The Mishnah (Berakhot 9:2) records that a person is to recite the blessing shekocho u-gevurato malei olam, "Blessed be He whose strength and might fill the world" when one sees comets, earthquakes, lighting, thunder and strong winds. A person is to recite the blessing oseh maaseh bereshit, "Blessed be He who does the works of creation" on seeing hills (mountains- Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim 228:3), valleys, oceans, rivers and deserts. The distinction between the two groups is between dynamic and static. The first group refers to various acts of nature, which we associate with G-d's active role in the world, while the objects in the second group are landscapes that G-d created in the past.
The Talmud (Berakhot 59a) is bothered why the first category of acts of nature are not also considered as relating to G-d's creation of the world, and the Talmud quotes a verses from Tehillim 135:7, which refers to lighting and can be understood to also refer to creation of the world. To answer this question, Abaye states that really by both categories of nature one says both blessings, while Rava says that by the first category (lighting, thunder) one says both blessings while by the second category (hills, rivers) one can only say the blessing referring to creation and not the blessing referring to G-d's power filling the world.
We follow Rava, but within the Rishonim (the Middle Ages), the argument developed how to understand his statement that we say two blessings. Raavad (on Rambam, laws of Blessings 10:14) and maybe Rashi (see Bet Yosef, on Orah Chayyim 227) maintain that Rava means literally that we say both blessing. However, Tosfot (Berkhot, 59a, Rava), Rambam (laws of Blessings 10:14) and Tur (Orah Chayyim, 227) write that one has a choice, to recite either the blessing referring to G-d's power to creation. It seems difficult to argue that one should recite two blessings on the same event even though this accords better with Rava's statement.
How could the Raavad maintain that one should recite two blessings? I believe the answer is that the Raavad's opinion is based on his other opinion (pages of Rif Berakhot 44a, comments on the Baal ha-Maor, also quoted by Meiri, on Berakhot 54a, pp.202-205) that these blessings did not involve saying G-d's name. Thus, one would not be saying G-d's name in vain by reciting a separate blessing. On the other hand, Tosfot who says that one says either one of the blessings, maintains that the blessings are said with G-d's name, see Ha-roeh on Berakhot 54a. The Rambam, who says that a person chooses one of the blessings, also seems to maintain that the blessing does not involve G-d's name, but maybe he thinks it is sufficient to say one blessing.
The Tur differs from the Rambam on two points. One, he specifically writes that the blessing involves G-d's name, and two, he changes the order of the option. According to the Rambam, the first choice is the blessing of G-d's power but a person can say the blessing referring to creation. However, the Tur writes that the first choice is the blessing referring to creation, but a person can say the blessing on G-d's power.
The Shulchan Arukh (15th century, Orah Chayyim 227:1) follows the Tur word for word, and hence he rules that when a person sees lighting or hears thunder, he is to say the blessing of oseh maaseh bereshit on creation, but if one wants one can say the blessing, shekocho u-gevurato malei olam on G-d's power.
This would seem to be the end of the story, but there developed a new custom concerning these blessings. The Taz (17th century, 227:1) records that the custom in his times was to recite the blessing on creation, oseh maaseh bereshit, on lighting, while by thunder one say the blessing on G-d's power, shekocho u-gevurato malei olam. (Did this custom just develop in the 17th century?) He writes that he cannot understand this difference, but maybe people think that thunder shows G-d's power more than lighting. My guess is that once people had the option of choosing the blessing, then they wanted to choose one blessing for one act of nature and the second blessing for the second act of nature. This would allow them to recite both blessings, as we do not normally recite the blessing on the other natural events listed in the Mishnah. Of the two events, thunder and lighting, lighting was more associated with creation since when the Talmud quoted the argument to say both blessings, it referred specifically to lighting as referring to creation. Thus, maybe the custom developed to say the blessing oseh maaseh bereshit on lighting and then shekocho u-gevurato malei olam was left for thunder.
While the custom of having one blessing for thunder and one for lighting was not an outright contradiction to the Shulchan Arukh's ruling since he allowed everybody to choose, still according to the Shulchan Arukh a person can say either blessing on thunder or lighting. The Be'er Hetev (Yehuda Ashkenazi, 18th century, born in Germany, dayyan in Tiktin, Poland, 227:1) attempted to defend the new custom. He writes that one cannot say the blessing on G-d's power, shekocho u-gevurato malei olam, on lighting, and when the Shulchan Arukh's allows one to choose which blessing this is only by thunder. This is quite amazing, as noted by the Mishnah Brurah (Shaar Tzyion 227:7) since he contradicts the Mishnah and the Rambam. The Mishnah states that one only says the blessing on G-d's power on lighting, and the Rambam says that this is the blessing of first choice, while the Be'er Hetev says that one cannot say the blessing of G-d's power on lighting! We see the misunderstanding that developed over the years from the fact that the Talmud added one blessing. This led to the position that once can choose which blessing to say, and then there developed the idea that one can only say the blessing oseh maaseh bereshit by lighting, contradictory to the Mishnah.
This new custom of specifying which blessing for each event is not only confusing because people cannot remember which blessing to say on which event, but also it leads to unnecessary blessings. The Mishneh Brurah (late 19th century, 227:5) based on the Magen Avraham (17th century) rules that if one sees lighting and hears thunder at the same time, then one should recite one blessing, oseh maaseh bereshit, or if one wants, shekocho u-gevurato malei olam. If the lighting and thunder come separately, then one would say two blessings, though one can have in mind that the blessing on the lighting should be applicable to the thunder even if one did not hear the thunder right after the lighting. The Arukh Hashulchan (late 19th century, 227:2) writes that if one says two blessings when one sees the lighting and hears the thunder together, which is the usual case, then the second blessing is unnecessary, levatelah, and is the sin of saying G-d's name in vain.
To conclude, the law in the Mishnah is straight forward that one says the blessing on G-d's power, shekocho u-gevurato malei olam for both lighting and thunder. In the time of the Talmud and the Rishinom there developed the idea to say either shekocho u-gevurato malei olam or oseh maaseh bereshit on either thunder and lighting. Somehow there developed the custom of saying oseh maaseh bereshit on lighting and shekocho u-gevurato malei olam on thunder but this custom leads to confusion and unnecessary blessings.
It seems to me that if one sees lighting and thunder at the same time, he should say the blessing shekocho u-gevurato malei olam (following the Mishnah and the Rambam) with G-d's name (following the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh), and if he wants to say the second blessing of oseh maaseh bereshit, he should say it without G-d's name (following the Raavad).
Hello. The goal of this blog is to enhance our understanding of the Torah and the practice of Judaism. The discussions in the blog are a portion of a more extensive commentary on the Torah, which I will be happy to send to you. You can contact me at ajayschein@gmail.com. Please feel free to send comments. Also, if you want to receive an email with a link to the new posts, send me a request, and I will add you to the email group. Best wishes, Andrew Schein
Sunday, May 31, 2009
Monday, May 25, 2009
Shavuot: Tikkun leil Shavuot
One of the popular customs on Shavuot is to stay awake all night learning Torah, tikkun leil shavuot. This custom is not mentioned in the Mishnah, the Gemara, by the Gaonim, the Rambam, the Tur, in the Shulchan Arukh (though see below) and by the Rama. What is the basis for this custom and how did it develop?
The oldest source for this custom is from Philo who mentions that the Essenes (1st century) used to stay awake the night of Shavuot praying (see Hallamish, 2000, p.595). However, it is unlikely that their practice had any influence on our present custom since the Essenes were not part of mainstream Judaism, and this source is never referred to again.
The next mention of this custom is in the Zohar (on Vayikra 23), which records that a select group of people, Hasidim, used to stay awake the night of Shavuot learning Torah in order that the bride (the Shekhinah? the Jewish people?) would be adorned appropriately to meet the King (G-d) in the morning.
In Spain, in the 14th and 15th centuries it is possible that there were some individuals who stayed awake all night on Shavuot (Hallamish, pp. 596, 597), but it was definitely not a common practice. R. David Abudraham (Spain, late 13th, early 14th century) in his book on prayers and customs, makes no mention of the custom even though he records in detail the prayers and customs on Shavuot.
In the 16th century there was a new stage in the development of the custom. In the beginning of the 1530s, R. Yosef Caro (1488-1575), a refugee from Spain and the future author of the Shulchan Arukh, was living in Turkey. R. Caro was also a mystic, and he had trances where a "Maggid" would speak through his mouth. (R. J. Werblowksy, 1962, p.22, refers to this speaking as automatic speech. The collection of these speeches is recorded in the book Maggid Mesharim.
On one Shavuot night (in 1530 or 1534, Werblowksy, p.111), R. Caro studied with Shlomo Alkabetz (the composer of Lekhah Dodi.) Alkabetz's experience that night with R. Caro was very interesting, and he recorded his recollection of the events of the night, which was later incorporated into the book Shenei Luchot ha-Brit (the Shelah). Alkabetz relates that when he was learning with R. Caro on Shavuot night, he heard this unique speech from R. Caro's mouth, and one of the things said was that R. Caro should move to Israel. Apparently, R. Caro was one of the individuals who knew of this custom to stay awake on Shavuot night, but he did not want to impose this custom on everybody and hence he left it out of the Bet Yosef and the Shulchan Arukh.
After R. Yosef Caro moved to Sefat (1536? 37?), the custom of learning all night on Shavuot became widespread in the town. R. Avraham Galanti (d. 1589) recorded that all the congregations in Sefat would gather on the night of Shavuot to stay awake and learn Torah until the morning when everybody would go to the mikveh and pray (Hallamish, p.598). From Sefat, the custom spread to the Mediterranean basin, and from there northwards throughout Europe. Towards the end of the 17th century, the Magen Avraham (R. Avraham Gombiner, 1637-1683, Poland, Orah Chayyim 494) wrote that most scholars stayed up all night to study Torah. And, a little bit afterwards, R. Yaakov Reischer (1661, Prague -1733, Metz) in his commentary on the Shulchan Arukh (Chok Yaakov, Orah Chayyim 494) noted that the custom had also spread to the general population.
There are several reasons why the custom spread. First, not only was R. Caro such a great Rabbi, but also due to Alkabetz's testimony concerning his learning with R. Caro, knowledge of the custom became well-known. Secondly, in Sefat in the 16th century, it became popular to regularly arise at midnight to recite tikkun hazot, prayers to mourn the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash and to pray for its redemption. This custom was independent of staying awake on Shavuot night, but still if one regularly practiced the tikkun hazot, then one would naturally be more inclined to stay awake also on Shavuot night. Thirdly, there developed the claim, which was attributed to the Ari (for example, see Mishnah Brurah, Orah Chayyim, 494:1), that if a person stays awake the entire night and learns Torah throughout the night, then no harm will come upon the person in the following year. (The Ari was born in Jerusalem in 1534, came to Sefat to live in 1569 or early 1570, and died on July 15, 1572, see Encyclopedia Judaica, 11:572-574.)
