Devarim 31:16-22 (Va-yelekh) – The song of Devarim 31

Devarim 31:19-30 record the phrase “this song” five times, 31:19 (2), 21, 22 and 30. (The phrase also appears in 32:44.) In 31:19,21, the song is referred to as being a witness. What is the song? Rashi, Rashbam and Ramban (all on 31:19) explain that the reference is to 32:1-43, Moshe's song, the bulk of parashat Ha'azinu.

One problem with this approach is that the word “this” in 31:19 should refer to either the preceding or the following verses and not to text twelve verses later. Two, 31:19 records that Moshe was to “put the song in the people’s mouth,” which Ibn Ezra explains means to have the people memorize the song. (Tigay, 1996, p. 295, writes that in Akkadian and Sumerian this phrase to “put in the mouth” also means to memorize.) Could the people memorize such a long and complicated poem as Moshe's song? Even if they could, did Moshe have enough time to teach it to them since it appears that chapter 31 took place on the last day or days of Moshe’s life (31:1)? Three, 31:20 relates the song to the people breaking the covenant in the future, but the covenant is not referred to explicitly in 32:1-43. Four, 31:22 records that Moshe taught the song to the people, but then 31:28-30 records that he told them to gather around and hear it again. Why did he teach the song to the people twice? Five, Moshe's song is very difficult to understand, while one would think that a song that was to function as a witness would be straightforward.

All the questions can be answered by understanding that 31:16-18 is the song being referred to in 31:19,21,22. (To be more precise, the song probably starts with the word ve-kam in 31:16.) It is true that 31:16-18 does not have the usual parallelism found in biblical poetry, but the verses are connected through similar words, azavani in 31:16,17 and histir, in 31:17,18. Also, the song of 31:16-18 is not a usual song that was meant to be chanted, but it was a declaration that was to be a witness to the people. The song was a witness that the straightforward message of 31:16-18 is that the people should understand that if they would violate the covenant in the future, then they would be punished and G-d would not help them.

If 31:16-18 is the song referred to in 31:19,21,22 then there were two songs, 31:16-18, and, 32:1-43, and we can answer all the questions raised above. The phrase, “this song” in 31:19,21,22 is referring to the first song, 31:16-18, its immediate context, while the same phrase in 31:30 and 32:44 is referring to the second song, and even form a bookend around the second song. The first song of 31:16-18 refers explicitly to the covenant, 31:16, as indicated in 31:20. Also, the first song is very short, three verses, which was relatively simple to write down and Moshe was able to quickly teach it to the people, 31:22. On the other hand, 31:28-30 refers to Moshe teaching the people the second song, 32:1-43.

Bibliography:

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society

Devarim 31:7-23 (Va-yelekh) - Yehoshua on the verge of taking the reins from Moshe

Devarim 31:7,8 records that Moshe gave a specific charge to Yehoshua in front of the people to be strong and courageous.  Afterwards in 31:23, G-d gave almost an identical support to Yehoshua. These two verses, 31:7,23 form a bookend of the intervening text, but why does 31:23 not follow 31:7,8, since this would join together the two charges concerning Yehoshua? Or, why is there a need for two charges to Yehoshua? In order to answer these questions, we will review the order of 31:8-23.

The first verse after Moshe’s charge is 31:9 that Moshe gave the Torah to the priests and the elders. Why was this verse recorded after Moshe's charge in 31:7,8? A possible answer is that 31:9 contains two ideas. One, the deposition of the Torah and two, Moshe is reminding Yehoshua that there are other leaders, the priests and the elders, who can help him. In 31:8, as part of his charge to Yehoshua, Moshe told Yehoshua that he was not alone since G-d was with him, and then in 31:9 Moshe was indicating to Yehoshua that also the priests and elders were with him. This explains the reference to the elders in 31:9 who did not have to be mentioned if the issue was only the storage of the Torah, but they did have to be referred to if the goal was to mention other leaders of the people. Thus, on the second occasion when Moshe gives the Torah over, 31:26, the elders are not mentioned since this was after Yehoshua had been fully appointed.

