The 2016 version of my commentary on the Haggadah is now available

Hello,

The 2016 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (58 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions.  If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file.  I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein  

Vayikra (Leviticus) 12:1-5 – Tumah of a new mother and circumcision on the eighth day

Vayikra (Leviticus) 12:1,2 records that if a woman gives birth to a boy she becomes tamei for seven days. Afterwards, for the following 33 days the new mother is in a quasi-state of tumah, she cannot go to the mikdash but she is considered tahor with regard to her husband, 12:4. On the other hand, if a woman gives birth to a girl, she is tamei for 14 days, and her quasi-state of tumah is for 66 days, 12:5. The ratio of the new mother being tamei and in a quasi-state of tumah is equal for the birth of a boy and a birth of a girl, but why are the absolute numbers different? Why is there a difference in the number of days of tumah for the mother if the child born was a boy as opposed to a girl?

Within the laws of the tumah of the mother, 12:3 records that a newborn boy is circumcised on the eighth day of his life. This verse is a little surprising since from Bereshit 17:10-14 (and Bereshit 21:4) we already know that a male must be circumcised after eight days. It is true that the law of circumcision in Bereshit occurred before the covenant at Mount Sinai, and thus one might argue that the law had to be repeated, see statement by R. Yehuda in Mishnah Hullin 7:6, and comments of the Rambam on the Mishnah. Yet, there are other laws in Bereshit (1:28, 32:33) that are applicable even though they were not repeated after the establishment of the covenant at Mount Sinai. More likely, the reference to circumcision within the laws of tumah of the new mother is because these two concepts are related. What is the relationship?

One possibility is that the tumah and taharah are the independent variables, and the circumcision (the dependent variable) is due to the ending of the tumah. The Talmud (Niddah 31b) quotes R. Shimon Bar Yochai who explains that the circumcision is on the eighth day since everybody is happy at the circumcision, and the Torah desired that the husband and wife should also be happy. If the wife is tamei, then the husband and wife cannot be together, so then they would be sad if the circumcision was before the eighth day. Thus, according to this explanation, the circumcision is on the eighth day since by then the wife is tahor. This is an interesting idea that the Torah was so concerned with the companionship between husband and wife that it delayed the circumcision to the eighth day, but it leaves the question of why the mother is tamei for seven days after the birth of a boy and fourteen days after the birth of a girl unanswered. For other suggestions that also follow the idea that the dating of the circumcision is due to the tumah, see Luzzatto on 12:3.

Hoffmann (on Vayikra 12:1-5, 1953, p. 252) suggests that the causality is reversed. With this understanding, the mother's tumah (the dependent variable) after the birth of a boy is limited to seven days because of the circumcision (the independent variable). Yet, why is the circumcision on the eighth day?

Korman (1998, vol. 2, pp. 290,291) quotes various reasons. One, from Vayikra Rabbah 27:10 that the circumcision is on the eighth day to ensure that the child experiences one Shabbat before the circumcision. It is not clear to me why the child needs to experience a Shabbat not circumcised. Two, from R. Judan ben Pazzi (Devarim Rabbah, 6:1) that the circumcision is on the eighth day to give the child enough strength to undergo the circumcision. This reason is also mentioned by the Rambam (Moreh 3:49, Maimonides, 1963, p. 611) and Korman quotes a study that the child has the most amount of vitamin K which helps the blood coagulate on the eighth day. This answer is certainly possible, but if the issue is the health of the child, would it not be better to wait a month?

I think the timing of the circumcision on the eighth day is related to the question why is the mother tamei after giving birth.  Tumah signifies a separation or potential separation from G-d. In the case of the new mother, the tumah (and the hatta't sacrifice, 12:6) does not relate to any sin but there are two possible reasons why the birth process might have separated the new mother in some ways from G-d. One, it could be that mother's attachment to the new child diminishes her connection to G-d or, more likely, during the time of the labor, which is the most intensive physical action a person goes through, the mother is separated from G-d since she is completely focused on her body. The new mother is then given time when she is tamei to acknowledge that this separation had occurred. The tumah by the birth of a girl is fourteen days, and this is the ideal time that is given to the new mother.

With this idea, the circumcision should be on the 15th day after the birth since then the mother's tumah, which marked her separation from G-d, has ended. However, delaying the circumcision to the 15th day is problematic. Circumcision demonstrates the parents' dedication to G-d that they are willing to have their newborn son circumcised. Based on this rationale, the circumcision should really be on the first day that the child is born. But, the new mother is not in a position to make this dedication on the first day after the birth due to her being in a state of tumah, which signifies her separation from G-d.

Accordingly, performing the circumcision on the eighth day is a compromise between two conflicting values. On the one hand, the circumcision should be on the 1st day after the birth, but the new mother is still tamei and separated from G-d. On the other hand, the circumcision could be on the 15th day after the birth when the new mother's tumah has ended, but then the parents have delayed demonstrating their dedication to G-d. The compromise is to do the circumcision on the 8th day, and then the mother's tumah, and separation from G-d, is shortened to seven days because by circumcising her son on the 8th day, the new mother is demonstrating her closeness and return to G-d.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Korman, Abraham, 1998, The parsha for her generations, Hebrew, Tel Aviv.

Shemot (Exodus) 32:20-28 – Spiked water and the aftermath of the sin of the golden calf

Shemot 32:27 records that Moshe ordered the Levites to kill the people who had sinned by the golden calf, and 32:28 records that they killed 3,000 people. How could Moshe order the Levites to go through the camp and kill people?

There are three approaches to understanding Moshe's order to the Levites. One, Moshe set up a court system to judge the people, and apparently the Levites were both the officials of the court and the executers of the court's judgments. (See Yoma 66b, also the Midrash Meor ha-Afalah, who is quoted by Menachem Kasher, Torah Shelemah 32:114, and Kasher's comments 114. In addition, see Midrash ha-Gadol, who is also quoted by Kasher, 32:225, Kasher's comments on 225, and Arussi 2000.) With this approach, there was no indiscriminate killing. However, as noted by the Ramban (on 32:27), this approach is problematic since there were 600,000 men and if there was a trial for each man (also the women?) then this would have taken years, while the impression of the Torah is that the actions of the Levites transpired immediately.

A second approach is from the Ramban who writes that this incident was a unique case to sanctify G-d's name, and did not follow normal judicial procedures, as for example there was no one around who could have warned each sinner. However, he also maintains that the Levites did not kill indiscriminately, but only those people they personally knew who had sinned.

