Bereshit 37:2-14 (Va-yeshev) – Yaakov's parenting

Bereshit 37:2 records that Yosef was 17 years old and he would tattle on his brothers, Dan Naftali, Gad and Asher (the sons of Bilha and Zilpa) to his father. It is surprising that Yosef felt the need to tattle since usually this would be the behavior of little kids and not of a 17 year old. In any event, the tattling surely did not endear Yosef to his brothers, but nothing is recorded concerning the brother's re-action to Yosef's tattling.

37:3 then records that Yaakov loved Yosef more than his other children since he was a ben zekunim (see our discussion on 37:3, "The anticipated child") and Yaakov gave Yosef a fancy special coat. After this action, the Torah records that the brothers hated Yosef, 37:4.

Why would Yaakov reveal his greater love for Yosef? The Talmud (Shabbat 10b) quotes Raba ben Mehasia who said in the name of Rebi Hama ben Giora who said in the name of Rav that from this case we learn that a parent should not favor one child over another. Did Yaakov not know this rule that a parent should not favor one child? Why would Yaakov have thought that his other children would accept his favoritism?

One possibility is that Yaakov was acting as a parent from what he learned from his parents. 27:28 records that Yitzhak loved/ favored Esav, while Rivka loved/ favored Yaakov. According to this idea, Yaakov thought it was perfectly fine to favor one child over another. Yet, when Yosef told his dreams to his brothers and to Yaakov, Yaakov attempted to reprimand Yosef in order that the brothers would not hate the Yosef. Yaakov gave an interpretation of the dream which showed that the dream could not be true, even though Yaakov really thought that the dream was a sign of the future, see our discussion on 37:9,10 "Yosef's dreams of the stars, the moon and the sun" Thus, the question remains why would Yaakov show such overt favoritism to Yosef by giving him the special coat if it could cause the brothers to hate Yosef and himself?

My guess is that Yaakov was gambling when he gave Yosef the special coat. Most likely Yaakov had told Yosef to stop tattling but Yosef was not listening to him. Yaakov was unable to discipline his children and to assert his authority in the house, as for example in the case of Reuven and Bilha, 35:22. What was Yaakov to do to stop Yosef from tattling?

Yaakov strategy was that the coat would change Yosef's behavior that Yosef would no longer tattle, and then this would reduce some of the enmity in the household. The logic would depend on what the coat signified. If it signified greater authority (see Seforno on 37:3), then the idea was that with this added authority Yosef would not feel a need to tell Yaakov what the other brothers were doing. Or if the coat was just a sign of love, then Yaakov thought that Yosef was tattling to win points with him, and then the coat was to tell Yosef that since he was so loved there was no need to tattle. With this idea we see the connection between 37:2 and 37:3 and we understand why the Torah had to inform us about Yosef's tattling since it was the reason why Yaakov gave Yosef the special coat.

Yaakov knew that there was a chance that his other sons would resent his favoritism, but he thought they probably already knew that he loved Yosef more, and hence he was gambling that the added level of overt favoritism was worth the chance that the Yosef would stop tattling which would lead overall to greater family unity.

Alas, Yaakov's gamble did not work. The coat caused more resentment and while the Torah does not record that Yosef continued to tattle, Yosef still felt the need to reveal his dreams to his brothers. As mentioned above, Yaakov tried to stop this by giving an unrealistic interpretation to the second dream, but this also did not work as the brothers were still jealous of Yosef, 37:11. This led Yaakov to gamble even more.

37:13,14 records that Yaakov asked Yosef to go visit his brothers in Shekhem to see how they were doing. Why did Yaakov send Yosef?

Yaakov was not oblivious to the brother’s hatred of Yosef, but he realized that he was unable to close the rift between Yosef and his brothers. Furthermore, he knew that Yosef being alone with his brothers away from home would be unpleasant for Yosef, but he did not think that Yosef’s life would be in danger since he knew from the dreams that Yosef would succeed. His plan was that if all of his sons (except Binyamin) were together far away from home, then maybe they might be able to restore their relationship on their own. Thus, he took the risk of sending Yosef to his brothers in the hope of unifying the family, but alas it too failed.     

Bereshit 24:1, 25:1,2 – Avraham in his older years: To be virile, again

Bereshit 24:1 records that Avraham was old, advanced in years, and G-d had blessed Avraham with everything. This verse raises several questions. One, we already know that Avraham was old, why is this information recorded? Two, what does the phrase "advanced in years" add after the verse already stated that he was old? Three, what is the connection between Avraham's age and the second half of the verse that he was blessed? Four, what was the blessing? What does the word everything refer to? Finally, how does this verse relate to the previous section of burying Sara and the next section of appointing a messenger to find a wife for Yitzhak?

The phrase "advanced in years" in 24:1 also appears in 18:11, which states that Avraham and Sara were old advanced in years, and then 18:11 records that Sara was no longer menstruating. 18:12 continues this theme, as the verse records that Sara stated that both she and Avraham were too old to have children. We see that the phrase "old advanced in age," means not just that the person is old but that with this old age, the person is no longer virile or fertile. Avraham and Sara were in this state prior to the announcement of Yitzhak's birth, and then G-d performed a miracle to restore Avraham's virility and Sara's fertility, 18:14. What happened since then? It appears that the normal course of time again returned, and they did not have any more children after Yitzhak.

