Thursday, July 18, 2013

Devarim 9:9-10:10 (Ekev) – One hundred and twenty days on high?

How many times did Moshe go up on Mount Sinai after the Decalogue and for how long did he go each time? Also, were these ascents consecutive or was there a break between them?

The book of Shemot seems to record that Moshe went up three times to Mount Sinai. Shemot 24:16,18 record that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai for forty days, and then Shemot 32:15 records that Moshe came down with the tablets. Afterwards, Shemot 33:20 (see Rashi on Devarim 9:18) seems to imply that Moshe went up a second time to Mount Sinai, but there is no mention for how long. Afterwards, Shemot 34:4,28 record that Moshe went up a third time for forty days.

The book of Devarim also seems to record that Moshe went up on Mount Sinai three times. Devarim 9:9,11 record that Moshe went up on Mount Sinai to get the first set of tablets. Afterwards, Devarim 9:18, 25 record that Moshe prayed for forty days, but it does not record that Moshe went up on Mount Sinai. Rashi (on 9:25) explains that 9:25 does not refer to a new set of 40 days but refers back to the second set of 40 days. This would be a case of resumptive repetition, where the text repeats itself to resume the narrative. Moshe had been discussing the sin of the golden calf from 9:8-21, but then he digressed to mention other sins of the people beside the golden calf, 9:22-24, so the text repeated itself to return to the incident of the golden calf, 9:25. Afterwards Devarim 10:1 records that Moshe was to go up to Mount Sinai to get the second set of tablets, but there is no mention for how long. This ascent corresponds to the third ascent recorded in Shemot 34:4,28. The final reference to being on Mount Sinai is Devarim 10:10, which records that Moshe was on the mountain for forty days. One might be tempted to understand that the verse is referring to Moshe's ascent to get the second set of tablets since this verse is recorded after 10:1, but 10:10 also records that “that G-d agreed not to destroy the people,” which is in reference to Moshe's prayers in 9:25. This means the verse is referring to the second set of forty days. If this is true, then Devarim 10:10 implies that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai also by the second set of the forty days.

This reading of Shemot 33, 34 and Devarim 9, 10 indicates that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai three times, each time for forty days. Luzzatto (on 9:18) agrees that there were three sets of forty days, but he argues that for the middle forty days, Moshe was not on Mount Sinai since Devarim 9:18,25 do not record that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai. Luzzatto brings a proof from Shemot 33:7, which records that Moshe moved his tent outside the camp, and this means that Moshe was not on Mount Sinai. How does he understand Shemot 32:30? I did not see him comment on the verse. Maybe he understands that as Shemot 32:30 just records the words “go up” but no mention is made of Mount Sinai, then “go up” means to separate from the people, which Moshe did in Shemot 33:7, but not that to ascend the mountain. Luzzatto notes that Devarim 10:10 seems to contradict his approach, but argues that the verse refers to the last set of forty days.

I think the simple reading of Shemot 32:30 is that for the middle forty days, Moshe was on Mount Sinai, and this is also the implication of Devarim 10:10. 10:10 is a continuation of 9:25-29, and is another case of resumptive repetition. Moshe had digressed from the story of the sin of the golden calf to discuss the selection of the Levites, and 10:10 returns to the second set of forty days when Moshe prayed for the people after they had sinned by the golden calf. Accordingly, since 10:10 states that Moshe was on Mount Sinai, then this means that also by the second set of forty days Moshe went up on Mount Sinai. However, as Luzzatto argued Shemot 33:7 and the ensuing conversation, 33:12-23, between G-d and Moshe could not have been on Mount Sinai. Thus, I think there is a need to offer a different chronology.

My guess is that there was a break in between the second and third sets of forty days. After breaking the tablets, at the end of the first set of forty days, Devarim 9:11-17, Moshe went back up to Mount Sinai for a second time, as indicated by Shemot 32:30 and Devarim 10:10, and this ascent was for forty days as indicated by 9:18, 25 and 10:10. After this second set of forty days, Moshe pitched his tent outside the camp and had another conversation with G-d, 33:1-23, but this conversation was not on Mount Sinai. We do not know how long this conversation lasted, a week, a month? At the end of this conversation, Moshe went up to Mount Sinai again, Shemot 34:4 and Devarim 10:1. In Devarim, there is no record of how long this third ascent lasted, but from Shemot 34:28, we know it lasted another 40 days.

With this chronology, Moshe went up to Mount Sinai three times after the Decalogue, each time for forty days, but these ascents were not consecutive. I think this approach gives a consistent reading of the text in Shemot and Devarim. (However, this approach does not accord with the idea mentioned by Rashi on 9:18 that Moshe came down with the second set of tablets on Yom Kippur.)

Sunday, June 16, 2013

Bemidbar (Numbers) 25:1-18, 32:2 - The war with Midyan: Kozbi

Bemidbar 25:1-3 records that the Jewish people sinned with the daughters of Moav, and G-d punished the people by sending a plague. The plague ended after Pinhas killed two of the brazen sinners, 25:6-8. 25:11-13 then records the rewards that Pinhas was to receive for his actions, and this apparently was the end of the incident. However, afterwards, 25:14,15 identifies the brazen sinners as Zimri, the son of Salu, a chieftain in the tribe of Shimon, and Kozbi, the daughter of one of the leaders of Midyan. The fact that the Torah identifies the sinners is not so unusual, but one would have thought that if the Torah was going to identify the sinners, then this would have occurred when they were first referred to in 25:6. Why initially did the Torah describe the sinners anonymously, and only after the episode was apparently over, did the Torah reveal their identity? (For some answers, see Ramban on 25:18 and Or ha-Chayyim on 25:14.)

My guess is that the Torah is trying to present the state of mind of Pinhas at the time when he acted. Just as the reader was unaware of the identity of the sinners until the episode was over, so too Pinhas was unaware of the sinner's identities when he acted. Moshe had ordered that the sinners were to be killed, 25:5, and Pinhas obeyed without inquiring who were the people sinning. This idea explain why the Torah initially presented the sinners anonymously, but then why is important for us to know their identity afterwards? The following verses suggest an answer.

