Devarim 32:11 (also Shemot 19:4) – On the wings of eagles

דברים לב:יא - כנשר יעיר קנו, על גוזליו ירחף, יפרש כנפיו יקחהו, ישאהו על אברתו. 

Devarim 32:11 records that just like a nesher (a bird) protects its young so too G-d protected the Jewish people, and as an example of this protection, the second half of the verses states that the nesher would put is young on its wings. This imagery is also mentioned in Shemot 19:4, but it is difficult since physically it is not clear that birds can put their young on their wings. Thus, Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on Shemot 19:4, also see Luzzatto on Shemot 19:4), writes that the phrase should be understood figuratively that G-d took care of the people. However, it seems that the imagery can be understood literally.

Driver (1955) discusses the identity of the nesher and he concludes that "the vulture is probably commonly intended, if only because it is the most easily and often seen of the great birds of prey. At the same time, the nesher undoubtedly includes the eagle." Three years later, (1958), he wrote that he "wrongly ascribed Shemot 19:4 and Devarim 32:11 to the vulture because of the great span of its wings, forgetting that instances of the eagle carrying its young on its back or wings had been recorded." He then recorded two observers of birds who noted that when the eagle teaches its young to fly it pushes the little bird out of the nest and then when the young bird falls down, the eagle swoops underneath the young bird. The eagle will repeat the process until its young learns how to fly. Thus, the eagle does not put its young on its back but it does carry its young on its back, as recorded in Shemot 19:4 and Devarim 32:11. Driver notes that both of these cases were with a golden eagle, and he concludes that "in the two passages, the nesher will be the golden eagle."

N. Leibowitz (1976a, pp. 295,296) compares the two verses, Shemot 19:4 and Devarim 32:11, and she claims that the verses present different images. One reason is that she claims that in Devarim 32:11, "it is doubtful if the idea of training and education can be read into it and the surrounding verses." Yet, as pointed out to me by my son Alon, this idea that the eagle carries its young when it is teaching them to fly, implies that the imagery of Devarim 32:11 refers both to G-d protecting the Jewish people and to G-d teaching the people.

Bibliography:

Driver, Godfrey Rolles, 1955, Birds in the Old Testament: I. Birds in laws, Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 86, pp. 5-20.

-----, 1958, Once again birds in the Bible, Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 90, pp. 56-58.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Devarim 15:19-23 (Re'eh) – Two types of firstborn animals

Devarim 12:6 records that a firstborn animal, bekhor, is sacrificed and Devarim 12:17,18 and 14:23 record that the bekhor is to be eaten before G-d in the chosen place. Devarim 15:19-23 clarifies that this requirement is only for a firstborn animal that has no blemishes. If a firstborn animal has a blemish, then it can be eaten anywhere like regular meat. These laws about the firstborn animal are surprising since they make no distinction between priests and regular people, and the implication is that non-priests are the ones eating the firstborn animal. However, Bemidbar 18:18 states that the priests eat the firstborn animal. How can Devarim 12-15 allow a regular person to eat the firstborn animal?

In Jewish law, (Rambam, Laws of Firstborns, 1:1,2) the firstborn animal of a pure unblemished animal (cow, sheep) is offered as a sacrifice and the priests eat the part of the animal that is not put on the altar. This law accords with Bemidbar 18:18, but what about the laws from Devarim 12-15? The traditional answer is that all the cases in Devarim 12-15 that refer to a person eating a sacrificed firstborn animal are only addressed to the priests and not to the general population (Rashi on 12:17, 15:20, Ibn Ezra on 12:17, 14:23 and 15:20). This is difficult since there is no indication in the Torah that the laws in Devarim 12-15 are only for priests. In addition, even in Jewish law, a non-priest can eat the blemished firstborn animal. The blemished firstborn animal must still be given to the priest, but based on 15:21,22, the priest can give it away or sell it to anybody (Rambam, Laws of firstborns, 1:3, Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 306:5). This means that 15:21,22, the law of a blemished firstborn animal, is understood as being addressed to the general population, and hence it is difficult to argue that the previous verse, 15:20, concerning the unblemished firstborn animal was only addressed to the priest.

Ibn Ezra (on 12:17) quotes a logical answer from the Karaites, but he rejects it without providing a reason. He writes that the deniers (Karaites) explain that there are two types of firstborn animals in the Torah, the firstborn animal of the womb and the firstborn animal each year of the flock. The law in Bemidbar 18:18 is referring to the firstborn animal of the womb, which goes to the priest, while Devarim 12-15 refer to the annual firstborn animal of the flock, which was eaten by the general population.

