Bereshit 44:18 – 45:3 – Almost the end of the game between Yosef and his brothers: Yehuda’s great speech

Bereshit 44:18-34 records Yehuda’s great speech which prompted Yosef to reveal himself to his brothers. It is rare that a speech alone can get a determined person to change their views but this is what happened. Yosef had been determined to keep Binyamin in Egypt and Yehuda’s speech got him to change his mind.

Yehuda’s speech was in response to Yosef’s messengers finding Yosef’s goblet in Binyamin’s pack, 44:12, and then Yosef’s rejection of Yehuda’s offer that all the brothers would be slaves, as Yosef had insisted that only the "guilty" person, Binyamin, be a slave, 44:16,17. Yehuda knew that Binyamin had been framed that Binyamin had not stolen the goblet, but he did not argue that Binyamin was innocent. Instead, Yehuda made a counter proposal that he would be a slave instead of Binyamin, 44:32-34. Yet, how could this be a counter-offer since it was less than the previous offer that all the brothers would be slaves? Furthermore, this counter-offer only accounts for the end of Yehuda's speech, 44:32-34, what is the point of the rest of the speech, 44:18-31?

The point of Yehuda’s speech was to make Yosef realize that if Yosef would keep Binyamin in Egypt then Yosef would kill Yaakov. Yehuda states this point before his counter-offer, 44:30,31, and then at the very end of the speech after he made his counter-offer, 44:34. Why should Yehuda have thought that a ruler of Egypt would be concerned about the father of a thief? Do judges give lenient sentences because the father of a criminal would feel bad if their son is punished?

Seforno (on 44:16-18) explains that as Yosef had said that only the guilty person should be punished, then Yehuda followed this logic and argued that Yosef was also punishing Yaakov an innocent bystander. Yet, families always suffer when a family member who is a criminal is punished, why should Yosef, a supposed Egyptian official, be considered about an innocent bystander and a foreigner to boot?

Netziv (on 44:17) explains that once only Binyamin was to be punished, Yehuda realized that the punishment was not due to the brothers throwing Yosef into the pit, and accordingly, he tried everything in his power to change the punishment.

Luzzatto (on 44:18) notes that Yosef in his response in 44:17 seemed to be speaking in a kind manner since he said to them go in peace, and this suggested to Yehuda to appeal for mercy.

While these suggestions are possible, the simplest idea is that Yehuda knew that Yosef would care about Yaakov since Yehuda knew that he was speaking to Yosef. This knowledge was learned from their meal the night before when Yosef seated all of the brothers according to their age, 44:33, Yosef’s statement about Binyamin in 43:29, Yosef’s actions towards them as for example demanding to see Binyamin even though this had nothing to do with his accusation of them being spies, Yosef’s concern about their father and the usual curiosity of people to investigate people who are tormenting them, see our discussions on 43:23-34 "The middle of the game between Yosef and his brothers: Know thy enemy," 

The one and only “proof” that Yehuda and the brothers did not know it was Yosef is that it is claimed that 45:3 records that the brothers were surprised when Yosef revealed himself. This surprise would only make sense if they did not know that it was Yosef. However, the word translated as surprised, nivahlu, really means scared as in the only other occurrence of the word in the Torah, Shemot 15:15. (This is also the usual translation of the word in Neviim and Ketuvim, and one wonders if the translation here as surprised is because people think that the brothers did not know that Yosef was speaking to them.)

Thus, as explained by the Bekhor Shor (on 45:3), 45:3 should be understood that the brothers were scared that Yosef was going to take revenge on them after he had revealed himself to them. This would be similar to the idea of cat playing with a mouse before the cat eats the mouse. Here Yosef had been playing with the brothers, and then once he revealed himself to them, the brothers were scared that literally the gauntlet was going to come down on them for trying to kill him. Sadly they were still scared even seventeen years later, 50:15, that Yosef would take revenge on them.

Once we understand that Yehuda knew that he was speaking to Yosef, then we can understand what prompted his great speech, and why he did not make this speech previously. At the end of Yosef's response to Yehuda's first offer that all the brothers would be slaves, Yosef said that the brothers, except for Binyamin, should "go in peace to your father," 44:17. Yehuda's response was that if you really care about peace with (y)our father, then I will tell you that your actions will kill our father, and this was the point of his speech. Yehuda was hoping that if Yosef would understand what he was doing to Yaakov then either Yosef would release Binyamin or he would reveal himself and end the charade.

I will now go through the speech verse by verse to point out clues that Yehuda knew he was speaking to Yosef.

44:18 records that Yehuda began his speech by approaching Yosef, apparently getting very close since before he had been standing before Yosef. How could he have been so bold? David Barett (personal correspondence) suggests that because Yehuda knew that it was Yosef, he knew that Yosef would allow him to approach. Yehuda approached Yosef to speak to him personally, brother to brother, in an attempt to awaken within Yosef his feelings towards his family.

44:18 also records that Yehuda began his speech by noting that Yosef was equal to Pharaoh, 44:18. This was to acknowledge Yosef’s dream that he had become a ruler. This was the hope that if the Yosef would realize that his dream was realized then Yosef would reveal himself.

Afterwards, Yehuda quoted Yosef, that Yosef had asked the brothers if they had a father or brother, 44:19. This quote is not recorded in the Torah by the first meeting between Yosef and his brothers in Egypt, 42:10-13, but later Yehuda told Yaakov that such a conversation ensued, 43:7. Was Yehuda embellishing here and in 43:7 or did 42:10-13 not record all the particulars of the conversation? (See Hizkuni and Radak on 44:19.)

In any event, the question, do you have a father, makes no sense since everybody has a father. However, this question introduces the theme of the speech to make Yosef aware of what he was doing to his father, Yaakov. Yehuda was trying to wake Yosef up that by not revealing himself he was acting as if he had no father that he did not care about Yaakov.

Yehuda then told Yosef that the brothers had responded to Yosef's supposed question by stating, "We have an old father and a young child, yeled, of his old age, zekunim, whose brother is dead, so that he alone is left of his mother and his father who loves him," 44:20 (Fox, 1995, translation). This verse raises several questions.

One, there is no record in the Torah of the brothers telling Yosef all this information. Would the brothers have mentioned to Yosef all this information?

Two, Yehuda refers to Binyamin as a yeled, a child, but Binyamin was then 33 years old. Also, in the remainder of the speech Yehuda refers to him as a na'ar, which in the Torah can mean adult, as by Yehoshua, Shemot 33:11, so why in 44:20 did Yehuda refer to Binyamin as a child instead of as a na'ar?

