Vayikra 1:1 – The terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Vayikra

When the Jewish people were living in the desert/ wilderness for forty years they constructed a special building which contained cultic furniture and had a surrounding courtyard. The Torah generally uses three terms to refer to the building and complex, the mikdash, mishkan and the ohel moed. I believe that most (all?) people understand the terms mishkan and ohel moed as being synonyms, which sometimes refer to just the special building and sometimes to the entire complex. In our discussion on Shemot 25:8,9: 27:21, “The terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Shemot,” I argued that in the book of Shemot, the term mikdash refers to special cultic furniture, the term mishkan refers to the walls of the special building and the first and maybe second covering of the walls, and the term ohel moed refers to the entire complex. I will now try to show that this identical distinction exists in the book of Vayikra.

The book of Vayikra begins, 1:1, by recording that G-d called to Moshe from the ohel moed. This verse continues the end of the Shemot 40:34,35 that the cloud of G-d filled the ohel moed, and my understanding is that the cloud of G-d was in the entire special complex. 1:1 then means that the voice of G-d called out to Moshe from the complex, and Moshe heard this voice when he was outside the entire complex. Possibly Moshe entered the complex after hearing G-d’s voice, but this is not recorded.

1:3 then records that the first stage in bringing a cow as an olah sacrifice is to bring the cow to the petach ohel moed, the entrance to the ohel moed. Which entrance? There are two possibilities. One, the opening to the courtyard from the special building, which is the popular opinion, or two, the opening to the courtyard from the area outside the complex. Note the opening to the courtyard from outside the complex is referred to as shaar ha-hatzer in Shemot 38:31 and Shemot 40:33, but this is the actual line that marks the opening, while the petach ohel moed would have some depth from the entrance towards the courtyard. While some verses, Shemot 26:36, Shemot 38:30 and Bemidbar 3:25, 4:25, suggest that the opening is from the special building to the courtyard, I think that Bemidbar 25:6 and 27:2 refer to the entrance from outside the complex.  In our discussion on the terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Shemot, we concluded that this entrance can refer to both places depending on the context. It is not clear which possibility is being referred to here in 1:3. An additional question, with regard to both of these possibilities, is how far into the courtyard from either direction does the term, entrance, refer to?

1:5 then refers to the outer altar that was petach ohel moed, and again this phrase could be referring to either of the two possible entrances mentioned above on 1:3. Note, since it is likely that the altar was in the middle of the courtyard (see picture in Sarna, 1986, p. 192), then the two possible entrances would be roughly equal distance from the altar.

3:2 refers to this entrance, petach ohel moed, by the slaughtering of a cow that is brought as a shelamim sacrifice. Again, this entrance could be either of the two places discussed on 1:3, though here my inclination is that the reference is to the entrance to the courtyard from the outside since otherwise there would numerous animals being killed immediately before the special building.

3:8,13 then refer to a new area, lifnei ohel moed, by the sheep and goat shelamim sacrifices. This area is most likely different than the petach ohel moed since it is labelled differently. Milgrom (1991, p. 209) argues that from Bemidbar 8:9,10 we see that the phrase lifnei ohel moed means outside the courtyard of the ohel moed, and that the phrase lifnei ha-Shem means in the courtyard. I agree with his point about the term lifnei ohel moed, but I think the phrase lifnei ha-Shem is not only the area in the ohel moed, but also the area near the ohel moed, as in 3:7. (One can even say that the whole world is considered as being lifnei ha-Shem.) Similarly, the phrase lifnei ohel moed in Bemidbar 3:7,38 seem to refer to the area outside the courtyard of the ohel moed.

4:4 records that when a priest, who had been anointed, accidentally sins, then he brings a bull to the petach ohel moed, which again can be the two possibilities we discussed on 1:3. 4:5,6 then record that the blood from the bull was to be brought to the ohel moed, where the priest would dip his fingers in the blood, and then sprinkle the blood on the parokhet within the special building. This bringing of the blood to the ohel moed, might imply that the ohel moed was just the special building, but if the ohel moed is the entire complex, then it includes the special building. Once 4:6 refers to the parokhet then we know where in the ohel moed, the entire complex, the priest was to sprinkle the blood. Note, it could be that the priest dipped his hands outside the special building and then entered the building with bloody fingers to sprinkle the blood. With either possibility of where the priest was to dip his fingers in the blood, the phrase to ohel moed in 4:5 is a movement from the petach ohel moed, that the priest moved either from the entrance to the special building to the special building or from the entrance to the complex to the main area in the courtyard or to the special building.

4:6 notes that the incense altar, which was in the special building, was located in the ohel moed, as the ohel moed refers to the entire complex. The verse ends by referring to the altar which was petach ohel moed, and this is similar to 1:5.

4:14 records the law when the entire congregation sinned by accident that the people are to bring a bull, lifnei ohel moed. As in 3:8,13, lifnei ohel moed is outside the complex, and this is very appropriate in this case since this would give more people the ability to see the elders, the representatives of the people, when they would lean on the bull, 4:15. 4:16 then records that the blood of the bull was to be brought to the ohel moed, which is similar to 4:5, though here the movement is more obvious since one is coming from the area outside the complex to the ohel moed, either to the special building or to the courtyard. 4:18 has two references to the ohel moed and is similar to 4:6.

The next reference is 6:9, which records that Aharon and his sons should eat the matzot of the minhah sacrifice in the courtyard of the ohel moed. The ohel moed is the entire complex, and the Torah is specifying where in the complex the matzot should be eaten. Similarly, 6:19 records that the priest who does the korban hatta’t eats part of the sacrifice in the courtyard of the ohel moed.

6:23 records that a hatta’t, whose blood is brought to the ohel moed to le-khapper the kodesh, cannot be eaten. This verse seems to refer to some of the cases of the hatta’t from chapter four. While one can understand the term ohel moed here as just referring to the special building, it can also be understood as referring to the entire complex, that a hatta’t, whose blood is brought into the complex to be used le-khapper the kodesh, i.e., to be sprinkled on the parokhet, cannot be eaten.

