Bemidbar 10:34 record (adaptation of Fox, 1995, translation), “Now the cloud of G-d is over them by day, as they march from the camp.”
This passage raises at least two questions. 10:34 implies that the cloud of G-d traveled above the aron to lead the people. Why were both the aron and the cloud necessary? Two, where was the cloud when the people marched? 9:15,16 record that the cloud floated above the Holy of Holies in the mishkan (Ramban on 9:15), and apparently the cloud was always on top of the Holy of Holies. Furthermore, 10:21 records that the mishkan was located in the middle of the people when they traveled, and then the cloud would be in the middle of the people. However, 9:17 records that when the cloud lifted up this was the signal to the people that they should march, and when the cloud “settled,” then this signaled to the people where they should camp. Also, 10:34 records that the cloud traveled with the aron leading the way. Thus, these verses imply that the cloud was in front of the people when the people marched.
Starting with the latter question, if we think of the cloud of G-d as literally a cloud, then it was able to expand and contract. Even though the cloud of G-d probably was in a form of a pillar still it functioned as a usual cloud whose elements can join together and split up. The cloud could have expanded to cover both the camp of the people, and the marching of the aron. This might have occurred in two ways. One, a small section of the cloud could have broken off to lead and cover the aron, while the main cloud remained on top of the camp of the people. When the people would join up with the Yehoshua and the aron (see above), then the small cloud would also re-join the main cloud. Two, the cloud over the people could have expanded to include a path to lead the way (see Rashi on 9:18) and cover Yehoshua and the aron, and then as the people traveled towards the aron, the path would contract. With either approach, the cloud was always over both the aron marching before the people and the people, as stated in 10:34. It is also possible that the cloud that split or extended out could have been in front of both the aron that was leading the way and of the people.
With regard to the first question, why was there a need for both the aron and the cloud to lead the way? The cloud showed that G-d was leading the way as indicted in 9:18 (also see Shemot 23:20 and 33:2), but even when G-d performs miracles, still mankind must attempt to contribute what he can. The aron with Yehoshua and his men marching before the people, follows a typical pattern of armies, that a scouting party goes ahead to lead the way. This was the people’s role in their journey, but ultimately it was the cloud that directed the people when and where to march and camp.
The idea that the cloud of G-d split up can explain the relationship between the verses 10:12 and 12:16. 10:12 records that the people left Mount Sinai, and the cloud camped in the desert of Paran. (It seems that the desert of Paran was in the northeastern part of the Sinai desert and/ or in the western part of the Negev desert.) Afterwards, 11:3 records that people camped in Taverah, which was re-named Kivrot ha-Taavah, 11:34. 11:35 then records that the people went to Hatzeirot, and from Hatzeirot they went to the desert of Paran, 12:16. How could it be that the people only made it to the desert of Paran in 12:16 when 10:12 already records that they reached the desert of Paran?
Ibn Ezra (on 10:33, also see Hizkuni on 10:12) explains that Taverah, Kivrot ha-Taavah and Hatzeirot were located in the desert of Paran. Yet, if this is true, why would 12:16 state that the people camped in the desert of Paran after leaving Hatzeirot, if Hatzeirot was part of the desert of Paran? Could it be that initially they camped in known locations in the desert of Paran, and afterwards they camped in a non-descript part of the desert, so it was just called the desert of Paran?
Ibn Ezra (on 12:16) quotes a different answer in the name of the many that initially only the cloud of G-d was already in the desert of Paran. This approach accords with a literal reading of 10:12. 10:12 states that the people started to travel away from Mount Sinai, but the verse does not record that the people reached the desert of Paran, only that the cloud settled by the desert of Paran. Ibn Ezra dismisses this answer without giving a reason, but I think it accords with the idea of the splitting and re-joining ability of the cloud of G-d.
The idea would be that when the people started to move as recorded in 10:12, the cloud of G-d went ahead of them to lead the way but only the cloud immediately reached the desert of Paran. Again, this does not mean the entire cloud reached the desert of Paran. Only a part of the cloud of G-d reached the desert, as the main part of the cloud was on top of the Holy of Holies in the middle of the people. The aron followed the path of the cloud of G-d marching in the direction of the desert of Paran, and the people followed the aron. On the way, the aron and the people stopped in Taverah, Kivrot ha-Taavah and Hatzeirot. Thus, the people only reached the desert of Paran after being in Hatzeirot, which was not part of the desert of Paran, as recorded in 12:16. When the people finally reached the desert of Paran, the two parts of the cloud of G-d were re-united.
Hello. The goal of this blog is to enhance our understanding of the Torah and the practice of Judaism. The discussions in the blog are a portion of a more extensive commentary on the Torah, which I will be happy to send to you. You can contact me at ajayschein@gmail.com. Please feel free to send comments. Also, if you want to receive an email with a link to the new posts, send me a request, and I will add you to the email group. Best wishes, Andrew Schein
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Vayikra 25:4-22: Some economic implications of the laws of shemitta and yovel
Vayikra 25:4-18 records the laws of the special years, shemitta and yovel, where people were forbidden from working the lands to grow grains and wine and the land returned to is original owners in the yovel year. Regardless of the rationale for the laws, what are the economic implications of the laws?
With regard to the law of not working the land during the shemitta and yovel years, what would the people do during the year? Also, a more basic question is whether the lack of grains would lead to the people starving?
Vayikra 25:6 records that the people could eat the natural produce of the land that grew without being cultivated, but the question is how much food would that give? Apparently not too much, since 25:20-22 record that G-d was going to bless the people with bountiful crops in the sixth year which would hold the people over until the people could harvest the crops from the eighth year. This blessing would help landowners, but poor people who did not own lands, could have seen severe food depravation during the shemitta and yovel years. It is true that they would have greater access to the fields, but if there was limited produce, then this access would not have been helpful. In addition, if the blessing was not fulfilled, possibly since a person was not worthy of receiving this blessing, then even landowners could have faced a problem of food deprivation.
The implication of this possible food depravation is that people would go hunting and fishing during the shemitta and yovel years. In addition, instead of people raising grains in the six non-shemitta years, they might have dedicated more of their land to growing vegetables, which could be grown in the shemitta and yovel years and raising sheep and cattle. While a person had to allow some animals to enter one’s field, 25:7, there is no prohibition of killing one’s animals that were not in the fields. For example, the shemitta year did not annul the korban pesach or other animal sacrifices, which means that people killed their sheep, goats and cows during the shemitta year to celebrate various holidays. Thus, if there was a problem of not having enough food during the shemitta and yovel years, then the people would have reverted back to being hunter/ gatherers.
Even if there was enough food to survive and there was no food depravation, then still the people could have gone hunting and fishing during the year. They might also have “wasted” the year by playing games and sports. Another possibility is that the people could have spent the year on building and upgrading their homes. Another possibility is that Soss (1975, p. 338) suggests that since a person could not work in the fields during the year, this would free time which “would act to stimulate technical inventiveness and innovation.”
Are there any possible economic gains from the land resting? One, as mentioned by the Rambam (Moreh 3:39), is that the resting of the land could be considered a form of crop rotation. Would this lead an overall gain in productivity in the other six years?
Buchholz (1988) suggests that maybe the shemitta year increased the capital stock by forcing people to save in the intervening six years. However, as noted by Soss (1975) most of the savings would be for food, which would literally be eaten in the 7th year. One other consideration is that the loss of production in the seventh year would naturally have been partially offset by people working harder in the six intervening years to compensate for being unable to work in the seventh year. In fact, one could understand the verses that introduce the shemitta year as obligating a person to work in the intervening years. Thus, Shemot 23:10 and Vayikra 25:2 record, “For six years you are to sow your land,” Fox, 1995 translation. (Note this idea could also apply to the Shabbat that a person is supposed to work for six days, see Shemot 20:9 and Devarim 5:19, and Avot de-Rav Natan, 11:1.) Furthermore, as mentioned above, the prohibition of the shemitta year would likely induce people to enter fields least effected by shemitta, such as tending sheep or cattle, crafts, or services instead of farming. Would these activities lead overall to increases in production in the economy?
The return of the ancestral land in the yovel year has more potential gains than the law of not working the fields in the shemitta and yovel years, though again these gains are not obvious. When the people would return to their ancestral fields this would decrease the inequality in society since each person would have the opportunity to start over again and there would be an increase of the assets of the poor people. However, if there was some particularly valuable land, then one family would own this land for perpetuity which can make them permanently wealthy. Also, over time normal demographic changes would nullify the initial attempt at equality when the land was divided in the time of Yehoshua. People from larger families would have less land than people from smaller families since their fixed share would be divided between more people. Furthermore, over time some families die out, and the land would be inherited by close relatives who would end up with “double” plots. (I heard this last point from Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, in a discussion with him in 2000.) Thus, the equality of the division of the land was just a starting point that people started from the same point, but there was no guarantee of future equality, and the return of the land would not necessarily increase equality.
There are definite losses in the efficiency of the economy from the return of the land in the yovel year since there is less incentive for a buyer to develop the land in the intervening 49 years. Buchholz (1988, p. 422) also argues that the subdivision of plots “limits the ability to exploit economies of scale” by the farming. Yet, unless there are large transaction costs, this problem could be surmounted since adjacent farmers could work together to attain economies of scale.
On the other hand, there are some potential gains in efficiency from the return of the land. While one generation might have worked hard to become wealthy and accumulate large tracts of land, the continued possession of the land by future generations if there were no laws of yovel, could have reduced the level of competition and efficiency in the economy. The inheritors of the land might tend to “satisfice” as opposed to maximizing the value of the fields. Instead, the redistribution of the land means that the descendants of the previous large landowners would have to re-earn their wealth, and the people who returned to their ancestral land would have resources that would enable them to compete. Accordingly, by the return of the land in the yovel year, it is possible that there would be economic benefits to the economy, but the potential gains or losses in equality and in efficiency from the law cannot be known unless one actually can measure a real-life case of the land periodically returning to its original owners. (I think these possibilities are similar in some ways to arguments about inheritance taxes if they lead to more or less efficiency and equality in an economy.)
Vayikra 25:6 records that the people could eat the natural produce of the land that grew without being cultivated, but the question is how much food would that give? Apparently not too much, since 25:20-22 record that G-d was going to bless the people with bountiful crops in the sixth year which would hold the people over until the people could harvest the crops from the eighth year. This blessing would help landowners, but poor people who did not own lands, could have seen severe food depravation during the shemitta and yovel years. It is true that they would have greater access to the fields, but if there was limited produce, then this access would not have been helpful. In addition, if the blessing was not fulfilled, possibly since a person was not worthy of receiving this blessing, then even landowners could have faced a problem of food deprivation.
The implication of this possible food depravation is that people would go hunting and fishing during the shemitta and yovel years. In addition, instead of people raising grains in the six non-shemitta years, they might have dedicated more of their land to growing vegetables, which could be grown in the shemitta and yovel years and raising sheep and cattle. While a person had to allow some animals to enter one’s field, 25:7, there is no prohibition of killing one’s animals that were not in the fields. For example, the shemitta year did not annul the korban pesach or other animal sacrifices, which means that people killed their sheep, goats and cows during the shemitta year to celebrate various holidays. Thus, if there was a problem of not having enough food during the shemitta and yovel years, then the people would have reverted back to being hunter/ gatherers.
Even if there was enough food to survive and there was no food depravation, then still the people could have gone hunting and fishing during the year. They might also have “wasted” the year by playing games and sports. Another possibility is that the people could have spent the year on building and upgrading their homes. Another possibility is that Soss (1975, p. 338) suggests that since a person could not work in the fields during the year, this would free time which “would act to stimulate technical inventiveness and innovation.”
Are there any possible economic gains from the land resting? One, as mentioned by the Rambam (Moreh 3:39), is that the resting of the land could be considered a form of crop rotation. Would this lead an overall gain in productivity in the other six years?
