Barkhu (Barchu) at the end of Shacharit and Maariv

When I was growing up in America, there was no regular custom by the chazzan or mourners to recite barkhu at the end of Shacharit or Maariv. However, occasionally people who came late to Maariv, would yell out barkhu at the end of the prayer services. In Israel, by Maariv the custom is for a mourner to recite barkhu after reciting Kaddish, and if no mourner is present then the chazzan recites barkhu. The one exception is that by Maariv on Shabbat and Yom Tov night, the chazzan automatically says barkhu and not the mourner. With regard to Shacharit, there are two variations. One, which I believe is the custom of Sefaridm and some Ashkenazim in Israel, is to recite barkhu at the end of Shacharit just like by Maariv. Two, which I believe is the custom of the majority of Ashkenazim in Israel is to recite barkhu at the end of Shacharit when there is no Torah reading, namely Sunday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday on a regular weekday.

It is not clear why barkhu is recited altogether at the end of the prayers and why different people, the chazzan, the person who comes late and the mourner, recite it. We will attempt to explain this custom and we start with the case of the mourner.

The source for the mourner to recite barkhu is from a legend about R. Akiva. I believe that the earliest version of the story is recorded in Kallah Rabbathi, 2:9. (Marienberg, 2009, p. 84, notes that the standard understanding is that the Kallah Rabbathi is from the early Geonic period, while Brodsky, 2006, argues that most likely the first two chapters are from the first half of the fifth century.) 

According to Kallah Rabbathi, R. Akiva meets a person carrying a very heavy load, crying and groaning. R. Akiva wondered why he was suffering and asked him what was his profession when he was alive. (Apparently R. Akiva realized that the person was dead, a ghost.) He answered that when he was alive he had violated all the prohibitions and now he was being punished. For some reason that is not clear to me, R. Akiva wanted to help this terrible person. R. Akiva then learned that he had a pregnant wife. When the boy grew up, R. Akiva took him to the synagogue to pray with the congregation. The ghost then appeared to R. Akiva and told R. Akiva that he had saved him. This version of the story makes no mention of saying kaddish or barkhu, but the story changed over time.

The Or Zarua (R. Yitzhak the son of Moshe from Vienna, 1200-1270?, Laws of Shabbat, 50) records the same basic story with some variations. In this version, R. Akiva met a naked person who was working very hard, and R. Akiva asked him, why are you working so hard? The person answered that he is dead, and everyday he is sent to cut trees and then he is burnt in them. R. Akiva wondered why he was suffering such a fate, and asked him what was his job when he was alive. The dead person answered that he was a tax collector. He favored the rich and killed the poor. R. Akiva then wondered if there is anything that could be done to help this dead person, and the dead person told him that he heard from the people tormenting him that if had a son who either recited barkhu, and the people would respond, baruch Hashem ha-mevurch, or if the son recited yitgadel (Kaddish), and the people would respond, ye-he shem rabba mevurch le-olam u-lealmei almaya he could be saved. R. Akiva learned that the dead person's name was also Akiva, and he found out where he lived, Lodkiya (Lod? Laodicea?). When R. Akiva went to the place, the people said of the dead person, "May his bones be ground to dust." R. Akiva persevered, and found the dead person's child. He taught him to pray, and the child recited both barkhu and yitgadel. The dead person was then released from his suffering, he appeared to R. Akiva in a dream, and blessed R. Akiva.

Wieseltier (1998, pp. 41-43) records a close variation to this version of the story from the Machzor Vitry (R. Simhah the son of Shmuel of Vitry, 11th century). Wieseltier (p. 36) also notes that in the seventh or eighth century a work appeared called Otiyot de-Rabbi Akiva, The Alphabet of Rabbi Akiva, and in the discussion of the seventh letter, zayin, the book records how the Kaddish can save souls of the dead from hell.

The Or Zarua concludes his re-telling of the story by noting that his teacher, R. Eleazar of Worms, the Rokeach, stated that a child who recites Kaddish saves his father from punishment. He does not refer to reciting barkhu, only Kaddish. My guess would be that this is because Kaddish does not have G-d's name in it while barkhu does, and saying G-d's name inappropriately could be a violation of the Shemot 20:7, see the Rama on Orah Chayyim 188:7. In addition, within Kaddish, there is a minor barkhu, when the mourner says brich hu and the congregation responds, brich hu. Furthermore, it is customary for the mourner to be the chazzan and then the mourner recites barkhu before the blessings of the Shema.

The Rambam makes no mention of a mourner or of a chazzan at the end of the prayers reciting barkhu. R. Yosef Caro in the Bet Yosef (Yorah Deah, 376) records a brief version of this story from the Kalbo with some variations (an anonymous Rabbi and not R. Akiva) and he writes that due to this story, the son of the deceased recites Kaddish for 12 months and recites the Haftorah (on the yahrzeit?). Neither in the Bet Yosef nor in the Shulchan Arukh, does R. Yosef Caro record that a mourner recites barkhu. When he does refer to reciting barkhu at the end of the prayers, it is in reference to a person coming late to the prayers and not to the mourner, see Orah Chayyim 133 and our discussion below.

I think this legendary story does not warrant saying G-d's name and hence mourners should not call out barkhu at the end of Shacharit or Maariv. In addition, according to the story, the son only has to recite the barkhu and the Kaddish once. With regard to the barkhu this "obligation" is fulfilled if the person is a chazzan once and recites barkhu in its regular place or receives an aliyah and recites barkhu. We now turn to the second reason for reciting barkhu at the end of Shacharit and Maariv.

