Vayikra 27:2-8 – To give

Vayikra 27:2 records the case where a person donates money, shekalim, to G-d in lieu of him/ herself. The Torah then explains how much the person can donate based on the age and gender of the person, 27:3-7. We can make a table of these donations:

	20 years until 60 years	5 years until 20 years	One month until 5 years	60 years and up
Male	50 shekels	20 shekels	5 shekels	15 shekels
Female	30 shekels	10 shekels	3 shekels	10 shekels
Ratio	50/30= 1.66	20/10 = 2	5/3= 1.66	15/10 = 1.5

Note the term shekel here does not correspond to the modern day shekel. In the Torah the term shekel means a weight of silver, as money in ancient time was weights of metals, usually gold, silver or copper. The word shekel literally means to weigh and this term was/ is used for money since one had to weigh the metal to know what amount of metal a person had to pay for a good. Similarly, the term kesef in Modern Hebrew means both money and silver since in many places money was from silver. This is not unique in Hebrew, as for example the basic unit account of money in the United Kingdom is called pound sterling.

The list of shekels for the different ages and the differences between men and women raises several questions. Why do the donations change with the age of the person being “donated”? Why are there different values for a man and woman? Why should a woman give less than a man? Finally, why does the ratio between what a man gives and what a woman gives change slightly for the different ages? One would have thought that ratio would remain constant, which would mean the change in years would have equal impact on men and women.

Ibn Ezra (on 27:3) writes that the valuations are decrees of the Torah, meaning that they are laws which man does not know their reason. Nonetheless, many commentators have tried to explain these laws based on differences in the levels of skills or productivity of people, which in economics is referred to as human capital (see Kleiman, 1987). According to this approach, in reference to the age categories, the idea would be that a person is most productive between the ages 20 and 60, and hence this age category has the highest valuation. Furthermore, according to this approach, a person between the years 5 and 20 is more productive than a person 60 years and over and a person between one month and 5 years old a person is barely productive at all.

The human capital approach has also been used to explain the different values for men and women. Levine (1989, p. 193) writes, “Gender differentiation may be linked to productivity, it being presumed that a male could earn more than a female.” Similarly, Bulah (1992, p. 245, footnote 2) writes that the different values for men and women are based on the prices in the slave market!

Based on this idea of human capital, suggestions have also been made to explain the change in the ratio between male and females over the years. Rashi (on 27:9) quotes from the Talmud (Arakhin 19a) “that an old man in the house is a nuisance while an old woman is a treasure in the house.” Thus Rashi explains that a man loses relatively more value, human capital, when he is over 60 than a woman, and the ratio from the valuation of men relative to women drops from 1.6 to 1.5. Bekhor Shor (on 27:2) explains slightly differently, that a man’s human capital is based on his physical strength while a woman’s human capital is based on her skills and a man’s strength diminishes more rapidly than a woman’s skills.

While the human capital approach is appealing, it does not offer a complete explanation. For example, for the 5 until 20 age category, why does the man/ boy have a relatively higher donation than a woman/ girl? Is a five year old boy more productive than a five year old girl? Also, if the donation levels are based on productivity, then there should be different values according to the productivity of each person. With regard to this question, the Abravanel (2005, p. 328) answers that the Torah did not want to make differences between people since some people who would have a low valuation might feel bad. Yet, then why then should women have lower valuations than men, will they not feel bad? In addition, the human capital approach seems only to give credit to earnings potential but not to work at home. Also, was the earnings potential of men really exactly 50 shekels in the time of the giving of the Torah and how could the Torah fix the level of donations if over time due to increases in technology a person’s productivity could increase to be much more than 50 or 30 shekels? Finally, if the values are based on people’s earnings potential, is the Torah sanctioning that a woman should earn less than a man? With all these questions, even though I am an economist, I have to reject the human capital approach.

Instead of focusing on the different valuations, one can ask why did the Torah give these donation levels altogether? Why not let a person decide on his/ her own how much to donate in lieu of him or herself? The answer is that the Torah was trying to protect the giver. There is a danger that a person could donate such large sums of money that it could impoverish the person. If the person is donating money to G-d due to guilt or due to religious feelings, there could be cases where a person would feel that there is no amount of money that is too much. Bulah (1992, p. 247) points out that usually the value (earnings potential) of a person is much more than the levels specified in the Torah, and had the Torah not set limits a person would have had to donate more money. Thus, the valuation levels in the Torah is to set maximum levels that a person can donate in lieu of him or herself. Proof of this idea is that after the list of valuation levels, 27:8 records that if a person cannot afford the levels in the Torah, then the priest estimates what the person can afford and this lower amount is sufficient. This shows that really one can give less, but nobody can give more. This means that the donation levels in 27:3-7 are maximums levels.