Buchholz (1988) suggests that maybe the shemitta year increased the capital stock by forcing people to save in the intervening six years. However, as noted by Soss (1975) most of the savings would be for food, which would literally be eaten in the 7th year. One other consideration is that the loss of production in the seventh year would naturally have been partially offset by people working harder in the six intervening years to compensate for being unable to work in the seventh year. In fact, one could understand the verses that introduce the shemitta year as obligating a person to work in the intervening years. Thus, Shemot 23:10 and Vayikra 25:2 record, “For six years you are to sow your land,” Fox, 1995 translation. (Note this idea could also apply to the Shabbat that a person is supposed to work for six days, see Shemot 20:9 and Devarim 5:19, and Avot de-Rav Natan, 11:1.) Furthermore, as mentioned above, the prohibition of the shemitta year would likely induce people to enter fields least effected by shemitta, such as tending sheep or cattle, crafts, or services instead of farming. Would these activities lead overall to increases in production in the economy?
The return of the ancestral land in the yovel year has more potential gains than the law of not working the fields in the shemitta and yovel years, though again these gains are not obvious. When the people would return to their ancestral fields this would decrease the inequality in society since each person would have the opportunity to start over again and there would be an increase of the assets of the poor people. However, if there was some particularly valuable land, then one family would own this land for perpetuity which can make them permanently wealthy. Also, over time normal demographic changes would nullify the initial attempt at equality when the land was divided in the time of Yehoshua. People from larger families would have less land than people from smaller families since their fixed share would be divided between more people. Furthermore, over time some families die out, and the land would be inherited by close relatives who would end up with “double” plots. (I heard this last point from Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, in a discussion with him in 2000.) Thus, the equality of the division of the land was just a starting point that people started from the same point, but there was no guarantee of future equality, and the return of the land would not necessarily increase equality.
There are definite losses in the efficiency of the economy from the return of the land in the yovel year since there is less incentive for a buyer to develop the land in the intervening 49 years. Buchholz (1988, p. 422) also argues that the subdivision of plots “limits the ability to exploit economies of scale” by the farming. Yet, unless there are large transaction costs, this problem could be surmounted since adjacent farmers could work together to attain economies of scale.
On the other hand, there are some potential gains in efficiency from the return of the land. While one generation might have worked hard to become wealthy and accumulate large tracts of land, the continued possession of the land by future generations if there were no laws of yovel, could have reduced the level of competition and efficiency in the economy. The inheritors of the land might tend to “satisfice” as opposed to maximizing the value of the fields. Instead, the redistribution of the land means that the descendants of the previous large landowners would have to re-earn their wealth, and the people who returned to their ancestral land would have resources that would enable them to compete. Accordingly, by the return of the land in the yovel year, it is possible that there would be economic benefits to the economy, but the potential gains or losses in equality and in efficiency from the law cannot be known unless one actually can measure a real-life case of the land periodically returning to its original owners. (I think these possibilities are similar in some ways to arguments about inheritance taxes if they lead to more or less efficiency and equality in an economy.)
Bibliography:
Buchholz, Todd, 1988, “Biblical Laws and the Economic Growth of Ancient Israel,” Journal of Law and Religion, 6:2, pp. 389-427.
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Soss, N., 1975, Old Testament Laws and Economic Society, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34, pp. 323-344.
Buchholz, Todd, 1988, “Biblical Laws and the Economic Growth of Ancient Israel,” Journal of Law and Religion, 6:2, pp. 389-427.
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Soss, N., 1975, Old Testament Laws and Economic Society, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34, pp. 323-344.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Vayikra 19:11,12 – The prohibition of lying in the Torah
Vayikra 19:11,12 record, "You shall not steal, you shall not deal falsely (lo tichahashu) or lie (ve-lo tishakroo). You shall not swear falsely (le-shaker)…." What is the difference between dealing falsely and lying?
The Rashbam and Ibn Ezra (on 19:11) explain that dealing falsely means denying that you have money that was given to you and the Rashbam quotes as a proof 5:22 which also has the phrase not to deal falsely (ve-kichesh) in reference to a pledge. Ibn Ezra adds that dealing falsely is also when somebody knows some information but does not testify.
With regard to lying, the Rashbam writes that it refers to lying about a loan, while the Ibn Ezra writes that the lying refers to making a false claim for money. These commentators seem to be explaining that the difference between dealing falsely and lying is whether the case concerns a pledge or a loan. This is a difficult distinction since the verse does not refer to different items but to different prohibitions.
This same term for dealing falsely also appears by Sara when she was accused of laughing and she denied laughing, va-tichachesh, Bereshit 18:15. Similarly, the case in Vayikra 5:21 is when a person denies having a pledge.
The Rashbam and Ibn Ezra (on 19:11) explain that dealing falsely means denying that you have money that was given to you and the Rashbam quotes as a proof 5:22 which also has the phrase not to deal falsely (ve-kichesh) in reference to a pledge. Ibn Ezra adds that dealing falsely is also when somebody knows some information but does not testify.
With regard to lying, the Rashbam writes that it refers to lying about a loan, while the Ibn Ezra writes that the lying refers to making a false claim for money. These commentators seem to be explaining that the difference between dealing falsely and lying is whether the case concerns a pledge or a loan. This is a difficult distinction since the verse does not refer to different items but to different prohibitions.
This same term for dealing falsely also appears by Sara when she was accused of laughing and she denied laughing, va-tichachesh, Bereshit 18:15. Similarly, the case in Vayikra 5:21 is when a person denies having a pledge.
I would suggest that the prohibition in 19:11 of dealing falsely is passive lying, that a person is falsely denying an accusation, while the prohibition of lying is active lying, to fabricate something that never happened or is not true.
Rashi (on 19:11) quotes from Torah Cohanim, that the prohibitions recorded in 19:11,12 form a sequence of events: if one steals, then this will lead one to deal falsely, then to lie and then to swear falsely. In our discussion on Vayikra 5:21,22, “False claims, gezel and genevah,” I propose that genevah was where one stole an item and could not claim ownership of the item, as opposed to gezelah where one stole an item and also falsely claimed ownership of the item. Following this idea, maybe one could understand the sequence of prohibitions in 19:11,12 in the following manner. First one steals and as he/ she cannot claim ownership of the item, then one "deals falsely" that he/ she denies that he/ she stole the item. Afterwards he/ she lies by fabricating a story to show that he/ she could not have stolen the item, a false alibi, and then finally he/ she swears to "prove" that he/ she did not steal the item.
Rashi (on 19:11) quotes from Torah Cohanim, that the prohibitions recorded in 19:11,12 form a sequence of events: if one steals, then this will lead one to deal falsely, then to lie and then to swear falsely. In our discussion on Vayikra 5:21,22, “False claims, gezel and genevah,” I propose that genevah was where one stole an item and could not claim ownership of the item, as opposed to gezelah where one stole an item and also falsely claimed ownership of the item. Following this idea, maybe one could understand the sequence of prohibitions in 19:11,12 in the following manner. First one steals and as he/ she cannot claim ownership of the item, then one "deals falsely" that he/ she denies that he/ she stole the item. Afterwards he/ she lies by fabricating a story to show that he/ she could not have stolen the item, a false alibi, and then finally he/ she swears to "prove" that he/ she did not steal the item.
Vayikra 19:16 – The prohibition of lo telekh rakhil
ויקרא יט:טז - לא תלך רכיל בעמיך ולא תעמוד על דם רעך אני ה'.
The standard translation of the word rakhil is talebearer, that a person should not be a talebearer, but this is a difficult translation. Rashi (on 19:16, also see Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon and Hoffmann) bases this translation on the word spying. Rashi argues that one changes the letter kf to a gimil, and then the phrase becomes not to spy. Yet, changing letters is a difficult approach. Rashi also quotes, as does the Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Ramban, that the word rakhil is from rokhel which means a merchant. Yet, not only are these two separate words, but also there is no obvious connection between merchants and talebearing. Finally, what is the connection between this prohibition and the following prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow? Ibn Ezra, Bekhor Shor and Rambam (Laws of opinions, 7:1) explain that people have died due to talebearing, yet this is quite a stretch.
It seems to me that Jeremiah 9:3 offers an explanation for the word rakhil. The verse records that a person should be careful of other people/ and one should not trust one's brother/ because brothers act with guile/ and other people go with rakhil. The parallelism of the verse suggests that the definition of rakhil is guile. Furthermore, from Jeremiah 6:28 and Ezekiel 22:9 we see that rakhil is not referring to some innocent pranks but deceit that leads to murder. Accordingly, 19:16 prohibits one from being maliciously deceitful and devious.
How does this prohibition relate to the prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow, the following phrase in the verse? Levine (1989, p.129) notes that this phrase "do not stand over the blood of your fellow" has been explained in three ways. One (see Rashi), is not to be inactive when another person's life is in danger, two, is not to conspire against others, and three, is not to "pursue one's livelihood in a manner that endangers another or at the expense of another's well-being." Levine likes the third approach since it "best fits the immediate context" which I understand to mean the approach that rakhil refers to a merchant. Yet, as pointed out above rakhil has nothing to do with being a merchant. The third approach does not fit into the context at all, and seems to be based on some anti-capitalist feelings. Levine notes that the second approach has support in several biblical verses and is the Ibn Ezra's explanation that "one should not join forces with murderers." I prefer the second approach and it accords with the suggestion above concerning rakhil. 19:16 would then mean that one is not to go about being maliciously deceitful and one should not join other people (gangs) who act in such a manner even if one does not participate (just stands around) in their evil acts.
It seems to me that Jeremiah 9:3 offers an explanation for the word rakhil. The verse records that a person should be careful of other people/ and one should not trust one's brother/ because brothers act with guile/ and other people go with rakhil. The parallelism of the verse suggests that the definition of rakhil is guile. Furthermore, from Jeremiah 6:28 and Ezekiel 22:9 we see that rakhil is not referring to some innocent pranks but deceit that leads to murder. Accordingly, 19:16 prohibits one from being maliciously deceitful and devious.
How does this prohibition relate to the prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow, the following phrase in the verse? Levine (1989, p.129) notes that this phrase "do not stand over the blood of your fellow" has been explained in three ways. One (see Rashi), is not to be inactive when another person's life is in danger, two, is not to conspire against others, and three, is not to "pursue one's livelihood in a manner that endangers another or at the expense of another's well-being." Levine likes the third approach since it "best fits the immediate context" which I understand to mean the approach that rakhil refers to a merchant. Yet, as pointed out above rakhil has nothing to do with being a merchant. The third approach does not fit into the context at all, and seems to be based on some anti-capitalist feelings. Levine notes that the second approach has support in several biblical verses and is the Ibn Ezra's explanation that "one should not join forces with murderers." I prefer the second approach and it accords with the suggestion above concerning rakhil. 19:16 would then mean that one is not to go about being maliciously deceitful and one should not join other people (gangs) who act in such a manner even if one does not participate (just stands around) in their evil acts.
Bibliography:
Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Vayikra 10:1,2 – The deaths of Nadav and Avihu
Vayikra 10:1,2 record, “Now, Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, took each-man his pan, and placing coals in them, put smoking-incense on it, and brought near, before the presence of G-d, foreign fire, such as he had not commanded them. And the fire went out from the presence of G-d and consumed them, so they died, before the presence of G-d” (adaptation of Fox’s 1995 translation). It seems clear that Nadav and Avihu died because they did what they were not commanded, but what were they trying to do? Numerous theories have been offered to explain their sin. We will review some of them and then offer our own.
Rashbam (on 10:1) suggests that Nadav and Avihu wanted to offer the incense sacrifice since they thought the regular daily law of offering incense was part of the ritual of the eighth day ceremony and they entered into the mishkan/ ohel moed proper to offer the incense even before the fire devoured the sacrifices. Their mistake according to the Rashbam was that on the special day (the eighth day), the fire for the sacrifices was to come from G-d and not from a regular human fire. This approach is problematic since not only does the Rashbam argue that Nadav and Avihu were killed prior to the fire devouring the sacrifices which contradicts the order of the Torah, but also as pointed out by David Tzvi Hoffmann (1953) and Shmuel David Luzzatto, they could not have been following the regular law of incense offering since that offering was brought by one priest and not two.
