2015 version of my commentary on the Haggadah is now available

Hello,

The 2015 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (54 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions.  If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file.  I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein  

Vayikra 10:16-20 – The argument between Moshe and Aharon after the deaths of Aharon's sons: An argument for the sake of heaven

Vayikra 10:16-18 records that Moshe learned that the hatta’t sacrifice from the ceremony of the eighth day had been burnt, and this made him angry since he thought the sacrifice should have been eaten. Aharon defended the burning of the hatta’t by saying, 10:19, “Here, today, they brought their hatta’t and olah offerings, before G-d, and such things as these happened to me! Had I eaten the hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” (Variation of Fox, 1995, translation.) 10:20 records that Moshe accepted Aharon’s response.

Why did Moshe believe that the sacrifice should have been eaten, and why did Aharon disagree? In 10:19, Aharon was referring to the deaths of his sons, but why should their deaths have caused him not to eat the hatta’t? Finally, why did Moshe accept Aharon’s response? (My understanding of this section began with a conversation with David Linzer in March 1992, though since then, notably in March 2014, I have changed some of my views of this section.)

In order to understand this argument, we need to clarify which hatta't is being argued about. 10:16 describes the hatta’t as being a goat, and 9:3 records that as part of the sacrifices of the eighth day the people were to bring a hatta’t that was a goat. This would seem to be the only possible reference to the hatta’t in 10:16, see Luzzatto on 10:16. R. David Hoffmann (on 10:16) notes that R. Akiva follows this understanding. However, Rashi (on 10:16) quotes the majority view of Chazal that the sacrifice was the hatta’t that was brought on the new moon (Bemidbar 28:5), which was an additional sacrifice to the sacrifices for the ceremony of the eighth day. Rashi (on 10:17) notes that Moshe said that the eating of the hatta’t was to bring atonement for the people (10:17) and the approach of Chazal is that the hatta’t of the new moon was to bring atonement for causing tumah in the Mikdash. Luzzatto rejects this "proof" since 9:7 records that the hatta’t of the people was to bring atonement for the people.

Rashi's explanation is based on the understanding that eighth day of the initiation of the priests was also the first day of the first month of the second year of the people’s stay in the desert. I doubt that the ceremony of the eighth day was on the first day of the first month in the second year of the people's stay in the desert since I believe that the seven day initiation process of the priests began on either the 15th or the 22nd of the first month of the second year, see our discussion on Shemot 40:1-33, "The anointing of the mishkan, the ohel moed and the priests."

The next point to clarify is what type of hatta't was the hatta't of the people. There are two types, the inner hatta't and the outer hatta't. By the inner hatta’t, the blood of the animal is sprinkled on the parokhet within the mishkan proper, and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are burnt, 4:1-21, 7:23. By the outer hatta’t, the blood is only sprinkled on the altar outside the mishkan proper and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are eaten by the priests, 4:22-35, 7:17-22. The hatta't of the people was an outer hatta't since the blood was sprinkled on the outer altar, 9:9,15. Accordingly, Moshe stated that the hatta't was to be eaten since the blood of the sacrifice had not been brought into the mishkan proper where the inner altar was located, 10:18.

Moshe was worried that there was a danger that because the sacrifice had not been eaten, all the people would be punished. 10:6 records that Moshe told Eleazar and Itamar, Aharon’s two surviving sons, that they should not engage in any mourning rites since they could die and there could be a ketsef on the people. The term ketsef indicates that G-d is angry and that there can be an ensuing punishment, see Bemidbar 17:11. Thus, just like Moshe was concerned that mourning rites could cause G-d to punish the people, so too he was worried that the non-eating of the sacrifice could also cause G-d to punish the people. We now understand Moshe's argument, but why did Aharon disagree if it was so important for the sacrifices to be eaten?

Rashi (on 10:16) quotes two opinions of Chazal to explain Aharon’s response. One, Aharon maintained that since he and his sons were mourners for Nadav and Avihu, they were not allowed to eat the sacrifice. The idea being that the law of mourning would override the usual law that the outer hatta’t was to be eaten. Luzzatto (on 10:17) rejects this approach since Moshe had already told Aharon and his sons that they were not to act as mourners (10:6,7), which means that in all cases they were not to follow the laws of mourning. Luzzatto (on 10:19) also adds that Aharon began his argument by referring to the hatta’t and the olah, 10:19, but this reference is irrelevant if the rationale was that they were mourners. In addition, how did Aharon know that the laws of mourning precluded eating from the sacrifices, something clearly unknown to Moshe?