The maximum levels are to ensure that a person is not impoverished by the donations, and the levels then are based on the person’s ability to pay. A person has the largest ability to pay during the ages 20-60, and accordingly this category has the highest donation level. After this category the level of donations drop significantly. The next highest level is from 5-20 years, where the donation by a man is 60% less than for the years 20-60. This is because the level of income is lower for this age group. For the 60 years and over age category not only is the income lower than for the 20 year until 60 years age category, but also there is less hope of future income so here the donation level is also lower than by the 5 years until 20 years age category. In the case of one month to 5 years, the person has no income at all, but as pointed out by Rashi (on 27:5) the person doing the donating is an adult who is donating based on a child. Presumably the person would be “donating” their children, and as one could “donate” many children, the Torah made the donation level the smallest again to reduce the possibility that one would become impoverished by many of these donations. This fear of a person being impoverished by these donations can also explain why the valuation rate for women is less than for men. Historically (and still today) women have earned less money than men, and would thus be less able to donate the same amount as men. Thus to protect women from their greater danger of becoming impoverished from the donations the Torah set a lower limit for women. Even if in the future women will have equal earnings with men, still the laws are for all time and had to protect women when they earned less.

The differences in the ratio of the donation levels of men and women over the years is because of the desire to have donations end with a 5 or 10. My guess is that the determining age group was the 20 years until 60 years age category since not only was this the first age category recorded in the Torah, but also these are the years when the donations are most likely to be made. Once the ratio was 5/3 in this group, then all the groups followed this ratio either exactly (the one month until five years age category) or closely. By the 5 years until 20 years age category, the woman’s donation should have been 12 shekels to maintain a ratio of 5/3 but the Torah set the value at 10 to have the donation level be at the round number 10. Similarly, by the 60 years and over age category group, the woman’s donation level should have been 9 to keep the ratio of 5/3 but again the Torah used 10 since this is a round number.

The last question would be why should the ratio be 5/3 for the age category of 20 years until 60 years? Here one can only surmise. Again to help women who have earned less money than men historically, the Torah set their donation levels lower than men, but the question is how much lower? If the ratio (man/woman) was 2 (for example 50/25), then one might have claimed (as the Abravanel did) that a woman’s value was half of a man’s. In order to negate this possibility, the Torah set a higher value to women and hence a lower ratio between men and women, and the next highest level based on the donation being a 5 or 10 digit was a ratio of 5/3 or 1.66 (50/30).

The structure of chapters 25 and 26 in the book of Vayikra and the four words of redemption in Shemot 6:5-8

Chapters 25 and 26 in the book of Vayikra can be divided into four sections based on the concluding sentences, 25:38, 25:55, 26:13 and 26:45 of each section. These verses have a amazing literary connection with Shemot 6:2-8.

Shemot 6:2 records that G-d spoke to Moshe and the second half of 6:2 through 6:8 record the contents of this conversation. 6:3-5 record four past verbs in reference to G-d and 6:5-8 records eight future verbs (seven based on vav ha-hipuch) in reference to G-d: "I will remember," I will take them out," I will save them," "I will redeem them," "I will take them," "I will be for them," "I will bring them," and "I will give them." Of these eight future verbs, the Yerushalmi (Pesachim 10:1, 68b) quotes R. Yochanon in the name of R. Biniyah(?) that four of them (take out, save, redeem and take) are the reason why we drink four cups of wine at the Seder, and these four words are referred to as the four words of redemption. Yet, why are only four verbs counted? Why are there not eight cups? Also, three of the four selected verbs, "I will take them out," "I will save them," and "I will redeem them" refer to the same action. If one is only counting the four selected verbs, then maybe there should have only been two cups of wine. It seems that these four verbs are a mnemonic to remember the four cups of wine, but not that they are the source of the four cups, see our discussion in our commentary on the Haggadah. 

I believe that a different four words of redemption or four verses can be identified in 6:2-8 through an analysis of the structure of chapters 25 and 26 in Vayikra. Vayikra 25 and 26 can be divided into four sections.

The first section is Vayikra 25:1-38, and refers to laws (yovel, shemitta) relating to the land. The section concludes with 25:38, “I am G-d who brought you out of the land of Egypt to give you the land of Canaan to be for you a G-d.” (Translations are based on Fox, 1995.)

