Hello,
While admittedly it is a little late, the 2018 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (67 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions. If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file. I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.
Andrew Schein
Hello. The goal of this blog is to enhance our understanding of the Torah and the practice of Judaism. The discussions in the blog are a portion of a more extensive commentary on the Torah, which I will be happy to send to you. You can contact me at ajayschein@gmail.com. Please feel free to send comments. Also, if you want to receive an email with a link to the new posts, send me a request, and I will add you to the email group. Best wishes, Andrew Schein
Thursday, March 29, 2018
Wednesday, March 21, 2018
Vayikra 3:16,17; 7:23-25 – The shelamim sacrifice: Fats, smoke and fire
Vayikra 3:17 records that in all places and in all times it is prohibited for a person to eat the helev, fat, of an animal and the blood of the animal. 7:23-25 repeats the prohibition of eating fat and adds more details regarding the prohibition: 7:23 explain that the prohibition is limited to three types of animals, ox (cows), sheep and goats, 7:24 explains that a person can use the fat of a nevelah and a trefah and 7:25 explains that the punishment for transgressing the law is karet. What is the definition of fat? Why is eating fat forbidden?
The Rambam (Laws of Forbidden foods, 7:5, see also Levine, 1989, p. 16) defines the forbidden fat as the fat on the inner organs that relate to the digestive track. This definition is from the context of verse 3:17 within the laws of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:1-16. Within the discussion of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:3,4,9,10,14,15, record that the fat of the kidneys, intestines, liver, stomach(?), from cows, sheep or goats which are offered as shelamim sacrifices is to be burnt on the altar. Thus, as the prohibition of eating fat is recorded at the end of the laws of the shelamim sacrifices, it is reasonable that the prohibition of fat is referring to the fat mentioned by the laws of sacrifices. This connection is strengthened since 7:23-25 explains that the prohibition of eating fat is only by animals that can be offered as a sacrifice, and this implies that the definition of the fat that is prohibited is related to the fat by the sacrifices.
Why is eating fat of cows, sheep and goats prohibited? The Rambam (Moreh 3:48, Maimonides, 1963, p. 598) explains that the prohibition is for health reasons that "the fat of the intestines makes us full, spoils the digestion and produces cold and thick blood." Ignoring the factual question of whether fat is medically bad, it is unlikely that this was the reason for the prohibition. From 7:25, we learn that a person can eat fat from animals that are not able to be sacrificed. Why would the Torah only forbid a person from eating unhealthy fat from some types of animals and not others?
Hoffmann (1953, p. 123, on 3:17, see also Alter, 2004, p. 555) notes that the prohibition of fat has to be related to the sacrifices, and he explains that the prohibition is because what is offered as a sacrifice cannot be eaten as a fear of G-d. Levine (1989, p. 45) varies this slightly. He explains that the prohibition of fat is a gezirah, "a fence around the law. Once the fat of sacrificial animals was forbidden, the fat of all pure animals was forbidden as well, whether or not the animals in question were actually sacrificed." Yet, by the olah sacrifice, the entire animal is sacrificed, and still the meat of animals is permitted to be eaten? Even in reference to the shelamim sacrifice, the kidneys, which are offered on the altar, 3:4,10,15, can be eaten by non-sacrificial meat. Why was there no gezirah by the kidneys? Why was the fat of animals that are sacrificed so important that even the fat by animals that are potential sacrifices but are not brought as sacrifices also forbidden to be eaten?
My guess is that the fat is the crucial part of the shelamim sacrifice, and other sacrifices, while the meat in the sacrifices is incidental. Thus, the shelamim sacrifice was essentially an offering of the fat of the animal as almost no meat except the kidneys was offered on the altar. (Maybe the kidneys were offered due to the difficulty and/ or time needed to remove the fat from them.)
The fat is the crucial part since this is what makes the sacrifice into a smoke (3:5,11,16 and 7:31) and/ or a "fire offering," 3:3,5,9,11,14,16. 6:5 refers to putting wood on the fire but this was just to keep the fire going or to start it, as during the day it was the fat that the was principle combustible item in the sacrifices. The smoke from the fat recalls the image of the cloud of G-d (Shemot 13:21,22) and fire from the fat is the imagery of glory of G-d (Shemot 24:17). Thus, 3:16 records that all the fat is to G-d since the fat is what generated these symbols of G-d. Maybe the imagery was for a person to realize that the sacrifice he/ she was offering was to G-d and not to some demons.
Once fat had this important role by the sacrifices to create an image of the cloud/ fire of G-d, then the Torah instituted a gezirah (“fence”) with regard to the animals that potentially could be brought as sacrifices but were not offered as sacrifices that it was forbidden to eat the fat of these animals. This gezirah was limited in several ways. One, the fat from an animal that could not be brought as a sacrifice since the animal had become a nevelah or a trefah could be used though not eaten, 7:24, and two, the fat of an animal that could not be offered as a sacrifice was permitted to be eaten, i.e. no double gezirah. Finally, even though the oil by the minhah sacrifices (2:1,4-7,15, and Bemidbar 5:15) probably had a similar role in creating smoke and fire by the minhah sacrifice, no gezirah was instituted on all oils, possibly since oil was not intrinsic to the minhah sacrifice unlike the fat which was intrinsic to the animal being sacrificed.
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Maimonides, Moses, 1963, The Guide to the Perplexed (Moreh Nevukhim), translated by Shlomo Pines, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Rambam (Laws of Forbidden foods, 7:5, see also Levine, 1989, p. 16) defines the forbidden fat as the fat on the inner organs that relate to the digestive track. This definition is from the context of verse 3:17 within the laws of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:1-16. Within the discussion of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:3,4,9,10,14,15, record that the fat of the kidneys, intestines, liver, stomach(?), from cows, sheep or goats which are offered as shelamim sacrifices is to be burnt on the altar. Thus, as the prohibition of eating fat is recorded at the end of the laws of the shelamim sacrifices, it is reasonable that the prohibition of fat is referring to the fat mentioned by the laws of sacrifices. This connection is strengthened since 7:23-25 explains that the prohibition of eating fat is only by animals that can be offered as a sacrifice, and this implies that the definition of the fat that is prohibited is related to the fat by the sacrifices.
Why is eating fat of cows, sheep and goats prohibited? The Rambam (Moreh 3:48, Maimonides, 1963, p. 598) explains that the prohibition is for health reasons that "the fat of the intestines makes us full, spoils the digestion and produces cold and thick blood." Ignoring the factual question of whether fat is medically bad, it is unlikely that this was the reason for the prohibition. From 7:25, we learn that a person can eat fat from animals that are not able to be sacrificed. Why would the Torah only forbid a person from eating unhealthy fat from some types of animals and not others?
Hoffmann (1953, p. 123, on 3:17, see also Alter, 2004, p. 555) notes that the prohibition of fat has to be related to the sacrifices, and he explains that the prohibition is because what is offered as a sacrifice cannot be eaten as a fear of G-d. Levine (1989, p. 45) varies this slightly. He explains that the prohibition of fat is a gezirah, "a fence around the law. Once the fat of sacrificial animals was forbidden, the fat of all pure animals was forbidden as well, whether or not the animals in question were actually sacrificed." Yet, by the olah sacrifice, the entire animal is sacrificed, and still the meat of animals is permitted to be eaten? Even in reference to the shelamim sacrifice, the kidneys, which are offered on the altar, 3:4,10,15, can be eaten by non-sacrificial meat. Why was there no gezirah by the kidneys? Why was the fat of animals that are sacrificed so important that even the fat by animals that are potential sacrifices but are not brought as sacrifices also forbidden to be eaten?
My guess is that the fat is the crucial part of the shelamim sacrifice, and other sacrifices, while the meat in the sacrifices is incidental. Thus, the shelamim sacrifice was essentially an offering of the fat of the animal as almost no meat except the kidneys was offered on the altar. (Maybe the kidneys were offered due to the difficulty and/ or time needed to remove the fat from them.)