In a fascinating article, Elliot Horowitz (1989) also credits the introduction of coffee for the spread of the custom of staying awake at night. In the 15th century, the drinking of coffee originated in Yemenite Sufi circles in order that they could stay awake for their nocturnal rituals, and by the end of the 16th century coffee had spread throughout the Muslim world. Horowitz points out that both coffee and the custom of tikkun hazot spread westward from Sefat to Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries.
There were two new developments with the spread of the custom to Europe. One, while the Magen Avraham's quotes the Zohar as the source for the custom, he suggested a new rationale for the custom. The Magen Avraham writes that the simple reason for the custom is to rectify a mistake of the generation who left Egypt who slept the night before G-d declared the Decalogue at Mount Sinai. This idea is based on the Midrash of Shir Hashirim (Chapter 1, 12:2, Simon, 1961, p.79), which records, "Israel slept all night, because the sleep of Shavuot is pleasant and the night is short. R. Judan said: Not a flea worried them. G-d came and found them sleeping, so He began to rouse them with trumpeters, as it says in Shemot 19:16, 'there were thunders and lightings'… It was for this that He taunted them through the mouth of Yeshayahu, in Isaiah 50:2." Meir Bar Ilan (1997, p.29) notes that this Midrash was known for generations, but prior to the Magen Avraham nobody had felt that there was a need to rectify this error by staying up all night. It seems that the Magen Avraham was looking for a new non-mystical reason for the custom in order to replace or complement the mystical reason of the Zohar.
This new reason also adds a new sin to the generation who were at Mount Sinai, which prompted Eliyahu Kitov (1978, Vol. 3 p.76) to defend the Jews who left Egypt. He writes, "This is not a condemnation of the Jews of that generation- all of whom eagerly awaited hearing the Divine Word. They were however, physically weak, and they feared that they might lack sufficient strength for hearing the Divine teaching without sufficient rest the previous night….It is for this reason that also today not all stay awake during the night."
A second development concerns what is to be studied during the night. R. Moshe Cordovero (1522-1570, Sefat, Shlomo Alkabetz's brother-in-law) recorded a specific order of study, first sections of the Torah, then Nevi'im (Yechezkel), Ketuvim (Shir Hashirim, Ruth and Tehillim chapter 68), Mishnah (usually Pirkei Avot), the poem Azharot, and in the end, and mostly, Kabbalah (see Hallamish, pp. 605.606). This order was considered the appropriate study to adorn the bride based on the rationale of the custom in the Zohar. R. Isaiah Horowitz (1565, Prague -1630, Sefat, in the Shelah) slightly changed this order to briefly include all the books of Tanakh and the Talmud and other small variations. This basic order has remained until today as the official tikkun leil shavuot. However, already by the end of the 17th century, R. Yaakov Reischer (Chok Yaakov 494) asserted that the official order was only for the "simple" people who did not know how to learn. This contention implies that people can learn what they choose. This explanation is incorrect historically since in Sefat everybody followed the official order, but it seems that for those of the non-kabbalistic bent, the official order was not sufficiently appreciated and they wanted to study other subjects.
Accordingly, the custom of staying awake on Shavuot night and studying Torah began as a kabbalistic practice, and started to become popular in the 16th century. The custom was quickly accepted even amongst the non-kabbalistic population, but for them a new non-mystical reason for the custom was proposed and the learning was changed from being a set order to being at each person's discretion.
The oldest source for this custom is from Philo who mentions that the Essenes (1st century) used to stay awake the night of Shavuot praying (see Hallamish, 2000, p.595). However, it is unlikely that their practice had any influence on our present custom since the Essenes were not part of mainstream Judaism, and this source is never referred to again.
The next mention of this custom is in the Zohar (on Vayikra 23), which records that a select group of people, Hasidim, used to stay awake the night of Shavuot learning Torah in order that the bride (the Shekhinah? the Jewish people?) would be adorned appropriately to meet the King (G-d) in the morning.
In Spain, in the 14th and 15th centuries it is possible that there were some individuals who stayed awake all night on Shavuot (Hallamish, pp. 596, 597), but it was definitely not a common practice. R. David Abudraham (Spain, late 13th, early 14th century) in his book on prayers and customs, makes no mention of the custom even though he records in detail the prayers and customs on Shavuot.
In the 16th century there was a new stage in the development of the custom. In the beginning of the 1530s, R. Yosef Caro (1488-1575), a refugee from Spain and the future author of the Shulchan Arukh, was living in Turkey. R. Caro was also a mystic, and he had trances where a "Maggid" would speak through his mouth. (R. J. Werblowksy, 1962, p.22, refers to this speaking as automatic speech. The collection of these speeches is recorded in the book Maggid Mesharim.
On one Shavuot night (in 1530 or 1534, Werblowksy, p.111), R. Caro studied with Shlomo Alkabetz (the composer of Lekhah Dodi.) Alkabetz's experience that night with R. Caro was very interesting, and he recorded his recollection of the events of the night, which was later incorporated into the book Shenei Luchot ha-Brit (the Shelah). Alkabetz relates that when he was learning with R. Caro on Shavuot night, he heard this unique speech from R. Caro's mouth, and one of the things said was that R. Caro should move to Israel. Apparently, R. Caro was one of the individuals who knew of this custom to stay awake on Shavuot night, but he did not want to impose this custom on everybody and hence he left it out of the Bet Yosef and the Shulchan Arukh.
After R. Yosef Caro moved to Sefat (1536? 37?), the custom of learning all night on Shavuot became widespread in the town. R. Avraham Galanti (d. 1589) recorded that all the congregations in Sefat would gather on the night of Shavuot to stay awake and learn Torah until the morning when everybody would go to the mikveh and pray (Hallamish, p.598). From Sefat, the custom spread to the Mediterranean basin, and from there northwards throughout Europe. Towards the end of the 17th century, the Magen Avraham (R. Avraham Gombiner, 1637-1683, Poland, Orah Chayyim 494) wrote that most scholars stayed up all night to study Torah. And, a little bit afterwards, R. Yaakov Reischer (1661, Prague -1733, Metz) in his commentary on the Shulchan Arukh (Chok Yaakov, Orah Chayyim 494) noted that the custom had also spread to the general population.
There are several reasons why the custom spread. First, not only was R. Caro such a great Rabbi, but also due to Alkabetz's testimony concerning his learning with R. Caro, knowledge of the custom became well-known. Secondly, in Sefat in the 16th century, it became popular to regularly arise at midnight to recite tikkun hazot, prayers to mourn the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash and to pray for its redemption. This custom was independent of staying awake on Shavuot night, but still if one regularly practiced the tikkun hazot, then one would naturally be more inclined to stay awake also on Shavuot night. Thirdly, there developed the claim, which was attributed to the Ari (for example, see Mishnah Brurah, Orah Chayyim, 494:1), that if a person stays awake the entire night and learns Torah throughout the night, then no harm will come upon the person in the following year. (The Ari was born in Jerusalem in 1534, came to Sefat to live in 1569 or early 1570, and died on July 15, 1572, see Encyclopedia Judaica, 11:572-574.)
In a fascinating article, Elliot Horowitz (1989) also credits the introduction of coffee for the spread of the custom of staying awake at night. In the 15th century, the drinking of coffee originated in Yemenite Sufi circles in order that they could stay awake for their nocturnal rituals, and by the end of the 16th century coffee had spread throughout the Muslim world. Horowitz points out that both coffee and the custom of tikkun hazot spread westward from Sefat to Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries.
There were two new developments with the spread of the custom to Europe. One, while the Magen Avraham's quotes the Zohar as the source for the custom, he suggested a new rationale for the custom. The Magen Avraham writes that the simple reason for the custom is to rectify a mistake of the generation who left Egypt who slept the night before G-d declared the Decalogue at Mount Sinai. This idea is based on the Midrash of Shir Hashirim (Chapter 1, 12:2, Simon, 1961, p.79), which records, "Israel slept all night, because the sleep of Shavuot is pleasant and the night is short. R. Judan said: Not a flea worried them. G-d came and found them sleeping, so He began to rouse them with trumpeters, as it says in Shemot 19:16, 'there were thunders and lightings'… It was for this that He taunted them through the mouth of Yeshayahu, in Isaiah 50:2." Meir Bar Ilan (1997, p.29) notes that this Midrash was known for generations, but prior to the Magen Avraham nobody had felt that there was a need to rectify this error by staying up all night. It seems that the Magen Avraham was looking for a new non-mystical reason for the custom in order to replace or complement the mystical reason of the Zohar.
This new reason also adds a new sin to the generation who were at Mount Sinai, which prompted Eliyahu Kitov (1978, Vol. 3 p.76) to defend the Jews who left Egypt. He writes, "This is not a condemnation of the Jews of that generation- all of whom eagerly awaited hearing the Divine Word. They were however, physically weak, and they feared that they might lack sufficient strength for hearing the Divine teaching without sufficient rest the previous night….It is for this reason that also today not all stay awake during the night."
A second development concerns what is to be studied during the night. R. Moshe Cordovero (1522-1570, Sefat, Shlomo Alkabetz's brother-in-law) recorded a specific order of study, first sections of the Torah, then Nevi'im (Yechezkel), Ketuvim (Shir Hashirim, Ruth and Tehillim chapter 68), Mishnah (usually Pirkei Avot), the poem Azharot, and in the end, and mostly, Kabbalah (see Hallamish, pp. 605.606). This order was considered the appropriate study to adorn the bride based on the rationale of the custom in the Zohar. R. Isaiah Horowitz (1565, Prague -1630, Sefat, in the Shelah) slightly changed this order to briefly include all the books of Tanakh and the Talmud and other small variations. This basic order has remained until today as the official tikkun leil shavuot. However, already by the end of the 17th century, R. Yaakov Reischer (Chok Yaakov 494) asserted that the official order was only for the "simple" people who did not know how to learn. This contention implies that people can learn what they choose. This explanation is incorrect historically since in Sefat everybody followed the official order, but it seems that for those of the non-kabbalistic bent, the official order was not sufficiently appreciated and they wanted to study other subjects.
Accordingly, the custom of staying awake on Shavuot night and studying Torah began as a kabbalistic practice, and started to become popular in the 16th century. The custom was quickly accepted even amongst the non-kabbalistic population, but for them a new non-mystical reason for the custom was proposed and the learning was changed from being a set order to being at each person's discretion.