The second and apparently completely independent reason for reciting barkhu is related to the question of barkhu's place or importance in the prayers. Probably the first reference to reciting barkhu is in the Mishnah (Tamid 5:1) which records that in the second Bet ha-Mikdash, the superintendent called out (to the priests), barkhu recite a blessing, and the priests recited a blessing and read the Decalogue and the Shema. The superintendent then called out again, barkhu the people three more blessings. We see that the point of reciting barkhu is to invite or call out to people to bless G-d. Thus, we recite barkhu by Shacharit and Maariv, which have the blessings of the Shema, but not by Minhah or Musaf which have no blessings of the Shema.

Another Mishnah (Berakhot 7:3) states that a person calls out barkhu prior to reciting the birkat ha-mazon in certain circumstances depending on the number of people reciting the birkat ha-mazon. Again we see that the barkhu is an invitation for others to bless G-d. It seems that by the time this Mishnah was compiled, people were already reciting barkhu in the synagogue since R. Akiva argues out that the law by birkat ha-mazon should be the same as by the synagogue that barkhu et Hashem is recited once there are ten people regardless of how many more people there are. R. Yishmael adds that the person should recite barkhu et Hashem ha-mevurach possibly in order that the person who calls out barkhu praises G-d. The Mishnah does not state when barkhu was recited in the synagogue and to the best of my knowledge, this law to recite barkhu before birkat ha-mazon has been lost.

One other possible case of reciting barkhu in the Mishnah is by reading the Torah. The Mishnah (Megillah 4:1) records that the first person and last people who have an aliyah recite a blessing. (Today, the custom is that each person having an aliyah makes a blessing before and after the aliyah.) The Mishnah does not mention what are the blessings and does not refer to reciting barkhu, but the custom (Rambam, Laws of prayer, 11:5) is to recite barkhu before the first blessing. Again the barkhu is an invitation to bless since the person immediately recites a blessing and after the reading of the aliyah the person recites another blessing. (I do not know when the barkhu was included in the aliyah. Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 59, records that one version of R. Amram Gaon's Siddur, mentions reciting barkhu before the aliyah.)

Around 600 years after the Mishnah, in the 9th century, R. Amram Gaon (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 41) records that a question arose with regard to people who came late to shul after the chazzan already recited barkhu, whether the chazzan could recite barkhu for these people in between the last blessing of the Shema and Shemoneh Esrei? R. Amram Gaon answered that this was possible by Maariv but not by Shacharit. (This law by Maariv is recorded by the Shulchan Arukh 236:2.) In this case, the barkhu was only for those people who came late, as R. Amram Gaon specifies that only the people who come late would respond to the barkhu.  Again, barkhu was  an invitation for people to recite the blessings of the Shema.

Around 300 hundred years later in the 12th century, the Manhig (Avraham b. Natan ha-Yarhi, Provence, Laws of prayer, 27) quotes from the Geonim that by Shacharit, the chazzan can recite barkhu for the people who come late at the end of the prayers, while by Maariv, following R. Amram Gaon, the chazzan can recite barkhu for the latecomers before starting Shemoneh Esrei. The Manhig explicitly writes that if the latecomers already recited the blessings of the Shema, then the chazzan does not recite barkhu for them.

Two hundred years later, in the 14th century, the Rivash (Isaac ben Sheshet Perfet, 1326-1407, Spain/ Algiers, response 334) was asked about reciting barkhu at the end of the prayers. The custom had developed to recite barkhu at the end of the prayers, and a certain R. Moshe was trying to abolish the custom since no blessing was recited afterwards. The Rivash agreed that one should not recite barkhu if nobody is reciting any blessings afterwards. He then quotes the custom in Barcelona, that on Friday and Yom Tov night because people always came late, they would recite barkhu at the end of the prayers and the latecomers would then pray after hearing the barkhu. Also during the weekday mornings, barkhu was recited at the end of the prayers for the people who came late and who would then begin to pray. However, on Shabbat and Yom Tov when the prayers take longer and everybody already prayed, then barkhu was not recited at the end of the prayers. He writes that this is the correct custom. However, he did not want to abrogate the custom of places who recited barkhu all the time even if the custom was incorrect. Accordingly, he concludes with a compromise that in those places which had the custom to always recite barkhu at the end of the prayers, they should at least stop reciting barkhu at the end of Shacharit/ Musaf on Shabbat and Yom Tov morning.

At around the same time and also in Spain, the Abudraham (1995, p. 140, towards the end of his discussion on weekday Shacharit) records that in some places, the chazzan recites barkhu at the end of the prayers even though no blessing was recited after the barkhu, while in other places, it was viewed as wrong to recite barkhu without any blessing afterwards since barkhu is an invitation to make a blessing.

We see that by the 14th century there had developed a new view of barkhu. The traditional view, espoused by the Manhig, R. Moshe and the Rivash is that barkhu is an invitation to recite blessings and there needs to be some blessing after saying barkhu. With this understanding, to be able to recite barkhu there has to be somebody who had not yet prayed. The new view was that barkhu stands alone that there is no need for there to be any blessing afterwards.

In the 16th century, the Shulchan Arukh (Orah Chayyim 69:1) writes that if ten people prayed individually and then joined together, one of them can recite Kaddish, barkhu and the first blessing of yotser or. The need for reciting yotser or is that there needs to be a blessing after barkhu. Thus, in the Bet Yosef, R. Yosef Caro quotes the Mahariya (?) that people who recite barkhu afterwards must make sure that there is somebody who is going to recite the blessings of the Shema since otherwise it looks as if they are denying G-d by ignoring the chazzan who told them to bless G-d. (The Mishnah Berurah, 69:1, quotes that the Radbaz thinks the Shulchan Arukh is incorrect that the blessing yotzer or cannot be said a second time, but he agrees that one can only recite the barkhu if there is a person who will recite yotser or for the first time.)