The fat is the crucial part since this is what makes the sacrifice into a smoke (3:5,11,16 and 7:31) and/ or a "fire offering," 3:3,5,9,11,14,16. 6:5 refers to putting wood on the fire but this was just to keep the fire going or to start it, as during the day it was the fat that the was principle combustible item in the sacrifices. The smoke from the fat recalls the image of the cloud of G-d (Shemot 13:21,22) and fire from the fat is the imagery of glory of G-d (Shemot 24:17). Thus, 3:16 records that all the fat is to G-d since the fat is what generated these symbols of G-d. Maybe the imagery was for a person to realize that the sacrifice he/ she was offering was to G-d and not to some demons.
Once fat had this important role by the sacrifices to create an image of the cloud/ fire of G-d, then the Torah instituted a gezirah (“fence”) with regard to the animals that potentially could be brought as sacrifices but were not offered as sacrifices that it was forbidden to eat the fat of these animals. This gezirah was limited in several ways. One, the fat from an animal that could not be brought as a sacrifice since the animal had become a nevelah or a trefah could be used though not eaten, 7:24, and two, the fat of an animal that could not be offered as a sacrifice was permitted to be eaten, i.e. no double gezirah. Finally, even though the oil by the minhah sacrifices (2:1,4-7,15, and Bemidbar 5:15) probably had a similar role in creating smoke and fire by the minhah sacrifice, no gezirah was instituted on all oils, possibly since oil was not intrinsic to the minhah sacrifice unlike the fat which was intrinsic to the animal being sacrificed.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Maimonides, Moses, 1963, The Guide to the Perplexed (Moreh Nevukhim), translated by Shlomo Pines, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sunday, February 18, 2018
Shemot (Exodus) 28:6-29 - The efod and hoshen: Stones of remembering
Shemot 28:6-12 records that one of the garments of the high priest was the efod. The efod appears to have been a type of apron or vest and it had a stone inserted into both of its shoulder straps. The names of six of the tribes of the Jewish people were engraved on each stone. (Does this mean that each stone was relatively large or was the engraving very small?) In addition, the high priest also wore the hoshen, the breastpiece, which was attached to the efod, and the hoshen contained twelve stones, 28:13-29. The names of each tribe were also engraved on these stones, as each stone was inscribed with the name of one tribe.
The Torah appears to give a similar rationale for both sets of stones. With regard to the stones on the efod, 28:12 records "You are to place the two stones on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel. Aharon is to bear their names before the presence of G-d on his two shoulders for remembrance." Similarly, 39:7 records, "They placed them (the stones) on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel." This idea of remembrance also appears by the stones of the hoshen. 28:29 records, "So Aharon is to bear the names of the children of Israel on the hoshen ha-mishpat over his heart, whenever he comes into the Holy-Shrine for remembrance, before the presence of G-d, regularly." (All translations from Fox, 1995.)
Bibliography:
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press
Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.
The Torah appears to give a similar rationale for both sets of stones. With regard to the stones on the efod, 28:12 records "You are to place the two stones on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel. Aharon is to bear their names before the presence of G-d on his two shoulders for remembrance." Similarly, 39:7 records, "They placed them (the stones) on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel." This idea of remembrance also appears by the stones of the hoshen. 28:29 records, "So Aharon is to bear the names of the children of Israel on the hoshen ha-mishpat over his heart, whenever he comes into the Holy-Shrine for remembrance, before the presence of G-d, regularly." (All translations from Fox, 1995.)
We see that both sets of stones relate to remembering, but who was to remember? What was to be remembered? Furthermore, why was there a need for two sets of stones to cause something to be remembered?
One approach (Rashi on 28:12, Seforno on 28:12,29) is that the stones were for G-d to remember the righteousness of the Jewish people. Rashbam (on 28:36) explains that due to this remembering, G-d would forgive the people for their sins. This approach is difficult theologically since it hard to understand why G-d would need to see the stones to be reminded of the righteousness of the Jewish people.
A second approach is that the stones were for the high priest to remember the Jewish people. Benno Jacob writes (1992, p. 918) with regard to the stones of the hoshen that "the high priest did not pray for his people through words in this service, but the names placed upon his heart told G-d what lay in his heart and for whom he sought healing." Similarly with regard to the stones of the efod, he writes (p. 921), that "the two shoulder stones led him to bear the worries of the individual Israelites upon his shoulder."
Cassuto suggests a similar rationale. He writes (1967, p. 374) that the stones of the efod "were a memorial and symbol that the priest ministers in the name of the tribes of Israel." Similarly, with regard to the stones of the hoshen, Cassuto writes (p. 378), "the priest will come before the Lord as the representative of Israel with the names of those whom he represents engraven for remembrance on the pouch (hoshen) that he wears on his heart."
Hertz (1960, pp. 340, 342) follows this idea as he writes by the efod that the "names denoted in concrete form that the high priest was the messenger and representative of the entire community,” and by the hoshen he quotes Benno Jacob’s explanation for the stones. However, by the stones of the efod, he adds another approach that the stones were "to remind the children of Israel of their unity of descent, and unity of service to G-d."
This idea that the high priest was/ is the messenger of the people might seem to be obvious, but as the high priest had relatively limited contact with the people since he was always in the mishkan/ ohel moed, Vayikra 21:12, it was possible that he would forget that he was the messenger of the people. The stones on his clothing with the names of the tribes could then have served as a reminder to him that he was a messenger of the people. Furthermore, the idea that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people makes sense since the high priest could see the stones on the hoshen which was on chest/ stomach. However, the stones on the efod were on the high priest's shoulders (28:12) and it would have been very hard for him to see them.
Another difference between the two sets of stones is that with regard to the stones on the hoshen, 28:29 records that the stones were to be on his heart, lev. The word lev in the Torah refers to thinking and then the idea of 28:29 is not just the placement of the stones, but also that they are to cause the high priest to think or to remember. However, this reference to the heart/ thinking by the high priest is not recorded in reference to the stones on the efod.
A third difference is that by the efod, the Torah refers to the stones as a zichron le-bnei yisrael, 28:12, 39:7, but this phrase does not appear by the hoshen. The phrase zichron le-bnei yisrael also appears in Bemidbar 17:5, which records that the fire-pans used in the test by the 250 rebels against Moshe and Aharon were to be a covering on the altar to be a lesson for the Jewish people. We see from this case that the phrase, zichron le-bnei yisrael, can refer to the Jewish people, and this implies that the stones on the efod were the Jewish people to remember.
These three differences between the sets of stones imply that the remembering by each set of stones differs. A possible distinction is that the remembering by the stones of the efod was for the Jewish people to remember, while the remembering by the stones of the hoshen was for the high priest, Aharon, to remember.
The question then is what were the Jewish people to remember when they saw the stones on the efod/ shoulders of the high priest? A possible answer is that the stones on the high priest's shoulders would look like a type of pillar of stones, and this could recall the pillars, matzevah, that Moshe put up by the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant, 24:4, as the pillars were a pile of stones. Furthermore, it might be that the matzevah in 24:4 was to re-call the people standing at the foot of Mount Sinai, 19:17, by the Decalogue. Thus, the stones on efod/ shoulders of the high priest might have been to re-call the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant or the Decalogue.
Accordingly, I believe that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people, and the stones on the efod were for the Jewish people to either re-call the covenant or the Decalogue.
One approach (Rashi on 28:12, Seforno on 28:12,29) is that the stones were for G-d to remember the righteousness of the Jewish people. Rashbam (on 28:36) explains that due to this remembering, G-d would forgive the people for their sins. This approach is difficult theologically since it hard to understand why G-d would need to see the stones to be reminded of the righteousness of the Jewish people.