A third approach is from the Ibn Ezra (short commentary on 32:27) who mentions the idea that the Levites only killed those people they knew had sinned, but he adds that they also killed those people who had a sign on their bodies that they had worshipped the golden calf. Ibn Ezra elaborates on this idea in his long commentary on 32:20. Ibn Ezra explains that when Moshe came down from the mountain he made the people drink the ashes of the golden calf with water, 32:30, and this caused the bodies of the people who had sinned with the golden calf to swell or for there to be marks on their faces similar to the water of the suspected adulteress (Bemidbar 5:27, see Avodah Zara 44a). The disfigured bodies or marks indicated to the Levites which people deserved to die.

Ibn Ezra's explanation is logical since 32:20 records that Moshe forced or caused the people to drink the ashes, and there is no record of any consequence to their drinking of the ashes. Why would Moshe cause the people to drink the water for no reason? However, once we know the case of the suspected adulteress, who would drink ashes which would cause marks on her body, then we can infer that Moshe forced the people to drink in order for there to be marks on their body, and the reason why the people had to have marks on their bodies was in order that the Levites could identify which people to kill. Accordingly, G-d did a miracle to identify the people deserving of punishment and this obviated the need to have courts. (Rashi on 32:20 based on the Talmud implies that the drinking per se caused the people to die, which is difficult since presumably more than 3,000 people drank the water, 32:20.)

While the Ibn Ezra's explanation is logical, how did Moshe get everybody to drink the water? Ibn Ezra writes that he commanded the people to drink, but would the people listen to such an order? Could a person be forced to drink water? The answer is from Moshe's' recollection of the sin of the golden calf in Devarim 9:21, where Moshe explained that he poured the water into the stream that flowed from Mount Sinai.

What seems to have happened is that Moshe went to the source of the water on Mount Sinai, and poured the ashes into the stream but the people did not see this. The people then naturally drank from the water as it flowed into the camp, and when they did this, the bodies of those people who were guilty were marked. Thus, Moshe caused or forced the people to drink the ashes, see Bekhor Shor on 32:20. This would be the same idea as in modern times if the government puts fluoride in the main water pumps of an area, and then everybody drinks the fluoride knowingly or unknowingly.

With this approach, we can understand the order of the events when Moshe came down from Mount Sinai. First, Moshe broke the tables, 32:19. Then, Moshe pulverized the golden calf, 32:20, and poured the ashes into the stream, Devarim 9:21. He did this away from the people on the Mount Sinai, and it took some time. He probably finished sometime in the afternoon, and he had hoped that the people would have quieted down after he had broken the tablets. Only after he had destroyed the idol did he confront Aharon as to what happened, 32:21-24. This conversation would have occurred in the late afternoon. At this point, the people were still out of control, 32:25, and when they did not respond to him after he asked the people, "who is with G-d, come to me," 32:26, he gave his order to the Levites to kill the people.

By this time, the late afternoon, there had been some time for some of the people to have drank the water and for the marks on their bodies to develop. It seems that not all the people who had rejected G-d were killed, but rather the 3,000 people killed were enough to restore order in the camp, and Moshe went to pray for the others, 32:30. Or, maybe, these 3,000 people had been particularly egregious sinners either in not listening to Moshe in 32:26 or by the golden calf. Note if the people had responded positively to Moshe's question, "Who is with G-d" in 32:26, then they would not have been killed. Either there would have been no marks from drinking the water, as G-d would not have caused the miracle to occur, or maybe the people would have remained with marks throughout their lives, but they would not have been killed.

Ramban (on Devarim 9:21) asks why does Shemot 32:20 record that Moshe forced the people to drink the ashes, while Devarim 9:21 just records that Moshe put the ashes in the stream. He suggests that in Devarim, Moshe was showing respect for the people since he did not want to recall that he had treated them as a suspected adulteress. Our approach here offers a slightly different answer.

In the description of the sin of the golden calf in Shemot, the Torah had to record that Moshe forced or caused the people to drink the ashes since otherwise one might have thought that Moshe just poured ashes into the water to destroy the idol (see Bekhor Shor and Hizkuni on Shemot 32:20). This language of causation implies that there was a reason for the drinking of the ashes, and this reason was for the Levites to be able to identify the sinners. On the other hand, in Devarim, Moshe did not explicitly refer to the Levites' actions (see Devarim 10:8), and consequently he did not have to state that he forced the people to drink the ashes. Instead, in Devarim, Moshe was explaining how he got the people to drink the ashes, and hence he just said that he put the ashes into the stream. Thus, the two verses, Shemot 32:20 and Devarim 9:21, complement each other.

Finally, if G-d performed a miracle that the ashes enabled the Levites to identify the sinners, why did G-d not simply strike those sinners or have the people die from the ashes without the Levites killing the people? One answer is that this is the usual method of the Torah to minimize miracles. In this case, the judicial system was impossible, so G-d performed a miracle, but just to identify the sinners. A second answer is that the steadfastness of the Levites would later lead the people to accept them as replacements of the firstborn sons, Bemidbar 3:41,45, and Devarim 10:8.

Bibliography:

Arusi, Ratzon, 2002, The trial of those who worshipped the golden calf, A divinely given Torah in our day and age, Vol. II, edited by Aryeh A. Frimer and Shlomo H. Pick, Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, pp. 245-249. 

Kasher, Menachem (1895-1983), 1992 (first volume appeared in 1927), Torah Shelemah: A talmudic-midrashic encyclopedia of the five books of Moses, Jerusalem: Beth Torah Shelemah, the Torah Shelemah Institute.

Shemot 18:13-27 –Yitro's visit to Moshe and the need for a judicial system

Shemot 18:13 records that on the day after Yitro came to Mount Sinai to visit Moshe, he observed Moshe judging the people the entire day. This might have been the first time that Moshe judged the people or maybe during the travels from the splitting of the Yam Suf until the people's arrival at Mount Sinai there were other days when Moshe judged. If there were other days, then only this day was recorded since we learn of Yitro's re-action to Moshe's system of judging. Yitro did not think much of Moshe's system, and he advised Moshe how to set up a more effective judicial system, 18:14-23. 18:24-26 records that Moshe heeded Yitro's advice and then 18:27 concludes the chapter that Yitro went back home to Midyan. When did these events happen: before the Decalogue in chapter 20 or after the Decalogue?