Seforno (on 10:1) proposes that Nadav and Avihu were acting based on the special character of the day. They thought that it was appropriate to offer an incense offering after the fire devoured the special sacrifices of the eighth day, and they were killed when attempting to offer this incense offering on the inner altar in the mishkan/ ohel moed proper. According to Seforno, Nadav and Avihu sinned by making this decision to add an incense offering without consulting Moshe. This approach is also difficult because the Torah records that the problem was that their fire was not commanded by G-d and not that the incense offering was not commanded.
Hoffmann (1953, p. 204) writes that Nadav and Avihu wanted to bring the incense offering to show their happiness about the appearance of the fire devouring the sacrifices. He claims that with their pans they brought the incense into the Holy of Holies, like the high priest does on Yom Kippur, though at this point this type of sacrifice had not yet been commanded. Hoffmann explains that while the Torah refers to their foreign fire, this really mean a sacrifice of fire that had not been commanded.
This idea that Nadav and Avihu went into the Holy of Holies is very popular, and it is claimed that 16:1, which refers to Nadav and Avihu’s sin in connection with the command to Aharon to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, supports this understanding. Yet, one can understand that in 16:1 the reference to Nadav and Avihu’s sin was to remind Aharon to follow G-d’s command exactly as he was commanded unlike Nadav and Avihu, and does not imply that Nadav and Avihu entered the Holy of Holies. Or, as pointed out by the Ramban (on 16:1), the reference to Nadav and Avihu in 16:1 could be to inform us that the laws regarding Yom Kippur were taught to Moshe immediately after the deaths of Nadav and Avihu. Independent of 16:1, there is no reason to think that Nadav and Avihu would have thought to enter the Holy of Holies on the ceremony of the eighth day since the ceremony of the eighth day was focused on the outer altar which was situated in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed. Thus, it is more likely that they died in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed in front of the special building of the mishkan/ ohel moed (the word kadosh in 10:4).
In order to understand the sin and deaths of Nadav and Avihu we have to connect their actions to 9:24. 9:24 records that a fire went out from the glory of G-d and consumed the sacrifices that were offered as part of the ceremony of the eighth day. After this fire appeared, Nadav and Avihu took their pans, and were walking around the outer altar with their incense offering. It could be that they did this out of joy (Hoffmann) or they thought it was appropriate to have an incense offering at that time (Seforno), but this was not commanded. The gravity of their sin was not the incense offering but the fire used to create the incense offering, the eish zarah, foreign fire, 10:1. The point of the ceremony of the eighth day was that G-d had sanctified the outer altar by sending a fire to devour the sacrifices, and now Nadav and Avihu were walking around the outer altar with a regular human fire. Their fire, which was not commanded by G-d, weakened the boundary between G-d and man since both the human fire and G-d’s fire were spatially co-existent, see our discussion on Shemot 19:12, 21-25, "Establishing boundaries I" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/02/shemot-2019-23-yitro-establishing.html. Nadab and Avihu were then killed by another fire that went out from the glory of G-d.
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Rashbam (on 10:1) suggests that Nadav and Avihu wanted to offer the incense sacrifice since they thought the regular daily law of offering incense was part of the ritual of the eighth day ceremony and they entered into the mishkan/ ohel moed proper to offer the incense even before the fire devoured the sacrifices. Their mistake according to the Rashbam was that on the special day (the eighth day), the fire for the sacrifices was to come from G-d and not from a regular human fire. This approach is problematic since not only does the Rashbam argue that Nadav and Avihu were killed prior to the fire devouring the sacrifices which contradicts the order of the Torah, but also as pointed out by David Tzvi Hoffmann (1953) and Shmuel David Luzzatto, they could not have been following the regular law of incense offering since that offering was brought by one priest and not two.
Seforno (on 10:1) proposes that Nadav and Avihu were acting based on the special character of the day. They thought that it was appropriate to offer an incense offering after the fire devoured the special sacrifices of the eighth day, and they were killed when attempting to offer this incense offering on the inner altar in the mishkan/ ohel moed proper. According to Seforno, Nadav and Avihu sinned by making this decision to add an incense offering without consulting Moshe. This approach is also difficult because the Torah records that the problem was that their fire was not commanded by G-d and not that the incense offering was not commanded.
Hoffmann (1953, p. 204) writes that Nadav and Avihu wanted to bring the incense offering to show their happiness about the appearance of the fire devouring the sacrifices. He claims that with their pans they brought the incense into the Holy of Holies, like the high priest does on Yom Kippur, though at this point this type of sacrifice had not yet been commanded. Hoffmann explains that while the Torah refers to their foreign fire, this really mean a sacrifice of fire that had not been commanded.
This idea that Nadav and Avihu went into the Holy of Holies is very popular, and it is claimed that 16:1, which refers to Nadav and Avihu’s sin in connection with the command to Aharon to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, supports this understanding. Yet, one can understand that in 16:1 the reference to Nadav and Avihu’s sin was to remind Aharon to follow G-d’s command exactly as he was commanded unlike Nadav and Avihu, and does not imply that Nadav and Avihu entered the Holy of Holies. Or, as pointed out by the Ramban (on 16:1), the reference to Nadav and Avihu in 16:1 could be to inform us that the laws regarding Yom Kippur were taught to Moshe immediately after the deaths of Nadav and Avihu. Independent of 16:1, there is no reason to think that Nadav and Avihu would have thought to enter the Holy of Holies on the ceremony of the eighth day since the ceremony of the eighth day was focused on the outer altar which was situated in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed. Thus, it is more likely that they died in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed in front of the special building of the mishkan/ ohel moed (the word kadosh in 10:4).
In order to understand the sin and deaths of Nadav and Avihu we have to connect their actions to 9:24. 9:24 records that a fire went out from the glory of G-d and consumed the sacrifices that were offered as part of the ceremony of the eighth day. After this fire appeared, Nadav and Avihu took their pans, and were walking around the outer altar with their incense offering. It could be that they did this out of joy (Hoffmann) or they thought it was appropriate to have an incense offering at that time (Seforno), but this was not commanded. The gravity of their sin was not the incense offering but the fire used to create the incense offering, the eish zarah, foreign fire, 10:1. The point of the ceremony of the eighth day was that G-d had sanctified the outer altar by sending a fire to devour the sacrifices, and now Nadav and Avihu were walking around the outer altar with a regular human fire. Their fire, which was not commanded by G-d, weakened the boundary between G-d and man since both the human fire and G-d’s fire were spatially co-existent, see our discussion on Shemot 19:12, 21-25, "Establishing boundaries I" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/02/shemot-2019-23-yitro-establishing.html. Nadab and Avihu were then killed by another fire that went out from the glory of G-d.
Bibliography:
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
The four sons
Within the maggid section of the Haggadah, there is a list of four sons and their questions. The wise son has the longest question, the wicked son, the second longest question, the simple son has a brief question, and the fourth son has not question at all.
The list of the four types of sons appears in slightly different versions in the Mekhilta and the Yerushalmi. The Mekhilta (Bo 18) lists the four sons in a different order with the simple son being mentioned before the evil son. The Yerushalmi (Pesachim 10:4) has more differences, as for instance it refers to the simple son as a fool, and it switches the answers for the wise and simple/ fool son. The answer to the wise son in the Haggadah is the answer to the simple/ foolish son in the Yerushalmi and vice versa. Also in the Yerushalmi the question of the wise son is, "What is the meaning of the testimonies, statues and ordinances which G-d has commanded us?" According to this version, the wise son says "commanded us" instead of "commanded you" as in our Haggadah. The different versions have given rise to much discussion as to the origin of the list of four sons.
David Tzvi Hoffmann (1843-1921, original in German, quoted in Francis below) notes that the four sons do not refer to similar characteristics, as the wise son, the foolish son and the one who cannot ask are intellectual qualities, while the evil son is a moral characterization. Hoffmann argues that the simple son is a positive moral characterization, since the simplicity indicates faith. Hoffmann further suggests that initially there were two separate traditions, one referring to intellectual abilities of three sons, and one referring to moral qualities, two sons, and the two traditions merged into our list of four sons.
This idea that initially there was a smaller group of sons has been followed by other scholars. For example, Zeitlin (1948) also suggested that initially there were three questions, but he removed the son who could not ask because there is no question. I would have thought that if one was going to have only three questions, then one would remove the question of the wise son since his question is recorded in Devarim separate from the other sons whose questions are from Shemot chapters 12 and 13, and more importantly, the wise son's question does not relate to Pesach.
Yet, as noted by Fred Francis (1972), it is more likely that there were always four types of sons, as we find in Proverbs and other wisdom literature that it was common to group people into the four types that are in the Haggadah. Similarly, Shmuel and Ze'ev Safrai (1998) point out that the four types of sons can be found in Persian and Greek literature, and a similar structure of four qualities also appears in Pirkei Avot (5:14-19).
One of the difficulties in understanding the list of four sons is how did Chazal identify the sons from the text in the Torah, as the Torah does not indicate that a specific type of son is being referred to. The identification must be from the question being asked since as noted above the answer to the wise son in the Haggadah is the identical answer to the simple/ foolish son in the Yerushalmi. Possibly, once it was a given that there were four types of sons, Chazal had to determine which of the sons best suited each question. In some cases, this was relatively easy, as the son who could not ask did not have a question, and the simple son asks a simple question "what is this?" Yet, for the wise and evil sons, it is not obvious how the questions enable one to designate one son wise and the other evil.
The wise son asks "what is the meaning of the testimonies, statues and ordinances which G-d has commanded you?" and the evil son asks "what is this service of yours?" What is the difference between these questions? N. Leibowitz (Studies in Shemot, Bo 4) reviews several answers to this question. One answer is based on the Yerushalmi, which quotes the question of the wise son as using the term "us" instead of you as in our version, and hence it has been suggested that the wise son was including himself in the question, while the evil son was excluding himself from the nation. Yet, I am not convinced by this answer as the word "you" in the Torah by the question of the evil son seems to be appropriate and if one reads the question in the Torah independent of this drasha one would not assume that the person asking the question was evil.
A different possibility is that if the designation of the types of sons was a given, as suggested by Francis, then it had to be that one question would be viewed positively and one negatively, the question was just which one. According to this idea there is nothing necessarily intrinsic to the questions that led to their identification with either son. Rather, it could be that there was some small, even relatively insignificant, factor that tipped the balance that one question was to be identified with one son, and then the other question was also determined.
My guess is that the small factor was that the question of the wise son shows more thought, as it refers to testimonies, statues and ordinances, and this small factor was enough to designate the question as being from the wise son. Once one question was determined to be the question of the wise son, then the other question was forced to be the question of the evil son and the question was understood as being a mocking question.
Once the evil son's question was viewed as mocking, then the Haggadah could not use the answer in the Torah (12:27) to the evil son's question since in the Torah there is nothing pejorative about the question which is assigned to the evil son. Instead, the Haggadah records a harsh response to the evil son's question. He is told, "To you, but not to himself; because he (the evil son) has excluded himself from the community, he denied the essential of the faith, and you must blunt his teeth, and tell him: Because of this, G-d did for us in Egypt and had you been there you would not have been redeemed." How did the evil son deny the essentials of the faith?
Safari and Safari (1998, p.123) write that he was mocking the exodus from Egypt. However, if one examines the question in the Torah, the evil son's question was not referring to the exodus from Egypt but was with regard to the korban pesach. Shemot 12:21-25 records that Moshe told the people that they were to offer the korban pesach, to put the blood from the sacrifice on the doorposts of their homes, and then they would not be harmed from the tenth plague. Moshe also told the people that in the future their children would ask what is this work, the evil son’s question, and it is clear that the term work is referring to the offering the korban pesach. Accordingly, if the evil son’s question is understood as being a mocking question, then the evil son was mocking the korban pesach. This means that he would not have offered the sacrifice, and hence he would have been killed during the tenth plague. This sacrifice was to show the Jewish people's faith in G-d and then a denial of the sacrifice showed that the person did not believe in G-d. Accordingly, his denial of the korban pesach separated him from the Jewish people.