Accordingly, the first half of 24:1 is stating that Avraham was no longer virile, and then the blessing of everything was that G-d returned to Avraham his virility. Maybe G-d did this as a comfort to Avraham after the death of Sara, that with his renewed strength, he could re-marry. However, before he re-married, he wanted Yitzhak to be married since many times it is difficult for children when their parents re-marry. To minimize any problems, Avraham waited to re-marry until after Yitzhak had found a wife. Furthermore, as Yitzhak was still at least 37 and not married, he decided to move things along by appointing a servant to find a wife for Yitzhak. After, the servant's successful mission, Avraham re-marries, 25:1, and and with his renewed virility he had more children, 25:2. This renewed virility and children might be the beginning of the fulfillment of the blessing to Avraham at the akedah, 22:17.

This understanding of 24:1 can answer another question. 25:2 records that Avraham had six sons with Ketura, which is quite surprising. Sara died when Avraham was 137, and already when he was 99, both he and Sara had expressed doubts that he was able to father any children, 17:17, and 18:12.

Netziv (on 25:2) explains that once Avraham was given the ability to father Yitzhak at the age of 100, then he never lost this ability. This is difficult since then we would have thought that Avraham and Sara would have had more than one child.

Hoffmann (1969) argues that although people lived longer in those days, the years were proportional to modern day lives. Thus, he claims that when Avraham was 140 this was comparable to being 56 in modern times, which allowed him to have had children without requiring any miracles. Hoffman then argues that the miracle of Yitzhak’s birth was that Sara was able to give birth. He follows Ramban’s explanation of 17:17, that Avraham was expressing doubt that he could have a child with Sara since they had not been able to do so before, but not that he himself could not father a child. While it must be that the aging process for Avraham and Sara was different from modern times, as how else could they live such long lives (see our discussion, "Longevity and the aging process in the Torah"), yet still 18:12 remains unexplained, as Sara says that Avraham was too old when he was 99. (Presumably, Ramban and Hoffmann understand 18:12 as they did 17:17, but it is a difficult explanation.)

Luzzatto (on 25:1) writes that there is no doubt that Avraham married Ketura before Sara died. This would seem to explain how Avraham was able to father the children of Ketura, but it seems difficult to believe that Sara would have allowed Avraham to take another wife after all the fights she had with Hagar. Also, presumably Avraham did not marry Ketura before he married Hagar, since then there would have been no need to marry Hagar once Avraham had fathered children with Ketura.

A simpler explanation on 25:2 is our explanation of 24:1 that G-d restored Avraham's virility to him after Sara died. This strength remained with him for enough years that he was able to father the six sons recorded in 25:2 and possibly more depending on how one understands 25:6. 

Bibliography: 

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1969, Commentary on Genesis, Bnei Brak: Nezach.

Tashlikh

The Rama (Cracow, 1520-1572) writes (on the Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim, 583:2) that on Rosh Hashanah people go to the rivers and recite the verse from Micah (7:19) "G-d should cast into the depths of the seas all their sins." The word for casting in Hebrew is tashlikh and this has become the name of this custom. However, the Rama only briefly mentioned the custom and he left out (probably purposely) the main element in the custom, which is the throwing of food to the fish.

Jacob Lauterbach (1873-1942) has a very lengthy review of the tashlikh custom. He quotes (1936, reprinted in 1973, p.389) from a convert, John Pfefferkorn (1469-1521) who wrote that "the people would come to near the water, shake their garments, (in which they carried their food) and, throwing the food into the water, they would cry out to the fish, 'We throw our sins to you." Pfefferkorn also did woodcuts of the ceremony and he shows the same idea of people throwing food into the war to the fishes. Lauterbach notes that another convert, Anthonius Margaritha gave a similar description of tashlikh in 1530.

The custom is first mentioned by the Maharil (R. Yaakov ben Moshe Levi Moelin, Germany, 1365-1427, Laws of Rosh Hashanah) and he writes that after the meal on Rosh Hashanah, people go to a river and recite the verse of Micah 7:19. Lauterbach (p.385) suggests that the timing of doing tashlikh after the meal was because people took the leftover food from the meal to throw to the fish. However, the Maharil writes that one should not throw food to the fish. From this statement, we see that the custom was in fact to throw food to the fish. (This is how I remember the custom when growing up in West Hempstead, Long Island in the early 1970s.)

It is not clear why the Maharil did not accept the custom of throwing food to the fish. The Maharil writes that throwing food to the fish violates the laws of carrying on the festivals and of feeding animals that are not yours. However, there is no prohibition of carrying on the festival if the carrying is for the festival and here the carrying of food is to fulfill the custom of the festival, which makes it permissible. With regard to feeding animals, the Shulchan Arukh (497:2) rules that on yom tov cannot feed fish, birds and animals that are not your own since you might come to catch them. The Mishnah Berurah (497:5) comments that it is only forbidden to feed the animals by placing the food right in front of them but if one puts the food a little away from them and they come on their own to get the food it is permitted. Thus, by tashlikh on yom tov there is no prohibition of feeding the fish since the person is not intending to catch the fish and the fish come up from the water to get the food (usually bread and crumbs).