Afterwards, 31:10-13 records the law of hakhel, that every seven years all the people were to gather together to hear the Torah being read. Why did Moshe wait until after passing the leadership to Yehoshua to tell the people about the laws of hakhel? The goal of the ceremony was to increase the people's fear of G-d in the future, and hence Moshe was telling Yehoshua that this ceremony would help him in dealing with the people. Due to the ceremony, there would be a greater chance that the people would continue to listen to Yehoshua in the future, and maybe this would boost Yehoshua's confidence.

Another possible connection between hakhel and the appointment of Yehoshua is that many have argued that the hakhel ceremony was to re-create the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai, see for example Jacobson, 1986, pp. 211,212. The basis for this supposition is from the Rambam, Laws of Festival Offerings, 3:6 and the use of the word hakhel in Devarim 4:10 and 18:16. Also, 31:12 records that the point of the gathering every seven years was experiential, to instill the fear of G-d into the people, which was also one of the purposes by the Decalogue, Shemot 20:17. Furthermore, Devarim 18:15-22 record that Moshe told the people that in the future they would have prophets who they would have to accept. Moshe explained that their future acceptance was based on their acceptance of Moshe at the time of the Decalogue, when they asked Moshe to speak to G-d since they were afraid of G-d continuing to speak to them. Accordingly, maybe Moshe mentioned the laws of hakhel as part of the process of appointing Yehoshua to be the next leader of the people to remind the people of their actions by Decalogue, the source of authority for all prophets. Furthermore, just as hakhel symbolized a re-enactment of the Decalogue, so too more prophets could be “re-created.” (Note, just as the hakhel was only a re-enactment of the giving of the Torah and not equal to the actual event, so too the future prophets who would be successors to Moshe would never be equal to Moshe.) Thus, the reference to the laws of hakhel might have been part of Moshe’s attempt to generate support for Yehoshua from the people or to increase Yehoshua's confidence. 

After the laws of hakhel, G-d told Moshe to bring Yehoshua into the ohel moed where G-d would speak to him, 31:14. Ramban (on 31:19) explains that the idea was for G-d to make Yehoshua a prophet in Moshe’s lifetime. 31:15 records that the cloud of G-d, a demonstration of G-d’s powers, descended upon the entrance of the ohel moed. This showed the people that G-d was talking to Yehoshua which showed G-d’s support for Yehoshua as a prophet. 

In addition, the appearance of the cloud of G-d was part of the 3rd stage of the covenantal process in the book of Devarim, see our discussion on Shemot 24 "The covenantal process." By every covenant there is a revelation from G-d (see Rashbam on Shemot 33:18), and the revelation by the covenant on the plains of Moav was the appearance of the cloud of G-d. The cloud showed the people that G-d approved of the appointment of Yehoshua to be their leader and it was the revelation that occurs by every covenant.

Afterwards, 31:16-22 records that G-d told Moshe about the song that was the witness of the covenant. When G-d finished telling Moshe the song, 31:22 records that G-d told Moshe to write the song down and teach it to the Jewish people, which means that Moshe left the tent. This implies that Yehoshua was left alone with G-d, and 31:23 records that G-d charged Yehoshua to be the next leader of the people, see Rashi, Ramban and Seforno on 31:23.

Why was Yehoshua with Moshe when G-d was just speaking to Moshe in 31:16-22? Why did G-d not charge Yehoshua immediately after the cloud of G-d appeared in 31:15? Or, in other words, why does 31:23 not follow 31:15? Ibn Ezra (on 31:16) is so bothered by this question that he argues that this is another example of the Torah recording events not in their chronological order, as he claims that 31:23 occurred immediately after 31:15. I rarely like this approach, and instead Hoffmann (1961, p. 566) suggests a reasonable answer.

