Bemidbar (Numbers) 34:16-29 –The significance of the fifth list of tribal leaders in the book of Bemidbar (Numbers)

The book of Bemidbar has five lists of tribal leaders. The first time is the opening words of Bemidbar, 1:5-15, and these same names are mentioned in chapter two within the count of the four parts of the camp. Afterwards, chapter 7 records the sacrifices of these same people and then 10:14-27 records again the list of tribal leaders. The fifth and last time there is a list of the tribal leaders is 34:16-29. Note there is another list of tribal officials, the spies, 13:4-16, who were not the leaders of the tribe. Also, see Olson (1996, p. 189) who suggests that these five lists can be used to form a literary division of the book of Bemidbar.

The fifth list of tribal leaders differs from the other four lists since it only has ten tribes, as opposed to twelve in the other lists, because the tribal leaders of Reuven and Gad are not mentioned in the fifth list because those tribes were receiving land outside of the land of Israel. 

Another difference is that within the ten tribes, the order of the tribal leaders does not follow the usual pattern in the other four lists of tribal leaders, as all the other lists are based on the birth order of the progenitors of the tribes and/ or the place in the camp of the tribes. For example, in the fifth list, the leader of the tribe of Binyamin is mentioned before the tribal leaders of Menashe and Efrayim, 34:21-23. Also, in the fifth list, the tribal leaders of the tribes of Zevulun and Yissachar are not mentioned in conjunction with the tribe of Yehuda, who camped together, and Zevulun is mentioned before Yissachar, his older brother (also in Devarim 33:18, maybe for the same reason), 34:25,26.  Also, in the fifth list of tribal leaders, Dan is listed separate from the other tribes who descended from Bilha and Zilpa, 34:22.

Instead, as noted by many (see Milgrom, 1990, p. 288) the order of the fifth list of tribal leaders follows the geographical distribution of the tribes in the land of Israel starting from the south and moving northwards. The list does not follow the exact pattern, but if one views each pair of tribes as a group, then the pairs move up in five “levels” in the land of Israel. Note, within each pair, the tribe with the larger population as recorded in Bemidbar 26 is mentioned first.  Also, the listing of the tribe of Dan is based on where they were supposed to get land, what roughly today is called Gush Dan, the center of Israel by the coast.

We see from the order of the fifth list of tribal leaders in the book of Bemidbar that before the Jewish people entered the land of Israel, it was known the general area where the tribes would be in the land. This would seem to be obvious since people would need to know where to go when they reached the land and there would not be fights with each person grabbing some particular land. Furthermore, it could be that as part of the investiture of Yehoshua, 27:18-23, the general division of the land was determined with the urim.

 
This change in the order of the tribes by the fifth list of tribal leaders signals the change in the people that had transpired from the beginning of the book of Bemidbar to the end of the book of Bemidbar. The first four lists of tribal leaders in the beginning of the book of Bemidbar revolved around the camp of the people in the desert/ wilderness, but the fifth list of tribal leaders, based on where the people were going to live in the land of Israel, shows that at the end of the forty years of the people's stay in the desert/ wilderness, the people were primed and ready to take possession of the land of Israel. Note, also the surrounding text of 33:50-36:13 record laws and narrative which indicate that the settlement of the land was imminent. 

Bibliography:

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Olson, Dennis, 1996, Numbers: Interpretation- A Bible Commentary for teaching and preaching, Louisville: John Knox Press.

Bemidbar 36:5-9 – The elders of the tribe of Menashe and the daughters of Tzelofhad: Tribalism

Bemidbar 36:1-4 records that the elders of the tribe of Menashe were afraid that the tribe of Menashe would lose some of its land if the daughters of Tzelofhad, who were to inherit land, would marry outside of the tribe. 36:5-9 records that Moshe told them that their fears were justified and hence he instructed the daughters of Tzelofhad to marry men from the tribe of Menashe.

There are different opinions how to understand Moshe’s response. The Talmud quotes Shmuel (Baba Bathra 120a) that Moshe was only giving advice and the Ramban (on 36:7, again see Baba Bathra 120a) suggests that the law not to mix-up the tribal land was only for that generation. Both of these approaches are possible, but the simplest understanding of Moshe’s response is that restriction on who to marry was binding and for all generations since there is no indication in the Torah that this was just advice or a temporary law.

As pointed out by the Ramban (on 36:7) and the Bekhor Shor (on 36:9), it is not clear if restricting women who can inherit property to marry within their tribes, will stop land from “moving” to another tribe. 36:8 records that only if a woman is going to inherit land, then she cannot marry outside of her tribe, but the Torah does not limit all women from marrying outside of their tribe. This means that there could be a case where a woman has a brother or many brothers, who were supposed to inherit their father’s land, and the woman married outside of her tribe thinking that her brother(s) would inherit her father’s land. However, if her brother or brothers died without any children, then the woman would seem to inherit from her father even if she had married outside of her tribe. Yet, this case would probably not occur that much.

Why was it a problem if land “moved” from one tribe to another? What would be so bad if a person from one tribe lived and owned land amongst another tribe, as everybody was part of the same nation? Why did Moshe just not respond to the tribe of Menashe that it is not a problem if a person from another tribe would own land within their tribe? Also, just like the tribe of Menashe could have “lost” land, the tribe could have “gained” land if a person from the tribe married a woman who would inherit land from another tribe.