25:16-18 record that G-d commanded the Jewish people to attack the Midyanites due to “the matter of Peor and the matter of Kozbi.” Is the “matter of Kozbi” identical with the events of Baal Peor? If yes, then why is it mentioned twice?

Ibn Ezra (on 25:18) suggests that 25:18 is listing two separate reasons why Midyan was to be attacked. One reason was for leading the people astray by Baal Peor and the second reason was that Midyan wanted to harm the people out of revenge for Kozbi's death, their Midyanite princess, because they blamed the Jewish people for her death. I understand this harm to mean that Midyan attacked the people after the events of Baal Peor.

A proof for this is that 25:18 uses the word, tsorerim, which implies ongoing hostility, see Milgrom, 1990, p.218. Furthermore, the Torah uses the same word, tsoror, assail, harass, when commanding the Jewish people to attack Midyan, 25:17. The double use of the same word implies that the attack was tit for tat, Midyan was to be attacked because they were attacking you. 25:18 could then be understood as “for they (Midyan) are attacking you with their craftiness (guerrilla warfare?), with which they were crafty with you in Baal Peor and in the matter of the death of Kozbi (that they blamed the Jewish people for her death).

In addition, when the command to fight Midyan is repeated in 31:2, the Torah records that the Jewish people are to take revenge on Midyan. Ibn Ezra (on 31:2) explains that the revenge is because Midyan caused the Jewish people to worship idolatry. Yet, Midyan did not force the people to commit idolatry. Instead, if Midyan had been attacking the people and were continuing to attack them, then it makes sense that the Jewish people were to seek revenge to stop these attacks.

This idea explains why the people were commanded to attack Midyan and not Moav who were also involved in the sins of Baal Peor. Rashi (on 25:18) explains that Moav was not to be attacked since Ruth was to come from Moav. Ramban (on 25:18) quotes a Midrash that Moav was not attacked since they had acted due to their fears while Midyan got involved in the sin of Baal Peor for no reason. Ramban also writes that Moav was protected due to their forefather Lot, as Devarim 2:9 records that G-d told Moshe the Jewish people could not fight with Moav. The idea that Midyan was attacking the Jewish people suggests another reason. Only Midyan was attacked since they attacked the Jewish people, while Moav was not attacked since they did not attack the Jewish people.

Finally, this idea also explains why Kozbi had to be identified. Midyan would only want to take revenge if the Jewish people had killed an important person, and from the identification of Kozbi we learn that she was a princess of Midyan. Thus, she is mentioned in 25:15 immediately prior to the command to attack Midyan, and the explanation that the command was due to the "matter of Kozbi." Therefore, had Torah not identified her we would not have understood why the Jewish people fought with Midyan.

We are left with the question why did Zimri have to be identified? Possibly once Kozbi was identified, then Zimri, her partner, was also mentioned.

My daughter, Talia, has suggested that Zimri was identified in order that Midyan should realize that Kozbi was not killed because she was a foreigner, but since she sinned, as a "high ranking" Jew, Zimri, was also killed. Thus, Zimri was identified to show that Midyan had no justification for their attacks on the Jewish people, and again the identification was recorded in conjunction with the command to attack Midyan, which was in response to the attacks from Midyan.

A third reason is that with the identification of Zimri we also learn that he was from one of the leading families of the tribe of Shimon, and then his death accorded with G-d's instruction to Moshe in 25:4, to kill the leaders of the people who were sinning. Moshe had not relayed this information to the people, 25:5, and hence when Pinhas acted he was consciously fulfilling Moshe's instructions and unintentionally G-d's instructions.




Monday, May 20, 2013

Bemidbar 15:32-36 - The wood-gatherer in the desert: Sticks and stones

Bemidbar 15:32-36 record the case of the wood gatherer. An anonymous person was found collecting wood on Shabbat and he was temporarily incarcerated since it was not known what was to be done with him. G-d then informed Moshe that the person was to be killed, and he was stoned to death.

This case raises several questions. What did the person do wrong? What is problematic about gathering wood? Why did Moshe (and Aharon) not know what to do with him? Also, was his crime so grave that he deserved to die?

The Talmud (Shabbat 96b) records three approaches to explain the person’s sin. Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel suggests that the person carried the wood four cubits in the public domain. An anonymous opinion (see Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 5:1) suggests that the person was found uprooting trees from the ground. And, three, Rav Aha the son of R. Yaakov suggests that the person was binding the wood/ branches together. With any of these explanations, the person was violating the Shabbat, and we understand why he was reported to Moshe. What then was Moshe’s confusion? The Talmud (Sanhedrin 78b) explains that Moshe knew the person was to die for his actions, but he did not how the person was to be killed. Thus, G-d told Moshe that he was to be stoned.

This approach from the Talmud is problematic. The idea that the person was uprooting trees or carrying does not fit the term gathering, as the Torah should have stated these specific infractions. The third idea, that the person was binding branches, could accord with the term gathering, but absence this case it would seem that the prohibition of binding is just by sheaves, which is part of the process of harvesting wheat. (See Shimon Eider, 1970, p. 80, who quotes the Minhat Hinuch who claimed that the Rambam held that the prohibition of gathering sheaves only applies to food.) Possibly for these reasons, Luzzatto (on 15:32) writes that really the person did not violate the prohibition of work on Shabbat, but that he was punished for acting brazenly.

In addition, the idea that Moshe was in doubt as to the method of execution seems forced. Why did G-d not inform Moshe of this fact when Moshe was told about the death penalty on Shabbat? Also, 15:35 records that first G-d told Moshe the person was to be killed, and afterwards the method of execution, which implies that initially Moshe did not know the person was to be killed.

Luzzatto’s approach is that the person did not violate any law of Shabbat, but what then did he do? Weingreen (1966) suggests that the case here is an example of making a fence around the Torah, as “the gathering of the wood on the Sabbath could have been construed as being a manifest prelude to the kindling of the fire.” (Kindling a fire is prohibited based on Shemot 35:3.) Weingreen explains that Moshe’s dilemma was whether this preparatory act was to be considered a violation of Shabbat and if yes, should it punished as severely as violations of the Shabbat? G-d’s answer to both questions was yes.