Hoffmann explains that Yehoshua was standing next to Moshe when the cloud of G-d descended and when G-d spoke to Moshe. G-d first spoke to both Moshe and Yehoshua together, 31:16-22 and then to Yehoshua alone, as a way of passing Moshe’s majesty to Yehoshua, 31:23. The idea is that it was not enough for G-d to have just spoken to Yehoshua alone, rather the people also had to see that G-d spoke to Moshe and Yehoshua together.

Accordingly, G-d’s charge to Yehoshua in 31:23 culminated a five part process to enhance Yehoshua’s leadership. First, Yehoshua was told that he would have assistance from the elders, 31:9, and then the laws of hakhel were mentioned, 31:10-13. Afterwards, the cloud of G-d appeared over the tent, 31:14,15, then G-d spoke to Moshe and Yehoshua together, 31:16-22 and lastly G-d spoke to Yehoshua alone, 31:23. Moshe’s charge to Yehoshua in 31:7 started this process and G-d’s charge to Yehoshua in 31:23 ended this process.

Why was there such a lengthy process? Presumably it was because Yehoshua had a very difficult task in following Moshe. Moshe had been the leader of the people for 40 years, and had done things no human would ever duplicate. It would have been only natural for the people to withhold their support for Yehoshua, as capable as he was, after having had Moshe as their leader. Thus, Moshe himself passed the leadership to Yehoshua, and G-d also raised Yehoshua’s status by making him equal to Moshe in hearing (and maybe writing, see Ramban on 31:19) the last message that G-d spoke to Moshe. G-d was not just establishing Yehoshua as a prophet but also showing the people that he was a worthy successor to Moshe.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1961, Commentary on Deuteronomy, translated by Tzvi Har-Shefer, Tel Aviv: Nezach.

Jacobson, B. S. 1986, Meditations on the Torah, Hebrew, Tel Aviv: Sinai Publishing.

Devarim (Deuteronomy) 23:4,5 – The economic relations between Moav and the Jewish people when the Jewish people were in the desert: Too late

Devarim 23:4,5 records that people from Ammon and Moav could not join the Jewish people. The Torah explains that this restriction was “on account that they did not greet you with food and with water on the way, at your going out from Egypt, and because he hired against you Bil’am son of Be’or from Petor, (in) Aram of-the-Two Rivers, to curse you” (Fox, 1995, translation).

This verse (23:5) is difficult for two reasons. One, why does the Torah provide two reasons for the prohibition, the fact that they did not greet the Jewish people with food and that Bil’am was hired to curse the Jewish people? Only Moav hired Bil’am (Bemidbar 22:2-5), and hence a person from Ammon was prohibited from joining the Jewish people solely due to the reason that they did not greet the Jewish people with food and water, so why was this same reason not sufficient with respect to Moav? Two, Devarim 2:29 records that Moav sold the people food and water, how could Devarim 23:4 state that they did not greet the Jewish people with food and water?

Ibn Ezra (on Devarim 2:29) records two answers to the second question. One, “in the name of the many,” is that while Moav sold the people food and water as indicated in 2:29, the problem in 23:5 was that they did not give the food freely to the people. Two, Ibn Ezra’s own approach, is that he argues that 2:29 does not state that Moav sold food to the people. 2:27,28 record that Moshe asked Sihon to allow the Jewish people to pass through his territory and Moshe offered that the Jewish people would buy food and water from Sihon. Afterwards, 2:29 records that Moshe asked Sihon to do to the Jewish people as Edom and Moav had done to the Jewish people. It is usually understood that the phrase “to do as Edom and Moav had done” in 2:29 refers back to Moshe’s offer to buy food and water in 2:28, that Moshe was asking Sihon to sell food and water to the Jewish people like Edom and Moav had sold food to the people. However, Ibn Ezra argues that the phrase “to do as Edom and Moav had done” refers back to 2:27 that Moshe was asking Sihon to let the Jewish people pass through his land as Edom and Moav had let the Jewish people pass through their lands.