The statement for the son who cannot ask a question is that he is told "because of this, G-d did for me when I went out of Egypt." This same phrase was used in reference to the evil son, but as argued above, with regard to the evil son, the Haggadah connected the phrase to the korban pesach. However, with regard to the son who cannot ask, it is more likely that the phrase refers to its context in the Torah. The phrase occurs after the laws of matzot and hametz (13:6,7) which are to remember that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt (12:17).
Accordingly, with regard to the son who cannot ask, the statement to him is to teach him about the exodus, the history of his people. How could this son learn about the exodus from this phrase? If the son did not even know enough to ask a question, it is hard to understand what he will learn from this statement. Maybe one can understand that the following section of the Maggid where we review the history of the exodus in detail is the real answer to the son who cannot ask. If this is true, then the four types of son are an introduction to the following section of the maggid.
The list of the four types of sons appears in slightly different versions in the Mekhilta and the Yerushalmi. The Mekhilta (Bo 18) lists the four sons in a different order with the simple son being mentioned before the evil son. The Yerushalmi (Pesachim 10:4) has more differences, as for instance it refers to the simple son as a fool, and it switches the answers for the wise and simple/ fool son. The answer to the wise son in the Haggadah is the answer to the simple/ foolish son in the Yerushalmi and vice versa. Also in the Yerushalmi the question of the wise son is, "What is the meaning of the testimonies, statues and ordinances which G-d has commanded us?" According to this version, the wise son says "commanded us" instead of "commanded you" as in our Haggadah. The different versions have given rise to much discussion as to the origin of the list of four sons.
David Tzvi Hoffmann (1843-1921, original in German, quoted in Francis below) notes that the four sons do not refer to similar characteristics, as the wise son, the foolish son and the one who cannot ask are intellectual qualities, while the evil son is a moral characterization. Hoffmann argues that the simple son is a positive moral characterization, since the simplicity indicates faith. Hoffmann further suggests that initially there were two separate traditions, one referring to intellectual abilities of three sons, and one referring to moral qualities, two sons, and the two traditions merged into our list of four sons.
This idea that initially there was a smaller group of sons has been followed by other scholars. For example, Zeitlin (1948) also suggested that initially there were three questions, but he removed the son who could not ask because there is no question. I would have thought that if one was going to have only three questions, then one would remove the question of the wise son since his question is recorded in Devarim separate from the other sons whose questions are from Shemot chapters 12 and 13, and more importantly, the wise son's question does not relate to Pesach.
Yet, as noted by Fred Francis (1972), it is more likely that there were always four types of sons, as we find in Proverbs and other wisdom literature that it was common to group people into the four types that are in the Haggadah. Similarly, Shmuel and Ze'ev Safrai (1998) point out that the four types of sons can be found in Persian and Greek literature, and a similar structure of four qualities also appears in Pirkei Avot (5:14-19).
One of the difficulties in understanding the list of four sons is how did Chazal identify the sons from the text in the Torah, as the Torah does not indicate that a specific type of son is being referred to. The identification must be from the question being asked since as noted above the answer to the wise son in the Haggadah is the identical answer to the simple/ foolish son in the Yerushalmi. Possibly, once it was a given that there were four types of sons, Chazal had to determine which of the sons best suited each question. In some cases, this was relatively easy, as the son who could not ask did not have a question, and the simple son asks a simple question "what is this?" Yet, for the wise and evil sons, it is not obvious how the questions enable one to designate one son wise and the other evil.
The wise son asks "what is the meaning of the testimonies, statues and ordinances which G-d has commanded you?" and the evil son asks "what is this service of yours?" What is the difference between these questions? N. Leibowitz (Studies in Shemot, Bo 4) reviews several answers to this question. One answer is based on the Yerushalmi, which quotes the question of the wise son as using the term "us" instead of you as in our version, and hence it has been suggested that the wise son was including himself in the question, while the evil son was excluding himself from the nation. Yet, I am not convinced by this answer as the word "you" in the Torah by the question of the evil son seems to be appropriate and if one reads the question in the Torah independent of this drasha one would not assume that the person asking the question was evil.
A different possibility is that if the designation of the types of sons was a given, as suggested by Francis, then it had to be that one question would be viewed positively and one negatively, the question was just which one. According to this idea there is nothing necessarily intrinsic to the questions that led to their identification with either son. Rather, it could be that there was some small, even relatively insignificant, factor that tipped the balance that one question was to be identified with one son, and then the other question was also determined.
My guess is that the small factor was that the question of the wise son shows more thought, as it refers to testimonies, statues and ordinances, and this small factor was enough to designate the question as being from the wise son. Once one question was determined to be the question of the wise son, then the other question was forced to be the question of the evil son and the question was understood as being a mocking question.
Once the evil son's question was viewed as mocking, then the Haggadah could not use the answer in the Torah (12:27) to the evil son's question since in the Torah there is nothing pejorative about the question which is assigned to the evil son. Instead, the Haggadah records a harsh response to the evil son's question. He is told, "To you, but not to himself; because he (the evil son) has excluded himself from the community, he denied the essential of the faith, and you must blunt his teeth, and tell him: Because of this, G-d did for us in Egypt and had you been there you would not have been redeemed." How did the evil son deny the essentials of the faith?
Safari and Safari (1998, p.123) write that he was mocking the exodus from Egypt. However, if one examines the question in the Torah, the evil son's question was not referring to the exodus from Egypt but was with regard to the korban pesach. Shemot 12:21-25 records that Moshe told the people that they were to offer the korban pesach, to put the blood from the sacrifice on the doorposts of their homes, and then they would not be harmed from the tenth plague. Moshe also told the people that in the future their children would ask what is this work, the evil son’s question, and it is clear that the term work is referring to the offering the korban pesach. Accordingly, if the evil son’s question is understood as being a mocking question, then the evil son was mocking the korban pesach. This means that he would not have offered the sacrifice, and hence he would have been killed during the tenth plague. This sacrifice was to show the Jewish people's faith in G-d and then a denial of the sacrifice showed that the person did not believe in G-d. Accordingly, his denial of the korban pesach separated him from the Jewish people.
The statement for the son who cannot ask a question is that he is told "because of this, G-d did for me when I went out of Egypt." This same phrase was used in reference to the evil son, but as argued above, with regard to the evil son, the Haggadah connected the phrase to the korban pesach. However, with regard to the son who cannot ask, it is more likely that the phrase refers to its context in the Torah. The phrase occurs after the laws of matzot and hametz (13:6,7) which are to remember that G-d took the Jewish people out of Egypt (12:17).
Accordingly, with regard to the son who cannot ask, the statement to him is to teach him about the exodus, the history of his people. How could this son learn about the exodus from this phrase? If the son did not even know enough to ask a question, it is hard to understand what he will learn from this statement. Maybe one can understand that the following section of the Maggid where we review the history of the exodus in detail is the real answer to the son who cannot ask. If this is true, then the four types of son are an introduction to the following section of the maggid.
Monday, March 22, 2010
Vayikra 7:9,10 (Tsav) – The korban minhah and the priests: Rewards and responsibility
Vayikra 7:9 records that by a baked minhah sacrifice, the priest who offered the sacrifice received the part of the sacrifice that is not placed on the altar. 7:10 then records that if the minhah was of flour and/ or oil (not baked), then the all of the priests received the part of the sacrifice that was not placed on the altar. Why does this distinction with regard to the priests exist by the two types of minhah sacrifices?
Rashi (on 7:9) quotes from the Sifra that there is no distinction between the different types of minhah sacrifices with regard to the priests, see also Mishnah Menachot 6:1. Instead, the two verses are informing us that all the priests of the family who worked that day in the mishkan/ Bet ha-Mikdash received the remains of all of the minhah sacrifices.
Rambam (Laws of performing sacrifices, 10:14,15, see also Hirsch and Or Hachayyim) notes that the law is as stated by Rashi, but questions why the Torah appears to make a difference between the minhah sacrifices that were baked and those that were just flour. He answers that since the portions of the flour minhah sacrifice that is distributed amongst the priests could be so small that they could not bake it, one might have thought that the priests would institute a system where some priests shared some of the minhah sacrifices and other priests shared other minhah sacrifices. Thus, 7:10 records that the flour minhah sacrifices are shared by all the priests to ensure that each minhah sacrifice is shared amongst all of the priests. This is a very interesting Rambam since we see that the Rambam was concerned about the difference between the simple reading of the Torah and the halakhah, but I am not sure how his rationale explains why 7:9 records that the baked minhah sacrifices go to the priest who offered the sacrifice.
Ramban (on 7:9) first writes that a reason for distinguishing between the two types of minhah sacrifices is that the baked minhah sacrifices involved more work for the officiating priest, and hence the officiating priest received all of the sacrifice as a reward for his work. However, afterwards, he notes that Chazal explained that all the minhah sacrifices go to the family that is officiating that day, and he accepted this ruling since it leads to peace amongst the priests.
The Ramban’s suggestion that the difference between the two types of minhah sacrifices was due to the work involved has been much criticized. Hoffmann (p.172) rejects this possibility since he says there is no even hint in the Torah that the priest was responsible for baking the minhah sacrifice. Chaval (1993, footnote mipnei on 7:9) quotes from the Malbim that a non-priest can bake the sacrifice and that 2:3 and 6:9 state that the minhah sacrifice goes to all of the priests, so how could it be that that only the officiating priest received the sacrifice? Chavel notes that the Panim Yafot suggested that maybe the Ramban meant that the officiating priest was to get the sacrifice since it was difficult (since it was hot?) to separate the baked minhah sacrifice when putting some of the sacrifice on the altar. However, Chaval rejects this suggestion. He writes that there were two priests, one who did the separating and one who put some of the sacrifice on the altar. I do not understand Chavel’s comment since from the Torah it seems that both jobs of separating the sacrifice and placing it on the altar were performed by one priest, but I thought maybe there is a different way to understand the distinction between the two types of minhah sacrifices.
The simple reading of the Torah is that there is a distinction between what the priests receives by the two types of minhah sacrifices. My guess is that the difference is due to the greater responsibility that is required of the priest who offers a baked minhah sacrifice. 2:11,12 records that hametz cannot be offered on the altar, and this was a real danger by the baked minhah sacrifice since it could easily have become hametz. While the priest may not have baked the minhah sacrifice, ultimately he was responsible for placing it on the altar. Thus, either as a reward for this responsibility or to make the priest more aware of this responsibility he was given the entire baked minhah sacrifice. However, this danger was not a problem by the flour minhah sacrifice, and hence the remains of the sacrifice were distributed to all the priests.
This idea might explain similar laws with regard to the officiating priest by the other sacrifices. 7:7 records that the officiating priest received the hatta’t and asham, and again it might be to ensure or reward the priest that the sacrifice was performed correctly. 7:8 records that the officiating priest received the skin of the olah sacrifice. Maybe this was to ensure that the sacrifice was done correctly and more specifically that the skin was not placed on the altar. Finally, the priest who sprinkled the blood on the altar by the todah sacrifice received a portion of the bread from the sacrifice, 7:14, as again it could be that this gift was because he was responsible to ensure that the hametz bread (7:13) that accompanied the sacrifice did not go on the altar. If this approach is correct, then it is the shelamim sacrifice that is the exception (that all the priests shared the priests portion of the shalamim sacrifice) since this was a special gift to the priests, 7:34, Shemot 29:28.
Rashi (on 7:9) quotes from the Sifra that there is no distinction between the different types of minhah sacrifices with regard to the priests, see also Mishnah Menachot 6:1. Instead, the two verses are informing us that all the priests of the family who worked that day in the mishkan/ Bet ha-Mikdash received the remains of all of the minhah sacrifices.