Gnana Robinson (1978) rejects Weingreen’s approach. She questions how the person could be punished so severely just for showing intent to violate a law, without actually violating the law. She suggests that the person was attempting to light a fire as part of idol worship and the gathering of the wood was part of the cultic act. She claims the death penalty was for idolatry and not for violating Shabbat. While this approach is possible, it leaves unexplained what was Moshe’s doubt as to the person’s guilt.

Milgrom (1990, p.37) claims the prohibition is the gathering itself, and this is derived from the prohibition of gathering the mahn on Shabbat, Shemot 16:22-30. Yet, the law by the mahn was unique since the mahn was a test of faith (see our discussion on Shemot 16:2-4, "A double test"), and hence it is not obvious that other cases can be extrapolated from the mahn, as maybe only gathering mahn was forbidden.

Weingreen’s approach is the most reasonable. Yet, still the death penalty seems very severe if the person only violated “a fence around the Torah.” My guess is that to understand this case, one has to speculate as to the motive of the person in gathering wood. Was this a hobby? Did the person want the wood to make a fire to cook? Both possibilities are doubtful. As noted by Ibn Ezra (on 15:2,32) and Luzzatto, it is more likely that the person was acting brazenly since the preceding section, 15:30,31, refers to brazen violations of the Torah, and cooking or just collecting wood would appear to be too insignificant to be considered brazen. I think one needs to combine Luzzatto’s comment with Weingreen’s approach.

Maybe the case was that the person was gathering the wood to build a bonfire, and this was evident by the quantity of wood that he gathered. Furthermore, the bonfire was to be a brazen demonstration that the person rejected the law prohibiting kindling a fire on Shabbat since the smoke would be seen and smelled by the entire nation. The gathering of a large quantity of wood demonstrated his intention to violate the Shabbat, and hence the people brought him to Moshe and Aharon. Most likely, this brazen act to desecrate the Shabbat was a rebellion against the Torah after the people were punished due to their initial refusal to enter the land of Israel (see Alter, 2004, p.759), and hence the episode ends with the entire population repudiating the person when they stoned him. (This could explain the significance of the opening phrase, the people were in the desert, in 15:32, see Ramban on 15:32.)

Following Weingreen, Moshe’s dilemma was whether the preparatory act of gathering the wood for the bonfire should be treated as a violation of an actual prohibition on Shabbat, and if yes, what should be the punishment? Usually a violation of a preparatory action would not entail death, but this was a unique case (see R. Yehuda, Sanhedrin 80b) due to the brazen nature of the bonfire. Thus, G-d told Moshe that the person was to be killed by stoning.

Death by stoning is a very common method of execution in the Torah (Vayikra 20:2,27, 24:14,23, Devarim 13:11, 17:5 and 21:21), but to modern minds it is considered barbaric. Yet in ancient times, it is likely that it was accepted as an appropriate method of execution. Gregory Clark (2007, p. 182) writes, "Earlier societies – the Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Incas – seem remarkably similar to ours in many of their details of their daily life, except for one thing: the apparently insatiable blood lust of the ancients. The Romans seem the most depraved. Criminals were executed for sport in the Coliseum and smaller town amphitheaters, often after being burned, raped, gouged, mangled or mutilated." Furthermore, he records an observation by Samuel Pepys, from London on October 13, 1660, that a criminal was "hanged, drawn, and quartered... And after he was cut down, his head and heart were shown to the people who responded with great shouts of joy."

Why did the Torah not abolish death by stoning? Again we turn to the Rambam's (Moreh, 3:32) argument by sacrifices that G-d did/ does not really want sacrifices, but they had to be instituted since the people in those days could not conceive of worship without sacrifices. (Is this need for sacrifices also due to the lust for blood?) Maybe one could make the same argument by stoning. If a person had been killed by "just being" beheaded or hanged then the people would have thought that the criminal got off easy, and hence they would not have appreciated the seriousness of the person's action, as in this case, the brazen act of desecrating the Shabbat by the wood gatherer.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Clark, Gregory, 2007, A farewell to alms: A brief economic history of the world, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eider, Shimon, 1970, Halachos of Shabbos, 1-3, Spring Valley: Phillip Feldheim Inc.

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Robinson, Gnana, 1978, The Prohibition of Strange Fire in Ancient Israel: A New Look at the Case of Gathering Wood and Kindling Fire on the Sabbath, Vetus Testamentum, Vol. 28, July 1978, pp. 301-317.

Weingreen, J. 1966, "The case of the woodgatherer," Vetus Testamentum, 16, pp. 361-364.

Monday, April 15, 2013

Vayikra 23:9-22 (Emor) – On the morrow: When is the korban omer brought?

Vayikra 23:9-14 records the law to bring the omer sacrifice on the morrow of the Shabbat. Afterwards, 23:15-22 records that the fiftieth day from the bringing of the omer was a mikrei kodesh (the holiday of Shavuot) and other special sacrifices, two loaves, were to be brought. One question that concerns both sections in when is the omer sacrifice offered? When is "the morrow of the Shabbat?" Which Shabbat?

There are at least six different approaches to understanding the term "morrow of the Shabbat." One, the traditional view is that it means the day after the first day of chag ha-matzot, the 16th of Nisan. (In the Diaspora, this is the second day of Yom Tov, and in Israel the first day of chol ha-moed of Pesach.)

Two, the view of the Karaites, and possibly of the Boethusians, a sect in the time of the second Bet ha-Mikdash, that it means, the Sunday after the Saturday within chag ha-matzot. (If Pesach started on Saturday, then the Karaites, held the day was the second day of Pesach just like the traditional view.) 

Three, Shmuel Sprecher (1993) has suggested that the Boethusians held that the omer was brought on the second day of chag ha-matzot like the traditional view, but the count started on the Sunday after the Saturday within chag ha-matzot. 

Four, the omer was brought on the day after the last day of chag ha-matzot. (Apparently, this was the practice of Ethiopian Jews. David Hoffmann, 1953, vol.2, pp. 124-127, quotes several scholars who hold this view and claims that this is the view of the Targum Peshitta. However, Yeshayahu Maori (1995, pp. 176-178) claims the Peshitta follows the traditional view.) 