Three, Yehuda referred to Binyamin as zekunim (see Rashbam on 35:18), which is translated as the child of Yaakov's old age, but we know from 37:3, that the term ben zekunim was referring to Yosef and not Binyamin. It could be that after Yosef was sold, Binyamin became the ben zekunim, but this is unlikely since Binyamin was eleven when Yosef was sold and the designation of a ben zekunim is at the time of the birth of a child, see our discussion on 37:3, "The anticipated child,"  

Four, Yehuda said that the brothers told Yosef that Binyamin's brother, Yosef, was dead, but not only did Yehuda not know that Yosef was dead, but also throughout the story and later during the speech Yehuda said that one brother was gone, 42:13,32, and 44:28, and not dead. Rashi (on 44:20) writes that Yehuda said this out of fear that if he said Yosef was alive, then Yosef would have demanded that the brothers bring this brother. Yet, Yehuda had already told them that the "other brother" was missing, why now would Yehuda say that the "other brother" was dead?

Five, Yehuda said that the brothers had told Yosef that he, Binyamin, alone was left of his mother, and he repeats this idea in 44:27. Was Yosef supposed to have known that the brothers were from different mothers? All along, the brothers referred to Binyamin as their brother, and there is no indication that they ever called him a half-brother. Was it so obvious from looking at Binyamin, that he had a different mother than the other brothers?

Six, why did Yehuda refer to Binyamin's mother in 44:20? It appears that Yehuda was quoting Yaakov's statement from 42:38, but Yaakov had not referred to Rahel, Binyamin's mother, in 42:38. Why would a stranger have cared about the mother of a criminal?

Seven, the last word in the verse, “who his father loved,” also seems to refer to Yosef, as 37:3 records that Yaakov loved Yosef, and there is no mention in the Torah that Yaakov had a special love for Binyamin.

One might answer all these questions by claiming that Yehuda was stumbling at the beginning of his speech, and hence he made minor errors. Yet, there are so many “errors” in 44:20 and afterwards the speech is so well crafted that it is difficult to accept that 44:20 is full of errors. More likely, while Yehuda was ostensibly talking about Binyamin, he was also talking about Yosef since he knew he was speaking to Yosef.

Yehuda used the term child, yeled, in 44:20 since this was how the brothers referred to Yosef. When Reuven came back to the pit after the brothers had put Yosef there, he told the brothers, the child is gone, 37: 30, also see 42:22. Also, when Yehuda used the term zekunim, this again was referring to Yosef since he was the ben zekunim and not Binyamin. In addition, Yehuda referred to Binyamin's mother, since she was also Yosef's mother.

Why did Yehuda in 44:20 refer to the other brother as being dead? Who is the other brother? Was Yehuda referring to Yosef as being dead? If yes, maybe the idea was that Yehuda was suggesting that Yosef was acting as if he was dead to the family. Or, if Yosef is the subject of the term zekunim, then the other brother is Binyamin, and then maybe the term dead can mean before Binyamin was born since both situations are when somebody is not alive. Yehuda was then trying to recall to Yosef the time before Binyamin was born, when Yosef was alone with him mother. With this reading, the ensuing phrase, he alone is left of his mother and father, could refer to Binyamin, that the brother who was not born then, was presently the only one left of his mother. Or, the phrase of being left alone, could also refer to Yosef before Binyamin was born, when Yosef was alone with his mother. (Note, the similar phrase in Bereshit 32:25 means that Yaakov was left alone.)

Maybe the point of 44:20 is that Yehuda told Yosef to remember the times when your brother was not alive (before Binyamin was born) and you, Yosef, was alone with your mother and father who loved you. If this is correct, then Yehuda made up this verse to remind Yosef of his early childhood. Yehuda wanted to return Yosef to his family, and he did this by trying to recall to Yosef what surely were Yosef's best memories of his family when his mother was alive and doting on him along with Yaakov. Once Yehuda could bring Yosef back to the family, then Yehuda could impress on Yosef the harm he would cause Yaakov if he did not let Binyamin return home.

The following verse, 44:21, records that Yehuda said that Yosef wanted the brothers to bring Binyamin to Egypt so that Yosef could see him. This idea of Yosef wanting to see Binyamin is not mentioned when the brothers first came to Egypt, but maybe this was not recorded previously or maybe Yehuda inferred this from Yosef when Yosef made the request/ demand for the brothers to bring Binyamin to Egypt. In any event, maybe Yehuda mentioned this idea of Yosef seeing Binyamin to point out that if Yosef’s goal was to see Binyamin, then you saw him, so now you can let him go.

44:22 then records that the brothers told Yosef that if Binyamin would leave his father, then somebody would die. While Rashi (on 44:22) explains that the someone was Binyamin, more likely the person was Yaakov (see Rashbam on 44:22). Yehuda was trying to explain to Yosef what Yosef was doing to Yaakov when he had insisted that Binyamin had to come to Egypt. Yosef understood this, and he would state in 45:3, “Is my father alive?” see our discussion below on 45:3b, “Present danger.”

44:23 then records Yehuda’s recollection of Yosef’s response to the brother’s previous statement that bringing Binyamin could kill Yaakov. While the beginning of 44:23 is the gist of what Yosef told them in their first encounter, the end of the verse, where Yehuda said that Yosef said “lo tosefun lirot panei,” you shall not see my face is never recorded in the Torah. Dorit Friedman (Mekor Rishon, 14.12.2007, Shabbat section, p. 4, perek camos bechayei ha-tatua) points out that the root of the word tosefun, is the name Yosef, and she suggested that Yehuda was hinting to Yosef that he knew that he was speaking to Yosef.

The following verses in Yehuda’s speech, 44:24-29, refer to the discussions between the brothers and Yaakov when the brothers returned from their first encounter with Yosef in Egypt. 44:24, as well as 44:27,30,31, record that Yehuda told Yosef that Yaakov was a servant to Yosef, but this was not true for a person from another land who was not in Egypt or an Egyptian. Again, this statement only makes sense if Yehuda knew he was speaking to Yosef, and then the point was that Yehuda was trying to tell Yosef that Yaakov had also accepted Yosef’s second dream where Yaakov was to bow down to Yosef.

44:25 records that Yehuda uses the plural, our father, 44:25, also in 44:31, when he should have always used the singular my father. Perhaps the plural is to include Yosef.