The Rama (16th century, Krakow) disagrees with the Shulchan Arukh. He writes in the Darkei Moshe (69:1) that once a person responds to the barkhu by saying baruch Hashem ha-mevurach le-olam vaed, then that is sufficient, and there is no need to recite any blessing afterwards. The Mishnah Berurah (69:4) writes that Elyah Rabbah and the Magen Avraham agree with the Rama. The Rama writes that a proof of this understanding is that by the Torah reading, the congregation only says baruch Hashem ha-mevurach le-olam vaed, and no other blessing. Yet, the blessing recited by the person having the aliyah after saying barkhu is the blessing that accompanies the barkhu. In addition, baruch Hashem ha-mevurach le-olam vaed is not a blessing.  In any event, the Rama writes that the custom to recite Kaddish and barkhu by the latecomers was only by Shacharit.

However, even though the Rama is following the idea that barkhu stands by itself, his ruling is only for people who "missed" barkhu, but the Rama did not state that the chazzan should repeat barkhu if everybody in the minyan heard/ recited barkhu. This issue arises in Orah Chayyim 133.

The Shulchan Arukh (133:1) quotes the Rivash and writes that on Shabbat and Yom Tov morning, the chazzan should not automatically recite barkhu. It is not clear how this ruling relates to his ruling in Orah Chayyim 69:1 where he required a blessing to be recited after the barkhu since it is not clear what is his opinion on other days. Possibly, he thinks (like the Rivash?) that on all other occasions, except Shabbat and Yom Tov morning, one can rely on the fact that there will be somebody who will be late and recite a blessing after the barkhu. Or, maybe he does not think it is right for the chazzan to automatically recite barkhu at the end of the prayers on any day, which accords with his ruling in Orah Chayyim 69, but in 133:1 he only forbids reciting barkhu on Shabbat and Yom Tov morning since the Rivash reluctantly allowed it on the other times.

The Rama on Orah Chayyim 133:1 agrees with the Shulchan Arukh and in his comments he explains the Shulchan Arukh's ruling. Yet, why does he agree with the Shulchan Arukh not to recite the barkhu on Shabbat and Yom Tov mornings, if he thinks that barkhu stands alone? The answer is that he writes that on Shabbat and Yom Tov mornings barkhu is not be recited at the end of the prayers since everybody comes to shul before the regular barkhu. We see that he thinks that a person should not recite a second barkhu for no reason. 

(Note that the Rama's explanation differs from the Rivash who is the source of this law. The Rivash claimed that by Shacharit on Shabbat and Yom Tov one should not recite barkhu since everybody would have prayed by the end of the prayers and then nobody will recite a blessing after barkhu. However, for the Rama one does not have to recite a blessing after barkhu but still barkhu is not to be recited on Shabbat and Yom Tov morning at the end of the prayers since he thinks that everybody will come to shul on time to hear barkhu in its proper place.)

It is curious that the Sefardim in Israel do not follow the Shulchan Arukh's ruling in Orah Chayyim 133 since they recite barkhu even on Shabbat and Yom Tov morning. The Mekor Chayyim (R. Chayyim David ha-Levi, 1924-1998, Israel, 1975, pp. 310,311) writes that the custom in Israel and Egypt is to recite barkhu at the end of Shacharit due to secret wisdom (Kabbalah?).

Not all of the Ashkenazi authorities agreed with the Rama's rulings in Orah Chayyim 69 and 133. The Chayyei Adam (R. Avraham Danzig, 1748-1829, Vilna, Laws of prayer 30:3) writes that barkhu does not stand on its own, and if one recites barkhu, then there has to be some person who recites a blessing after the barkhu. Rav Schachtar (1994, p. 148) quotes from Rav Soloveitchik that in Brisk they did not allow people to recite barkhu at the end of the prayers for the reason mentioned above by the Bet Yosef, that there needs to be a blessing after the barkhu since otherwise one appears to be denying G-d by ignoring the chazzan's call to bless G-d.

The Chayyei Adam also added that even for those people who are going to recite a blessing after the barkhu, still one should not recite barkhu for them on Monday and Thursday morning when they can hear barkhu by the reading of the Torah. He also writes not to say it by Friday night and Yom Tov night since one can assume that everybody came in time to hear the regular barkhu.

This last case is interesting since the Minhat Elazar (R. Chayyim Elazar Spira, 1868-1937, Ukraine, Hungary, Response 4:71) writes that custom is for the chazzan to recite barkhu on Friday night, and I was told that in America the people who pray nusach Sefard add barkhu only on Friday night. Similarly in the Siddur Rinat Yisrael nusach Sefard (Tal, 1984, pp. 98,170, 208) it records that during the week there is a custom for the mourners to recite barkhu at the end of the prayers, while by Friday night (and only on Friday night), it states that the chazzan (and not the mourner) recites barkhu. Presumably this custom just for the chazzan to recite barkhu on Friday night and Yom Tov night is from the Rivash's comments about Barcelona that people always came late to Maariv on Friday and Yom Tov night, but today when we recite Kabbalat Shabbat, more likely the Chayyei Adam is correct that people do not generally miss the barkhu at the beginning of Maariv.

The Arukh Hashulchan (R. Yehiel Michel Epstein, 1829-1908, Russia) on Orah Chayyim 69:5 seems to follows the Rama that barkhu stands alone. Afterwards, he writes that in some places before the repetition of the Shemoneh Esrei, a person recites Kaddish and barkhu for the people who "missed" the first barkhu. I have never seen this done. He also follows the Chayyei Adam that on Monday and Thursday morning there is no need for this extra barkhu. On Orah Chayyim 133:5, he writes that the custom of reciting barkhu at the end of the prayers was unknown to him.