Five, the book of Jubilees, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and possibly the view of the Boethusians, the omer was to be brought on the first Sunday after chag ha-matzot. 

Six, the omer was brought on the first Sunday after the first reaping with no connection with chag ha-matzot.

The Talmud (Menahot 65a-66a) quotes many arguments for the traditional approach, but perhaps the most convincing proof is not mentioned in the Talmud. Yehoshua 5:11 records that when the Jewish people first came into the land of Israel even before the battle of Jericho, they ate bread and wheat on the day after the pesach sacrifice (see Rambam, Laws of regular and extra sacrifices, 7:8-10, and Hoffmann, pp. 134-136). The proof is that Vayikra 23:14 only allows one to eat the new grains after the omer sacrifice was brought, and in Yehoshua 5:11 it appears that the people ate the new wheat on the day after the pesach sacrifice, which means the omer was brought on the day after the pesach sacrifice.

This proof has several problems and it is telling that the Talmud did not mention it. One, according to Yehoshua 5:10, the pesach sacrifice was brought on the 14th of Nisan, which means the day after the sacrifice was the 15th of Nisan, and this does not match up with the traditional view, which is that the omer is to be brought on the 16th of Nisan. Two, Yehoshua 5:11,12 does not state that the people ate new grains, rather that they ate grains from the land of Israel and not the mahn. Three, the book of Yehoshua makes no mention that the people celebrated chag ha-matzot that year, and hence maybe that year was a special circumstance since there was only the pesach sacrifice. (On the other hand, if one claims that pesach also means chag ha-matzot, as is the common language today, then the day after pesach could be the day after chag ha-matzot, which is the fourth view.) Four, the case is unique for another reason. Usually people have old grain stored up, but presumably when the people just came to the land of Israel, they had no supplies of grain, and hence maybe once the mahn stopped, they had to be allowed to eat even new grain immediately.

The order of the festivals in chapter 23 strongly implies that the omer offering was to be brought after chag ha-matzot.  In the chapter, the Torah first records the festival of chag ha-matzot and then the bringing of the omer sacrifice.

In addition, in chapter 23, each festival is separated in the chapter by the verse, "G-d spoke to Moshe." Yet, with regard to the holiday of Shavuot there appears to be anomaly since this phrase does not appear by 23:15, which apparently begins the discussion of the laws of the day of Shavuot. N. Leibowitz (1980, pp. 218-223) quotes the Talmud and the Hinukh that there is no separating verse for Shavuot since Shavuot is a continuation of the holiday of Matzot since the goal of the exodus from Egypt was to receive the Torah at Mount Sinai. Yet, chapter 23 never alludes to the fact that the Torah was given on Shavuot. Furthermore, the phrase “G-d spoke to Moshe” appears between the laws of Pesach and the laws of Shavuot as it occurs prior to the verses that record the law of bringing the omer, 23:9.

The phrase "G-d spoke to Moshe" in 23:9 signals the beginning of the holiday of Shavuot. The holiday is a fifty day holiday, and only the last day is a mikra kodesh that one is forbidden to work, 23:21. The holiday starts with the bringing of the omer and after seven full weeks, it ended with the bringing of the two loaves. Shemot 23:16 refers to the holiday as one of reaping, and this reaping is referred to in Vayikra 23:10 by the bringing of the omer, which is the beginning of the festival. This idea accords with the name Shavuot a feast of weeks, as the holiday was for seven weeks. Similarly, Bemidbar 28:26 and Devarim 16:9-12 when discussing the festival of Shavuot refers to weeks prior to the day of Shavuot, again because the holiday is for fifty days. This understanding nullifies the first three explanations of the term "on the morrow" since it cannot be that the fifty day holiday of Shavuot started in the middle of the holiday of matzot.

This same idea that the fifty days of Shavuot begins after chag ha-matzot is evident in Devarim 16. Devarim 16:1-8 records laws of the holiday of Pesach and of the chag ha-matzot, and it refers to the second mikrei kodesh of chag ha-matzot.  Afterwards, Devarim 16:9 records that one is to start counting the seven weeks. The implication is that the counting is only to begin after the chag ha-matzot ended.

I think the fourth view is correct that the phrase "on the morrow" refers to the day after chag ha-matzot. In the end of 23:15, the word shabbat means week, seven weeks. This suggests that the word shabbat in the beginning of 23:15 also means week, the morrow after the week. What week is being referred to? The week of chag ha-matzot. 23:11 then means that the omer is to be brought on the day after the end of the week of chag ha-matzot. Finally, the word shabbat in 23:16 also means week, "Until the morrow after the seventh week, you shall count fifty days."

Why did the Torah not then clearly state that that the omer is to be brought on the day after chag ha-matzot? One possibility is that really the word shabbat means a period of time when one is to rest, and while usually this is Saturday, really it can be a longer period of time, like a week. With this idea, the word shabbat does not necessarily refer to Saturday, and can just as equally refer to a festival. A second possibility is that the Torah did not want to connect Shavuot with chag ha-matzot. Chag ha-matzot is a historical holiday, while Shavuot is an agricultural holiday. If the bringing of the omer was recorded in reference to chag ha-matzot, this might have caused one to think that chag ha-matzot was an agricultural holiday, but really the holiday is only to recognize that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt. A third possibility is that the use of the word shabbat in conjunction with mimaharet is to re-enforce the sabbatical theme of the shabbatot of the weeks. 

My guess is that the traditional approach to understanding the term "on the morrow" as being the 16th of Nisan is because Chazal deliberately moved up the counting of the omer six days in order to make the holiday of Shavuot closer to the day of the Decalogue. In the Torah there is no connection at all between Shavuot and the Decalogue, but Chazal wanted to make this connection. (This connection occurs in the book of Jubilees.) If the counting of the omer starts after chag ha-matzot, the 22nd of Nisan, then Shavuot would be celebrated on the 12th of Sivan, but if the counting of the omer starts on the 16th of Nisan, then Shavuot is on the sixth day of Sivan.

