Vayikra 11:2 - The definition of the words behamot and hayyot in the Torah

Vayikra (Leviticus) chapter 11 records different animals that can be eaten (that is to say they are kosher) and animals that cannot be eaten. After the introductory sentence, Vayikra 11:2 records, “These are the hayyot that you can eat from all the behamah that are (is) on the land." 

Which animals are classified as hayyot and which animals are classified as behemot?

In modern Hebrew the definition of hayyot are wild animals and behamot are large domesticated animals. I believe that this definition derives from the halakhah of kosher animals. Devarim 14:4,5 record, "These are the behamot that can be eaten: ox (cows), sheep and goats, gazelle, deer, roebuck, bison, antelope, wild goat, ibex, and mountain sheep." The Rambam (Laws of forbidden foods, 1:8) writes that the animals listed in Devarim14:4, the ox, sheep and goats are behamot, while the other seven animals listed in Devarim 14:5 are hayyot. The Rambam (Laws of forbidden foods, 6:1, also see Rashi on Devarim 14:4) also writes that hayyot are a sub-category of behamot. This definition has important practical implication. Vayikra 17:13 records that if a person hunts (kills) a chaya (or a bird), then the blood of the animal has to be covered with dirt. Based on this verse, the blood of an animal that is classified as a behama does not have to covered with dirt.

I do not understand this distinction between hayyot and behamot since Devarim 14:4 records "These are the behamot that you can eat" before the list of all ten animals, and there is no mention of hayyot in the verses. It seems obvious that the ten animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 are behamot. In addition, hayyot, based on the name, living things (see also Vayikra 11:47), refers to all animals, and then behamot are a subcategory of hayyot. With regard to Vayikra 17:13, according to my more expansive definition of the term behamot, the blood of all the animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 do not have be covered, which would be a leniency. Note with regard to which animals can be eaten, the difference between my understanding and the traditional understanding is just a question of semantics since there are still just ten land animals that can be eaten. It is just that I think that all ten animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 are behamot, while the traditional view lists three as behamot and seven as hayyot. However, the different definitions of the term behamot lead to some differences how to understand various verses in the Torah.

If we return to 11:2, the verse means these are the hayyot, the animals, that can be eaten: (Example one:) With regard to the behamah, a sub-category of hayyot, (animals that move) on the land. And then 11:3 explains that “with regard to the behamah” means those behamot that have split hooves and bring up their cud can be eaten. Thus, some behamot can be eaten, while others cannot be eaten. Afterwards, 11:9 records a different sub-category of hayyot, example two, animals that move in the water that can be eaten, and 11:13 records a third sub-category of hayyot, example three, animals that fly that cannot be eaten.

Another verse that indicates that behamot are more types of animals than cows, sheep and goats is Vayikra 1:2, which records that a person who wants to offer a behama as a sacrifice, can offer a cow or a tzon (which refers to both sheep and goats, see Vayikra 1:10). However, if behamot are cows, sheep and goats, then there is no need to specify these animals once behamot are mentioned. We see that behamot are more types of animals than cows, sheep and goats, and then the mention of cows and tzon in Vayikra 1:2 is to limit which types of behamot can be brought as a sacrifice.

Another example is Vayikra 7:25, which records “for whoever eats helev (fat) from the behamah that is offered as a sacrifice…” This verse means that there are some behamot which can be offered as a sacrifice and some that cannot be. If the term behamot refers to the ten animals (or more) listed in Devarim 14:4,5, then there exists the possibility that some behamot are offered as sacrifices and some are not. However, if behamot are only ox, sheep and goats, then all behamot can be offered as sacrifices, and Vayikra 7:25 cannot be understood in its simple sense.

In addition, Vayikra 11:26 records that any behama that has hoofs but the hoofs are not split and does not chew its cud is tamei. Yet, if behamot are only ox, sheep and goats, then all behamot have split hoofs. Instead, 11:26 is indicating that some behamot do not have split hoofs, such as horses, donkeys, zebras (see Luzzatto on 11:26) and these behamot differ from animals whose hoofs are split and chew the cud who are kosher and not tamei. This distinction between behamot that are tamei and those that are tahor is also recorded in 20:25.

11:27 then records that any animal that walks on its paws among the hayyot that walk on four legs is tamei. This implies that an animal that walks on paws (bears, cats, dogs?) is a type of hayya, but it is not a behama. This means that a behama is a hoofed animal (ungulates) and all the animals listed in Devarim 14:4,5 seem to be ungulates. (Note that Rashi on Shemot 14:7 seems to define horses as being behamot, which supports the idea that animals that have hoofs are behamot.)

Some other verses where the two terms, hayyot and behamot appear are in Bereshit 2:19,20, by the Garden of Eden.  In Bereshit 2:19 the Torah uses the word hayya when referring to all land animals. In the following verse, 2:20, the Torah separates out the behamot (deer? sheep?), the sub-category of hayyot, from all the other hayyot in the Garden of Eden. 2:20 also refers to the behamot before the remaining land animals, hayyot, maybe because Adam was more likely to have found help (ezer) from these animals, the ungulates, who are relatively tamer than the hayyot.

Another case is in Bemidbar 35:3, where first the behamot are listed since they are more likely to be in one's field since some of them are raised for food or work, and then the general term for all animals, who may happen to be in one's fields (i.e., dogs? birds?), hayyot is recorded.

There is a third term in the Torah for a group of animals, mikneh, livestock, cattle, sheep, pigs and horses(?). Behamot are a larger category of animals than mikneh, as all mikneh are behamot but not all behamot are mikneh. Thus, Bereshit 36:6 starts with the smallest group, the mikneh, then it becomes more expansive, the behamot, all ungulates, which would be horses and donkeys, and then it refers to all possessions. In Bemidbar 31:9, the Torah first refers to women and children, then to behamot, the larger group of animals, and then to mikneh, the smaller group of animals.

In Tanakh, Micah 5:7 records that lions will eat behamot in the forest, but farm animals like cows, sheep and goats usually are not living in the forest. On the other hand, deer, antelopes and gazelle do live in forests and are eaten by lions.

After writing this, my son Yishai, pointed out to me that this discussion of what animal is defined as a behama is not new. Ibn Ezra in his commentary on Tehillim 8:8 quotes from the Karaite commentator Yefet that behamot refer to animals who eat grass, which would be ungulates, but Ibn Ezra rejected this interpretation since Mishlei 30:30 refers to a lion as being a behamah. Note Ibn Ezra in his comments on Bemidbar 31:30 refers to camels as behamot, and if a lion is considered a behama, then this would also contradict the traditional definition of the word behama. I am not convinced by this refutation from Mishlei since a verse from a prophetic writing is not sufficient to overturn the simple understanding of the verses in the Torah. It could be that the definition of the word behama changed from the time of the Torah to when Mishlei was written. Also, maybe, one can understand Mishlei 30:30 that it means that lions, who are not behamot, are stronger than behamot, which includes rhinoceros and hippopotamuses.

Vayikra 1:1 – The terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Vayikra

When the Jewish people were living in the desert/ wilderness for forty years they constructed a special building which contained cultic furniture and had a surrounding courtyard. The Torah generally uses three terms to refer to the building and complex, the mikdash, mishkan and the ohel moed. I believe that most (all?) people understand the terms mishkan and ohel moed as being synonyms, which sometimes refer to just the special building and sometimes to the entire complex. In our discussion on Shemot 25:8,9: 27:21, “The terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Shemot,” I argued that in the book of Shemot, the term mikdash refers to special cultic furniture, the term mishkan refers to the walls of the special building and the first and maybe second covering of the walls, and the term ohel moed refers to the entire complex. I will now try to show that this identical distinction exists in the book of Vayikra.