It is possible that the Maharil, who lived before the Shulchan Arukh, did not accept the Shulchan Arukh's ruling on feeding animals, but more likely his two reasons were a cover, and he had another reason which he did not want to publicize. Daniel Sperber (1995, p.121) makes the interesting suggestion that the fear was that Christians would seize upon the throwing of food into the river as a pretense to claim that the Jews were poisoning the water. Another possibility is that the practice of throwing food to the fish was copying a Christian practice, as Lauterbach (p.429, also noted by Sperber, p.119) writes that Petrarch recorded a ceremony exactly like tashlikh done by Christians in Cologne, Germany in the 14th century. (Who copied who?) A third possibility is that the Maharil was trying to minimize the custom since the going to the river and hanging around to feed the fish led to the intermingling of men and women, see Arukh Hashulchan (583:4), who as much later time period, end of the 19th century, was concerned about this issue.

Due to the rabbinic protestations against the custom of throwing food to the fish and in some places the lack of water with fish, the custom of tashlikh has evolved into various forms. One practice is to continue the initial custom of reciting the verses and throwing food to the fish. I believe this practice is still prevalent in the Diaspora. Two, amongst Sefardim and many in Israel, one just looks at some body of water and recites the verses, without throwing any food into the water. This body of water can be water from a faucet, a hose, a fountain or a water tower, where one does not see the water but knows that there is water inside. Within this variation, some people make an effort to go to a body of water that have fish, but they do not throw food to the fish. A third variation is that one goes to the water, recites the verses, and empties one's pockets. This emptying of the pockets is clearly the idea of taking the crumbs out of the pockets to feed the fish, but today most people's pockets are clean, so they are just shaking out empty pockets. A fourth variation, which I have never seen, is quoted by Lauterbach (pp.399, 411) that people in Tangiers in 17th century and people from Kurdistan in the 19th century, actually jumped into the war themselves! Finally, it is quoted (Ma'aseh Rav) that the Gra (1720-1797) did not do tashlikh at all, and the Arukh Hashulchan (583:4) writes that many people do not do this custom.

What is the reason for the custom of tashlikh? The Maharil (quoted in Mishnah Berurah 583:8) writes that it is to recall a miracle that G-d did for Avraham on the way to the akedah. According to the Midrash, which was written before the custom of tashlikh existed, the devil tried to block Avraham from going to do the akedah by becoming a raging river, but G-d did a miracle to dry up the river (the devil). This rationale for tashlikh is very strange. Why should we want to go to a river since that represents the devil? With this logic one should do tashlikh by a dry place. However, we need to remember that the Maharil was not trying to explain the real custom but was trying to find a reason for his desired change in the custom that people would just go to the river and not throw food into the river.

The Rama in his commentary on the Tur, the Darkei Moshe, which he wrote before his commentary on the Shulchan Arukh, gives another reason for the custom. In the Darkei Moshe (583), he quotes from R. Isaac Tyrnau (contemporary of the Maharil, Sefer ha-Minhagim) that the point was to see fish, which somehow is a sign that the evil eye will not look upon us (do not really understand) since it does not look upon the fish (not sure why not). The Rama in a different book, Torat ha-Olah 3:56 (quoted in Sperber, p.120) gives another reason that by going to the river this reminds one of G-d's majesty. This rationale is obviously problematic for one who fulfills the custom of tashlikh by turning on a faucet. For other reasons and more sources on this custom, see Rabbi Ari Zivotosky's fascinating review of the custom in Jewish Action, Fall 5768/ 2007, pp. 62-65, http://www.ou.org/torah/article/tzarich_iyun_tashlich

All these reasons are difficult since they are not explaining the real custom of throwing food to the fish, but the real custom has a simple explanation. On Yom Kippur, a major part of the ritual was for the high priest to transfer the sins of the people to a goat which was sent into the desert, Vayikra 16:21,22. This ceremony ended with the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, but because this was such an important part of the ritual of the day, people wanted to continue it in some other forms and tashlikh is one of these attempts. Thus, the food, which symbolizes the sins, is sent to the fish who will take the sins far away. The Magen Avraham (1635-1682, 583:5) notes that it is best to do tashlikh outside the city, which is the idea of sending the sins far away. This understanding of the custom is not novel. It is exactly the meaning of the verse that is recited by tashlikh, Micah 7:19, to send the sins to the depths of the sea. Lauterbach (pp.397-399) quotes even two non-Jews from the 17th century who write that the custom was to carry the sins off "just like the scapegoat of old." With this understanding one should not do tashlikh by feeding fish in a home aquarium since then the sins stay at home.