The Ramban (on 23:5) rejects both answers quoted by the Ibn Ezra. He rejects the idea that the problem with Moav was that it sold food instead of giving the food away for free since selling the food is also reasonable and could not be sufficient cause to prohibit a person from Moav of joining the Jewish people. Ramban’s question seem cogent to me, but Hoffmann (on 2:29) also likes this distinction between selling and giving away, as he argues that Moav should have been like Malki-Tzedek who brought food to Avram (Bereshit 14:19). Yet, this example is not applicable here, as Malki-Tzedek brought food as tribute and thanks for Avram, while Moav did not owe the Jewish people any thanks. Furthermore, Malki-Tzedek bought food for one person, would one expect that Moav should feed the entire Jewish nation for free? Finally, again even if they should have fed all the people for free, still as the Ramban asked was selling food so horrible a crime that they could never join the Jewish people?

The Ramban also rejects Ibn Ezra’s approach that 2:29 does not imply that Moav sold food to the people. According to Ibn Ezra’s reading of 2:29 Moshe asked Sihon to let the people pass through Sihon’s lands just as Edom and Moav had let the people pass through their lands. However, as pointed out by Ramban, the Jewish people did not pass through Moav’s land. Thus, the phrase in 2:29 “to do as Edom and Moav had done” must mean that Moshe asked Sihon to sell the people food as Edom and Moav sold the people food.

The Ramban suggests a different answer based on the fact that two reasons are recorded in 23:5 for the prohibition of Ammon and Moav to join the Jewish people. His suggestion is that one reason refers to Ammon and one to Moav. A person from Ammon could not join the Jewish people since they did not sell the people food, while a person from Moav could not join the Jewish community since they hired Bil’am. This approach answers both of the questions raised above: the Torah had to record two reasons, and 23:5 does not contradict 2:29 because with this reading 23:5 only implies that Ammon did not sell food and water to the Jewish people not Moav.

The Abravanel rejects Ramban’s answer for a grammatical reason. 23:5 switches from the plural to the singular, that “they did not greet the people” as opposed to “he hired Bil’am.” Abravanel argues that the plural in 23:5 means that both Moav and Ammon did not greet the people, while the singular in 23:5 means that only Moav hired Bil'am. Abravanel notes that also in Nehemiah 13:2,3, the plural is used to indicate that both Moav and Ammon did not greet the people. Instead, Abravanel offers a different reading of 2:29 which is not clear to me.

My guess is that the questions can be answered if we understand the geography of where the people marched in the 40th year in reference to Moav. While 2:29 records that Moav sold food to the Jewish people, the verse does not refer to all of Moav but rather to those people of Moav who lived in Ar. What and where is Ar? Tigay (1996, p. 526, footnotes 6,7) writes that Ar was a city of Moav, and from 2:18 it seems that it was “situated near the border on the Wadi Arnon.” Wadi Arnon was the border between Moav and the Amorites, with Moav south of the Wadi, and the Amorites, whose king was Sihon, north of the Wadi. This means that Ar was situated in northern Moav just south of the Wadi Arnon. When the Jewish people marched in the 40th year, they skirted around Moav, and then they had to pass through the Amorite land to get to the land of Israel. The people crossed Wadi Arnon and then Moshe sent messengers to Sihon, Bemidbar 21:13-23. Moshe was already in the land of Sihon (the periphery) when he sent the messengers to Sihon, and the people were north of Moav. However, they were still close to Ar, the Moav city by the Wadi Arnon, and this offered the people of the city the opportunity to sell food and water to the Jewish people as indicated in 2:29.