Rambam (Laws of performing sacrifices, 10:14,15, see also Hirsch and Or Hachayyim) notes that the law is as stated by Rashi, but questions why the Torah appears to make a difference between the minhah sacrifices that were baked and those that were just flour. He answers that since the portions of the flour minhah sacrifice that is distributed amongst the priests could be so small that they could not bake it, one might have thought that the priests would institute a system where some priests shared some of the minhah sacrifices and other priests shared other minhah sacrifices. Thus, 7:10 records that the flour minhah sacrifices are shared by all the priests to ensure that each minhah sacrifice is shared amongst all of the priests. This is a very interesting Rambam since we see that the Rambam was concerned about the difference between the simple reading of the Torah and the halakhah, but I am not sure how his rationale explains why 7:9 records that the baked minhah sacrifices go to the priest who offered the sacrifice.
Ramban (on 7:9) first writes that a reason for distinguishing between the two types of minhah sacrifices is that the baked minhah sacrifices involved more work for the officiating priest, and hence the officiating priest received all of the sacrifice as a reward for his work. However, afterwards, he notes that Chazal explained that all the minhah sacrifices go to the family that is officiating that day, and he accepted this ruling since it leads to peace amongst the priests.
The Ramban’s suggestion that the difference between the two types of minhah sacrifices was due to the work involved has been much criticized. Hoffmann (p.172) rejects this possibility since he says there is no even hint in the Torah that the priest was responsible for baking the minhah sacrifice. Chaval (1993, footnote mipnei on 7:9) quotes from the Malbim that a non-priest can bake the sacrifice and that 2:3 and 6:9 state that the minhah sacrifice goes to all of the priests, so how could it be that that only the officiating priest received the sacrifice? Chavel notes that the Panim Yafot suggested that maybe the Ramban meant that the officiating priest was to get the sacrifice since it was difficult (since it was hot?) to separate the baked minhah sacrifice when putting some of the sacrifice on the altar. However, Chaval rejects this suggestion. He writes that there were two priests, one who did the separating and one who put some of the sacrifice on the altar. I do not understand Chavel’s comment since from the Torah it seems that both jobs of separating the sacrifice and placing it on the altar were performed by one priest, but I thought maybe there is a different way to understand the distinction between the two types of minhah sacrifices.
The simple reading of the Torah is that there is a distinction between what the priests receives by the two types of minhah sacrifices. My guess is that the difference is due to the greater responsibility that is required of the priest who offers a baked minhah sacrifice. 2:11,12 records that hametz cannot be offered on the altar, and this was a real danger by the baked minhah sacrifice since it could easily have become hametz. While the priest may not have baked the minhah sacrifice, ultimately he was responsible for placing it on the altar. Thus, either as a reward for this responsibility or to make the priest more aware of this responsibility he was given the entire baked minhah sacrifice. However, this danger was not a problem by the flour minhah sacrifice, and hence the remains of the sacrifice were distributed to all the priests.
This idea might explain similar laws with regard to the officiating priest by the other sacrifices. 7:7 records that the officiating priest received the hatta’t and asham, and again it might be to ensure or reward the priest that the sacrifice was performed correctly. 7:8 records that the officiating priest received the skin of the olah sacrifice. Maybe this was to ensure that the sacrifice was done correctly and more specifically that the skin was not placed on the altar. Finally, the priest who sprinkled the blood on the altar by the todah sacrifice received a portion of the bread from the sacrifice, 7:14, as again it could be that this gift was because he was responsible to ensure that the hametz bread (7:13) that accompanied the sacrifice did not go on the altar. If this approach is correct, then it is the shelamim sacrifice that is the exception (that all the priests shared the priests portion of the shalamim sacrifice) since this was a special gift to the priests, 7:34, Shemot 29:28.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Vayikra 5:21,22 (Vayikra) – False claims, gezel and genevah
Vayikra 5:21,22 record, "When a person sins and commits a trespass against G-d by dealing deceitfully with his fellow in the matter of a deposit or a pledge, or through robbery (gezel), or by defrauding (oshek) his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it, (JPS translation in Levine, 1989, p. 33)" and then admits his guilt, he has to restore the item plus pay a 20% penalty and bring a korban asham, 5:23-26. (Note oshek, defrauding is usually understood to mean that the person did not hand over wages he had promised to pay.)
The case of 5:21,22 seems to be that initially the guilty person swears that he/ she is the owner of the particular item and as the claim cannot be disproved, the guilty party is able to possess the disputed item. Afterwards the guilty party comes forward and admits his/ her crime based on the different possible actions listed in the verses (see Rashi on 5:22,23). The person then has to bring a sacrifice since he/ she swore falsely, return the item and pays a 20% penalty. The fine is less than the usual penalty of 100% when one does not admit to one's guilt (Shemot 22:3,6-8).
One curiosity about this list of criminal actions in 5:21,22 is that the list does not include theft. Milgrom (1991, pp. 335,336) follows Chazal's distinction between theft and robbery, that theft is committed secretly while robbery is done openly with force (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, 348:3 and 359:7), and suggests that theft is not included since the thief is unknown so he/ she cannot swear. Milgrom notes that there are some cases where the thief is known, but he claims that the beginning of 5:24 refers to "anything else," which covers "the limited cases of theft wherein the identification of the alleged thief does take place."
Westbrook (1988, pp. 17-22) rejects this approach since the finder of a lost item is included in the list, but the finder of a lost item is also not always known. The Torah could have listed the case of theft where the thief is known just like it does by the finder of the lost item.
Another question of the list of five criminal offenses is gezel. The other four actions (deposit, pledge, defrauding and finding a lost item) are similar that the guilty person legally obtained possession of the items, which allows the person to make his/ her initial claim that he/ she is the true owner of the disputed item. On the other hand, gezel, robbery, seems to be completely different. The crook forcibly obtained possession of the item, which seems to preclude him/ her from being able to claim ownership of the item. This incongruity suggests that the term gezel needs to be re-defined.
Buchler (1928, p. 378) reviewed the word gezel in all of Tanakh and concluded, "It seems that both robbery (gezel) and oppression (oshek) were acts of injustice supported by the application of some law and legal claim, the one a legal appropriation of the helpless man's produce or field or house on a judgment of the court of justice, the other an exaction of money or a pledge, or the cheating of a helpless hired servant of his wages on some justification advanced." As to why theft is not recorded here, Buchler (p. 375) writes, "robbery seems to include theft, and any form of a dishonest removal of the neighbor's property." Westbrook (p.16) rejects this approach since the definition of gezel "becomes impossibly wide,… one wonders what function is left to theft."
Westbrook (pp. 23-38) writes that "gezel always involves the taking away of property," but as opposed to theft, it also involves an abuse of power. "The victim has little chance of obtaining redress from the robbers through the normal judicial process since a member of the establishment wrongfully takes advantage of his office or economic power in order to take property from the poor and the weak." He explains that the penalty here of gezel (20%) is less than by theft (100%) since here eventually the guilty person confessed, and the lower penalty is to encourage people to confess. He writes that theft is not included in the criminal actions in 5:21,22 either because the list is not exhaustive or because the case involves pillars of the community who can abuse their power, while thieves lack this power.
Westbrook's approach is too specific. The case here is not only by "pillars of the community" who can abuse their power, but refers to anybody who can claim in court that the item in question is his. I would vary Buchler's and Westbrook's suggestions.
Following Buchler, the term gezel in the Torah is the case where one steals an object, whether violently or not, and then claims to be the rightful owner of the object. Gezel is included in 5:21,22 because it involved a claim of ownership which enabled the person to swear falsely, and the common denominator of all the offenses int the verses is that the guilty party initially claims that he/ she is the true owner of the disputed object. On the other hand, theft, genevah, is when a person takes an item but is unable to make a claim of ownership since the owner of the item is able to prove that he/ she indeed is the rightful owner, and hence the thief has to pay a fine of 100%. The thief cannot swear and/ or his/ her swearing is irrelevant, and hence the case of theft is not included in 5:21,22. I believe this understanding of the words gezel and ganav, is supported by the various instances where the terms appears in the Torah.
Bereshit 21:25 records that Avraham accused Avimelekh's servants of gezel, that they stole his well. After this accusation, Bereshit 21:30 records that Avraham gave sheep to Avimelekh as proof that he dug the well. The insinuation of the gift is that the ownership of the well was in dispute, and this would explain Avraham's use of the term gezel that Avimelekh's servants had claimed ownership of the wells.
Bereshit 31:27-31 records that Lavan accused Yaakov of theft, (also 31:20,26), of both his daughters and his gods and then Yaakov stated that he was afraid that Lavan was going to steal, gazel, his wives (Lavan's daughters) from him. Seforno (on Bereshit 31:31) explains that this verse is based on Bereshit 31:43 where Lavan claimed his daughters as his possession. Buchler notes that in Bereshit 30:26 Yaakov asked Lavan for permission to leave and take his wives and his children even though he already worked for them. This suggests that Lavan still had some claim over his daughters and his grandchildren, and this is what Yaakov referred to in Bereshit 31:31.
Lavan used the word ganev since it was obvious to him that he was the "owner" of his daughters and of his gods, that Yaakov could not make any claim on them. However, from Yaakov's perspective Lavan was the crook, and as Lavan was going to claim ownership of Yaakov's wives, this was a case of gezel. Note in 31:39, Yaakov used the word ganev by other people who would have stolen Lavan's sheep, where Lavan could have proven ownership of the sheep.
Bereshit 44:8 records the word, ganev, by the brothers "theft" of Yosef's cup since they could make no claim of ownership of the cup, and the brothers did not try to claim ownership of the cup.
In the Decalogue (Shemot 20:13 and Devarim 5:17) the word ganev is used since this is the more common case, where the victim can prove that he is the owner of the item. Similarly all cases of kidnapping (Bereshit 40:15, Shemot 21:16, Devarim 24:7) use the term ganev, as the thief cannot claim ownership of the victim. Shemot 21:37, 22:1,6,11 all use the word ganev since these are the common cases where the owner can prove he owns the animal, and this is why the thief pays at least double the value of the stolen animal.
Vayikra 19:11-13 refers both to genevah and to gezel. 19:11 records the case where one stole, ganev, and cannot prove ownership of the time, but the person lies anyway. (If the verse had recorded the word gezel, then the continuation of the verse, not to lie, would have been tautologous since gezel involves a false claim.) 19:13 records the word gezel in conjunction with oshek (as in 5:21) and withholding wages, as in both cases the guilty person has some claim to the item.
Devarim 28:29,31 record the word gezel in reference to several curses. Devarim 28:29 records a curse that a person will feel hopeless like the person who had been gazul, since by gezel the guilty party claims ownership of the item, and the rightful owner has no hope of getting the item back, unless the crook confesses, as in 5:23. Yet, by the case of genevah, the crook can still have hope as he/ she can prove his/ her ownership of the item. Similarly, Devarim 28:21 records a curse that a person's donkey will be stolen (and the thief might claim ownership of the animal), but the crucial point is that the person has no hope of getting it back, which is the case of gezel.
(In Tanakh, see Buchler above, the idea of gezel also seems to be that the crook claims ownership of the item and hence the victim has no hope. For example, Yechezkel 32:15 calls on the crook to return the gezel since the victim cannot prove ownership of the item. Mishle 22:22,23 says not to legzal as G-d will help the victim, as once the crook can claim ownership the victim cannot win in court, see also Tehillim 35:10. Kohelet 5:7 uses the word gezel in conjunction with perverting justice since the gezel involves the false claim of ownership which is a perversion of justice.)
The case of 5:21,22 seems to be that initially the guilty person swears that he/ she is the owner of the particular item and as the claim cannot be disproved, the guilty party is able to possess the disputed item. Afterwards the guilty party comes forward and admits his/ her crime based on the different possible actions listed in the verses (see Rashi on 5:22,23). The person then has to bring a sacrifice since he/ she swore falsely, return the item and pays a 20% penalty. The fine is less than the usual penalty of 100% when one does not admit to one's guilt (Shemot 22:3,6-8).
One curiosity about this list of criminal actions in 5:21,22 is that the list does not include theft. Milgrom (1991, pp. 335,336) follows Chazal's distinction between theft and robbery, that theft is committed secretly while robbery is done openly with force (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, 348:3 and 359:7), and suggests that theft is not included since the thief is unknown so he/ she cannot swear. Milgrom notes that there are some cases where the thief is known, but he claims that the beginning of 5:24 refers to "anything else," which covers "the limited cases of theft wherein the identification of the alleged thief does take place."