Yet, the sending away of the sins is on Yom Kippur, why is this ceremony done on Rosh Hashanah? The answer is that there exists another custom, kapparot, which has the same symbolism to send away the sins, see our post Kapparot, http://www.lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2011/10/kapparot. Yet, kapparot is the older custom and is done on erev Yom Kippur, so why was another custom added which has the same meaning? To answer this question, we need to determine when the custom of tashlikh began.

The Maharil was the first person to quote the custom of tashlikh, which suggests that the custom began in his lifetime or shortly beforehand. Lauterbach (p.429) notes that people have made this argument but he thinks they are deluded. Yet, I think the argument is correct since the Tur (1269-1343?) who lived prior to the Maharil, quotes all Ashkenazi customs in his book, the Tur, but he does not refer to the custom of tashlikh. This strongly implies that he was not aware of the custom since it did not exist.

Why did the custom begin around the 14th century? I believe that there are two possible complementary answers. One, Rosh Hashanah is considered the day of judgment, and hence there developed the idea that people need to remove their sins by Rosh Hashanah and not wait until Yom Kippur. Two, the 14th century was a very difficult period for the Jews. The Black Plague killed off 50-60% of the population of Western Europe, and in the ensuing anti-Semitism, more Jews were killed since they were blamed for causing the plague. Thus, life began to be viewed as being very tenuous, even more so than before, and this created a need to do everything possible to be judged favorably. Tashlikh was an answer to this need since this was a symbolic act to hopefully increase one's chances of living. Note the Maharil was also the first person to quote the idea that one has to do kapparot for a fetus (see Darkei Moshe 505) which again is the idea of doing everything to ensure that G-d would judge the unborn child (who could not even have sinned) favorably.

Tashlikh became a crucial part of Rosh Hashanah, and then there developed the problem of what to do when the first day of Rosh Hashanah is on Shabbat because then there is truly a problem of carrying the food to the river. There would be no problem of carrying if the river was within the eruv (theoretical door frames that allow one to carry), but not all places had eruvs and as mentioned above tashlikh was usually done outside the city, which would be outside the eruv. This problem must have arisen almost immediately with the development of the custom, but Lauterbach (p.420) writes that R. Jehiel M. Epstein, the author of the Kitzur Shnei Luchot ha-Brit (end of 17th century) was the first person to discuss this problem, some 200-300 years after the custom started. R. Jehiel M. Epstein argued that when the first day of Rosh Hashanah was on Shabbat, tashlikh should be pushed off to Sunday, the second day of Rosh Hashanah. Lauterbach notes that R. Jehiel M. Epstein also objected to the "popular" idea that by tashlikh one throws away one's sins, so then for him it was not difficult to move the day. However, for those people who accepted the symbolism of tashlikh, it was very important to have tashlikh on the first day.

In 1725, the first day of Rosh Hashanah was on Shabbat and R. Jacob Riescher (Shvut Yaakov 3:42) argued that one should do tashlikh on the first day and that the Maharil allowed tashlikh on Shabbat. Yet, what about the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat? One could claim that the proponents of doing tashlikh on Shabbat were only maintaining that one should recite verses by the river and these verses could be memorized. Yet, again the practice was to throw food to the fish, so how could one carry the food to the river? Maybe the people usually threw food, but when the first day of Rosh Hashanah was on Shabbat then tashlikh was done without throwing food. Another possibility is that in his discussion of tashlikh, the Maharil writes that one should not take food from a non-Jewish person who was by the river. Lauterbach (p.386) notes that the non-Jew's presence by the river was surely no accident, and this suggests that on Shabbat the people would have non-Jews bring the food for them to throw into the water. If this is true, then it is quite amazing that we do not blow the shofar on Shabbat due to fear of carrying, but people would continue to do tashlikh on Shabbat. (With regard to throwing the food into the water, this would be from a carmelit (the edge of the river, see Mishnah Berurah, 301:176) to a carmelit (the river) less than four amot, which is permitted, see Shulchan Arukh 346:2. Even if the water would take the food further away, this would be coah (power) of the carmelit which is permitted see Shulchan Arukh, 355:1)

The Mishnah Berurah (583:7, end of 19th century, beginning of the 20th century) writes that he saw that in some places tashlikh was done on the second day of Rosh Hashanah when the first day falls on Shabbat because of the problem of carrying the machzor, but he does not refer to problem of bringing food to the river. The implication of his words (a few places) is that still in his time most people did tashlikh on the first day of Rosh Hashanah even when it was on Shabbat, see also Shaarei Tshuvah 583:10 (R. Chaim Mordechai Margoliot, 19th century). My impression is that today most people do tashlikh on the second day of Rosh Hashanah when the first day of Rosh Hashanah is on Shabbat.

In conclusion, the custom of tashlikh developed around the 14th century, and the initial custom was to throw food to the fish. This was thought to symbolically remove one's sins in order that a person would be judged favorably on Rosh Hashanah. This became such an intrinsic part of the day that even when the first day of Rosh Hashanah was on Shabbat, initially many people still did tashlikh, possibly by having a non-Jewish person bring them the food to throw.

Devarim (Ki Teitzei) 21:18-21 – The defiant son?