The second section is from Vayikra 25:39-55, and records laws concerning slavery. This section concludes with 25:55, “For it is to me that the Children of Israel are servants, my servants are they, whom I brought out of the land of Egypt, I am G-d.”

The third section is Vayikra 26:1-13 and records the rewards for upholding the laws. This section concludes with 26:13, “I am G-d who brought you out of the land of Egypt from your being serfs to them; I broke the bars of your yoke, enabling you to walk upright.”

The fourth section is from Vayikra 26:14-45, and records the punishments for disobeying the laws. This section concludes with 26:45, “I will remember to their (benefit) the covenant of the former-ones whom I brought out of the land of Egypt, before the eyes of the nations, to be for them a G-d. I am G-d.”

Each of the four concluding sentences in Vayikra 25,26 have the common theme that G-d took the people out of Egypt. Also, the phrase "I am G-d " appears in each verse in the concluding sentences in Vayikra and in Shemot 6:6-8 the phrase appears in each verse. More so, 6:2 has the phrase, "I am G-d" and this verse is connected to 6:5 through the word "also" in the beginning of 6:5. Thus, one can divide G-d’s words from the second half of Shemot 6:2 through Shemot 6:8 based on the phrase “I am G-d,” into four ideas, 6:2-5, 6:6, 6:7 and 6:8, and this division accords with the concluding sentences of the sections in Vayikra 25,26.

The conclusion to the first section, Vayikra 25:38, refers to the fact that G-d gave (la-tet) the land of Canaan to the people, and this corresponds with Shemot 6:8, which records that G-d promised to bring the people to the land of their forefathers (Canaan) to give them (la-tet) the land.

The conclusion to the second section, Vayikra 25:55, refers to the idea that the people are G-d’s slaves (lee) and this corresponds to Shemot 6:7, which records that G-d will take the people to be G-d's nation (lee).

The conclusion to the third section, Vayikra 26:13, refers to the fact that G-d took the people out of slavery (me-heyot la-hem avadim) in the land of Egypt and this corresponds to the three verbs in Shemot 6:6, that G-d promised to free the people from the bondage in Egypt (me-avodatam).

The conclusion to the fourth section, Vayikra 26:45, refers to the idea that G-d would remember the covenant (ve-zacharti la-hem berit) and this corresponds to Shemot 6:2-5, which that G-d said that He will remember the covenant (va-ezkor et beriti). 

Not only are the themes identical, but the order of the sections of Vayikra chapters 25 and 26 has a chiastic structure with the verses Shemot 6:2-8. The conclusion to the first section, Vayikra 25:38, corresponds with Shemot 6:8. The conclusion to the second section, Vayikra 25:55, corresponds with, Shemot 6:7. The conclusion to the third section, Vayikra 26:13, corresponds with Shemot 6:6 and the conclusion to the fourth section, Vayikra 26:45, corresponds to the beginning of G-d’s statement to Moshe, Shemot 6:2-5.

The correspondence between Vayikra 25,26 and Shemot 6:2-8 shows in a literary manner that the passages from Shemot 6 and Vayikra 25,26, are all one unit.

In addition, as Vayikra 26 records the blessings and curses that seal the covenant, the correspondence between Vayikra 25,26 and Shemot 6:5-8 indicate that the purpose of the Exodus is the establishment of the covenant between G-d and the Jewish people.

Furthermore, the correspondence suggests that the four verses from Shemot 6:5-8 can be called the four verses of redemption. In terms of words or phrases, the four words or verbs would be: One, I will remember them (6:5). Two, I will take out, save and redeem them (6:6). Three, I will take them for me and will be for them (6:7) and four, I will bring and give them the land of Canaan (6:8). This division of the four promises of redemption differs from the usual understanding by the four cups since in the usual understanding all four words are from Shemot 6:6,7, while with this approach, Shemot 6:6 is counted once, and Shemot 6:5 and 6:8 are also included.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books

Vayikra 26:4-9 (Behukkotai) – A new utopia?

Within the blessings recorded in 26:3-13 it is interesting to examine some items that are not promised.

One, while 26:4,5 records that there will be enough rain and that the crops will be plentiful, the Torah does not state that the people would not have to work. On the contrary, the promise of sufficient rain means that the crops were going to grow in the normal manner, which requires the people to work. The Torah does not even state that the work will be easy, just that the crops will grow. Thus, the Torah was not promising a utopia and was not removing the "curse" told to Adam that work was going to be difficult, Bereshit 3:17.