The book of Vayikra begins, 1:1, by recording that G-d called to Moshe from the ohel moed. This verse continues the end of the Shemot 40:34,35 that the cloud of G-d filled the ohel moed, and my understanding is that the cloud of G-d was in the entire special complex. 1:1 then means that the voice of G-d called out to Moshe from the complex, and Moshe heard this voice when he was outside the entire complex. Possibly Moshe entered the complex after hearing G-d’s voice, but this is not recorded.

1:3 then records that the first stage in bringing a cow as an olah sacrifice is to bring the cow to the petach ohel moed, the entrance to the ohel moed. Which entrance? There are two possibilities. One, the opening to the courtyard from the special building, which is the popular opinion, or two, the opening to the courtyard from the area outside the complex. Note the opening to the courtyard from outside the complex is referred to as shaar ha-hatzer in Shemot 38:31 and Shemot 40:33, but this is the actual line that marks the opening, while the petach ohel moed would have some depth from the entrance towards the courtyard. While some verses, Shemot 26:36, Shemot 38:30 and Bemidbar 3:25, 4:25, suggest that the opening is from the special building to the courtyard, I think that Bemidbar 25:6 and 27:2 refer to the entrance from outside the complex.  In our discussion on the terms mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Shemot, we concluded that this entrance can refer to both places depending on the context. It is not clear which possibility is being referred to here in 1:3. An additional question, with regard to both of these possibilities, is how far into the courtyard from either direction does the term, entrance, refer to?

1:5 then refers to the outer altar that was petach ohel moed, and again this phrase could be referring to either of the two possible entrances mentioned above on 1:3. Note, since it is likely that the altar was in the middle of the courtyard (see picture in Sarna, 1986, p. 192), then the two possible entrances would be roughly equal distance from the altar.

3:2 refers to this entrance, petach ohel moed, by the slaughtering of a cow that is brought as a shelamim sacrifice. Again, this entrance could be either of the two places discussed on 1:3, though here my inclination is that the reference is to the entrance to the courtyard from the outside since otherwise there would numerous animals being killed immediately before the special building.

3:8,13 then refer to a new area, lifnei ohel moed, by the sheep and goat shelamim sacrifices. This area is most likely different than the petach ohel moed since it is labelled differently. Milgrom (1991, p. 209) argues that from Bemidbar 8:9,10 we see that the phrase lifnei ohel moed means outside the courtyard of the ohel moed, and that the phrase lifnei ha-Shem means in the courtyard. I agree with his point about the term lifnei ohel moed, but I think the phrase lifnei ha-Shem is not only the area in the ohel moed, but also the area near the ohel moed, as in 3:7. (One can even say that the whole world is considered as being lifnei ha-Shem.) Similarly, the phrase lifnei ohel moed in Bemidbar 3:7,38 seem to refer to the area outside the courtyard of the ohel moed.

4:4 records that when a priest, who had been anointed, accidentally sins, then he brings a bull to the petach ohel moed, which again can be the two possibilities we discussed on 1:3. 4:5,6 then record that the blood from the bull was to be brought to the ohel moed, where the priest would dip his fingers in the blood, and then sprinkle the blood on the parokhet within the special building. This bringing of the blood to the ohel moed, might imply that the ohel moed was just the special building, but if the ohel moed is the entire complex, then it includes the special building. Once 4:6 refers to the parokhet then we know where in the ohel moed, the entire complex, the priest was to sprinkle the blood. Note, it could be that the priest dipped his hands outside the special building and then entered the building with bloody fingers to sprinkle the blood. With either possibility of where the priest was to dip his fingers in the blood, the phrase to ohel moed in 4:5 is a movement from the petach ohel moed, that the priest moved either from the entrance to the special building to the special building or from the entrance to the complex to the main area in the courtyard or to the special building.

4:6 notes that the incense altar, which was in the special building, was located in the ohel moed, as the ohel moed refers to the entire complex. The verse ends by referring to the altar which was petach ohel moed, and this is similar to 1:5.

4:14 records the law when the entire congregation sinned by accident that the people are to bring a bull, lifnei ohel moed. As in 3:8,13, lifnei ohel moed is outside the complex, and this is very appropriate in this case since this would give more people the ability to see the elders, the representatives of the people, when they would lean on the bull, 4:15. 4:16 then records that the blood of the bull was to be brought to the ohel moed, which is similar to 4:5, though here the movement is more obvious since one is coming from the area outside the complex to the ohel moed, either to the special building or to the courtyard. 4:18 has two references to the ohel moed and is similar to 4:6.

The next reference is 6:9, which records that Aharon and his sons should eat the matzot of the minhah sacrifice in the courtyard of the ohel moed. The ohel moed is the entire complex, and the Torah is specifying where in the complex the matzot should be eaten. Similarly, 6:19 records that the priest who does the korban hatta’t eats part of the sacrifice in the courtyard of the ohel moed.

6:23 records that a hatta’t, whose blood is brought to the ohel moed to le-khapper the kodesh, cannot be eaten. This verse seems to refer to some of the cases of the hatta’t from chapter four. While one can understand the term ohel moed here as just referring to the special building, it can also be understood as referring to the entire complex, that a hatta’t, whose blood is brought into the complex to be used le-khapper the kodesh, i.e., to be sprinkled on the parokhet, cannot be eaten.

The next mention of one of the three terms is in 8:3,4 by the initiation of the priests, that the ceremony is to begin by the petach ohel moed, the entrance to the ohel moed. Again, as by 1:3, this could mean two different areas. My guess is that here the reference is to the entrance to the entire complex since the entire nation is to gather around the entrance and this could not be if the petach ohel moed is the entrance to the special building.

8:10 records the first mention of the mishkan in the book of Vayikra, as the verse records that Moshe anointed the mishkan and everything that was in it. This means that Moshe anointed the walls, and maybe the ceiling covering the walls of the special building. The phrase “everything that was in it” refers to the special cultic ritual items that were located within the walls of the special building.

Chapter eight concludes that Aharon and his sons were to cook and eat meat and bread from the sacrifices by the petach ohel moed and that they had to remain by the petach ohel moed for seven days, 8:31,33,35. While this phrase could be referring to the entrance to the special building since Aharon and his sons would have had to sleep in that spot this strikes me as not being respectful to the special building, and then my inclination is that the area being referred to in the verses is the entrance to the entire complex, which is where Aharon and his sons would have slept.

9:5 has the phrase, penei ohel moed, which is the first time this phrase appears in the Torah (also later in Bemidbar 17:8 and 19:4), and means in the direction of ohel moed, from outside of the entire complex. This cannot be referring to the courtyard of the complex since the entire congregation were standing in this place and they could not all fit in the courtyard.

9:23 then records that during the special ceremony of the eight day, Moshe and Aharon went into the ohel moed and then they came out. To understand this verse, one must ascertain where Moshe and Aharon were before they came into the ohel moed. Previously, Aharon had been in the courtyard working on the sacrifices, and then 9:22 records that he blessed the people. Was this blessing in the courtyard? If yes, then 9:23 must mean that Moshe and Aharon went into the special building. However, since the people were outside of the complex (see above on 9:5), it is more likely that when Aharon blessed the people, he went outside the complex to bless them, and then 9:23 means that Moshe and Aharon went into the courtyard area of the ohel moed, see our discussion on 9:22,23, “The double blessings by the ceremony of the eighth day.”

10:7 records that after the tragic deaths of Nadv and Avihu, Moshe told Aharon, Elazar and Itamar to remain in the petach ohel moed, which is similar to the law in 8:33,35.

10:9 then records that G-d told Aharon that he and his sons cannot drink wine when they are in the ohel moed. If a person thinks that the ohel moed means only the special building, then the priests would be permitted to drink wine in the courtyard of the ohel moed. This would seem to contradict the point of 10:10, the following verse, that the wine should not cause a priest to make a mistake by something which is kodesh. Rashi (on 10:9), who follows the idea that the ohel moed is just the special building, is uncomfortable with this implication that a priest could drink in the courtyard, and hence he quotes a drasha to negate this implication with regard to the outer altar. On the other hand, 10:9,10 accord very well with the understanding that the term ohel moed means the entire complex, and then the priests could not drink wine in any area in the complex.