Shavuot: To thank G-d
We celebrate Shavuot on the sixth of Sivan, which is the 50th day of the counting of the omer starting from the second day of Pesach (Passover). The common understanding of the holiday is that it is to celebrate the giving of the Torah, which I think most people understand to mean that Shavuot was the day when the Decalogue was told to the people at Mount Sinai. Thus, the Torah reading for the holiday is the Decalogue, Shemot chapters 19 and 20. Yet, this connection is not mentioned in the Torah. Was the sixth of Sivan the day when the Torah was given to the Jewish people? Was the Decalogue told to the people on that day?
Shemot 19:1 records that the Jewish people come to Mount Sinai in the third month, hodesh, (Sivan) without explicitly specifying which day in the month. However, Rashi (on 19:1) explains that 19:1 means that the people came to Mount Sinai on the 1st day of the month. Similarly, Cassuto (1967, p. 224) explains that the word hodesh, in ancient Hebrew means new moon, which is the 1st day of the month. After the Torah provides this date, no other date is given for when the revelation on Mount Sinai occurred, but we can try to calculate the day from the events recorded in Shemot chapter 19.
Shemot 19:3 records that Moshe went up the mountain to speak to G-d, and Rashi (on 19:3) writes that this happened on the second day of the month. The end of 19:8 records that Moshe went back to speak to G-d, and Rashi (on 19:8) explains that this was on the third day of the month. The end of 19:9 records that Moshe told G-d the response of the people, and Rashi (on 19:9) says this was on the fourth day of the month. As part of that conversation, 19:10 records that G-d told Moshe that the people were to prepare themselves today and the next day for on the third day there would be the revelation on Mount Sinai. Rashi (on 19:10,11) explains that this preparation was to be on the fourth and fifth days of the month and the revelation would be on the sixth day of the month. According to this chronology, the Torah was given to the people on the sixth of Sivan. This chronology makes sense, but still it is based on the assumptions that Moshe had one conversation a day with G-d and these conversations occurred on successive days. We cannot know for sure on what day was the Decalogue.
The Talmud (Shabbat 86b) quotes an opinion that the Torah was given on the seventh day of Sivan. The Rabbis maintain that the Decalogue was told to the people on the sixth day (the basis for Rashi’s opinion), but R. Jose says it occurred on the seventh day of Sivan. Why does R. Jose believe that it was given on the seventh day of the month? He believes that the people needed three full days to prepare for the Decalogue, yet the Talmud asks that Shemot 19:10,11 records that they were only supposed to have two days, so R. Jose answers that Moshe added a day on his own. (Note this opinion of R. Jose is not really rejected, as we follow this opinion by the laws of niddah, see Magen Avraham, Orah Chayyim, 494.) Thus, from the Talmud we cannot be sure on what day the Torah was given.
A different way to understand Shavuot is that it is an agricultural holiday as Shemot 23:16, 34:22, and Bemidbar 28:26, all refer to the holiday as the time of the first harvest of the crops of the year. In conjunction with this theme, when the Bet ha-Mikdash existed, on Shavuot there was a special offering of two loaves, Vayikra 23:17.
Why do we bring the two loaves? The loaves are made from the first crops that are harvested. What is the significance of bringing the first crops as a sacrifice? The answer can be seen by the declaration that each person made when he/ she brought his/ her personal first fruits to the Bet ha-Mikdash. Devarim 26:5-10 records that the person recites a brief review of the exodus and mentions that G-d gave the Jewish people the land of Israel. The person then bows before G-d. This short prayer and bowing indicates that the giving the first fruits shows one’s acceptance of G-d, and being thankful to G-d for the exodus and for the land of Israel. Correspondingly by the sacrifice of the two loaves on Shavuot, this demonstrates a communal acceptance and thankfulness of G-d, and this could be the rationale of the holiday of Shavuot independent of the historical day when the Decalogue was said.
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.
Shemot 19:1 records that the Jewish people come to Mount Sinai in the third month, hodesh, (Sivan) without explicitly specifying which day in the month. However, Rashi (on 19:1) explains that 19:1 means that the people came to Mount Sinai on the 1st day of the month. Similarly, Cassuto (1967, p. 224) explains that the word hodesh, in ancient Hebrew means new moon, which is the 1st day of the month. After the Torah provides this date, no other date is given for when the revelation on Mount Sinai occurred, but we can try to calculate the day from the events recorded in Shemot chapter 19.
Shemot 19:3 records that Moshe went up the mountain to speak to G-d, and Rashi (on 19:3) writes that this happened on the second day of the month. The end of 19:8 records that Moshe went back to speak to G-d, and Rashi (on 19:8) explains that this was on the third day of the month. The end of 19:9 records that Moshe told G-d the response of the people, and Rashi (on 19:9) says this was on the fourth day of the month. As part of that conversation, 19:10 records that G-d told Moshe that the people were to prepare themselves today and the next day for on the third day there would be the revelation on Mount Sinai. Rashi (on 19:10,11) explains that this preparation was to be on the fourth and fifth days of the month and the revelation would be on the sixth day of the month. According to this chronology, the Torah was given to the people on the sixth of Sivan. This chronology makes sense, but still it is based on the assumptions that Moshe had one conversation a day with G-d and these conversations occurred on successive days. We cannot know for sure on what day was the Decalogue.
The Talmud (Shabbat 86b) quotes an opinion that the Torah was given on the seventh day of Sivan. The Rabbis maintain that the Decalogue was told to the people on the sixth day (the basis for Rashi’s opinion), but R. Jose says it occurred on the seventh day of Sivan. Why does R. Jose believe that it was given on the seventh day of the month? He believes that the people needed three full days to prepare for the Decalogue, yet the Talmud asks that Shemot 19:10,11 records that they were only supposed to have two days, so R. Jose answers that Moshe added a day on his own. (Note this opinion of R. Jose is not really rejected, as we follow this opinion by the laws of niddah, see Magen Avraham, Orah Chayyim, 494.) Thus, from the Talmud we cannot be sure on what day the Torah was given.
A different way to understand Shavuot is that it is an agricultural holiday as Shemot 23:16, 34:22, and Bemidbar 28:26, all refer to the holiday as the time of the first harvest of the crops of the year. In conjunction with this theme, when the Bet ha-Mikdash existed, on Shavuot there was a special offering of two loaves, Vayikra 23:17.
Why do we bring the two loaves? The loaves are made from the first crops that are harvested. What is the significance of bringing the first crops as a sacrifice? The answer can be seen by the declaration that each person made when he/ she brought his/ her personal first fruits to the Bet ha-Mikdash. Devarim 26:5-10 records that the person recites a brief review of the exodus and mentions that G-d gave the Jewish people the land of Israel. The person then bows before G-d. This short prayer and bowing indicates that the giving the first fruits shows one’s acceptance of G-d, and being thankful to G-d for the exodus and for the land of Israel. Correspondingly by the sacrifice of the two loaves on Shavuot, this demonstrates a communal acceptance and thankfulness of G-d, and this could be the rationale of the holiday of Shavuot independent of the historical day when the Decalogue was said.
Bibliography:
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Vayikra 26:4-9 (Behukkotai) – A new utopia?
Within the blessings recorded in 26:3-13 it is interesting to examine some items that are not promised.
One, while 26:4,5 records that there will be enough rain and that the crops will be plentiful, the Torah does not state that the people would not have to work. On the contrary, the promise of sufficient rain means that the crops were going to grow in the normal manner, which requires the people to work. The Torah does not even state that the work will be easy, just that the crops will grow. Thus, the Torah was not promising a utopia and was not removing the "curse" told to Adam that work was going to be difficult, Bereshit 3:17.
Two, 26:5 records that the food would be sufficient that the people would be satiated, but there is no promise of great wealth. The Torah does not state that the people would have gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, and even spices (or oil). Again, we see that the Torah was not promising a utopia. The people would have to work to support themselves without easily finding treasures in the ground.
Three, 26:6-8 record that there will be peace in the land and that the people will easily be able to chase and kill their enemies. This last promise is quite surprising. It implies that that the people will have enemies and will have to continue fighting wars. The people are only promised that they will have peace within the country, but the borders can still be attacked. This is much less than the messianic idea in Yeshayahu (2:4) of universal peace.
Four, 26:9 records that the people would be fruitful and multiple. This would be the fulfillment of the covenant with the patriarchs, as stated in the verse, see Ibn Ezra. Yet, there is no mention of G-d removing sickness and stopping miscarriages, which was promised in Shemot 23:25,26. It could be that as the covenant that was being sealed in Vayikra 26 builds upon the covenant in Shemot 20-23, then the promise of good health of Shemot is also included in the blessings of chapter 26, see Ramban on 26:11. However, it could be that after the sin of the golden calf, the people lost the promises of no sicknesses and no miscarriages. With this latter possibility, again we see that the promises in Vayikra 26 did not envisage a new type of human existence. (The Ramban also claims that 26:6 indicates that there will be a new type of existence but the Rambam, Laws of Kings, 12:1 disagrees.)
One, while 26:4,5 records that there will be enough rain and that the crops will be plentiful, the Torah does not state that the people would not have to work. On the contrary, the promise of sufficient rain means that the crops were going to grow in the normal manner, which requires the people to work. The Torah does not even state that the work will be easy, just that the crops will grow. Thus, the Torah was not promising a utopia and was not removing the "curse" told to Adam that work was going to be difficult, Bereshit 3:17.
Two, 26:5 records that the food would be sufficient that the people would be satiated, but there is no promise of great wealth. The Torah does not state that the people would have gold, silver, diamonds, rubies, and even spices (or oil). Again, we see that the Torah was not promising a utopia. The people would have to work to support themselves without easily finding treasures in the ground.
Three, 26:6-8 record that there will be peace in the land and that the people will easily be able to chase and kill their enemies. This last promise is quite surprising. It implies that that the people will have enemies and will have to continue fighting wars. The people are only promised that they will have peace within the country, but the borders can still be attacked. This is much less than the messianic idea in Yeshayahu (2:4) of universal peace.
Four, 26:9 records that the people would be fruitful and multiple. This would be the fulfillment of the covenant with the patriarchs, as stated in the verse, see Ibn Ezra. Yet, there is no mention of G-d removing sickness and stopping miscarriages, which was promised in Shemot 23:25,26. It could be that as the covenant that was being sealed in Vayikra 26 builds upon the covenant in Shemot 20-23, then the promise of good health of Shemot is also included in the blessings of chapter 26, see Ramban on 26:11. However, it could be that after the sin of the golden calf, the people lost the promises of no sicknesses and no miscarriages. With this latter possibility, again we see that the promises in Vayikra 26 did not envisage a new type of human existence. (The Ramban also claims that 26:6 indicates that there will be a new type of existence but the Rambam, Laws of Kings, 12:1 disagrees.)