The Talmud (Zevachim 116a) quotes an argument between R. Yehoshua who argued that Yitro visited Moshe before the Decalogue was declared, which follows the order of the Torah, and R. Eleazar ha-Modia, who argued that Yitro’s visit was after the Decalogue. This argument continued amongst the commentators.

Ibn Ezra (long commentary on 18:1) follows R. Eleazar ha-Modia’s opinion and presents five reasons why he thinks chapter 18 is not recorded in chronological order. One, 18:5 refers to Yitro coming to Moshe who was camped in the desert by the mountain of G-d, Mount Sinai, and Ibn Ezra (on 18:5) believes that the word camped means for an extended time, which could only have been after the Decalogue. Two, Yitro offered sacrifices but there is no mention of an altar until after the giving of the Torah. Three, 18:16,20 refer to laws, which would seem to only be possible after the giving of the Torah. Four, Bemidbar 10:29-32, appears to record that Yitro was with the Jewish people in the second year, but 18:27 records that he left. Five, Devarim 1:9-19, which also records the establishment of the judicial system, implies that the people were ready to travel into the land of Israel after the system was established, while in chapter 18 the people were not going to travel for some time. Ibn Ezra (see also Tosafot, Avodah Zara, 24b, Yitro and Cassuto, 1967, pp. 211,212) explains that the section was recorded at this point in the Torah to contrast Amalek and Yitro, that Amalek harmed the Jewish people while Yitro was good to the Jewish people.

Ramban (on 18:1) disagrees with the Ibn Ezra. He claims that Yitro visited Moshe before the giving of the Torah, left and then returned in the second year. Ramban points out that 18:1 records that Yitro heard the wonders of the Exodus but does not state that he heard about the declaration of the Decalogue. Also 18:8 records that Moshe told Yitro the complete story of the Exodus but again there is no mention of the Decalogue, and 18:9,10, which record Yitro’s response, again only refer to the Exodus and not the Decalogue. Ramban argues that if Yitro had really visited after the Decalogue, then 18:1-10 should have referred to the Decalogue.

Abravanel (1997, pp. 260-263) follows the Ramban that Yitro visited Moshe before the giving of the Torah. He suggests that the altar used by Yitro was the one that Moshe built after the battle with Amalek, 17:16, and that the laws referred to in chapter 18 are the laws of Shabbat and civil laws that were taught at Mara, 15:25. Note, Luzzatto (on 18:15), who also follows this approach that Yitro visited Moshe before the Decalogue, suggests that the laws referred to in 15:25 were monetary laws, and other issues concerning personal disagreements and public order, see also Ramban on 15:25. 

Abravanel (see also Tosafot, Avodah Zara, 24b, Yitro) suggests that while Yitro advised Moshe about the judicial system before the giving of the Torah,  Moshe only implemented the system afterwards. Thus, Devarim 1:19 can record to the implementation of the judicial system when the people were ready to travel, and Shemot 18:24-26 is recorded out of chronological order. Abravanel believes that Yitro stayed with the people until the second year of the people’s stay in the desert in accordance with Bemidbar 10:29-32, and then Shemot 18:27, which records that Yitro left before the Decalogue, is also recorded out of chronological order.

Benno Jacob (1992, pp. 494,495) follows the Abravanel’s approach and points out that the more logical assumption is that Moshe’s family went to visit him immediately after the Exodus instead of waiting another year to see him. Jacob (p. 498) claims the altar could have been an “ad hoc altar,” since it is not difficult to build an altar, and hence there was no need to mention the building of an additional altar when Yitro offered his sacrifices. Furthermore, he (p. 502) argues that the establishment of the judicial system must have occurred at a later date, since the selection of so many judges was “a difficult and time–consuming task which had to be undertaken with great care. It surely could not have been accomplished during the few days which remained till their arrival at Sinai.”

My inclination is to follow the approach that Yitro visited Moshe before the Decalogue as argued by the Ramban, Abravanel, Luzzatto and Benno Jacob. With regard to Ibn Ezra's questions, I am not convinced that the word camping in 18:5 implies that Moshe had been camping for a long time by Mount Sinai, though it would imply that Yitro arrived at Mount Sinai after Moshe. With regard to the altar, Benno Jacob makes sense that it is not difficult to build an "ad hoc altar." The reference to laws in 18:16 could be that Moshe heard various cases, and then G-d told him the law relevant to the particular case. This could mean that G-d spoke to Moshe on the spot, or it could be that G-d spoke to Moshe every few hours or at the end of the day. 18:20 would then mean that Yitro advised Moshe to pass on to the people the laws that G-d had told him about the cases. With regard to the relationship between this section and Bemidbar 10:29-32, I do not think that Yitro is being referred to in Bemidbar 10:29-32, so Yitro could have left the people before the Decalogue as indicated by 18:27, see our discussion on Bemidbar 10:29-32, "Confusion in the family." Finally, I think Abravanel and Benno Jacob make sense that even if Yitro visited Moshe before the Decalogue, Moshe only implemented Yitro's advice afterwards, and then Devarim 1:9-19 can accord with Shemot 18:24-26. It is also possible that in Devarim 1, where Moshe was reminding the people of past events, Moshe was not giving the exact timing of each event in relation to the other events.

Yet, there is a stronger question that Ibn Ezra did not refer to in his long commentary, but he did mention in his short commentary on 18:1. Did Moshe have the time to sit and judge the people at Mount Sinai before the Decalogue?

Rashi (on 19:3,8,9) explains that once the people reached Mount Sinai, Moshe went up to Mount Sinai once a day to speak to G-d, and then he could not have been judging the people, from morning to night, 18:13. However, maybe there was a break in the days that Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to speak to G-d.  19:11 specifically refers to the people being ready on the third day, which means that on the following day, Moshe was "free." Rashi (on 19:11) explains that Moshe built the altar for the ceremony that is recorded in Shemot 24 on that day, but this is because he thinks that this ceremony occurred before the Decalogue (see Rashi on 24:1). However, if one believes that the ceremony occurred after the Decalogue, then Moshe could have judged the people on that day.

With this understanding, Yitro came to Mount Sinai on the day when G-d told Moshe the instructions recorded in 19:10-13, and Moshe judged the people the following day during his one "free" day.  Yet, was this judging necessary at this time? It could not wait until after the Decalogue?  Was there a need or desire to resolve all the conflicts amongst the people prior to the Decalogue?