12:4 records for the first time in the book of Vayikra, the term mikdash, that a new mother, cannot go in the mikdash even when she has tahor blood. I believe that the term mikdash means the collection of special cultic furniture, and then 12:4 is forbidding the new mother for going amongst these items. Maybe, the Torah did not use the word ohel moed since she was forbidden for going amongst these items, even if for some reason they were not being housed in the special complex.

12:6 then records that after the period of tahor blood is completed, the new mother is to bring a sacrifice to the petach ohel moed, which could refer to either of the two possibilities discussed on 1:3.

The phrase petach ohel moed appears next by the sacrifices of the metsora, 14:11,23, and then again by the sacrifices of the zav and zavah, 15:14,29. Again these verses can refer to either of the two possibilities discussed above on 1:3. However, my inclination is that there would be a goal to limit the number the people standing right in front of the special building, and then the reference to petach ohel moed in these verses would be to the entrance of the special complex from the outside.

The end of chapter 15, 15:31 records that the Jewish people were to be careful not to make G-d’s mishkan tamei. This is referring to the walls and covering of the special building and the area enclosed by the walls and the ceiling. The fact that the verse does not refer to the ohel moed indicates that the crucial problem of tumah in the complex is with regard to the special building and not to the courtyard.

The phrase petach ohel moed next appears by the selection of the goats in the ceremony on Yom Kippur, as the goats were to be brought petach ohel moed, 16:7. Again, this phrase could refer to either of the two possibilities discussed on 1:3.

Later in the ceremony, 16:16 records that Aharon was to kipper (purify?) the ohel moed. If one understands that the ohel moed refers just to the special building, then the verse means that Aharon was to sprinkle blood within that building, while if the term ohel moed means the entire complex, then 16:16 can mean that he was to sprinkle blood in the courtyard, see our discussion on 16:16-20, “Was the outer altar or the inner altar or both purified on Yom Kippur?”

The following verse, 16:17, records that no person was to be in the ohel moed when Aharon was in the kodesh, the inner room of the special building. If one believes that the ohel moed means just the special building, then 16:17 is stating that no one could be in the outer room of the special building when Aharon was in the inner room of the special building. I think this is obvious. Was a person going to be following Aharon when he was bringing the coals and blood into the inner room from the outer room? Also, with this understanding people could be in the courtyard when Aharon was going in the inner room, but then maybe a person in the courtyard could see the aron in the inner room when Aharon was going in, which is very dangerous, see Bemidbar 4:20. Instead, it is simpler to understand that when Aharon was in the inner room of the special building, no one could be in the entire complex until he completely finished needing to be in the inner room. This would remove the small possibility that a person could have seen the inner room from the courtyard when Aharon was going into the room. This would also mean that the people/ person watching the goat to be sent to Azazel would leave the complex until Aharon would need the goat in 16:20.

16:20,33 record that on Yom Kippur, Aharon’s action was to me-khapper the kodesh, the ohel moed and the altar. Depending on how one defines the term ohel moed in 16:16 determines how one understands the term ohel moed in these two verses, either the outer room of the special building or the entire complex.

16:23 then records that Aharon went to the ohel moed to change his priestly clothing. It is incredible to think that Aharon changed his clothing within the special building. Instead, Aharon had gone towards the exit of the complex or even left it to accompany the sending away of the goat to Azazel, and then in 16:23, he was to go in the courtyard in a relatively hidden place to change his clothing. 

16:33, a summary verse to the Yom Kippur ceremony, records that in the ceremony, the mikdash ha-kodesh was kipper. The term mikdash would refer to the aron, the special cultic furniture in the kodesh, inner room of the special building, as on Yom Kippur the high priest was to sprinkle blood on the kapporet, the cover of the aron and the base for the keruvim.

17:4,5,6,9 refer to the petach ohel moed, and again these verses could mean either possibility discussed on 1:3. 17:4 also refers to the mishkan, and here the idea is to the tent of G-d, which I understand means the walls and ceiling of the special building.

19:21 refers to the bringing of the asham sacrifice to the petach ohel moed, and, again, this could be referring to either possibility discussed on 1:3.

19:30 records that a person should fear G-d’s mikdash, and this means to fear (respect?) cultic items dedicated to G-d.

A reference to G-d’s mikdash appears in 20:3, and again it refers to the cultic furniture that is dedicated to G-d.

The next reference is that 21:12 records that a high priest cannot leave the mikdash to mourn for relatives since if he left, this would profane the mikdash. This means that he cannot leave the area where the special cultic furniture is situated since this would profane this furniture. A similar idea occurs in 21:23 which records a law not to profane G-d’s mikdash, and two of the special cultic items are mentioned in the beginning of the verse.

Skipping some chapters, 24:3, records that the menorah was to be lit outside the parokhet in the ohel moed. This designation outside the parokhet informs us where in the ohel moed, the entire complex, the menorah was to be lit, namely in the outer room of the special building.

Towards the end of the book of Vayikra, 26:2 refers to the mikdash of G-d, which again is to the cultic furniture, that people should fear the special furniture relating to G-d, similar to 19:30.

26:11 refers to G-d’s mishkan, as in 15:31, but here the verse appears to be referring to a future mishkan and not to the mishkan in the desert.

26:31 records how G-d will destroy the mikdash of the people if they sin, and here the reference is to the cultic furniture that the people made.

This concludes our review of the three terms, mikdash, mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Vayikra, and we need to continue examining the terms in the books of Bemidbar and Devarim.

Bibliography:

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.

Sarna, Nahum, (1923-2005), 1986, Exploring Exodus, New York: Schocken Books.

Vayikra 9:22 – Access to the top of the altar in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed

ויקרא ט:כב - וישא אהרן את ידו אל העם ויברכם וירד מעשת החטאת והעלה והשלמים

Towards the end of the ceremony of the eighth day, Vayikra 9:22 records that Aharon blessed the people (see our discussion, “The double blessings by the ceremony of the eighth day”) and then he came down after offering the hatta’t, the olah and the shelamim. These sacrifices were offered on the altar in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed, and then it is presumed that Aharon came down from the outer altar (see Rashi on 9:22). Was Aharon able to stand on the top of the outer altar? How did he ascend and descend from the altar?

Shemot 27:1 records that the dimensions of the outer altar were five amot (cubits) by five amot and the three amot high. An amah (cubit) is an ancient measuring system used by the Egyptians and many societies and is the distance from a person’s elbow to the tip of his/ her middle finger. This is assumed to be around 18 inches to 21 inches (even 24 inches?). This would mean that the height of the altar was from 54 inches (4.5 feet, 137 centimeters) to 63 inches (5.25 feet, 160 centimeters). (The distance from my elbow to my middle finger is 16 inches.)

It could be that an amah is even smaller, and the altar was at a lower height than 54 inches, but we do not know how tall Aharon was. Was he tall enough to work comfortably on the altar when standing on the ground? If he was six feet tall, which would have been tall for those days since today people are taller than in the past, and the altar was 4.5 feet, then he could have reached the top of the altar, but could he have reached the middle section of the altar? Did Aharon have to get to the top of the altar?

Chazal (see Rashi on Shemot 27:5) understand that there was a ramp that led to the altar and then Aharon could go up and down the ramp to reach the altar. This would make it easy to get to the top of the altar, and then Aharon could have come down the ramp in 8:22. However, the Torah never mentions this ramp. The ramp would have been a substantial item. If it existed, it is surprising that it was not mentioned in the construction of the mishkan/ ohel moed and by the transporting of the mishkan/ ohel moed. Yet, if there was no ramp, then how was Aharon able to get to the top of the altar. Was Aharon supposed to jump? Was there a ladder?

My guess is that Aharon did not get to the top of the altar. 8:22 does not record that he descended from the altar, just that he descended. Yet, if he was not on the top of the altar, where was he descending from?