Vayikra 26:1,2 - The last two verses of parashat Behar: Connected to parashat Behar or to parashat Be-hukkotai?
Vayikra 26:1,2, the first two verses in chapter 26 are the last two verses of parashat Behar, while the remainder of chapter 26 is part of parashat Behukkotai. While the division of chapters in the Torah was done by Archbishop Stephen Langton in the 13th century, are 26:1,2 more connected with parashat Behar or parashat Be-hukkotai? The underlying difficulty is that verses 26:1,2, which refers to improper worship (idolatry), the Shabbat and fear of the mikdash, do not seem to relate to the previous laws of Behar or to the following section in Be-hukkotai.
Most Jewish commentators follow the parasha division and connect 26:1,2 with Behar. For example, Rashi and Ramban (on 26:1, see also Ibn Ezra on 26:1) quote from the Sifra that the laws of 26:1,2 are connected to the slavery section since if a person is sold to a non-Jewish owner, he/ she might be tempted to adopt the practices of his owner. Hence the Torah reminds the slave that he/ she must follow the Torah even if he/ she is a slave to a non-Jew. Yet, how much freedom do slaves have? Also, Zev Whitman (1987) questions these views since if the intent of the Torah was to tell us that a slave had to keep the laws then the Torah should have stated so explicitly. Furthermore, why are only these three laws mentioned if the slave has to keep all the laws?
A modern commentator, Baruch Schwartz (2004, p. 273) notes that 26:1 elaborates on 19:4 and 26:2 repeats 19:30, and hence he suggests that these verses, which relate to chapter 19, are concluding verses to the laws of Vayikra prior to the blessings and curses. Yet, even with respect to chapter 19, 26:1,2, at best only refer to two verses in chapter 19, which does not make them sufficient to be summary verses for the entire book of Vayikra or even just for chapter 19.
Kochman (2002, pp. 201,202) notes several parallels between these verses and three of the first four statements in the Decalogue, and leaves as a question whether the two verses are a condensed conclusion to the laws of Vayikra (the connections with chapter 19) or an introduction to the ensuing blessings and cruses. My guess is that they function more as an introduction to the blessings and curses, and one can add more literary connections of these verses to the Decalogue.
The literary connection between 26:1,2 to the Decalogue at Mount Sinai begins with the previous verse, 25:55, which records that the Jewish people are G-d’s people, ki li, and this same phrase appears both in 25:23 and in Shemot 19:5, prior to the Decalogue. 25:55 then records that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt, and these words are part of G-d’s opening statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:2. 25:55 ends with the phrase, G-d is the G-d of the people, and while this is a common phrase, it appears in a similar form in the first statement of the Decalogue.
Most Jewish commentators follow the parasha division and connect 26:1,2 with Behar. For example, Rashi and Ramban (on 26:1, see also Ibn Ezra on 26:1) quote from the Sifra that the laws of 26:1,2 are connected to the slavery section since if a person is sold to a non-Jewish owner, he/ she might be tempted to adopt the practices of his owner. Hence the Torah reminds the slave that he/ she must follow the Torah even if he/ she is a slave to a non-Jew. Yet, how much freedom do slaves have? Also, Zev Whitman (1987) questions these views since if the intent of the Torah was to tell us that a slave had to keep the laws then the Torah should have stated so explicitly. Furthermore, why are only these three laws mentioned if the slave has to keep all the laws?
A modern commentator, Baruch Schwartz (2004, p. 273) notes that 26:1 elaborates on 19:4 and 26:2 repeats 19:30, and hence he suggests that these verses, which relate to chapter 19, are concluding verses to the laws of Vayikra prior to the blessings and curses. Yet, even with respect to chapter 19, 26:1,2, at best only refer to two verses in chapter 19, which does not make them sufficient to be summary verses for the entire book of Vayikra or even just for chapter 19.
Hoffmann (1953, pp. 140-142) writes that the laws of 26:1,2 are the foundation for the covenant and hence he understands 26:1,2 to be related to Be-hukkotai and not Behar. Whitman develops this idea as he notes that the three laws mentioned in 26:1,2 are referred to in the section of punishments that these were laws the people violated, 26:34,35 – shemitta (Shabbat of the land), 26:30 – idolatry, and 26:31 – the mikdash. Furthermore, as 26:2 refers to the Shabbat, it can refer to the regular Shabbat or the shemitta year (see Ibn Ezra on 26:2). Thus, Whitman adds the law of the regular Shabbat to the group of three laws, and claims that these are the four basic laws of the covenant that had to be mentioned prior to the rewards and punishments of chapter 26. He further argues that 26:14 which records “that if one did not observe these laws,” refers to the four laws.
While this argument is appealing, Whitman notes (in footnote 5), that the lack of reference even by hint to the non-observance of the regular Shabbat in the punishments of chapter 26 is problematic. If Shabbat was such a basic law its non-observance should have been mentioned as the non-observance of his other basic laws are mentioned. To resolve this difficulty, he concedes that one could drop the regular Sabbath from the list. Also, notwithstanding his defense of these four laws as being the basis of the covenant, this seems like an unlikely group, as for example, what happened to the prohibition of murder? In addition, 26:14 seems to refer to all the laws as it parallels 26:3, which also seems to refer to all the laws and not just this group of four. According to his explanation, 26:3 should have stated “if you keep these laws.”
Instead of claiming that the laws of 26:1,2 are the basis for the covenant, perhaps one can make a more limited suggestion that, as pointed out Whitman, the references to shemitta, idolatry and the mikdash in the curses in chapter 26, correspond to 26:1,2, and this correspondence could be the reason why the Torah records 26:1,2 prior to the blessings and curses of the covenant in the remainder of chapter 26. Yet, even this claim is weak since 26:1 refers to three separate laws, not to make an idol, not to set up an idol and not to bow down either to images or even on a stone floor, and none of these laws correspond to the reference to idolatry in 26:30, which seems to refer to sacrifices to false gods. Similarly, the law in 26:2 is to be in fear when one is in G-d’s mikdash, while the “corresponding” verse in the curses, 26:31, is that G-d threatened to destroy the mikdashim of the people. Thus, the correspondence of 26:1,2 to the curses in 26:30,31 seems insignificant.
While this argument is appealing, Whitman notes (in footnote 5), that the lack of reference even by hint to the non-observance of the regular Shabbat in the punishments of chapter 26 is problematic. If Shabbat was such a basic law its non-observance should have been mentioned as the non-observance of his other basic laws are mentioned. To resolve this difficulty, he concedes that one could drop the regular Sabbath from the list. Also, notwithstanding his defense of these four laws as being the basis of the covenant, this seems like an unlikely group, as for example, what happened to the prohibition of murder? In addition, 26:14 seems to refer to all the laws as it parallels 26:3, which also seems to refer to all the laws and not just this group of four. According to his explanation, 26:3 should have stated “if you keep these laws.”
Instead of claiming that the laws of 26:1,2 are the basis for the covenant, perhaps one can make a more limited suggestion that, as pointed out Whitman, the references to shemitta, idolatry and the mikdash in the curses in chapter 26, correspond to 26:1,2, and this correspondence could be the reason why the Torah records 26:1,2 prior to the blessings and curses of the covenant in the remainder of chapter 26. Yet, even this claim is weak since 26:1 refers to three separate laws, not to make an idol, not to set up an idol and not to bow down either to images or even on a stone floor, and none of these laws correspond to the reference to idolatry in 26:30, which seems to refer to sacrifices to false gods. Similarly, the law in 26:2 is to be in fear when one is in G-d’s mikdash, while the “corresponding” verse in the curses, 26:31, is that G-d threatened to destroy the mikdashim of the people. Thus, the correspondence of 26:1,2 to the curses in 26:30,31 seems insignificant.
The structure of chapter 25 and 26 support the idea that 26:1,2 relate to parashat Be-hukkotai and not to parashat Behar. In our discussion on the structure of Vayikra chapter 25 and 26 and on Shemot 6:5-8, "The four words of redemption," we pointed out that chapters 25 and 26 of Vayikra can be divided into four sections, and each section has a concluding verse, which are 25:38, 25:55, 26:13 and 26:45. Once 25:55 is a concluding sentence then the following verses, 26:1,2, relate to other verses in the third section 26:3-13 (in parashat Be-hukkotai) and not to chapter 25. Yet, still what is the connection?
Kochman (2002, pp. 201,202) notes several parallels between these verses and three of the first four statements in the Decalogue, and leaves as a question whether the two verses are a condensed conclusion to the laws of Vayikra (the connections with chapter 19) or an introduction to the ensuing blessings and cruses. My guess is that they function more as an introduction to the blessings and curses, and one can add more literary connections of these verses to the Decalogue.
The literary connection between 26:1,2 to the Decalogue at Mount Sinai begins with the previous verse, 25:55, which records that the Jewish people are G-d’s people, ki li, and this same phrase appears both in 25:23 and in Shemot 19:5, prior to the Decalogue. 25:55 then records that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt, and these words are part of G-d’s opening statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:2. 25:55 ends with the phrase, G-d is the G-d of the people, and while this is a common phrase, it appears in a similar form in the first statement of the Decalogue.
26:1 then begins by referring to the prohibition of making, taasu, an idol, and this same word, taaseh, with the same idea is part of the second statement in the Decalogue, Shemot 20:4. 26:1 then refers to the prohibition of setting up an idol, a pesel, and this word, pesel also appears in Shemot 20:4. 26:1 then refers to a prohibition of bowing, hishtachavot, and this word, tishtachveh, also appears in the second statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:5. The end of 26:1 again records that G-d is the G-d of the people, and the phrase appears in just a very slightly different form in the second statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:5.
26:2 then refers to remembering the Shabbat, and this same idea, with a different word, zachor, appears in the fourth statement of the Decalogue, Shemot 20:8. Finally, the second half of 26:2 refers to the need for people to be in fear when they are in the mikdash, and after G-d stated the Decalogue, Shemot 20:17 records that Moshe told the people that a reason for the Decalogue was that the people would learn to fear G-d.
Note even if 26:1,2 are thematically related to parashat Be-hukkotai this does not imply that these verses should have been included in parashat Be-hukkotai. Occasionally, the narrative is interrupted with a division of the parashot because there is a desire to start a new parasha with a dramatic opening, as for example by parashat Mikketz and parashat Va-yigash. Thus, as 26:3 is a more dramatic opening than 26:1, it is more appropriate verse to begin a new parasha.
Bibliography:
Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Kochman, Michael, 2002, in The World of the Bible: Vayikra, edited by Baruch Levine, Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, Divrei Hayamim, Sifrei Hemed.
Schwartz, Baruch J. 2004, Leviticus: Introduction and annotations, in The Jewish Study Bible, edited by Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203-280.