My thought is that the discussion of Moshe judging the people and Yitro's advice to establish a judicial system is to teach the lesson prior to the Decalogue that societies need judicial systems. The Decalogue was part of the covenant which was a system of laws, and some people, such as anarchists, might question why is there a need for laws? The case of Moshe judging the people prior to the Decalogue and Yitro's advice demonstrates the need for laws since people naturally have disputes and there needs to be laws and a system to deal with these conflicts. Accordingly, Moshe had to make time to judge the people before the Decalogue to show that laws and especially civil laws are necessary for a society. Furthermore, this advice to establish a judicial system came from Yitro, a "foreigner," which shows that judicial systems are a universal need. (Note, if one wants to follow the idea that Yitro visited after the Decalogue, then this reason could explain why his visit was recorded before the Decalogue.)

To conclude, my inclination is that Yitro visited Moshe before the Decalogue, but Moshe implemented his advice after the Decalogue. As to when Yitro left, I doubt he left before the Decalogue since that was such an amazing event, but he could have left any time afterwards without any connection to the events in Bemidbar 10:29-32.

This understanding means that 18:1-4 occurred sometime after the Exodus from Egypt, but it took some time for Yitro and Moshe’s family to reach Moshe. 18:5-12 occurred after the people were already at Mount Sinai on the day when G-d told Moshe the instructions of 19:10-13. 18:13-23 occurred on the following day prior to the Decalogue, and 18:24-27 occurred sometime after the Decalogue, possibly right before the people left Mount Sinai.

The narrative order of chapter 18 is to record all the events relating to Yitro together even though this meant not following the chronological order of the events, see Tosafot, Avodah Zara, 24b, Yitro. Abravanel compares this to Shemot 16:33-35, which records that Moshe, told Aharon to take the mahn and put in it the aron, an event that also is recorded out of chronological order. Another example is Bereshit 11:32, which records the death of Terah out of chronological order in order to complete the discussion concerning Terah. In both cases, several references to the same person (Terah) or item (mahn) are recorded together even if some of the events regarding the person or item occurred at a later time. (Note, following this logic, one might be tempted to argue that also the events of 18:13-23 are recorded out of chronological order, but 18:13 is connected to 18:12 through the words, "on the morrow.")

Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Bereshit 45:5-8, 50:20 (Va-yiggash, Va-yehi) – The pawn

After Yosef revealed himself to his brothers, Bereshit 45:5-8 records that he told his brothers, "And now, do not be pained and do not be incensed with yourselves that you sold me down here, because for sustenance G-d has sent me before you…. And G-d has sent me before you to make you a remnant on earth and to preserve life, for you to be a great surviving group," (Alter, 2004, p. 261, translation). Seventeen years later, Yosef told his brothers almost the identical message, 50:20. These statements are ironic since Yosef meant that his brothers were pawns in G-d’s plan, but really he was the pawn in G-d’s plan for the Jewish people to end up in Egypt as foretold in the prophecy to Avram by the covenant of the pieces, Bereshit 15:13.

Yosef's rise to power was only one of the many inexplicable events that led to the fulfillment of the prophecy of 15:13. Others are that Lavan switched his daughters on Yaakov (see our discussion on 29:18-30, "The switch," Yaakov overtly favored Yosef (see our discussion on 37:2-14,"Parenting," the Midyanites happened to find Yosef in the pit, and the Yishmaelites happened to be going to Egypt at that time (see our discussion above on 37:25-34, 42:21, "Who sold Yosef?" All these events led Yaakov to agree to go to Egypt to see Yosef (Bereshit 45:28) even though he knew of the prophecy that Avram's descendants would suffer in a foreign land. 

The story of Yosef is the longest story in the Torah where there is no direct intervention by G-d either through miracles, communication from G-d or malakhim, and all the inexplicable events (even the dreams) could be understood in a human level. Yet, the string of so many inexplicable events and the fact that we know they are fulfilling the prophecy to Avram means that Yosef's story illustrates G-d's intervention in the story. Thus, N. Leibowitz (1976, pp. 394, 395) notes that the story of Yosef shows the "two levels on which actions are conducted:" The human, and "the hidden workings of Providence."

Even more important is that the story of Yosef shows how G-d intervenes in the world. The switching of Rahel and Lea occurred approximately 45 years before Yaakov and the family went to Egypt, and the sale of Yosef was 22 years before the family came to Egypt. Yosef even had to wait two years for the cupbearer to inform Pharaoh about his dream interpreting abilities. We see that G-d intervenes in the world in a very indirect way that can only be understood at best after many years. Perhaps this indirect and hidden method is to ensure that people still have free will to follow G-d or not.

My impression is that while G-d can intervene in the world, G-d usually does not intervene in the world, as instead the world functions according to the laws of nature. Furthermore, from the story of Yosef we see that even when G-d intervenes in the world, it is in a very indirect manner that is not self-evident. Accordingly, one should not expect G-d to do miracles that are manifest to all.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Bereshit 33:1-16 (Va-yishlach) - My brother, my enemy?

Bereshit 33:1-5 records that Yaakov and Esav hugged, kissed and cried when they met after not having seen each other for 20 years. Prior to the meeting, Yaakov was very scared of Esav, 32:8, but Esav was apparently extremely gracious.

Bereshit Rabbah 78:9 quotes two views as to whether Esav was really being friendly during this encounter. R. Shimon b. Eliezer states that Esav kissed Yaakov with all his heart, while R. Yannai claims that Esav really attempted to bite Yaakov. The idea that Esav attempted to bite Yaakov is far from the simple sense of the text, but was Esav, who initially wanted to kill Yaakov, 27:41, genuinely gracious to Yaakov? Why did Esav not attack Yaakov when they met?

One possibility is that Esav was truly a good person. Mark Twain followed this idea and wrote (1869, p. 22) "of Esav's sublime generosity to his brother who had wronged him."

Benno Jacob (1974, p. 226) suggests that Esav did not attack Yaakov due the wound that Yaakov received from fighting the night before. According to this idea, Esav took pity on Yaakov after he saw that Yaakov was wounded. Yet, if Esav had been waiting twenty years to take revenge, it is doubtful that seeing Yaakov wounded would have stopped him from attacking Yaakov.

Elhanan Samet (2002, p. 96-100) follows the idea that Yaakov fought with Esav's guardian angel the previous night, and claims that when the angel lost to Yaakov, the angel changed Esav's attitude towards Yaakov. I cannot accept this idea since I believe that Esav fought with Yaakov and not any guardian angel, see our discussion on 32:25-31, "Who fought with Yaakov?"