I spoke to Rabbi David Lau (Chief Rabbi of Israel from 2013-2024) about this issue and he told me that R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (1910-1995, Israel) said that barkhu should not be recited by the chazzan at the end of Maariv on mostsei Yom Kippur since for sure nobody comes late to that Maariv.

I believe that there is a major problem with reciting barkhu for no reason. This problem is mentioned by the Rama in the Darkei Moshe (69:2), but to the best of my knowledge it was not picked up by later authorities. The Rama believes that barkhu stands by itself, but then he writes that for those people who think it does not, the problem is not that one appears to be denying G-d by not responding to the chazzan's call to bless G-d, but of reciting a bracha le-vatalah. This seems obvious. A bracha le-vatalah is when a person recites a blessing unnecessarily and it is forbidden either biblically (Rambam, Laws of Oaths, 12:9, also see Laws of Blessings 1:15) or rabbinically (Tosafot, Rosh Hashanah 33a, Ha Rebbi Yehuda) because one says G-d's name for no purpose. Note the Mishnah Berurah (14:18, 16:4)  follows the view that reciting a bracha le-vatalah is a biblical prohibition. Yet, even by a bracha le-vatalah, one is praising G-d by reciting the blessing, but the halacha is that if the blessing is unnecessary, then it is forbidden. Barkhu is the same situation. Even though one is praising G-d by reciting barkhu, still if it recited unnecessarily, it should be forbidden because one is saying G-d's name for no purpose.

There exists a strange dichotomy in reference to reciting G-d's name. On the one hand, everybody agrees that an unnecessary blessing is forbidden, just that there is an argument what is the level of prohibition. On the other hand, many people claim that outside of the context of a blessing, a person can recite G-d's name whenever one wants if one is praising or praying to G-d, see Magen Avraham, Orah Chayyim 188:11 and Biur Halacha, Orah Chayyim, 188, ve-ein. An example of this second case is to recite G-d's name by zemirot on Shabbat, as then there is no structure of a blessing, and I think many people recite G-d's name when singing zemirot. (I do not understand this difference since it seems to me that even by zemirot one should not recite G-d's name, see Rav Schachter, 1994, p. 160.)

With regard to barkhu it has the basic form of a blessing. The Rama (Orah Chayyim 188:7) writes that the prayer yaaleh ve-yavo is considered to have a status of a blessing to be considered as a bracha le-vatalah when it is recited unnecessarily, so certainly barkhu which refers to blessing G-d should be considered a bracha le-vatalah according to all opinions if it recited unnecessarily. 

To conclude, barkhu is an invitation to recite blessings, and then one can only recite it after Shacharit and Maariv if there is someone who will recite the blessings of Shema (or other blessings) afterwards. The person calling out the barkhu can be the chazzan or the person who will recite the blessings afterwards. 

I do not think that barkhu should be recited automatically by a chazzan or the mourner at the end of the prayers based on the assumption that somebody missed barkhu since a person also missed saying a blessing on an apple if he/ she did not eat an apple. If nobody missed barkhu, then the chazzan or mourner has recited a bracha le-vatalah. In the case where a person came late and "missed" barkhu, the person can recite the barkhu and the blessings afterwards or the chazzan can check if somebody came late and then recite barkhu.  If a chazzan or a mourner automatically recites barkhu  it leads to the chazzan or the mourner reciting barkhu when there is nobody who came late. Even if 90% or 99% of the time, there is somebody who "missed" barkhu, this does not justify reciting barkhu unnecessarily (saying G-d's name in vain) on the 10% or even 1% of the time when there is nobody who "missed" barkhu. 

I am not sure whether the congregants should respond to an unnecessary barkhu. Can one claim that the response of baruch Hashem ha-mevurach le-olam vaed is appropriate even if the barkhu itself was not? This response also invokes G-d's name.  Or just like one does not respond amen to a bracha le-vatalah (Rambam, Laws of blessing, 1:15), then one should not say baruch Hashem ha-mevurach le-olam vaed to an unnecessary barkhu? I personally do not recite barkhu when I am the chazzan or a mourner.  Also, if somebody recites barchu when nobody is going to recite a blessing afterwards, then either I do not answer or sometimes I answer without saying G-d’s name, saying Hashem,  Note, in the period of counting the omer, in some places, a blessing by the counting of the omer is recited after the barkhu by Maariv if the omer is counted before Alenu, and this blessing by the counting of the omer removes the problem of reciting the second barkhu by Maariv for these 49 days.

In the synagogue which I attend, Yakir Efrayim in Modiin, Israel, we had a committee to discuss the prayers in the shul. I attempted to stop having barkhu be recited all the time at the end of Shacharit and Maariv (like the person R. Moshe in the response of the Rivash), but there were people who did not want to change the custom of reciting barkhu. We compromised that on Friday and Yom Tov night, the barkhu will be recited by the chazzan (as in the Siddur Rinat Yisrael), on Monday, Thursday, Rosh Chodesh, Hanukkah, Purim, Shabbat and Yom Tov mornings, barkhu will not be recited (like the Shulchan Arukh and Chayyei Adam), and on all other occasions, it is the decision of the chazzan or the mourners whether to call out barkhu or not.

Note, the idea not to recite barkhu when there is a Torah reading, which is a popular, but certainly not the only opinion amongst Ashkenazim in Israel in the 21st century, is not logical. If one thinks that it is important for a person to state/ hear barkhu, why should it matter if a person came to the synagogue after the Torah reading since still it should be important for the person to recite barkhu? Is the idea to “punish” the person for coming really late? However, at least this opinion reduces some unnecessary times when people recite G-d’s name in vain.

