Vayikra 16:7-10 record that as part of the service,
avodah, on Yom Kippur, Aharon, the high priest, would take two goats and by lottery choose one for/ to G-d and one for/ to
azazel. Afterwards, 16:21,22 record that Aharon would confess the sins of the people on the goat that was for/ to
azazel, and the goat was then sent to the desert, possibly to die. What does the term
azazel mean? The term appears four times in the chapter, 16:8, 10(2), 26, but nowhere else in Tanakh. There are at least four definitions to the word, all of them educated guesses.
Before reviewing the various definitions of the word
azazel, we need to review the reason why this goat is part of the ceremony of Yom Kippur altogether. The point of the ceremony of Yom Kippur was to
le-taher, purify, the
ohel moed/
mishkan, 16:30, see our discussion on 16:3-34, “
The avodah on Yom Kippur.” This means that all the elements of the ceremony were to contribute to this
taharah, purification, process. With regard to the goat that was sent to
azazel, 16:22 records that the goat was to carry the sins of the people to
eretz gezerah in the desert, which seems to refer to a remote desolate place in the desert. Clearly, the goat could not literally carry away sins, but even symbolically, how is this carrying to be conceived? The goat “received” the sins from Aharon’s confession, but could Aharon really confess the sins of other people he did not even know? Instead, the problem on Yom Kippur of the sins of the people is that they caused the
ohel moed/
mishkan to be
tamei. The goat was then “carrying” away the
tumah that derived from the sins of the people, and since this
tumah is symbolic, the whole process of Aharon placing the sins of the people on the goat and the goat carrying away the
tumah from sins works on the symbolic level. This process parallels the sending away of the bird in the purification ceremony of the person with
tsara’at that the bird carried away the
tumah of the person with
tsara’at, 14:7. (The parallelism between these cases has been noted by many people.)
Indeed, the purification process of the person with
tsara’at with two birds is exactly the same as the process with the two goats on Yom Kippur but on a lower level since the person with
tsara’at generated less
tumah than the sins of the people. Thus, on Yom Kippur a goat was used to send away the
tumah, while by the person with
tsara’at, a bird was sent away. Also, while the bird was sent out on the field, the goat was sent to a remote desolate region (16:22) since it encompassed more
tumah. In both cases, the animal can take away the
tumah since
tumah is a symbolic concept and symbols can be “moved.”
To return to a review of the various definitions that have been proposed for the word
azazel. One definition is based on the goat's destination. Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on 16:8,10) suggests that
azazel refers to the name of a mountain in the region of the people. Ibn Ezra (the beginning of his comments on 16:8) adds that maybe this was a name of a mountain near Mount Sinai, which was a mighty peak, and then this became the name for the goat even if the name was not relevant in future generations. Similarly, Rashi (on 16:8, based on Yoma 67b, also Bekhor Shor on 16:8) explains that
azazel means a mighty peak that the goat was to be sent to a mighty peak. Milgrom (1991, p. 1020) quotes a variation of this idea that according to this approach, the term
azazel means "a rough and a difficult place," without any reference to a peak or mountain. With this approach, the preposition
lamed before the word
azazel means to, to the mountain or to a remote and desolate place.
These explanations are based on the phrase,
eretz gezerah in 16:22, since this phrase,
eretz gezerah, can be understood as a synonym for
azazel. Notwithstanding this textual support, still the lottery is then between G-d and a place, which is not parallel. Possibly to answer this question, Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on 16:8,9) writes that when the Torah records that the lottery was to G-d, this was to the house of G-d. With this understanding, the two possibilities in the lottery are both to places. We will return to this approach since it has the most textual support of any of the other suggestions.
The second interpretation of the term
azazel is that the term refers to the act of sending away the goat that the term
azazel means the one or the animal to be sent away. This explanation can be found in the Septuagint, corresponds to the term in the Mishnah (Yoma 6:2)
sair ha-mishtalleah, the goat that is sent away, and is the basis for the term scapegoat in English translations. However, this interpretation is difficult since it is not clear what the
lamed, the preposition to/ for, before the term
azazel means unless, the
lamed is part of the word, and the term should be
lazazel.
The third explanation, which is mentioned by Ramban (on 16:8), Hizkuni (on 16:8) and maybe by Ibn Ezra (end of comments on 16:8, though see alternative explanation of Ibn Ezra’s cryptic comment by R. Isaac Mehler, quoted by Klein, 2005, p. 194) is that the term
azazel is a name of a demon that the goat was sent to a demon. With this idea, the preposition
lamed can mean for, for the demon. However, Hertz (1960, p. 481) notes that once 17:7 denounces sacrifices that were offered to satyrs, goat demons, how could something, even if not a sacrifice, be given to demons as part of the service on Yom Kippur?
Maybe one can vary the third approach and argue that the term
azazel was an anachronism even in the time of the Torah. The idea is that while people once believed in demons, the term had already lost its original meaning to the people in the desert, but by using the term the people could easier understand the idea of sending
tumah away, see Luzzatto on 16:8, quoted in Bulah, 1992, footnote 11 on chapter 16. The problem with this explanation is that in 17:7 we see that some people still believed in demons, so if
azazel refers to a demon, it was not an anachronism to all the people living at that time in the desert.