Another possibility (see for example, Sarna, 1989, p. 229) is that Esav chose not to attack Yaakov since Yaakov was submissive to Esav. Yaakov bowed down to Esav seven times, 33:3, which showed that he accepted that Esav was the dominant brother. This idea is made more explicit when after Esav initially refused to accept Yaakov's gifts, Yaakov referred to the gifts as his blessing, 33:11. Also, when Yaakov's children bowed down to Esav, 33:6,7, this was a fulfillment of the blessing that was intended for Esav that Yaakov received from Yitzhak, that the sons of your mother will bow down to you, 27:29. As noted by many commentators (see for example, Sacks, 2009a, p. 226), Yaakov was giving back the blessings to Esav that he had falsely received from Yitzhak, 27:28,29.  With this idea, the reason why Esav wanted to kill Yaakov was because Yaakov had stolen the blessing, but now that Yaakov was making amends, there was no reason for Esav to try to kill him. (Note, Yaakov was not giving back the second blessing he received from Yitzhak, 28:3,4, which was the crucial blessing, see our discussion on 28:3,4 "Endogamy.") 

While I agree that Yaakov was trying to give the blessings back, I think that Esav did not attack Yaakov since he had just attacked him the night before and failed. Why did he not attack Yaakov in the morning with his four hundred men? The answer is that Esav wanted to kill Yaakov personally without it being public knowledge, so I think his generosity to Yaakov was contrived.

Whether Esav was truly a good soul or whether he still harbored hatred of Yaakov can be discerned from their conversation after Esav agreed to accept Yaakov's gifts. Esav then offered Yaakov that they should travel together, 33:12. Yaakov tried to decline the offer by claiming that his children and animals needed to walk slowly, while if Esav was with him, he would be end up being forced to walk quickly. However, Yaakov said that he would go to Seir, ostensibly to see Esav, 33:13,14.

It is not clear if Yaakov was being truthful in his response to Esav. It could be that he was lying since he was scared that Esav would attack him again if they traveled together, and he was just trying to politely get out of the offer to travel together. Furthermore, as Esav knew that Yaakov knew that he was the assailant the previous night (again see our discussion on 32:25-31, "Who fought with Yaakov?"), he would have understood that Yaakov had no intention of ever going to Seir. (In modern times, The Economist, 2011a, pp. 108, 109, writes "Chinese circumlocution is often a form of polite opacity. Chinese people don't like being too direct in turning down invitations or (as many journalists find) requests for interviews. So they will frequently reply that something is bu fang (not convenient). This does not mean reapply in a few weeks' time. It means they don't want to do it, ever.)

Or, it could be that Yaakov wanted to travel alone, possibly due to his wound from the fight in the previous night or for some other personal reason, and he did not want to bring up his wounds from the fight or the personal reasons, so he mentioned the children and the animals. With this possibility, it could be that he did intend to go to Seir, and that he went to Seir but this visit is not recorded. With this possibility, Yaakov had not initially been intending to go to Seir, but Yaakov made this offer in response to Esav's offer to travel together.

Regardless of what Yaakov meant or how Esav understood Yaakov's answer, Esav responded to Yaakov's concern about the children and animals, that Esav would leave some of his 400 men to help Yaakov travel, 33:15. Yaakov refused this offer without giving a reason. Maybe again Yaakov was worried about Esav attacking him or again he just wanted to travel alone. 

Esav made no response after Yaakov declined his offer of aid, and instead 33:16 records that he went back home. The Netziv (on 33:16) notes the difference between the parting between Yaakov and Esav and the parting between Yaakov and Lavan. Yaakov and Lavan ate together, stayed together at night and in the morning Lavan kissed and blessed Yaakov and his family, 32:54, 33:1. None of this occurred by Yaakov and Esav. Their encounter started very dramatically, but then it ended quickly with no sign of love and brotherliness. The Netziv deduces that Esav left in anger, and he explains that this anger is why Yaakov never went to Seir. The idea being that when Yaakov said that he would go to Seir, he meant it, but he just wanted to travel alone at his own pace. However, when Yaakov saw that Esav left in a hurry, he realized that his brother still hated him and it would be dangerous to go to Seir, and only then he decided not to go to Seir.

This refusal by Yaakov to accept Esav's assistance is another example of the flipping of the blessings of Yitzhak, only now by the blessing that Esav received. After Yaakov tricked Yitzhak, Esav begged Yitzhak for a blessing, 27:34, and then Yitzhak blessed Esav that while Yaakov would be the dominant brother, still Esav would be able to break off from his yoke, 27:40. Now, this blessing was being fulfilled in the opposite manner. Yaakov had bowed down to Esav, but Yaakov was breaking from Esav's yoke by wanting to travel by himself without Esav and Esav's men.

In any event, we can return to the question was Esav truly a good person? One could claim yes, that Esav forgave Yaakov for stealing the blessings, he was offering Yaakov to travel together and to help Yaakov, and he only got angry when he perceived that Yaakov was lying to him. However, since I think that Esav attacked Yaakov in the middle of the night to kill him (see our discussion on Bereshit 32:25-31, "Who fought with Yaakov?") his graciousness upon meeting Yaakov was false, and his anger when Yaakov rebuffed his offer to travel together indicated his true feelings towards Yaakov. Esav should have known that Yaakov would be wary of traveling with him and/ or under escort of his men, and if Esav had really changed or was a good soul, then when Yaakov rebuffed him, he should have accepted Yaakov's reluctance and just said something like "ok, we will be expecting you" and then left in a pleasant manner (good wishes/ mutual blessings/ handshakes/ kisses/ hugs). However, his leaving in a huff indicates that Esav was not a sublime fellow, but at most was temporarily touched by Yaakov bowing down to him.

Bibliography:

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1974, The first book of the bible: Genesis, commentary abridged, edited and translated by Earnest I. Jacob and Walter Jacob, New York: Ktav Publishing House.

Sacks, Jonathan, 2009, Covenant and Conversation: Genesis: The Book of Beginnings, Jerusalem: Maggid Books.

Samet, Elhanan, 2002, Studies in the Weekly Parsha, Hebrew, Jerusalem: Hemed.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Twain, Mark, (1869, first edition), 1966, The Innocents Abroad, New York: The New American Library.