It is not obvious in the Torah on which day the Decalogue occurred. Shemot 19:1 records that the Jewish people came to Mount Sinai on the third month (Sivan) and the verse seems to be referring to the first day of the month. Afterwards, there are several conversations between G-d and Moshe and it is not clear when they took place, on one day or spread out over several days. Shemot 19:10 records the next explicit reference to time that the Decalogue would take place three days later, which at a minimum was the third day of Sivan. However, in the Talmud (Shabbat 86b) the Rabbis maintained that each conversation between G-d and Moshe occurred on a separate day, and then the Decalogue was either on the sixth or seventh of Sivan.

The Tosefta, Erechin 1:4, and Talmud Rosh Hashanah 6b, note that in the time when the calendar was determined by sight, the holiday of Shavuot was celebrated on either the fifth, sixth or seventh of Sivan depending on the length of the months of Nisan and Iyar, see Henshke, 1992, pp. 441-444. This means that even if the omer was offered on the 16th of Nisan, still Shavuot was sometimes celebrated near the date of the Decalogue but not always on the day of the Decalogue,

My guess is that Chazal moved up the omer offering to have Shavuot be close to the day when they thought that the Decalogue occurred. They could not get it exact since the lengths of the months were not exact, but they could make the two events close. When the calendar and the months were fixed, then they could get them to be exact, but this also took to interpreting Shemot 19 to mean that the Decalogue was on the sixth of Sivan. The jump of moving the counting of the omer a week earlier was not so ground-breaking since according the fourth view, the day of the morrow was the day after the last day of chag ha-matzot, while now it would be the day after the first day of chag ha–matzot. Finally, according to the Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 2:10) and the Talmud (Pesachim 117b and Berakhot 49a), Chazal have the power to decide when a holiday is celebrated, and hence they can decide to celebrate Shavuot a week earlier on the sixth of Sivan instead of the twelfth of Sivan.

Bibliography:

Henshke, David, 1992, The history of the counting of the omer, in Rabbi Mordechai Breuer Festchrift, edited by Moshe Bar-Asher, Jerusalem: Academon Press, pp. 417-448.

Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980, Studies in Vayikra, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Maori, Yeshayahu, 1995, The Peshitta version of the Pentateuch and early Jewish exegesis, Jerusalem: Magnes Press.

Sprecher, Shmuel, 1993, "The offering of the omer and counting of the omer: The view of the Boethusians," Sidra, 9, pp. 105-116.


Tuesday, March 12, 2013

Lighting candles before Shabbat and Yom Tov

One of the most popular practices in Judaism is to light candles on Friday night before Shabbat. Why do we light candles before Shabbat?

This practice is not mentioned in the Torah, but we know from Roman sources that at least by the end of the period of the second Bet ha-Mikdash, the Jewish people lit candles prior to Shabbat, see sources in Lewin, 1938, pp. 55,56, and Lauterbach, 1973, p. 454. The Mishnah (Shabbat, chapter 2) discusses details of the law but does not explain the source of this practice.

The Talmud (Shabbat 23b) quotes from Rava that if a person has only enough oil for Shabbat candles or for Hanukkah candles, or only enough money for Shabbat candles or wine for Kiddush, then Shabbat candles takes precedence because of shalom bayit, peace in the house. The idea being that the light gives benefit to the people, and this has been understood to mean that light enables one to see one's food (Rashi on Shabbat 25b, hovah, Neuwirth, 1989, p. 31) and/or that a person will not trip when walking in the house, (Rashi on Shabbat 25b, hadlakah). Furthermore, this idea of benefit has been called kavod Shabbat, and oneg Shabbat in addition to being considered shalom bayit, see Rambam (Laws of Shabbat 5:1) and Arukh Hashulchan (1829-1908, Orah Chayyim 263:1). Yet, was the Talmud giving the reason for the law or just saying that this was an additional benefit to lighting Shabbat candles over and above its basic rationale?

One indication that the point of lighting Shabbat candles is not just to give light is that the basic requirement is just to light one candle (Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim 263:1). In addition, the Talmud (Shabbat 25b) states that lighting the candles is an obligation, while if the law was due to kavod Shabbat, oneg Shabbat or shalom bayit it would not be an obligation.

Lauterbach, (1973, p. 459) makes the fascinating suggestion that the “ceremony of having lights on Friday night was a protest against the Samaritans and Sadducees." According to the Sadducees and the Samaritans, based on Shemot 35:3 (see our discussion on Shemot 35:3, "Can't start a fire"), a person has to extinguish all fires prior to the Shabbat, while now one is lighting a fire specifically prior to Shabbat in order that there would be a fire burning on Shabbat. Thus, only one light had to be lit because that was sufficient to show that a person was repudiating the Sadducees and Samaritan beliefs. 

(Lewin, 1938, p. 60, quotes a similar idea from R. Yosef Caro, but R. Caro relates it to the Karaites, that that the lighting is to repudiate the Karaites. Also, according to Lauterbach's suggestion, the comment in the Midrash, Genesis Rabbah, 60:16, quoted by Rashi on Bereshit 24:67, that when Sarah was alive, a lamp used to burn in her tent from the evening of Sabbath until the evening of the following Sabbath, is not referring to our practice of lighting Shabbat candles since by Sarah the candles burned all week.)

This idea that the lighting of the candles was to repudiate the views of the Samaritans, Sadducees and the Karaites explains some of the importance given to the lighting of the Sabbath candles. For instance, Rambam (Laws of Sabbath 5:1) writes that one must beg for money to fulfill the requirement of lighting candles for Shabbat. However, in Laws of Sabbath 30:7, he records that with regard to eating on Shabbat, which is also considered oneg Shabbat, one is not required to beg for money to get food on Shabbat. Why the difference? The answer is that lighting the Shabbat candles not only added pleasure to Shabbat but it made the point that a person was not a Sadducee, Samaritan and later a Karaite.