Alexander Rofe (1988a, p. 34), writes that this distinction between the two types of firstborn animals is from the Karaite work, Keter Torah. He calls it elegant since there is textual support for it, but he also does not accept it, again without providing a reason. The textual support is that Bemidbar 18:14 uses the word womb when discussing the firstborn animal, while Devarim 15:19 does not mention the term womb. Also Devarim 12-15 refer to firstborn of all the animals, which could mean from the entire flock. This explanation of the Karaites clearly contradicts normative Jewish law, but this is not a reason to reject it as an explanation of the text. The Rashbam (Introduction to parashat Mishpatim) writes that while the traditional interpretation is primary and is how we practice, still one can interpret the text differently.

There is another proof for this distinction between two types of firstborn animals, which I do not know if the Karaites already mentioned. Devarim 15:20 records that the firstborn animal is to be eaten “year after year.” What does it mean “year after year?” Rashi (on 15:20) writes that the phrase requires the unblemished firstborn animal to be brought as a sacrifice in its first year. However, this does not seem to be the sense of the phrase “year after year.” Also, it contradicts Shemot 22:29 that the firstborn animal should be brought to G-d on its 8th day. The traditional answer (Rambam, Laws of Firstborns, 1:8) is that the firstborn animal can be given to G-d from the 8th day onwards until it is one year old.

With the distinction between the two types of firstborn animals, the phrase "year after year" is not difficult at all. If Devarim 12-15 is referring to the firstborn of the entire flock, then each year there would be a new firstborn something that does necessarily occur when the firstborn is the first of the womb. Thus, Devarim 15:20, just means simply that each year the sacrifice is to be offered, and is not referring to how soon after the animal was born is it offered as a sacrifice.

This distinction between the two types of firstborn animals also better explains the change in the law from a non-blemished firstborn animal to a blemished firstborn animal that a non-priest can eat the blemished firstborn animal, 15:21,22. This law of the blemished firstborn animal is in reference to the annual firstborn of the flock, which has a lower level of kedusha than the firstborn of the womb. The annual firstborn of the flock has a lower level of kedusha, that even when the firstborn animal is non-blemished a regular person can eat it, just in the chosen place, so when the animal is blemished, a regular person can eat it anywhere ("one jump down"). However, for the a firstborn animal of the womb, which can only eaten by priest when it is non-blemished, so one would think that if blemished, while it cannot be offered as a sacrifice, it could also not be eaten by a non-priest ("two jumps down").

Finally, Rashi (on 15:19) notes that the word to dedicate, takdish, the firstborn animals in 15:19 seems to contradict Vayikra 27:26, which records that the firstborn animal is not to be dedicated since it already G-d's. An answer based on the distinction between the two types of firstborn animals could be that Vayikra 27:26 is referring to a firstborn animal from the womb and this firstborn animal cannot be dedicated, while 15:19 is referring to the annual firstborn of the flock and these firstborn animals can be dedicated.

Bemidbar 32:33 (Mattot) - Menashe and the east bank of the Jordan River

Bemidbar 32:1-32 record negotiations between Moshe and the tribes of Gad and Reuven for land on the east bank of the Jordan River (see our discussion http://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2011/07/bemidbar-chapter-32-other-side.html). Bemidbar 32:33 then records that Moshe gave some of the land on the east bank not just to the tribes of Gad and Reuven but also to half the tribe of Menashe. This is surprising since the tribe of Menahse had never been mentioned before in chapter 32 and had not requested land on the east bank. Why did Menashe get land on the east bank if they were not involved in the negotiations between Moshe and the tribes of Reuven and Gad? Why did only half the tribe of Menahse get land? Why was the tribe of Menashe divided by the Jordan River?

Ramban (on 32:33) explains that when the tribes of Reuven and Gad were granted land on the east bank, it was recognized that the land was too much for two tribes. Volunteers were asked who would want to live there and then some of the tribe of Menashe requested the land.

Luzzatto (on 32:33) suggests that after the deal with the tribes of Gad and Reuven was made, some members of the tribe of Menashe on their own took the initiative to conquer more land on the east bank, 32:39.

My guess is that since the deal with the tribes of Reuven and Gad separated these tribes from the other tribes due to the Jordan River, there was a desire to re-connect the tribes of Gad and Reuven with the other tribes. This was done by splitting another tribe that half of the tribe would be on the east side of the Jordan and half of the tribe would be on the west side. With this idea, we can apply the principle of transitivity. The tribes of Reuven and Gad would be connected with the split tribe on their side (the eastern side) of the Jordan River, the split tribe would be connected with its other half on the other side (the western side) of the Jordan River, and this half of the tribe would be connected with the remaining tribes who all lived on the western side of the Jordan River.