Bibliography:
Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Kochman, Michael, 2002, in The World of the Bible: Vayikra, edited by Baruch Levine, Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, Divrei Hayamim, Sifrei Hemed.
Schwartz, Baruch J. 2004, Leviticus: Introduction and annotations, in The Jewish Study Bible, edited by Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203-280.
Whitman, Zev, 1987, Shemitta and the Mikdash, Megadim, vol. 3, pp. 9-20.
Saturday, May 9, 2009
Lag Ba-omer - You do the math
Lag Ba-omer, literally the 33rd day in the counting of the omer or the 18th of Iyar, is a mysterious day since there is no obvious explanation for why the day is special.
The traditional reason for the holiday is that it is claimed that this is the day when the students of R. Akiva stopped dying. The Talmud (Yevamot 62b) records that 12,000 pairs of students of R. Akiva died at one time since they did not respect each other, and the Talmud explains that they died from Pesach to Shavuot.
The Talmud makes no mention of Lag Ba-omer, and also in the time of the Geonim (9th, 10th centuries) there is no mention of Lag Ba-omer. Interestingly in the 9th century there is a reference to the 18th of Iyar in a piyyut which refers to the day as the fast of Yehoshua due to the battle of Ai, Joshua 7:6 (quoted in Levinsky, 1955, vol. 6, p.357), but again there is no mention of Lag Ba-omer. Also, the Rambam does not mention Lag Ba-omer, and in Yemen, the Dardaim, who did not accept the Zohar, treated Lag Ba-omer as a regular day (Lavinsky, p.363).
In Provence, France in the Middle Ages, we have the first references to Lag Ba-omer. R. Avraham Hayarchi (1155, Provence, to 1215 Toledo, Spain) writes in the Sefer Hamanhig (quoted in Zevin, 1956, p. 299) that in France and Provence the custom was to marry from Lag Ba-omer onwards. To support this practice, he writes that he heard from R. Zecharya Halevi (1125 Gerona to 1186, Provence) that a text was found in Spain which records that R. Akiva's students died until "peros" Shavout. R. Hayarchi writes that peros means half, and as the word half appears with regard to the law of learning the laws of Pesach 30 days before Pesach, then peros means half of 30 or 15. Thus, he writes that Lag Ba-omer is 15 days prior to Shavout.
This explanation of peros is very difficult since even if peros means half why should the word be related to the 30 days before Pesach and mean 15? In addition, Lag Ba-omer is not 15 days before Shavout but 17 days. In fact, because of this reason of peros, the Shulchan Arukh (1488-1575, Orah Chayyim 493:2) writes that the period of mourning ends during the 34th day of the omer, which is 15 days less than 49. It seems that the Shulchan Arukh did not consider Lag Ba-omer a special day. Finally, Daniel Sperber (1995a, pp.237-239) quotes Saul Liebermann that the word peros means the day before, and then the phrase peros Shavout means that the students of R. Akiva died until the day before Shavout, which corresponds to the Talmud.
The Meiri (1249-1306, commentary on Yevamot 62a) who was also from Provence writes that there exists a tradition from the Geonim that the students of R. Akiva stopped dying on Lag Ba-omer. Most likely he knew the drasha of peros but because it was so weak he just relied on saying that a tradition existed without quoting the drasha. He also wrote more that due to this tradition people do not fast on Lag Ba-omer, which implies that he knew of the initial custom to fast on Lag Ba-omer.
This idea from Provence that Lag Ba-omer is because the students of R. Akiva stopped dying on the day is difficult independent of the problems with the drasha of peros. First, it contradicts our Gemara, and secondly, as the Prei Hadesh (1659-1695, 493:2) asks what is the happiness that the students stopped dying as all the students were dead?
The Maharil (1365-1437, Germany, Sefer Maharil, 1989, p.156) writes that Lag Ba-omer was a day of happiness, and he suggested a new reason for the day. He follows the Talmud that the students of R. Akiva died throughout the entire period, but he claims that they only died on days when tachanun was recited. There were 17 days when tachanun was not said (Pesach, 7, Shabbat, 7, and Rosh Hodesh, 3) between Pesach and Shavout, and hence the students died for 32 days. With this rationale Lag Ba-omer is celebrated not because the students of R. Akiva did not die on the day but as a sign that they died only for 32 days. Thus, the Maharil ingenuously combined the Talmud that the students of R. Akiva died throughout the entire period, the idea in Provence that they died for only thirty three days, and Lag ba-omer. However, this is also a difficult approach. How did he know that the students of R. Akiva died only when tachanun was said? In addition, there are other days when tachanun is not said, the month of Nisan, Pesach Sheni, and the three days before Shavout, and also one of the days of Shabbat was on Pesach, see Sperber, 1990, p.104 and 1995a, pp.239-241. Again, it seems that Lag Ba-omer was an accepted holiday and the derivation is a justification for the holiday.
A modern explanation of the deaths of R. Akiva's students is that really these students were soldiers fighting in Bar Kokhba's rebellion (132-135). Some "proofs" for this idea is that we know that R. Akiva was an ardent supporter of Bar Kokhba and the reference to pair of students in the Talmud could mean small army (guerrilla?) units. This rationale could also explain the custom of going out with bows and arrows on Lag Ba-omer though more likely this custom developed in the Middle Ages under the influence of Christians who had archery contests in May.
Based on the connection between R. Akiva's students and Bar Kokhba, Levinsky (1955, p.342) suggests that Lag Ba-omer was the day when Bar Kokhba had one of his early victories. According to this idea, from the time of this victory onwards, there was a custom in Israel to celebrate Lag Ba-omer, and from Israel this custom spread to Provence and Germany.
Zechariah Goren (1992) argues that this connection of Bar Kokhba to Lag Ba-omer is due to Zionist ideology. The idea is that Bar Kokhba, the fighter, was viewed as a prototype of the new Jew that the Zionist movement wanted to create, and thus the Zionist movement wanted to stress the connections of the people to Bar Kokhba. However, Goren rejects the connection between Bar Kokhba and Lag Ba-omer for several reasons. One, if the holiday is celebrated due to a victory, then the holiday should be known as the 18th of Iyar since the victory has no connection with the omer. Goren notes that some people have claimed that the reference to the omer was a subterfuge to fool the Romans, but he doubts such a possibility. Also, as mentioned above, in the 9th century there is a piyyut that refers to the 18th of Iyar as the fast of Yehoshua and Goren points out that it seems that the author of the piyyut had no knowledge of any special events relating to Bar Kokhba or R. Akiva's students on Lag Ba-omer since no mention of these events are included in the piyyut. Furthermore, if Lag Ba-omer was from the second century, why then was it not mentioned until the Middle Ages? I can accept that the deaths of the students of R. Akiva relate to the Bar Kokhba revolt, but I doubt that people would celebrate any victory of Bar Kokhba in light of the fact that his rebellion led to disaster when he eventually lost to the Romans.
The second popular rationale for celebrating Lag Ba-omer is that it is claimed that this was the day that R. Shimon Bar Yochai died. However, the Hatam Sofer (quoted in Zevin, p.301) points out that the deaths of the righteous are reasons for fast days and not celebrations. Thus, there was (is?) a custom to fast on the day that Moshe died, so why would we celebrate the day that R. Shimon Bar Yochai died?
Avraham Yaari (1962) has a fascinating article where he traces the source of the celebrations at R. Shimon Bar Yochai's grave in Meron on Lag Ba-omer. He finds that there are no sources that refer to this celebration before the 16th century, though people did refer to the graves of Hillel and Shamai that were in the same area, and celebrations on the 14th of Iyar by those graves. The initial custom of the Kabbalists of Sefat in the 16th century was to go to the grave of R. Shimon Bar Yochai 10 days before Shavout and 10 days before Rosh Hashanah and not on Lag Ba-omer. Yaari claims that the source for the celebration in Meron on the Lag Ba-omer was a custom in Yerushalayim to go to the grave of Shmuel ha-Navi on the 28th of Iyar, and when this was prohibited by the Ottoman authorities, the people started going to Meron on the Lag Ba-omer.
Accordingly, there is no intrinsic connection between R. Shimon Bar Yochai and Lag Ba-omer. Furthermore, the claim that R. Shimon Bar Yochai died on Lag Ba-omer is first attributed to the Ari (16th century) but Yaari points out that the one source that makes this claim is most likely a corrupted text. Yaari notes that this point had already been made by the Hida (R. Hayyim Jospeh David Azulai, 1724-1806), and thus the Hida suggests instead that Lag Ba-omer was the day when R. Akiva started to teach his new students. Yet, this rationale just returns us to the idea that Lag Ba-omer was the day when R. Akiva's students stopped dying, which as mentioned above is difficult to accept.
From this review we see that in the Middle Ages, Lag Ba-omer had become a special day, and that the "holiday" seems to have begun in Provence. Maybe there is another possibility for the holiday based on the mourning customs during sefirat ha-omer in the time of the Geonim. Otzar Ha-Geonim (7:141, on Yevamot 62b) quotes two responses that in the time of the Geonim, there was a custom not to marry and not to work from dusk to dawn throughout entire period of the sefirat ha-omer due to the deaths of the students of Rabbi Akiva.
This custom not to marry was for quite a long time, and my guess is that in Provence there developed a "break-away" custom to shorten the period of mourning. Why starting on Lag Ba-omer could people marry? It is quite striking that Lag Ba-omer is two thirds of 49 (32.7), and thus the day signifies that two thirds of the sefirat ha-omer period has passed. Thus, as a justification for shortening the mourning period, in Provence they decided that it was enough to keep two thirds of the mourning of sefirat ha-omer. This would mean that people would only have to wait at most 33 days to marry instead of 49 days. After the restrictions ended, the following day would be a happy day, since people could then marry on that day. Most likely, this idea of a majority was not accepted by all and hence the drasha of peros was devised to support their new custom. Finally, this idea connects the holiday to sefirat ha-omer, and not to the 18th of Iyar, which would explain why the day is referred to as the 33rd day of the omer.
The traditional reason for the holiday is that it is claimed that this is the day when the students of R. Akiva stopped dying. The Talmud (Yevamot 62b) records that 12,000 pairs of students of R. Akiva died at one time since they did not respect each other, and the Talmud explains that they died from Pesach to Shavuot.
The Talmud makes no mention of Lag Ba-omer, and also in the time of the Geonim (9th, 10th centuries) there is no mention of Lag Ba-omer. Interestingly in the 9th century there is a reference to the 18th of Iyar in a piyyut which refers to the day as the fast of Yehoshua due to the battle of Ai, Joshua 7:6 (quoted in Levinsky, 1955, vol. 6, p.357), but again there is no mention of Lag Ba-omer. Also, the Rambam does not mention Lag Ba-omer, and in Yemen, the Dardaim, who did not accept the Zohar, treated Lag Ba-omer as a regular day (Lavinsky, p.363).