Rashi's (on 10:16) second approach for understanding Aharon’s argument is that there was some tumah attached to the hatta’t and thus Aharon did not want to eat the sacrifice. Milgrom (1991, pp. 635-640) develops this approach. He argues that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu transformed the hatta’t of the people from an outer hatta’t to an inner hatta’t since their deaths raised the level of tumah of the hatta’t that the sacrifice had to be burnt. This understanding accords with his view that in general a hatta’t is to remove tumah, and the reason why an inner hatta’t is burnt is because the level of tumah the sacrifice is removing is so large that the hatta’t cannot be eaten.

I doubt that Aharon did not eat the hatta't since it was tamei because there is no connection between this explanation and Aharon's response to Moshe. According to Milgrom's explanation, why did Aharon refer to his sacrifices that he had offered beforehand? According to Milgrom, Aharon was not permitted to eat the hatta’t, so why did Aharon not simply say something like "I cannot eat it since it is tamei."

Also, how did the sacrifice become tamei? Milgrom writes that “that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu in the midst of sacred precincts polluted the entire sanctuary.” Yet, according to the laws of tumah (Bemidbar 19) death only causes tumah, when the body is in a tent with a roof, but this did not occur here as Nadav and Avihu died outside of the mishkan proper, 10:4, and see our discussion on Vayikra 10:1,2 "Nadav and Avihu,"  In addition, the hatta’t sacrifice should not have become tamei because the supposed cause of the tumah (Nadav and Avihu's sin) occurred after the sacrifice was offered and its blood was sprinkled, and there is no indication that Nadav and Avihu died when touching the hatta’t. 
Finally, why did Moshe not know that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu generated so much tumah that the hatta’t could not be eaten? It seems to me that Milgrom is forcing his theory of hatta’t and tumah into this episode.

These two approaches are legal arguments as to why Aharon and his sons burnt the hatta't, and instead two psychological arguments have been suggested.

Rashbam (on 10:19) suggests that Aharon was claiming that after the deaths of his sons, he and his remaining sons were too sad to eat the sacrifice. N. Leibowitz (1980, p. 74) likes this approach. She explains that sacrifices must be offered in the proper state of mind, and Aharon could not fulfill this requirement in his state of grief. This approach is similar to the mourning approach but it stresses personal feelings as opposed to a point of law. Yet, where does this idea come from that one cannot be in a state of grief when one eats sacrifices? If there was a need to eat the sacrifices to help the people, then why were the personal feelings of Aharon and his sons relevant? How did Aharon know that G-d would not accept his eating if he was sad? Also, Luzzatto points out that this explanation does not explain why Aharon referred to his personal sacrifices, his hatta’t and his olah? According to this idea, Aharon should have just said "After the events of the day, I am too sad to eat the hatta't."

Luzzatto suggests that the argument between Moshe and Aharon was whether the eating of the hatta’t could lead to atonement for the people. Moshe wanted the hatta’t to be eaten in order for the people to attain atonement, 10:17. Aharon responded that he and his sons had already offered sacrifices that day, and still his sons died. Thus, he understood that his sacrifices did not lead to atonement for himself. Aharon continued and said, “Had I eaten the hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” Aharon doubted that his eating of the hatta’t of the people could lead to atonement for the people once he was not able to bring atonement for himself from his own sacrifices.

This explanation accords with all of Aharon’s statement in 10:19 and makes Aharon’s statement a rebuttal to Moshe’s argument in 10:16-18. Yet, how did the deaths of Nadav and Avihu show that Aharon did not attain atonement from his sacrifices since it seems that they died for their own sins? Luzzatto writes that Aharon felt that he was out of favor with G-d, but from the death of his sons he should only have known that his sons had fallen out of favor with G-d not himself. Perhaps he was a father feeling guilty about his children’s deaths, as maybe he felt that it was his actions by the sin of the golden calf which caused his sons to die, see Rashi on Devarim 9:20. Moshe did not have this feeling so he initially wanted Aharon to eat the sacrifices following the law of the outer hatta’t. However, after Moshe heard Aharon’s claim, he accepted the idea that Aharon felt that he had not attained atonement from his sacrifices and hence he could not help the people attain atonement.