These questions are part of the larger question of why did the Jewish people maintain the tribal structure by the division of the land? Was this for legal reasons as maybe it was considered easier to judge people within one’s tribe? Was the tribal system considered a simpler way to administer a large nation? Or, was it that the tribal affinity was so great that people did not want to give it up even if it meant weakening the bonds of the nation as a whole?

Maybe the goal of maintaining tribes and their land was a way to maintain the names of the sons and even grandsons of Yaakov. The idea of keeping a name of their father is the claim of the daughters of Tzelofhad, 27:4, and is the basis for the law of yibbum, Devarim 25:6. This concern could also be with the names of the children of Yaakov, and the Jewish people are called in the Torah the sons of Yisrael, see for example 36:1,2,3,4,7,8,9,13. By distributing the land based on tribal names, this maintains the names of the sons of Yaakov and the two grandsons who Yaakov blessed in Bereshit 48. This same idea would then apply to not allowing some tribes to inherit land within other tribes since with the land “moving” within the tribes, it is theoretically possible that after enough years, a tribe’s land would lose its distinctive name.

A minor proof for this idea that the goal here is to maintain the names of the sons of Yaakov is that 36:1,5,12, three times refer to Menashe as the son of Yosef. This reference to Yosef is not necessary, but it does hint that the basis for the law to marry within the tribe is keep the name of Yosef, and then his brothers, the sons of Yaakov/ Yisrael.

Interestingly, to this day, the Jewish people are known based on the name of Yehuda, the fourth son of Yaakov.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 35:27 – A cost-benefit calculation by the accidental killer

Bemidbar (Numbers) 35:27 records that if an accidental killer leaves the city of refuge, then the relative of the person killed is allowed to kill the accidental killer.  Yet, Bemidbar 35:25 records that the people are to save the accidental killer from the relative of the victim. Also, Devarim 19:1-10 stresses that the people are obligated to prepare the way to the city of the refuge and to establish even more cities of refugee if their territory becomes larger in order to stop innocent blood from being shed, i.e. to stop the relative from killing the accidental killer. This means the accidental killer is not deserving of death.  Why did the Torah allow the relative of the victim to kill the accidental killer?

Luzzatto (on 35:12, see also N. Leibowitz, 1980a, pp. 189-193) explains that in olden times people believed that they had to avenge the deaths of their relatives even if the person was killed accidentally. The Torah could not change this belief immediately, and if the Torah would have forbidden the relative from killing in revenge, then he/ she would have done so in any event. The net result would have been that another person (the relative who killed) would also die for committing murder. Hence, the Torah limited the right to take revenge to outside the city of refuge with the hope that this would cause this desire to take revenge to end. The idea is that really the Torah does not want people to take revenge and this permission is based on human weaknesses. Yet, just because of human weakness, we allow a person to murder somebody who does not deserve to die? Even if taking revenge was the custom in olden times, if the relative was convicted of murder and punished, then this would eradicate this norm of taking revenge.

My guess is that the allowance of the relative to kill the accidental killer meant that relatives were a type of police to force the accidental murderer to go to the city of refuge and to stay there until the high priest died either as a punishment or as a form of atonement for the accidental killer. The permission for the relative to kill was then a cost-benefit calculation. The benefit of allowing the relative of the victim to kill the accidental killer was that this put pressure on the accidental killer to go to the city of refuge and to stay there. The cost is that if the accidental killer did not succeed in fleeing to the city of refugee or tried to leave the city of refugee and then he/ she would be killed even though he/ she did not deserve to die. The basis for the law is then that the benefit of forcing the accidental killer to flee to the city of refugee and stay in the city of refuge was greater than the chance that the accidental killer would not safely reach the city of refuge.

Bibliography:

Leibowitz, Nehama, 1980a, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Bemidbar 35:28 - The death of the high priest and the accidental killer: Something unpredictable

Bemidbar 35:28 records that if a person kills accidently, then he must remain in the city of refuge until the high priest dies. What is the connection between the death of the high priest and the permission for the accidental killer to leave the city of refuge?

Rambam (Moreh 3:40) explains that the death of the high priest will abate the desire of the relatives of the victim for revenge. This idea follows the approach that the city of refuge was an asylum.

A popular approach (see Rashi and Luzzatto on 35:25) is that the death of the high priest serves as a form of atonement for the accidental murderer. Just as the actions of the high priest, as for example on Yom Kippur, bring atonement to people, so too his death brings atonement for the accidental murderer. This approach follows the idea that the city of refuge was for the accidental murderer to attain atonement.

Seforno suggests that as the responsibility for the accidental murder differs in each case due to the "degree of accident" involved in the particular case, so then the stay in the city of refuge also differs. This leaves the judgment to G-d to ensure that those accidental murderers who are relatively guiltier will stay in the city of refuge for longer time periods. This approach follows the idea that the city of refuge is to punish the accidental murderer.

My guess is that the conditioning of the release of the accidental killer from the city of refuge upon the death of the high priest is to make the accidental killer's stay in the city of refuge indeterminate since who knows how long the high priest will live. This indeterminacy matches the accidental nature of the murder since both are unpredictable. The "punishment" for killing accidentally then follows the usual formula of being a measure for measure. With this idea, the death of the high priest is ad hoc. There is a need for some unpredictable event to end the period of asylum, and the death of the high priest serves this purpose. As discussed in our commentary on Shemot 2:11-23 "An accidental killing," I believe that the death of Pharaoh served the same purpose to enable Moshe to return to Egypt.