This same idea can also explain, why Moshe designated three cities of refuge on the east side of the Jordan River, see our discussion on Bemidbar 35:13,14 "Three and three."

Bemidbar (Numbers) 20:6-13 - Moshe's reaction to the people's request for water in the desert in Bemidbar (Numbers) 20 : The "sin?"

Bemidbar (Numbers) 20:2-13 record the people's complaint for water and the ensuing “sin” of Moshe and Aharon that caused them to be punished that they were not allowed to take the people to the land of Israel. What was Moshe's and Aharon’s sin? For various reviews of this question, see Ibn Ezra on 20:8, Abravanel, 2008, pp. 167-176, and N. Leibowitz, 1982, pp. 236-247. I will review some of the explanations of the "sin" and offer two possible explanations.

The Rambam (Shemoneh Perakim, chapter 4) suggests that Moshe’s sin was that he got angry and his anger implied that G-d was angry at the people, but G-d was not angry with the people. Moshe definitely seems to be angry here, both his language in 20:10 and the fact that he hit the rock twice. Why did Moshe get angry here? Perhaps it was because he felt the people were attacking him personally, 20:3-5. Even though a person is humble, still when someone is attacked, then he/ she will respond by being angry. Yet, Moshe had been angry before, as for example when speaking to Datan and Aviram (16:15), when they attacked him personally, 16:13,14, and he was not punished then.

A second answer is Rashi's explanation (on 20:11,12) that Moshe was supposed to speak to the rock, 20:8, but instead Moshe hit the rock, 20:11. The idea of speaking to the rock is understood to mean that Moshe was supposed to give an order to the rock to exude water, for example to say to the rock "give the people water." This approach has raised various questions.

The Ramban (on 20:7) criticizes Rashi's approach. He notes that 20:12 records that Moshe and Aharon showed a lack of faith in G-d, lo heehmanetem, but how did Moshe show a lack of faith in G-d by hitting the rock instead of speaking to the rock? When Moshe hit the rock, he had faith that water would flow from the rock. It could be that Moshe was not following G-d's command (according to Rashi) and that the miracle would have been more impressive if Moshe had spoken and not hit the rock, but still Moshe did not demonstrate any lack of faith in G-d. The Ramban also notes that Moshe spoke about the rock, 20:10, which he argues was the fulfillment of G-d's command to Moshe to speak to the rock.

Another question on Rashi's approach is how could Moshe have misunderstood what G-d told him to do? The Sifrei (157, on parshat Mattot), Rashi (on Bemidbar 31:21 quoting the Talmud Pesachim 66b), the Ran (Derashot haRan, derashot 8 and 9, 2003, pp. 304, 334, 335) and Luzzatto (end of comments on 20:12) suggest that the misunderstanding was because Moshe was angry, but still it seems problematic to say that Moshe misunderstood G-d's command to speak to the rock. (The Rashbam on 20:10 seems to accept this possibility, but if one says that Moshe misunderstood G-d here, then this opens a pandora’s box for other cases.)

A third question on Rashi's approach is why was Aharon punished here? Aharon did not speak to the rock, but did he have a chance to do so? 20:10 records that Moshe spoke to the people, said rhetorically, “could the rock exude water?” and then Moshe hit the rock. Was Aharon supposed to jump in and shout "exude water" to the rock?

Abravanel argues that Moshe and Aharon were being punished for previous sins. Aharon was punished for his role in building the golden calf and Moshe was punished for requesting more information from the spies than what was needed. Abravanel claims his approach explains why in Devarim 1:37 Moshe mentioned his punishment in conjunction with the sin of the spies since his real sin was by the sending of the spies. Also, Abravanel’s approach appears to explain why Aharon was punished here even though he had almost no role here.

The Abravanel's approach is appealing but not convincing. 20:24 states that Aharon sinned here as well, and thus he was not being punished for his role in the sin of the golden calf. Similarly, as Rashi (on 20:12) points out, the sense of 20:12 is that Moshe was also being punished for his action here. Also, I do not think that Moshe sinned in any way by the sending of the spies, see our discussion on 13:1,2,26, "A test."

Luzzatto (on 20:12) has a lengthy review of Moshe's "sin" and he begins with a disclaimer that for many years he did not try to examine this question since he did not want to add another sin to Moshe. Instead, initially he accepted Moshe Mendelssohn’s (1729-1786, Germany) approach that the sin was Moshe and Aharon's reaction to the people when the people complained for water that Moshe and Aharon ran away from the people, 20:6, also see Ibn Ezra on 20:6. Luzzatto notes that three other commentators (R. Avraham ben Shem Tov Bibago, Spain 15th century, Derekh Emunah; R. Avraham Menachem ben Jacob haKohen Porto, Verona, 16th century, Minhah Belulah; and the book Avat Nefesh a commentary on Ibn Ezra) also followed this approach.