N. Leibowitz (p. 73) likes Luzzatto’s approach in that it accords with the idea that Aharon was giving expression to his personal feelings, but she rejects the explanation since she claims that “a sense of guilt does not free a man from responsibility to perform his duties.” This is similar to the question on the Rashbam's approach, that if it was Aharon and his son's responsibility to eat the hatta't and they were not allowed to mourn, then they had to eat it, whether they felt guilty or sad.

Maybe the argument between Aharon and Moshe is a basic argument about the value of sacrifices, akin to the argument many years later between the Rambam and the Ramban, see our discussion on Vayikra 1:9, "How can one understand sacrifices in the Torah?" Aharon was pointing out that the events of the day showed that sacrifices were ineffective. Aharon noted that he and his sons had just offered a hatta't and an olah, and yet his sons were killed almost immediately afterwards. What point was there for him to eat the hatta't? Aharon was rebutting Moshe's claim that the non-eating of the hatta't would lead to a ketsef not due to sadness or guilt but because he doubted that his eating of the sacrifices would please G-d to stop a ketsef if G-d decided to send ketsef. This would be analogous to the Rambam's view of sacrifice in the Moreh, 3:32, that sacrifices were only commanded since the people could not envisage a religion with sacrifices.

With this idea, Moshe had initially thought that sacrifices had to be eaten since either he thought that sacrifices were effective to bring atonement (like the Ramban) or because one had to do what was commanded, but he agreed to Aharon's point. This could be because he accepted that sacrifices are not effective in general or that in this case they were ineffective. 

A reason why in this particular case they were meaningless is that if the point of offering sacrifices is because one is demonstrating one's devotion to G-d, then here where Nadav and Avihu acted not according to G-d's will (10:1), then any sacrifice that they did would also become meaningless. Note that according to this idea, once Moshe accepted Aharon's opinion, then Aharon and his sons would not have eaten the minhah and the shelamim, 10:12-15.

If this is understanding is correct, then this episode supports the Rambam's opinion that really G-d does not want our sacrifices. If this is the message of this episode, then this would have been the most appropriate place to make this point, right after the laws of the sacrifices and the initiation of the priests. Furthermore, it is telling that it is the high priest, Aharon, who rejects sacrifices.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980, Studies in Vayikra, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday

Shemot 25:31-40 – The menorah in the mishkan: A burning tree

Shemot 25:31-40 records the instructions to construct the menorah, the lampstand, as one of the pieces of furniture within the mishkan. Why was the menorah in the mishkan?

One possible answer is due to the lights of the menorah (25:37). Was there a need to have lights in the mishkan? One might answer that it is obvious, people need light to see. However, from Shemot 27:21 and Vayikra 24:3 it seems that the lamps were lit only at night since apparently during the daytime, some sunlight was able to provide light inside the mishkan through the one side where there was only one veil, 26:36,37, as most likely, the veil was not that thick to stop light from passing through. (Note, the Talmud, Shabbat 22b, quotes Rav that the western light on the menorah was used to light the other lights because this light burnt all day, and apparently this was the practice in the Bet ha-Mikdash, see Ramban on 27:20.)

Was anybody in the mishkan at night? The Torah never records anybody entering at night, but maybe when the menorah was lit at twilight (30:8) there was a need for light just then. Another possibility is that the Abravanel (on 27:20,21, 1997, p. 462, also see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, p. 512) writes that Moshe was able to enter the mishkan at all times, and Moshe would have needed the light if he came into the mishkan at night.

Rashbam (on 25:31, quoted also by Bekhor Shor and Hizkuni) writes that the lights from the menorah were to illuminate the table. Yet, the Rashbam does not explain why there was a need to illuminate the table.

Rambam (Moreh 3:45, see also Amos Chacham, 1991, vol. 2, p. 280) writes that the lights were in order to glorify and honor the Bet ha-Mikdash. Apparently he believes that the light would enable people to see the rooms of the Bet ha-Mikdash and this vision would increase their awe of the Bet ha-Mikdash. (I believe though I am not positive that the Rambam was also referring to the mishkan.)

Another possibility is that the lights on the menorah symbolized the revelation of G-d, see Zechariah 4:6 and statement by Rav Sheshet in Shabbat 22b. This symbolism could be the reference to the statement in 27:21 that the lighting of the menorah was before G-d, see Amos Chacham (1991, on 27:21). This idea explains why there was a need for light, but the Torah records that the menorah had an intricate design. Do the details relate to the lighting? Were the details just for decoration?