Shemot 27:5 records that around the altar there was a type of mesh or net, and this mesh was below the karkov. The Torah mentions this karkov parenthetically, and it is not clear what it is. Cassuto (1967, p. 364) writes that the karkov was a ledge. He writes, "as we learn from an examination of the ancient altars that have been found in great numbers in Israel and in the neighboring countries, the karkov is a kind of horizontal projection that encompasses the altar on all sides, and is situated a third or a quarter of the way down from the top; its purposes apparently, was purely ornamental." This makes sense to me, except the last point that it was ornamental. 

My guess is that the karkov was a ledge for Aharon to stand on, and then he could access the entire top of the altar. Rashi (on Shemot 27:5) also writes that the karkov was for standing, but he writes that it was on the top of the altar. More likely, partially following Cassuto, it was a ledge on all sides of the altar for Aharon and the priests to stand on when working on the altar. The Torah does not record the width of the karkov, but if it was to support people, then it had to be sufficiently wide and strong for people to stand comfortably.

The height of the karkov is also not recorded in the Torah. Shemot 27:5 records that the mesh was below the karkov and the mesh reached until the halfway point of the altar. The dimensions of the mesh are unknown. If the mesh was three inches, and the height of the altar was 54 inches, then the bottom of the karkov could have been 30 inches up from the ground (27+3). If the depth of the karkov was two inches, then Aharon and all the priests had to climb up about 32 inches, and from that point there would have been another 22 inches to the top of the altar. It is not a simple step to go up 32 inches, but it is not that difficult. Also, maybe some rocks could have placed near the altar to make a step between the ground and the karkov. Note, the parts of the animals that were to be sacrificed on the altar would have to had been hoisted with some of the priests on the ground and some standing on the karkov. 

To return to our question how to understand Aharon’s descent from the altar in 8:22 after he blessed the people and offered sacrifices. The idea here is that when he blessed the people and when he was offering the sacrifices, he was standing on the karkov, and then he jumped down or stepped down carefully.

(I do not think this understanding contradicts Shemot 20:23, which according to the common understanding forbids one to make steps to ascend to an altar, firstly because here there would have been only one step, and secondly, Sarna (1991, p. 117) notes that Shemot 20:23 is in reference to laymen by private alters, who may not have worn underwear, while the official priests had to wear underwear, Shemot 28:42. In fact, my understanding of Shemot 20:23 is that the verse is prohibiting people from standing on platforms on top of the altar if they were not wearing underwear, and then Aharon could have been standing on one of these ledges on the altar since he was wearing underwear.)

Bibliography

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1991, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Vayikra 10:16-20 – The argument between Moshe and Aharon after the deaths of Aharon's sons: An argument for the sake of heaven

Vayikra 10:16-18 records that Moshe learned that the hatta’t sacrifice from the ceremony of the eighth day had been burnt, and this made him angry since he thought the sacrifice should have been eaten. Aharon defended the burning of the hatta’t by saying, 10:19, “Here, today, they brought their hatta’t and olah offerings, before G-d, and such things as these happened to me! Had I eaten the hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” (Variation of Fox, 1995, translation.) 10:20 records that Moshe accepted Aharon’s response.

Why did Moshe believe that the sacrifice should have been eaten, and why did Aharon disagree? In 10:19, Aharon was referring to the deaths of his sons, but why should their deaths have caused him not to eat the hatta’t? Finally, why did Moshe accept Aharon’s response? (My understanding of this section began with a conversation with David Linzer in March 1992, though since then, notably in March 2014, I have changed some of my views of this section.)

In order to understand this argument, we need to clarify which hatta't is being argued about. 10:16 describes the hatta’t as being a goat, and 9:3 records that as part of the sacrifices of the eighth day the people were to bring a hatta’t that was a goat. This would seem to be the only possible reference to the hatta’t in 10:16, see Luzzatto on 10:16. R. David Hoffmann (on 10:16) notes that R. Akiva follows this understanding. However, Rashi (on 10:16) quotes the majority view of Chazal that the sacrifice was the hatta’t that was brought on the new moon (Bemidbar 28:5), which was an additional sacrifice to the sacrifices for the ceremony of the eighth day. Rashi (on 10:17) notes that Moshe said that the eating of the hatta’t was to bring atonement for the people (10:17) and the approach of Chazal is that the hatta’t of the new moon was to bring atonement for causing tumah in the Mikdash. Luzzatto rejects this "proof" since 9:7 records that the hatta’t of the people was to bring atonement for the people.

Rashi's explanation is based on the understanding that eighth day of the initiation of the priests was also the first day of the first month of the second year of the people’s stay in the desert. I doubt that the ceremony of the eighth day was on the first day of the first month in the second year of the people's stay in the desert since I believe that the seven day initiation process of the priests began on either the 15th or the 22nd of the first month of the second year, see our discussion on Shemot 40:1-33, "The anointing of the mishkan, the ohel moed and the priests."

The next point to clarify is what type of hatta't was the hatta't of the people. There are two types, the inner hatta't and the outer hatta't. By the inner hatta’t, the blood of the animal is sprinkled on the parokhet within the mishkan proper, and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are burnt, 4:1-21, 7:23. By the outer hatta’t, the blood is only sprinkled on the altar outside the mishkan proper and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are eaten by the priests, 4:22-35, 7:17-22. The hatta't of the people was an outer hatta't since the blood was sprinkled on the outer altar, 9:9,15. Accordingly, Moshe stated that the hatta't was to be eaten since the blood of the sacrifice had not been brought into the mishkan proper where the inner altar was located, 10:18.

Moshe was worried that there was a danger that because the sacrifice had not been eaten, all the people would be punished. 10:6 records that Moshe told Eleazar and Itamar, Aharon’s two surviving sons, that they should not engage in any mourning rites since they could die and there could be a ketsef on the people. The term ketsef indicates that G-d is angry and that there can be an ensuing punishment, see Bemidbar 17:11. Thus, just like Moshe was concerned that mourning rites could cause G-d to punish the people, so too he was worried that the non-eating of the sacrifice could also cause G-d to punish the people. We now understand Moshe's argument, but why did Aharon disagree if it was so important for the sacrifices to be eaten?

Rashi (on 10:16) quotes two opinions of Chazal to explain Aharon’s response. One, Aharon maintained that since he and his sons were mourners for Nadav and Avihu, they were not allowed to eat the sacrifice. The idea being that the law of mourning would override the usual law that the outer hatta’t was to be eaten. Luzzatto (on 10:17) rejects this approach since Moshe had already told Aharon and his sons that they were not to act as mourners (10:6,7), which means that in all cases they were not to follow the laws of mourning. Luzzatto (on 10:19) also adds that Aharon began his argument by referring to the hatta’t and the olah, 10:19, but this reference is irrelevant if the rationale was that they were mourners. In addition, how did Aharon know that the laws of mourning precluded eating from the sacrifices, something clearly unknown to Moshe?

Rashi's (on 10:16) second approach for understanding Aharon’s argument is that there was some tumah attached to the hatta’t and thus Aharon did not want to eat the sacrifice. Milgrom (1991, pp. 635-640) develops this approach. He argues that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu transformed the hatta’t of the people from an outer hatta’t to an inner hatta’t since their deaths raised the level of tumah of the hatta’t that the sacrifice had to be burnt. This understanding accords with his view that in general a hatta’t is to remove tumah, and the reason why an inner hatta’t is burnt is because the level of tumah the sacrifice is removing is so large that the hatta’t cannot be eaten.

I doubt that Aharon did not eat the hatta't since it was tamei because there is no connection between this explanation and Aharon's response to Moshe. According to Milgrom's explanation, why did Aharon refer to his sacrifices that he had offered beforehand? According to Milgrom, Aharon was not permitted to eat the hatta’t, so why did Aharon not simply say something like "I cannot eat it since it is tamei."