After quoting these other commentators, and noting that he taught their explanation for 15 years, Luzzatto rejected it for the following reasons. One, G-d did not criticize Moshe and Aharon for not speaking to the people, but for showing a lack of faith. Two, the statement in the Torah words that “you (Aharon) rebelled against Me,” 20:24, implies that Moshe and Aharon did not do something that they were commanded. Three, the language in the Torah that Moshe and Aharon left the people, 20:6, does not imply that they ran from the people. Luzzatto writes that he now accepted Rashi’s explanation that the sin was they were supposed to speak to the rock.

It seems to me obvious that Moshe would not have misunderstood G-d’s command even if he was angry, and hence I think the Ramban in correct that Moshe's statement in 20:10 about the rock with Aharon standing next to him was the fulfillment of G-d's command to him and Aharon in 20:8 to speak to the rock. What then were Moshe and Aharon’s sins?

One possibility is that after Moshe made his statement in 20:10 about the rock, he was supposed to wait until the water started to gush from the rock, but he got impatient, maybe since he was angry, and he hit the rock twice. This impatience was the lack of faith since the water was going to go forth in a few more seconds. Aharon's sin here was that he did not stop Moshe from hitting the rock. 20:11 records that Moshe raised his arm to lift his staff to hit the rock and at the time, Aharon could have grabbed Moshe's arm and stopped him from hitting the rock. Moshe even hit the rock twice, and my son Binyamin believes that this means that Moshe raised his arm a second time, which would have given Aharon a second chance to stop Moshe from hitting the rock. (Note this idea could also be Aharon's sin if one believes that the sin was not telling the rock to exude water, Rashi's approach.)

Another possible "sin" could have been Moshe and Aharon's reaction to the people's demand for water. Was the people’s complaint about water justified? The traditional explanation (see Rashi on 20:2) for the people’s complaint for water is that previously they had been getting water from a well which traveled with the people, but after Miryam died, the well disappeared. With this explanation, the complaint of the people would seem to be justified since they truly needed water to live (see Hizkuni on 20:2). Yet, why then was the people’s complaint considered a fight against G-d (20:13)? Also, after Miryam died, how were the people supposed to get water, as the incident here appears to be a onetime event?

As we discussed on 20:2-5 "Water in the desert," my understanding is that the mahn was able to supply the people with all their nutritional needs in the desert, both solids and liquids. I doubt there was a well that traveled with the people since it is never mentioned in the Torah, but even if there was a well and it disappeared after Miryam died, the people did not need regular water. Thus, the peoples' complaints for water in 20:5 and 21:5, were unjustified, and this understanding offers a new perspective on Moshe's and Aharon's "sin."

The people stated that they were going to die in the desert and that they never should have left Egypt, 20:3-5. This was a denial of G-d’s goodness to them, and hence the Torah calls it a rebellion against G-d, 20:13. Moshe and Aharon should have told the people that they were not going to die because they would live by eating the mahn. It is possible that the people were so worked up, that they would not have listened to Moshe and Aharon, but then Moshe and Aharon should have ignored the people’s complaint for water. (Note by the sin of the spies, Moshe and Aharon did not run to the ohel moed, but fell on their faces before the people, 14:4. Also by Korah’s rebellion, Moshe tried to convince the people to stop.) Again, it could have been because Moshe was angry that he did not try to argue with the people.

When Moshe and Aharon went to G-d after hearing the people's complaint for water, this gave the impression that they were going to ask G-d to give the people water, which implied that Moshe and Aharon accepted the people’s complaint. Thus, when Moshe and Aharon went to the ohel moed it was a partial negation of the great miracle of the desert, the mahn. If Moshe and Aharon gave the impression that they were even just partially negating the miracle of the mahn, then this would be considered as showing a lack of faith in G-d. In addition, if Moshe and Aharon gave the impression that they were praying for the people to get water, then in some sense they were joining the people’s fight with G-d. This could then be considered as rebelling against G-d, and this would explain the language in 20:24 (also see 27:14), that “you (Aharon) rebelled against Me.”

With either possibility (Moshe was impatient or Moshe and Aharon should have argued with the people before going to G-d), the sins of Moshe and Aharon here seem minor, but this is not our judgement to make. Also, it could be that that the punishment was in conjunction with other actions, Moshe by 11:21-23 and Aharon by the golden calf, Shemot 32:2-5, (the straw that broke the camel’s back).