Bibliography:

Brodsky, David, 2006, A Bride without a Blessing: A Study in the Redaction and Content of Massekhet Kal-lah and its Gemara, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Goldschmidt, Daniel (1895-1972), 2004, Seder Rav Amram Gaon, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Halevi, R. Chayyim David (1924-1998), 1975, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch Mekor Chayyim, Tel Aviv.

Marienberg, Evyatar, 2009, Review of the book, A Bride without a Blessing: A Study in the Redaction and Content of Massekhet Kal-lah and its Gemara, Journal for the Study of Judaism, 40, p. 87.

Schachter, Hershel, 1994, Nefesh Harav, New York: Flatbush Beth Hamedrosh.

Tal, Shelomo, 1984, Siddur Rinat Yitzhak: Nusach sefard, Bnei Brak: Moreshet Publishing

Wieseltier, Leon, 1998, Kaddish, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Vayikra 25:8-11 (Behar) - From yovel to yovel: 49 or 50 years?

Vayikra 25:8,9 record that the people are to count 49 years, and then on Yom Kippur the shofar is to be blown. 25:10 then records that the 50th year is kadosh, the slaves are to go free, the year is called yovel, and each person can return to his ancestral home. The Torah does not explain how the count is to begin after the yovel year, and this had led to various opinions.

The Talmud records an argument as to when the new cycle begins. One opinion, the Rabbanim (Nedarim 61a, Rosh Hashanah 9a), explains that the yovel year stands alone, that it is not part of the 49 year cycle (shemitta years 7,14,21,28,35,42,49, yovel year 50). This means that year 51 begins a new cycle, shemitta years 57,64,71,78,85,92, 99, and the next yovel is year 100 . Year 101 begins a new cycle and year 150 is the third yovel year. With this system there are two consecutive years of not working the land, years 49 and 50, or years 99 and 100, etc., and the yovel year breaks up the seven year cycles of shemitta. This system is accepted by the Rambam (Laws of shemitta and yovel, 10:7) and Kawashima (2003).

The second opinion in the Talmud is Rabbi Judah ben Ilai (again Nedarim 61a and Rosh Hashanah 9a and Bergsma 2005) that the yovel year is part of the 49 year cycle. The idea is that the 50th year counts both as part of the previous cycle (shemitta years 7,14,21,28,35,42,49, yovel year 50) and is also part the first year of the next cycle (shemitta years 56,63,70,77,84,91,98, yovel year 99). With this cycle, year 99 is the second yovel year and begins the third cycle. The third yovel is year 148. This approach is similar to the first approach that there are two consecutive years of not working on the land (shemitta and yovel), but it differs from the first opinion since there are only 49 years from one yovel to the next and also there is no break in the counting of seven years of shemitta. However, as pointed out by the Talmud (Nedarim 61a), this approach is problematic since during the seven year cycle which includes a yovel year, the people can only work five years, while the Torah states that the people will work six years, and then rest in the seventh year, 25:3,4.

The Talmud in Nedarim notes that both opinions cannot explain verses 25:20-22, which record that the crops in the sixth year would be sufficient until the crops that are planted in the eighth year are reaped in the ninth year. The Torah is referring to the land lying completely fallow for only one year, but according to both opinions, there is a possibility that the land lies fallow for two years, when a yovel year follows a shemitta year, which would mean that the crops from the sixth year would have to last four years until the tenth year. 

A third approach, which is possibly the opinion of R. Judah (in Talmud Rosh Hashanah 9a but not in Nedarim 61a), follows the second opinion that the yovel year is every 49 years, but maintains that the yovel year was also a shemitta year. The difference between the two approaches is that according to the second opinion the first year in the first cycle is a regular year, while according to the third opinion the first year in the first cycle was a special or shemitta year. According to third approach, the phrase in 25:2, "the land will rest, a Shabbat to G-d," is not a general statement, but indicating that the beginning of the count was a year of rest, though not necessarily a regular shemitta year. The next shemitta year would be year eight in the cycle and then the seventh shemitta year would be year fifty of the cycle, the yovel year, (shemitta years 8,15,22,29,36,43,50, yovel year 50) and the first year with regard to the count of the next fifty years (shemitta years 57,64,71,78,85,92,99, yovel year 99). Year 99 is 49 years from the previous yovel in year 50, and also the fiftieth year counting year 50 as the first year. The third cycle would be shemitta years 106,113,120,127,134,141,148 and yovel year 148. Again, year 148 is 49 years from the previous yovel year in year 99, and the fiftieth year counting year 99 as the first year in the cycle.

This approach accords with 25:20-22 since there are never two years when the land is not worked, and with 25:3,4 since there are always six years of work between each shemitta. In addition, this approach matches the counting by sefirat ha-omer in 23:15,16, that the first day that begins the count is a holiday, the offering of the omer sacrifice, and the fiftieth day, is also a holiday, Shavuot, and so too here the first and last years are shemitta and yovel years.

According to the third approach, why does the Torah (25:11) list the agricultural restrictions of the yovel year if in any event the year was a shemitta year? The answer is that had the restrictions not been motioned, then a person might have thought that the yovel year superseded the shemitta year, and there would be no restrictions in that particular shemitta year.

The most recent proponent that I saw of the third approach is Hye Kim (2010) and he makes the interesting point that this double counting (counting the same year, year 50, 99, 148, etc., as both the last year of one cycle and the first year of next cycle) accords with the counting in Shemot 19:10-11, Vayikra 7:16-19, and Vayikra 19:6,7.