Also, how did the sacrifice become tamei? Milgrom writes that “that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu in the midst of sacred precincts polluted the entire sanctuary.” Yet, according to the laws of tumah (Bemidbar 19) death only causes tumah, when the body is in a tent with a roof, but this did not occur here as Nadav and Avihu died outside of the mishkan proper, 10:4, and see our discussion on Vayikra 10:1,2 "Nadav and Avihu,"  In addition, the hatta’t sacrifice should not have become tamei because the supposed cause of the tumah (Nadav and Avihu's sin) occurred after the sacrifice was offered and its blood was sprinkled, and there is no indication that Nadav and Avihu died when touching the hatta’t. 
Finally, why did Moshe not know that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu generated so much tumah that the hatta’t could not be eaten? It seems to me that Milgrom is forcing his theory of hatta’t and tumah into this episode.

These two approaches are legal arguments as to why Aharon and his sons burnt the hatta't, and instead two psychological arguments have been suggested.

Rashbam (on 10:19) suggests that Aharon was claiming that after the deaths of his sons, he and his remaining sons were too sad to eat the sacrifice. N. Leibowitz (1980, p. 74) likes this approach. She explains that sacrifices must be offered in the proper state of mind, and Aharon could not fulfill this requirement in his state of grief. This approach is similar to the mourning approach but it stresses personal feelings as opposed to a point of law. Yet, where does this idea come from that one cannot be in a state of grief when one eats sacrifices? If there was a need to eat the sacrifices to help the people, then why were the personal feelings of Aharon and his sons relevant? How did Aharon know that G-d would not accept his eating if he was sad? Also, Luzzatto points out that this explanation does not explain why Aharon referred to his personal sacrifices, his hatta’t and his olah? According to this idea, Aharon should have just said "After the events of the day, I am too sad to eat the hatta't."

Luzzatto suggests that the argument between Moshe and Aharon was whether the eating of the hatta’t could lead to atonement for the people. Moshe wanted the hatta’t to be eaten in order for the people to attain atonement, 10:17. Aharon responded that he and his sons had already offered sacrifices that day, and still his sons died. Thus, he understood that his sacrifices did not lead to atonement for himself. Aharon continued and said, “Had I eaten the hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” Aharon doubted that his eating of the hatta’t of the people could lead to atonement for the people once he was not able to bring atonement for himself from his own sacrifices.

This explanation accords with all of Aharon’s statement in 10:19 and makes Aharon’s statement a rebuttal to Moshe’s argument in 10:16-18. Yet, how did the deaths of Nadav and Avihu show that Aharon did not attain atonement from his sacrifices since it seems that they died for their own sins? Luzzatto writes that Aharon felt that he was out of favor with G-d, but from the death of his sons he should only have known that his sons had fallen out of favor with G-d not himself. Perhaps he was a father feeling guilty about his children’s deaths, as maybe he felt that it was his actions by the sin of the golden calf which caused his sons to die, see Rashi on Devarim 9:20. Moshe did not have this feeling so he initially wanted Aharon to eat the sacrifices following the law of the outer hatta’t. However, after Moshe heard Aharon’s claim, he accepted the idea that Aharon felt that he had not attained atonement from his sacrifices and hence he could not help the people attain atonement.

N. Leibowitz (p. 73) likes Luzzatto’s approach in that it accords with the idea that Aharon was giving expression to his personal feelings, but she rejects the explanation since she claims that “a sense of guilt does not free a man from responsibility to perform his duties.” This is similar to the question on the Rashbam's approach, that if it was Aharon and his son's responsibility to eat the hatta't and they were not allowed to mourn, then they had to eat it, whether they felt guilty or sad.

Maybe the argument between Aharon and Moshe is a basic argument about the value of sacrifices, akin to the argument many years later between the Rambam and the Ramban, see our discussion on Vayikra 1:9, "How can one understand sacrifices in the Torah?" Aharon was pointing out that the events of the day showed that sacrifices were ineffective. Aharon noted that he and his sons had just offered a hatta't and an olah, and yet his sons were killed almost immediately afterwards. What point was there for him to eat the hatta't? Aharon was rebutting Moshe's claim that the non-eating of the hatta't would lead to a ketsef not due to sadness or guilt but because he doubted that his eating of the sacrifices would please G-d to stop a ketsef if G-d decided to send ketsef. This would be analogous to the Rambam's view of sacrifice in the Moreh, 3:32, that sacrifices were only commanded since the people could not envisage a religion with sacrifices.

With this idea, Moshe had initially thought that sacrifices had to be eaten since either he thought that sacrifices were effective to bring atonement (like the Ramban) or because one had to do what was commanded, but he agreed to Aharon's point. This could be because he accepted that sacrifices are not effective in general or that in this case they were ineffective. 

A reason why in this particular case they were meaningless is that if the point of offering sacrifices is because one is demonstrating one's devotion to G-d, then here where Nadav and Avihu acted not according to G-d's will (10:1), then any sacrifice that they did would also become meaningless. Note that according to this idea, once Moshe accepted Aharon's opinion, then Aharon and his sons would not have eaten the minhah and the shelamim, 10:12-15.

If this is understanding is correct, then this episode supports the Rambam's opinion that really G-d does not want our sacrifices. If this is the message of this episode, then this would have been the most appropriate place to make this point, right after the laws of the sacrifices and the initiation of the priests. Furthermore, it is telling that it is the high priest, Aharon, who rejects sacrifices.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980, Studies in Vayikra, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday

Vayikra 11:19,20 (Shemini) – The classification of kosher and non-kosher animals in the Torah: Do the locomotion

Within the list of kosher and non-kosher animals, there are several questions about the classification of the various animals. One, 11:19 records bats among the birds that cannot be eaten, but bats are mammals. Two, 11:20 records that insects that have four legs cannot be eaten, but all insects have six legs.

These questions are because today we are conditioned to classify animals based on the scientific zoological definitions and then bats do not belong with birds. However, as argued by Mary Douglas (1992) the Torah is classifying animals based on the different spheres, land, water and air, and the movement of the animals in these spheres. The classification is animals that move on land, animals that move in the water and animals that move in the air. Thus, the criteria that determine the classification of the animals are based on their means of movement. The legs of the insects are mentioned since this relates to their movement. Land animals can be eaten if they walk on cloven hoofs (and chew their cud) but if they walk on their paws, 11:27 or if they crawl on the ground, 11:42, then they are impure, tamei, and they cannot be eaten. Fins are mentioned as the criteria for fish since the fins are the way that fish move. Whales and dolphins cannot be eaten since they move in the water, but they lack scales and fins, which is the criteria for kosher animals that move in the water. Similarly, bats are listed with animals that move in the air since they move in the air, even though they are not birds.

This understanding can explain why the Torah classified insects as having four legs. S. R. Hirsch (on 11:20, 1989, p. 278) explain that four legs means "that they have more than two feet and this multiplicity of feet is just the characteristic difference between a bird and sherets bird (insect)." I would follow this latter idea that the four legs by insects is to separate them from birds. Birds are classified based on their movement through air even though they walk on the ground since they only walk on two legs. If they would walk on four legs, then they would have been judged as land animals. Thus, by insects the Torah uses the term four legs since once they have four legs then they are judged by their movement on land and not in the air and then they fail the criteria of land animals (chew their cuds and have split hoofs).

Why did the Torah classify the animals based on their locomotion in the different spheres? Douglas argues that this classification reflects society’s values. This is possible, but maybe this method was a relatively easy way for people to classify the animals without requiring a degree in zoology.