44:26 records that the brothers explained to Yaakov that they could only go back to Egypt to get food if they took Binyamin and then 44:27 records Yehuda’s recollection of Yaakov’s response to the brothers’ statement that they need to bring Binyamin to Egypt. 44:27 (also 44:20 as mentioned above) is odd that Yehuda claimed that Yaakov had stated that he only had two sons from his wife, but all along, the brothers had claimed that they were one family, 42:13. The only way that Yehuda's statement in 44:27 made sense was if someone knew Yaakov's family, like Yosef. If Yehuda knew that he was speaking to Yosef, then we understand that Yehuda could talk as if it was known that Binyamin was from a different mother, and that Yaakov only had two sons from his beloved wife. I have been told that it was so obvious that people had many wives, but the term “my wife” in 44:27 implies one wife.  Furthermore, as pointed out by Robert Alter (2004, p. 258) in 44:27 Yehuda was accepting Yaakov’s favoritism of Rahel and Yosef. The verse and 44:20 would only make sense if the person hearing Yehuda’s speech knew Yaakov's family.

44:28 continue Yehuda recollecting Yaakov’s response to the brothers' request to bring Binyamin to Egypt. In this verse, Yehuda refers to Yaakov’s statement when the brothers brought back Yosef’s special coat, 37:33. Why would Yehuda mention to Yosef that Yaakov thought that Yosef had been attacked by an animal? Would this information have been relevant to a stranger who did not know the previous interaction between Yosef and the brothers? Obviously, no. However, since Yehuda knew that he was speaking to Yosef, he could mention this information since Yosef had known that the brothers were going to claim that he had been attacked by an animal, as they stated this prior to his arrival to them 37:20, and most likely again when they ripped the special coat off of him, 37:23.

The end of 44:28 records that Yehuda said that Yaakov said “that he had not seen Yosef since then.” Again, was this information relevant to a stranger? No. Instead, Yehuda was trying to tell Yosef that Yaakov had not given up on seeing him,. 

42:29 records Yehuda paraphrasing Yaakov’s statement in 42:38 when the brothers first returned from Egypt. In terms of strict chronological order, Yaakov’s recollection of 42:38 in 44:29 occurred before Yaakov told the brothers to go back to Egypt to get food, 43:2, which Yehuda had already mentioned in 44:25. However, the order of the events was not important to Yehuda since he was building up to the damage that Yosef was going to cause to Yaakov by keeping Binyamin in Egypt. This damage was not just causing Yaakov to die, which Yehuda had mentioned in 44:22, but even worse, that Yaakov would suffer a fate of “evil in Sheol” something apparently relating to either dying in a terrible state or referring to something bad in the afterlife.

In 44:30, Yehuda returns to the present, and he mentioned the special connection that existed between Yaakov and Binyamin. I have always thought that this special connection is true for all parents with their children, but again, as in the end of 44:20, Yehuda is trying to remind Yosef of Yaakov’s love for him.

In 44:31, Yehuda’s ends the background information to his offer to replace Binyamin, by stating that Yosef would not only kill Yaakov but also it would be a terrible death, “sorrow in Sheol” if Yosef did not release Binyamin.

44:32,33 record Yehuda’s offer to replace Binyamin, and while this offer is the official point of the speech, it is anti-climactic in the sense that it does not relate to building up the effect that Yosef was going to have on Yaakov by keeping Binyamin in Egypt. Because 44:32,33 was anti-climactic, in 44:34, the last verse of the speech, Yehuda returns to the main theme of his speech that if Yosef insisted on keeping Binyamin in Egypt, then he would cause Yaakov to have a horrible death. As mentioned above, the speech was so effective that Yosef officially revealed himself to his brothers, 45:1-3.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

25:19 – The elleh toledot unit of Yitzhak

25:19 records elleh toledot Yitzhak the son of Avraham, Avraham begot Yitzhak. The end of this verse is surprising since after the Torah records that Yitzhak was the son of Avraham in the beginning of the verse, why does the Torah need to record that Avraham fathered Yitzhak in the end of the verse?

Several answers have been suggested to explain the end of 25:19. Rashi (on 25:19, based on Baba Metzia 87a) explains that the end of the verse is to stress that Yitzhak was Avraham’s son since he looked like Avraham, and not Avimelekh’s son as claimed by cynics. Ibn Ezra (on 25:19) quotes this idea and adds that maybe the point of the verse is to tell us that Avraham raised Yitzhak. Ramban (on 25:19) suggests that the end of the verse is telling us that only Yitzhak and not Avraham’s other children should be considered Avraham’s successor.

While all of these suggestions are possible, my guess is that the phrase, “Avraham begot Yitzhak,” is recorded as part of the elleh toledot structure of the book of Bereshit, see above our discussion "Introduction: The structure of the book of Bereshit" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/10/structure-of-book-of-bereshit.html

Verse 25:19 is an example of a verse that begins a lengthy elleh toledot narrative section of the book of Bereshit, as does 11:27 and 37:2. 25:19 records elleh toledot of Yitzhak, and the section proceeds to recount the story of Yitzhak’s son, Yaakov. This is also the pattern of 11:27, which records the phrase elleh toledot Terah and the ensuing section recounts the story of Terah’s son, Avraham, and 37:2, which record the phrase elleh toledot Yaakov and the ensuing section recounts the story of Yaakov’s son, Yosef.

Even when the phrase elleh toledot begins a lengthy narrative section, still the section is framed from a genealogical perspective. Thus, the lengthy narrative elleh toledot sections begin with a genealogical reference to of a child or children of the person referred to in the heading, and end with the death of the child. For example, 11:27 records elleh toledot Terah, and then records that Terah begot Avram, Nahor and Haran, and fourteen chapters later, the section ends with Avraham’s death, 25:8-11. 37:2 records elleh toledot Yaakov and that Yosef was 17 years old, and the section ends with Yosef’s death, 50:26.

Our elleh toledot section, also begins with genealogical details. It mentions that Yitzhak was the son of Avraham (the first half of 25:19) and then it records the birth of Yitzhak’s children, 25:20-26. The statement that Yitzhak was Avraham’s son, which is known from 21:2,3, was because this was a new toledot section, and genealogical information is repeated in a new toledot section, as for example by Noah’s sons 5:32 and 6:10 and by Terah’s sons 11:26,27. However, in contrast to the other lengthy toledot sections, this elleh toledot section ends with the death of Yitzhak, 35:28,29, and not with the deaths of Yitzhak’s children, Yaakov or Esav. I believe that this anomaly explains the need for the phrase “Avraham begot Yitzhak” in the second half of 25:19.

The elleh toledot section of Yitzhak should have ended with the death of Yaakov following the usual pattern in Bereshit that the section ends with the death of son of the person referred in the elleh toledot phrase. However, Yaakov could not die at the end of the section of elleh toledot Yitzhak since he also plays a crucial part in the story of Yosef, the following section. Accordingly, somebody else had to die at the end of the toledot section to maintain the genealogical framework of the elleh toledot structure, and this person was Yitzhak. Yet, if Yitzhak’s death ended the section, then the section has to start with his birth. Thus, the phrase, “Avraham begot Yitzhak,” is recorded in 25:19 to mark Yitzhak’s birth, which enables his death to end the section.