Devarim 21:18-21 record that parents can take their son to the elders of a city, claim that he is being disobedient and then all the people of the city are to stone the boy to death. This law is very troubling. How could the Torah allow parents to be so cruel to their children? Furthermore, why is the law just by sons and not by daughters? Also, 21:18 records that the problem is that the son is not listening to the parents, but then 21:20 adds that the parents have to also claim that their son is a "glutton and a drunkard." What is the need for this additional claim? Is the boy being killed for eating and drinking too much?

Tigay (1996, p. 196) writes "the law seeks to deter filial insubordination, but by requiring that the case be judged by the elders, it also places limits on parental authority, as does the previous law." Similarly, Barry Eichler (2010, p. 451) writes, "the essential purpose of the Torah is to protect the child from the absolute and capricious authority of the father even as it seeks to strengthen parental authority by deterring filial insubordination." According to these scholars, the law has two goals, limiting the power of the parents, and deterring rebellious children, but these goals are contradictory. If the power of the parents is limited, then this encourages children to be more insubordinate. Furthermore, how is the power of the parents limited if they can have their son killed?

Eichler reviews several laws in ancient times to show "that patriarchal authority over one's wife and minor children was a potent force in ancient Near Eastern societies." We see this absolute power in the Torah by the story of Yosef. When the brothers of Yosef returned without Shimon and told Yaakov that they could only return to Egypt if they brought Binyamin with them, Reuven offered to kill his two sons if he did not bring Binyamin back to Yaakov (Bereshit 42:37). How could Reuven offer to kill his sons? What had they done to deserve to die? The answer is that it appears that in biblical times the parents had absolute power over their children and could kill their kids without even having to make any claims.

Accordingly, since Devarim 21:20 requires the parents to speak to the elders and to explain why they want to have their son killed, this law is a limitation on their powers. The elders do not appear to act as judges, but just the requirement to make a public declaration has the potential to stop the parents from acting capriciously. Furthermore, as noted by Tigay (p.197) the parents do not participate in the stoning, which means the parents must be convincing enough that the other people of the city are willing to stone their son.

This need to prove the parent's claim might be the reason why the parents have to also state that their son is a glutton and a drunkard. Other people cannot really determine if a son is listening to his parents, but they can observe him to see if he is a glutton and drunkard. The boy is not being killed for drinking and eating excessively, but this is the minimal proof that is needed to convince people to accept the parent's claim that their son is not listening to them. Relatively speaking this minimal proof was significant since in those days no proof was needed at all for parents to kill their sons for disobedience.

Therefore, the point of the law was only to limit the powers of the parents. Even though the Torah allows the parents to have their son killed, still in the context of the absolute power wielded by parents in ancient times, the law limits their powers in some ways. In addition, maybe there was only a need to limit the powers of parents in reference to disobedient sons and not daughters, if in those days daughters were not sufficiently independent to rebel to the extent that parents would want to kill them.

If the Torah was trying to reduce the power of parents over their children, why did the Torah not just abolish the power altogether? The answer to this question follows the Rambam's (Moreh 3:32, see also our discussions on Shemot 20:3 "Other gods," and Bemidbar 15:32-36 "Sticks and stones") explanation as to why the Torah commands people to offer sacrifice even though according to the Rambam, G-d does not really desire sacrifices, that the Rambam argues that in those days people could not conceive of a religion not having sacrifices. Similarly, in those days the culture was so ingrained that parents have absolute powers over their children that the most the Torah could do was to limit these powers.

This idea can explain the development of this law in the rabbinic period. While some opinions (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8:5, R. Yose ha-Galili, Sanhedrin 72a, quoted in Rashi on 21:18) attempted to justify the killing of the son that it was better for him to die innocent than to be guilty of real crimes later on, other Rabbis effectively neutralized the law by adding numerous conditions that it could never happen. For example, R. Yehuda (Sanhedrin 71a) stated that the son can only be judged a disobedient son if the voice, looks and heights of both parents are equal. Why did the Rabbis add these conditions to abrogate the biblical law? The answer might be that they realized that the Torah was trying to limit the power of the parents, but could not completely end this practice due to the cultural background of the people. However, when the Rabbis realized that people were able to accept that parents do not have complete absolute power over their children, then they added these conditions to end this ability of parents to kill their children.

Devarim 9:9-10:10 (Ekev) – One hundred and twenty days on high?

How many times did Moshe go up on Mount Sinai after the Decalogue and for how long did he go each time? Also, were these ascents consecutive or was there a break between them?

The book of Shemot seems to record that Moshe went up three times to Mount Sinai. Shemot 24:16,18 record that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai for forty days, and then Shemot 32:15 records that Moshe came down with the tablets. Afterwards, Shemot 33:20 (see Rashi on Devarim 9:18) seems to imply that Moshe went up a second time to Mount Sinai, but there is no mention for how long. Afterwards, Shemot 34:4,28 record that Moshe went up a third time for forty days.