N. Leibowitz (1976a, p. 500) notes that while the Rambam was unconcerned with the details of the menorah, many commentators believed that there had to be some lesson to be learned from these details. She quotes Abravanel who suggested that all the aspects of menorah relate to knowledge, and the Alshikh who relates them to moral qualities. However, she notes that allegoric explanations, such as these, are subjective. Yet, there is one approach that has been developed at least since the 19th century that accords with the simple reading of the text.

In a lengthy excursus on the menorah, S.R. Hirsch writes (1989, pp. 459,460), "If we picture its whole appearance, with its flowery base, its stem and arms with their almond shaped cups, knobs and flowers, the whole appearance strikes one as a tree,… blossoming upwards from its root,… a golden tree." Similarly, Benno Jacob (1992, p. 906) writes of the menorah that "its description… leaves no doubt that we are dealing with a unified organism which was to possess the form of a stylized tree." Likewise, Sarna (1991, p. 165) writes, "the shape of the lampstand - the trunk with its branches extending on either side - unmistakably evokes the image of a tree."

The idea explains why all the pieces of the menorah were to be made together from one block of gold (25:36), and not joined together after they were fashioned since the menorah was one unit like a tree. The base of the menorah is a yerech (25:31), which would be like the roots of the tree. The word the Torah uses for the main shaft and the sides going up is a kaneh, which is a reed. The seven kanim were decorated with gaviaim, kaftorim and perahim, all of whom relate to flora. The gavia is referred to as being almonds (25:33), the kaftor were apple shaped according to Rashi (on 25:31), and perahim are flowers. They would be like fruit on the branches of a tree.

Why was there an image of a tree in the mishkan? Various suggestions have been offered. Hirsch refers to the tree of knowledge, but I did not understand the connection. Benno Jacob suggests that the menorah parallels Aharon since he was the first in the family tree of priests. Sarna writes that possibly the imagery is to represent the tree of life, but he does not explain this relationship. Everett Fox (1995, p. 402) writes that trees "connote permanence, growth, and majesty- in other words a reflection of the divine."

Maybe trees symbolize a connection between man and G-d. A tree begins in the ground and grows upward towards the heavens. In the Garden of Eden, it was the trees and their fruit which were the bridge between G-d and mankind. When Adam and Chava ate from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, they became G-d like, Bereshit 3:22. If they had eaten from the tree of life, then they would have had eternal life, and again been similar to G-d, see our discussion on Bereshit 2:9,17 "Two trees."

The two ideas of light and the image of a tree can be combined, as together they give the image of a fire on a tree. This might be the imagery by the burning bush, Shemot 3:2. In addition, and this could be the reason for the burning bush, when Moshe went up on Mount Sinai to get the luchot, the people saw the glory of G-d as a burning fire, 24:32. This burning image would have been seen by the person who lit the menorah, and maybe by the people if they were able to see the menorah lit up from outside the mishkan.

In our discussion on chapters 26,27, "The three zones of the mishkan and the covenantal process," we suggested that the mishkan represents different aspects of the covenant. Every covenant has some type of revelation. By the covenant at Mount Sinai, the revelation was the people's vision of the glory of G-d (also 24:10,11). Accordingly, if the menorah was able to evoke that vision, then the menorah was also a symbol of the covenant.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (1437-1508), 1997, Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Horev

Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1991, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Shemot 8:16-28 - The fourth plague in Egypt: Arov

Shemot 8:16-28 records the plague of arov, the fourth plague, but today nobody knows what exactly it was. The word arov implies a mixture of something, but a mixture of what?

Josephus writes that arov was a mixture of wild animals while Philo suggests that it was types of flies (quoted in Jacob, 1992, pp. 266,267). This argument continued in the Midrash. Shemot Rabbah (11:3) quotes that R. Yehuda suggests that the fourth plague was a mixture of wild beasts, while R. Nehemiah argues that the plague was gnats and hornets. The author of the Midrash favors R. Yehuda since he notes that 8:27 records that G-d removed all of the arov, which suggests that the arov had some value being dead, which he claims is the skins of the wild beasts. Possibly for this reason, this definition has become the traditional approach, see Rashi and Ibn Ezra on 8:17.