Westbrook (1988, pp. 17-22) rejects this approach since the finder of a lost item is included in the list, but the finder of a lost item is also not always known. The Torah could have listed the case of theft where the thief is known just like it does by the finder of the lost item.
Another question of the list of five criminal offenses is gezel. The other four actions (deposit, pledge, defrauding and finding a lost item) are similar that the guilty person legally obtained possession of the items, which allows the person to make his/ her initial claim that he/ she is the true owner of the disputed item. On the other hand, gezel, robbery, seems to be completely different. The crook forcibly obtained possession of the item, which seems to preclude him/ her from being able to claim ownership of the item. This incongruity suggests that the term gezel needs to be re-defined.
Buchler (1928, p. 378) reviewed the word gezel in all of Tanakh and concluded, "It seems that both robbery (gezel) and oppression (oshek) were acts of injustice supported by the application of some law and legal claim, the one a legal appropriation of the helpless man's produce or field or house on a judgment of the court of justice, the other an exaction of money or a pledge, or the cheating of a helpless hired servant of his wages on some justification advanced." As to why theft is not recorded here, Buchler (p. 375) writes, "robbery seems to include theft, and any form of a dishonest removal of the neighbor's property." Westbrook (p.16) rejects this approach since the definition of gezel "becomes impossibly wide,… one wonders what function is left to theft."
Westbrook (pp. 23-38) writes that "gezel always involves the taking away of property," but as opposed to theft, it also involves an abuse of power. "The victim has little chance of obtaining redress from the robbers through the normal judicial process since a member of the establishment wrongfully takes advantage of his office or economic power in order to take property from the poor and the weak." He explains that the penalty here of gezel (20%) is less than by theft (100%) since here eventually the guilty person confessed, and the lower penalty is to encourage people to confess. He writes that theft is not included in the criminal actions in 5:21,22 either because the list is not exhaustive or because the case involves pillars of the community who can abuse their power, while thieves lack this power.
Westbrook's approach is too specific. The case here is not only by "pillars of the community" who can abuse their power, but refers to anybody who can claim in court that the item in question is his. I would vary Buchler's and Westbrook's suggestions.
Following Buchler, the term gezel in the Torah is the case where one steals an object, whether violently or not, and then claims to be the rightful owner of the object. Gezel is included in 5:21,22 because it involved a claim of ownership which enabled the person to swear falsely, and the common denominator of all the offenses int the verses is that the guilty party initially claims that he/ she is the true owner of the disputed object. On the other hand, theft, genevah, is when a person takes an item but is unable to make a claim of ownership since the owner of the item is able to prove that he/ she indeed is the rightful owner, and hence the thief has to pay a fine of 100%. The thief cannot swear and/ or his/ her swearing is irrelevant, and hence the case of theft is not included in 5:21,22. I believe this understanding of the words gezel and ganav, is supported by the various instances where the terms appears in the Torah.
Bereshit 21:25 records that Avraham accused Avimelekh's servants of gezel, that they stole his well. After this accusation, Bereshit 21:30 records that Avraham gave sheep to Avimelekh as proof that he dug the well. The insinuation of the gift is that the ownership of the well was in dispute, and this would explain Avraham's use of the term gezel that Avimelekh's servants had claimed ownership of the wells.
Bereshit 31:27-31 records that Lavan accused Yaakov of theft, (also 31:20,26), of both his daughters and his gods and then Yaakov stated that he was afraid that Lavan was going to steal, gazel, his wives (Lavan's daughters) from him. Seforno (on Bereshit 31:31) explains that this verse is based on Bereshit 31:43 where Lavan claimed his daughters as his possession. Buchler notes that in Bereshit 30:26 Yaakov asked Lavan for permission to leave and take his wives and his children even though he already worked for them. This suggests that Lavan still had some claim over his daughters and his grandchildren, and this is what Yaakov referred to in Bereshit 31:31.
Lavan used the word ganev since it was obvious to him that he was the "owner" of his daughters and of his gods, that Yaakov could not make any claim on them. However, from Yaakov's perspective Lavan was the crook, and as Lavan was going to claim ownership of Yaakov's wives, this was a case of gezel. Note in 31:39, Yaakov used the word ganev by other people who would have stolen Lavan's sheep, where Lavan could have proven ownership of the sheep.
Bereshit 44:8 records the word, ganev, by the brothers "theft" of Yosef's cup since they could make no claim of ownership of the cup, and the brothers did not try to claim ownership of the cup.
In the Decalogue (Shemot 20:13 and Devarim 5:17) the word ganev is used since this is the more common case, where the victim can prove that he is the owner of the item. Similarly all cases of kidnapping (Bereshit 40:15, Shemot 21:16, Devarim 24:7) use the term ganev, as the thief cannot claim ownership of the victim. Shemot 21:37, 22:1,6,11 all use the word ganev since these are the common cases where the owner can prove he owns the animal, and this is why the thief pays at least double the value of the stolen animal.
Vayikra 19:11-13 refers both to genevah and to gezel. 19:11 records the case where one stole, ganev, and cannot prove ownership of the time, but the person lies anyway. (If the verse had recorded the word gezel, then the continuation of the verse, not to lie, would have been tautologous since gezel involves a false claim.) 19:13 records the word gezel in conjunction with oshek (as in 5:21) and withholding wages, as in both cases the guilty person has some claim to the item.
Devarim 28:29,31 record the word gezel in reference to several curses. Devarim 28:29 records a curse that a person will feel hopeless like the person who had been gazul, since by gezel the guilty party claims ownership of the item, and the rightful owner has no hope of getting the item back, unless the crook confesses, as in 5:23. Yet, by the case of genevah, the crook can still have hope as he/ she can prove his/ her ownership of the item. Similarly, Devarim 28:21 records a curse that a person's donkey will be stolen (and the thief might claim ownership of the animal), but the crucial point is that the person has no hope of getting it back, which is the case of gezel.
(In Tanakh, see Buchler above, the idea of gezel also seems to be that the crook claims ownership of the item and hence the victim has no hope. For example, Yechezkel 32:15 calls on the crook to return the gezel since the victim cannot prove ownership of the item. Mishle 22:22,23 says not to legzal as G-d will help the victim, as once the crook can claim ownership the victim cannot win in court, see also Tehillim 35:10. Kohelet 5:7 uses the word gezel in conjunction with perverting justice since the gezel involves the false claim of ownership which is a perversion of justice.)
Accordingly, my understanding is that gezel involves stealing and claiming ownership while by theft the crook cannot make a viable claim of ownership to the item. Following Westbrook, to encourage the crook to confess, by gezel the penalty is reduced to paying a 20% fine, but if the rightful owner can prove his ownership then the crook would pay at least a 100% fine. In addition, if the crook swears falsely to back his/ her false claim of ownership then he/ she has to bring a korban asham when he/ she confesses.
Bibliography:
Buchler, A. 1928, Studies in sin and atonement in the rabbinic literature in the 1st century, London: Oxford University Press.
Buchler, A. 1928, Studies in sin and atonement in the rabbinic literature in the 1st century, London: Oxford University Press.
Levine, Baruch A., 1989,
Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia
Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.
Westbrook, Raymond, 1988, Studies in biblical and cuneiform law, Cahiers de la revue Biblique, 26, Paris: J. Gabalda
Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday.
Westbrook, Raymond, 1988, Studies in biblical and cuneiform law, Cahiers de la revue Biblique, 26, Paris: J. Gabalda
Vayikra 2:11 – Devash in the Torah: Bee honey, dates or fruit juices?
Vayikra 2:11 records that “no minhah sacrifice that you offer to G-d shall be made with leaven (hametz), for no se'or or devash may be turned into smoke as an offering by fire to G-d (JPS translation in Levine 1989).” This verse means that the minhah sacrifice, which was a grain sacrifice, could not contain devash. Today the term devash means honey from bees, but is that its meaning in the Torah?
Rashi in his comments on Shemot 13:5 explains that devash means the juice that comes from dates and figs, and in his comments on Vayikra 2:11 he writes that any juice from a fruit is called devash. (Rashi on Eruvin 4b, rov, writes that the word devash in the Torah always means juice from dates.)
Rashi in his comments on Shemot 13:5 explains that devash means the juice that comes from dates and figs, and in his comments on Vayikra 2:11 he writes that any juice from a fruit is called devash. (Rashi on Eruvin 4b, rov, writes that the word devash in the Torah always means juice from dates.)
Ibn Ezra (on 2:11) notes that many understand the word devash as juice from dates, and he believes that this definition has support from the book of Ezra. Nahum Sarna (1986, p. 47) notes that the term devash corresponds to the Arabic words dibs, which means syrup from grapes and dates. Devash is also listed as one of the seven species of the land of Israel in Devarim 8:8, and Tigay (1996, p. 94) in his comments on the verse, writes that, "since this verse is a list of agricultural products, devash must refer to the nectar of dates and figs."
A different definition is that devash means dates, see Rashbam on 2:11. Rambam (Laws of Blessings 8:1) writes that dates are considered as being one of the seven species, while devash is not. This means that one recites the blessing meayen shalosh after eating dates, but not after eating honey from bees. We see that the Rambam is following the interpretation that the term devash in the Torah is dates, and then dates are part of the seven species, while honey from bees is not one of the seven species even though today it is called devash, see Mishnah Berurah 208:1. (Encyclopedia Talmudit 7:195 notes that by the time of Chazal the word devash was understood to mean bee honey, see Mishnah Nedarim 6:9.)
There are some interpreters who understand devash to also refer to bee honey. Hoffmann (1953, comments on 2:11) notes that Philo thought that the word devash in Devarim 8:8 means bee honey, but he thinks that devash must be dates since dates were such an important fruit in Israel that they had to be included in the verse. Rabinowitz (1977, p. 137, see also Levine, 1989, p. 12) writes, "that while in the biblical period, devash was essentially the juice extracted from fruit (not necessarily from dates), it was primarily the juice of dates, although bee honey is also included." His reason for including honey from bees is from the story of Shimshon's riddle, Shoftim 14:8, and not from the Torah.
The Rambam (Mishnah Torah, Laws of prohibitions of the altar, 5:1) records that the prohibition of 2:11 is when the devash is added to any sacrifice or when the devash itself is offered as a sacrifice. The Mishnah Le-Melekh (Judah ben Samuel Rosanes, 1657-1727, Turkey) in his commentary on the Rambam notes that the Rambam did not define the term devash. (Was he relying on his ruling in Laws of blessing 8:1?) The Mishnah Le-Melekh quotes the Raah (?), that devash has to be juice from fruits and not bee honey since the following verse 2:12 seems to refer to devash as an offering of first fruits (which is not placed on the altar) and honey from bees cannot be considered a first fruit.
In addition to recording the prohibition of placing devash on the altar, 2:11 also records the prohibition of putting se’or on the altar, and states that the minhah sacrifice cannot become hametz. This conjunction implies that se’or and devash are forbidden since they could cause the grain of the sacrifice to become hametz, see Ibn Ezra on 2:11. This would means that devash ferments, just like se’or, but the Talmud (Pesachim 35b, see also Shulchan Arukh Orah Chayyim 462:1, though see Rashi on Pesachim 36a) states that fruit juices do not ferment. However, the Shulchan Arukh 462:2 writes that fruit juices with water speeds up the fermentation process. The Torah does not refer to any water being offered as part of the minhah sacrifice, but maybe the prohibition is that nothing is to be added to the minhah that might possibly enhance the fermentation process.
This question how to define devash also relates to our understanding of the phrase “a land flowing with halav (milk) and devash,” Shemot 3:8. Does the phrase mean milk and bee honey, milk and dates, milk and the juice of dates or milk and the juice of all fruits?