The book of Devarim also seems to record that Moshe went up on Mount Sinai three times. Devarim 9:9,11 record that Moshe went up on Mount Sinai to get the first set of tablets. Afterwards, 9:18, 25 record that Moshe prayed for forty days, but it does not record that Moshe went up on Mount Sinai. Rashi (on 9:25) explains that 9:25 does not refer to a new set of 40 days but refers back to the second set of 40 days. This would be a case of resumptive repetition, where the text repeats itself to resume the narrative. Moshe had been discussing the sin of the golden calf from 9:8-21, but then he digressed to mention other sins of the people beside the golden calf, 9:22-24, so the text repeated itself to return to the incident of the golden calf, 9:25. Afterwards 10:1 records that Moshe was to go up to Mount Sinai to get the second set of tablets, but there is no mention for how long. This ascent corresponds to the third ascent recorded in Shemot 34:4,28. The final reference to being on Mount Sinai is 10:10, which records that Moshe was on the mountain for forty days. One might be tempted to understand that the verse is referring to Moshe's ascent to get the second set of tablets since this verse is recorded after 10:1, but 10:10 also records that “that G-d agreed not to destroy the people,” which is in reference to Moshe's prayers in 9:25. This means the verse is referring to the second set of forty days. If this is true, then 10:10 implies that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai also by the second set of the forty days.

This reading of Shemot 33, 34 and Devarim 9, 10 indicates that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai three times, each time for forty days. Luzzatto (on 9:18) agrees that there were three sets of forty days, but he argues that for the middle forty days, Moshe was not on Mount Sinai since 9:18,25 do not record that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai. Luzzatto brings a proof from Shemot 33:7, which records that Moshe moved his tent outside the camp, and this means that Moshe was not on Mount Sinai. How does he understand Shemot 32:30? I did not see him comment on the verse. Maybe he understands that as Shemot 32:30 just records the words “go up” but no mention is made of Mount Sinai, then “go up” means to separate from the people, which Moshe did in Shemot 33:7, but not that to ascend the mountain. Luzzatto notes that 10:10 seems to contradict his approach, but argues that the verse refers to the last set of forty days.

I think the simple reading of Shemot 32:30 is that for the middle forty days, Moshe was on Mount Sinai, and this is also the implication of 10:10. 10:10 is a continuation of 9:25-29, and is another case of resumptive repetition. Moshe had digressed from the story of the sin of the golden calf to discuss the selection of the Levites, and 10:10 returns to the second set of forty days when Moshe prayed for the people after they had sinned by the golden calf. Accordingly, since 10:10 states that Moshe was on Mount Sinai, then this means that also by the second set of forty days Moshe went up on Mount Sinai. However, Luzzatto has a strong proof that Shemot 33:7 and the ensuing conversation, 33:12-23, between G-d and Moshe could not have been on Mount Sinai. Thus, I think there is a need to offer a different chronology.

My guess is that there was a break in between the second and third sets of forty days. After breaking the tablets, at the end of the first set of forty days, 9:11-17, Moshe went back up to Mount Sinai for a second time, as indicated by Shemot 32:30 and Devarim 10:10, and this ascent was for forty days as indicated by 9:18, 25 and 10:10. After this second set of forty days, Moshe pitched his tent outside the camp and had another conversation with G-d, 33:1-23, but this conversation was not on Mount Sinai. We do not know how long this conversation lasted, a week, a month? At the end of this conversation, Moshe went up to Mount Sinai again, Shemot 34:4 and Devarim 10:1. In Devarim, there is no record of how long this third ascent lasted, but from Shemot 34:28, we know it lasted another 40 days.

With this chronology, Moshe went up to Mount Sinai three times after the Decalogue, each time for forty days, but these ascents were not consecutive. I think this approach gives a consistent reading of the text in Shemot and Devarim. (However, this approach does not accord with the idea mentioned by Rashi on 9:18 that Moshe came down with the second set of tablets on Yom Kippur.)

Bemidbar 25:1-18, 32:2 (Balak, Pinhas, Mattot) - Kozbi

Bemidbar 25:1-3 records that the Jewish people sinned with the daughters of Moav, and G-d punished the people by sending a plague. The plague ended after Pinhas killed two of the brazen sinners, 25:6-8. 25:11-13 then records the rewards that Pinhas was to receive for his actions, and this apparently was the end of the incident. However, afterwards, 25:14,15 identifies the brazen sinners as Zimri, the son of Salu, a chieftain in the tribe of Shimon, and Kozbi, the daughter of one of the leaders of Midyan. The fact that the Torah identifies the sinners is not so unusual, but one would have thought that if the Torah was going to identify the sinners, then this would have occurred when they were first referred to in 25:6. Why initially did the Torah describe the sinners anonymously, and only after the episode was apparently over, did the Torah reveal their identity? (For some answers, see Ramban on 25:18 and Or ha-Chayyim on 25:14.)

My guess is that the Torah is trying to present the state of mind of Pinhas at the time when he acted. Just as the reader was unaware of the identity of the sinners until the episode was over, so too Pinhas was unaware of the sinner's identities when he acted. Moshe had ordered that the sinners were to be killed, 25:5, and Pinhas obeyed without inquiring who were the people sinning. This idea explain why the Torah initially presented the sinners anonymously, but then why is important for us to know their identity afterwards? The following verses suggest an answer.