Or, maybe the idea of referring to a demon on Yom Kippur was to deny the powers of demons indirectly. Yehezkel Kaufmann (1972a, p. 114, quoted by Jacobson, 1986, p. 130) argues that the sending of the goat to azazel was a transformation of a pagan ritual. He claims that the original pagan ritual was an expulsion of the satyr
azazel to the desert, but in the Torah, “the Azazel of chapter 16 is not conceived of either as (being) among the people or as the source of danger or harm; he plays no active role at all. He is merely a passive symbol of impurity,
tumah… The world of old gods has become transformed into the desolate haunts of dancing satyrs who keep company with wild animals. All decisive power, divine and demonic, has been taken from them and given to the messengers of G-d.” The idea here is that while the term
azazel might refer to a demon, the Torah gives
azazel no power since
azazel just receives the goat sent to it. This idea could accord with our explanation of Shemot 20:3 that the Torah does not prohibit belief in other gods, as it only prohibited to believe that they are equal or greater to G-d, see our discussion on Shemot 20:3, "
Forces and gods."
Yet, if
azazel refers to a powerless demon, why is it mentioned altogether? Maybe the idea is that it is better to acknowledge demons but to make them powerless since some people believed in them, than to leave demons to people’s imagination. Thus, maybe
azazel is mentioned for those people who think demons exist that they should know that the supposed demons are powerless. I used to follow this idea, but from the actions with regard to the goat to
azazel in the service on Yom Kippur, we see that the goat that was for/ to
azazel was also to/ for G-d. This point was made by Rav Shmuel ben Hofni, the Gaon of Sura from 998 to 1012, quoted by Ibn Ezra on 16:8.
Firstly, the point of the lottery is that either goat could be for G-d or
azazel, so then if
azazel refers to a demon, then this would be making G-d equivalent to the demon and not making the demon powerless. Secondly, even after the goat was selected for
azazel, 16:10 records that the goat was to stand before G-d, which shows that it too was to/ for G-d. Thirdly, the two goats work together. The blood of the goat that was selected to/ for G-d was sprinkled in the
mishkan/
ohel moed to
le-taher the
mishkan/
ohel moed, and the goat that was selected to/ for
azazel carried away the sins that caused the
tumah which had to be purified. If the
mishkan/
ohel moed was just sprinkled with the blood of goat to/ for G-d, then the problem of
tumah would have remained if the sins of the people had not been carried away (symbolically) by the goat for/ to
azazel. Fourthly, by the sprinkling of the blood by the goat selected to/ for G-d, and the carrying away of the sins by the goat selected to/ for
azazel, the Torah uses the exact same words, 16:16,21, which shows that the goats are a team, and cannot be separated, as both are for/ to G-d.
A fourth definition of the term
azazel is quoted by Hertz (1960, p. 481, also Hoffmann, 1953, p. 305 and Hartom, 1999, p. 53) that the term is based on the purpose of the sending away of the goat, and means "dismissal or entire removal." Hertz explains that the word
azazel "is the ancient technical term for the entire removal of the sin and guilt of the community, that was symbolized by the sending away of the goat into the wilderness." The problem with this explanation is that it is an odd word to signify destruction and the term is not parallel with G-d by the lottery.
In the end, my guess is to slightly vary the first approach that the term
azazel means a desolate forlorn place based on the phrase
eretz gezerah in 16:22, but it was not a specific place. Anywhere in the desert which was particularly desolate and lacking any possibility of life would be called
azazel.
The idea of the lottery is that the goat which would be for/ to G-d symbolized/ represented
taharah since its blood was sprinkled in the inner room of the
mishkan/
ohel moed, and the goat which was for/ to
azazel, symbolized/ represented
tumah due to the sins of the people being “placed” upon it. Both
tumah and
taharah are symbolic concepts and both are determined by G-d. Thus, both goats are before G-d in 16:7,9,10, and either goat could have been chosen to symbolize or represent the two concepts. The randomness of the lottery shows that G-d decides who and what are considered
tamei and who and what are considered
tahor. The goat which symbolized/ represents
taharah goes to G-d since being
tahor is a symbolic movement towards G-d, while the goat that symbolized/ represented
tumah goes to a forlorn place,
eretz gezerah, since
tumah is a symbolic movement away for G-d to nothingness. The parallelism of the lottery is a movement towards G-d or a movement away from G-d, but both goats remain symbolically before G-d, just a question of how distant. A variation of this idea is, following Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon, that the preposition, lamed, both in reference to G-d and
azazel by the lottery, 16:8, means to a place, either a place associated with G-d, the Holy of Holies, by the goat which symbolized
taharah, or to a place that is associated with desolation or nothingness by the goat which symbolized
tumah.
My son-in-law Yuri Lubomirsky has pointed out to me that if
azazel is referring to a specific place (like some of the proponents of the first definition claim), then the Torah should not have used the preposition
lamed, before the term, and instead should have written
azazelah, like
midbarah in 16:10,22 and
Sedomah in Bereshit 19:1, see Rashi on Bereshit 32:3. Also, he claims that when something is sent to a place, then there is no need for a preposition at all. However, if
azazel is not a defined place, but a description of any forlorn place that occurs in the desert, then the preposition
lamed could be appropriate. The idea being that the person who took the goat to
azazel was to search in the desert to find a particularly remote and desolate area,
azazel, in the desert to release the goat, 16:10,22.
Bibliography:
Bulah, Menachem, 1991, 1992, Vayikra: Da'at Mikra, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Hartom, E. S. 1999, Commentary on Vayikra, Tel Aviv: Yavne Publishing House.
Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press.
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Kaufmann, Yehezkel (1889-1963), 1972, The Religion of Israel, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute and Tel Aviv: Dvir Co.
Klein, Alexander, 2005, The law of the scapegoat, in in Professors on the Parashah: Studies on the weekly Torah readings, edited by Leib Moskowitz, Jerusalem: Urim Publications.
Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.