Luzzatto (on 8:17) argues that arov cannot be wild beasts since 8:17,20 record that the arov entered the house of the Egyptians, and if it was wild beasts then the people could have closed their doors and kept the animals outside. Furthermore, Benno Jacob (1992, p. 266) argues that arov cannot be wild animals since the plagues were not meant to be lethal, while if there really were wild animals then the plague would have killed large numbers of the Egyptians something not mentioned in the Torah. Yet, if arov is a mixture of insects, then it seems to have been almost identical to the previous plague, kinnim.

One clue to the difference between arov and kinnim is that the kinnim appear to have been in the air like dust and they affected people and animals, 8:13, while the arov was on the ground and seems to have affected the Egyptian homes, 8:17,20. In addition, the Torah does not record any damage due to the kinnim. Kinnim, which was the third plague in the first set of three plagues, appear to have been annoying as were the other two plagues (blood and frogs) in the first set of plagues. On the other hand, 8:20 records that the arov caused great destruction, but what was the destruction? It could not have been the destruction of the crops since that occurred later by the plagues of hail and locusts, 9:31, 10:15. The Torah twice refers to the arov as entering the homes of the Egyptians, 8:17,20, and on the second occasion this description precedes the statement that the arov caused great destruction.

My guess is that kinnim were insects that fly while arov were terrestrial insects. Some terrestrial insects (ants, termites) can cause great destruction to homes, and then the destruction attributed to the arov was to the Egyptian homes, something unique in the plagues. I am not sure what the Egyptian homes were made of, wood, stone, mud, and/ or dung, but the arov could have been a mixture of terrestrial insects that were able to eat through the building materials of the Egyptian homes.

8:18,19 note that the plague of arov would only affect the Egyptians, G-d would make a division (pedut) between the Jewish people and the Egyptians by this plague, and the plague would be a sign of this division. This distinction was not just that by the Jews there were no insects, while by the Egyptians there were insects, as this was the only plague that the Torah specifically states that it would be a sign (ot) of the division or separation between the Jews and the Egyptians.

What was the sign from the plague of arov? When terrestrial insects appear in the multitudes, they cover the ground, which takes on the color of the insects. However, since the insects did not enter the land of Goshen, they would have formed a line on the ground between the land of Goshen and the rest of the Egypt, which would be the sign that the plague only affected the Egyptians and not the Jewish people.

(There were other plagues where this division was very evident, as for example the plagues of darkness and the deaths of the Egyptian firstborn sons, 11:6,7, but the Torah does not use the word ot by these plagues. The word ot does appear by the blood on the homes, 12:13, and I believe that the sign here by arov would be similar to the sign of the blood, which was a red line.  It is possible that the Torah makes a point of the plague of arov being a sign of this division between the Jews and Egyptians since this was the first plague where this division occurred, see Ibn Ezra on 7:24.)

Bibliography:

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Bereshit 37:25-36, 39:1, 42:21 (Va-yeshev, Mikketz) – Who sold Yosef?

Bereshit 37:25 records that after Yosef's brothers threw Yosef into the pit, they sat down to eat. When they were eating they saw a caravan of Yishmaelites in the distance going to Egypt, and Yehuda proposed that they sell Yosef to the Yishmaelites, 37:25-27. The Torah informs us that the brothers listened to Yehuda’s proposal, 37:27, which means that they agreed. However, the Torah does not record any action by them, but rather the next verse, 37:28, records that passing Midyanite traders took Yosef out of the pit and sold him to the Yishmaelite traders. The presence of both Yishmaelite and Midyanite traders is not surprising since the brothers were in Dotan, which was on a main trade route crossing (east-west) through the land of Israel. Yet, who sold Yosef to the Yishmaelites: The brothers or the Midyanites? Yosef states that the brothers sold him, 45:4,5 but did Yosef know exactly what happened? In addition, 37:36 records that the Medanites sold Yosef to Potifar, while 39:1 records that the Yishmaelites sold Yosef to Potifar. When did the Medanites enter the picture and how could both the Medanites and the Yishmaleites sell Yosef to Potifar?

Numerous explanations have been suggested to explain the sequence of events in 37:25-36, but the simplest explanation is the Rashbam’s explanation (on 37:28) that the Midyanites took Yosef out of the pit without the brother’s knowledge and the Midyanites sold Yosef to the Yishmaelite traders, see the elaboration on the Rashbam's explanation by a Shmuel Chayyim son of David Lali quoted by Luzzatto in his comments on 37:28 and by N. Leibowitz, 1976, pp. 406,407. The Rashbam explains that the brothers were eating a little bit away from the pit, which means that they would not have seen the Midyanites come and take Yosef. A possible reason for eating away from the pit was because then they would not hear Yosef pleading for mercy, see 42:21. (Maybe, it was this pleading that alerted the Midyanites to Yosef’s presence in the pit.) In addition, the Rashbam explains that when Yosef said to the brothers that they sold him, this should be understood to mean that you (the brothers) caused me (Yosef) to be sold.