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
A different definition is that devash means dates, see Rashbam on 2:11. Rambam (Laws of Blessings 8:1) writes that dates are considered as being one of the seven species, while devash is not. This means that one recites the blessing meayen shalosh after eating dates, but not after eating honey from bees. We see that the Rambam is following the interpretation that the term devash in the Torah is dates, and then dates are part of the seven species, while honey from bees is not one of the seven species even though today it is called devash, see Mishnah Berurah 208:1. (Encyclopedia Talmudit 7:195 notes that by the time of Chazal the word devash was understood to mean bee honey, see Mishnah Nedarim 6:9.)
There are some interpreters who understand devash to also refer to bee honey. Hoffmann (1953, comments on 2:11) notes that Philo thought that the word devash in Devarim 8:8 means bee honey, but he thinks that devash must be dates since dates were such an important fruit in Israel that they had to be included in the verse. Rabinowitz (1977, p. 137, see also Levine, 1989, p. 12) writes, "that while in the biblical period, devash was essentially the juice extracted from fruit (not necessarily from dates), it was primarily the juice of dates, although bee honey is also included." His reason for including honey from bees is from the story of Shimshon's riddle, Shoftim 14:8, and not from the Torah.
The Rambam (Mishnah Torah, Laws of prohibitions of the altar, 5:1) records that the prohibition of 2:11 is when the devash is added to any sacrifice or when the devash itself is offered as a sacrifice. The Mishnah Le-Melekh (Judah ben Samuel Rosanes, 1657-1727, Turkey) in his commentary on the Rambam notes that the Rambam did not define the term devash. (Was he relying on his ruling in Laws of blessing 8:1?) The Mishnah Le-Melekh quotes the Raah (?), that devash has to be juice from fruits and not bee honey since the following verse 2:12 seems to refer to devash as an offering of first fruits (which is not placed on the altar) and honey from bees cannot be considered a first fruit.
In addition to recording the prohibition of placing devash on the altar, 2:11 also records the prohibition of putting se’or on the altar, and states that the minhah sacrifice cannot become hametz. This conjunction implies that se’or and devash are forbidden since they could cause the grain of the sacrifice to become hametz, see Ibn Ezra on 2:11. This would means that devash ferments, just like se’or, but the Talmud (Pesachim 35b, see also Shulchan Arukh Orah Chayyim 462:1, though see Rashi on Pesachim 36a) states that fruit juices do not ferment. However, the Shulchan Arukh 462:2 writes that fruit juices with water speeds up the fermentation process. The Torah does not refer to any water being offered as part of the minhah sacrifice, but maybe the prohibition is that nothing is to be added to the minhah that might possibly enhance the fermentation process.
This question how to define devash also relates to our understanding of the phrase “a land flowing with halav (milk) and devash,” Shemot 3:8. Does the phrase mean milk and bee honey, milk and dates, milk and the juice of dates or milk and the juice of all fruits?
Bibliography:
Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society
Rabinowitz, Louis Isaac, 1977, Torah and Flora, New York: Sanhedrin Press.
Sarna, Nahum, (1923-2005), 1986, Exploring Exodus, New York: Schocken Books.
Rabinowitz, Louis Isaac, 1977, Torah and Flora, New York: Sanhedrin Press.
Sarna, Nahum, (1923-2005), 1986, Exploring Exodus, New York: Schocken Books.
Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society
Labels:
Devarim: Ekev,
Shemot: Shemot,
Vayikra: Vayikra
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
Shemot 40:1-33 (Pekudei) - The anointing of the mishkan, the ohel moed and the priests
Shemot 40:1-15 records G-d’s instructions to Moshe for setting up the mishkan, and Shemot 40:16-33 records that Moshe set up the mishkan. One curiosity of 40:16-33 is that the verses only partially record Moshe’s fulfillment of G-d’s instructions from 40:1-15.
40:2 records that Moshe was to construct the mishkan, and 40:17-19 record the fulfillment of 40:2 that Moshe put up the boards for the walls and the coverings for the ceiling. 40:3 then records that Moshe was to put the aron and the parokhet (the screen to the room with the aron) in the mishkan, and 40:20,21 record that Moshe fulfilled this instruction from G-d. 40:4 records that Moshe was to put the table and the menorah into the mishkan, and 40:22-25 records that Moshe fulfilled these instructions. 40:5 records that Moshe was then to put the incense altar into the mishkan and put up the screen separating the mishkan proper from the courtyard. 40:26-28 records that Moshe fulfilled this command. 40:6 records that Moshe was then to put up the outer altar outside the mishkan proper and 40:29 records that Moshe fulfilled this command. 40:7 records that Moshe was to place the laver between the outer altar and the mishkan proper and fill the laver with water. 40:30-32 record that Moshe fulfilled these instructions. 40:8 records that Moshe was to put up the walls around the courtyard, and 40:33 records that Moshe fulfilled this instruction. 40:9 then records that Moshe was to anoint the mishkan with oil. By now, following the pattern of 40:1-8 and 40:17-33, we would expect that 40:34 would record that Moshe fulfilled this instruction to anoint the mishkan to maintain the order of the chapter. However, there is no mention of Moshe anointing the mishkan. Instead, 40:34 records that the cloud of G-d and the glory of G-d filled the mishkan.
What happened to the anointing of the mishkan? The section 40:17-33 followed an exact pattern that Moshe followed G-d’s instructions from the beginning of chapter 40. Yet, 40:9 records that Moshe was instructed to anoint the mishkan, and here the pattern breaks down since there is no mention of Moshe anointing the mishkan in chapter 40. We know that Moshe must have fulfilled this action since 40:16 records that Moshe did everything that he was instructed by G-d. When did Moshe anoint the mishkan? Three are two possibilities. Vayikra 8:10 and Bemidbar 7:1 both record that Moshe anointed the mishkan. We will review both possibilities, starting with Vayikra 8:10.
Vayikra 8 records the initiation of the priests, and as part of that process, Vayikra 8:10 records that Moshe anointed the mishkan. However, this anointing cannot be the fulfillment of G-d’s instruction in Shemot 40:9 since the order of events in Vayikra 8 do not correspond with the order of Shemot 40. Vayikra 8:7-9 records that Moshe dressed Aharon in the special clothing of the High Priest before he anointed the mishkan while Shemot 40:9 records that the mishkan was to be anointed before Moshe dressed Aharon, Shemot 40:13. As we noticed above, Moshe when fulfilling G-d’s instruction of Shemot 40 followed them exactly in the order that they were commanded.
Ramban (on Vayikra 8:10) explains that in Shemot 40, the Torah wanted to record together all the actions with regard to Aharon and his sons, and hence the instructions to dress Aharon in his priestly clothing were recorded after the instruction to anoint the mishkan. He is insinuating that the instructions in Shemot 40 are not to be understood as indicating a specific order. Yet, this is contradicted by the correspondence noted above that Moshe followed the instructions of Shemot 40 in their exact order.
Or Hachayyim (on Vayikra 8:10) argues that in Vayikra 8, Moshe was following the order of 8:2, which records the instructions to “take Aharon, his sons, their clothing and the oil.” Since the oil was mentioned last, Or Hachayyim suggests that Moshe learned that first he was to dress Aharon and then to anoint the mishkan. Yet, still this dressing of Aharon before the anointing of the mishkan contradicts the order of Shemot 40. Or Hachayyim answers that the order of Shemot 40 only meant to anoint the mishkan before anointing Aharon, but he claims, following the Ramban, that the instructions to dress Aharon in Shemot 40 were recorded after the instructions to anoint the mishkan in order to combine the dressing of Aharon with his anointing. Yet, again this contradicts the order of Shemot 40. Also, if in Vayikra 8 the Torah could record the dressing of Aharon separate from the anointing, then Shemot 40 could also have done so. Or Hachayyim seems correct that in Vayikra 8, Moshe was following the order of Vayikra 8:2, but this means that the anointing recorded in Vayikra 8 was not the anointing that was instructed in Shemot 40. Accordingly, since Vayikra 8:10 cannot be the fulfillment of the instructions of Shemot 40:9, it must be that the instructions were fulfilled in Bemidbar 7:1.
Bemidbar 7:1 records that, “On the day when Moshe finished setting up the mishkan, he anointed it and sanctified it, and all of its vessels, and the altar and all of its vessels he also anointed and sanctified.” Not only must this be the fulfillment of the instructions of Shemot 40:9 since Vayikra 8:10 was ruled out as discussed above, but also the words “on the day when Moshe finished the mishkan” refer to the events of Shemot 40. Bemidbar 7:1 is a continuation of Shemot 40:33. Yet, there remain several problems.
One, Shemot 40:11 records that Moshe was to anoint the laver and its basin, but this anointing is not mentioned in Bemidbar 7. This might tempt one to argue that Vayikra 8:11 is the fulfillment of Shemot 40:11. Yet, not only would this contradict the order of Shemot 40 as discussed above, but also one could not wash from the laver until it was anointed and Vayikra 8:6 records that Aharon washed before the anointing of Vayikra 8:11. Thus the laver had to be anointed before the events of Vayikra 8, and it is most likely that the anointing of the laver occurred after the anointing recorded in Bemidbar 7:1 but was not recorded in the Torah. My guess is that it was not specified in Bemidbar 7:1 since the main focus of the chapter is on the sacrifices of the tribal leaders, which were not directly related to the anointing of the laver. (In fact, the laver was omitted on another occasion as Shemot 38:30,31 records the items of the mishkan that were from bronze, and the laver was not mentioned, see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, pp. 689-695.)
A second problem with the idea that Bemidbar 7:1 is the continuation of Shemot 40:33, is how does the anointing in Bemidbar 7:1 relate to the anointing recorded in Vayikra 8? The most popular opinion of the commentators (see Rashi on Vayikra 9:1 and Bemidbar 7:1) is that Vayikra 8, the initiation of the priests, occurred a week before the events of Shemot 40. According to this approach, Vayikra 8 records a completely separate process of anointing from the anointing of Shemot 40 and Bemidbar 7:1. Yet, as Shemot 40:2 records the completion of the mishkan, how could the priests have been initiated before there was a mishkan? The standard answer (Bemidbar Rabbah 12:15) is that during the seven days of the initiation of the priests Moshe put the mishkan up and took it down daily (even twice or three times a day), and then Shemot 40 refers to the period when Moshe constructed the mishkan without it having to be dismantled immediately afterwards. Yet, why would Moshe do this since this was an enormous amount of work? Furthermore, from Vayikra 8:33-36 it seems that the mishkan existed continuously during the seven-day initiation process of the priests. Ramban (on Shemot 40:2) attempts to answer these questions, but as maintained by Rabbi Akiva and Ibn Ezra (see long comments on Shemot 40:2), it cannot be that Vayikra 8 occurred before Shemot 40.
We now have a problem. Bemidbar 7:10 records that on the day of the anointing of the mishkan, the chiefs of the tribes brought their sacrifices for the mishkan and this went on for 12 days. Yet, if Bemidbar 7:1 is a continuation of Shemot 40, and if the initiation of the priests as recorded in Vayikra 8 was after Shemot 40, then how does the initiation of the priests relate to the sacrifices brought by the tribal leaders?
There are three possible ways to mesh the chronology of the initiation of the priests with the sacrifices of the tribal leaders. One possibility is that they both started on the day when Moshe finished putting up the mishkan, the first day of Nisan. This seems unlikely since not only would it have been a very, very busy day (see Abravanel on Bemidbar 7) but also why would Moshe have anointed the mishkan twice on one day? Furthermore, the seven-day initiation rite of the priests and the events of the eighth day (Vayikra 9) would then have been contemporaneous with the 12 days when the tribal leaders were bringing their sacrifices, and this seems difficult.
A second possibility is R. Akiva and Ibn Ezra's (long comments on 40:2) approach, that the priests were initiated after the mishkan was anointed and then after this initiation process, the tribal leaders brought their sacrifices. With this idea, the priests began their initiation rite on the first day of Nisan, and the tribal leaders began to bring their sacrifices on the eighth day of Nisan. This also seems unlikely since Bemidbar 7:10 records that the tribal leaders brought their sacrifices immediately after Moshe anointed the mishkan. Also, again there would be the problem that Moshe would have anointed the mishkan twice on the same day. (Ibn Ezra understands Bemidbar 7:1 as referring to the anointing of Vayikra 8:10 and not recording a new anointing, but again this is problematic since Vayikra 8 does not follow the order of Shemot 40.)