Bereshit 9:12-17 (Noah) – A rainbow after the flood?

Bereshit (Genesis) 9:12-17 record that the sign of the covenant between G-d and Noah is the keshet, and keshet is translated as a rainbow based on Yechezkel 1:28. The symbolism of the rainbow accords nicely with the timing of the covenant with Noah since just as the rainbow shows hope after the storm, so too Noah should have been hopeful to re-start the world.

Was the rainbow just created at the time of the flood? Ibn Ezra (on 9:13) argues yes, based on the word natati (9:13). Radak (on 9:13) explains that according to this approach after the flood G-d made the sun stronger that it would cause a rainbow. On the other hand, the Mishnah (Pirkei Avot 5:9) records that the rainbow was created during the twilight of the eve of the first Shabbat. Similarly, Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on 9:13) and the Ramban (on 9:12) argue that the rainbow always existed and only after the flood was its appearance to be taken as an ot, sign, of the covenant. (Does Radak suggest an in-between approach that it existed before the flood but did not exist during the year of the flood?) The text here supports the Ibn Ezra, but it is hard to argue that the physical properties of the sun and water changed from before the flood to after the flood.

Another question is the purpose of the rainbow. It is commonly understood that the rainbow informs a person that really G-d should have destroyed the world but G-d did not do so since G-d had promised not to. With this idea, the rainbow is for people to realize that they are misbehaving. However, 9:15 states that rainbow was for G-d to remember.

The language of G-d remembering is also not clear since we believe that G-d does not forget. Instead, the word remembering in reference to G-d is traditionally understood as a way of expressing the idea, in human terms that G-d is acting after ignoring something but in this case what was G-d ignoring?

Cassuto (1964, pp. 138,139) notes two other difficulties with the sign of the rainbow. One, 9:13,14,16, all record that the keshet was to be in the clouds, but rainbows are in the sky not in the clouds. Two, how can the rainbow remind G-d to not wipe out the world, if the rainbow appears after the storm is over?

While Cassuto suggests answers to his questions, I doubt the word keshet here means rainbow. I believe that after the flood, G-d put in the clouds (atmosphere?) a mechanism to stop the rains at some point, a type of automatic shut-off system. The language of G-d remembering is in reference to the system that the system that G-d set up would act to stop the world from being flooded. This action would occur after the rains had begun, which from the system's point of view would be ignored until the rains reached a certain "danger" point, and then the new system would stop or slow down the rains.

With this idea, the word, ot, sign, does not mean a sign that people will see on a regular basis but it is a sign that the covenant is being fulfilled and is not mere words. Thus, G-d established the system to stop the rains from flooding the world, and this indicates that the promise of the covenant of 9:8-11 is being fulfilled. This would be similar to the ot by circumcision, 17:11, that it is not for a person to always look at this sign, but when parents circumcise their sons, then they have demonstrated their commitment to the covenant. This demonstration is the ot of the covenant.

Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1964, A commentary on the book of Genesis, part two: From Noah to Abraham, Jerusalem: Magnes Press.

When is the Jewish New Year?

Rav Zevin (1956, p. 33) discusses whether Rosh Hashanah is really the Jewish New Year. He notes that in the Torah the holiday is referred to as the first day of the seventh month, which clearly means that that it is not the New Year. Ezra and Nehemiah also used this dating, see Nehemiah 7:72. (Also Megillat Esther 3:7 refers to Nisan, as the first month.) Furthermore even in the time of the Talmud, Rabbi Yehoshua (Rosh Hashanah 11a) maintained that the world was created in Nisan, which would mean that the 1st of Nisan is really the Jewish New Year. Zevin also notes that in the prayers of Rosh Hashanah there is barely any reference (he notes one verse) to the day as marking the New Year, as the day is usually referred to as a day of remembrance. Zevin concludes that notwithstanding all these points, it is accepted that Rosh Hashanah is the New Year, as the name itself attests to.

Shemot 12:2 explicitly states that the month of Pesach (Nisan) is the first month of the year, and all of the dates in the Torah follow this system. This implies that the year begins in the spring. However, Shemot 23:16, 34:22, record that the holiday of the gathering (Sukkot) was at the end of the year, which implies that the year begins in the fall. Also, Devarim 31:10 records that the law of hakhel is to be done at the end of the every seven years, in the shemitta year in the holiday of Sukkot. This phrase “end of every seven years” also implies that Sukkot marks the end of the year. However, this dating of hakhel is problematic even if Rosh Hashanah is the beginning of the year. If Rosh Hashanah is the beginning of the year, then Sukkot, which is 15 days later, is in the beginning of the shemitta year and not the end of the seven years. Rashi (on Devarim 31:10) explains that Devarim 31:10 refers to Sukkot in the 8th year since that would be the end of the shemitta cycle. Furthermore, he explains that 31:10 refers to the 8th year as the shemitta year since some laws of shemitta still applied. Yet, 31:10 records that hakhel was to be in the shemitta year, and the 8th year is no longer the shemitta year.

Ibn Ezra (on Shemot 12:2 and Vayikra 25:9) tries to prove that the year begins in Tishrei in an argument he had with a Karaite, Yehuda HaParsi. One proof is that the blowing of the shofar for the yovel year occurs on Yom Kippur, Vayikra 25:9. Presumably the blowing of the shofar announces the start of the yovel year, and thus the year begins in Tishrei. A 2nd proof is that if the New Year is in Nisan, then hakhel should be by Pesach in the beginning of the year instead of waiting until the middle of the year. A third proof is from Shemot 23:16, 34:22 which we mentioned above. A fourth proof is from Vayikra 25:11, which records the prohibitions of working the land in the yovel year, and first records that one cannot plant before recording the prohibition of harvesting. In Israel planting is done in the fall and harvesting in the spring, so if the New Year was in the spring, then the text should have first recorded harvesting and then planting. Furthermore Ibn Ezra claims that if the New Year was in Nissan, then it should have been forbidden to plant in the 6th year as well since one could not harvest in the 7th year. Yet, the Torah only forbids planting in the 7th year. (I think this is the proof.)