According to this explanation the brothers did not sell Yosef, and there are two proofs for this approach. One, 37:29,30 records that Reuven returned to the pit and was surprised that Yosef was not in the pit. Yet, if the brothers sold Yosef, why was Reuven surprised when Yosef was not in the pit? The answer based on the Rashbam's approach is that Reuven was surprised since the brothers did not sell Yosef, and then he could not understand what happened to Yosef. Two, after Yosef had incarcerated his brothers in Egypt, they talked freely amongst themselves, and they expressed remorse for not heeding to Yosef's pleas, 42:21. Why did they not express remorse for selling Yosef? The implication is that they did not sell Yosef, as argued by the Rashbam.

The Rashbam's approach has raised several questions. One, how could the brothers not have known that the Midyanites took Yosef out of the pit? Even if they were not sitting in view of the pit, still they would not have heard the noise and commotion of the Midyanites? Two, why were the brothers other than Reuven not surprised that Yosef was not in the pit? Three, if the brothers did not sell Yosef, why did the Torah record Yehuda’s proposal to sell him? Four, when Yosef said to his brothers that you sold me, can one really understand that Yosef is to be understood to mean that you caused me to be sold?

These questions on the Rashbam's explanation can be answered by realizing that the brothers attempted to actualize their plan to sell Yosef immediately after Yehuda proposed it. 37:27 does not record the brothers acting upon Yehuda's proposal, but they had to act quickly since the Yishmaelites were travelling and if they waited, then they would have missed their opportunity. This need for speed to talk to the Yishmaelites meant that they did not take the time to remove Yosef from the pit, but went immediately to the Yishmaelites to work out a deal.

When all the brothers left to speak to the Yishmaelites, the pit was not being watched, which means that nobody would have seen or heard when the Midyanites pulled Yosef out the pit. As the Rashbam notes, the word, va-yaavru, signals that they happened to be passing by and by chance they passed the pit where Yosef. They then picked up Yosef and met up with the Yishmaelites who were talking to the brothers. The brothers then saw Yosef and he saw them. He started to plead with them, 42:21, but they did not save him and the Midyanites sold him to the Yishmaelites.

When the brothers were negotiating with the Yishmaelites, Reuven realized that this was his chance to save Yosef, so he went back to the pit where Yosef was, 37:29, but during the time when brothers left the area near the pit to speak to the Yishmaelites until the time that Reuven returned, the Midyanites had already pulled Yosef out of the pit, 37:28. By the time that Reuven returned to his brothers, 37:30, Yosef was gone with the Yishmaelites traders.

The understanding answers all the questions on the Rashbam's approach. The brothers were not near the pit when the Midyanites took Yosef out of the pit (first question) since they had gone to make a deal with the Yishmaelites traders. The brothers were not surprised that Yosef was not in the pit (the second question) because they knew that the Midyanites had taken him out of the pit since they saw Yosef when he was sold by the Midyanites to the Yishmaelites traders. It is possible that they never told Reuven that they had seen Yosef being sold so he thought that Yosef had been killed, 42:22. The discussion between the brothers to sell Yosef (the third question) is significant to the story since the brothers acted upon this suggestion, which enabled the Midyanites to take Yosef out of the pit. In addition, when Yosef saw them when he was sold by the Midyanites to the Yishmaelites, he considered them to be accessories of the sale because from his point of view they were cooperating with the Midyanites by not stopping them from selling him to the Yishmaelite traders. Thus, (the fourth question) he stated that they sold him, 45:4,5, and he did not mean that you caused me to be sold. On the other hand, the brothers never thought that they sold him, and instead they believed that their sin was that they had not heeded Yosef's pleas to stop the Midyanites from selling him to the Yishmaelites, 42:21. In this case, both Yosef and the brothers viewed the same situation from different perspectives.