For more discussion on why Moshe was not able to go to the land of Israel, see our discussion on Devarim 1:37, 3:26, 4:21, "Why was Moshe unable to go to the land of Israel?"  

Bibliography:

Abravanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 2008, Commentary on Bemidbar, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing.

Leibowitz, Nehama, 1982, Studies in Bemidbar, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Rabbenu Nissim (Ha-Ran, Spain, 1290-1376), 2003, Derashot HaRan, compiled by Aryeh Leib Feldman and comments by Mordechai Leib Katzenelbogen, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Bemidbar 3:39-43 (Bemidbar) - A baby boom

The first three chapters of the book of Bemidbar record various population data of the people. 1:46 and 2:32 record that as of the second month of the 2nd year of the people's stay in the desert there were 603,550 men age twenty years and up. 3:39 records that there were 22,000 Levites, and 3:43 records that there were 22,273 firstborn sons more than one month old.

One question that arises with these figures is how could there have been just 22,273 firstborn sons out of an adult male population of more than 600,000? If one assumes that that there were an equal number of adult females, and that the population of the people under twenty, both male and female, was equal to half the total adult population, then the population of the people one year after the Exodus was approximately 1.8 million people. If there were 22,273 first born males, then presumably there were also 22,273 firstborn females, which would mean that that there were approximately 45,000 families. The ratio of the total population to the number of families means that each family would have averaged 40 children, which is incredible.

While it is possible that G-d performed a miracle that enabled women to have such large families (see Rashi on Shemot 1:7), it is odd that by any list of children in a family in the Torah, there is a much smaller number of children. For example, Moshe had two siblings, and he had two children while Aharon had four sons. 3:17-20 records the families of the Levities, and there is no family listed with more than four sons. Similarly, Bemidbar 26:9 records that the family of Eliav had three sons. Bemidbar 27:1-3 records that Tzelofhad had five daughters and no sons. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how there could have so few firstborn sons in 3:43. (One might claim that the firstborn sons died due to disease or due to the Egyptian decrees, but then there would be a corresponding increase in the number of non-firstborn sons who died, and the estimated family size would remain problematic.)

The Ramban (on 3:45) makes an interesting suggestion though he rejects his own suggestion. He writes that one cannot say that the firstborn sons were only those firstborn sons born after the Exodus, in the first year of the people's stay in the desert, since the population did not increase at such a rapid rate. This rejected suggestion is based on the very reasonable idea that the firstborn sons only acquired their special status as firstborn sons after the Exodus. Prior to the Exodus, there were firstborn sons, but there was no special status to being a firstborn son. However, after the tenth plague, when the firstborn sons were saved, then the firstborn sons had a special status (Shemot 13:15, see also Bemidbar 3:13; 8:17). Ramban's suggestion is that the special status was not applied retroactively to the firstborn sons who had already been born but only to the future firstborn sons. Ramban rejects this idea due to the technical problem that this rationale would sharply increase the growth rate of the Jewish population. If 22,000 firstborn sons were born just in the first year of the people's stay in the desert, then this implies that over forty years, the population was booming, but the male population at the end of the forty years in the desert, 601,730, Bemidbar 26:47, had decreased by 1,820 men.

Beller (1992) presents a mathematical model that builds on the Ramban's suggestion and gives a plausible outcome to explain the ratio of firstborn sons to the general population. However, the model, as by all models, is only as good as the assumptions that are the basis for the model, and some of the assumptions as to the growth rate and the length of years are difficult to accept. (For a discussion of the model, see Samet, 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 156-167.) Instead, we will suggest a different variation on the Ramban's suggestion.

In our commentary on Shemot 1:8-22, "Population dynamics," http://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/01/shemot-18-22-population-dynamics.html, we suggested that Pharaoh did not intend to kill the entire male Jewish population, but that his goal was to control the male Jewish population in order to allow him to benefit from their work as slaves without having to fear that they would rebel. Thus, his decree to kill all the male children (Shemot 1:22) was a temporary recurring decree that was enacted whenever the male population passed some threshold level.

Overall Pharaoh's plan existed for at least eighty years since Moshe was 80 at the time of the Exodus, Shemot 7:7, but how long would the decree have been in effect each time? It would have to have been for a sufficient amount of time that the growth rate stopped, and this suggests that each set of parents was only allowed to have a limited amount of time to have male children. A possible system could have been that for ten years, all male children were killed, and then for five years the male children were allowed to live. In the "permitted" five years, a family could have had a few sons, but by the time another cycle of "permitted" years came around, the family might not have had more children. (One could lengthen the number of forbidden years or shorten the number of permitted years, but this would have no effect on the argument here.)