In his comments on Vayikra 25:20, Ibn Ezra disputes a proof from the Sadducees that the year begins in Nisan. Vayikra 25:20 records that “the people will ask what can we eat in the 7th year, can we not harvest our crops?” The Sadducees argued that the words “our crops” implies that that the people planted the crops in the fall, as otherwise they would not be called “our” and this planting could only be done if the shemitta year started in Nisan since then the planting was done in the fall of the 6th year. Ibn Ezra responded that our crops could be what grew naturally, as in 25:12 (although 25:12 does not use the word ours). Furthermore, Ibn Ezra notes that Vayikra 25:21 records that the crops of the 6th year would last for three years, but according to the Sadducees during yovel it would have to last four years: the 7th year would be the shemitta year, the 8th year would be yovel, and only in the 9th year could one plant crops but as the planting season was in the fall the crops would not be available until the 10th year. Thus the harvest of the 6th year would have had to last four years but the Torah only stated that the produce would last 3 years. (However, Rashi on 25:22 notes that even when the year begins in Tishrei it is possible that the crops of the 6th year would need to last 4 years.)

Notwithstanding the arguments of Ibn Ezra, I think the text supports Rabbi Yehoshua that the year starts in Nisan, as implied by Shemot 12:2. Shemot 23:16 and 34:22 can be understood as simply referring to the end of the agricultural year, not the calendar year. Sukkot is the celebration of the complete harvest since after Sukkot there is no more harvest and this signaled whether the agricultural year was successful or not. It would be similar to a business that does all of its business in the summer, so for the business the end of the summer is considered the end of the year.

Devarim 31:10, which records “the end of every seven years in the shemitta year” would mean that hakhel was to be done at 6 years and seven months in the 7 year cycle, which is close to the end of the cycle. I do not understand why Ibn Ezra thought it is problematic to read hakhel in the middle of the year. If the New Year is in Nisan, this allows hakhel to be both in the shemitta year itself and at the end of the 7-year cycle, as stated in Devarim 31:10. (See our discussion in our commentary on Devarim 31:10, "Hakhel, shemitta, and sukkot")

Ibn Ezra’s proof from the fact that the prohibition of seeding is recorded before the prohibition of harvesting is not convincing since the verse (Vayikra 25:11) does not show the order of the year but follows the order of field work, first one plants and then one harvests. Also, I do not see why planting should have been forbidden in the 6th year just because it was forbidden to harvest in the 7th year, as according to the Torah one can eat the crops that grow in the 7th year, Vayikra 25:7 .

I think Vayikra 25:21 recorded that the crops of the 6th year would last 3 years because really the yovel year was also the shemitta year, so there was no double years of no planting and no harvesting, see our discussion on Vayikra 25:8-11, "From yovel to yovel: 49 or 50 years?" In addition, even if one maintains that the yovel year was separate from the shemitta year as Rashi pointed out (on 25:22), 25:21 can be understood as only referring to the shemitta year and not to the yovel year,.

Furthermore, Vayikra 25:22 supports the idea that the New Year is Nisan since it records that the people would plant in the 8th year and in the 9th year the new crop would be ready. If shemitta started in Tishrei, so then already in the summer of the 8th year one could eat of the planting from the fall of the 8th year. (Bulah, 1992, on 25:21, explains that if the year starts in Tishrei, then for 2/3 of the 8th year there would be no produce and that the full harvest would not be until the 9th year.) It is simpler to understand that the year starts in Nisan, which means there would be no harvest (other than from natural growth) in the 8th year because one could not plant in the 7th year. The fall planting in the 8th year would then be available in the 9th year.

With regard to the blowing of the shofar for the yovel year, I believe it was blown in the seventh month of the 49th year to announce the upcoming yovel year, which would begin five months later in Nissan. This would allow people time to prepare for the yovel year and be similar to the idea that the shofar on Rosh Hashanah announces that Yom Kippur is coming, see our discussion on Vayikra 23:23-25, "Rosh Hashanah."

Bibliography:

Bulah, Menachem, 1991, 1992, Vayikra: Da'at Mikra, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Zevin, Shlomo Yosef (1890-1978), 1944, first edition, 1956, seventh edition, Ha-Mo'adim ba- Halakhah, Jerusalem.

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 20:2-8 - Draft exemptions in the Torah

Devarim 20:3,4 record that before going to war, the priest is to announce that the people should not fear the enemy since G-d will help them win. Afterwards, 20:5-8 record that the shotrim (officials) were to list four reasons for people to be exempt from fighting in the war. It is clear from the exemptions in 20:5-8, that some soldiers will die in the war even thought 20:4 records that G-d will help the people. We see that even if G-d will intervene to help the people, still the laws of nature apply, and people will die in the war.

In addition, we see that a person's lifespan is not pre-determined since if the person returns home and does not fight then he has a greater chance of living. Hoffmann (1961, p. 379, on 20:7) writes that for sure the person was destined to die, but just like the law by putting up a guardrail (22:8), we do not want the person's death to be the responsibility of the officials who send the people to war. Yet, this analogy is not correct since the guardrail stops everybody from falling off the roof and dying, while here the exemptions only stop a few people from dying. The simple understanding of 20:2-8, and of the law of putting up a guardrail, is that if a person acts in a dangerous manner, then he/she has a greater chance of dying, and when possible people should take precautions to increase their chance of living.

The four draft exemptions can be divided into two groups, based on the break in 20:8, "and the shotrim continue to speak." The first group, 20:5-7, record exemptions for a person who has built a house but has not yet dedicated it, planted a vineyard but did not harvest it or was engaged but did not yet marry. The second group, 20:8, is for a person who is scared of dying and/ or of attacking the enemy (Ibn Ezra and Hizkuni on 20:8).

It is striking that these exemptions do not include the most popular draft exemption today in Israel, learning Torah. If this is a legitimate exemption, why was it not mentioned in the Torah with the other exemptions? In fact, the examples of planting a vineyard and building a house are probably completely removed from the life of the typical person today who does not serve in the Israeli army. As S. R. Hirsch writes, (1989, on 20:5-7) “Clearly here the Torah… strikingly lays value on these peace-time tasks being accomplished by every individual personally.” The list of draft exemptions is another case where the Torah indicates the importance of working.

The Torah explains that the reason for the exemption in 20:8 (the second group) is in order that these people who are exempt do not harm the morale of the people fighting, but what is the reason for the exemptions in 20:5-7 (the first group)? One curiosity within the first group of exemptions is that for each of the three cases, the Torah stresses that there is fear that somebody else may either dedicate the house, harvest the vineyard or marry the woman. Why is this possibility relevant to granting the exemption to a person from fighting? Why is it important who dedicates the house or harvests the vineyard?