A second approach is that the stones were for the high priest to remember the Jewish people. Benno Jacob writes (1992, p. 918) with regard to the stones of the hoshen that "the high priest did not pray for his people through words in this service, but the names placed upon his heart told G-d what lay in his heart and for whom he sought healing." Similarly with regard to the stones of the efod, he writes (p. 921), that "the two shoulder stones led him to bear the worries of the individual Israelites upon his shoulder."
Cassuto suggests a similar rationale. He writes (1967, p. 374) that the stones of the efod "were a memorial and symbol that the priest ministers in the name of the tribes of Israel." Similarly, with regard to the stones of the hoshen, Cassuto writes (p. 378), "the priest will come before the Lord as the representative of Israel with the names of those whom he represents engraven for remembrance on the pouch (hoshen) that he wears on his heart."
Hertz (1960, pp. 340, 342) follows this idea as he writes by the efod that the "names denoted in concrete form that the high priest was the messenger and representative of the entire community,” and by the hoshen he quotes Benno Jacob’s explanation for the stones. However, by the stones of the efod, he adds another approach that the stones were "to remind the children of Israel of their unity of descent, and unity of service to G-d."
This idea that the high priest was/ is the messenger of the people might seem to be obvious, but as the high priest had relatively limited contact with the people since he was always in the mishkan/ ohel moed, Vayikra 21:12, it was possible that he would forget that he was the messenger of the people. The stones on his clothing with the names of the tribes could then have served as a reminder to him that he was a messenger of the people. Furthermore, the idea that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people makes sense since the high priest could see the stones on the hoshen which was on chest/ stomach. However, the stones on the efod were on the high priest's shoulders (28:12) and it would have been very hard for him to see them.
Another difference between the two sets of stones is that with regard to the stones on the hoshen, 28:29 records that the stones were to be on his heart, lev. The word lev in the Torah refers to thinking and then the idea of 28:29 is not just the placement of the stones, but also that they are to cause the high priest to think or to remember. However, this reference to the heart/ thinking by the high priest is not recorded in reference to the stones on the efod.
A third difference is that by the efod, the Torah refers to the stones as a zichron le-bnei yisrael, 28:12, 39:7, but this phrase does not appear by the hoshen. The phrase zichron le-bnei yisrael also appears in Bemidbar 17:5, which records that the fire-pans used in the test by the 250 rebels against Moshe and Aharon were to be a covering on the altar to be a lesson for the Jewish people. We see from this case that the phrase, zichron le-bnei yisrael, can refer to the Jewish people, and this implies that the stones on the efod were the Jewish people to remember.
These three differences between the sets of stones imply that the remembering by each set of stones differs. A possible distinction is that the remembering by the stones of the efod was for the Jewish people to remember, while the remembering by the stones of the hoshen was for the high priest, Aharon, to remember.
The question then is what were the Jewish people to remember when they saw the stones on the efod/ shoulders of the high priest? A possible answer is that the stones on the high priest's shoulders would look like a type of pillar of stones, and this could recall the pillars, matzevah, that Moshe put up by the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant, 24:4, as the pillars were a pile of stones. Furthermore, it might be that the matzevah in 24:4 was to re-call the people standing at the foot of Mount Sinai, 19:17, by the Decalogue. Thus, the stones on efod/ shoulders of the high priest might have been to re-call the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant or the Decalogue.
Accordingly, I believe that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people, and the stones on the efod were for the Jewish people to either re-call the covenant or the Decalogue.
Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press
Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.
Sunday, January 14, 2018
Shemot 12:30 (Exodus) - Deaths in the Egyptian homes during the tenth plague
Shemot 12:30 records that during the tenth plague, "there was a great outcry in Egypt for there was no household in which there was no death" (Alter translation, 2004, p. 381). How could this be if only the firstborn Egyptian males were killed? How could it be that every house in Egypt had a firstborn male? Even if three generations lived together, there must have been some homes with no firstborn males. Ibn Ezra (on 12:30) explains that the verse only means the majority of homes had a death during the plague but not literally every home. Was there even a majority of homes with firstborn males?
Rashi (on 12:30) quotes two explanations from the Midrash. One, if there was no firstborn males, then the oldest male was considered a firstborn male. Two, the firstborn could refer to either the firstborn to the father or to the mother, and since there was a great deal of promiscuity in Egypt, there could be many firstborn males.
Hizkuni (on 12:31) quotes two other explanations from the Midrash. One, from R. Natan that the Egyptians used to make a memorial to their dead, and during the plague the memorials were destroyed, which was equivalent to having the person killed. Two, the Egyptians used to bury their dead by their homes, and during the plague the dogs dug up the graves. This act was considered by the Egyptians as being equivalent to having the person killed.
Amos Chacham (1991, p. 202) suggests that the Egyptians used to live together as clans, and then the verse means that there was no clan that did not have at least one firstborn male who died. Yet, even if one accepts that house means clan, then still the clans would have to have been quite large that every clan would have a firstborn son.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Rashi (on 12:30) quotes two explanations from the Midrash. One, if there was no firstborn males, then the oldest male was considered a firstborn male. Two, the firstborn could refer to either the firstborn to the father or to the mother, and since there was a great deal of promiscuity in Egypt, there could be many firstborn males.
Hizkuni (on 12:31) quotes two other explanations from the Midrash. One, from R. Natan that the Egyptians used to make a memorial to their dead, and during the plague the memorials were destroyed, which was equivalent to having the person killed. Two, the Egyptians used to bury their dead by their homes, and during the plague the dogs dug up the graves. This act was considered by the Egyptians as being equivalent to having the person killed.
Amos Chacham (1991, p. 202) suggests that the Egyptians used to live together as clans, and then the verse means that there was no clan that did not have at least one firstborn male who died. Yet, even if one accepts that house means clan, then still the clans would have to have been quite large that every clan would have a firstborn son.
A different possibility is that reference to the dead in every Egyptian household in 12:30 includes the animals that died in the plague. The previous verse, 12:29, records that the plague "killed all the firstborn in Egypt, from the firstborn who was to inherit the throne to the firstborn in prison and all the firstborn animals." Also, when Moshe warned Pharaoh about the tenth plague, he mentioned the death of the firstborn animals, 11:5, and the death of the animals is the source for the later law that a person has to redeem his firstborn donkey, 13:14,15. We see that that the death of the animals was an intrinsic element of the tenth plague and maybe then the idea that there was no Egyptian home without a death also includes the animals that died in the plague. 12:30 does not specify that the reference is only to humans, and people cry about the death of their animals. Note, I doubt that the firstborn animals died in order that the Torah could state that in each house there was a death, but once the firstborn animals died, then this led to the result that there was a death in each Egyptian house during the tenth plague.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Saturday, December 9, 2017
Bereshit 42:25,27,35 – The middle of the game between Yosef and his brothers: A double dose of fear
Bereshit 42:25 records that Yosef instructed his servant to secretly return to his brothers the silver (money) they had spent on buying the food. Why did Yosef do this? To be nice?
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Most likely, Yosef was trying to re-create the situation which he thought had occurred when he was sold as the brothers would now be returning home without one brother (Shimon) and with money. Note that Yosef also gave the brothers food for the trip, 42:25, maybe in order that they would not have to open their bags right away which meant that they would only find the silver when it was too late for them to return to Egypt.
Bereshit 42:27 then records that when the brothers stopped at some place on the road home, one brother found the silver that he had used to buy the food. When he told this to the other brothers, they were all scared, and they stated, “what has G-d done to us?" 42:28. The brothers then continued on their way home, and upon arrival they told Yaakov about Yosef’s accusations and that Shimon was being kept as a hostage, 42:29-34. They did not mention anything about the silver. Instead, they opened their sacks, found the silver and they and Yaakov were scared, 42:35. What does it mean that they found the silver in 42:35, as they already knew about the silver in 42:27? Why were they scared a second time?