Bibliography:

Douglas, Mary, 1992 (first published in 1966), Purity and Danger, London: Rutledge.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Vayikra 9:22,23 - The double blessings on the ceremony of the eighth day

Vayikra 9:22 records that towards the end of the ceremony on the eighth day, Aharon blessed the people. After Aharon blessed the people, the end of 9:22 records that he finished the sacrifices of the eighth day. According to 9:6, once the sacrifices were finished, then the glory of G-d was to appear. However, the beginning of 9:23 does not record the appearance of the glory of G-d, but that Moshe and Aharon went into the ohel moed, which is usually understood to be the mishkan proper, but I think also means the courtyard of the mishkan, see our discussion above on 1:1, “The terms mishkan and ohel moed in the book of Vayikra.” The remainder of 9:23 records that Moshe and Aharon came out from where they were, and blessed the people and then the glory of G-d appeared to the people.

Various suggestions have been made as to what were these blessings (see Rashi and the Ramban on 9:22,23), but a more basic question is why were the blessings said altogether? 9:1-7 records Moshe’s instructions to Aharon, his sons and the elders for what they were to do at the ceremony of the eighth day, and Moshe did not mention that any blessing was supposed to be said. Furthermore, why did Moshe and Aharon go into the ohel moed? And, why did they bless the people a second time after Aharon had already blessed the people?

Rashi (on 9:23) records two suggestions for why Moshe and Aharon entered the mishkan, as he follows the common approach that the ohel moed and the mishkan are synonyms. One, Moshe wanted to teach Aharon how to offer the spice offering (ketoret), but this is difficult since why at this point would this be important? The glory of G-d was supposed to appear and Moshe was taking time out to teach a lesson concerning the ketoret? It was not recorded in the Torah that the spice offering was to be offered as part of the ceremony of the eighth day, and after the ceremony of the eighth day, Moshe could have taught this lesson. Rashi's second answer (see also Ibn Ezra and Hizkuni on 9:23) is that Moshe and Aharon went inside the mishkan to pray for the appearance of the glory of the G-d. Yet, why was there a need for any prayer given that Moshe had already stated that the glory of G-d would appear due to the bringing of the sacrifices (9:6)? Furthermore, why could they not have prayed outside the mishkan, as the events of the day were focused on the outer altar? It seems that Moshe and Aharon’s entrance into the ohel moed relates to the two blessings since one blessing occurred before they entered the ohel moed and one occurred after they left the mishkan/ ohel moed, but what could be the connection?

In order to understand 9:23, we need to understand why Aharon blessed the people in 9:22. It seems that Aharon decided on his own to state the blessings, as it is not recorded that Moshe had told him to bless the people. While many people would think that giving a blessing is a nice idea, this action was problematic since when one worships G-d one must do what one is commanded and not add extras. A few minutes later this would be the sin of his sons, Nadav and Avihu, who attempted to serve G-d in a way that was not commanded and they were killed for this sin, 10:1,2, see our discussion below on 10:1,2, "Nadav and Avihu" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2010/04/vayikra-1012-shemini-nadav-and-avihu.html.

If Aharon's blessing was a mistake, then Moshe and Aharon went into the mishkan or in the courtyard of the ohel moed to talk. When they were alone, Moshe told Aharon that he is only to do what is commanded and not to add on extras. This rebuke might explain why the Torah did not mention what was said in the ohel moed.

The second blessing when they left the area where they had their brief discussion was an attempt to rectify Aharon's mistake. Aharon had blessed the people even though he had not been commanded to do so, but when Moshe and Aharon blessed the people, the people would think that they had been commanded by G-d when they conversed alone, and then the people would also think that Aharon had acted appropriately when he had had blessed the people in 9:22. (Maybe G-d spoke to them in the ohel moed but this cannot be known since it is not recorded.) The important idea was that the people would learn that one can only do what commanded, even though in this case the people were possibly being fooled. After this rectification of Aharon's mistake, then the glory of G-d appeared in the end of 9:23.

A possible proof for this approach is that immediately prior to Aharon's first blessing, in the end of 9:21, the Torah records that Aharon did exactly as he was commanded by Moshe. (This idea to do as commanded also appears in 9:5,6,7,10.) The statement in 9:21 is referring to Aharon's work with the sacrifices, and the implication is that while this work was commanded, Aharon's blessing that followed this statement was not commanded by G-d or Moshe.

Yet, if Aharon acted inappropriately when he first blessed the people, why was he not punished immediately like his sons were? Maybe his sin was not grievous enough to warrant his death. Or, maybe had he been killed, the ceremony would have stopped without the appearance of G-d's glory. This could not happen after Moshe had announced that G-d's glory would appear, 9:6. With this understanding, G-d delayed the appearance of the glory of G-d until Moshe was able to rectify Aharon's mistake, and then maybe Aharon was not punished later since he already suffered greatly when his sons were killed, though they died for their own sins.

Independent of the question of whether Aharon should have been punished for blessing the people on his own, Aharon, Nadav and Avihu all attempted to serve G-d in a way that was not commanded. Possibly this was the effect of the seven day consecration process in the previous chapter (chapter 8) that it prompted them with a desire to serve G-d more than what was commanded. This is a very common desire with the religious personality that one wants to do "more," and the seven day consecration process was an intense religious experience that could very likely have inspired this feeling.

After discussing this idea in my synagogue, a friend, Paul Kloot made the interesting point that Aharon's action might have influenced his sons Nadav and Avihu since undoubtedly they were in close vicinity to Moshe and Aharon. Paul wondered that if they had not realized that Moshe had to rectify their father's actions, then Aharon’s action might have led them to think that it was ok for a person to serve G-d based on one's own ideas.

Vayikra 9:1-4 – The ceremony of the eighth day of the consecration of the priests in the desert

Vayikra 9:1-4 records that on the eighth day, Moshe called Aharon, Aharon's sons and the elders of the people. The eighth day was the day after the seven day ceremony to initiate Aharon and his sons as priests, which was recorded in chapter 8. (The number eight in reference to a previous set of seven is a common phenomenon in the Torah, as for example by shemitta and yovel, Shavuot, Sukkot and Shemini Azaret, and possibly by the brit milah. In each case, there are some connections and some differences between the set of seven and the eighth day or year.) 

What was the purpose of the ceremony of the eighth day if the priests had already been initiated in the seven day ceremony? And, what was its connection with the previous seven days?

From the fact that Moshe called the elders, 9:1, we see that the purpose of the ceremony of the eighth day was not limited to the priests but also included the people. Furthermore, while both the priests and the people had to bring sacrifices the people brought more sacrifices. (The people brought double the types of sacrifices, and 150% more animals.) In addition, one of the sacrifices of the people was an ox, 9:4, and this is only time in the whole Torah that an ox was brought as part of the public cult. (This excludes the firstborn ox, which was a private sacrifice, Shemot 34:19, and Bemidbar 18:17.). This ox was surely the significant sacrifice of the day, and this indicates that the people were the primary participants of the day while the priests were secondary.

The ceremony of the eighth day ended when the people saw the glory of G-d and a fire consumed the sacrifices, 9:23,24. The appearance of the glory of G-d and the fire consecrated the outer altar, and since the outer altar was for the people to enable them to offer sacrifices, they were the primary participants of the ceremony of the eighth day. The consecration of the outer altar on the eighth day is what joins the ceremony of the eighth day with the seven day initiation of the priests that occurred beforehand since both processes were part of the establishment of the public cult of the mishkan/ ohel moed.

With this consecration, there were two consecrations of the mishkan/ ohel moed by the glory of G-d. In Shemot 40:35, the appearance of the glory of G-d consecrated the mishkan proper, while here the appearance of the glory of G-d consecrated the outer altar where the sacrifices were performed. This dual consecration accords with Shemot 29:44, which records that G-d would consecrate both the mishkan and the outer altar.

Vayikra 10:1,2 – The deaths of Nadav and Avihu

Vayikra 10:1,2 record, “Now, Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, took each-man his pan, and placing coals in them, put smoking-incense on it, and brought near, before the presence of G-d, foreign fire, such as he had not commanded them. And the fire went out from the presence of G-d and consumed them, so they died, before the presence of G-d” (adaptation of Fox’s 1995 translation). It seems clear that Nadav and Avihu died because they did what they were not commanded, but what were they trying to do? Numerous theories have been offered to explain their sin. We will review some of them and then offer our own.