If the toledot section starts with Yitzhak’s birth and ends with his death, then why was the section not titled elleh toledot Avraham? This would follow the rule that the death of the person who ends the toledot section is the son of the person in the phrase elleh toledot. The answer is that the son of the person in the phrase elleh toledot is also the main character of the section, and Yitzhak is not the main character of the section from 25:19-35:29, as Yaakov is the main character of the section. Therefore, the section begins elleh toledot Yitzhak, which means the main character in the section will be Yitzhak's son, Yaakov, but as Yitzhak’s death ends the section, his birth also begins the section, which is the phrase, “Avraham begot Yitzhak.” Yitzhak’s birth and death are then the genealogical markers to this elleh toledot section from 25:19 through 35:29.

Bereshit 1:5,8,13,19,23,31; 2:2 and Shemot 20:11 - The seven days of creation

Bereshit 1:5,8,13,19,23,31 and 2:2 refer to the seven days of the creation of the world that G-d created the world in six days and “rested” on the seventh day. These days are a literary framework for the description of the creation of the world in the Torah. 

These seven days are difficult for several reasons. One, according to science the world is around 13.8 billion years and not six/ seven days. Two, the days are unnecessary to the narrative. The Torah could simply have recorded the different items created without stating that they were created on particular days. Three, even if it was desired for the description of the creation of the world to have a literary framework, why was it days and not the phrase “G-d saw that X was good?” The phrase “G-d saw that X was good” appears seven times within the description of the creation of the world, 1:4,12,18,21,23,25,31, and would also seem to be a way of dividing the description of the creation of the world into seven groups. Or, as discussed in the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot 5:1, the creation of the word could have been divided by G-d’s statements, which appear nine times in chapter one. (The Mishnah records that the phrase appears ten times, and commentators to the Mishnah attempt to find the tenth statement by G-d.) Finally, one could ask the question of the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot, why was the world not created complete in one instance? Or, why did the Torah just not record, “G-d created the world” without any of the particular details?

The answer to all these questions is from Shemot 20:11, which is part of the Decalogue, and some people recite this verse as part of kiddush on Shabbat morning. The verse records “For in six days G-d made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in it, and he rested on the seventh day; therefore (al ken) G-d gave the seventh day his blessing, and he hallowed it,” Fox translation, 1995, p. 371. This verse is similar to the last verse in the description of the creation of the world in 2:3, though 2:3 does not have the word, therefore. 

Shemot 20:11 is telling us that the division of the creation of the world into seven days was in order that the seventh day, Shabbat, would be special, which occurred by G-d “resting” on the seventh day. In theory, G-d could have created the word without the framework of days, and then told the Jewish people to rest every seventh day. Yet, if this were true, the resting on the seventh day would not be related to the creation of the world. Instead, the seven day literary framework within the description of the creation of the world is to create a connection between a person resting on Shabbat and the creation of the world.

Accordingly, even if scientifically the world is 13.8 billion years, the point of the days within the description of the creation of the world is for people to make the seventh day special. Even if each day in chapter one of Bereshit is really billions or millions of years, still the usage of the word day is for people living after creation to relate the creation of the world to their normal twenty four day and seven day week. The creation of the world could not been recorded by a division of years or even periods since then there would be no connection between Shabbat and the creation of the world. Also, the phrase “and G-d saw that X was good,” could not be used as the literary framework of the description of the creation of the world since it does not relate to people keeping the Shabbat. Possibly to ensure that this phrase is not used as a literary framework, the phrase is not used on days two and seven. For the same reason, the creation of the world could not be framed around G-d’s statements, as again this would not relate the creation of the world to resting on Shabbat. Finally, for the same reason there had to be a division in the description of the creation of the world into seven days and not one instantaneous act or just one verse which stated that G-d created the world. Note this idea might be an example of the principle in the Midrash that G-d looked into the Torah when He created the world, (Bereshit Rabbah 1:1), as the description of the creation of the world in the Torah with regard to the number of days is based on people in the future observing Shabbat.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books

Devarim 26:4,10 – Logistics of the bikkurim ceremony

Devarim 26:1-11 record the bikkurim ceremony that a farmer was to bring some of his new crops to the chosen place and make two declarations, 26:3 and 26:5 through the first half of 26:10, the mikra bikkurim. 26:4 records that after making the first declaration, 26:3, the farmer would give a basket of his new crops to the priest who would put it down by the altar. The farmer would then recite the second declaration, 26:5 through the first half of 26:10, and after finishing this declaration, the second half of 26:10 records that the basket would be put down before G-d. How could the basket be put down twice? Did the farmer pick up the basket when making the second declaration?

The Mishnah (Bikkurim 3:6) quotes two possibilities how the basket was put down during this ceremony. The first opinion, the anonymous tanna kamma, states that the farmer holds the basket on his shoulder the entire time he is reciting the second declaration, and after finishing the declaration he puts the basket down. This opinion seems to understand that the real placing down was at the end of the second declaration, and then the first placing down mentioned in 26:4 is understood to be on the farmer’s shoulders. As noted by David Hoffmann (1961, p. 486), it is hard to reconcile this approach with a simple reading of the Torah.

The second opinion, R. Yehuda, states that when the farmer recites the second declaration, he holds the edge of the basket while the priest holds the bottom of the basket. After the farmer finished reciting the verses, he then placed the basket down. Hoffmann writes that this approach accords with the Torah, but still 26:4 seems to state that only the priest is holding the basket at this point of the ceremony and the priest would place the basket down by the altar, while with R. Yehuda’s approach, the farmer is also holding the basket when making the second declaration and the basket is not placed by the altar prior to the second declaration.

My guess is that this double reference to putting the basket down is to indicate that two actions, the farmer’s declaration and the putting down of the basket, were happening concurrently. If the Torah had only recorded that the basket was to put down once, then one would have thought that it was to be put down either before the farmer started his second declaration (if only 26:4 was recorded) or that the placing was to be done after the farmer had finished his second declaration (if only the second half of 26:10 was recorded). However, with the double reference to putting down, we see that that the basket had to be put down both before and after the second declaration. How could this be?

The crucial point is that it would take some time (a minute? five minutes?) for the priest to take the basket from the farmer and put it down by the altar. This action would begin before the farmer made the second declaration and continue when the farmer was reciting the second declaration, as then the farmer would end the declaration or part of it before the basket was put down. Thus, prior to the farmer’s second declaration, he would hand the basket to the priest, who would then go to place it by the altar. The basket was not yet placed by the altar, but this is referred to as placing it down since once the farmer hands off the basket to the priest, the process of putting the basket down has begun. When the priest was walking over to the altar and putting the basket by the altar, the farmer would recite the verses of the second declaration and at this point he would not be holding the basket at all.

