is due to the connection between slaves and prostitutes. (I am not sure if he means that slaves become prostitutes or that slavery and prostitutes are similar actions of selling one's body for money.) Rofe notes that 23:18,19 refer to a prostitute with the word kadesh, and this word is mentioned in 23:15, though in a completely different context. However, he thinks a more likely connection is that the previous law, 23:17, ended by stating that one is not to ill-treat the slave, lo tonenu, and 23:17 uses the same three letters, taf, nun, nun, in reference to the prostitute's gift, etnan. 

The next law, 23:20,21, is the prohibition of charging interest to a Jew.  Rofe and Kaufman (p. 139) connect this law to the previous verse, which records that a person cannot donate money to the worship of G-d that is derived from a dog (a male prostitute?), and 23:20,21 records seven times, the word neshek, which literally means to bite. 

The next law, 23:22-24, is that a person must fulfill his vows.  Ibn Ezra (on 23:22) and Rofe notes that this section connects with the law by the prostitute (two laws prior, 23:19) which also uses the word vow, neder. (Note the word neder in 23:19, is recorded after the reference to the dog, and the laws of interest, which are connected to the word dog, precede the law of fulfilling one's vow.) In addition, the obligation to fulfill one's vows contrasts with the case of the prostitute whose donations are not accepted, while for other people the Torah encourages the people to fulfill their donations.  

The next law, 23:25,26, is permission to eat grapes and grain from a neighbor's field if one is passing through the field.  Rofe suggests that the connection is that 23:25 uses the phrase, kenafeshecha, your soul can be satiated from eating the grapes and he points out that the word nefesh can also mean throat.  Thus, he suggests that this word connects with the previous law which records that one must fulfill the vows uttered by one's lips in 23:24. My guess is that the connection is between the reference to the lips, 23:24, and to eating in 23:25, similar to the association between a dog and biting in 23:19,20, that the lips are used for eating.  

The next law, 24:1-5, is that while people can get divorced, they cannot remarry their first spouse if they re-married somebody else in the interim. Ibn Ezra (on 24:1, see Weiser, 1976, vol. 3, p. 283, footnote 2) seems to connect this law with the previous law as he writes that the woman is also considered a field that she has children like fields have fruits. Rofe suggests the connection is that 24:1 refers to the wife he does not find favor in her husband's eyes, and this connects to the references to other parts of a person's head, the throat in 23:25 according to his suggestion of the word kenafeshecha, and the mouth in 23:24. Alter (p. 996) notes that the connection between 24:1 and 23:15 is that both verses have the phrase of ervat davar. In addition, maybe the connection is based on the word hands.  23:26 records that when you go through the fields, you can pluck the grain with your hands, and 24:1,3 state that the bill of divorce must be placed in her hands.   

The next law, 24:5, is that a person is exempt from going to the army the first year of his marriage. Rofe notes that this law begins with the same opening as the previous 24:1, "if a man takes a wife."  In addition, the laws are connected by the word davar in 24:1 and 24:5.  

The next law, 24:6, is that a lender cannot take a millstone or even just the upper part of the millstone from the borrower as a pawn since the borrower needs it to grind his wheat. Ibn Ezra (24:6) notes that the Karaites claim that grinding and the separation of the upper part of the millstone from the bottom part of millstone have a sexual imagery, and this is why the law is recorded after the law to not separate the husband and wife the first year of their marriage. Ibn Ezra rejects this idea, but Rofe and Kaufmann follow it. Another possibility following the literal idea of grinding is that 24:5 records that the husband should be naki, which literally means clean, but here is used figuratively that the husband should be free for the year, a strange use of the word naki. This word, naki, corresponds to the process of grinding wheat, which was the use of the millstone referred to in 24:6, to produces clean flour. A third possible connection is that the law of 24:5 is not just related to the new groom going off to fight but to any separation between the new couple which will reduce the happiness of the new wife. Similarly, 24:6 refers to the separation of the millstone from a person or even the separation of the millstone from itself and either act will cause hardship on the owner of the millstone.

The next law is, 24:7, prohibits kidnapping. Ibn Ezra (on 24:6), Rofe and Kaufman all connects this law with the previous law based on the word nefesh in 24:6 and 24:7.  

The next law, 24:8,9, is that a person must listen to the priest when they have leprosy. Ibn Ezra (on 24:6) suggests the connection is that if one does not listen to the priest then he/ she will harm other people, and this connects with several of the previous laws and all of the ensuing laws that violations of the laws harm others.  Heinemann suggests that the connection with the previous laws is because the leper must leave his house and the camp. This is similar to the divorcee who leaves the house, 24:1, and contrasts with the husband in the first year of his marriage who cannot leave his house, 24:5. My guess is that the connection is based on the story of Yosef who is the only case in the Torah of a person being kidnapping and sold. 24:6 even uses the word your brother, and that the victim is made into a slave, just like what occurred to Yosef.  The law by leprosy refers to the case by Miryam who spoke badly about Moshe, and this brings to mind the case of Yosef who spoke badly about his brothers, Bereshit 37:2. 

The next law, 24:10-13, is that a lender cannot enter the borrower's house to seize a pledge, and if the borrower is poor and needs the pledge, then the lender must return the pledge at night. Heinemann and Rofe connect this law with the leprosy since here the lender has to stay outside the borrower's house, 24:11, just like the leper had to stay outside the camp, Vayikra 13:46.  