Two, 26:5 records that the food would be sufficient that the people would be satiated, but there is no promise of great wealth. The Torah does not state that the people would have gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, and even spices (or oil). Again, we see that the Torah was not promising a utopia. The people would have to work to support themselves without easily finding treasures in the ground.

Three, 26:6-8 record that there will be peace in the land and that the people will easily be able to chase and kill their enemies. This last promise is quite surprising. It implies that that the people will have enemies and will have to continue fighting wars. The people are only promised that they will have peace within the country, but the borders can still be attacked. This is much less than the messianic idea in Yeshayahu (2:4) of universal peace.

Four, 26:9 records that the people would be fruitful and multiple. This would be the fulfillment of the covenant with the patriarchs, as stated in the verse, see Ibn Ezra. Yet, there is no mention of G-d removing sickness and stopping miscarriages, which was promised in Shemot 23:25,26. It could be that as the covenant that was being sealed in Vayikra 26 builds upon the covenant in Shemot 20-23, then the promise of good health of Shemot is also included in the blessings of chapter 26, see Ramban on 26:11. However, it could be that after the sin of the golden calf, the people lost the promises of no sicknesses and no miscarriages. With this latter possibility, again we see that the promises in Vayikra 26 did not envisage a new type of human existence. (The Ramban also claims that 26:6 indicates that there will be a new type of existence but the Rambam, Laws of Kings, 12:1 disagrees.)

Vayikra 26:1,2 - The last two verses of parashat Behar: Connected to parashat Behar or to parashat Be-hukkotai?

Vayikra 26:1,2, the first two verses in chapter 26 are the last two verses of parashat Behar, while the remainder of chapter 26 is part of parashat Behukkotai. While the division of chapters in the Torah was done by Archbishop Stephen Langton in the 13th century, are 26:1,2 more connected with parashat Behar or parashat Be-hukkotai? The underlying difficulty is that verses 26:1,2, which refers to improper worship (idolatry), the Shabbat and fear of the mikdash, do not seem to relate to the previous laws of Behar or to the following section in Be-hukkotai.

Most Jewish commentators follow the parasha division and connect 26:1,2 with Behar. For example, Rashi and Ramban (on 26:1, see also Ibn Ezra on 26:1) quote from the Sifra that the laws of 26:1,2 are connected to the slavery section since if a person is sold to a non-Jewish owner, he/ she might be tempted to adopt the practices of his owner. Hence the Torah reminds the slave that he/ she must follow the Torah even if he/ she is a slave to a non-Jew.  Yet, how much freedom do slaves have? Also, Zev Whitman (1987) questions these views since if the intent of the Torah was to tell us that a slave had to keep the laws then the Torah should have stated so explicitly. Furthermore, why are only these three laws mentioned if the slave has to keep all the laws?

A modern commentator, Baruch Schwartz (2004, p. 273) notes that 26:1 elaborates on 19:4 and 26:2 repeats 19:30, and hence he suggests that these verses, which relate to chapter 19, are concluding verses to the laws of Vayikra prior to the blessings and curses. Yet, even with respect to chapter 19, 26:1,2, at best only refer to two verses in chapter 19, which does not make them sufficient to be summary verses for the entire book of Vayikra or even just for chapter 19.

 

Hoffmann (1953, pp. 140-142) writes that the laws of 26:1,2 are the foundation for the covenant and hence he understands 26:1,2 to be related to Be-hukkotai and not Behar. Whitman develops this idea as he notes that the three laws mentioned in 26:1,2 are referred to in the section of punishments that these were laws the people violated, 26:34,35 – shemitta (Shabbat of the land), 26:30 – idolatry, and 26:31 – the mikdash. Furthermore, as 26:2 refers to the Shabbat, it can refer to the regular Shabbat or the shemitta year (see Ibn Ezra on 26:2). Thus, Whitman adds the law of the regular Shabbat to the group of three laws, and claims that these are the four basic laws of the covenant that had to be mentioned prior to the rewards and punishments of chapter 26. He further argues that 26:14 which records “that if one did not observe these laws,” refers to the four laws.