The first half of 26:10 records that the farmer ends the second declaration by stating that he has brought his crops since by finishing the second declaration and by having given his crops (in the basket) to the priest, he has fulfilled his obligation to bring the bikkurim. The second half of 26:10 then records that the basket is placed down before G-d, and this is referring to the action by the priest, who placed the basket down by the altar when the farmer was reciting the verses or depending on how long it took for the priest to place the basket down, after the farmer finished making the second declaration. The putting down in 26:10 is attributed to the farmer since the priest is the messenger of the farmer, but it is the priest who is putting the basket down (see Hoffmann, 1961, p. 486).

In conclusion, the double reference to putting down the basket during the bikkurim ceremony enclose the second declaration of the farmer, and signify that when the farmer was making his second declaration the priest was simultaneously putting down the basket by the altar.

Devarim 13:2-4 – The false prophet and the process of creation of the world

Devarim 13:2-4 records that even if a person gives (predicts, announces) a sign or wonder (ot and mofet) and the sign or wonder occurs, still the people must not listen to this person to worship idolatry since by telling the people to worship idolatry, the person has self-identified him or herself as a false prophet. What is the sign and wonder (ot and mofet) that the false prophet is giving?

The terms ot and mofet appear almost always in reference to the exodus from Egypt, either with regard to proving that Moshe was G-d’s messenger (Shemot 3:12, 4:8,9,17,21,28,30) or proving G-d’s power (Shemot 7:3,9, 10:1,2, 11:10; Bemidbar 14:11,22; Devarim 4:34, 6:22, 7:19, 11:3, 26:8, 29:2). In all of these cases, the ot and mofet are miraculous in nature, but on one occasion, Devarim 28:46, by the curses when the people would not fulfill the laws, the phrase ot and mofet does not refer to the exodus and does not appear to relate to any miraculous event. In addition there are other cases, where the word ot is a non-miraculous sign like by the Shabbat (Shemot 31:13,17) and by tefillin (Shemot 13:9,16; Devarim 6:8, 11:18). The conjunction of both words ot and mofet would then seem to mean that 13:2,3 is referring to a case where the false prophet announced that some miraculous event would happen, and it occurred. This would differ from the case in Devarim 18:21,22, where the person predicts the future but does not forecast any miraculous event, see Tigay, 1996, pp. 129,178. Yet, how could the person be able to give a miraculous sign or wonder if the person was going to tell the people to worship idolatry? Would G-d enable a false prophet to be able to perform miracles as a sign?

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 90a, also in Sifrei 84) quotes an interesting argument regarding the ability of the false prophet to give the signs or wonders. R Yossi ha-Galili explains that G-d grants false prophets the ability to predict or even do these signs, but that people should not pay attention to their powers since G-d gave the person these powers to test the people. Rabbi Akiva responded to this claim by stating "G-d forbid" that G-d would give great powers to false prophets. Instead, R. Akiva explains that initially when the person gave the signs, he/ she was really a true prophet, but then later he/ she became a false prophet.

R. Akiva makes sense that it is incomprehensible that G-d would give a “bad” person the power to predict or do signs or wonders to test other people since that would be entrapment. However, R. Akiva's approach is also difficult since would a true prophet really turn so bad? I once said this explanation in my synagogue and somebody said that R. Akiva knew of Acher (Elisha ben Abuyah) who was a great scholar but he turned into a heretic. Yet, Acher was not a prophet beforehand. (With regard to Bil’am’s status, who was not initially a true prophet but he did become a prophet, see our discussion on Bemidbar chapters 22-25, “The bad, the good and the ordinary?” https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/07/bemidbar-chapters-22-25-balak-bad-good.html)

Another question on R. Akiva’s approach is why would G-d choose to grant these powers to give these signs and wonders to a person of bad character who would turn into a false prophet? Was there nobody else who G-d could have been given the powers to know these signs and was of better character? Presumably, R. Akiva would answer that there must have been a great need to make this particular person a prophet at the particular time even though G-d either knew that the person would become a false prophet (according to the idea that G-d knows the future) or that G-d knew that the person's character was such the person had a good chance of becoming a false prophet (according to the idea that G-d does not know the future). 

Abarbanel (1999, p. 213, also see Luzzatto on 13:4) offers a third approach to explain the person’s ability to give signs and wonders. He writes that it only seems that the person was able give a sign or wonder, but really he/ she had no power at all. Nehama Leibowitz (1982, p. 128) does not like the Abarbanel's explanation since she argues that the simple meaning of the Torah is that the person was able to predict a sign or wonder. Yet, the point of the Abarbanel's explanation is that some people truly believe that the false prophet performed the sign, and the Torah is writing from their perspective, that even if you believe in the powers of the false prophet, still you should not listen to the person to worship idolatry. According to the Abarbanel (and R. Akiva for a different reason), 13:2-4 is not entrapment since no sign or wonder happened, and the statement that G-d is testing you is an explanation for those people who (mistakenly) believe that the false prophet has real powers. However, for the person who knows the act is a charade then this was not a test at all.

N. Leibowitz (1982, pp. 131-133), who follows R. Yossi he-Galili, uses this case to support her general view that miracles are no proof of faith. I disagree with this understanding. My understanding is that in the Torah, miracles are a proof for the belief in G-d and Moshe, but that our verses are telling us that in the future after Moshe dies, then miracles will no longer be a source for faith since people are so easily fooled by charlatans.

The three views concerning the false prophet might also be relevant to questions about the creation of the world. The universe has billion of stars, and the question is why would G-d need to create so many stars? Also there are many animals that existed and went extinct. Why did G-d create these animals?

One "answer" to these questions is that all the stars and extinct animals are to test a person's faith, and this would correspond to R. Yossi ha-Galili's approach by the false prophet. A second answer is that it only appears that there are many stars and that animals became extinct as G-d created the world to appear to be much older and bigger than it really is. These answers would correspond to the Abarbanel's opinion that it only appeared that the false prophet could know and do the signs and wonders. The third opinion is that the billions of stars are real and truly many animals became extinct, but each of the stars and the animals had some necessary reason for being created, even if it is not obvious. This approach would correspond to R. Akiva's approach that for some reason G-d had to give a person of bad character great powers even though later on he/ she would become a false prophet.