The next mention of one of the three terms is in 8:3,4 by the initiation of the priests, that the ceremony is to begin by the petach ohel moed, the entrance to the ohel moed. Again, as by 1:3, this could mean two different areas. My guess is that here the reference is to the entrance to the entire complex since the entire nation is to gather around the entrance and this could not be if the petach ohel moed is the entrance to the special building.

8:10 records the first mention of the mishkan in the book of Vayikra, as the verse records that Moshe anointed the mishkan and everything that was in it. This means that Moshe anointed the walls, and maybe the ceiling covering the walls of the special building. The phrase “everything that was in it” refers to the special cultic ritual items that were located within the walls of the special building.

Chapter eight concludes that Aharon and his sons were to cook and eat meat and bread from the sacrifices by the petach ohel moed and that they had to remain by the petach ohel moed for seven days, 8:31,33,35. While this phrase could be referring to the entrance to the special building since Aharon and his sons would have had to sleep in that spot this strikes me as not being respectful to the special building, and then my inclination is that the area being referred to in the verses is the entrance to the entire complex, which is where Aharon and his sons would have slept.

9:5 has the phrase, penei ohel moed, which is the first time this phrase appears in the Torah (also later in Bemidbar 17:8 and 19:4), and means in the direction of ohel moed, from outside of the entire complex. This cannot be referring to the courtyard of the complex since the entire congregation were standing in this place and they could not all fit in the courtyard.

9:23 then records that during the special ceremony of the eight day, Moshe and Aharon went into the ohel moed and then they came out. To understand this verse, one must ascertain where Moshe and Aharon were before they came into the ohel moed. Previously, Aharon had been in the courtyard working on the sacrifices, and then 9:22 records that he blessed the people. Was this blessing in the courtyard? If yes, then 9:23 must mean that Moshe and Aharon went into the special building. However, since the people were outside of the complex (see above on 9:5), it is more likely that when Aharon blessed the people, he went outside the complex to bless them, and then 9:23 means that Moshe and Aharon went into the courtyard area of the ohel moed, see our discussion on 9:22,23, “The double blessings by the ceremony of the eighth day.”

10:7 records that after the tragic deaths of Nadv and Avihu, Moshe told Aharon, Elazar and Itamar to remain in the petach ohel moed, which is similar to the law in 8:33,35.

10:9 then records that G-d told Aharon that he and his sons cannot drink wine when they are in the ohel moed. If a person thinks that the ohel moed means only the special building, then the priests would be permitted to drink wine in the courtyard of the ohel moed. This would seem to contradict the point of 10:10, the following verse, that the wine should not cause a priest to make a mistake by something which is kodesh. Rashi (on 10:9), who follows the idea that the ohel moed is just the special building, is uncomfortable with this implication that a priest could drink in the courtyard, and hence he quotes a drasha to negate this implication with regard to the outer altar. On the other hand, 10:9,10 accord very well with the understanding that the term ohel moed means the entire complex, and then the priests could not drink wine in any area in the complex.

12:4 records for the first time in the book of Vayikra, the term mikdash, that a new mother, cannot go in the mikdash even when she has tahor blood. I believe that the term mikdash means the collection of special cultic furniture, and then 12:4 is forbidding the new mother for going amongst these items. Maybe, the Torah did not use the word ohel moed since she was forbidden for going amongst these items, even if for some reason they were not being housed in the special complex.

12:6 then records that after the period of tahor blood is completed, the new mother is to bring a sacrifice to the petach ohel moed, which could refer to either of the two possibilities discussed on 1:3.

The phrase petach ohel moed appears next by the sacrifices of the metsora, 14:11,23, and then again by the sacrifices of the zav and zavah, 15:14,29. Again these verses can refer to either of the two possibilities discussed above on 1:3. However, my inclination is that there would be a goal to limit the number the people standing right in front of the special building, and then the reference to petach ohel moed in these verses would be to the entrance of the special complex from the outside.

The end of chapter 15, 15:31 records that the Jewish people were to be careful not to make G-d’s mishkan tamei. This is referring to the walls and covering of the special building and the area enclosed by the walls and the ceiling. The fact that the verse does not refer to the ohel moed indicates that the crucial problem of tumah in the complex is with regard to the special building and not to the courtyard.

The phrase petach ohel moed next appears by the selection of the goats in the ceremony on Yom Kippur, as the goats were to be brought petach ohel moed, 16:7. Again, this phrase could refer to either of the two possibilities discussed on 1:3.

Later in the ceremony, 16:16 records that Aharon was to kipper (purify?) the ohel moed. If one understands that the ohel moed refers just to the special building, then the verse means that Aharon was to sprinkle blood within that building, while if the term ohel moed means the entire complex, then 16:16 can mean that he was to sprinkle blood in the courtyard, see our discussion on 16:16-20, “Was the outer altar or the inner altar or both purified on Yom Kippur?”

The following verse, 16:17, records that no person was to be in the ohel moed when Aharon was in the kodesh, the inner room of the special building. If one believes that the ohel moed means just the special building, then 16:17 is stating that no one could be in the outer room of the special building when Aharon was in the inner room of the special building. I think this is obvious. Was a person going to be following Aharon when he was bringing the coals and blood into the inner room from the outer room? Also, with this understanding people could be in the courtyard when Aharon was going in the inner room, but then maybe a person in the courtyard could see the aron in the inner room when Aharon was going in, which is very dangerous, see Bemidbar 4:20. Instead, it is simpler to understand that when Aharon was in the inner room of the special building, no one could be in the entire complex until he completely finished needing to be in the inner room. This would remove the small possibility that a person could have seen the inner room from the courtyard when Aharon was going into the room. This would also mean that the people/ person watching the goat to be sent to Azazel would leave the complex until Aharon would need the goat in 16:20.

16:20,33 record that on Yom Kippur, Aharon’s action was to me-khapper the kodesh, the ohel moed and the altar. Depending on how one defines the term ohel moed in 16:16 determines how one understands the term ohel moed in these two verses, either the outer room of the special building or the entire complex.