The traditional answer (see Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ramban, Radak on 42:27, Luzzatto on 42:35) is that initially only one brother found the silver and it was only when the brothers came home did all the other brothers find their silver. This approach is difficult for three reasons. One, 43:21 records that when the brothers returned to Egypt they returned the silver, and they told Yosef’s steward that they found the silver on their way home. Why should they have lied to the steward about where they found the silver? Two, it is more logical to assume that once one of the brothers found his silver, the other brothers would have searched their sacks as well. Three, this approach does not explain why the brothers did not mention to Yaakov that at least one of them had found the silver.
Sarna (1989, p. 296) suggests that the brothers “had prearranged to tell their father nothing of the money and to stage the discovery in his presence.” Similarly, Robert Altar (2004, p. 244) writes that maybe “the brothers deliberately acted out a discovery in the presence of their father in order to impress upon him how they were all at the mercy of a superior power.” With this idea, one of the brothers found the money in his amtahat, 42:27, and after he told the other brothers they also checked their packs and found the money in their respective amtahot, 43:21. The brothers then put the silver back in the bottom of the sacks with their food for the animals. Once they came home and reported to Yaakov what happened, they deliberately emptied their sacks in front of him to have Yaakov “find” the silver, 42:35.
A possible reason for this explanation is that this was the second time the brothers were returning home without a brother. On the first occasion, they returned home without Yosef, and now they returned home without Shimon. The brothers were very aware of this parallelism since when Yosef told them of his plan to hold one of them hostage, they immediately associated this with their actions with regard to Yosef, 42:19-22. Hence maybe they thought that it was better for Yaakov to “find” the money instead of them showing him the money since this would increase the chance that he would believe this crazy story that they had been accused of spies and Shimon was being held hostage. Or, maybe the brothers staged the discovery of the money instead of showing the money to Yaakov to break the parallelism between this return home and their previous return home without Yosef. The idea being that they thought that if they showed Yaakov the silver it would appear that they had sold Shimon, and this might have led Yaakov to suppose that they had sold or caused Yosef to be sold.
These ideas can explain why the brothers did not inform Yaakov about the silver they had found, but there is a simpler explanation as to how the brothers found the silver twice and were scared twice. When they were home speaking to Yaakov, the Torah, 42:35, does not state that the brothers found their silver, but that they found their money bag or purse/ wallet. One can simply understand that 42:35 means that the brothers found an empty money bag, and then 42:27 and 42:35 refer to two separate findings, one the brothers found their silver, 42:27, and one the brothers found their empty money bags, 42:35.
This means that when Yosef ordered a person to return the brother's silver to them, 42:25, this was done in two different ways, the silver was placed in their amtahat and the money bag was placed in the sack. Yosef had only said to put the silver in the sack, but either the person on his own separated the silver from the money bags or maybe it was obvious that this is what Yosef wanted.
How would Yosef have attained the brother's money bags, as when people pay for items they give their money/ silver but not their purses? While it could be that they handed over their bags of silver when they paid for the grain, it could also be that Yosef got the bags when he had the brothers in jail, 42:17.
The double finding, first of the silver and then of the empty money bags increased the effect of Yosef scaring his brothers. Furthermore, it is possible that had the money bag not appeared, the brothers would never have told Yaakov about the silver, but once the money bag appeared, then they had to explain that their silver had mysteriously returned to them. Maybe, this is why the money bag was separated from the silver to increase the chance that Yaakov would find out about Yosef returning the silver.
After discussing this idea in my synagogue, Oded Walk noted to me that the following verse, 42:36, records that Yaakov bewailed, "Me you have bereaved, Yosef is no more, Shimon is no more and Binyamin you would take!" (Altar, 2004 translation, pp. 244, 245). Yet, all the facts about Shimon and Binyamin was known before the brothers found their money bags, and hence Yaakov should have made this statement before the finding of the money bags, i.e. after 42:34 and before 42:35. Thus, it is clear that it was the finding of the empty money bags that caused Yaakov to make his statement in 42:36. Oded suggested that maybe the money bags had some relation to the special coat that Yosef had, as somehow it brought back a memory of the brothers showing Yaakov the coat when they returned home without Yosef, 37:32. My wife, Yonina, suggested that this could have happened if there was a family mark or insignia on the money bags.
It is also possible that the fear that resulted from the finding of the empty money bags was not related to the sale of Yosef but to the present predicament of the brothers and Yaakov. My son in law, Yuri Lubomirsky, suggested that when they found the silver, they might have thought that it was a mistake but when they found their money bags, then it was obvious that the returning of the silver was not a mistake. My son, Binyamin, suggested that if Yosef really got the brother's money bags when the brothers were in prison, then the finding of the money bags meant that Yosef was behind the return of the silver.
Bereshit 42:27 then records that when the brothers stopped at some place on the road home, one brother found the silver that he had used to buy the food. When he told this to the other brothers, they were all scared, and they stated, “what has G-d done to us?" 42:28. The brothers then continued on their way home, and upon arrival they told Yaakov about Yosef’s accusations and that Shimon was being kept as a hostage, 42:29-34. They did not mention anything about the silver. Instead, they opened their sacks, found the silver and they and Yaakov were scared, 42:35. What does it mean that they found the silver in 42:35, as they already knew about the silver in 42:27? Why were they scared a second time?
The traditional answer (see Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ramban, Radak on 42:27, Luzzatto on 42:35) is that initially only one brother found the silver and it was only when the brothers came home did all the other brothers find their silver. This approach is difficult for three reasons. One, 43:21 records that when the brothers returned to Egypt they returned the silver, and they told Yosef’s steward that they found the silver on their way home. Why should they have lied to the steward about where they found the silver? Two, it is more logical to assume that once one of the brothers found his silver, the other brothers would have searched their sacks as well. Three, this approach does not explain why the brothers did not mention to Yaakov that at least one of them had found the silver.
Sarna (1989, p. 296) suggests that the brothers “had prearranged to tell their father nothing of the money and to stage the discovery in his presence.” Similarly, Robert Altar (2004, p. 244) writes that maybe “the brothers deliberately acted out a discovery in the presence of their father in order to impress upon him how they were all at the mercy of a superior power.” With this idea, one of the brothers found the money in his amtahat, 42:27, and after he told the other brothers they also checked their packs and found the money in their respective amtahot, 43:21. The brothers then put the silver back in the bottom of the sacks with their food for the animals. Once they came home and reported to Yaakov what happened, they deliberately emptied their sacks in front of him to have Yaakov “find” the silver, 42:35.
A possible reason for this explanation is that this was the second time the brothers were returning home without a brother. On the first occasion, they returned home without Yosef, and now they returned home without Shimon. The brothers were very aware of this parallelism since when Yosef told them of his plan to hold one of them hostage, they immediately associated this with their actions with regard to Yosef, 42:19-22. Hence maybe they thought that it was better for Yaakov to “find” the money instead of them showing him the money since this would increase the chance that he would believe this crazy story that they had been accused of spies and Shimon was being held hostage. Or, maybe the brothers staged the discovery of the money instead of showing the money to Yaakov to break the parallelism between this return home and their previous return home without Yosef. The idea being that they thought that if they showed Yaakov the silver it would appear that they had sold Shimon, and this might have led Yaakov to suppose that they had sold or caused Yosef to be sold.
These ideas can explain why the brothers did not inform Yaakov about the silver they had found, but there is a simpler explanation as to how the brothers found the silver twice and were scared twice. When they were home speaking to Yaakov, the Torah, 42:35, does not state that the brothers found their silver, but that they found their money bag or purse/ wallet. One can simply understand that 42:35 means that the brothers found an empty money bag, and then 42:27 and 42:35 refer to two separate findings, one the brothers found their silver, 42:27, and one the brothers found their empty money bags, 42:35.