In the book Just Six Numbers by Martin Rees (2000), he explains that all the stars and galaxies are necessary for our existence since it was needed for stars (supernovas) to explode over and over again until enough atoms were created to make our world, as initially there were just hydrogen and helium atoms, and though the explosions, carbon, oxygen and iron atoms were created.  Rees writes (pp. 49,52) “These ancient stars made the atoms of which we and our planet are composed… Accounting for the proportion of different atoms- and realizing that the Creator didn’t need to turn 92 different knobs- is a triumph of astrophysics.” Furthermore, he notes that the number of years this exploding, reforming and re-exploding were needed to make our solar system corresponds to how many years are believed to have transpired from the first stars until our solar system was founded. He writes (p. 10):

The very hugeness of our universe, which seems at first to signify how unimportant we are in the cosmic scheme, is actually entailed by our existence! This is not to say that there couldn’t have been a smaller universe, only that we could not have existed in it. The expansion of cosmic space is not an extravagant superfluity; it’s a consequence of the prolonged chain of events, extending back before our Solar System formed, that preceded out arrival on the scene.

In conclusion, I think the Abarbanel is correct in his reading of the Torah regarding the ability of the false prophet to give signs and wonders, but in reference to these questions concerning the creation of the world, I believe that R. Akiva's approach makes the most sense. For more questions on the creation world with regard to the Torah see our discussion on Bereshit chapter one, "Concordism," https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2018/10/bereshit-120-30-description-of-creation.html, and https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/10/bereshit-11-19-bereshit-some-thoughts.html.

Bibliography:

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1982, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Rees, Martin, 2000, Just six numbers: The deep forces that shape the universe, New York: Basic Books.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 35:27 – A cost-benefit calculation by the accidental killer

Bemidbar (Numbers) 35:27 records that if an accidental killer leaves the city of refuge, then the relative of the person killed is allowed to kill the accidental killer.  Yet, Bemidbar 35:25 records that the people are to save the accidental killer from the relative of the victim. Also, Devarim 19:1-10 stresses that the people are obligated to prepare the way to the city of the refuge and to establish even more cities of refugee if their territory becomes larger in order to stop innocent blood from being shed, i.e. to stop the relative from killing the accidental killer. This means the accidental killer is not deserving of death.  Why did the Torah allow the relative of the victim to kill the accidental killer?

Luzzatto (on 35:12, see also N. Leibowitz, 1980a, pp. 189-193) explains that in olden times people believed that they had to avenge the deaths of their relatives even if the person was killed accidentally. The Torah could not change this belief immediately, and if the Torah would have forbidden the relative from killing in revenge, then he/ she would have done so in any event. The net result would have been that another person (the relative who killed) would also die for committing murder. Hence, the Torah limited the right to take revenge to outside the city of refuge with the hope that this would cause this desire to take revenge to end. The idea is that really the Torah does not want people to take revenge and this permission is based on human weaknesses. Yet, just because of human weakness, we allow a person to murder somebody who does not deserve to die? Even if taking revenge was the custom in olden times, if the relative was convicted of murder and punished, then this would eradicate this norm of taking revenge.

My guess is that the allowance of the relative to kill the accidental killer meant that relatives were a type of police to force the accidental murderer to go to the city of refuge and to stay there until the high priest died either as a punishment or as a form of atonement for the accidental killer. The permission for the relative to kill was then a cost-benefit calculation. The benefit of allowing the relative of the victim to kill the accidental killer was that this put pressure on the accidental killer to go to the city of refuge and to stay there. The cost is that if the accidental killer did not succeed in fleeing to the city of refugee or tried to leave the city of refugee and then he/ she would be killed even though he/ she did not deserve to die. The basis for the law is then that the benefit of forcing the accidental killer to flee to the city of refugee and stay in the city of refuge was greater than the chance that the accidental killer would not safely reach the city of refuge.

Bibliography:

Leibowitz, Nehama, 1980a, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 17:10,11 – Moshe, a quick learner

Bemidbar17:10 records that G-d told Moshe that he and Aharon should separate from the people since G-d was about to kill the people who had accused Moshe and Aharon of killing the 250 men (17:6), and the end of 17:10 records that Moshe and Aharon fell on their faces when they heard this threat. I think that G-d did not really intend to kill all the people since then G-d would have killed the people without speaking to Moshe. (This same point can be made in other cases where G-d threatened to kill the people, as for example, after the sin of the golden calf, Shemot 32:10, after the sin of the spies, Bemidbar 14:12, and in the previous chapter, 16:21.) Moshe understood that something could be done to save the people, and then Moshe sent out Aharon to walk between the people with an incense pan to stop the plague that had started to kill the people, 17:11-15.

How did Moshe know that Aharon should take an incense pan and walk amongst the people? Why did he choose this action instead of praying as he did by the sin of the golden calf and by the sin of the spies?

One possibility is the G-d gave the instructions to Moshe to tell Aharon to take the incense pan when Moshe fell on his faces. In a similar situation in the beginning of Korah’s rebellion, when Moshe fell on his face, 16:4, the Rashbam (on 16:4) makes the suggestion that when Moshe fell on his face, G-d gave Moshe instructions what to say to Korah. If G-d did speak to Moshe on that occasion, then here too G-d could have spoken to Moshe when Moshe fell on his face. However, in both cases there is no indication in the Torah that G-d spoke to Moshe when Moshe fell on his face.

Rashi (on 17:11) quotes a second possibility from the Talmud (Shabbat 89a) that when Moshe was on Mount Sinai the angel of death told him that the incense could stop a plague. The Talmud ends that if
this was not true, then how could Moshe have known that the incense would stop the plague?

My guess is that Moshe deduced this information by the first stage of Korah's revolt. 16:21 records that G-d told Moshe and Aharon to remove themselves from the 250 men who had come to do the test of fire pans since G-d was about to kill them. 16:25 then records that Moshe left, but it is not recorded that Aharon left, and according to 16:17 he was supposed to stay with the 250 men since he was part of the test of the fire pans. How then was Aharon protected if he did not leave? Did he have immunity since he was the high priest? This could be, but his two sons, Nadav and Avihu did not have immunity (Vayikra 10:2) and 16:21 and 17:10 imply that he did not have immunity, though maybe one could argue that these were not real threats. Yet, even these if these cases were not real threats, still the basis for the possible threat is that if a plague goes out from G-d then even the innocents can be killed, see Rashi on Shemot 12:22. 

If Aharon did not have immunity, how did he survive the fire that went out and killed the 250 men? It must be that when he brought his incense as part of the test of the 250 men, the incense gave him immunity from the fire that killed the 250 men. This would be similar to the incense that protects the high priest when he goes in the Holy of Holies, the inner room of the mishkan on Yom Kippur, Vayikra 16:2,13. Why then did G-d have to tell Aharon and Moshe to separate from the rebels prior to the incense test in 16:21, if he had this protection? It could be that G-d was just threatening Moshe and Aharon to get Moshe to act or it could be that Aharon had not yet lit the incense so he did not yet have this protection from the incense. In any event, from the fact that Aharon was with the 250 men but was saved when the 250 men died, 16:35, Moshe realized that the incense, if brought correctly, could protect a person from danger, and hence he knew to instruct Aharon to walk through the people with the incense to stop the plague.