What was the reaction of the Jewish people to this decree? A rational response was to wait for the "permitted" years, in order not to have children during the forbidden years that would be killed. (This seems to be the initial response of Moshe's parents, see our discussion on Shemot 2:1, "Moshe’s parent’s marriage." Some parents might have succeeded in having children in the "forbidden" years, as by Moshe's parents, but these successes would have been rare.)

If our assumptions are correct, then the Jewish population at the time of the Exodus was not uniform, but consisted of discrete groups based on certain ages, with almost no population at all for most age groups. A possible example is an adult population consisting of four age groups, 20-24, 35-39, 50-54, and 65-69, with approximately 150,000 males in each age group. In addition, there would be another set of male children between the ages of 5-9, whose parents would be from the age group of 35-39. With such a system, the Exodus could have transpired in the middle of the "forbidden" years, meaning that the group of 20-24 year olds had no children prior to the Exodus. If this is true, then after the Exodus, when the restrictions on having children were abrogated, then the people compromising the age group 20-24 would have had children for the first time. Thus, almost all the children born in the first year after the Exodus were firstborn children. If there were 150,000 males in the age group 20-24, then the birth of 45,000 children (22,000 males) in the first year of the people's stay in the desert is very reasonable.

Thereafter the population would not have increased at a rate of 45,000 children a year since there were many age groups (for instance 10-19) with zero population. In some years of the people's stay in the desert there would have been large increases in the number of children, while in other years few children would have been born. If there were 20 years, of "high" population growth of 20,000 males, and 20 years of "low" population growth, then the adult male population would have been approximately 600,000 after forty years in the desert. Accordingly, the understating of Pharaoh's plan as being a temporary recurring decree not only provides a coherent explanation for chapter one in the book of Shemot but also explains the number of firstborn sons in the first year of the desert and the lack of population growth of the people in the desert.

The 2016 version of my commentary on the Haggadah is now available

Hello,

The 2016 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (58 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions.  If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file.  I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein  

Vayikra (Leviticus) 12:1-5 – Tumah of a new mother and circumcision on the eighth day

Vayikra (Leviticus) 12:1,2 records that if a woman gives birth to a boy she becomes tamei for seven days. Afterwards, for the following 33 days the new mother is in a quasi-state of tumah, she cannot go to the mikdash but she is considered tahor with regard to her husband, 12:4. On the other hand, if a woman gives birth to a girl, she is tamei for 14 days, and her quasi-state of tumah is for 66 days, 12:5. The ratio of the new mother being tamei and in a quasi-state of tumah is equal for the birth of a boy and a birth of a girl, but why are the absolute numbers different? Why is there a difference in the number of days of tumah for the mother if the child born was a boy as opposed to a girl?

Within the laws of the tumah of the mother, 12:3 records that a newborn boy is circumcised on the eighth day of his life. This verse is a little surprising since from Bereshit 17:10-14 (and Bereshit 21:4) we already know that a male must be circumcised after eight days. It is true that the law of circumcision in Bereshit occurred before the covenant at Mount Sinai, and thus one might argue that the law had to be repeated, see statement by R. Yehuda in Mishnah Hullin 7:6, and comments of the Rambam on the Mishnah. Yet, there are other laws in Bereshit (1:28, 32:33) that are applicable even though they were not repeated after the establishment of the covenant at Mount Sinai. More likely, the reference to circumcision within the laws of tumah of the new mother is because these two concepts are related. What is the relationship?

One possibility is that the tumah and taharah are the independent variables, and the circumcision (the dependent variable) is due to the ending of the tumah. The Talmud (Niddah 31b) quotes R. Shimon Bar Yochai who explains that the circumcision is on the eighth day since everybody is happy at the circumcision, and the Torah desired that the husband and wife should also be happy. If the wife is tamei, then the husband and wife cannot be together, so then they would be sad if the circumcision was before the eighth day. Thus, according to this explanation, the circumcision is on the eighth day since by then the wife is tahor. This is an interesting idea that the Torah was so concerned with the companionship between husband and wife that it delayed the circumcision to the eighth day, but it leaves the question of why the mother is tamei for seven days after the birth of a boy and fourteen days after the birth of a girl unanswered. For other suggestions that also follow the idea that the dating of the circumcision is due to the tumah, see Luzzatto on 12:3.

Hoffmann (on Vayikra 12:1-5, 1953, p. 252) suggests that the causality is reversed. With this understanding, the mother's tumah (the dependent variable) after the birth of a boy is limited to seven days because of the circumcision (the independent variable). Yet, why is the circumcision on the eighth day?