With regard to the Medanites, while many claim that they are Midyanites, this is unlikely. 25:2 records the children of Avraham and Ketura, and in this list, there is Midyan and Medan, which implies that they are different people. Also, 37:36 refers to the Medanites selling Yosef to Potifar in Egypt, while the Midyanites sold Yosef to the Yishmaelites in Israel.  What is the role of the Medanites in the sale of Yosef?

The answer is that Medanites were the brokers who arranged the sale for the Yishmaelites. 37:25 records that the Yishmaelite traders were spice merchants. Why was this information mentioned? The answer is that it teaches us that they were spice traders and not slave traders. They bought Yosef from the Midyanites and brought him to Egypt, but in Egypt they needed help to sell Yosef. The Medanites were the brokers who arranged the sale of Yosef from the Yishmaelite traders to Potifar. Thus, 39:1 records that Potifar bought Yosef from the hands of the Yishmaelite traders, and this signaled the change in ownership of Yosef. However, 37:36 records that Medanites sold Yosef to Potifar, since when brokers arrange for a sale, they say “I sold X,” meaning they were the cause of the sale but not that they were the actual sellers.

In conclusion, Yosef was sold twice, once by the Midyanites to the Yishmaelites, and then from the Yishmaelites to Potifar. With regard to the first transaction, the brothers were aware of the sale but were not actively involved in the sale. With regard to the second transaction, the Medanites were the brokers to the sale but they never owned Yosef.

Bibliography:

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization

Bereshit 25:29-34 – Yaakov's sale of soup to Esav: Code red

Bereshit 25:29,30 record that Yaakov was boiling some type of soup and Esav asked to have some since he was weak. This would appear to be a reasonable request from one brother to another, but Yaakov gave the surprising answer that he wanted Esav to sell him the birthright for the soup, 25:31. Esav agreed to this deal since he stated that he was on the verge of dying, and if he was dead, then there was no point to having the birthright, 25:32. This agreement was not enough for Yaakov. He made Esav swear to ensure that Esav would not back out of the deal, and when Esav agreed to swear, then Yaakov gave Esav the soup, 25:33,34. The episode ends with a note by the Torah, that Esav despised the birthright, 25:34. Why did Yaakov not freely give the soup to Esav? What did he buy when he bought the birthright? What is the significance of this transaction? Was this just another example of their fights (see comments by David Hoffmann, 1969)?

One approach (see Samet, 2004, pp. 111-113) is that the birthright signified who was to receive the blessings from Yitzhak. This approach explains why Yaakov wanted the birthright since he wanted to receive the blessings and also the significance of this episode, that Yaakov was truly the brother who should have received the blessings of Yitzhak. With this idea, Yaakov thought that he had to get Esav to sell the birthright even if it meant taking advantage of Esav.

This approach is difficult. Why would Esav despise the birthright if it implied which brother was to be blessed? Was he really so reckless? Even if Esav was impulsive, it seems that both of the participants to the deal did not believe that their transaction related to the blessings. When Yitzhak attempted to bless Esav, Yaakov never attempted to stake his “rightful” claim that he had bought the birthright and instead he pretended to be Esav. Also, after Yitzhak was tricked, Esav stated that Yaakov had deceived him twice, once by the birthright and once by the blessings, 27:36. This duality implies that Esav viewed the birthright and the blessings as two separate issues.

A second approach is that the sale of the birthright relates to the financial question who would inherit the family wealth. One variant of this approach is that while Yaakov should have generously given the soup to Esav, he did not take advantage of Esav since Esav, the great hunter, was not really on the verge of dying, was of sound mind at the time of the transaction and valued the soup as being equal to the value of having the birthright. How could this be? Ibn Ezra (on 25:34) argues that Yitzhak was poor and hence there was no expected gain from having the birthright. With this approach, the importance of the episode is not the inheritance itself, which is never mentioned again, but to show Esav’s character that because he was impulsive he was not worthy of Yitzhak’s blessing.

This approach also raises many questions. Was Yitzhak really poor? The Ramban (on 25:34) rejects the idea that Yitzhak was poor. If Yitzhak was poor, and the expected inheritance was truly a pittance, why did Yaakov want the birthright? Did Yaakov foresee Yitzhak becoming wealthy while Esav did not? If Esav really believed that the expected value of the inheritance was worthless, then how does his actions indicate that he was not worthy to receive the blessings? Also, could the inheritance have been so little that its expected value was equal to the value of the soup which Esav devoured in a few minutes? Furthermore, even if Esav was impulsive, is impulsiveness a reason to be disqualified from receiving the blessings of Yitzhak?