In Provence, France in the Middle Ages, we have the first references to Lag Ba-omer. R. Avraham Hayarchi (1155, Provence, to 1215 Toledo, Spain) writes in the Sefer Hamanhig (quoted in Zevin, 1956, p. 299) that in France and Provence the custom was to marry from Lag Ba-omer onwards. To support this practice, he writes that he heard from R. Zecharya Halevi (1125 Gerona to 1186, Provence) that a text was found in Spain which records that R. Akiva's students died until "peros" Shavout. R. Hayarchi writes that peros means half, and as the word half appears with regard to the law of learning the laws of Pesach 30 days before Pesach, then peros means half of 30 or 15. Thus, he writes that Lag Ba-omer is 15 days prior to Shavout.
This explanation of peros is very difficult since even if peros means half why should the word be related to the 30 days before Pesach and mean 15? In addition, Lag Ba-omer is not 15 days before Shavout but 17 days. In fact, because of this reason of peros, the Shulchan Arukh (1488-1575, Orah Chayyim 493:2) writes that the period of mourning ends during the 34th day of the omer, which is 15 days less than 49. It seems that the Shulchan Arukh did not consider Lag Ba-omer a special day. Finally, Daniel Sperber (1995a, pp.237-239) quotes Saul Liebermann that the word peros means the day before, and then the phrase peros Shavout means that the students of R. Akiva died until the day before Shavout, which corresponds to the Talmud.
The Meiri (1249-1306, commentary on Yevamot 62a) who was also from Provence writes that there exists a tradition from the Geonim that the students of R. Akiva stopped dying on Lag Ba-omer. Most likely he knew the drasha of peros but because it was so weak he just relied on saying that a tradition existed without quoting the drasha. He also wrote more that due to this tradition people do not fast on Lag Ba-omer, which implies that he knew of the initial custom to fast on Lag Ba-omer.
This idea from Provence that Lag Ba-omer is because the students of R. Akiva stopped dying on the day is difficult independent of the problems with the drasha of peros. First, it contradicts our Gemara, and secondly, as the Prei Hadesh (1659-1695, 493:2) asks what is the happiness that the students stopped dying as all the students were dead?
The Maharil (1365-1437, Germany, Sefer Maharil, 1989, p.156) writes that Lag Ba-omer was a day of happiness, and he suggested a new reason for the day. He follows the Talmud that the students of R. Akiva died throughout the entire period, but he claims that they only died on days when tachanun was recited. There were 17 days when tachanun was not said (Pesach, 7, Shabbat, 7, and Rosh Hodesh, 3) between Pesach and Shavout, and hence the students died for 32 days. With this rationale Lag Ba-omer is celebrated not because the students of R. Akiva did not die on the day but as a sign that they died only for 32 days. Thus, the Maharil ingenuously combined the Talmud that the students of R. Akiva died throughout the entire period, the idea in Provence that they died for only thirty three days, and Lag ba-omer. However, this is also a difficult approach. How did he know that the students of R. Akiva died only when tachanun was said? In addition, there are other days when tachanun is not said, the month of Nisan, Pesach Sheni, and the three days before Shavout, and also one of the days of Shabbat was on Pesach, see Sperber, 1990, p.104 and 1995a, pp.239-241. Again, it seems that Lag Ba-omer was an accepted holiday and the derivation is a justification for the holiday.
A modern explanation of the deaths of R. Akiva's students is that really these students were soldiers fighting in Bar Kokhba's rebellion (132-135). Some "proofs" for this idea is that we know that R. Akiva was an ardent supporter of Bar Kokhba and the reference to pair of students in the Talmud could mean small army (guerrilla?) units. This rationale could also explain the custom of going out with bows and arrows on Lag Ba-omer though more likely this custom developed in the Middle Ages under the influence of Christians who had archery contests in May.
Based on the connection between R. Akiva's students and Bar Kokhba, Levinsky (1955, p.342) suggests that Lag Ba-omer was the day when Bar Kokhba had one of his early victories. According to this idea, from the time of this victory onwards, there was a custom in Israel to celebrate Lag Ba-omer, and from Israel this custom spread to Provence and Germany.
Zechariah Goren (1992) argues that this connection of Bar Kokhba to Lag Ba-omer is due to Zionist ideology. The idea is that Bar Kokhba, the fighter, was viewed as a prototype of the new Jew that the Zionist movement wanted to create, and thus the Zionist movement wanted to stress the connections of the people to Bar Kokhba. However, Goren rejects the connection between Bar Kokhba and Lag Ba-omer for several reasons. One, if the holiday is celebrated due to a victory, then the holiday should be known as the 18th of Iyar since the victory has no connection with the omer. Goren notes that some people have claimed that the reference to the omer was a subterfuge to fool the Romans, but he doubts such a possibility. Also, as mentioned above, in the 9th century there is a piyyut that refers to the 18th of Iyar as the fast of Yehoshua and Goren points out that it seems that the author of the piyyut had no knowledge of any special events relating to Bar Kokhba or R. Akiva's students on Lag Ba-omer since no mention of these events are included in the piyyut. Furthermore, if Lag Ba-omer was from the second century, why then was it not mentioned until the Middle Ages? I can accept that the deaths of the students of R. Akiva relate to the Bar Kokhba revolt, but I doubt that people would celebrate any victory of Bar Kokhba in light of the fact that his rebellion led to disaster when he eventually lost to the Romans.
The second popular rationale for celebrating Lag Ba-omer is that it is claimed that this was the day that R. Shimon Bar Yochai died. However, the Hatam Sofer (quoted in Zevin, p.301) points out that the deaths of the righteous are reasons for fast days and not celebrations. Thus, there was (is?) a custom to fast on the day that Moshe died, so why would we celebrate the day that R. Shimon Bar Yochai died?
Avraham Yaari (1962) has a fascinating article where he traces the source of the celebrations at R. Shimon Bar Yochai's grave in Meron on Lag Ba-omer. He finds that there are no sources that refer to this celebration before the 16th century, though people did refer to the graves of Hillel and Shamai that were in the same area, and celebrations on the 14th of Iyar by those graves. The initial custom of the Kabbalists of Sefat in the 16th century was to go to the grave of R. Shimon Bar Yochai 10 days before Shavout and 10 days before Rosh Hashanah and not on Lag Ba-omer. Yaari claims that the source for the celebration in Meron on the Lag Ba-omer was a custom in Yerushalayim to go to the grave of Shmuel ha-Navi on the 28th of Iyar, and when this was prohibited by the Ottoman authorities, the people started going to Meron on the Lag Ba-omer.
Accordingly, there is no intrinsic connection between R. Shimon Bar Yochai and Lag Ba-omer. Furthermore, the claim that R. Shimon Bar Yochai died on Lag Ba-omer is first attributed to the Ari (16th century) but Yaari points out that the one source that makes this claim is most likely a corrupted text. Yaari notes that this point had already been made by the Hida (R. Hayyim Jospeh David Azulai, 1724-1806), and thus the Hida suggests instead that Lag Ba-omer was the day when R. Akiva started to teach his new students. Yet, this rationale just returns us to the idea that Lag Ba-omer was the day when R. Akiva's students stopped dying, which as mentioned above is difficult to accept.
From this review we see that in the Middle Ages, Lag Ba-omer had become a special day, and that the "holiday" seems to have begun in Provence. Maybe there is another possibility for the holiday based on the mourning customs during sefirat ha-omer in the time of the Geonim. Otzar Ha-Geonim (7:141, on Yevamot 62b) quotes two responses that in the time of the Geonim, there was a custom not to marry and not to work from dusk to dawn throughout entire period of the sefirat ha-omer due to the deaths of the students of Rabbi Akiva.
This custom not to marry was for quite a long time, and my guess is that in Provence there developed a "break-away" custom to shorten the period of mourning. Why starting on Lag Ba-omer could people marry? It is quite striking that Lag Ba-omer is two thirds of 49 (32.7), and thus the day signifies that two thirds of the sefirat ha-omer period has passed. Thus, as a justification for shortening the mourning period, in Provence they decided that it was enough to keep two thirds of the mourning of sefirat ha-omer. This would mean that people would only have to wait at most 33 days to marry instead of 49 days. After the restrictions ended, the following day would be a happy day, since people could then marry on that day. Most likely, this idea of a majority was not accepted by all and hence the drasha of peros was devised to support their new custom. Finally, this idea connects the holiday to sefirat ha-omer, and not to the 18th of Iyar, which would explain why the day is referred to as the 33rd day of the omer.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Vayikra 23:1-4 (Emor) - Shabbat, a moed and a mikra kodesh?
Vayikra Chapter 23 records the days in the year which are a mikrei kodesh, literally those days that are proclaimed as kodesh. The term mikra kodesh means a day that is proclaimed or designated as a separate day, and one way that it is separated is that no work is done on that day (see Benno Jacob, 1992, p. 322). Accordingly, chapter 23 does not mention the new moon since work is not forbidden on the day and hence it is not a mikra' kodesh.
The chapter begins with an introductory verse, 23:2, then a verse which refers to the Shabbat, 23:3, and then apparently another introductory verse, 23:4, which is very similar to the 23:2. Why is there a need for two introductory verses?
The answer is that this is an example of a repetitive resumption or a bookend, that after there is a digression, the Torah refers to its previous topic by restating the verse prior to the digression. The digression is the reference to the Shabbat in 23:3, but why should the reference to Shabbat be considered a digression?
Ramban (on 23:2) first writes that Shabbat is a moed, a set time, but afterwards he argues that Shabbat is different than the other days mentioned in the chapter since Shabbat is not considered a moed while the other days are considered a moed. Ramban quotes two proofs for why Shabbat is not considered a moed. One, by all the festival days in chapter 23 there are references to sacrifices brought on the particular day, but there is no mention of sacrifices with regard to Shabbat. Thus we see a difference between Shabbat and the other festive days. Secondly, towards the end of the chapter, 23:37 records the phrase "these are the moadim, set times, of G-d," and then 23:38 records the phrase "apart from Shabbat." Ramban claims that the word "apart" in 23:38 means to separate Shabbat from the other days which are moadim, set times. Similarly, Levine (1989, p. 154) writes that Shabbat is not a moed since a festival must have its date "fixed," while Shabbat does not have to have its date fixed since the seventh day is not a "calendrical phenomenon."