25:16-18 record that G-d commanded the Jewish people to attack the Midyanites due to “the matter of Peor and the matter of Kozbi.” Is the “matter of Kozbi” identical with the events of Baal Peor? If yes, then why is it mentioned twice?

Ibn Ezra (on 25:18) suggests that 25:18 is listing two separate reasons why Midyan was to be attacked. One reason was for leading the people astray by Baal Peor and the second reason was that Midyan wanted to harm the people out of revenge for Kozbi's death, their Midyanite princess, because they blamed the Jewish people for her death. I understand this harm to mean that Midyan attacked the people after the events of Baal Peor.

A proof for this is that 25:18 uses the word, tsorerim, which implies ongoing hostility, see Milgrom, 1990, p.218. Furthermore, the Torah uses the same word, tsoror, assail, harass, when commanding the Jewish people to attack Midyan, 25:17. The double use of the same word implies that the attack was tit for tat, Midyan was to be attacked because they were attacking you. 25:18 could then be understood as “for they (Midyan) are attacking you with their craftiness (guerrilla warfare?), with which they were crafty with you in Baal Peor and in the matter of the death of Kozbi (that they blamed the Jewish people for her death).

In addition, when the command to fight Midyan is repeated in 31:2, the Torah records that the Jewish people are to take revenge on Midyan. Ibn Ezra (on 31:2) explains that the revenge is because Midyan caused the Jewish people to worship idolatry. Yet, Midyan did not force the people to commit idolatry. Instead, if Midyan had been attacking the people and were continuing to attack them, then it makes sense that the Jewish people were to seek revenge to stop these attacks.

This idea explains why the people were commanded to attack Midyan and not Moav who were also involved in the sins of Baal Peor. Rashi (on 25:18) explains that Moav was not to be attacked since Ruth was to come from Moav. Ramban (on 25:18) quotes a Midrash that Moav was not attacked since they had acted due to their fears while Midyan got involved in the sin of Baal Peor for no reason. Ramban also writes that Moav was protected due to their forefather Lot, as Devarim 2:9 records that G-d told Moshe the Jewish people could not fight with Moav. The idea that Midyan was attacking the Jewish people suggests another reason. Only Midyan was attacked since they attacked the Jewish people, while Moav was not attacked since they did not attack the Jewish people.

Finally, this idea also explains why Kozbi had to be identified. Midyan would only want to take revenge if the Jewish people had killed an important person, and from the identification of Kozbi we learn that she was a princess of Midyan. Thus, she is mentioned in 25:15 immediately prior to the command to attack Midyan, and the explanation that the command was due to the "matter of Kozbi." Therefore, had Torah not identified her we would not have understood why the Jewish people fought with Midyan.

We are left with the question why did Zimri have to be identified? Possibly once Kozbi was identified, then Zimri, her partner, was also mentioned.

My daughter, Talia, has suggested that Zimri was identified in order that Midyan should realize that Kozbi was not killed because she was a foreigner, but since she sinned, as a "high ranking" Jew, Zimri, was also killed. Thus, Zimri was identified to show that Midyan had no justification for their attacks on the Jewish people, and again the identification was recorded in conjunction with the command to attack Midyan, which was in response to the attacks from Midyan.

A third reason is that with the identification of Zimri we also learn that he was from one of the leading families of the tribe of Shimon, and then his death accorded with G-d's instruction to Moshe in 25:4, to kill the leaders of the people who were sinning. Moshe had not relayed this information to the people, 25:5, and hence when Pinhas acted he was consciously fulfilling Moshe's instructions and unintentionally G-d's instructions.

Bemidbar 15:32-36 (Shelah) - Sticks and stones

Bemidbar 15:32-36 record the case of the wood gatherer. An anonymous person was found collecting wood on Shabbat and he was temporarily incarcerated since it was not known what was to be done with him. G-d then informed Moshe that the person was to be killed, and he was stoned to death.

This case raises several questions. What did the person do wrong? What is problematic about gathering wood? Why did Moshe (and Aharon) not know what to do with him? Also, was his crime so grave that he deserved to die?

The Talmud (Shabbat 96b) records three approaches to explain the person’s sin. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel suggests that the person carried the wood four cubits in the public domain. An anonymous opinion (see Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 5:1) suggests that the person was found uprooting trees from the ground. And, three, Rav Aha the son of R. Yaakov suggests that the person was binding the wood/ branches together. With any of these explanations, the person was violating the Shabbat, and we understand why he was reported to Moshe. What then was Moshe’s confusion? The Talmud (Sanhedrin 78b) explains that Moshe knew the person was to die for his actions, but he did not how the person was to be killed. Thus, G-d told Moshe that he was to be stoned.

This approach from the Talmud is problematic. The idea that the person was uprooting trees or carrying does not fit the term gathering, as the Torah should have stated these specific infractions. The third idea, that the person was binding branches, could accord with the term gathering, but absence this case it would seem that the prohibition of binding is just by sheaves, which is part of the process of harvesting wheat. (See Shimon Eider, 1970, p.80, who quotes the Minhat Hinuch who claimed that the Rambam held that the prohibition of gathering sheaves only applies to food.) Possibly for these reasons, Luzzatto (on 15:32) writes that really the person did not violate the prohibition of work on Shabbat, but that he was punished for acting brazenly.