Another possibility within this second approach is that the birthright had no financial relevance because Esav was still legally the firstborn even after the sale, and then Yaakov did not take advantage of Esav since he did not gain anything tangible from the sale. Instead, the sale just signaled which brother had a greater connection to the family. Yaakov’s purchased the birthright to show his desire to be part of the family, especially to be closer with his father. (This would accord with the Or Hachayyim's suggestion, on 25:29, that Yaakov was cooking the soup to give to Yitzhak.)

On the other hand, Esav was willing to sell the birthright for almost nothing since he did not value being part of the family, even though his father loved him greatly. A proof for this idea is the note in 25:34 that Esav despised the birthright, which would mean according to this approach that he despised his family. With this idea, the significance of the transaction was that the sale showed that Esav was not worthy of receiving Yitzhak's blessing since he did not want to part of the family, similar to his marriages outside the family, 26:34.

However, one might maintain that Esav really thought that he was on the verge of dying and he only despised the birthright after he sold it. This would be similar to the story of sour grapes, that when a person cannot get something then he disparages it. Also, later, he claimed that Yaakov tricked him out of the birthright, 27:36, which implies that he did not willfully relinquish the birthright, though maybe this statement was due to his later regret after having made the sale.

A third approach is that Yaakov sold the soup in order to rectify what he perceived as an injustice in the world. Yaakov was fighting the idea that the firstborn should receive greater honor or rights solely because he was born first, which in this case of twins, was just a few minutes. (Presumably, their "struggle" in Rivka's womb was to see who would come out first, and Yaakov was holding Esav's heel to symbolize his effort to be the firstborn, 25:22,26.) By selling the soup for the birthright, Yaakov was mocking the value of being firstborn, as he showed that it was worth just a bowl of soup.

A variation on this third approach is that Esav bragged about being the firstborn, and Yaakov though that this was doubly unfair. Thus, when Esav came home famished, Yaakov saw his chance to protest against this injustice and stop Esav from bragging.

Is there any evidence that Esav bragged about being the firstborn? 25:34 records that Esav called the soup the red, red, which is bizarre. Robert Alter (2004, p.131) writes, "although the Hebrew of the dialogues in the Bible reflect the same level of normative literary language as the surrounding narrative, here the text comes close to assigning substandard Hebrew to the rude Esav." Why did Esav not refer to the food as soup or red just once? What is the significance of the double reference to the color red?

In addition, 25:34 records that Esav was called Edom. The usual explanation of the name Edom is that it was due to this transaction that he used the double term red as part of the transaction. This understanding is based on the idea that everybody learned about this transaction. Yet, it seems that Yitzhak only learned of this transaction after he blessed Yaakov by mistake, see Rashi on 27:36.

My thought is that Esav was particularly fond of the color red, and his fondness for the color red in general caused others to call him Edom. This incident would then be one example of Esav always referring to the color red, and the word "therefore" in 25:30 is referring to his general pattern of referring to the color red and not specifically to the case here. (See Yehuda Keel, 2000, p. 231, footnote 57, who quotes an interesting suggestion from Baal ha-Deyukim(?), that Esav called himself Edom unrelated to this sale.)

Independent of whether this incident is the source of Esav being called Edom, why did he have an affinity for the color red? The answer is that when he was born he was ruddy, 25:25, and the color red was his code that he was the firstborn. Here he referred to the soup twice as red, and Yaakov understood that he was bragging about being the firstborn and possibly, he was even demanding the soup because he was the firstborn. This ticked off Yaakov, and then, and only then, he came up with the idea of demanding that Esav sell him the firstborn, which meant that Esav could no longer brag about being the firstborn to Yaakov. According to this approach, Yaakov did take advantage of Esav by the sale, but it was to stop Esav from bragging about being the firstborn.

With either variation of the third approach, the importance of this story is that this is another example of the fight against the firstborn status in the book of Bereshit. This is the pattern in Bereshit, starting with Kayin and Hevel (chapter 4) and ending with Efrayim and Menashe (chapter 48), that the older brother is not intrinsically superior to the younger brother.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1969, Commentary on Genesis, Bnei Brak: Nezach.

Keel, Yehuda, 2000, Commentary on Bereshit: Da'at Mikra, Three volumes, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Samet, Elhanan, 2004, Studies in the weekly parasha, second series, Hebrew, Jerusalem: Hemed.