Most Jewish commentators follow the parasha division and connect 26:1,2 with Behar. For example, Rashi and Ramban (on 26:1, see also Ibn Ezra on 26:1) quote from the Sifra that the laws of 26:1,2 are connected to the slavery section since if a person is sold to a non-Jewish owner, he/ she might be tempted to adopt the practices of his owner. Hence the Torah reminds the slave that he/ she must follow the Torah even if he/ she is a slave to a non-Jew. Yet, how much freedom do slaves have? Also, Zev Whitman (1987) questions these views since if the intent of the Torah was to tell us that a slave had to keep the laws then the Torah should have stated so explicitly. Furthermore, why are only these three laws mentioned if the slave has to keep all the laws?
A modern commentator, Baruch Schwartz (2004, p. 273) notes that 26:1 elaborates on 19:4 and 26:2 repeats 19:30, and hence he suggests that these verses, which relate to chapter 19, are concluding verses to the laws of Vayikra prior to the blessings and curses. Yet, even with respect to chapter 19, 26:1,2, at best only refer to two verses in chapter 19, which does not make them sufficient to be summary verses for the entire book of Vayikra or even just for chapter 19.
Hoffmann (1953, pp. 140-142) writes that the laws of 26:1,2 are the foundation for the covenant and hence he understands 26:1,2 to be related to Be-hukkotai and not Behar. Whitman develops this idea as he notes that the three laws mentioned in 26:1,2 are referred to in the section of punishments that these were laws the people violated, 26:34,35 – shemitta (Shabbat of the land), 26:30 – idolatry, and 26:31 – the mikdash. Furthermore, as 26:2 refers to the Shabbat, it can refer to the regular Shabbat or the shemitta year (see Ibn Ezra on 26:2). Thus, Whitman adds the law of the regular Shabbat to the group of three laws, and claims that these are the four basic laws of the covenant that had to be mentioned prior to the rewards and punishments of chapter 26. He further argues that 26:14 which records “that if one did not observe these laws,” refers to the four laws.
While this argument is appealing, Whitman notes (in footnote 5), that the lack of reference even by hint to the non-observance of the regular Shabbat in the punishments of chapter 26 is problematic. If Shabbat was such a basic law its non-observance should have been mentioned as the non-observance of his other basic laws are mentioned. To resolve this difficulty, he concedes that one could drop the regular Sabbath from the list. Also, notwithstanding his defense of these four laws as being the basis of the covenant, this seems like an unlikely group, as for example, what happened to the prohibition of murder? In addition, 26:14 seems to refer to all the laws as it parallels 26:3, which also seems to refer to all the laws and not just this group of four. According to his explanation, 26:3 should have stated “if you keep these laws.”
Instead of claiming that the laws of 26:1,2 are the basis for the covenant, perhaps one can make a more limited suggestion that, as pointed out Whitman, the references to shemitta, idolatry and the mikdash in the curses in chapter 26, correspond to 26:1,2, and this correspondence could be the reason why the Torah records 26:1,2 prior to the blessings and curses of the covenant in the remainder of chapter 26. Yet, even this claim is weak since 26:1 refers to three separate laws, not to make an idol, not to set up an idol and not to bow down either to images or even on a stone floor, and none of these laws correspond to the reference to idolatry in 26:30, which seems to refer to sacrifices to false gods. Similarly, the law in 26:2 is to be in fear when one is in G-d’s mikdash, while the “corresponding” verse in the curses, 26:31, is that G-d threatened to destroy the mikdashim of the people. Thus, the correspondence of 26:1,2 to the curses in 26:30,31 seems insignificant.
While this argument is appealing, Whitman notes (in footnote 5), that the lack of reference even by hint to the non-observance of the regular Shabbat in the punishments of chapter 26 is problematic. If Shabbat was such a basic law its non-observance should have been mentioned as the non-observance of his other basic laws are mentioned. To resolve this difficulty, he concedes that one could drop the regular Sabbath from the list. Also, notwithstanding his defense of these four laws as being the basis of the covenant, this seems like an unlikely group, as for example, what happened to the prohibition of murder? In addition, 26:14 seems to refer to all the laws as it parallels 26:3, which also seems to refer to all the laws and not just this group of four. According to his explanation, 26:3 should have stated “if you keep these laws.”