On the other hand, the fact that 23:2 ends with phrase "these are My moed," and then 23:3 refers to the Shabbat implies that Shabbat is a moed. Ramban argues that the phrase "these are My moed," in 23:2 refers to the festivals which are recorded in 23:5. While Hoffmann (1953) brings a proof for this idea from Shemot 35, still it would seem that since Shabbat is mentioned immediately after the phrase "these are My moed," Shabbat is a moed.
The answer is that Shabbat is a moed, a set time, and a mikra' kodesh, but it is different than the festivals since there is no need to proclaim Shabbat as a moed and a mikra' kodesh through sacrifices, only through the abstinence of work. (Later usage only refers to the festivals as moadim, but in the Torah, Shabbat is also a moed.)
The festivals are proclaimed as a moed and a mikra' kodesh by the sacrifices that are mentioned in chapter 23 that are to be brought on the particular festival, by some ritual action and the fact that work is forbidden on the day. Verse 23:38 uses the word "apart" since the previous verse, 23:37, stated that "these are the moadim that are proclaimed a mikra' kodesh to bring sacrifices." Shabbat is not included in 23:37 since there was no need to offer sacrifices to proclaim the day as a moed and a mikra kodesh. Yet, Shabbat had to be mentioned in chapter 23 since it is a moed and a mikra' kodesh, but this does not happen due to sacrifices. Thus, 23:2,4 are a bookend that separates Shabbat from the festivals.
The chapter begins with an introductory verse, 23:2, then a verse which refers to the Shabbat, 23:3, and then apparently another introductory verse, 23:4, which is very similar to the 23:2. Why is there a need for two introductory verses?
The answer is that this is an example of a repetitive resumption or a bookend, that after there is a digression, the Torah refers to its previous topic by restating the verse prior to the digression. The digression is the reference to the Shabbat in 23:3, but why should the reference to Shabbat be considered a digression?
Ramban (on 23:2) first writes that Shabbat is a moed, a set time, but afterwards he argues that Shabbat is different than the other days mentioned in the chapter since Shabbat is not considered a moed while the other days are considered a moed. Ramban quotes two proofs for why Shabbat is not considered a moed. One, by all the festival days in chapter 23 there are references to sacrifices brought on the particular day, but there is no mention of sacrifices with regard to Shabbat. Thus we see a difference between Shabbat and the other festive days. Secondly, towards the end of the chapter, 23:37 records the phrase "these are the moadim, set times, of G-d," and then 23:38 records the phrase "apart from Shabbat." Ramban claims that the word "apart" in 23:38 means to separate Shabbat from the other days which are moadim, set times. Similarly, Levine (1989, p. 154) writes that Shabbat is not a moed since a festival must have its date "fixed," while Shabbat does not have to have its date fixed since the seventh day is not a "calendrical phenomenon."
On the other hand, the fact that 23:2 ends with phrase "these are My moed," and then 23:3 refers to the Shabbat implies that Shabbat is a moed. Ramban argues that the phrase "these are My moed," in 23:2 refers to the festivals which are recorded in 23:5. While Hoffmann (1953) brings a proof for this idea from Shemot 35, still it would seem that since Shabbat is mentioned immediately after the phrase "these are My moed," Shabbat is a moed.
The answer is that Shabbat is a moed, a set time, and a mikra' kodesh, but it is different than the festivals since there is no need to proclaim Shabbat as a moed and a mikra' kodesh through sacrifices, only through the abstinence of work. (Later usage only refers to the festivals as moadim, but in the Torah, Shabbat is also a moed.)
The festivals are proclaimed as a moed and a mikra' kodesh by the sacrifices that are mentioned in chapter 23 that are to be brought on the particular festival, by some ritual action and the fact that work is forbidden on the day. Verse 23:38 uses the word "apart" since the previous verse, 23:37, stated that "these are the moadim that are proclaimed a mikra' kodesh to bring sacrifices." Shabbat is not included in 23:37 since there was no need to offer sacrifices to proclaim the day as a moed and a mikra kodesh. Yet, Shabbat had to be mentioned in chapter 23 since it is a moed and a mikra' kodesh, but this does not happen due to sacrifices. Thus, 23:2,4 are a bookend that separates Shabbat from the festivals.
Vayikra 23:23-26 (Emor) - Rosh Hashanah
23:23-26 records that the first day of the seventh month, which today we call Rosh Hashanah, is a mikra' kodesh. Why is the first day of the seventh month a mikra kodesh? The most popular answer is that the day marks the beginning of the year, but this idea is absent from the Torah.
The only clue the Torah gives us to understand the nature of Rosh Hashanah is that on this day there should be a commemoration with loud blasts, zikhron teru'ah. What is the point of these blasts? Levine (1989, p. 160) argues that the blasts were to announce the forthcoming pilgrimage festival, the festival of Sukkot. The people would hear the blasts and they would be reminded of the upcoming festival and its pilgrimage requirements. However, as Yom Kippur, which is on the tenth of the month, precedes Sukkot, the fifteenth of the month, it more likely that the announcement should be for Yom Kippur.
There are three indications in the Torah that Rosh Hashanah is to prepare the people for Yom Kippur. One, the text connects Rosh Hashanah with Yom Kippur by using the word, 'akh, in 23:27, which connects the two sections. (Also in 23:39, the word connects the two sets of laws of Sukkot. Similarly, in Shemot 31:13, the word connects the Shabbat to the building of the tabernacle, and in Shemot 12:15, it connects the destruction of the leaven with the eating of the unleavened bread.) Two, as noted by Hoffmann, every festival in chapter 23 begins with the phrase, "the Lord spoke to Moshe, speak to the Israelites", but by Yom Kippur, only the phrase "the Lord spoke to Moshe" appears. The omission of the second half of the phrase limits the break between the section on Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. Three, it is logical that Yom Kippur requires an announcement, as 23:29-30 record that the penalty for violating the laws of Yom Kippur is very severe and this holiday occurs on the tenth of the month which cannot be simply calculated by looking at the moon.
This idea that Rosh Hashanah is to prepare for Yom Kippur also corresponds to the later idea that the days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, are the ten days of repentance.
Bibliography:
Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
The only clue the Torah gives us to understand the nature of Rosh Hashanah is that on this day there should be a commemoration with loud blasts, zikhron teru'ah. What is the point of these blasts? Levine (1989, p. 160) argues that the blasts were to announce the forthcoming pilgrimage festival, the festival of Sukkot. The people would hear the blasts and they would be reminded of the upcoming festival and its pilgrimage requirements. However, as Yom Kippur, which is on the tenth of the month, precedes Sukkot, the fifteenth of the month, it more likely that the announcement should be for Yom Kippur.
There are three indications in the Torah that Rosh Hashanah is to prepare the people for Yom Kippur. One, the text connects Rosh Hashanah with Yom Kippur by using the word, 'akh, in 23:27, which connects the two sections. (Also in 23:39, the word connects the two sets of laws of Sukkot. Similarly, in Shemot 31:13, the word connects the Shabbat to the building of the tabernacle, and in Shemot 12:15, it connects the destruction of the leaven with the eating of the unleavened bread.) Two, as noted by Hoffmann, every festival in chapter 23 begins with the phrase, "the Lord spoke to Moshe, speak to the Israelites", but by Yom Kippur, only the phrase "the Lord spoke to Moshe" appears. The omission of the second half of the phrase limits the break between the section on Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. Three, it is logical that Yom Kippur requires an announcement, as 23:29-30 record that the penalty for violating the laws of Yom Kippur is very severe and this holiday occurs on the tenth of the month which cannot be simply calculated by looking at the moon.
This idea that Rosh Hashanah is to prepare for Yom Kippur also corresponds to the later idea that the days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, are the ten days of repentance.
Bibliography:
Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Vayikra 23:4-37 (Emor) - Two sets of mikrei kodesh
Vayikra 23:4-37 records the laws of five festivals, mikrei kodesh: The festivals of Matzot, Shavuot, Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Sukkot. This list does not include the holiday of Pesach since this is not a mikra kodesh because in the Torah there is no prohibition of work on the day when the korban pesach is offered. This list also excludes Shemini Atzeret, which is subsumed under the festival of Sukkot, the “eighth day of Sukkot,” see our discussion “Shemini Atzeret: A separate holiday?”
Three of the five mikrei kodesh, are in the seventh month (starting from Nisan), Rosh Hashanah (23:24), Yom Kippur (23:26) and Sukkot (23:34). Sukkot is in the seventh month since it is at the time of the harvest, which is in the fall. However, why are Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur also in the seventh month, as presumably they could have been celebrated any time during the year?
One possible answer is that the date of Yom Kippur was chosen to correspond to the day when Moshe came down from Mount Sinai with the second set of luchot. Yet, the Torah never makes this connection, and this fact cannot be known from a simple reading of the Torah.
Hoffmann (1953, p. 175) suggests that Yom Kippur is on the tenth of the month to prepare for Sukkot. The idea is that due to Yom Kippur everybody will be pure, which enables them to fully celebrate the happiness of Sukkot. Hoffmann notes that this approach does not negate the independent importance of Yom Kippur, but rather it is appropriate that Yom Kippur is before Sukkot. Yet, according to this rationale, Yom Kippur could also have been before Pesach, when all Jews have to bring the passover sacrifice, the korban pesach.
My thought is that the five festivals encompass two sets of mikrei kodesh, and Sukkot is the culmination of both sets. One set includes the festivals, Matzot, Shavuot and Sukkot, while the second set comprises Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Sukkot. The first set is based on the timing of the rationale of the holiday: The festival of Matzot has to be in the first month since that was when the people left Egypt, the festival of Shavuot is the time of the first reaping, and the holiday of Sukkot is the time when the harvesting is completed. On the other hand, the mikrei kodesh of the second set are connected through the seventh month, and then Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur had to be in the same month as Sukkot. Sukkot fulfils both criteria, and is part of both sets.
Why are there two sets of mikrei kodesh? My guess is that there are different themes to the two separate sets of mikrei kodesh.
The first set of mikrei kodesh begins with the holiday of Matzot, where G-d showed his acceptance of the people by taking them out of Egypt. One can even include the holiday of Pesach, which while not a mikra kodesh, is referred to in chapter 23, 23:5, as the introduction to the holiday of Matzot since this holiday re-calls the people showing their acceptance of G-d when they offered the korban pesach in Egypt. Shavuot, the second holiday in the first set of mikrei kodesh, signals the people thanking G-d, the bringing of new crops as sacrifices, which is in response to G-d taking the people out of Egypt by the holiday of Matzot, see our discussion on Shavuot. “To thank G-d” in the file a commentary on Jewish holidays and custom. The main motif of the third holiday in the first set of mikrei kodesh, the holiday of Sukkot, is to be happy, see our discussion on Sukkot in the file a commentary on Jewish holidays and custom, “Be happy.” This happiness signifies that the person is truly thankful to G-d.