This means that when Yosef ordered a person to return the brother's silver to them, 42:25, this was done in two different ways, the silver was placed in their amtahat and the money bag was placed in the sack. Yosef had only said to put the silver in the sack, but either the person on his own separated the silver from the money bags or maybe it was obvious that this is what Yosef wanted.
How would Yosef have attained the brother's money bags, as when people pay for items they give their money/ silver but not their purses? While it could be that they handed over their bags of silver when they paid for the grain, it could also be that Yosef got the bags when he had the brothers in jail, 42:17.
The double finding, first of the silver and then of the empty money bags increased the effect of Yosef scaring his brothers. Furthermore, it is possible that had the money bag not appeared, the brothers would never have told Yaakov about the silver, but once the money bag appeared, then they had to explain that their silver had mysteriously returned to them. Maybe, this is why the money bag was separated from the silver to increase the chance that Yaakov would find out about Yosef returning the silver.
After discussing this idea in my synagogue, Oded Walk noted to me that the following verse, 42:36, records that Yaakov bewailed, "Me you have bereaved, Yosef is no more, Shimon is no more and Binyamin you would take!" (Altar, 2004 translation, pp. 244, 245). Yet, all the facts about Shimon and Binyamin was known before the brothers found their money bags, and hence Yaakov should have made this statement before the finding of the money bags, i.e. after 42:34 and before 42:35. Thus, it is clear that it was the finding of the empty money bags that caused Yaakov to make his statement in 42:36. Oded suggested that maybe the money bags had some relation to the special coat that Yosef had, as somehow it brought back a memory of the brothers showing Yaakov the coat when they returned home without Yosef, 37:32. My wife, Yonina, suggested that this could have happened if there was a family mark or insignia on the money bags.
It is also possible that the fear that resulted from the finding of the empty money bags was not related to the sale of Yosef but to the present predicament of the brothers and Yaakov. My son in law, Yuri Lubomirsky, suggested that when they found the silver, they might have thought that it was a mistake but when they found their money bags, then it was obvious that the returning of the silver was not a mistake. My son, Binyamin, suggested that if Yosef really got the brother's money bags when the brothers were in prison, then the finding of the money bags meant that Yosef was behind the return of the silver.
Bibliography:
Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Thursday, November 16, 2017
Bereshit 28:11- Yaakov going to Haran: The wealth test
28:11 (also 28:18) records that one
night when Yaakov was on his way to Haran he used a rock as a pillow. This surely must have been uncomfortable, and
this indicates that he did not have a pack with him with any clothing which
could have been used as a pillow. We
know that Esav had at least two pairs of clothing (27:15), so presumably Yaakov
also had at least two pairs of clothing. Why did Yaakov not use some of his clothing
as a pillow?
During the night, Yaakov had an amazing dream, 28:12-15, and when he awoke in the morning, he made a vow. However, Yaakov made several conditions to the vow, one of which was that G-d would give him food and clothing, 28:20. This condition implies that Yaakov was lacking both items.
Later, when Yaakov was returning home he prayed to G-d before meeting Esav, and in the prayer he mentioned that when he left the land of Israel, all he had was his walking stick, 32:11.
These three verses (28:11, 28:20 and 32:11) indicate that Yaakov left home with nothing, and raises the question, why did his parents, Yitzhak and Rivka, not give Yaakov at least some clothing when he left to go to Haran?
One might answer that Yitzhak did not offer Yaakov any assistance since Yitzhak was angry at Yaakov for lying to him and tricking him (27:18-30). However, the Torah never informs us that Yitzhak desired to punish Yaakov for tricking him. When Yitzhak first realized that he had been tricked, he trembled that he had been fooled, but he still said that Yaakov was to be blessed, 27:33. A few seconds later, Yitzhak stated that Yaakov had tricked him, 27:35, but he made this statement matter-of-factly with no apparent anger. Afterwards, Yitzhak gave Yaakov another set of blessings, 28:3,4.
Rashi (on 29:11) quotes from Bereshit Rabbah (70:12) another answer. According to this approach, really Yitzhak and Rivka gave Yaakov lots of material assistance when he left home, but Elifaz the son of Esav was sent by Esav to kill Yaakov. When Elifaz caught up with Yaakov, Yaakov convinced him to rob him of everything (except his staff?) since a poor person can be considered as if he was dead. If this did happen, then it must have occurred almost immediately when Yaakov left home since it seems that Yaakov's dream was on the very first night that he left home.
During the night, Yaakov had an amazing dream, 28:12-15, and when he awoke in the morning, he made a vow. However, Yaakov made several conditions to the vow, one of which was that G-d would give him food and clothing, 28:20. This condition implies that Yaakov was lacking both items.
Later, when Yaakov was returning home he prayed to G-d before meeting Esav, and in the prayer he mentioned that when he left the land of Israel, all he had was his walking stick, 32:11.
These three verses (28:11, 28:20 and 32:11) indicate that Yaakov left home with nothing, and raises the question, why did his parents, Yitzhak and Rivka, not give Yaakov at least some clothing when he left to go to Haran?
One might answer that Yitzhak did not offer Yaakov any assistance since Yitzhak was angry at Yaakov for lying to him and tricking him (27:18-30). However, the Torah never informs us that Yitzhak desired to punish Yaakov for tricking him. When Yitzhak first realized that he had been tricked, he trembled that he had been fooled, but he still said that Yaakov was to be blessed, 27:33. A few seconds later, Yitzhak stated that Yaakov had tricked him, 27:35, but he made this statement matter-of-factly with no apparent anger. Afterwards, Yitzhak gave Yaakov another set of blessings, 28:3,4.
Rashi (on 29:11) quotes from Bereshit Rabbah (70:12) another answer. According to this approach, really Yitzhak and Rivka gave Yaakov lots of material assistance when he left home, but Elifaz the son of Esav was sent by Esav to kill Yaakov. When Elifaz caught up with Yaakov, Yaakov convinced him to rob him of everything (except his staff?) since a poor person can be considered as if he was dead. If this did happen, then it must have occurred almost immediately when Yaakov left home since it seems that Yaakov's dream was on the very first night that he left home.
Ibn Ezra (on 25:34) suggests a third answer that Yitzhak was generally poor even though he inherited great wealth from Avraham (25:5) and became wealthy from his planting (26:13). One of his proofs is the fact that Yaakov came penniless to Haran since he argues that surely Yitzhak or Rivka would have helped Yaakov out if they could have. However, were they so poor not to give Yaakov anything?
Ramban (on 25:34) strongly disagrees with Ibn Ezra, as nothing in the Torah indicates that Yitzhak lost his wealth. Ramban notes that G-d thrice blessed Yitzhak, 25:11; 26:3,24 and what kind of blessing could it have been if Yitzhak was to lose all his wealth? Instead, Ramban suggests a fourth answer that Yitzhak did not want to give Yaakov money when Yaakov went to Haran in order not to increase Esav’s hatred of Yaakov. Yet, Yitzhak had told Esav that Yaakov was to be blessed, 27:33, and had given Yaakov another set of blessing, 28:3,4, which Esav was aware of, 28:6. It is unlikely that letting Yaakov take some clothing would have enraged Esav even more.
My guess is that Yitzhak purposely sent out Yaakov with nothing and did not allow Rivka to supply Yaakov as a test whether Yaakov was truly to be the blessed son. After Yitzhak realized that Yaakov had tricked him, he stated that Yaakov was still to be blessed, 27:33, and he gave Yaakov another blessing, 28:3,4. However, after initially desiring to bless Esav, and then being lied to by Yaakov, Yitzhak must have wondered if Yaakov really deserved to be blessed. Yaakov’s leaving to go to Haran was an opportunity for Yitzhak to test whether Yaakov was truly to be the blessed son. The test was that Yitzhak sent Yaakov away with nothing to see if Yaakov could succeed and flourish completely on his own. It seems that G-d even responded to this test by making Yaakov fabulously successful, 30:43.