The next law, 24:14,15, is that a worker must be paid on time. Rofe notes that this law is connected with the previous law through the word shemesh, the sun. 24:13 records that the pledge must be returned by sundown, and 24:15 records that the worker must be paid by sundown.  

The next law, 24:16 is that judges (see Rashbam on 24:16) cannot inflict capital punishment on people for the sins of their relatives. Rofe notes that this law is connected with the previous law by the word chet, sin.  24:15 records that if a person does not pay his wages on time, then it will be accounted as a sin, and 24:16 records that each person is to be punished for his own sins.  

The next law, 24:17,18 is not to pervert the justice of the unfortunate people in society or to take a pledge from a widow. Rofe writes that this connects to the law to pay the worker's wages, 24:14,15, and to protect the poor person who borrows money, 24:10-13.  More likely, following the idea that 24:16 is referring to judges who cannot punish a person for another person's sins, then 24:16 connects with the beginning of 24:17 which records that judges are to judge all people equally.  

The next set of laws, 24:19-22 records that a person must leave over some of his crops, olives and grapes for the poor. This set of laws is connected through the almost identical motive statement to follow these laws in 24:18 and 24:22, and the reference to the stranger, orphans and widows in 24:17 and 24:19.  

The next law, 25:1-3, is that a person cannot be flogged more than 40 times (39 times according to accepted opinion in the Mishnah, Makkot 3:10).  Rofe notes the similarity between flogging and the harvesting of olives referred to in 24:20 since in antiquity (still today?) olives were harvested by beating the trees with long sticks. Another connection is that 24:16-18 was addressed to judges as is 24:1-3.  

The next law, 25:4, is that one may not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.  Rofe writes that the connection with the previous verse is that word used for muzzle, tachasom, also has the understanding of beating. My guess is that the connection is with the laws of 24:19-22 that one must leave over some of the crops for the poor, and 24:4 is telling us that one must also allow the animal to have some of the crops.  

The next law, 25:5-10, is that if a man dies without children, then the dead man's brother can marry the widow.  Rofe writes that this law connects thematically with the law of 25:1-3. 25:3 records that one cannot excessively flog a person since this would degrade the victim, and 25:9,10 records that if the brother of the dead man refuses to marry the widow then he is to be embarrassed. My guess is that 25:5-10 is also connected with 25:1-3 but through the word ben.  25:1 records that there is a fight ben, between people, 25:2 refers to the guilty persons in the strange way as a ben hacot, and 25:5 states that the law only applies if the dead man does not have a ben, son.  

The next law, 25:11,12, records that a woman should not improperly intervene in a fight.  Ibn Ezra (on 25:11) notes that the opening of the law is the opposite from the opening of 25:5, as 25:5 records, "if  brothers live together," while 25:11 records "if men fight together." Heinemann and Rofe also note the common word, together, in 25:5 and 25:11.  Rofe also adds that both in this case and by the brother-in-law who refuses to marry the widow, the women embarrass a man.  Furthermore, Eslinger (1984) notes that the end of 25:12, do not pity the woman, lo tachos, has the same sound as the prohibition to muzzle the animal in the law prior to yibbum, 25:4, lo tachasom.  In addition, Alter (p. 1002) notes that the case of 25:12 could be where the woman injuries the man's testicles. And, "if an impairment of reproductive function is involved, this would be grave, and would link this law to the concern for the continuation of man's name in the levirate marriage." 

The next law, 25:13-16, is that one must have accurate weights in order not to deceive people.  Rofe (1988b, p. 276) suggests that this law is connected with the previous law since the weights are stones, avanim, and this word is a double entendre for women's genitals, which then connects with the previous law where the woman grabbed the man's genitals, 25:11. (Rofe argues that this understanding of the word avanim also applies to Shemot 1:16.)  A different approach can be suggested based on Hoffmann's (1961, p. 481) insight that the law to have accurate weights is also recorded in Vayikra 19:35,36, and there too it serves as the last law in a series of laws.  The basis for the laws of false weights is the requirement to be honest in one's business dealings. When there were no coinage people paid for items by giving various amounts of metals such as gold, silver and copper, and then these metals had to be weighted. Correct weights and measures were an indication that a person was honest in his economic transactions, and this is a very suitable theme to conclude the law section. 

In addition, the last two verses of this section, 25:15,16 record, “You must have completely honest weights and completely honest measures, if you are to endure long on the soil that the Lord your G-d is giving you. For everyone who does things, everyone who deals dishonestly, is abhorrent to the Lord your G-d, (JPS translation in Tigay, 1966, p. 235).  Tigay (1996, p. 235) notes that these exhortations are “a fitting conclusion to the civil and criminal laws in the book of Devarim.” Thus, according to this possibility, this law of having accurate weights is not connected to the previous law, but is the law that ends law sections. 

The next and last law in parashat Ki Teitzei, 25:17-19, is for the Jewish people to wipe out Amalek. Alter (2004, p. 1003) quotes from Luzzatto (I did not see this in my commentary of Luzzatto) that this law is connected with the previous law since both laws involved deception, the false weights and Amalek's attack on the Jewish people, 25:18. Alter also notes that the word to remember Amalek, zekher, 25:19, "is strongly linked with zakhar, male," and the case of the levirate marriage was where there was no son, 25:5, and where the goal was to prevent a name from being lost, 25:6.  In addition, the word wipe out, timcheh, appears in both 25:6 and 25:19. 

My thought is that this law concerning Amalek begins a new section relating to the establishment of the covenant in chapter 28, and then from a thematic perspective the law is independent of the previous law on weights.

 
Bibliography:

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