Video of lecture at Chabad at Oxford University on Judaism and economics

Hello,

On May 9, 2019, I spoke at a conference on economic history at Oxford University, and when I was in Oxford, the Chabad Rabbi, Rabbi Eli Brackman asked me to speak on Judaism and economics. He videoed the presentation and I have posted it below. (Need to double click.)

Parts of the talk were based on discussions that I have posted in the past, in 2009, “The end of poverty,” (Re’eh), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/08/devarim-15411-reeh-end-of-poverty.html,
in 2010, “Equality vs. efficiency,” (Behar), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2010/05/vayikra-254-18-behar-equality-vs.html and
in 2011, “Shemitta, yovel, communism and capitalism,” (Behar), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2011/05/vayikra-254-18-shemitta-yovel-communism.html.

Also, during the talk, I was asked questions about slavery in the Torah, and now I realize that I need to correct one of my answers in reference to Vayikra 25:46.

Please feel free to send comments to me, Andrew Schein, ajayschein@gmail.com, and not to the the blog.

Best wishes to all.

https://www.chabad.org/multimedia/media_cdo/aid/4390461/jewish/Does-the-Torah-Support-Any-One-Economic-System.htm

                  

Vayikra 27:2-8 – To give

Vayikra 27:2 records the case where a person donates money, shekalim, to G-d in lieu of him/ herself. The Torah then explains how much the person can donate based on the age and gender of the person, 27:3-7. We can make a table of these donations:

	20 years until 60 years	5 years until 20 years	One month until 5 years	60 years and up
Male	50 shekels	20 shekels	5 shekels	15 shekels
Female	30 shekels	10 shekels	3 shekels	10 shekels
Ratio	50/30= 1.66	20/10 = 2	5/3= 1.66	15/10 = 1.5

Note the term shekel here does not correspond to the modern day shekel. In the Torah the term shekel means a weight of silver, as money in ancient time was weights of metals, usually gold, silver or copper. The word shekel literally means to weigh and this term was/ is used for money since one had to weigh the metal to know what amount of metal a person had to pay for a good. Similarly, the term kesef in Modern Hebrew means both money and silver since in many places money was from silver. This is not unique in Hebrew, as for example the basic unit account of money in the United Kingdom is called pound sterling.

The list of shekels for the different ages and the differences between men and women raises several questions. Why do the donations change with the age of the person being “donated”? Why are there different values for a man and woman? Why should a woman give less than a man? Finally, why does the ratio between what a man gives and what a woman gives change slightly for the different ages? One would have thought that ratio would remain constant, which would mean the change in years would have equal impact on men and women.

Ibn Ezra (on 27:3) writes that the valuations are decrees of the Torah, meaning that they are laws which man does not know their reason. Nonetheless, many commentators have tried to explain these laws based on differences in the levels of skills or productivity of people, which in economics is referred to as human capital (see Kleiman, 1987). According to this approach, in reference to the age categories, the idea would be that a person is most productive between the ages 20 and 60, and hence this age category has the highest valuation. Furthermore, according to this approach, a person between the years 5 and 20 is more productive than a person 60 years and over and a person between one month and 5 years old a person is barely productive at all.

The human capital approach has also been used to explain the different values for men and women. Levine (1989, p. 193) writes, “Gender differentiation may be linked to productivity, it being presumed that a male could earn more than a female.” Similarly, Bulah (1992, p. 245, footnote 2) writes that the different values for men and women are based on the prices in the slave market!

Based on this idea of human capital, suggestions have also been made to explain the change in the ratio between male and females over the years. Rashi (on 27:9) quotes from the Talmud (Arakhin 19a) “that an old man in the house is a nuisance while an old woman is a treasure in the house.” Thus Rashi explains that a man loses relatively more value, human capital, when he is over 60 than a woman, and the ratio from the valuation of men relative to women drops from 1.6 to 1.5. Bekhor Shor (on 27:2) explains slightly differently, that a man’s human capital is based on his physical strength while a woman’s human capital is based on her skills and a man’s strength diminishes more rapidly than a woman’s skills.

While the human capital approach is appealing, it does not offer a complete explanation. For example, for the 5 until 20 age category, why does the man/ boy have a relatively higher donation than a woman/ girl? Is a five year old boy more productive than a five year old girl? Also, if the donation levels are based on productivity, then there should be different values according to the productivity of each person. With regard to this question, the Abravanel (2005, p. 328) answers that the Torah did not want to make differences between people since some people who would have a low valuation might feel bad. Yet, then why then should women have lower valuations than men, will they not feel bad? In addition, the human capital approach seems only to give credit to earnings potential but not to work at home. Also, was the earnings potential of men really exactly 50 shekels in the time of the giving of the Torah and how could the Torah fix the level of donations if over time due to increases in technology a person’s productivity could increase to be much more than 50 or 30 shekels? Finally, if the values are based on people’s earnings potential, is the Torah sanctioning that a woman should earn less than a man? With all these questions, even though I am an economist, I have to reject the human capital approach.

Instead of focusing on the different valuations, one can ask why did the Torah give these donation levels altogether? Why not let a person decide on his/ her own how much to donate in lieu of him or herself? The answer is that the Torah was trying to protect the giver. There is a danger that a person could donate such large sums of money that it could impoverish the person. If the person is donating money to G-d due to guilt or due to religious feelings, there could be cases where a person would feel that there is no amount of money that is too much. Bulah (1992, p. 247) points out that usually the value (earnings potential) of a person is much more than the levels specified in the Torah, and had the Torah not set limits a person would have had to donate more money. Thus, the valuation levels in the Torah is to set maximum levels that a person can donate in lieu of him or herself. Proof of this idea is that after the list of valuation levels, 27:8 records that if a person cannot afford the levels in the Torah, then the priest estimates what the person can afford and this lower amount is sufficient. This shows that really one can give less, but nobody can give more. This means that the donation levels in 27:3-7 are maximums levels.