The three possibilities mentioned in 20:5-7 are also referred to in the section of curses, 28:30, which is understandable since it is a misfortune if a person cannot enjoy his/ her efforts by the house and the fields and if a person who is engaged loses the prospective spouse to somebody else. However, here the fear is that a person will die in battle, why is it worse that the soldier dies without dedicating his house, eating the grapes of his vineyard or getting married?

One approach (see Rashi on 20:5 and Bekhor Shor on 20:7) is that the exemptions are because it is very sad for somebody who has worked so hard at a project to be unable to complete the project. This sadness compounds the sadness of a soldier dying in battle. Is this true even by a vineyard?  Is the death of a soldier sadder if somebody else lives in the house he built?  Also, if one accepts this idea, that the goal is to reduce the sadness of a death of a soldier, why are there no exemptions to soldiers who have pregnant wives or very young children?

Another approach (see Ibn Ezra on 20:5 and Ramban end of comments on 20:1) is that because a person is so pre-occupied with thinking about his house, vineyard and wife, he will flee the battle. Again, I do not understand why this concern should also not be for a soldier with a pregnant wife or young children? Also, with this idea, what difference does it make if another person is going to enjoy the vineyard or the house? Furthermore, if a person is really so worried about his house, vineyard and wife, maybe he would fight harder to get back to them. Paul Kloot (congregant of shul in Modiin) suggested to me that in battle everybody has to be together, so if a person is worried that another person will take his house, vineyard or wife, then the person will not be willing to sacrifice to help out his fellow soldiers.

My guess is that the draft exemptions are to slightly reduce the tragedy of war. In war, many people die and there is no recollection of them at all, as at times even the bodies cannot be identified. In all three cases of the draft exemption of 20:5-7, the person is on the verge of making a name for himself, either by his house, vineyard or wife, that people would say this is his house, vineyard or wife. This is the point of dedicating the house that it will be called his house, and this is the fear of another person appearing, that the house, vineyard or wife will be called after the other person.  The Torah gives this person an exemption in order that he can make a name for himself in some small way, and not suffer the fate of a solider to be a nameless causality. With this logic, we understand why no exemption was granted for a soldier whose wife was pregnant or who had young children since his name and memory would be remembered by the wife, children or potential child.

Bibliography:

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, translated by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1961, Commentary on Deuteronomy, translated by Tzvi Har-Shefer, Tel Aviv: Nezach.

Bemidbar 13:2 and Devarim 1:22,23 - Whose idea was it to send the spies?

Devarim 1:19-45 records Moshe’s recollection of the sending of the spies 38 years earlier. It has long been noted that there are several differences between the account of the spies in Bemidbar 13,14 and Moshe's retelling of the incident in Devarim 1. Perhaps the most obvious difference in Moshe's retelling of the sending of the spies is that Devarim 1:22 records that Moshe stated that it was the people who requested for the spies to be sent, while Bemidbar 13:2 records that G-d told Moshe to send the spies.

Rashi (on Bemidbar 13:2, and for a more recent versions see Samet 2002) explains that the people first requested from Moshe to send spies, and then Moshe asked and received G-d's permission to send the spies. Yet, if both G-d and the people desired for the spies to be sent, why did Bemidbar 13 only refer to G-d's authorization and not the people's request while in Devarim, Moshe only referred to the people's request and not G-d's authorization? N. Leibowitz (1980a, pp. 16-25) explains, based on the Ramban's comments on Bemidbar 13:2, that in Bemidbar the Torah did not record the people's request for the spies since it was "natural and understood" while in Devarim, Moshe only referred to the people's request for the spies since he wanted to emphasize the people's responsibility for their sin.

I doubt that the people had the gumption to take the initiative and propose to send spies. Prior to the incident of the spies, we read how the people were crying for meat, Bemidbar 11:4, and their re-action to the report of the spies show that they had not lost their slave mentality. If the people really initiated the sending of the spies, then this fact should have been recorded in Bemidbar. In addition, my understanding is that the sending of the spies was a test to see if the people were ready to enter the land of Israel, had they lost slave mentality or not, see our discussion on Bemidbar 13:1,2 "A test," http://www.lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/06/bemidbar-131-20-shelah-test.html. Accordingly, I believe that it was G-d who initiated the sending of the spies, as recorded in Bemidbar 13:2.

How then can we explain Moshe's statement in Devarim 1:22? My guess is that after Moshe heard the command from G-d to send the spies he told this to the Jewish people, and their response is recorded in Devarim 1:22. The people were "agreeing" to the idea to send the spies, though the spies would have been sent even if they had not "agreed." In addition, the people proposed their own reason why to send the spies. G-d had not given a reason why the spies were to be sent, and the people on their own said, 1:22, "that the spies should explore which is the best road to travel on…" Moshe was very happy with the people's response, Devarim 1:23, since this was an indication that maybe the people were ready to enter the land of Israel, but, alas, they were not.

In Bemidbar 13, the Torah did not record that the people had "agreed" to send the spies since the sending of the spies was not due to the initiative of the people as even had they not "agreed," Moshe would still have sent the spies. Thus, their "agreement" was not important to the historical record of the sending of the spies, and in Bemidbar 13 the stress is on the historical account of the events. Most likely there were other conversations between Moshe and the people about the spies that were not recorded in the Torah. In addition, coupled with the people's statement to send spies was their rationale for the spies, and had this rationale been recorded in Bemidbar 13, then readers of the Torah would have assumed that the reason for the spies was the people's rationale, to find the best way to travel, but really the sending of the spies was to test whether the people had lost their slave mentality or not.

In Devarim the people's "agreement" to the sending the spies and not G-d's command to send the spies was mentioned for two possible reasons. One, as explained by N. Leibowitz, the goal was to emphasize the people's responsibility for the sin of the spies. Two, it is possible that some of the people had become bitter about the incident of the spies. After spending forty years in the desert, the people might have wondered why did G-d tell them to send the spies? Did G-d not know that the people of Canaan would scare the spies? Thus, in Devarim Moshe did not want to mention that G-d had commanded Moshe to send the spies, and instead he recalled that the people had "agreed" to send the spies. Hence, the people cannot blame G-d for entrapment, but instead they were to understand that they had failed by accepting the report of the spies. Also, as the people were about to enter the land of Israel, Moshe wanted them to know that it was permitted to send spies to explore the land so he recorded here how they wanted to send the spies to explore the land and that he was happy with the offer.