In conclusion, the third approach best accords with the text.

Bibliography:

Hye Kim, Young, 2010, The Jubilee: Its reckoning and inception day, Vetus Testamentum, 60, pp. 147-151.

Kawashima, Robert, 2003, The Jubilee, every 49 or 50 years? Vetus Testamentum, 53:1, pp. 117-120.

2015 version of my commentary on the Haggadah is now available

Hello,

The 2015 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (54 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions.  If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file.  I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein  

Vayikra 10:16-20 – The argument between Moshe and Aharon after the deaths of Aharon's sons: An argument for the sake of heaven

Vayikra 10:16-18 records that Moshe learned that the hatta’t sacrifice from the ceremony of the eighth day had been burnt, and this made him angry since he thought the sacrifice should have been eaten. Aharon defended the burning of the hatta’t by saying, 10:19, “Here, today, they brought their hatta’t and olah offerings, before G-d, and such things as these happened to me! Had I eaten the hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” (Variation of Fox, 1995, translation.) 10:20 records that Moshe accepted Aharon’s response.

Why did Moshe believe that the sacrifice should have been eaten, and why did Aharon disagree? In 10:19, Aharon was referring to the deaths of his sons, but why should their deaths have caused him not to eat the hatta’t? Finally, why did Moshe accept Aharon’s response? (My understanding of this section began with a conversation with David Linzer in March 1992, though since then, notably in March 2014, I have changed some of my views of this section.)

In order to understand this argument, we need to clarify which hatta't is being argued about. 10:16 describes the hatta’t as being a goat, and 9:3 records that as part of the sacrifices of the eighth day the people were to bring a hatta’t that was a goat. This would seem to be the only possible reference to the hatta’t in 10:16, see Luzzatto on 10:16. R. David Hoffmann (on 10:16) notes that R. Akiva follows this understanding. However, Rashi (on 10:16) quotes the majority view of Chazal that the sacrifice was the hatta’t that was brought on the new moon (Bemidbar 28:5), which was an additional sacrifice to the sacrifices for the ceremony of the eighth day. Rashi (on 10:17) notes that Moshe said that the eating of the hatta’t was to bring atonement for the people (10:17) and the approach of Chazal is that the hatta’t of the new moon was to bring atonement for causing tumah in the Mikdash. Luzzatto rejects this "proof" since 9:7 records that the hatta’t of the people was to bring atonement for the people.

Rashi's explanation is based on the understanding that eighth day of the initiation of the priests was also the first day of the first month of the second year of the people’s stay in the desert. I doubt that the ceremony of the eighth day was on the first day of the first month in the second year of the people's stay in the desert since I believe that the seven day initiation process of the priests began on either the 15th or the 22nd of the first month of the second year, see our discussion on Shemot 40:1-33, "The anointing of the mishkan, the ohel moed and the priests."

The next point to clarify is what type of hatta't was the hatta't of the people. There are two types, the inner hatta't and the outer hatta't. By the inner hatta’t, the blood of the animal is sprinkled on the parokhet within the mishkan proper, and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are burnt, 4:1-21, 7:23. By the outer hatta’t, the blood is only sprinkled on the altar outside the mishkan proper and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are eaten by the priests, 4:22-35, 7:17-22. The hatta't of the people was an outer hatta't since the blood was sprinkled on the outer altar, 9:9,15. Accordingly, Moshe stated that the hatta't was to be eaten since the blood of the sacrifice had not been brought into the mishkan proper where the inner altar was located, 10:18.

Moshe was worried that there was a danger that because the sacrifice had not been eaten, all the people would be punished. 10:6 records that Moshe told Eleazar and Itamar, Aharon’s two surviving sons, that they should not engage in any mourning rites since they could die and there could be a ketsef on the people. The term ketsef indicates that G-d is angry and that there can be an ensuing punishment, see Bemidbar 17:11. Thus, just like Moshe was concerned that mourning rites could cause G-d to punish the people, so too he was worried that the non-eating of the sacrifice could also cause G-d to punish the people. We now understand Moshe's argument, but why did Aharon disagree if it was so important for the sacrifices to be eaten?

Rashi (on 10:16) quotes two opinions of Chazal to explain Aharon’s response. One, Aharon maintained that since he and his sons were mourners for Nadav and Avihu, they were not allowed to eat the sacrifice. The idea being that the law of mourning would override the usual law that the outer hatta’t was to be eaten. Luzzatto (on 10:17) rejects this approach since Moshe had already told Aharon and his sons that they were not to act as mourners (10:6,7), which means that in all cases they were not to follow the laws of mourning. Luzzatto (on 10:19) also adds that Aharon began his argument by referring to the hatta’t and the olah, 10:19, but this reference is irrelevant if the rationale was that they were mourners. In addition, how did Aharon know that the laws of mourning precluded eating from the sacrifices, something clearly unknown to Moshe?

Rashi's (on 10:16) second approach for understanding Aharon’s argument is that there was some tumah attached to the hatta’t and thus Aharon did not want to eat the sacrifice. Milgrom (1991, pp. 635-640) develops this approach. He argues that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu transformed the hatta’t of the people from an outer hatta’t to an inner hatta’t since their deaths raised the level of tumah of the hatta’t that the sacrifice had to be burnt. This understanding accords with his view that in general a hatta’t is to remove tumah, and the reason why an inner hatta’t is burnt is because the level of tumah the sacrifice is removing is so large that the hatta’t cannot be eaten.