The maximum levels are to ensure that a person is not impoverished by the donations, and the levels then are based on the person’s ability to pay. A person has the largest ability to pay during the ages 20-60, and accordingly this category has the highest donation level. After this category the level of donations drop significantly. The next highest level is from 5-20 years, where the donation by a man is 60% less than for the years 20-60. This is because the level of income is lower for this age group. For the 60 years and over age category not only is the income lower than for the 20 year until 60 years age category, but also there is less hope of future income so here the donation level is also lower than by the 5 years until 20 years age category. In the case of one month to 5 years, the person has no income at all, but as pointed out by Rashi (on 27:5) the person doing the donating is an adult who is donating based on a child. Presumably the person would be “donating” their children, and as one could “donate” many children, the Torah made the donation level the smallest again to reduce the possibility that one would become impoverished by many of these donations. This fear of a person being impoverished by these donations can also explain why the valuation rate for women is less than for men. Historically (and still today) women have earned less money than men, and would thus be less able to donate the same amount as men. Thus to protect women from their greater danger of becoming impoverished from the donations the Torah set a lower limit for women. Even if in the future women will have equal earnings with men, still the laws are for all time and had to protect women when they earned less.

The differences in the ratio of the donation levels of men and women over the years is because of the desire to have donations end with a 5 or 10. My guess is that the determining age group was the 20 years until 60 years age category since not only was this the first age category recorded in the Torah, but also these are the years when the donations are most likely to be made. Once the ratio was 5/3 in this group, then all the groups followed this ratio either exactly (the one month until five years age category) or closely. By the 5 years until 20 years age category, the woman’s donation should have been 12 shekels to maintain a ratio of 5/3 but the Torah set the value at 10 to have the donation level be at the round number 10. Similarly, by the 60 years and over age category group, the woman’s donation level should have been 9 to keep the ratio of 5/3 but again the Torah used 10 since this is a round number.

The last question would be why should the ratio be 5/3 for the age category of 20 years until 60 years? Here one can only surmise. Again to help women who have earned less money than men historically, the Torah set their donation levels lower than men, but the question is how much lower? If the ratio (man/woman) was 2 (for example 50/25), then one might have claimed (as the Abravanel did) that a woman’s value was half of a man’s. In order to negate this possibility, the Torah set a higher value to women and hence a lower ratio between men and women, and the next highest level based on the donation being a 5 or 10 digit was a ratio of 5/3 or 1.66 (50/30).

Vayikra 20:27 – Ghostbusters

Vayikra 20:27, the last verse in parashat Kedoshim, records, “And any man or woman who has within themselves a ghost or a familiar spirit is to be killed by stoning.” (Are ghosts unfamiliar or scary spirits?)

20:27 is difficult for two reasons. One, the placement of this verse is difficult since it appears after the concluding sentences of chapter 20, 20:22-26, but also it is not part of the next chapter that begins with the phrase, "G-d spoke to Moshe," 21:1. A possible answer is that Devarim 18:11 refers again to this prohibition and Devarim 18:13 records that one is to be tamim with G-d. While the word tamim in Devarim 18:13 is understood to mean that a person should be whole with G-d and not turn to ghosts or spirits, still the literal idea of tamim is to be physically whole. In the following chapters in the book of Vayikra, 21:16-23 records the law of the priest who is physically blemished, and 22:19,21 refers to being tamim by the sacrifices, that one cannot offer a blemished sacrifice. Thus, maybe 20:27 is connected with the ensuing laws through the idea of being tamim by not turning to ghosts and spirits and that both the priests and the animals being sacrificed have to be physically whole.

A second difficulty in 20:27 is that this law of a person attempting to contact ghosts or spirits is mentioned twice within chapters 19,20. 19:31 records that one should not turn to ghosts or familiar spirits since they cause one to become tamei, and 20:6 records that if one turns to these ghosts or familiar spirits, then the person receives the punishment of karet. The fact that the Torah repeats this injunction in 20:27 is not surprising because people need to understand the severity of not turning to ghosts and spirits, as apparently many people believed (still?) in ghosts and spirits. However, why in 20:6 is the punishment for turning to ghosts and spirits karet, while in 20:27 it is death by stoning? Several answers have been suggested to answer this question. 

Rashi (on 20:27) explains that 20:6, where the penalty is karet, is the case where the person willfully turned to ghosts or spirits, but was not warned about the prohibition. On the other hand, 20:27 is the case where the person turned to ghosts and spirits when he or she was warned and there were witnesses that saw the person violate this law. Similarly, Ibn Ezra (on 20:27) writes that 20:27 is dealing with the case where one turns to ghosts or spirits publicly.

Abravanel (on 20:27, 2005, p. 224) notes that 20:27 records the phrase “within themselves,” which leads him to suggest that 20:27 is referring to a person who claims that the ghost or spirit is within him or herself. I understand the Abravanel to mean that 20:6 differs from 20:27 that 20:6 (also 19:31) is the prohibition for a client, a person who goes to another person for that person to make contact with ghosts and spirits and who would then act based on the information “learned” from this contact, while 20:27 is referring to the “service provider,” of the client who (pretends) makes the actual “contact” with the ghost and spirits, and who does not necessarily act based on this “contact.” For example in the case of Shaul and the witch of Endor, Samuel I 28:3-25, Shaul was the client as he went to the witch, the “service provider” in order to use her “powers” so that he could speak to Shmuel’s ghost. According to this understanding of 20:6,27, Shaul would have violated 20:6 and the witch who made the contact would have violated 20:27. The difference in penalties in the verses is that 20:27 records the death penalty for those people who claim to make contact with ghosts and spirits since killing them would end the problem of people turning to ghosts and spirits since then there would be no more “service providers” (see also Shemot 20:27), while the penalty of karet would be for the clients. (Note, in this field of making contact with ghosts and spirits, there are many fewer people who are “service providers” than there are clients.) This understanding of 20:27 also suggests an answer to the first difficulty of 20:27.

20:27 is clearly connected to chapters 19,20 based on 19:31 and 20:6, but now we can suggest another reason how it can be related to the ensuing chapters. As suggested above, 20:27 is referring to the person who pretended to contact the ghosts and spirits and in many societies this person was (is?) frequently thought of as being a religious figure. The ensuing laws, 21:1-22:16 record laws relating to the priests. The priests are the legitimate religious figures in contrast to the people who claim to speak to ghosts and spirits who are illegitimate religious figures. Thus, 20:27 rules out the illegitimate religious figures, who are to be killed, and then chapter 21 continues with a discussion of the laws concerning the true religious figures. Similarly, Devarim 18:1-8 records laws about priests and Levites, Devarim 18:15-22 records the laws of the prophets, and sandwiched between these two sections, Devarim 18:9-14, records the prohibitions of magicians and people who turn to ghosts and spirits. Again, the Torah contrasts the legitimate religious figures with the illegitimate religious figures. Vayikra 20:27 would then be a connecting sentence between chapters 19 and 20 (also chapter 18 which is part of the same unit as chapters 19 and 20) and the following chapters, 21 and 22.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (Abarbanel), Yitzhak, (1437-1508), 2005, Commentary on Vayikra, Jerusalem: Horev.