While this argument is appealing, Whitman notes (in footnote 5), that the lack of reference even by hint to the non-observance of the regular Shabbat in the punishments of chapter 26 is problematic. If Shabbat was such a basic law its non-observance should have been mentioned as the non-observance of his other basic laws are mentioned. To resolve this difficulty, he concedes that one could drop the regular Sabbath from the list. Also, notwithstanding his defense of these four laws as being the basis of the covenant, this seems like an unlikely group, as for example, what happened to the prohibition of murder? In addition, 26:14 seems to refer to all the laws as it parallels 26:3, which also seems to refer to all the laws and not just this group of four. According to his explanation, 26:3 should have stated “if you keep these laws.”

Instead of claiming that the laws of 26:1,2 are the basis for the covenant, perhaps one can make a more limited suggestion that, as pointed out Whitman, the references to shemitta, idolatry and the mikdash in the curses in chapter 26, correspond to 26:1,2, and this correspondence could be the reason why the Torah records 26:1,2 prior to the blessings and curses of the covenant in the remainder of chapter 26. Yet, even this claim is weak since 26:1 refers to three separate laws, not to make an idol, not to set up an idol and not to bow down either to images or even on a stone floor, and none of these laws correspond to the reference to idolatry in 26:30, which seems to refer to sacrifices to false gods. Similarly, the law in 26:2 is to be in fear when one is in G-d’s mikdash, while the “corresponding” verse in the curses, 26:31, is that G-d threatened to destroy the mikdashim of the people. Thus, the correspondence of 26:1,2 to the curses in 26:30,31 seems insignificant.

The structure of chapter 25 and 26 support the idea that 26:1,2 relate to parashat Be-hukkotai and not to parashat Behar. In our discussion on the structure of Vayikra chapter 25 and 26 and on Shemot 6:5-8, "The four words of redemption," we pointed out that chapters 25 and 26 of Vayikra can be divided into four sections, and each section has a concluding verse, which are 25:38, 25:55, 26:13 and 26:45. Once 25:55 is a concluding sentence then the following verses, 26:1,2, relate to other verses in the third section 26:3-13 (in parashat Be-hukkotai) and not to chapter 25.  Yet, still what is the connection?

Kochman (2002, pp. 201,202) notes several parallels between these verses and three of the first four statements in the Decalogue, and leaves as a question whether the two verses are a condensed conclusion to the laws of Vayikra (the connections with chapter 19) or an introduction to the ensuing blessings and cruses. My guess is that they function more as an introduction to the blessings and curses, and one can add more literary connections of these verses to the Decalogue.

The literary connection between 26:1,2 to the Decalogue at Mount Sinai begins with the previous verse, 25:55, which records that the Jewish people are G-d’s people, ki li, and this same phrase appears both in 25:23 and in Shemot 19:5, prior to the Decalogue. 25:55 then records that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt, and these words are part of G-d’s opening statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:2. 25:55 ends with the phrase, G-d is the G-d of the people, and while this is a common phrase, it appears in a similar form in the first statement of the Decalogue.

26:1 then begins by referring to the prohibition of making, taasu, an idol, and this same word, taaseh, with the same idea is part of the second statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:4. 26:1 then refers to the prohibition of setting up an idol, a pesel, and this word, pesel also appears in Shemot 20:4. 26:1 then refers to a prohibition of bowing, hishtachavot, and this word, tishtachveh, also appears in the second statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:5. The end of 26:1 again records that G-d is the G-d of the people, and the phrase appears in just a very slightly different form in the second statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:5. 

26:2 then refers to remembering the Shabbat, and this same idea, with a different word, zachor, appears in the fourth statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:8. Finally, the second half of 26:2 refers to the need for people to be in fear when they are in the mikdash, and after G-d stated the Decalogue, Shemot 20:17 records that Moshe told the people that a reason for the Decalogue was that the people would learn to fear G-d.

Note even if 26:1,2 are thematically related to parashat Be-hukkotai this does not imply that these verses should have been included in parashat Be-hukkotai. Occasionally, the narrative is interrupted with a division of the parashot because there is a desire to start a new parasha with a dramatic opening, as for example by parashat Mikketz and parashat Va-yigash. Thus, as 26:3 is a more dramatic opening than 26:1, it is more appropriate verse to begin a new parasha.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Kochman, Michael, 2002, in The World of the Bible: Vayikra, edited by Baruch Levine, Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, Divrei Hayamim, Sifrei Hemed.

Schwartz, Baruch J. 2004, Leviticus: Introduction and annotations, in The Jewish Study Bible, edited by Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203-280.

Whitman, Zev, 1987, Shemitta and the Mikdash, Megadim, vol. 3, pp. 9-20.