The second set of mikrei kodesh, Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Sukkot, relate to renewing the covenantal relationship with G-d. Rosh Hashanah with the blowing of the shofar is to remind one to prepare for Yom Kippur, see our discussion above on 23:23-25, “Rosh Hashanah.” The following mikra kodesh, Yom Kippur, is the day man is closest to G-d. The high priest enters the Holy of Holies, Vayikra 16:12, and Vayikra 16:30 records that on that Yom Kippur man is considered before G-d. The service by the high priest on Yom Kippur purifies the ohel moed/ Bet ha-Mikdash and the people, which enables the people to start again their covenantal relationship with G-d. Sukkot, the festival of happiness and celebration, signifies not just the joy of people for their harvest, but also the happiness of the people with the renewal of their relationship with G-d after Yom Kippur.
Maybe the sacrifices brought on Sukkot indicate the duality of holiday. With regard to the number of lambs and rams offered on the various special days, all the days have exactly the same number of sacrifices, seven lambs and one ram. However, on Sukkot, there are double the number of lambs and rams, fourteen lambs and two rams, which are brought as sacrifices. Maybe this doubling of sacrifices demonstrates that Sukkot functions as a double holiday since it concludes both sets of mikrei kodesh.
Three of the five mikrei kodesh, are in the seventh month (starting from Nisan), Rosh Hashanah (23:24), Yom Kippur (23:26) and Sukkot (23:34). Sukkot is in the seventh month since it is at the time of the harvest, which is in the fall. However, why are Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur also in the seventh month, as presumably they could have been celebrated any time during the year?
One possible answer is that the date of Yom Kippur was chosen to correspond to the day when Moshe came down from Mount Sinai with the second set of luchot. Yet, the Torah never makes this connection, and this fact cannot be known from a simple reading of the Torah.
Hoffmann (1953, p. 175) suggests that Yom Kippur is on the tenth of the month to prepare for Sukkot. The idea is that due to Yom Kippur everybody will be pure, which enables them to fully celebrate the happiness of Sukkot. Hoffmann notes that this approach does not negate the independent importance of Yom Kippur, but rather it is appropriate that Yom Kippur is before Sukkot. Yet, according to this rationale, Yom Kippur could also have been before Pesach, when all Jews have to bring the passover sacrifice, the korban pesach.
My thought is that the five festivals encompass two sets of mikrei kodesh, and Sukkot is the culmination of both sets. One set includes the festivals, Matzot, Shavuot and Sukkot, while the second set comprises Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Sukkot. The first set is based on the timing of the rationale of the holiday: The festival of Matzot has to be in the first month since that was when the people left Egypt, the festival of Shavuot is the time of the first reaping, and the holiday of Sukkot is the time when the harvesting is completed. On the other hand, the mikrei kodesh of the second set are connected through the seventh month, and then Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur had to be in the same month as Sukkot. Sukkot fulfils both criteria, and is part of both sets.
Why are there two sets of mikrei kodesh? My guess is that there are different themes to the two separate sets of mikrei kodesh.
The first set of mikrei kodesh begins with the holiday of Matzot, where G-d showed his acceptance of the people by taking them out of Egypt. One can even include the holiday of Pesach, which while not a mikra kodesh, is referred to in chapter 23, 23:5, as the introduction to the holiday of Matzot since this holiday re-calls the people showing their acceptance of G-d when they offered the korban pesach in Egypt. Shavuot, the second holiday in the first set of mikrei kodesh, signals the people thanking G-d, the bringing of new crops as sacrifices, which is in response to G-d taking the people out of Egypt by the holiday of Matzot, see our discussion on Shavuot. “To thank G-d” in the file a commentary on Jewish holidays and custom. The main motif of the third holiday in the first set of mikrei kodesh, the holiday of Sukkot, is to be happy, see our discussion on Sukkot in the file a commentary on Jewish holidays and custom, “Be happy.” This happiness signifies that the person is truly thankful to G-d.
The second set of mikrei kodesh, Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur and Sukkot, relate to renewing the covenantal relationship with G-d. Rosh Hashanah with the blowing of the shofar is to remind one to prepare for Yom Kippur, see our discussion above on 23:23-25, “Rosh Hashanah.” The following mikra kodesh, Yom Kippur, is the day man is closest to G-d. The high priest enters the Holy of Holies, Vayikra 16:12, and Vayikra 16:30 records that on that Yom Kippur man is considered before G-d. The service by the high priest on Yom Kippur purifies the ohel moed/ Bet ha-Mikdash and the people, which enables the people to start again their covenantal relationship with G-d. Sukkot, the festival of happiness and celebration, signifies not just the joy of people for their harvest, but also the happiness of the people with the renewal of their relationship with G-d after Yom Kippur.
Maybe the sacrifices brought on Sukkot indicate the duality of holiday. With regard to the number of lambs and rams offered on the various special days, all the days have exactly the same number of sacrifices, seven lambs and one ram. However, on Sukkot, there are double the number of lambs and rams, fourteen lambs and two rams, which are brought as sacrifices. Maybe this doubling of sacrifices demonstrates that Sukkot functions as a double holiday since it concludes both sets of mikrei kodesh.
Vayikra 23:39-43 (Emor) - The structure of Vayikra chapter 23: Sukkot and mikrei kodesh
One oddity of Vayikra chapter 23 is that from 23:1-23:36 there are laws about the festivals, including Sukkot, then there are two ostensibly concluding verses, 23:37,38, but then 23:39-43 record new laws (about the four species and the sukkah) concerning Sukkot. Why were the laws of 23:39-43 not recorded before the concluding verses of 23:37,38? (For a different answer than below, see our discussion above, “The structure of the book of Vayikra.”)
A possible answer to this question is from the concluding verse in 23:37, which records that these are the festivals that are to be declared or designated as mikrei kodesh, separated days. This declaration also appears in the beginning of the chapter, 23:2, and throughout the chapter, 23:3,4,7,8,21,24,27,35,36, while the phrase does not appear in the verses after the concluding sentences, 23;37,38. This suggests that all the information about the festivals that was recorded in the chapter until 23:37,38 are part of the process of declaring a day a mikrei kadosh, while the laws of the festivals in the end of the chapter 23:39-43 do not relate to declaring or designating a day as a mikra kadosh. All of the verses recorded between 23:1-36 relate to this theme of proclaiming a day a mikra kodesh. 23:3 explain that Shabbat is proclaimed as mikra kodesh since work is forbidden on the day, see our discussion below, 23:1-4, "Designating special days." 23:5 records the obligation to bring the korban pesach on the fourteenth of the first month (Nisan) not because this day is a mikra kodesh, but because the bringing of the sacrifice is part of the process of declaring the holiday of Matzot, and especially the first day of the holiday as a mikrei kodesh. 23:6-8 refer to the prohibition of work on the first and seventh days of the holiday of Matzot, the 15th and 22nd of the first month (Nisan). During this seven-day period, sacrifices are brought and one is to eat of matzot, and these acts proclaim the 15th and the 22nd as mikrei kodesh. 23:9-22 refer to the sacrifices that proclaim Shavuot as a mikra kodesh, the omer and the two loaves. This section also records the obligation to count forty-nine days since the counting connects these sacrifices, and hence the counting is also part of the process of declaring the 50th day of the omer, a special day. Afterwards, 23:22, records laws concerning harvesting crops. These laws are not related to designating any day as a mikra kodesh, but they are recorded as a reminder about how one is to harvest since Shavuot signals the beginning of the harvest season. The following verses are 23:23-25, which records the sacrifices, a ritual act and the prohibition of work that make Rosh Hashanah a mikra kodesh. The next verses, 23:26-32 records the sacrifices, the prohibition of work and obligation to afflict one’s self that make Yom Kippur a mikra kodesh. Finally, 23:33-36 record the prohibition of work on the 15th (the holiday of Sukkot) and on the 23rd of the seventh month, the fact that holiday of Sukkot lasts seven days and the sacrifices that proclaim the 15th and the 23rd day as a mikra kodesh. The next verses are the concluding verses 23:37,38 which end the section of laws that designate a day as a mikra kodesh, a special day, while the following laws of Sukkot do not relate to designating the day of Sukkat as a mikra kodesh.
A possible answer to this question is from the concluding verse in 23:37, which records that these are the festivals that are to be declared or designated as mikrei kodesh, separated days. This declaration also appears in the beginning of the chapter, 23:2, and throughout the chapter, 23:3,4,7,8,21,24,27,35,36, while the phrase does not appear in the verses after the concluding sentences, 23;37,38. This suggests that all the information about the festivals that was recorded in the chapter until 23:37,38 are part of the process of declaring a day a mikrei kadosh, while the laws of the festivals in the end of the chapter 23:39-43 do not relate to declaring or designating a day as a mikra kadosh. All of the verses recorded between 23:1-36 relate to this theme of proclaiming a day a mikra kodesh. 23:3 explain that Shabbat is proclaimed as mikra kodesh since work is forbidden on the day, see our discussion below, 23:1-4, "Designating special days." 23:5 records the obligation to bring the korban pesach on the fourteenth of the first month (Nisan) not because this day is a mikra kodesh, but because the bringing of the sacrifice is part of the process of declaring the holiday of Matzot, and especially the first day of the holiday as a mikrei kodesh. 23:6-8 refer to the prohibition of work on the first and seventh days of the holiday of Matzot, the 15th and 22nd of the first month (Nisan). During this seven-day period, sacrifices are brought and one is to eat of matzot, and these acts proclaim the 15th and the 22nd as mikrei kodesh. 23:9-22 refer to the sacrifices that proclaim Shavuot as a mikra kodesh, the omer and the two loaves. This section also records the obligation to count forty-nine days since the counting connects these sacrifices, and hence the counting is also part of the process of declaring the 50th day of the omer, a special day. Afterwards, 23:22, records laws concerning harvesting crops. These laws are not related to designating any day as a mikra kodesh, but they are recorded as a reminder about how one is to harvest since Shavuot signals the beginning of the harvest season. The following verses are 23:23-25, which records the sacrifices, a ritual act and the prohibition of work that make Rosh Hashanah a mikra kodesh. The next verses, 23:26-32 records the sacrifices, the prohibition of work and obligation to afflict one’s self that make Yom Kippur a mikra kodesh. Finally, 23:33-36 record the prohibition of work on the 15th (the holiday of Sukkot) and on the 23rd of the seventh month, the fact that holiday of Sukkot lasts seven days and the sacrifices that proclaim the 15th and the 23rd day as a mikra kodesh. The next verses are the concluding verses 23:37,38 which end the section of laws that designate a day as a mikra kodesh, a special day, while the following laws of Sukkot do not relate to designating the day of Sukkat as a mikra kodesh.
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