16:23 then records that Aharon went to the ohel moed to change his priestly clothing. It is incredible to think that Aharon changed his clothing within the special building. Instead, Aharon had gone towards the exit of the complex or even left it to accompany the sending away of the goat to Azazel, and then in 16:23, he was to go in the courtyard in a relatively hidden place to change his clothing. 

16:33, a summary verse to the Yom Kippur ceremony, records that in the ceremony, the mikdash ha-kodesh was kipper. The term mikdash would refer to the aron, the special cultic furniture in the kodesh, inner room of the special building, as on Yom Kippur the high priest was to sprinkle blood on the kapporet, the cover of the aron and the base for the keruvim.

17:4,5,6,9 refer to the petach ohel moed, and again these verses could mean either possibility discussed on 1:3. 17:4 also refers to the mishkan, and here the idea is to the tent of G-d, which I understand means the walls and ceiling of the special building.

19:21 refers to the bringing of the asham sacrifice to the petach ohel moed, and, again, this could be referring to either possibility discussed on 1:3.

19:30 records that a person should fear G-d’s mikdash, and this means to fear (respect?) cultic items dedicated to G-d.

A reference to G-d’s mikdash appears in 20:3, and again it refers to the cultic furniture that is dedicated to G-d.

The next reference is that 21:12 records that a high priest cannot leave the mikdash to mourn for relatives since if he left, this would profane the mikdash. This means that he cannot leave the area where the special cultic furniture is situated since this would profane this furniture. A similar idea occurs in 21:23 which records a law not to profane G-d’s mikdash, and two of the special cultic items are mentioned in the beginning of the verse.

Skipping some chapters, 24:3, records that the menorah was to be lit outside the parokhet in the ohel moed. This designation outside the parokhet informs us where in the ohel moed, the entire complex, the menorah was to be lit, namely in the outer room of the special building.

Towards the end of the book of Vayikra, 26:2 refers to the mikdash of G-d, which again is to the cultic furniture, that people should fear the special furniture relating to G-d, similar to 19:30.

26:11 refers to G-d’s mishkan, as in 15:31, but here the verse appears to be referring to a future mishkan and not to the mishkan in the desert.

26:31 records how G-d will destroy the mikdash of the people if they sin, and here the reference is to the cultic furniture that the people made.

This concludes our review of the three terms, mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Vayikra, and we need to continue examining the terms in the books of Bemidbar and Devarim.

Bibliography:

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.

Sarna, Nahum, (1923-2005), 1986, Exploring Exodus, New York: Schocken Books.

A suggestion for the structure of the book of Vayikra

מה ענין שמיטה אצל הר סיני?

The book of Vayikra can be divided into three units, and the phrase behar Sinai, Mount Sinai, is a literary marker to these units. The phrase behar Sinai appears four times in the book of Vayikra, 7:38, 25:1, 26:46 and 27:34. By the second appearance of the phrase, Rashi (on 25:1) recorded one of his most famous questions, “What is the connection between shemitta (the laws in the beginning of chapter 25) and Mount Sinai?” My answer is that it is a literary way to mark the beginning of a new unit in the book of Vayikra.

The first unit in the book of Vayikra is from 1:1 to 7:38, and 7:38 records the phrase behar Sinai, which marks the end of the unit. The book of Shemot ended with the construction of the mishkan, and the first unit in Vayikra (chapters 1-7) records the laws of the sacrifices which were offered in the mishkan.

The second unit is from 8:1-24:23. This unit has a unique structure consisting of three cycles and within each cycle there are five themes. The five themes are separation, a connection of the people to the mishkan, a reference to G-d’s presence relating to the mishkan, a sin, and laws that are consequences of the sin and or are to amend for the sin. I will present the structure in a table and then I will explain the table.

Structure of the second unit of the book of Vayikra	Cycle 1: 8:1-10:20: Chapters 8-10	Cycle II: 11:1-17:16:  Chapters 11-17	Cycle III: 18:1-24:23:  Chapters 18-24
Separation = kedusha	8:1-36	11:1-47	18:1-21:24
Connection between the people and the mishkan	9:1-23a	12:1-15:33	22:1-23:38
G-d’s presence	9:23b,24	16:1-34	23:39-24:9
A sin	10:1-3	17:1-7	24:10-12
Laws that are consequences of the sin and or are to amend for the sin	10:4-10:20	17:8-16	24:13-23

The first cycle within the second unit is from 8:1-10:20. Chapter 8 records the initiation of the priests, which separated them from the general population, and made Aharon and his sons kadosh, 8:12,30. Also, within this ceremony, Moshe poured oil on various items in the mishkan, and was mekadesh the mishkan, 8:10,11,15. Afterwards, 9:1-23a records the ceremony of the eighth day, which was the dedication of the outer altar. This ceremony showed the connection of the people to the mishkan through the sacrifices of the people, 9:3,4, which were the main sacrifices in the ceremony, as the people brought more sacrifices than the priests. This section ends with Aharon twice blessing the people, 9:22,23a, which again shows a connection between the mishkan and the people. The culmination of the ceremony was that a fire came and burnt the sacrifices, and this fire showed G-d’s presence, 9:23b,24. 10:1-3 then records the sin of Nadav and Avihu, the sin of the first cycle. 10:4-20 then records laws relating to removing the bodies of Nadav and Avihu and how the priests were supposed to act after this tragedy. Within this section, 10:8-11 record laws that the priests are forbidden to drink wine in the mishkan, and this is conceptually related to the sin of Nadav and Avihu since when people become drunk, they do not follow the rules like Nadav and Avihu did.