Instead of claiming that the laws of 26:1,2 are the basis for the covenant, perhaps one can make a more limited suggestion that, as pointed out Whitman, the references to shemitta, idolatry and the mikdash in the curses in chapter 26, correspond to 26:1,2, and this correspondence could be the reason why the Torah records 26:1,2 prior to the blessings and curses of the covenant in the remainder of chapter 26. Yet, even this claim is weak since 26:1 refers to three separate laws, not to make an idol, not to set up an idol and not to bow down either to images or even on a stone floor, and none of these laws correspond to the reference to idolatry in 26:30, which seems to refer to sacrifices to false gods. Similarly, the law in 26:2 is to be in fear when one is in G-d’s mikdash, while the “corresponding” verse in the curses, 26:31, is that G-d threatened to destroy the mikdashim of the people. Thus, the correspondence of 26:1,2 to the curses in 26:30,31 seems insignificant.
The structure of chapter 25 and 26 support the idea that 26:1,2 relate to parashat Be-hukkotai and not to parashat Behar. In our discussion on the structure of Vayikra chapter 25 and 26 and on Shemot 6:5-8, "The four words of redemption," we pointed out that chapters 25 and 26 of Vayikra can be divided into four sections, and each section has a concluding verse, which are 25:38, 25:55, 26:13 and 26:45. Once 25:55 is a concluding sentence then the following verses, 26:1,2, relate to other verses in the third section 26:3-13 (in parashat Be-hukkotai) and not to chapter 25. Yet, still what is the connection?
Kochman (2002, pp. 201,202) notes several parallels between these verses and three of the first four statements in the Decalogue, and leaves as a question whether the two verses are a condensed conclusion to the laws of Vayikra (the connections with chapter 19) or an introduction to the ensuing blessings and cruses. My guess is that they function more as an introduction to the blessings and curses, and one can add more literary connections of these verses to the Decalogue.
The literary connection between 26:1,2 to the Decalogue at Mount Sinai begins with the previous verse, 25:55, which records that the Jewish people are G-d’s people, ki li, and this same phrase appears both in 25:23 and in Shemot 19:5, prior to the Decalogue. 25:55 then records that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt, and these words are part of G-d’s opening statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:2. 25:55 ends with the phrase, G-d is the G-d of the people, and while this is a common phrase, it appears in a similar form in the first statement of the Decalogue.
26:1 then begins by referring to the prohibition of making, taasu, an idol, and this same word, taaseh, with the same idea is part of the second statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:4. 26:1 then refers to the prohibition of setting up an idol, a pesel, and this word, pesel also appears in Shemot 20:4. 26:1 then refers to a prohibition of bowing, hishtachavot, and this word, tishtachveh, also appears in the second statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:5. The end of 26:1 again records that G-d is the G-d of the people, and the phrase appears in just a very slightly different form in the second statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:5.
26:2 then refers to remembering the Shabbat, and this same idea, with a different word, zachor, appears in the fourth statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:8. Finally, the second half of 26:2 refers to the need for people to be in fear when they are in the mikdash, and after G-d stated the Decalogue, Shemot 20:17 records that Moshe told the people that a reason for the Decalogue was that the people would learn to fear G-d.
Note even if 26:1,2 are thematically related to parashat Be-hukkotai this does not imply that these verses should have been included in parashat Be-hukkotai. Occasionally, the narrative is interrupted with a division of the parashot because there is a desire to start a new parasha with a dramatic opening, as for example by parashat Mikketz and parashat Va-yigash. Thus, as 26:3 is a more dramatic opening than 26:1, it is more appropriate verse to begin a new parasha.
Bibliography:
Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Kochman, Michael, 2002, in The World of the Bible: Vayikra, edited by Baruch Levine, Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, Divrei Hayamim, Sifrei Hemed.
Schwartz, Baruch J. 2004, Leviticus: Introduction and annotations, in The Jewish Study Bible, edited by Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203-280.
Bibliography:
Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Kochman, Michael, 2002, in The World of the Bible: Vayikra, edited by Baruch Levine, Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, Divrei Hayamim, Sifrei Hemed.
Schwartz, Baruch J. 2004, Leviticus: Introduction and annotations, in The Jewish Study Bible, edited by Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203-280.
Whitman, Zev, 1987, Shemitta and the Mikdash, Megadim, vol. 3, pp. 9-20.
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