I discussed this idea in my synagogue, Yakir Efrayim in Modiin, and some people (including my son Binyamin) questioned me whether a father would really act in this way. One friend, Efrayim Chotam, even called this idea akedat Yaakov. Yet, Yitzhak had experienced the real akedah when G-d tested Avraham, 22:1, and also Yitzhak knew (saw?) that his father sent out his brother Yishmael, with almost nothing, 21:14. Thus, this idea of testing a son by sending him away with nothing would not have seemed foreign or bizarre to Yitzhak. (Later Yaakov would act similarly, also sending out his son, Yosef, 37:14, though in a different context, see our discussion on 37:2-14, "Parenting" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2013/11/bereshit-372-14-va-yeshev-parenting.html)
Monday, October 9, 2017
Beating the willows
One of the stranger customs in Judaism is that on the seventh day of Sukkot, Hoshana Rabbah, we takes some aravot (willow branches) and beat them on the ground, havatat aravot. The Rambam (Laws of lulav 7:22) writes that a person is to take one or more branches and to hit them on the floor or on an item, two or three times without reciting a blessing. The Shulchan Arukh (664:4) follows this ruling, while the Mishnah Berurah (664:19) quotes the Ari that one should hit the branches five times on the floor. What is the point of this custom?
The Mishnah (Sukkah 4:5,6, Talmud Sukkah 45a) records the ceremony in the Bet ha-Mikdash of hoshannot, that people circled around the altar with aravot on each of the seven days of the holiday of Sukkot, but it does not mention beating the aravot. Instead, at the end of its discussion of the hoshannot ceremony, the Mishnah quotes Rebbi Yochanon ben Berokah that the seventh day of Sukkot was called the day of the beating of the palm branches since the people would beat palm branches on the ground by the side of the altar. Why all of a sudden is the Mishnah referring to palm branches in the middle of the ceremony of the aravot?
The Tosefta (Sukkah 3:1, also Talmud Sukkah 43b) records that when Hoshana Rabbah was on Shabbat there was an argument between the Rabbis and the Boethusians whether the aravot could be beaten, the Rabbis said yes while the Boethusians said no. This source indicates that really it was aravot that were beaten on the seventh day and not palm branches. (Maybe to cover up this argument the Mishnah switched the aravot to palm branches.) Note that because of this argument the calendar was fixed that Hoshana Rabbah could not come out on Shabbat, which suggests that the Rabbis agreed with the Boethusians that it was wrong to beat the aravot on Shabbat but that they allowed it due to the demand of the people. Yet, still what is the reason for beating the aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash?
Bradley Shavit Artson (1996) reviews several reasons that have been suggested for beating the aravot. One reason he quotes from Abraham Milligram that is that beating was connected with rain bringing rituals. Artson rejects this reason since "there is nothing extant to indicate why the willow beating would symbolize rain." Instead, he suggests that the beating was to make the aravot pasul, no longer usable. A proof for this idea is that the following Mishnah (Sukkah 4:7) records that after the hoshannot ceremony, the children would separate the lulav from the other items and eat the etrogim. Yet, why only beat the aravot and not the hadasim or lulavim?
My guess is that the beating of the aravot is related to the prayers for rain during Sukkot and it must be connected with the hoshannot ceremony of circling the altar. In our discussion, "Aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash," (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2017/09/aravot-in-bet-ha-mikdash.html) I suggested that the circling of the aravot was to make the Bet ha-Mikdash green. The idea was that by making the altar green, this was a prayer that there should be rain to make the land green. I suspect that the beating of the willows had the same purpose, to make the altar green, as the beating was a way of painting the altar green. This was done on the last day of Sukkot to leave the altar green since the people would no longer be circling the altar with aravot. This explanation offers a reason why the Boethusians objected to this practice only on Shabbat since this beating was a form of painting the altar, and then they would argue that it was forbidden to paint on Shabbat. Also, maybe the Mishnah switched the beating from aravot to palm branches since palm branches would not leave stains.
The Mishnah (Sukkah 4:5,6, Talmud Sukkah 45a) records the ceremony in the Bet ha-Mikdash of hoshannot, that people circled around the altar with aravot on each of the seven days of the holiday of Sukkot, but it does not mention beating the aravot. Instead, at the end of its discussion of the hoshannot ceremony, the Mishnah quotes Rebbi Yochanon ben Berokah that the seventh day of Sukkot was called the day of the beating of the palm branches since the people would beat palm branches on the ground by the side of the altar. Why all of a sudden is the Mishnah referring to palm branches in the middle of the ceremony of the aravot?
The Tosefta (Sukkah 3:1, also Talmud Sukkah 43b) records that when Hoshana Rabbah was on Shabbat there was an argument between the Rabbis and the Boethusians whether the aravot could be beaten, the Rabbis said yes while the Boethusians said no. This source indicates that really it was aravot that were beaten on the seventh day and not palm branches. (Maybe to cover up this argument the Mishnah switched the aravot to palm branches.) Note that because of this argument the calendar was fixed that Hoshana Rabbah could not come out on Shabbat, which suggests that the Rabbis agreed with the Boethusians that it was wrong to beat the aravot on Shabbat but that they allowed it due to the demand of the people. Yet, still what is the reason for beating the aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash?
Bradley Shavit Artson (1996) reviews several reasons that have been suggested for beating the aravot. One reason he quotes from Abraham Milligram that is that beating was connected with rain bringing rituals. Artson rejects this reason since "there is nothing extant to indicate why the willow beating would symbolize rain." Instead, he suggests that the beating was to make the aravot pasul, no longer usable. A proof for this idea is that the following Mishnah (Sukkah 4:7) records that after the hoshannot ceremony, the children would separate the lulav from the other items and eat the etrogim. Yet, why only beat the aravot and not the hadasim or lulavim?
My guess is that the beating of the aravot is related to the prayers for rain during Sukkot and it must be connected with the hoshannot ceremony of circling the altar. In our discussion, "Aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash," (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2017/09/aravot-in-bet-ha-mikdash.html) I suggested that the circling of the aravot was to make the Bet ha-Mikdash green. The idea was that by making the altar green, this was a prayer that there should be rain to make the land green. I suspect that the beating of the willows had the same purpose, to make the altar green, as the beating was a way of painting the altar green. This was done on the last day of Sukkot to leave the altar green since the people would no longer be circling the altar with aravot. This explanation offers a reason why the Boethusians objected to this practice only on Shabbat since this beating was a form of painting the altar, and then they would argue that it was forbidden to paint on Shabbat. Also, maybe the Mishnah switched the beating from aravot to palm branches since palm branches would not leave stains.
Thursday, September 28, 2017
Aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash
The Mishnah (Sukkah 4:1) lists seven different laws of Sukkot, one of whom is the law of aravot. The Mishnah (Sukkah 4:5) explains the law of aravot: In the time of the Bet ha-Mikdash the people would go to Motza to get aravot and then they would stand them by the side of the altar in order that the top of the aravot would be over the altar. Afterwards, the shofar would be blown, the people would circle the altar, and recite the phrase, anna hashem hoshiah na, anna hashem haslicha na, "G-d, save us, G-d, let us prosper." On the seventh day of Sukkot, the people circled seven times around the altar. The Mishnah did not discuss the reason for this ceremony.
The most likely explanation for the aravot ceremony is that it relates to prayers for rain since the Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 1:2) records that Sukkot is the time of judgment for the water for the year. (This dating accords with the weather pattern in Israel that the rainy season begins in the fall after Sukkot.) Furthermore, in many societies, prayers for rain involved processions. (For one example, see The New York Times, July 6, 1908, "Italians pray for rain: Procession of 30,000 seeking to end disastrous drought in Apulia.) The increase in processions on the seventh day would then be because this was the final time to pray on Sukkot, and these processions on the seventh day were so important that they occurred even if the seventh day was on Shabbat (Mishnah Sukkah 4:6). Furthermore, the prayers "G-d, save us and G-d, let us prosper" can also relate to prayers of rain that the rain was needed for the people to live and to prosper. Finally, the blowing of the shofar in the ceremony of the aravot also connotes the idea of judgment.