Another question that arises with regard to the candle lighting is whether one recites a blessing when lighting the candles. Today the practice is to say a blessing, but the Talmud does not record any blessing only that one is required to light the candles, Shabbat 25b. Tosafot (Shabbat 25b, Hovah, also see Tur 263) quotes that in the Middle Ages, there were people who said that one does not make a blessing on candle lighting, and they compared this case to washing one's hands after eating, mayim achronim, which is also considered obligatory by the Talmud but has no blessing. However, Tosafot quotes Rabbenu Tam that we do say a blessing as Rav Amram Gaon (9th century, 2004, p.61) in his Siddur stated that one recites a blessing by candle lighting.

The Arukh Hashulchan (above) asks that with regard to other obligations on Shabbat that are considered oneg Shabbat there is no blessing, so why by candle lighting is there a blessing? He answers that there was a special enactment by the candle lighting. Yet, his proof of this enactment is that the Talmud stated that candle lighting is obligatory but while this is true, the Talmud never stated that one is to recite a blessing by the candle lighting.

Lewin (1938, pp. 67,68) notes that we have no record of exactly when the blessing on candle lighting was instituted, but he quotes Rav Natronai Gaon, (9th century) who preceded Rav Amram Gaon as the head of the academy of Sura (853-858), as the first person who we have on record as stating that one says a blessing on candle lighting. (Also see Lewin's work, Otzar ha-Geonim, Shabbat 25b, paragraphs 83-85.) Hoffmann (1979, p. 86) questions whether the attribution of the blessing to Rav Natronai Gaon is correct, but he concludes, "we cannot go far wrong if we attribute the blessing to either Amram or Natronai."

We see that the blessing on candle lighting on Friday night seems to have begun in the ninth century. Why then was a blessing instituted? Again, Lauterbach (1951, pp. 459-61) provides the insight, as he suggests that "the blessing was a protest against the Karaites,” as the Karaites also followed the idea that Shemot 35:3 means that a person cannot have a fire burning on Shabbat even if it was lit beforehand.

Hoffmann (1979, p. 88) notes the difficulty the Geonim had in justifying the blessing on candle lighting, and he agrees with Lauterbach that "we may see the benediction as a polemic against the Karaite sect." The blessing increased the religious significance of lighting the Shabbat candles, which would have strengthened the observance of lighting the candles to contradict the Karaite practice of not having any fires lit on Shabbat.

Accordingly, we see that there was a two-stage development in the law of lighting Shabbat candles. Initially, the lighting was done to counter the beliefs of the Sadducees and the Samaritans, and when the controversy was renewed with the Karaites, the Geonim added the blessing to repudiate the Karaites.

This rationale for lighting and making the blessing on Shabbat candles might also explain some customs with regard to lighting candles on Yom Tov. Abudraham (Spain, early 14th century, in his commentary on Friday night prayers, Bameh Madlikin, Mishnah Shabbat 2:6) first quotes Rabbenu Gershon ben Rabbi Shelomo that the custom is not to make a blessing when lighting the candle for Yom Tov, but then he quotes that the Baal Mishmeret ha-Moadot wrote that a person should recite a blessing when lighting a candle for Yom Tov.

Rason Arusi (1979) notes that even today some Yemenite Jews do not make a blessing on lighting candles on Yom Tov. Arusi writes that the Raviah (Germany, 12th century) was the first to record that one is light candles on Yom Tov. The Raviah writes that his source was a Yerushalmi, but this Yerushalmi does not exist in out versions today. Arusi suggests that this reference to a Yerushalmi is not to the Talmud Yerushalmi but to a book of customs in medieval Germany which called itself Yerushalmi since many of the customs of Ashkenazi Jewry were from the community that lived in the land of Israel.

Arusi argues that the late development of lighting candles and saying a blessing on candles for Yom Tov is because the reason for lighting on Shabbat is due to the fight with the Sadducees and the Karaites, but this reason was not applicable to Yom Tov, where the use of fire is permitted. Thus, initially the custom was only to light candles for Shabbat, while the lighting of candles prior to Yom Tov and reciting the blessing on the lighting only developed afterwards due to a desire to make Yom Tov similar to Shabbat.

Bibliography:

Arusi, Rason, 1979, Blessing on lighting candles for Yom Tov: Examination of custom of Yeminite Jewry, Sinai, 85, pp. 55-91.

Hoffmann, Lawrence A. 1979, The canonization of the synagogue service, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Lauterbach, Jacob (1873-1942), 1973, Rabbinic Essays, New York: Ktav. Reprint of 1951, Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College

Lewin, B.M. 1938, Letoledot ner shel Shabbat, in Essays and studies in memory of Linda R. Miller, edited by Israel Davidson, New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1938, pp. 55-68, Hebrew section.




Sunday, February 17, 2013

Reading Megillat Esther at night and drinking on Purim


Our practice is to read Megillat Esther twice on Purim, once at night and once in the morning (Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim, 687:1).  The source for this practice is from the Talmud (Megillah 4a), which quotes R. Yehoshua ben Levi and separately a Rabbi Helbo in the name of Ulla of Biri that a person is supposed to read the Megillah twice.   Both Amoraim quote verses from Tehillim, which was written before Megillat Esther, to support their rulings but they do not provide a reason why the Megillah should be read twice.  Every Shabbat we read the Torah once, why should the Megillah be read twice?

It is highly likely that the initial practice was just to read the Megillah once.  The Mishnah (Megillah 1:1) records that villagers would read the Megillah earlier than Purim, on the day of assembly.  The days of assembly were market days when the villagers would come to the bigger towns for business, and then they could hear the Megillah on these days even though it was not yet Purim. Rashi (commentary on the Mishnah) explains that the villagers were illiterate so they could not read on their own, and Chazal did not require the residents of the villagers to make an extra trip to come to the bigger towns on Purim.
 
This law of reading the Megillah before Purim on the days of assembly is no longer applicable (Megillah 2a, Rambam, Laws of Megillah 1:9) but the law shows that the Megillah was only read once during the day. The residents of the villagers only came on the day of the assembly to hear the reading of the Megillah.  They did not sleep over the night before and they did not come twice to the larger towns, once at night and once during the day. 