Rashbam (on 10:1) suggests that Nadav and Avihu wanted to offer the incense sacrifice since they thought the regular daily law of offering incense was part of the ritual of the eighth day ceremony and they entered into the mishkan/ ohel moed proper to offer the incense even before the fire devoured the sacrifices. Their mistake according to the Rashbam was that on the special day (the eighth day), the fire for the sacrifices was to come from G-d and not from a regular human fire. This approach is problematic since not only does the Rashbam argue that Nadav and Avihu were killed prior to the fire devouring the sacrifices which contradicts the order of the Torah, but also as pointed out by David Tzvi Hoffmann (1953) and Shmuel David Luzzatto, they could not have been following the regular law of incense offering since that offering was brought by one priest and not two.

Seforno (on 10:1) proposes that Nadav and Avihu were acting based on the special character of the day. They thought that it was appropriate to offer an incense offering after the fire devoured the special sacrifices of the eighth day, and they were killed when attempting to offer this incense offering on the inner altar in the mishkan/ ohel moed proper. According to Seforno, Nadav and Avihu sinned by making this decision to add an incense offering without consulting Moshe. This approach is also difficult because the Torah records that the problem was that their fire was not commanded by G-d and not that the incense offering was not commanded.

Hoffmann (1953, p. 204) writes that Nadav and Avihu wanted to bring the incense offering to show their happiness about the appearance of the fire devouring the sacrifices. He claims that with their pans they brought the incense into the Holy of Holies, like the high priest does on Yom Kippur, though at this point this type of sacrifice had not yet been commanded. Hoffmann explains that while the Torah refers to their foreign fire, this really mean a sacrifice of fire that had not been commanded.

This idea that Nadav and Avihu went into the Holy of Holies is very popular, and it is claimed that 16:1, which refers to Nadav and Avihu’s sin in connection with the command to Aharon to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, supports this understanding. Yet, one can understand that in 16:1 the reference to Nadav and Avihu’s sin was to remind Aharon to follow G-d’s command exactly as he was commanded unlike Nadav and Avihu, and does not imply that Nadav and Avihu entered the Holy of Holies. Or, as pointed out by the Ramban (on 16:1), the reference to Nadav and Avihu in 16:1 could be to inform us that the laws regarding Yom Kippur were taught to Moshe immediately after the deaths of Nadav and Avihu.  Independent of 16:1, there is no reason to think that Nadav and Avihu would have thought to enter the Holy of Holies on the ceremony of the eighth day since the ceremony of the eighth day was focused on the outer altar which was situated in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed. Thus, it is more likely that they died in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed in front of the special building of the mishkan/ ohel moed (the word kadosh in 10:4).

In order to understand the sin and deaths of Nadav and Avihu we have to connect their actions to 9:24. 9:24 records that a fire went out from the glory of G-d and consumed the sacrifices that were offered as part of the ceremony of the eighth day.  After this fire appeared, Nadav and Avihu took their pans, and were walking around the outer altar with their incense offering. It could be that they did this out of joy (Hoffmann) or they thought it was appropriate to have an incense offering at that time (Seforno), but this was not commanded. The gravity of their sin was not the incense offering but the fire used to create the incense offering, the eish zarah, foreign fire, 10:1. The point of the ceremony of the eighth day was that G-d had sanctified the outer altar by sending a fire to devour the sacrifices, and now Nadav and Avihu were walking around the outer altar with a regular human fire. Their fire, which was not commanded by G-d, weakened the boundary between G-d and man since both the human fire and G-d’s fire were spatially co-existent, see our discussion on Shemot 19:12, 21-25, "Establishing boundaries I" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/02/shemot-2019-23-yitro-establishing.html. Nadab and Avihu were then killed by another fire that went out from the glory of G-d.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

The structure of chapter 11 in the book of Vayikra: A literary separation of animals

The structure of the chapter 11 demonstrates in a literary manner the idea of separation which is the idea of kedusha and is the theme of the chapter. The chapter can be divided based on whether the animals being discussed are referred to as a sherets (swarming) or not. 

11:2 is an introductory sentence, and the first laws are from 11:3-11:8, and these discuss behamot which are not sherets. 

11:9-12 record laws about fishes and the fish that are not allowed are referred to as sherets (11:10). 

The third set of laws, 11:13-20, are about birds, and these are not referred to as sherets.

The fourth set of laws are with regard to flying insects, 11:20-23, and these are sherets, 11:20,21,23. Note that 11:20 and 11:23 form a bookend around 11:21,22, which record which insects can be eaten.

The fifth set of laws, 11:24-28, is about the behamot and the hayyot, and again they are not sherets.

The sixth set of laws, 11:29-38, is about the land animals that swarm and they are sherets, 11:29.

The seventh set of laws 11:39,40 is again about behamot, and these are not sherets. 

The last set of laws 11:41,42 refers to eating animals that swarm, and these are referred to as sherets four times within the two sentences. 

The pattern of the chapter is non-sherets to sherets and back again, and this is written to show in a literary way the idea of separation, kedusha.

Vayikra 11 (Shemini) - The list of kosher animals in the book of Vayikra

Vayikra 11:2-23 records the list and/ or criteria of which animals can be eaten (are kosher). The reasons for these lists and criteria have been debated for centuries. Drazin (2006, pp. 124-128) presents a brief review of this question and he notes that the Rama (16th century, Krakow) relates it to the concept of kedusha since the verses at the end of the chapter, 11:44,45, record that the Jewish people are to be kadosh. While one could understand that the term kedusha in 11:44 and 11:45 as both refer to not becoming tamei, it is also possible to understand that only 11:44 refers to tumah, while 11:45 refers to kedusha from not eating the various creatures listed in the chapter. This duality accords with the double nature of the chapter of referring both to the creatures that cannot or cannot be eaten and the tumah relating to animals, see the concluding sentence to the chapter 11:47.

If the non-eating of certain creatures generates kedusha, the question is how? One possibility is that eating of the forbidden foods themselves causes a person's kedusha to be diminished in some way, see Abarbanel, 2005, p. 127, and comments of the Shach, Yoreh Deah, 81:26 (on the Rama). A different possibility is that act of not eating certain animals causes one to separate between the animals and it is this separation that generates the kedusha. The idea is that kedusha means to separate (see our discussion on chapters 11-25 "To separate") and in the final verse of chapter 11, 11:47. the Torah refers to this act of separation between tumah and taharah and the animals that can be eaten and those that cannot.

A possible underlying idea of the relationship between the act of separating and the dietary laws was articulated by Jean Solar (1979) who wrote, "Here (the prohibition of mixing various items together, such as meat and milk) as elsewhere, it is a matter of upholding the separation between the two classes or two types of relationships. To abolish distinction by means of a sexual or culinary act is to subvert the order of the world. Everybody belongs to one species only, one people, one sex, one category. And in the same manner, everyone has only one G-d… The keynote of this order is the principle of identity, instituted in the law of every being."

Even if the point of not eating certain creatures is just to make a separation, still there might be some benefits that accrue from the non-eating of certain creatures. Luzzatto (footnote on comments to 11:1) suggests three reasons. One, that it causes the Jewish people to be separate from non-Jews, and this stops assimilation. (Drazin writes that this reason was first suggested in the book of Tobit.) Nehama Leibowitz (1980, pp. 83, 85) notes that this idea was rejected by David Hoffmann since he argues that the laws of not eating certain animals is because G-d had separated the Jewish people and it is not the laws of which animals can be eaten causes this separation. However, from my personal experiences, I see that the dietary laws definitely cause a separation between people who keep these laws and people who do not, though still maybe this was not the reason for the laws.