Two questions remain. How did the placing of the aravot on the altar relate to prayers for rain? Also, on Sukkot there is the water libations ceremony which is also for rain (see Mishnah, Sukkah 4:9, and statement by R. Akiva in Talmud Rosh Hashanah 16a), why was there a need for two ceremonies (aravot and water libations) to pray for rain?
The answer is that the two ceremonies, aravot and water libations, worked together to form a joint symbolism. By the water libations, the altar was "being watered," and then by placing the aravot on the top of the altar, this made the altar green. Thus, at the end of the ceremony of the aravot the people would say how beautiful was the altar, end of Mishnah, Sukkah 4:5. In addition, if the people circled the altar holding aravot (the simple reading of the Mishnah Sukkah 4:5, but see Talmud, Sukkah 43b), then this also gave the entire area around the altar a green imagery. This symbolism of watering and greenery is the hoped for result from the prayers for rain, that there would be enough rain to make everything green that the crops would grow.
The most likely explanation for the aravot ceremony is that it relates to prayers for rain since the Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 1:2) records that Sukkot is the time of judgment for the water for the year. (This dating accords with the weather pattern in Israel that the rainy season begins in the fall after Sukkot.) Furthermore, in many societies, prayers for rain involved processions. (For one example, see The New York Times, July 6, 1908, "Italians pray for rain: Procession of 30,000 seeking to end disastrous drought in Apulia.) The increase in processions on the seventh day would then be because this was the final time to pray on Sukkot, and these processions on the seventh day were so important that they occurred even if the seventh day was on Shabbat (Mishnah Sukkah 4:6). Furthermore, the prayers "G-d, save us and G-d, let us prosper" can also relate to prayers of rain that the rain was needed for the people to live and to prosper. Finally, the blowing of the shofar in the ceremony of the aravot also connotes the idea of judgment.
Two questions remain. How did the placing of the aravot on the altar relate to prayers for rain? Also, on Sukkot there is the water libations ceremony which is also for rain (see Mishnah, Sukkah 4:9, and statement by R. Akiva in Talmud Rosh Hashanah 16a), why was there a need for two ceremonies (aravot and water libations) to pray for rain?
The answer is that the two ceremonies, aravot and water libations, worked together to form a joint symbolism. By the water libations, the altar was "being watered," and then by placing the aravot on the top of the altar, this made the altar green. Thus, at the end of the ceremony of the aravot the people would say how beautiful was the altar, end of Mishnah, Sukkah 4:5. In addition, if the people circled the altar holding aravot (the simple reading of the Mishnah Sukkah 4:5, but see Talmud, Sukkah 43b), then this also gave the entire area around the altar a green imagery. This symbolism of watering and greenery is the hoped for result from the prayers for rain, that there would be enough rain to make everything green that the crops would grow.
Tuesday, August 29, 2017
Devarim (Deuteronomy) 23:25,26 – Maximizing the use of ownerless land
Devarim 23:25,26 record that if a person passes through a vineyard or stalks of wheat, then the person is allowed to eat the grapes or wheat in the field but the person is not allowed to gather the grapes in a bucket or use a sickle to cut down the wheat.
The simple explanation of these verses is that any person can enter anybody's fields and eat their crops. This is the approach of Isi ben Yehuda (Baba Metsia 92a). However, as noted by Rav (on Baba Metsia 92a) this permission would ruin a farmer since he/ she would never get to harvest his/ her crops, and hence he/ she will not plant any crops. Thus, the Mishnah (Baba Metsia 7:2, Talmud Baba Metsia, 87a, 87b, and all the mishnayot Baba Metsia 7:2 through the beginning of 7:8) explains that this allowance to eat the crops only applies to a worker working in the field. Luzzatto (on 23:26) expands this allowance to include any person who is permitted to be in the field. While this approach limits the damage to the farmer from the law, it contradicts 23:25,26 since the verses imply that all people have the right to eat the crops.
How can people pass through somebody else's fields? Why is this "passing" not considered trespassing? The poor are allowed to come into fields only after the field has been harvested (Vayikra 19:9; 23:22, Devarim 24:19), while here all people are seemingly allowed carte blanche into other people's fields and can eat until they are satiated.
A different perspective is that instead of viewing the case as one where the passerby is entering the private property of the farmer, it is the farmer who is attempting to plant in ownerless land that is public property. With this understanding, the reference to reecha in 23:25,26, your neighbor, which seemingly indicates that the property in question is private property, should be interpreted to mean that only the vines or stalks of grains is the farmer's property but not the land the crops are situated on. A proof for this is that 23:26 does not use the word fields, as it refers just to the stalks of grains as being the farmer's since the land is not owned by the farmer. With regard to the word vineyard, kerem, in 23:25, the idea would be that kerem could also mean the vines and not necessarily the land on which the vines are situated. Other possible instances where the term kerem means vines are 24:21, Bemidbar 22:24 and Shemot 23:11.
The idea would then be that since the land is ownerless land, any person is allowed to walk in the fields and eat the crops of the field. However, how could a person be allowed to plant his private crops in the public domain?
I believe the laws of 23:25,26 are an attempt to maximize the use of ownerless land. If the ownerless land is land which people use, then it will not be worthwhile for the farmer to plant any crops since the public will either trample and/ or eat his/ her crops. The land will then remain only for the public use. However, some ownerless land is wasted that nobody uses the land either for productive purposes or to pass through. In this case, the most efficient allocation of the land would be to allow a farmer to use the land for planting. The farmer would calculate the number of people who would eat from the crops versus the gain from planting the field, and only use the field if it was worthwhile to develop the field. If the farmer gained from using the field after taking into account the number of people who would eat of the crops, then the field would be used productively, the quantity of food in the country would increase, and any person could eat of the crops.
Note 23:25,26 does not allow the passerby to use a bucket or a sickle to gather the crops since the goal is to balance the production of the farmer with the public needs. If a bucket or sickle is allowed, then one person can take all the crops of the field, which will cause the farmer to let the land lie fallow and the field will not be developed due to the efforts of one person. However, if many people use the land, and they eat a large percentage of the field without needing to use a bucket or a sickle, then the farmer will not plant the land since the benefit from the land to the public is greater than the benefit from growing crops on the land.
In addition, the permission for anybody to enter the fields insures that the farmer would not be able to claim the land as his private property. Furthermore, the permission is only given to plant fields on the ownerless land but not to build buildings.
This idea of balancing between the public and private interests is similar to the Coase theorem in economics, see my article, Schein, A biblical precedent for the Coase theorem? Journal of Markets and Morality, 2004, 7:2, pp. 495-503..
The simple explanation of these verses is that any person can enter anybody's fields and eat their crops. This is the approach of Isi ben Yehuda (Baba Metsia 92a). However, as noted by Rav (on Baba Metsia 92a) this permission would ruin a farmer since he/ she would never get to harvest his/ her crops, and hence he/ she will not plant any crops. Thus, the Mishnah (Baba Metsia 7:2, Talmud Baba Metsia, 87a, 87b, and all the mishnayot Baba Metsia 7:2 through the beginning of 7:8) explains that this allowance to eat the crops only applies to a worker working in the field. Luzzatto (on 23:26) expands this allowance to include any person who is permitted to be in the field. While this approach limits the damage to the farmer from the law, it contradicts 23:25,26 since the verses imply that all people have the right to eat the crops.
How can people pass through somebody else's fields? Why is this "passing" not considered trespassing? The poor are allowed to come into fields only after the field has been harvested (Vayikra 19:9; 23:22, Devarim 24:19), while here all people are seemingly allowed carte blanche into other people's fields and can eat until they are satiated.