The second cycle within the second unit is 11:1-17:16. Vayikra 11:1-47 focuses on the laws of eating, which is a type of separation of humans from animals and tumah relating to animals. This section ends, 11:44-47 with the statement that that people are to be kadosh and to make a separation between different animals, just as G-d has separated the people by taking the people out of Egypt. Afterwards, chapters 12-15 record the laws of tumah, but also the sacrifices of various individuals, the sacrifices of the new mother, 12:6,8, the sacrifices of the metsora, 14:10-31, and the sacrifices of the zav and the zavah, 15:14,15,29,30. 15:31 ends this section of tumah and taharah by warning the people not to defile the mishkan by their tumah, which connects the people with the mishkan. Chapter 16 then records the service of Yom Kippur, and the key element of the service was Aharon’s entry to the Holy of Holies, where he would be symbolically before G-d, 16:13,30. The beginning of Chapter 17 refers to people sacrificing to demons, 17:7, which is the sin in the cycle. Afterwards, there are laws relating to blood, which seems to relate to the sin of the people (see our discussion on 17:3-11, “Blood and demons”). The section ends with laws relating to nevelah and terefa, 17:15,16 since within the discussion of the sin of sacrificing to demons, there are references to slaughtering animals, 17:3,5.

The third cycle in the second unit of the book of Vayikra is 18:1-24:23. Chapters 18 and 20 refer to sexual misconduct, which relates to the idea of separation from different people, and form a bookend around chapter 19. Not only are the sexual prohibitions a form of separation, but the point of the laws is to separate the people from other nations, 18:3, 24-30; 20:24,26. 20:25 at the end of this sub-section, refers back to the separation of the animals, a theme of chapter 11, and this is because both sections embody the separation theme of their respective cycles. 21:1-24 continues the theme of separation with reference to the priests, with regard to who the priests can marry and a separation between priests with blemishes and priests without blemishes. Afterwards, 22:1-33, records general laws concerning the sacrifices, such as laws about the quality and status of animals that can be donated for sacrifices, and the sacrifices again show the connection between people and the mishkan. Note that within this section, 22:32 refers to kedusha, which is not a theme of this section, but the kedusha is in reference to G-d and not the people. 23:1-38 continues with the idea of connections between the people and mishkan, as this section records the bringing of sacrifices on the festivals. After the concluding verses of 23:37,38, there are more laws about the holiday of Sukkot, 23:39-44, but these laws do not relate to sacrifices. Instead, a central theme of these laws of Sukkot is for a person to celebrate before G-d, 23:40. The idea of being before G-d occurs again in 24:1-4, by laws relating to lighting the menorah, and by the laws of the lechem ha-panim, 24:5-9. Accordingly, 23:39-44, 24:1-4 and 24:5-9 all express the idea of being before G-d, which is the third theme in the cycle, a reference to G-d’s presence. Afterwards, 24:10-12 records the case of the blasphemer, which is the sin of the third cycle. Afterwards, 24:13-23 record laws that relate to the sin of blasphemy and the punishment of the person who sinned.

Within the three cycles of the second unit of the book of Vayikra, the presence of G-d in each cycle becomes less manifest, and correspondingly, the sin in each cycle also becomes less pronounced. Also, the cycles do not end with a sin, but with laws that relate to dealing with the sin. The point might be that while people inevitably sin, they can overcome their sin by following the laws. 

The third unit of the book of Vayikra is 25:1-27:34. As mentioned above, 25:1 begins the unit with the reference to behar Sinai, and the unit and the book of Vayikra ends with this phrase, 27:34. Within this unit, 25:1-26:45 can be divided into four parts based on the concluding sentences, 25:38,55; 26:13,45, see our discussion on Shemot 6:5-8, “The four words of redemption.” This section of 25:1-26:45 also concludes with the phrase behar Sinai in 26:46. The last chapter of Vayikra, chapter 27, is connected with chapter 25 since some of the laws in chapter 27 are dependent on the yovel year, 27:17,18,21,23,24, which is first introduced in 25:8-13.

Vayikra 3:16,17; 7:23-25 – The shelamim sacrifice: Fats, smoke and fire

Vayikra 3:17 records that in all places and in all times it is prohibited for a person to eat the helev, fat, of an animal and the blood of the animal. 7:23-25 repeats the prohibition of eating fat and adds more details regarding the prohibition: 7:23 explain that the prohibition is limited to three types of animals, ox (cows), sheep and goats, 7:24 explains that a person can use the fat of a nevelah and a trefah and 7:25 explains that the punishment for transgressing the law is karet. What is the definition of fat? Why is eating fat forbidden?

The Rambam (Laws of Forbidden foods, 7:5, see also Levine, 1989, p. 16) defines the forbidden fat as the fat on the inner organs that relate to the digestive track. This definition is from the context of verse 3:17 within the laws of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:1-16. Within the discussion of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:3,4,9,10,14,15, record that the fat of the kidneys, intestines, liver, stomach(?), from cows, sheep or goats which are offered as shelamim sacrifices is to be burnt on the altar. Thus, as the prohibition of eating fat is recorded at the end of the laws of the shelamim sacrifices, it is reasonable that the prohibition of fat is referring to the fat mentioned by the laws of sacrifices. This connection is strengthened since 7:23-25 explains that the prohibition of eating fat is only by animals that can be offered as a sacrifice, and this implies that the definition of the fat that is prohibited is related to the fat by the sacrifices.

Why is eating fat of cows, sheep and goats prohibited? The Rambam (Moreh 3:48, Maimonides, 1963, p. 598) explains that the prohibition is for health reasons that "the fat of the intestines makes us full, spoils the digestion and produces cold and thick blood." Ignoring the factual question of whether fat is medically bad, it is unlikely that this was the reason for the prohibition. From 7:25, we learn that a person can eat fat from animals that are not able to be sacrificed. Why would the Torah only forbid a person from eating unhealthy fat from some types of animals and not others?

Hoffmann (1953, p. 123, on 3:17, see also Alter, 2004, p. 555) notes that the prohibition of fat has to be related to the sacrifices, and he explains that the prohibition is because what is offered as a sacrifice cannot be eaten as a fear of G-d. Levine (1989, p. 45) varies this slightly. He explains that the prohibition of fat is a gezirah, "a fence around the law. Once the fat of sacrificial animals was forbidden, the fat of all pure animals was forbidden as well, whether or not the animals in question were actually sacrificed." Yet, by the olah sacrifice, the entire animal is sacrificed, and still the meat of animals is permitted to be eaten? Even in reference to the shelamim sacrifice, the kidneys, which are offered on the altar, 3:4,10,15, can be eaten by non-sacrificial meat. Why was there no gezirah by the kidneys? Why was the fat of animals that are sacrificed so important that even the fat by animals that are potential sacrifices but are not brought as sacrifices also forbidden to be eaten?