We are left with the possibility that the initiation process of the priests happened after the tribal leaders brought their gifts. According to this possibility, on the 1st day of 1st month (Nisan) of the 2nd year in the desert, the mishkan was completed, Shemot 40:17. On that day, Moshe anointed the mishkan as recorded in Bemidbar 7:1, and the tribal leaders began to bring their sacrifices. Their sacrifices continued until the 12th day of the month. At that point the priests could have started their initiation process, but as the 14th of the month was the day the korban pesach (Bemidbar 9:3) was offered presumably the initiation process would have been afterwards. (Note that according to this chronology, the korban pesach in the desert was brought without the help of the priests, as was true for the korban pesach in Egypt.)
40:2 records that Moshe was to construct the mishkan, and 40:17-19 record the fulfillment of 40:2 that Moshe put up the boards for the walls and the coverings for the ceiling. 40:3 then records that Moshe was to put the aron and the parokhet (the screen to the room with the aron) in the mishkan, and 40:20,21 record that Moshe fulfilled this instruction from G-d. 40:4 records that Moshe was to put the table and the menorah into the mishkan, and 40:22-25 records that Moshe fulfilled these instructions. 40:5 records that Moshe was then to put the incense altar into the mishkan and put up the screen separating the mishkan proper from the courtyard. 40:26-28 records that Moshe fulfilled this command. 40:6 records that Moshe was then to put up the outer altar outside the mishkan proper and 40:29 records that Moshe fulfilled this command. 40:7 records that Moshe was to place the laver between the outer altar and the mishkan proper and fill the laver with water. 40:30-32 record that Moshe fulfilled these instructions. 40:8 records that Moshe was to put up the walls around the courtyard, and 40:33 records that Moshe fulfilled this instruction. 40:9 then records that Moshe was to anoint the mishkan with oil. By now, following the pattern of 40:1-8 and 40:17-33, we would expect that 40:34 would record that Moshe fulfilled this instruction to anoint the mishkan to maintain the order of the chapter. However, there is no mention of Moshe anointing the mishkan. Instead, 40:34 records that the cloud of G-d and the glory of G-d filled the mishkan.
What happened to the anointing of the mishkan? The section 40:17-33 followed an exact pattern that Moshe followed G-d’s instructions from the beginning of chapter 40. Yet, 40:9 records that Moshe was instructed to anoint the mishkan, and here the pattern breaks down since there is no mention of Moshe anointing the mishkan in chapter 40. We know that Moshe must have fulfilled this action since 40:16 records that Moshe did everything that he was instructed by G-d. When did Moshe anoint the mishkan? Three are two possibilities. Vayikra 8:10 and Bemidbar 7:1 both record that Moshe anointed the mishkan. We will review both possibilities, starting with Vayikra 8:10.
Vayikra 8 records the initiation of the priests, and as part of that process, Vayikra 8:10 records that Moshe anointed the mishkan. However, this anointing cannot be the fulfillment of G-d’s instruction in Shemot 40:9 since the order of events in Vayikra 8 do not correspond with the order of Shemot 40. Vayikra 8:7-9 records that Moshe dressed Aharon in the special clothing of the High Priest before he anointed the mishkan while Shemot 40:9 records that the mishkan was to be anointed before Moshe dressed Aharon, Shemot 40:13. As we noticed above, Moshe when fulfilling G-d’s instruction of Shemot 40 followed them exactly in the order that they were commanded.
Ramban (on Vayikra 8:10) explains that in Shemot 40, the Torah wanted to record together all the actions with regard to Aharon and his sons, and hence the instructions to dress Aharon in his priestly clothing were recorded after the instruction to anoint the mishkan. He is insinuating that the instructions in Shemot 40 are not to be understood as indicating a specific order. Yet, this is contradicted by the correspondence noted above that Moshe followed the instructions of Shemot 40 in their exact order.
Or Hachayyim (on Vayikra 8:10) argues that in Vayikra 8, Moshe was following the order of 8:2, which records the instructions to “take Aharon, his sons, their clothing and the oil.” Since the oil was mentioned last, Or Hachayyim suggests that Moshe learned that first he was to dress Aharon and then to anoint the mishkan. Yet, still this dressing of Aharon before the anointing of the mishkan contradicts the order of Shemot 40. Or Hachayyim answers that the order of Shemot 40 only meant to anoint the mishkan before anointing Aharon, but he claims, following the Ramban, that the instructions to dress Aharon in Shemot 40 were recorded after the instructions to anoint the mishkan in order to combine the dressing of Aharon with his anointing. Yet, again this contradicts the order of Shemot 40. Also, if in Vayikra 8 the Torah could record the dressing of Aharon separate from the anointing, then Shemot 40 could also have done so. Or Hachayyim seems correct that in Vayikra 8, Moshe was following the order of Vayikra 8:2, but this means that the anointing recorded in Vayikra 8 was not the anointing that was instructed in Shemot 40. Accordingly, since Vayikra 8:10 cannot be the fulfillment of the instructions of Shemot 40:9, it must be that the instructions were fulfilled in Bemidbar 7:1.
Bemidbar 7:1 records that, “On the day when Moshe finished setting up the mishkan, he anointed it and sanctified it, and all of its vessels, and the altar and all of its vessels he also anointed and sanctified.” Not only must this be the fulfillment of the instructions of Shemot 40:9 since Vayikra 8:10 was ruled out as discussed above, but also the words “on the day when Moshe finished the mishkan” refer to the events of Shemot 40. Bemidbar 7:1 is a continuation of Shemot 40:33. Yet, there remain several problems.
One, Shemot 40:11 records that Moshe was to anoint the laver and its basin, but this anointing is not mentioned in Bemidbar 7. This might tempt one to argue that Vayikra 8:11 is the fulfillment of Shemot 40:11. Yet, not only would this contradict the order of Shemot 40 as discussed above, but also one could not wash from the laver until it was anointed and Vayikra 8:6 records that Aharon washed before the anointing of Vayikra 8:11. Thus the laver had to be anointed before the events of Vayikra 8, and it is most likely that the anointing of the laver occurred after the anointing recorded in Bemidbar 7:1 but was not recorded in the Torah. My guess is that it was not specified in Bemidbar 7:1 since the main focus of the chapter is on the sacrifices of the tribal leaders, which were not directly related to the anointing of the laver. (In fact, the laver was omitted on another occasion as Shemot 38:30,31 records the items of the mishkan that were from bronze, and the laver was not mentioned, see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, pp. 689-695.)
A second problem with the idea that Bemidbar 7:1 is the continuation of Shemot 40:33, is how does the anointing in Bemidbar 7:1 relate to the anointing recorded in Vayikra 8? The most popular opinion of the commentators (see Rashi on Vayikra 9:1 and Bemidbar 7:1) is that Vayikra 8, the initiation of the priests, occurred a week before the events of Shemot 40. According to this approach, Vayikra 8 records a completely separate process of anointing from the anointing of Shemot 40 and Bemidbar 7:1. Yet, as Shemot 40:2 records the completion of the mishkan, how could the priests have been initiated before there was a mishkan? The standard answer (Bemidbar Rabbah 12:15) is that during the seven days of the initiation of the priests Moshe put the mishkan up and took it down daily (even twice or three times a day), and then Shemot 40 refers to the period when Moshe constructed the mishkan without it having to be dismantled immediately afterwards. Yet, why would Moshe do this since this was an enormous amount of work? Furthermore, from Vayikra 8:33-36 it seems that the mishkan existed continuously during the seven-day initiation process of the priests. Ramban (on Shemot 40:2) attempts to answer these questions, but as maintained by Rabbi Akiva and Ibn Ezra (see long comments on Shemot 40:2), it cannot be that Vayikra 8 occurred before Shemot 40.
We now have a problem. Bemidbar 7:10 records that on the day of the anointing of the mishkan, the chiefs of the tribes brought their sacrifices for the mishkan and this went on for 12 days. Yet, if Bemidbar 7:1 is a continuation of Shemot 40, and if the initiation of the priests as recorded in Vayikra 8 was after Shemot 40, then how does the initiation of the priests relate to the sacrifices brought by the tribal leaders?
There are three possible ways to mesh the chronology of the initiation of the priests with the sacrifices of the tribal leaders. One possibility is that they both started on the day when Moshe finished putting up the mishkan, the first day of Nisan. This seems unlikely since not only would it have been a very, very busy day (see Abravanel on Bemidbar 7) but also why would Moshe have anointed the mishkan twice on one day? Furthermore, the seven-day initiation rite of the priests and the events of the eighth day (Vayikra 9) would then have been contemporaneous with the 12 days when the tribal leaders were bringing their sacrifices, and this seems difficult.
A second possibility is R. Akiva and Ibn Ezra's (long comments on 40:2) approach, that the priests were initiated after the mishkan was anointed and then after this initiation process, the tribal leaders brought their sacrifices. With this idea, the priests began their initiation rite on the first day of Nisan, and the tribal leaders began to bring their sacrifices on the eighth day of Nisan. This also seems unlikely since Bemidbar 7:10 records that the tribal leaders brought their sacrifices immediately after Moshe anointed the mishkan. Also, again there would be the problem that Moshe would have anointed the mishkan twice on the same day. (Ibn Ezra understands Bemidbar 7:1 as referring to the anointing of Vayikra 8:10 and not recording a new anointing, but again this is problematic since Vayikra 8 does not follow the order of Shemot 40.)
We are left with the possibility that the initiation process of the priests happened after the tribal leaders brought their gifts. According to this possibility, on the 1st day of 1st month (Nisan) of the 2nd year in the desert, the mishkan was completed, Shemot 40:17. On that day, Moshe anointed the mishkan as recorded in Bemidbar 7:1, and the tribal leaders began to bring their sacrifices. Their sacrifices continued until the 12th day of the month. At that point the priests could have started their initiation process, but as the 14th of the month was the day the korban pesach (Bemidbar 9:3) was offered presumably the initiation process would have been afterwards. (Note that according to this chronology, the korban pesach in the desert was brought without the help of the priests, as was true for the korban pesach in Egypt.)
Ibn Ezra (on Shemot 40:2) argues that the Jewish people did not celebrate the holiday of Matzot in the desert, which means the priests could have started their initiation process on the 15th of the month. If Ibn Ezra is incorrect then the holiday of Matzot ended on the 21st of the month, and then the initiation process would have started on the 22nd of the month. In either case, the initiation of the priests would have ended before the 2nd month, which is when Moshe was commanded to count the people, Bemidbar 1:1,2.
This chronology means that the mishkan would have existed for a short time when there were no priests. This anomaly explains why the mishkan had to be anointed twice. Once, in Bemidbar 7:1, it was anointed for the regular population on the first day of Nisan, and then Vayikra 8:10 records that it was anointed a second time for the priests on either the 15th or the 22nd of Nisan.
In addition, because it was the priestly clothing that made Aharon a priest, he was dressed before the anointing recorded in Vayikra 8:10, which was for his family. This dressing and anointing of the priests during their initiation process in Vayikra 8 was the fulfillment of the instructions of Shemot 40:12-15, but this occurred after the events recorded in Bemidbar 7:1 which records the fulfillment of Shemot 40:9,10.
This chronology means that the mishkan would have existed for a short time when there were no priests. This anomaly explains why the mishkan had to be anointed twice. Once, in Bemidbar 7:1, it was anointed for the regular population on the first day of Nisan, and then Vayikra 8:10 records that it was anointed a second time for the priests on either the 15th or the 22nd of Nisan.
In addition, because it was the priestly clothing that made Aharon a priest, he was dressed before the anointing recorded in Vayikra 8:10, which was for his family. This dressing and anointing of the priests during their initiation process in Vayikra 8 was the fulfillment of the instructions of Shemot 40:12-15, but this occurred after the events recorded in Bemidbar 7:1 which records the fulfillment of Shemot 40:9,10.
Labels:
Bemidbar: Naso,
Shemot: Pekudei,
Vayikra: Tsav
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