A different perspective is that instead of viewing the case as one where the passerby is entering the private property of the farmer, it is the farmer who is attempting to plant in ownerless land that is public property. With this understanding, the reference to reecha in 23:25,26, your neighbor, which seemingly indicates that the property in question is private property, should be interpreted to mean that only the vines or stalks of grains is the farmer's property but not the land the crops are situated on. A proof for this is that 23:26 does not use the word fields, as it refers just to the stalks of grains as being the farmer's since the land is not owned by the farmer. With regard to the word vineyard, kerem, in 23:25, the idea would be that kerem could also mean the vines and not necessarily the land on which the vines are situated. Other possible instances where the term kerem means vines are 24:21, Bemidbar 22:24 and Shemot 23:11.
The idea would then be that since the land is ownerless land, any person is allowed to walk in the fields and eat the crops of the field. However, how could a person be allowed to plant his private crops in the public domain?
I believe the laws of 23:25,26 are an attempt to maximize the use of ownerless land. If the ownerless land is land which people use, then it will not be worthwhile for the farmer to plant any crops since the public will either trample and/ or eat his/ her crops. The land will then remain only for the public use. However, some ownerless land is wasted that nobody uses the land either for productive purposes or to pass through. In this case, the most efficient allocation of the land would be to allow a farmer to use the land for planting. The farmer would calculate the number of people who would eat from the crops versus the gain from planting the field, and only use the field if it was worthwhile to develop the field. If the farmer gained from using the field after taking into account the number of people who would eat of the crops, then the field would be used productively, the quantity of food in the country would increase, and any person could eat of the crops.
Note 23:25,26 does not allow the passerby to use a bucket or a sickle to gather the crops since the goal is to balance the production of the farmer with the public needs. If a bucket or sickle is allowed, then one person can take all the crops of the field, which will cause the farmer to let the land lie fallow and the field will not be developed due to the efforts of one person. However, if many people use the land, and they eat a large percentage of the field without needing to use a bucket or a sickle, then the farmer will not plant the land since the benefit from the land to the public is greater than the benefit from growing crops on the land.
In addition, the permission for anybody to enter the fields insures that the farmer would not be able to claim the land as his private property. Furthermore, the permission is only given to plant fields on the ownerless land but not to build buildings.
This idea of balancing between the public and private interests is similar to the Coase theorem in economics, see my article, Schein, A biblical precedent for the Coase theorem? Journal of Markets and Morality, 2004, 7:2, pp. 495-503..
Monday, July 24, 2017
Tisha B'av, the Holocaust and the founding of the State of Israel
I have heard many times that Tisha B’av is historically related to the tragedy of the Holocaust (in print see Rav Soloveitchik, 2006, p. 226, and Press, 1996, p.70). The claim is that World War I started on Tisha B’av in 1914, and World War II is a continuation of WWI. Almost certainly future generations will view the two world wars, which were so close in years and involved almost the exact same countries fighting each other, as one war, yet this connection is not just ex post. During the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Versailles, which officially concluded WWI, John Maynard Keynes (1919), wrote a celebrated essay “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” where he predicted that the harsh terms of the treaty imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles would lead to another war.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to see a connection between WWI and the Holocaust, but did WWI begin on Tisha B’av? This cannot be answered definitely since is not clear on which day the war began. Tisha B’av in 1914 was on August 1, which was the day when Germany declared war on Russia. Yet, one could argue for other dates for the beginning of WWI such as June 28 1914 when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated, July 28th when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, July 30th when Russia ordered a general mobilization or August 3 when Germany declared war on France and invaded Belgium. Thus, it seems that while WWI started around the time of Tisha B’av, one cannot categorically state that it started on Tisha B’av. However, even if there is no exact historical connection, as Tisha B’av is a day of national mourning it still is appropriate to remember the Holocaust on Tisha B’av.
One of the themes of Tisha B’av is that while we have suffered on this day, the day will eventually be a festival since it will be related to the future redemption. If the present state of Israel is the beginning of the redemption (and we should remember the failure of Bar Kokhba) and one has accepted the argument above that WWI is connected with Tisha B’av, then maybe one can claim that the same Tisha B’av of 1914 relates to the future redemption. I have heard it argued that the “world” allowed Israel to exist because of its guilt for the Holocaust. I have never liked this argument, as for example Great Britain showed no evidence of any guilt about the Holocaust when it acted with tremendous cruelty in not allowing Jews to come to Israel after WWII. Yet, one could make the simpler argument that WWI itself led to the founding of the state of Israel.
In 1917, near the end of WWI, after Great Britain had captured the southern part of the land of Israel, it announced the Balfour Declaration, which committed Great Britain to support "the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people" in the land of Israel. In 1918, Great Britain conquered the remainder of the land of Israel from Turkey and ruled the land, as a British mandate, until May 1948. Initially Great Britain was very supportive of Jews coming to Israel, and throughout the entire period it helped foster the development of the economy in the land. Under the British mandate the Jewish population in Israel rose from around 56,000 people in 1918 to 650,000 in 1948. It is hard to imagine that such a growth in population would have occurred had the land of Israel remained under Turkish rule. Furthermore, throughout almost the entire Mandate period, including the years of the Great Depression and WWII, the economy boomed in the land of Israel, as the area had the second highest growth rate in the world from 1922-1947, and this economic growth was one of the factors (the main one?) that enabled the Jewish population to achieve independence in 1948. (For more information on the excellent economic growth in the land of Israel under the British, see Schein 2007, 2012 and 2016.)
Accordingly, it is reasonable to see a connection between WWI and the Holocaust, but did WWI begin on Tisha B’av? This cannot be answered definitely since is not clear on which day the war began. Tisha B’av in 1914 was on August 1, which was the day when Germany declared war on Russia. Yet, one could argue for other dates for the beginning of WWI such as June 28 1914 when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated, July 28th when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, July 30th when Russia ordered a general mobilization or August 3 when Germany declared war on France and invaded Belgium. Thus, it seems that while WWI started around the time of Tisha B’av, one cannot categorically state that it started on Tisha B’av. However, even if there is no exact historical connection, as Tisha B’av is a day of national mourning it still is appropriate to remember the Holocaust on Tisha B’av.
One of the themes of Tisha B’av is that while we have suffered on this day, the day will eventually be a festival since it will be related to the future redemption. If the present state of Israel is the beginning of the redemption (and we should remember the failure of Bar Kokhba) and one has accepted the argument above that WWI is connected with Tisha B’av, then maybe one can claim that the same Tisha B’av of 1914 relates to the future redemption. I have heard it argued that the “world” allowed Israel to exist because of its guilt for the Holocaust. I have never liked this argument, as for example Great Britain showed no evidence of any guilt about the Holocaust when it acted with tremendous cruelty in not allowing Jews to come to Israel after WWII. Yet, one could make the simpler argument that WWI itself led to the founding of the state of Israel.
In 1917, near the end of WWI, after Great Britain had captured the southern part of the land of Israel, it announced the Balfour Declaration, which committed Great Britain to support "the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people" in the land of Israel. In 1918, Great Britain conquered the remainder of the land of Israel from Turkey and ruled the land, as a British mandate, until May 1948. Initially Great Britain was very supportive of Jews coming to Israel, and throughout the entire period it helped foster the development of the economy in the land. Under the British mandate the Jewish population in Israel rose from around 56,000 people in 1918 to 650,000 in 1948. It is hard to imagine that such a growth in population would have occurred had the land of Israel remained under Turkish rule. Furthermore, throughout almost the entire Mandate period, including the years of the Great Depression and WWII, the economy boomed in the land of Israel, as the area had the second highest growth rate in the world from 1922-1947, and this economic growth was one of the factors (the main one?) that enabled the Jewish population to achieve independence in 1948. (For more information on the excellent economic growth in the land of Israel under the British, see Schein 2007, 2012 and 2016.)
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