My guess is that the fat is the crucial part of the shelamim sacrifice, and other sacrifices, while the meat in the sacrifices is incidental. Thus, the shelamim sacrifice was essentially an offering of the fat of the animal as almost no meat except the kidneys was offered on the altar. (Maybe the kidneys were offered due to the difficulty and/ or time needed to remove the fat from them.)

The fat is the crucial part since this is what makes the sacrifice into a smoke (3:5,11,16 and 7:31) and/ or a "fire offering," 3:3,5,9,11,14,16. 6:5 refers to putting wood on the fire but this was just to keep the fire going or to start it, as during the day it was the fat that the was principle combustible item in the sacrifices. The smoke from the fat recalls the image of the cloud of G-d (Shemot 13:21,22) and fire from the fat is the imagery of glory of G-d (Shemot 24:17). Thus, 3:16 records that all the fat is to G-d since the fat is what generated these symbols of G-d. Maybe the imagery was for a person to realize that the sacrifice he/ she was offering was to G-d and not to some demons.

Once fat had this important role by the sacrifices to create an image of the cloud/ fire of G-d, then the Torah instituted a gezirah (“fence”) with regard to the animals that potentially could be brought as sacrifices but were not offered as sacrifices that it was forbidden to eat the fat of these animals. This gezirah was limited in several ways. One, the fat from an animal that could not be brought as a sacrifice since the animal had become a nevelah or a trefah could be used though not eaten, 7:24, and two, the fat of an animal that could not be offered as a sacrifice was permitted to be eaten, i.e. no double gezirah. Finally, even though the oil by the minhah sacrifices (2:1,4-7,15, and Bemidbar 5:15) probably had a similar role in creating smoke and fire by the minhah sacrifice, no gezirah was instituted on all oils, possibly since oil was not intrinsic to the minhah sacrifice unlike the fat which was intrinsic to the animal being sacrificed.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Maimonides, Moses, 1963, The Guide to the Perplexed (Moreh Nevukhim), translated by Shlomo Pines, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vayikra 1:9 – How can one understand sacrifices in the Torah?

Vayikra 1:9 records that an olah sacrifice has a pleasing smell, re-ach nichoach,  to G-d. This phrase occurs repeatedly in the Torah in reference to sacrifices. As noted by the Ibn Ezra (on Bereshit 8:21), this phrase does not mean that G-d actually smells the sacrifices, but rather it is a figurative expression that G-d approved or is happy with the sacrifice. This positive view of sacrifices is very difficult for modern sensibilities, even for those of us who are not vegetarians. Even though we kill animals to eat them, which means that for us non-vegetarians we see nothing immoral in killing animals, still why would G-d want people to kill animals as part of their worship of Him? What is the reason for sacrifices and does the Torah view them positively?

Menachem Kasher (1992, Torah Shelemah, additions to parashat Vayikra) quotes the Rama (16th century, Krakow) who presents 12 reasons for sacrifices. The first reason is from the Kuzari (see also Everett Fox 1995, p. 507, who quotes Smith 1927) that the sacrifice connects the giver with G-d through the food. Apparently, the idea is that the sacrifices are a shared meal that joins man with G-d as any regular meal joins people together. I find this difficult since there is no action of G-d by the sacrifices, and as Ehrlich (1900, p. 168) points out the sacrifices are eaten before G-d but not with G-d, see Shemot 18:12.

Reasons #2 and #8 are that sacrifices show a denial of idolatrous beliefs. Rambam (Moreh 3:46) writes that people used to worship sheep, goats and oxen, and hence he suggests that we are commanded to sacrifice these animals to show that we deny any divinity to these animals. (The Rambam does note that as these species are domesticated they are easy to obtain.) Ramban (on Vayikra 1:9) disputes this idea since then the point of sacrifices is only to deny beliefs of foolish people who worshipped the animals. Furthermore, sacrificing the animals is not a denial of the divinity of the animals but a form of honoring the animals. If the Rambam was correct, then we should just eat the animals. Ramban also points that one cannot claim that sacrifices are a “pleasant smell” because they show a denial of idolatrous beliefs since when Noah and Hevel offered their sacrifice nobody else existed, and the Torah records that G-d approved of their sacrifices, Bereshit 4:4, 8:21.

The 3rd reason is the juridical approach. Ramban (on 1:9, apparently quoting Ibn Ezra) writes that when a person pours blood on the altar one should think that he sinned to G-d and really his blood should have been poured on the altar. With this idea, it is G-d's kindness to spare the person and take the sacrifice instead. Yet, Hoffmann (1953, Introduction to Vayikra) points out that some sacrifices were not animals. Also, not all sacrifices were for sins and even when the sacrifices were due to sins the person was not supposed to die for their sins even had there been no sacrifice.

A variation on the 3rd reason is reason #11, that the sacrifice redeems or expiates a person from sins that did not entail cardinal punishment. Bekhor Shor (on Shemot 30:1 and Vayikra 2:13) suggests a further variation that the sacrifices show a person that he has been forgiven for his sins and this stops a person from sinning further. If there had been no sacrifices, then a person might have become discouraged and say, “well I have sinned already what harm is there in sinning again.” Yet, again this rationale of expiation might be applicable when the sacrifice is brought for sins but as pointed out by Hoffmann many sacrifices were not due to sins.

The 4th and 5th reasons are that sacrifices are to stop people from sinning because either the cost of the sacrifice is a financial penalty (#4) or because when one sees the dead animal one realizes how precarious is one’s own life (#5). The problem with reason #4 is that again many sacrifices are not based on sins, most sins do not require sacrifices, and even when sacrifices are due to sins many times they can be brought cheaply, as in Bemidbar 5:15. The problem with reason number five is any non-animal sacrifice and whether seeing a dead animal will really inspire a person to question the point of life. I have been told that for people who are accustomed to seeing blood and guts, the sight of the sacrificed animal would have no impact on them.