Korman (1998, vol. 2, pp. 290,291) quotes various reasons. One, from Vayikra Rabbah 27:10 that the circumcision is on the eighth day to ensure that the child experiences one Shabbat before the circumcision. It is not clear to me why the child needs to experience a Shabbat not circumcised. Two, from R. Judan ben Pazzi (Devarim Rabbah, 6:1) that the circumcision is on the eighth day to give the child enough strength to undergo the circumcision. This reason is also mentioned by the Rambam (Moreh 3:49, Maimonides, 1963, p. 611) and Korman quotes a study that the child has the most amount of vitamin K which helps the blood coagulate on the eighth day. This answer is certainly possible, but if the issue is the health of the child, would it not be better to wait a month?

I think the timing of the circumcision on the eighth day is related to the question why is the mother tamei after giving birth.  Tumah signifies a separation or potential separation from G-d. In the case of the new mother, the tumah (and the hatta't sacrifice, 12:6) does not relate to any sin but there are two possible reasons why the birth process might have separated the new mother in some ways from G-d. One, it could be that mother's attachment to the new child diminishes her connection to G-d or, more likely, during the time of the labor, which is the most intensive physical action a person goes through, the mother is separated from G-d since she is completely focused on her body. The new mother is then given time when she is tamei to acknowledge that this separation had occurred. The tumah by the birth of a girl is fourteen days, and this is the ideal time that is given to the new mother.

With this idea, the circumcision should be on the 15th day after the birth since then the mother's tumah, which marked her separation from G-d, has ended. However, delaying the circumcision to the 15th day is problematic. Circumcision demonstrates the parents' dedication to G-d that they are willing to have their newborn son circumcised. Based on this rationale, the circumcision should really be on the first day that the child is born. But, the new mother is not in a position to make this dedication on the first day after the birth due to her being in a state of tumah, which signifies her separation from G-d.

Accordingly, performing the circumcision on the eighth day is a compromise between two conflicting values. On the one hand, the circumcision should be on the 1st day after the birth, but the new mother is still tamei and separated from G-d. On the other hand, the circumcision could be on the 15th day after the birth when the new mother's tumah has ended, but then the parents have delayed demonstrating their dedication to G-d. The compromise is to do the circumcision on the 8th day, and then the mother's tumah, and separation from G-d, is shortened to seven days because by circumcising her son on the 8th day, the new mother is demonstrating her closeness and return to G-d.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Korman, Abraham, 1998, The parsha for her generations, Hebrew, Tel Aviv.

Shemot (Exodus) 32:20-28 – Spiked water and the aftermath of the sin of the golden calf

Shemot 32:27 records that Moshe ordered the Levites to kill the people who had sinned by the golden calf, and 32:28 records that they killed 3,000 people. How could Moshe order the Levites to go through the camp and kill people?

There are three approaches to understanding Moshe's order to the Levites. One, Moshe set up a court system to judge the people, and apparently the Levites were both the officials of the court and the executers of the court's judgments. (See Yoma 66b, also the Midrash Meor ha-Afalah, who is quoted by Menachem Kasher, Torah Shelemah 32:114, and Kasher's comments 114. In addition, see Midrash ha-Gadol, who is also quoted by Kasher, 32:225, Kasher's comments on 225, and Arussi 2000.) With this approach, there was no indiscriminate killing. However, as noted by the Ramban (on 32:27), this approach is problematic since there were 600,000 men and if there was a trial for each man (also the women?) then this would have taken years, while the impression of the Torah is that the actions of the Levites transpired immediately.

A second approach is from the Ramban who writes that this incident was a unique case to sanctify G-d's name, and did not follow normal judicial procedures, as for example there was no one around who could have warned each sinner. However, he also maintains that the Levites did not kill indiscriminately, but only those people they personally knew who had sinned.

A third approach is from the Ibn Ezra (short commentary on 32:27) who mentions the idea that the Levites only killed those people they knew had sinned, but he adds that they also killed those people who had a sign on their bodies that they had worshipped the golden calf. Ibn Ezra elaborates on this idea in his long commentary on 32:20. Ibn Ezra explains that when Moshe came down from the mountain he made the people drink the ashes of the golden calf with water, 32:30, and this caused the bodies of the people who had sinned with the golden calf to swell or for there to be marks on their faces similar to the water of the suspected adulteress (Bemidbar 5:27, see Avodah Zara 44a). The disfigured bodies or marks indicated to the Levites which people deserved to die.