In addition, the idea that Moshe was in doubt as to the method of execution seems forced. Why did G-d not inform Moshe of this fact when Moshe was told about the death penalty on Shabbat? Also, 15:35 records that first G-d told Moshe the person was to be killed, and afterwards the method of execution, which implies that initially Moshe did not know the person was to be killed.  

Luzzatto’s approach is that the person did not violate any law of Shabbat, but what then did he do? Weingreen (1966) suggests that the case here is an example of making a fence around the Torah, as “the gathering of the wood on the Sabbath could have been construed as being a manifest prelude to the kindling of the fire.” (Kindling a fire is prohibited based on Shemot 35:3.) Weingreen explains that Moshe’s dilemma was whether this preparatory act was to be considered a violation of Shabbat and if yes, should it punished as severely as violations of the Shabbat? G-d’s answer to both questions was yes.

Gnana Robinson (1978) rejects Weingreen’s approach. She questions how the person could be punished so severely just for showing intent to violate a law, without actually violating the law. She suggests that the person was attempting to light a fire as part of idol worship and the gathering of the wood was part of the cultic act.  She claims the death penalty was for idolatry and not for violating Shabbat.  While this approach is possible, it leaves unexplained what was Moshe’s doubt as to the person’s guilt.

Milgrom (1990, p.37) claims the prohibition is the gathering itself, and this is derived from the prohibition of gathering the mahn on Shabbat, Shemot 16:22-30. Yet, the law by the mahn was unique since the mahn was a test of faith (see our discussion on Shemot 16:2-4, "A double test"), and hence it is not obvious that other cases can be extrapolated from the mahn, as maybe only gathering mahn was forbidden.                

Weingreen’s approach is the most reasonable.  Yet, still the death penalty seems very severe if the person only violated “a fence around the Torah.”  My guess is that to understand this case, one has to speculate as to the motive of the person in gathering wood. Was this a hobby? Did the person want the wood to make a fire to cook?  Both possibilities are doubtful. As noted by Ibn Ezra (on 15:2,32) and Luzzatto, it is more likely that the person was acting brazenly since the preceding section, 15:30,31, refers to brazen violations of the Torah, and cooking or just collecting wood would appear to be too insignificant to be considered brazen. I think one needs to combine Luzzatto’s comment with Weingreen’s approach. 

Maybe the case was that the person was gathering the wood to build a bonfire, and this was evident by the quantity of wood that he gathered.  Furthermore, the bonfire was to be a brazen demonstration that the person rejected the law prohibiting kindling a fire on Shabbat since the smoke would be seen and smelled by the entire nation. The gathering of a large quantity of wood demonstrated his intention to violate the Shabbat, and hence the people brought him to Moshe and Aharon.  Most likely, this brazen act to desecrate the Shabbat was a rebellion against the Torah after the people were punished due to their initial refusal to enter the land of Israel (see Altar, 2004, p.759), and hence the episode ends with the entire population repudiating the person when they stoned him.  (This could explain the significance of the opening phrase, the people were in the desert, in 15:32, see Ramban on 15:32.)

Following Weingreen, Moshe’s dilemma was whether the preparatory act of gathering the wood for the bonfire should be treated as a violation of an actual prohibition on Shabbat, and if yes, what should be the punishment? Usually a violation of a preparatory action would not entail death, but this was a unique case (see R. Yehuda, Sanhedrin 80b) due to the brazen nature of the bonfire.  Thus, G-d told Moshe that the person was to be killed by stoning. 

Death by stoning is a very common method of execution in the Torah (Vayikra 20:2,27, 24:14,23, Devarim 13:11, 17:5 and 21:21), but to modern minds it is considered barbaric. Yet in ancient times, it is likely that it was accepted as an appropriate method of execution.  Gregory Clark (2007, p.182) writes, "Earlier societies – the Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Incas – seem remarkably similar to ours in many of their details of their daily life, except for one thing: the apparently insatiable blood lust of the ancients.  The Romans seem the most depraved.  Criminals were executed for sport in the Coliseum and smaller town amphitheaters, often after being burned, raped, gouged, mangled or mutilated." Furthermore, he records an observation by Samuel Pepys, from London on October 13, 1660, that a criminal was "hanged, drawn, and quartered... And after he was cut down, his head and heart were shown to the people who responded with great shouts of joy." 

Why did the Torah not abolish death by stoning? Again we turn to the Rambam's (Moreh, 3:32) argument by sacrifices that G-d did/ does not really want sacrifices, but they had to be instituted since the people in those days could not conceive of worship without sacrifices.  (Is this need for sacrifices also due to the lust for blood?)  Maybe one could make the same argument by stoning.  If a person had been killed by "just being" beheaded or hanged then the people would have thought that the criminal got off easy, and hence they would not have appreciated the seriousness of the person's action, as in this case, the brazen act of desecrating the Shabbat by the wood gatherer.