I doubt that Aharon did not eat the hatta't since it was tamei because there is no connection between this explanation and Aharon's response to Moshe. According to Milgrom's explanation, why did Aharon refer to his sacrifices that he had offered beforehand? According to Milgrom, Aharon was not permitted to eat the hatta’t, so why did Aharon not simply say something like "I cannot eat it since it is tamei."

Also, how did the sacrifice become tamei? Milgrom writes that “that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu in the midst of sacred precincts polluted the entire sanctuary.” Yet, according to the laws of tumah (Bemidbar 19) death only causes tumah, when the body is in a tent with a roof, but this did not occur here as Nadav and Avihu died outside of the mishkan proper, 10:4, and see our discussion on Vayikra 10:1,2 "Nadav and Avihu,"  In addition, the hatta’t sacrifice should not have become tamei because the supposed cause of the tumah (Nadav and Avihu's sin) occurred after the sacrifice was offered and its blood was sprinkled, and there is no indication that Nadav and Avihu died when touching the hatta’t. 
Finally, why did Moshe not know that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu generated so much tumah that the hatta’t could not be eaten? It seems to me that Milgrom is forcing his theory of hatta’t and tumah into this episode.

These two approaches are legal arguments as to why Aharon and his sons burnt the hatta't, and instead two psychological arguments have been suggested.

Rashbam (on 10:19) suggests that Aharon was claiming that after the deaths of his sons, he and his remaining sons were too sad to eat the sacrifice. N. Leibowitz (1980, p. 74) likes this approach. She explains that sacrifices must be offered in the proper state of mind, and Aharon could not fulfill this requirement in his state of grief. This approach is similar to the mourning approach but it stresses personal feelings as opposed to a point of law. Yet, where does this idea come from that one cannot be in a state of grief when one eats sacrifices? If there was a need to eat the sacrifices to help the people, then why were the personal feelings of Aharon and his sons relevant? How did Aharon know that G-d would not accept his eating if he was sad? Also, Luzzatto points out that this explanation does not explain why Aharon referred to his personal sacrifices, his hatta’t and his olah? According to this idea, Aharon should have just said "After the events of the day, I am too sad to eat the hatta't."

Luzzatto suggests that the argument between Moshe and Aharon was whether the eating of the hatta’t could lead to atonement for the people. Moshe wanted the hatta’t to be eaten in order for the people to attain atonement, 10:17. Aharon responded that he and his sons had already offered sacrifices that day, and still his sons died. Thus, he understood that his sacrifices did not lead to atonement for himself. Aharon continued and said, “Had I eaten the hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” Aharon doubted that his eating of the hatta’t of the people could lead to atonement for the people once he was not able to bring atonement for himself from his own sacrifices.

This explanation accords with all of Aharon’s statement in 10:19 and makes Aharon’s statement a rebuttal to Moshe’s argument in 10:16-18. Yet, how did the deaths of Nadav and Avihu show that Aharon did not attain atonement from his sacrifices since it seems that they died for their own sins? Luzzatto writes that Aharon felt that he was out of favor with G-d, but from the death of his sons he should only have known that his sons had fallen out of favor with G-d not himself. Perhaps he was a father feeling guilty about his children’s deaths, as maybe he felt that it was his actions by the sin of the golden calf which caused his sons to die, see Rashi on Devarim 9:20. Moshe did not have this feeling so he initially wanted Aharon to eat the sacrifices following the law of the outer hatta’t. However, after Moshe heard Aharon’s claim, he accepted the idea that Aharon felt that he had not attained atonement from his sacrifices and hence he could not help the people attain atonement.

N. Leibowitz (p. 73) likes Luzzatto’s approach in that it accords with the idea that Aharon was giving expression to his personal feelings, but she rejects the explanation since she claims that “a sense of guilt does not free a man from responsibility to perform his duties.” This is similar to the question on the Rashbam's approach, that if it was Aharon and his son's responsibility to eat the hatta't and they were not allowed to mourn, then they had to eat it, whether they felt guilty or sad.

Maybe the argument between Aharon and Moshe is a basic argument about the value of sacrifices, akin to the argument many years later between the Rambam and the Ramban, see our discussion on Vayikra 1:9, "How can one understand sacrifices in the Torah?" Aharon was pointing out that the events of the day showed that sacrifices were ineffective. Aharon noted that he and his sons had just offered a hatta't and an olah, and yet his sons were killed almost immediately afterwards. What point was there for him to eat the hatta't? Aharon was rebutting Moshe's claim that the non-eating of the hatta't would lead to a ketsef not due to sadness or guilt but because he doubted that his eating of the sacrifices would please G-d to stop a ketsef if G-d decided to send ketsef. This would be analogous to the Rambam's view of sacrifice in the Moreh, 3:32, that sacrifices were only commanded since the people could not envisage a religion with sacrifices.

With this idea, Moshe had initially thought that sacrifices had to be eaten since either he thought that sacrifices were effective to bring atonement (like the Ramban) or because one had to do what was commanded, but he agreed to Aharon's point. This could be because he accepted that sacrifices are not effective in general or that in this case they were ineffective. 

A reason why in this particular case they were meaningless is that if the point of offering sacrifices is because one is demonstrating one's devotion to G-d, then here where Nadav and Avihu acted not according to G-d's will (10:1), then any sacrifice that they did would also become meaningless. Note that according to this idea, once Moshe accepted Aharon's opinion, then Aharon and his sons would not have eaten the minhah and the shelamim, 10:12-15.