In addition, the Mishnah (Megillah 2:5) records that the Megillah and other commandments can be done all day, and then the next Mishnah records two laws (reaping the omer and putting the fats on the altar) that can be done at night.  If the Megillah was read at night, why did the second Mishnah not list reading the Megillah at night? It seems clear that in the times of the Mishnah, Megillat Esther was only read once during the day, and not at night. (This point has been made by Harav Shlomo HaCohen, 1828-1905, Vilna, Responsa Binyan Shlomo, 58, Hanoch Albeck, 1988, p.349, and Tabory, 1996, p.347.   Tabory, footnote 76, quotes other sources arguing for and against this understanding.  Also see Zevin, 1956, p.159, footnote 47, for more sources.) 

A halakhic vestige of this practice of reading the Megillah only once in the daytime is the practice of Ashkenazim to recite the blessing shehecheyanu on the reading of the Megillah during the daytime, Rama 692:1.  The Rambam (Laws of Megillah, Purim 1:3) writes that one does not recite shehecheyanu during the daytime since it is recited at night.  This ruling is logical since we only recite shehecheyanu the first time when doing a commandment so it should only be recited once, and this is the ruling of the Shulchan Arukh, 692:1.  However, Tosfot (Megillah 4a, Chayev) quotes R. Yitzhak that we recite the shehecheyanu even on the daytime reading since this is the main time for the reading. Similarly, the Tur (692) quotes Rabbenu Tam that the blessing is to be recited during the daytime and that his father, the Rosh, agreed with Rabbenu Tam.  Also, the Maggid Mishnah (14th century, comments on the Rambam) writes that the custom in his time in Spain was to recite the shehecheyanu during the daytime.  

This idea that the main reading of the Megillah is the daytime reading is most likely because in the time of the Mishnah, it was the only reading of the Megillah.  Furthermore, even if the daytime is the main reading this still should not be enough to warrant reciting the shehecheyanu blessing twice. More likely, in the time of the Mishnah, the Megillah was only read once and then shehecheyanu was recited on that reading. Afterwards, in the time of the Talmud, when the night reading was added, some communities retained the old custom of reciting the blessing of shehecheyanu during the daytime. 

Why in the time of the Talmud was it decided to read the Megillah twice? (Note this question still exists even if one wants to claim that initially the Megillah was read twice.)  My guess is that this extra reading was instituted because of the practice of getting drunk on Purim. 

The Talmud (Megillah 7b) quotes Rava that a person is to become so intoxicated on Purim that he cannot tell the difference between the good Mordechai and the evil Haman.   The Talmud then relates an incident where Rabbah and R. Zeira had a Purim meal together and Rabbah was so drunk that he killed R. Zeira.  However, a miracle happened the next day and R. Zeira came back to life.  The next year, Rabbah again invited R. Zeira to have a Purim meal together, but R. Zeira declined since he said that miracles do not happen all the time. While clearly the story cannot be understood literally as R. Zeira was not resurrected, what is the message of this story? 

R. Yosef Karo (1488-1573, Beit Yosef 695) quotes the Ran who quotes Rabbenu Efrayim that the point of the story of Rabbah and R. Zeira is to show that it is wrong to get drunk on Purim.  The Bach (1561-1640, Krakow, 695) adds that this lesson is why the story is quoted immediately after the statement of Rava that a person should get drunk.  

Other people (Zevin, 1956, p.203, quotes the Eshkol and the Prei Hadash) argue that the story of Rabbah and R. Zeira shows that people are supposed to get drunk.  The logic is that if it was wrong to drink, then R. Zeira should have told Rabbah not to drink and then they could have their meal together without R. Zeira worrying that Rabbah would get drunk and kill him again.   This counter-argument is not compelling.  Clearly the practice of many people on Purim was to drink as indicated by Rava's statement and Rabbah's behavior, but the question is why were they drinking? Were they drinking because of a religions obligation or because this was the common practice to drink on Purim?  If a person believes that it is wrong to drink on Purim, then he views the drinking as having no religious value and is simply part of the general culture of the people.  It is very hard to stop people from doing something which they have grown up with as part of the general culture. Had R. Zeira told Rabbah not to drink, would Rabbah have listened to him?  R. Zeira thought no since the culture was so strong to get drunk, and hence he declined the invitation to dine together a second time.  (In my own life, I have seen that pointing out to people not to do something which is ingrained in their psyche is hopeless.) 

The net result is that my understanding of the Talmud is like Rabbenu Efrayim and the Bach that the editors of tractate Megillah (Ravina and Rav Ashi?) viewed getting drunk as being horrible since it leads to terrible actions, and they made this point through the story of Rabbah and R. Zeira.  Yet, one cannot deny that in the times of the Talmud people did get drunk on Purim, and this practice suggests two reasons why it was instituted to read the Megillah at night. 

The first reason is that if the Megillah is only read during the daytime, then a person who gets drunk at night will not hear the reading in the morning.  Thus, it was decided that it is better to at least read the Megillah at night than for it not to be read at all.  It is true that the laws of drinking are always recorded within the laws of the meal of Purim and the meal is only during the day, but I have seen many times that people get drunk at night.  Zevin (1956, p.205) quotes a piyyut in Machzor Vitry that reflects the massive drinking on the night of Purim, and refers to the night as the night of drunkenness.

A second reason for reading the Megillah at night is that the reading gives a religious framework to the drinking at night. This is especially important in reference to the drinking on Purim since it is not clear why it was the common practice to drink on Purim.  It is very possible that this practice derives from the pagan festival of Dionysia.  If there was no reading at night, then people would be drinking and celebrating but there would be no apparent religious basis for their actions.  Thus, it was decided to read the Megillah at night, and then it can be claimed that the drinking is part of the celebration of Purim.                                      

Monday, January 21, 2013

Shemt 20:3 (Yitro) - The prohibition of idolatry in the Decalogue: Forces and gods

Shemot 20:3 records that G-d said "You are not to have other gods al panai."  The Abravanel (1997, p. 318) understands the verse as an introduction to the following laws, 20:4,5. However, the Rambam's understanding, which I believe today is considered the traditional approach, is that the verse is a separate prohibition from 20:4,5. According to the Rambam (Mishnah Torah, Basic principles of the Torah 1:6), "whoever permits the thought to enter his mind that there is another deity besides G-d, violates the prohibition of 20:3," (translation from Twersky, 1972, p. 44).