Luzzatto second reason is that by being conscious of which animals a person can eat, this leads to a greater awareness of G-d in one's life, and his third reason is that the fact that some foods are forbidden increases one's self-control. While Luzzatto might have only intended that the benefits of self-control were to help people fulfill the commandments, Mischel (2014) based on his marshmallow test of whether young children can withstand the temptation to eat a marshmallow for a certain period of time, has shown that having self-control enables a person to be more successful in life. (N. Leibowitz seems to like Luzzatto's second and third reasons. Bamberger, 1981, p. 810 notes that Luzzatto's third reason is not novel as he writes that Philo had written that "the dietary laws are to control our bodily appetites" and he claims that the Rambam also understood them this way in the Moreh 3:33.)

If the main point of not eating certain creatures is to make a separation, then the designation of which animals can be eaten and which not is not the crucial issue since with this logic there had to be some animals that are forbidden. Yet, this does not imply that the choice of which creatures are forbidden to be eaten is completely arbitrary since still there can be some reasons, even trivial, for why one animal is forbidden and one is not. My guess is that these reasons also relate to the idea of separation.

The first type of animals is the animals that move on land, 11:2-8. The only animals that can be eaten in this group are animals that are classified as ungulates, hoofed animals, and they must also have split hoofs and chew their cud. The hoof serves to separate the animals from the ground, and the split literally shows the idea of separation. If they walk on their paws, 11:27 or if they crawl on the ground, 11:42, then they are not separated from the ground and they cannot be eaten.

The chewing of the cud has nothing to do with separation, but it has been suggested that this sign was specifically to make the pig a non-kosher animal even though it has split hoofs. Maybe the problem with the pig is that even though it has split hoofs, still its body barely remains above the ground, and this is not enough of a separation from the ground.

The next type of animals is those that move in the water, 11:9-12, and they can be eaten if they have fins and scales, i.e. fish, which means that they do not crawl in the water. Thus, clams are not kosher since they live on the ocean floor. According to this idea, sharks, whales and dolphins should be kosher since they swim and do not live on the bottom of the ocean floor, but they are not kosher since they do not have fins. Yet, why are fins the criteria and not swimming in the water? Maybe these are specific reasons for each one that makes them forbidden. Sharks are part of class of fish called cartilaginous who most of the members inhabit the ocean depths, and hence are not separate from the bottom of the ocean. With regard to whales and dolphins, they are the opposite since they are tied to the surface since they have to breathe. Thus all three are not considered as truly moving in the water.

The next type of animal is animals that fly, such as birds and insects, 11:13-23. According to this idea, all birds that fly should be kosher since by flying they are separated from the land. In fact, all birds except the 20 mentioned in the Torah are kosher. No reason is given for why the particular 20 are forbidden and since we do not know exactly which birds are being described it is hard to guess reasons for their prohibition.

Most likely, the twenty birds were chosen was in order that not all birds would be allowed since this forces one to separate between birds, see 20:25. This logic could apply to the other two categories of animals as well. Maybe the pig is forbidden since then even within animals that have hoofs one must make a separation. Also, maybe then sharks, whales and dolphins are forbidden in order that one has to make a separation even within animals that move in the water.

Finally with regard to insects once they have four legs they are considered land animals, and hence not kosher. (They actually have six legs, see our discussion on 11:19,20 "Do the locomotion.") Also, relative to birds, the insects are land animals since they do not get as high in the air as birds. The exception is grasshoppers, which jump off the ground, and hence they are classified by their movement in air and considered like birds. Also, maybe they can be eaten to be merciful in times when there is a plague of locusts since then at least people can eat the grasshoppers.

Vayikra 11 (Shemini) – Tumah of the animals and separation

Chapter 11 of the book of Vayikra discusses which animals can be eaten and which animals are tamei. Why are animals tamei and why was their tumah recorded in conjunction with the laws of eating? There are at least four possible ways of understanding this apparent connection between tumah of the animals and the laws of eating.

One possibility is that these are two separate laws that happened to be recorded together. However, just the fact that two concepts are recorded together indicates that these are not unrelated ideas. This juxtaposition also occurs in Devarim 14:3-21, which records the animals that can be eaten and again refers to the animals as being tamei though without mentioning the consequences of the tumah.

The second possibility is that the animals cannot be eaten because they are tamei. With this possibility, the tumah of the animals is independent of the laws of eating and is the cause why some animals can be eaten and some cannot. A possible support for this approach is that Nachshoni (1987, p. 440) writes that Chazal understand that eating forbidden foods damages the soul of the person. Why should a soul be so damaged? One possibility is that this damage is from the tumah that resides in the forbidden animals.

Samet (2002, p. 44) also follows this idea that tumah causes animals to be forbidden as food. He claims that all the animals that creep cannot be eaten, 11:41,42, but only eight of them are tamei, 11:29-38, which leads him to argue that the prohibition of eating an animal does not cause the animal to be tamei. Yet, 11:43,44 explicitly record that all beings that creep on the ground are tamei, even though the Torah does not specify in which situation does the tumah exist. The eight animals are animals that creep have more cases of tumah than the other animals that creep.

This approach that tumah is the independent variable implies that there is something intrinsically wrong with the animals that are tamei and this is difficult. As noted by Hoffmann (1953, Introduction to chapter 11, p. 217) the Torah repeatedly writes that they are tamei to you, (11:4-8,27-29,28), and the term “you” implies that their tumah is not intrinsic to the animals. Also, in Vayikra 11, the forbidden fish and birds are referred to as shekets but not as being tamei. In Devarim 14, they are referred as being tamei, but if their tumah was the cause of their being forbidden to be eaten, than this fact should have been mentioned in Vayikra 11, which is the first mention of the laws, and includes an explanation, albeit cryptic, 11:45, for the laws.

The third possible connection between the laws of eating animals and their tumah is the opposite of reason two: The animals are tamei because they cannot be eaten. With this possibility, the independent factor is that animals cannot be eaten for some reason (see our discussion on 11:1-23, "The kosher animals"), and this causes the animals to be tamei. The proof for this approach is that chapter 11 first begins with laws of eating and then discuss the laws of tumah. Also, the fact that the forbidden birds and fishes are only referred to as tamei after chapter 11 (Vayikra 20:25 and Devarim 14:10) implies that they are tamei since they are forbidden to be eaten. The tumah would then be so that one will not come to eat the animals. With this idea, even an animal that is permitted to be eaten, but it dies without being slaughtered (nevelah) is tamei, 11:39,40, since it would be forbidden in the future (Devarim 14:21), in the desert it was forbidden to the priests (22:8) and even for the general population in the desert it was not desired for people to eat such meat, see our discussion on 22:8, "Dead meat I."

The fourth possible connection between the two sets of laws is that both are based on the identical rationale. The concluding sentences to chapter 11, 11:46,47, record “This is the law… that there may be-separation between the tamei and the pure, between the living-creatures that can be eaten and the living-creatures that you are not to eat.” These verses imply that both the laws of eating and the tumah of animals relate to the idea of separation. What does this mean?

The two verses prior to the concluding sentences, 11:44,45, while apparently just referring to laws by the animals that creep and swarm, really provide an explanation for the whole chapter, and they state that the people are to be kadosh and that one should not become tamei. Kedusha is to separate, and tumah is indicative of a lack of separation, see our discussion above on chapters 11-25 "To separate." This separation here is between people and animals that most animals cannot be eaten and a person becomes tamei if one touches them after they died. Eating forbidden animals ends this separation between people and animals and hence reduces the kedusha of the individual. Similarly, when animals are alive there is a natural division between people and animals since animals can move, but when they are dead the animals are tamei to keep them separate from people.

Thus, maybe the reason for both the laws relating to eating and tumah is that since the Jewish people are a separated people they must separate in some way from the animals. This separation between animals and mankind is because man was created in the image of G-d (Bereshit 1:26,27) and animals were not.

Note, one could claim that the third and fourth possibilities are complementary that according to the third possibility, the point of the tumah of the animals is to stop people from eating animals, and it leads to a separation between mankind and the animals, the fourth possibility.