If this is understanding is correct, then this episode supports the Rambam's opinion that really G-d does not want our sacrifices. If this is the message of this episode, then this would have been the most appropriate place to make this point, right after the laws of the sacrifices and the initiation of the priests. Furthermore, it is telling that it is the high priest, Aharon, who rejects sacrifices.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980, Studies in Vayikra, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday

Shemot 25:31-40 – The menorah in the mishkan: A burning tree

Shemot 25:31-40 records the instructions to construct the menorah, the lampstand, as one of the pieces of furniture within the mishkan. Why was the menorah in the mishkan?

One possible answer is due to the lights of the menorah (25:37). Was there a need to have lights in the mishkan? One might answer that it is obvious, people need light to see. However, from Shemot 27:21 and Vayikra 24:3 it seems that the lamps were lit only at night since apparently during the daytime, some sunlight was able to provide light inside the mishkan through the one side where there was only one veil, 26:36,37, as most likely, the veil was not that thick to stop light from passing through. (Note, the Talmud, Shabbat 22b, quotes Rav that the western light on the menorah was used to light the other lights because this light burnt all day, and apparently this was the practice in the Bet ha-Mikdash, see Ramban on 27:20.)

Was anybody in the mishkan at night? The Torah never records anybody entering at night, but maybe when the menorah was lit at twilight (30:8) there was a need for light just then. Another possibility is that the Abravanel (on 27:20,21, 1997, p. 462, also see N. Leibowitz, 1976a, p. 512) writes that Moshe was able to enter the mishkan at all times, and Moshe would have needed the light if he came into the mishkan at night.

Rashbam (on 25:31, quoted also by Bekhor Shor and Hizkuni) writes that the lights from the menorah were to illuminate the table. Yet, the Rashbam does not explain why there was a need to illuminate the table.

Rambam (Moreh 3:45, see also Amos Chacham, 1991, vol. 2, p. 280) writes that the lights were in order to glorify and honor the Bet ha-Mikdash. Apparently he believes that the light would enable people to see the rooms of the Bet ha-Mikdash and this vision would increase their awe of the Bet ha-Mikdash. (I believe though I am not positive that the Rambam was also referring to the mishkan.)

Another possibility is that the lights on the menorah symbolized the revelation of G-d, see Zechariah 4:6 and statement by Rav Sheshet in Shabbat 22b. This symbolism could be the reference to the statement in 27:21 that the lighting of the menorah was before G-d, see Amos Chacham (1991, on 27:21). This idea explains why there was a need for light, but the Torah records that the menorah had an intricate design. Do the details relate to the lighting? Were the details just for decoration?

N. Leibowitz (1976a, p. 500) notes that while the Rambam was unconcerned with the details of the menorah, many commentators believed that there had to be some lesson to be learned from these details. She quotes Abravanel who suggested that all the aspects of menorah relate to knowledge, and the Alshikh who relates them to moral qualities. However, she notes that allegoric explanations, such as these, are subjective. Yet, there is one approach that has been developed at least since the 19th century that accords with the simple reading of the text.

In a lengthy excursus on the menorah, S.R. Hirsch writes (1989, pp. 459,460), "If we picture its whole appearance, with its flowery base, its stem and arms with their almond shaped cups, knobs and flowers, the whole appearance strikes one as a tree,… blossoming upwards from its root,… a golden tree." Similarly, Benno Jacob (1992, p. 906) writes of the menorah that "its description… leaves no doubt that we are dealing with a unified organism which was to possess the form of a stylized tree." Likewise, Sarna (1991, p. 165) writes, "the shape of the lampstand - the trunk with its branches extending on either side - unmistakably evokes the image of a tree."

The idea explains why all the pieces of the menorah were to be made together from one block of gold (25:36), and not joined together after they were fashioned since the menorah was one unit like a tree. The base of the menorah is a yerech (25:31), which would be like the roots of the tree. The word the Torah uses for the main shaft and the sides going up is a kaneh, which is a reed. The seven kanim were decorated with gaviaim, kaftorim and perahim, all of whom relate to flora. The gavia is referred to as being almonds (25:33), the kaftor were apple shaped according to Rashi (on 25:31), and perahim are flowers. They would be like fruit on the branches of a tree.

Why was there an image of a tree in the mishkan? Various suggestions have been offered. Hirsch refers to the tree of knowledge, but I did not understand the connection. Benno Jacob suggests that the menorah parallels Aharon since he was the first in the family tree of priests. Sarna writes that possibly the imagery is to represent the tree of life, but he does not explain this relationship. Everett Fox (1995, p. 402) writes that trees "connote permanence, growth, and majesty- in other words a reflection of the divine."

Maybe trees symbolize a connection between man and G-d. A tree begins in the ground and grows upward towards the heavens. In the Garden of Eden, it was the trees and their fruit which were the bridge between G-d and mankind. When Adam and Chava ate from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, they became G-d like, Bereshit 3:22. If they had eaten from the tree of life, then they would have had eternal life, and again been similar to G-d, see our discussion on Bereshit 2:9,17 "Two trees."

The two ideas of light and the image of a tree can be combined, as together they give the image of a fire on a tree. This might be the imagery by the burning bush, Shemot 3:2. In addition, and this could be the reason for the burning bush, when Moshe went up on Mount Sinai to get the luchot, the people saw the glory of G-d as a burning fire, 24:32. This burning image would have been seen by the person who lit the menorah, and maybe by the people if they were able to see the menorah lit up from outside the mishkan.

In our discussion on chapters 26,27, "The three zones of the mishkan and the covenantal process," we suggested that the mishkan represents different aspects of the covenant. Every covenant has some type of revelation. By the covenant at Mount Sinai, the revelation was the people's vision of the glory of G-d (also 24:10,11). Accordingly, if the menorah was able to evoke that vision, then the menorah was also a symbol of the covenant.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (1437-1508), 1997, Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Horev

Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1991, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.