What do the last two words of the verse, al panai, mean? N. Leibowitz (1976a, pp. 316-319) reviews three different ways the phrase has been understood. 

One, (see Rashi and Fox 1995, p. 369) the phrase signifies G-d's presence. This would seem to limit the prohibition of believing in other gods to only being in G-d's presence (see Seforno?), and then this would be a partial recognition of the other gods. However, she notes "of course this is not so since He is omnipresent in both time and space." Yet, what then is the point of this phrase? Rashi quoting the Mechilta suggests that one might have thought that the prohibition was only applicable for the generation who left Egypt, but once the phrase al panai is added, which signifies G-d's presence, which is forever, then we know that the prohibition is binding on all generations. This is a difficult drasha since why would one have thought that the prohibition was only for the generation who left Egypt? And, if the point of the phrase is to teach that the prohibition is forever, it would have been simpler to say that directly.

A second approach to understanding the phrase al panai is that the phrase means "besides Me." (N. Leibowitz quotes this in the name of the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, and this understanding appears in the translations by JPS, Sarna, 1991, p. 109 and Alter 2004, p. 428). With this understanding, it is also unclear what is the need for phrase since the verse could have just said "You are not to have other gods" without the phrase "Besides me."

A third approach is from Luzzatto that the phrase al panai refers to G-d being angry, and the phrase is a warning to the people that if they worship other gods then this will make G-d angry. With this understanding, the phrase al panai has a similar message to the end of 20:5.

My guess is that phrase "al panai" means that one is not to believe that other gods are equal to G-d. With this understanding, 20:3 does not prohibit the belief in other gods, as argued by the Rambam (above), but it prohibits one from believing that they are equal to G-d. 

The idea that other gods exist but that they are inferior to G-d occurs repeatedly in the Torah. For instance, Yitro states "now I know that G-d is greater than all the other gods" Shemot 18:11. In the song by the Sea, Shemot 15:11 records that Moshe said (and we recite the verse three times in our daily prayers) "who is like You amongst the gods? (Alter, 2004, p. 400 on Shemot 15:11 writes the Torah "had no difficulty in conceding the existence of other deities, though always stipulating their absolute inferiority to the God of Israel.") Avraham in his conversation with Malki-Tzedek, refers to G-d as the highest god (Bereshit 14:22, and this verse is included in the first blessing of the shemoneh esrei), which signals an acceptance of other gods but G-d is greater than them. The acceptance of the existence of other gods also appears in Shemot 12:12, Shemot 18:11, Shemot 22:19, Bemidbar 33:4, Devarim 3:24, Devarim 10:17 (also recited in the first blessing of the shemoneh esrei), Devarim 13:8, and Devarim 29:25. In Devarim 32:12 the words "there was no god with Him" implies that there are other gods since the verse could have simply said "there are no other gods."  (Is the term Azazel in Vayikra 16:8,10 another example?  Another example in our prayers is by ein ke-elohanu.)

Devarim 4:35 (also Devarim 4:39) records that there is no other besides G-d, which might be interpreted to mean that one cannot conceive of the existence of other gods. However, the explanation of the verse is that there are no other gods like G-d since even if one believes in other gods, one must recognize that they are inferior to G-d. (Even the Rambam, Basic principles of the Torah 1:4, explains the verse that it means that there is no being like G-d, see Twersky, 1972, p. 44.) With this understanding, these verses do not repudiate the existence of other gods, and they accord with all the verses quoted above and our understanding of Shemot 20:3.

Of course, just because the Torah allows one to believe that other gods exist does not mean that they exist, only that one is not prohibited from thinking this way. Also, even if one thinks they exist, still these other gods cannot be worshipped in any way, Shemot 20:4,5; 34:14, and it is forbidden to mention their names, Shemot 23:13, since this might lead one to worshipping them.

Why was the Torah written from the point of view that there are other gods who are inferior to G-d? A possible answer is from the Rambam's (Moreh 3:32) explanation for why the Torah includes sacrifices, that the people of the generation who received the Torah could not conceive of a religion without sacrifices. Similarly, G-d could not have commanded the people not to believe in other gods since in those days the existence of all gods was an accepted fact. This seems to be the idea behind G-d's statement to Moshe by the sin of the golden calf, that the people are stiff or hard necked, Shemot 32:9. Luzzatto (on 32:9) explains that G-d was saying to Moshe that the people were attached to making and worshipping idols, and that the people were too stubborn to change their practice. Instead, the goal was to minimize this belief by demanding that the people accept that G-d was superior to these other gods and by forbidding worship these other gods, a lesson that was not learnt by the sin of the golden calf.

I discussed this idea in my synagogue, and a friend Harold Davies suggested another or complimentary reason. He suggested that it is natural for some people (even in modern times) to believe in forces in the world, and hence G-d did not prohibit these beliefs as long as people do not worship these forces and think they are equal to G-d. This idea relates to the further question what does it mean other gods? G-d is the supreme force who controls the world, and exists for eternity, while these other gods are supernatural forces that people believe in such as demons, angels, and fairies (tooth?).

Possibly then the understanding to all these reference to other gods in the Torah just boils down to semantics. If one calls then gods, as the Torah does, then it is permissible to acknowledge their existence, provided that it is understood that they are inferior to G-d and not worshipped. On the other hand, if people want to label them as "forces," which immediately makes them inferior to G-d, then it is forbidden to acknowledge other gods since with this approach all gods are considered equal. Presumably those people who believe in angels and do not believe in the existence of other gods (following the Rambam's interpretation of the 20:3) follow this second approach.

In conclusion, in the Torah and in our prayers, we clearly refer to the existence of other gods. If this understanding bothers a person, then he/ she can label all the references to other gods as forces. However, the crucial point is that Shemot 20:3 does not prohibit people from believing in other gods or forces if they want to, just that they cannot think that they are equal to G-d, and Shemot 20:4,5 prohibits them from being worshipped.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (1437-1508), 1997, Commentary on Shemot. 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev.

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1991, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Tigay, Jeffrey H., 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Twersky, Isadore, 1972, A Maimonides reader, New York: Behrman House.