The 6th reason is that the sacrifices give a livelihood to the priests. Yet, while this is a result of the sacrifices, it is unlikely to be the reason for the sacrifices since there could have been just donations to the priests, like by the Levites.

The 7th reason is that the fire of the altar destroys the evil inclination within the person sacrificing the animal. How this happens is completely unknown to me.

The 9th and 12th reasons are that the sacrifices lead a person to a further dedication to G-d. I think the idea is that going through the whole process leads one to dedicate himself to G-d. Yet, is this different than other commandments? Maybe sacrifices are a particularly lengthy and physical process.

The 10th reason is Kabbalistic that the sacrifice is a process that unites the divine powers, the Sefirot, see Ramban on 1:9, "the true reason." After recording these 12 opinions the Rama adds a 13th opinion based on a connection with the creation of the world that is also mystical.

Hoffmann (1953, Introduction to Vayikra, pp. 59-67) presents a shorter list of four reasons for sacrifices. One approach is the “rational” approach of the Rambam (Moreh 3:32, also see Luzzatto on Vayikra 1:1). The Rambam writes that really G-d does not want there to be sacrifices, but when the Torah was given the people were so accustomed to religion involving sacrifices that G-d allowed for there to be sacrifices. With this idea, sacrifices do not appear to have any positive value, but the Rambam (Moreh 3:46) believes that there is some positive value to sacrifices since, as mentioned above, he thinks that they can eradicate idolatrous beliefs. Hoffmann rejects this approach since he claims it has no support in Chazal, though the Rambam (Moreh 3:32) argues that his view is supported by the prophets and by some Midrashim. (Maybe there is even a proof from the Torah for this idea, see our discussion below on 10:16-20, "An argument for the sake of heaven,"  https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2015/03/vayikra-1016-20-shemini-argument-for.html)

A second approach is anthropological that sacrifices are to propitiate G-d by giving G-d gifts. Hoffmann rejects this approach since the most important part of the sacrificial process was the sprinkling of the blood on the altar, and not the offering of the sacrifice itself. Also, G-d does not need our gifts.

The third approach is the juridical approach, mentioned above.

The fourth approach is the symbolic approach that the sacrifices symbolize a dedication to G-d, which corresponds to approaches nine and twelve above. Hoffmann argues that this approach can be seen in the sacrifices brought prior to Mount Sinai by Hevel, Noah, Avraham (the akedah) and Yaakov, that Hoffman suggests that each person was showing his belief and dedication to G-d. Hoffman argues that an oral dedication is not enough since actions are needed to show that the dedication is sincere. Yet, why is there a need to kill an animal to show a sincere dedication as opposed to some other action?

My guess is that to understand sacrifices, we need to understand the phrase "a pleasing smell" in 1:9. The phrase "a pleasing smell" connotes a good thing, but the use of the imagery of one of the senses, smell, suggests the idea of temporariness as senses give a temporary sensation but then are absent when the cause of the sensation is gone. Smells might be the least permanent of the senses since even when the cause of the smell is present, smells dissipate. This imagery of a "pleasing smell" then suggests that the sacrifices have at best a temporary effect on the person and/ or on G-d's view of the person.

What is this temporary effect? Here we enter the realm of speculation, but following the Rambam's approach (Moreh 3:32), in olden times, sacrifices were how people thought they were connecting to and establishing a relationship with G-d, and hence G-d allowed sacrifices since people then could not conceive of having a religion without sacrifices. The act of offering the animal was considered as giving something to G-d, and this gave the person bringing the sacrifice a feeling of being connected to G-d. The phrase a "pleasing smell" is then G-d's recognition that the person is offering the sacrifice to get close to and to worship Him, and hence the sacrifice is viewed positively. Yet, due to the temporary effect of the sacrifice, the sacrifice has no value in itself and the person is not considered intrinsically better or more religious since he/ she offered sacrifices. For example, I doubt that G-d decided not to curse the world again after the flood just because Noah offered sacrifices when he left the ark, Bereshit 8:21. However, when Noah offered sacrifices, this action was viewed positively by G-d since G-d knew that Noah was offering the sacrifices to thank G-d for saving him and his family from the flood. (This idea would be similar to reason number one of the Rama, though I doubt that people thought they were sharing food with G-d, and number four of Hoffmann, but it minimizes the value of the sacrifice.)

This idea would apply to the korban olah, to the minhah, which was a poor man's olah, and the shelamim sacrifices. It also could apply to a person who brings a sacrifice when he/ she sins accidentally, and who needs to "re-connect" with G-d, 4:31. This idea does not apply to the korban pesach, which is a re-enactment of the first korban pesach in Egypt. In Egypt, the offering was necessary to get the blood to put on the doorposts, and the subsequent sacrifices are to remember that offering. Possibly for this reason, the phrase "a pleasing smell" is never used in reference to the korban pesach since the bringing of this sacrifice is viewed positively forever.

Bibliography:

Ehrlich, A. 1990, Hamiqra Kifshuto, Berlin: Poppelauer.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Smith, Robertson, 1927, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, 3rd edition, New York: Macmillan

Vayikra 5:21,22 (Vayikra) – False claims, gezel and genevah

Vayikra 5:21,22 record, "When a person sins and commits a trespass against G-d by dealing deceitfully with his fellow in the matter of a deposit or a pledge, or through robbery (gezel), or by defrauding (oshek) his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it, (JPS translation in Levine, 1989, p. 33)" and then admits his guilt, he has to restore the item plus pay a 20% penalty and bring a korban asham, 5:23-26. (Note oshek, defrauding is usually understood to mean that the person did not hand over wages he had promised to pay.)

The case of 5:21,22 seems to be that initially the guilty person swears that he/ she is the owner of the particular item and as the claim cannot be disproved, the guilty party is able to possess the disputed item. Afterwards the guilty party comes forward and admits his/ her crime based on the different possible actions listed in the verses (see Rashi on 5:22,23). The person then has to bring a sacrifice since he/ she swore falsely, return the item and pays a 20% penalty. The fine is less than the usual penalty of 100% when one does not admit to one's guilt (Shemot 22:3,6-8).