Ibn Ezra's explanation is logical since 32:20 records that Moshe forced or caused the people to drink the ashes, and there is no record of any consequence to their drinking of the ashes. Why would Moshe cause the people to drink the water for no reason? However, once we know the case of the suspected adulteress, who would drink ashes which would cause marks on her body, then we can infer that Moshe forced the people to drink in order for there to be marks on their body, and the reason why the people had to have marks on their bodies was in order that the Levites could identify which people to kill. Accordingly, G-d did a miracle to identify the people deserving of punishment and this obviated the need to have courts. (Rashi on 32:20 based on the Talmud implies that the drinking per se caused the people to die, which is difficult since presumably more than 3,000 people drank the water, 32:20.)

While the Ibn Ezra's explanation is logical, how did Moshe get everybody to drink the water? Ibn Ezra writes that he commanded the people to drink, but would the people listen to such an order? Could a person be forced to drink water? The answer is from Moshe's' recollection of the sin of the golden calf in Devarim 9:21, where Moshe explained that he poured the water into the stream that flowed from Mount Sinai.

What seems to have happened is that Moshe went to the source of the water on Mount Sinai, and poured the ashes into the stream but the people did not see this. The people then naturally drank from the water as it flowed into the camp, and when they did this, the bodies of those people who were guilty were marked. Thus, Moshe caused or forced the people to drink the ashes, see Bekhor Shor on 32:20. This would be the same idea as in modern times if the government puts fluoride in the main water pumps of an area, and then everybody drinks the fluoride knowingly or unknowingly.

With this approach, we can understand the order of the events when Moshe came down from Mount Sinai. First, Moshe broke the tables, 32:19. Then, Moshe pulverized the golden calf, 32:20, and poured the ashes into the stream, Devarim 9:21. He did this away from the people on the Mount Sinai, and it took some time. He probably finished sometime in the afternoon, and he had hoped that the people would have quieted down after he had broken the tablets. Only after he had destroyed the idol did he confront Aharon as to what happened, 32:21-24. This conversation would have occurred in the late afternoon. At this point, the people were still out of control, 32:25, and when they did not respond to him after he asked the people, "who is with G-d, come to me," 32:26, he gave his order to the Levites to kill the people.

By this time, the late afternoon, there had been some time for some of the people to have drank the water and for the marks on their bodies to develop. It seems that not all the people who had rejected G-d were killed, but rather the 3,000 people killed were enough to restore order in the camp, and Moshe went to pray for the others, 32:30. Or, maybe, these 3,000 people had been particularly egregious sinners either in not listening to Moshe in 32:26 or by the golden calf. Note if the people had responded positively to Moshe's question, "Who is with G-d" in 32:26, then they would not have been killed. Either there would have been no marks from drinking the water, as G-d would not have caused the miracle to occur, or maybe the people would have remained with marks throughout their lives, but they would not have been killed.

Ramban (on Devarim 9:21) asks why does Shemot 32:20 record that Moshe forced the people to drink the ashes, while Devarim 9:21 just records that Moshe put the ashes in the stream. He suggests that in Devarim, Moshe was showing respect for the people since he did not want to recall that he had treated them as a suspected adulteress. Our approach here offers a slightly different answer.

In the description of the sin of the golden calf in Shemot, the Torah had to record that Moshe forced or caused the people to drink the ashes since otherwise one might have thought that Moshe just poured ashes into the water to destroy the idol (see Bekhor Shor and Hizkuni on Shemot 32:20). This language of causation implies that there was a reason for the drinking of the ashes, and this reason was for the Levites to be able to identify the sinners. On the other hand, in Devarim, Moshe did not explicitly refer to the Levites' actions (see Devarim 10:8), and consequently he did not have to state that he forced the people to drink the ashes. Instead, in Devarim, Moshe was explaining how he got the people to drink the ashes, and hence he just said that he put the ashes into the stream. Thus, the two verses, Shemot 32:20 and Devarim 9:21, complement each other.

Finally, if G-d performed a miracle that the ashes enabled the Levites to identify the sinners, why did G-d not simply strike those sinners or have the people die from the ashes without the Levites killing the people? One answer is that this is the usual method of the Torah to minimize miracles. In this case, the judicial system was impossible, so G-d performed a miracle, but just to identify the sinners. A second answer is that the steadfastness of the Levites would later lead the people to accept them as replacements of the firstborn sons, Bemidbar 3:41,45, and Devarim 10:8.

Bibliography:

Arusi, Ratzon, 2002, The trial of those who worshipped the golden calf, A divinely given Torah in our day and age, Vol. II, edited by Aryeh A. Frimer and Shlomo H. Pick, Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, pp. 245-249. 

Kasher, Menachem (1895-1983), 1992 (first volume appeared in 1927), Torah Shelemah: A talmudic-midrashic encyclopedia of the five books of Moses, Jerusalem: Beth Torah Shelemah, the Torah Shelemah Institute.