One curiosity about this list of criminal actions in 5:21,22 is that the list does not include theft. Milgrom (1991, pp. 335,336) follows Chazal's distinction between theft and robbery, that theft is committed secretly while robbery is done openly with force (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, 348:3 and 359:7), and suggests that theft is not included since the thief is unknown so he/ she cannot swear. Milgrom notes that there are some cases where the thief is known, but he claims that the beginning of 5:24 refers to "anything else," which covers "the limited cases of theft wherein the identification of the alleged thief does take place."

Westbrook (1988, pp. 17-22) rejects this approach since the finder of a lost item is included in the list, but the finder of a lost item is also not always known. The Torah could have listed the case of theft where the thief is known just like it does by the finder of the lost item.

Another question of the list of five criminal offenses is gezel. The other four actions (deposit, pledge, defrauding and finding a lost item) are similar that the guilty person legally obtained possession of the items, which allows the person to make his/ her initial claim that he/ she is the true owner of the disputed item. On the other hand, gezel, robbery, seems to be completely different. The crook forcibly obtained possession of the item, which seems to preclude him/ her from being able to claim ownership of the item. This incongruity suggests that the term gezel needs to be re-defined.

Buchler (1928, p. 378) reviewed the word gezel in all of Tanakh and concluded, "It seems that both robbery (gezel) and oppression (oshek) were acts of injustice supported by the application of some law and legal claim, the one a legal appropriation of the helpless man's produce or field or house on a judgment of the court of justice, the other an exaction of money or a pledge, or the cheating of a helpless hired servant of his wages on some justification advanced." As to why theft is not recorded here, Buchler (p. 375) writes, "robbery seems to include theft, and any form of a dishonest removal of the neighbor's property." Westbrook (p.16) rejects this approach since the definition of gezel "becomes impossibly wide,… one wonders what function is left to theft."

Westbrook (pp. 23-38) writes that "gezel always involves the taking away of property," but as opposed to theft, it also involves an abuse of power. "The victim has little chance of obtaining redress from the robbers through the normal judicial process since a member of the establishment wrongfully takes advantage of his office or economic power in order to take property from the poor and the weak." He explains that the penalty here of gezel (20%) is less than by theft (100%) since here eventually the guilty person confessed, and the lower penalty is to encourage people to confess. He writes that theft is not included in the criminal actions in 5:21,22 either because the list is not exhaustive or because the case involves pillars of the community who can abuse their power, while thieves lack this power.

Westbrook's approach is too specific. The case here is not only by "pillars of the community" who can abuse their power, but refers to anybody who can claim in court that the item in question is his. I would vary Buchler's and Westbrook's suggestions.

Following Buchler, the term gezel in the Torah is the case where one steals an object, whether violently or not, and then claims to be the rightful owner of the object. Gezel is included in 5:21,22 because it involved a claim of ownership which enabled the person to swear falsely, and the common denominator of all the offenses int the verses is that the guilty party initially claims that he/ she is the true owner of the disputed object. On the other hand, theft, genevah, is when a person takes an item but is unable to make a claim of ownership since the owner of the item is able to prove that he/ she indeed is the rightful owner, and hence the thief has to pay a fine of 100%. The thief cannot swear and/ or his/ her swearing is irrelevant, and hence the case of theft is not included in 5:21,22. I believe this understanding of the words gezel and ganav, is supported by the various instances where the terms appears in the Torah.

Bereshit 21:25 records that Avraham accused Avimelekh's servants of gezel, that they stole his well. After this accusation, Bereshit 21:30 records that Avraham gave sheep to Avimelekh as proof that he dug the well. The insinuation of the gift is that the ownership of the well was in dispute, and this would explain Avraham's use of the term gezel that Avimelekh's servants had claimed ownership of the wells.

Bereshit 31:27-31 records that Lavan accused Yaakov of theft, (also 31:20,26), of both his daughters and his gods and then Yaakov stated that he was afraid that Lavan was going to steal, gazel, his wives (Lavan's daughters) from him. Seforno (on Bereshit 31:31) explains that this verse is based on Bereshit 31:43 where Lavan claimed his daughters as his possession. Buchler notes that in Bereshit 30:26 Yaakov asked Lavan for permission to leave and take his wives and his children even though he already worked for them. This suggests that Lavan still had some claim over his daughters and his grandchildren, and this is what Yaakov referred to in Bereshit 31:31.

Lavan used the word ganev since it was obvious to him that he was the "owner" of his daughters and of his gods, that Yaakov could not make any claim on them. However, from Yaakov's perspective Lavan was the crook, and as Lavan was going to claim ownership of Yaakov's wives, this was a case of gezel.  Note in 31:39, Yaakov used the word ganev by other people who would have stolen Lavan's sheep, where Lavan could have proven ownership of the sheep.

Bereshit 44:8 records the word, ganev, by the brothers "theft" of Yosef's cup since they could make no claim of ownership of the cup, and the brothers did not try to claim ownership of the cup.

In the Decalogue (Shemot 20:13 and Devarim 5:17) the word ganev is used since this is the more common case, where the victim can prove that he is the owner of the item. Similarly all cases of kidnapping (Bereshit 40:15, Shemot 21:16, Devarim 24:7) use the term ganev, as the thief cannot claim ownership of the victim. Shemot 21:37, 22:1,6,11 all use the word ganev since these are the common cases where the owner can prove he owns the animal, and this is why the thief pays at least double the value of the stolen animal.

Vayikra 19:11-13 refers both to genevah and to gezel. 19:11 records the case  where one stole, ganev, and cannot prove ownership of the time, but the person lies anyway. (If the verse had recorded the word gezel, then the continuation of the verse, not to lie, would have been tautologous since gezel involves a false claim.) 19:13 records the word gezel in conjunction with oshek (as in 5:21) and withholding wages, as in both cases the guilty person has some claim to the item.

Devarim 28:29,31 record the word gezel in reference to several curses. Devarim 28:29 records a curse that a person will feel hopeless like the person who had been gazul, since by gezel the guilty party claims ownership of the item, and the rightful owner has no hope of getting the item back, unless the crook confesses, as in 5:23. Yet, by the case of genevah, the crook can still have hope as he/ she can prove his/ her ownership of the item. Similarly, Devarim 28:21 records a curse that a person's donkey will be stolen (and the thief might claim ownership of the animal), but the crucial point is that the person has no hope of getting it back, which is the case of gezel.

(In Tanakh, see Buchler above, the idea of gezel also seems to be that the crook claims ownership of the item and hence the victim has no hope. For example, Yechezkel 32:15 calls on the crook to return the gezel since the victim cannot prove ownership of the item. Mishle 22:22,23 says not to legzal as G-d will help the victim, as once the crook can claim ownership the victim cannot win in court, see also Tehillim 35:10. Kohelet 5:7 uses the word gezel in conjunction with perverting justice since the gezel involves the false claim of ownership which is a perversion of justice.)

 

Accordingly, my understanding is that gezel involves stealing and claiming ownership while by theft the crook cannot make a viable claim of ownership to the item. Following Westbrook, to encourage the crook to confess, by gezel the penalty is reduced to paying a 20% fine, but if the rightful owner can prove his ownership then the crook would pay at least a 100% fine. In addition, if the crook swears falsely to back his/ her false claim of ownership then he/ she has to bring a korban asham when he/ she confesses. 

Bibliography:

Buchler, A. 1928, Studies in sin and atonement in the rabbinic literature in the 1st century, London: Oxford University Press.

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.

Westbrook, Raymond, 1988, Studies in biblical and cuneiform law, Cahiers de la revue Biblique, 26, Paris: J. Gabalda

 

Vayikra 2:11 – Devash in the Torah: Bee honey, dates or fruit juices?

Vayikra 2:11 records that “no minhah sacrifice that you offer to G-d shall be made with leaven (hametz), for no se'or or devash may be turned into smoke as an offering by fire to G-d (JPS translation in Levine 1989).” This verse means that the minhah sacrifice, which was a grain sacrifice, could not contain devash. Today the term devash means honey from bees, but is that its meaning in the Torah?

Rashi in his comments on Shemot 13:5 explains that devash means the juice that comes from dates and figs, and in his comments on Vayikra 2:11 he writes that any juice from a fruit is called devash. (Rashi on Eruvin 4b, rov, writes that the word devash in the Torah always means juice from dates.) 

Ibn Ezra (on 2:11) notes that many understand the word devash as juice from dates, and he believes that this definition has support from the book of Ezra. Nahum Sarna (1986, p. 47) notes that the term devash corresponds to the Arabic words dibs, which means syrup from grapes and dates. Devash is also listed as one of the seven species of the land of Israel in Devarim 8:8, and Tigay (1996, p. 94) in his comments on the verse, writes that, "since this verse is a list of agricultural products, devash must refer to the nectar of dates and figs."

A different definition is that devash means dates, see Rashbam on 2:11. Rambam (Laws of Blessings 8:1) writes that dates are considered as being one of the seven species, while devash is not. This means that one recites the blessing meayen shalosh after eating dates, but not after eating honey from bees. We see that the Rambam is following the interpretation that the term devash in the Torah is dates, and then dates are part of the seven species, while honey from bees is not one of the seven species even though today it is called devash, see Mishnah Berurah 208:1. (Encyclopedia Talmudit 7:195 notes that by the time of Chazal the word devash was understood to mean bee honey, see Mishnah Nedarim 6:9.)

There are some interpreters who understand devash to also refer to bee honey. Hoffmann (1953, comments on 2:11) notes that Philo thought that the word devash in Devarim 8:8 means bee honey, but he thinks that devash must be dates since dates were such an important fruit in Israel that they had to be included in the verse. Rabinowitz (1977, p. 137, see also Levine, 1989, p. 12) writes, "that while in the biblical period, devash was essentially the juice extracted from fruit (not necessarily from dates), it was primarily the juice of dates, although bee honey is also included." His reason for including honey from bees is from the story of Shimshon's riddle, Shoftim 14:8, and not from the Torah.

The Rambam (Mishnah Torah, Laws of prohibitions of the altar, 5:1) records that the prohibition of 2:11 is when the devash is added to any sacrifice or when the devash itself is offered as a sacrifice. The Mishnah Le-Melekh (Judah ben Samuel Rosanes, 1657-1727, Turkey) in his commentary on the Rambam notes that the Rambam did not define the term devash. (Was he relying on his ruling in Laws of blessing 8:1?) The Mishnah Le-Melekh quotes the Raah (?), that devash has to be juice from fruits and not bee honey since the following verse 2:12 seems to refer to devash as an offering of first fruits (which is not placed on the altar) and honey from bees cannot be considered a first fruit.

In addition to recording the prohibition of placing devash on the altar, 2:11 also records the prohibition of putting se’or on the altar, and states that the minhah sacrifice cannot become hametz. This conjunction implies that se’or and devash are forbidden since they could cause the grain of the sacrifice to become hametz, see Ibn Ezra on 2:11. This would means that devash ferments, just like se’or, but the Talmud (Pesachim 35b, see also Shulchan Arukh Orah Chayyim 462:1, though see Rashi on Pesachim 36a) states that fruit juices do not ferment. However, the Shulchan Arukh 462:2 writes that fruit juices with water speeds up the fermentation process. The Torah does not refer to any water being offered as part of the minhah sacrifice, but maybe the prohibition is that nothing is to be added to the minhah that might possibly enhance the fermentation process.

This question how to define devash also relates to our understanding of the phrase “a land flowing with halav (milk) and devash,” Shemot 3:8. Does the phrase mean milk and bee honey, milk and dates, milk and the juice of dates or milk and the juice of all fruits?

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society

Rabinowitz, Louis Isaac, 1977, Torah and Flora, New York: Sanhedrin Press.

Sarna, Nahum, (1923-2005), 1986, Exploring Exodus, New York: Schocken Books.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society