This selling does not contradict 23:5 that the people of Moav did not greet the Jewish people with food and water since the people of Ar only sold the Jewish people food after the Jewish people had passed them by. When the people were marching around Moav, the people of Moav did not sell them any food or water. Accordingly, Moav did not greet the Jewish people with water and food, as greeting means to go out to a person, while Moav waited until the Jewish people passed them by to sell them food. Therefore, both Moav and Ammon did not greet the Jewish people to sell them food or water. Yet, still one could ask that if in the end some people of Moav sold food to the Jewish people, then this should have been sufficient to allow them the opportunity to enter the Jewish people? The answer is that Moav had a double sin that they also hired Bil’am to curse the Jewish people. Thus, the Torah had to mention two reasons why Ammon and Moav could not enter the Jewish community.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Devarim 16:21,22 (Shoftim) - Asherot and matzevot in the Torah

Devarim 16:21,22 record the following two prohibitions, “You are not to plant yourself an asherah (or) any-kind of tree beside the altar of G-d that you make yourself. And, you are not to raise yourself a matzevah (stone pillar) that G-d hates,” (adaptation of Fox 1995 translation). The asherah would be a carved tree, while the prohibition of any tree would be to a natural tree that had not been worked on.

These prohibitions are troubling since Avraham appears to have planted an ashera, Bereshit 21:33, and Yaakov, Bereshit 28:18, 35:14, and Moshe made matzevot, Shemot 24:4.

Rashi (on 16:22) explains that in the time of the patriarchs G-d liked them, but after the Canaanites adopted them as part of their pagan ritual, G-d hated them. Yet, did the Canaanites really not use these items for idolatry in the times of the patriarchs?

The Ramban (on 16:22, also see comments on Bereshit 26:5) notes that the Canaanites also had altars as part of their pagan worship, but altars did not become prohibited. Ramban suggests that the altars could not have been prohibited since they were essential to offering sacrifices, while the matzevot are not needed to offer sacrifices, which means that they could be abolished once they were adopted by the Canaanites.

Ibn Ezra (on 16:22) suggests that the prohibition of matzevot (also asherot?) was only when the matzevot were made with the intention of using them for idol worship. However, if they were made to worship G-d as by Yaakov (and by Moshe?), then they would be permitted. Yet, there is no indication in 16:21 of a distinction between permitted and forbidden matzevot, or good and bad worship that is associated with the pillars.

My guess is that first one has to distinguish between pillars that are used for worship at all and others that are types of monuments to re-call events, that the latter case would be permitted. Most likely this was the case by the pillars that Moshe put up, the pillar that Yehoshua put up, Yehoshua 24:26,27, and Yaakov’s matzevah for Rahel, Bereshit 35:20. The prohibitions in 16:21,22 are then referring to a pillar or a tree that is used in some ways for religious actions, certainly idol worship but even worship of G-d.

In addition, maybe by Avraham and Yaakov, G-d always hated their ashera and matzevot, but He tolerated them since he knew that they were using them to worship Him. However, before Moshe died the people had to be told that asherot and matzevot were no longer going to be tolerated, even if they were intended to be used for the worship of G-d.

This explanation is similar to the Rambam’s approach by sacrifices, Moreh 3:32, that G-d “suffered the above mentioned kinds of worship (sacrifices) to remain” (Pines, 1963, p. 526) since mankind could not conceive of a worship of G-d without sacrifices. Likewise, in this case, G-d initially did not prohibit the asherot and matzevot since they were used with good intentions. However, by the asherot and matzevot, they were eventually prohibited, possibly because they were not considered by the people as being crucial to the worship of G-d as opposed to sacrifices, and hence the people could accept their prohibition.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Pines, Shlomo, 1963, Translation of Guide to the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Devarim 15:7,8 (Re'eh) - The idea of charity in the Torah

Rambam (Laws of gifts to the poor, 7:1) writes, “It is a positive commandment to give charity to the poor according to what the poor requires…as it says, “You shall open your hand to him, Devarim 15:8, and “When your brother sinks down and his hand falters beside you, than shall you strengthen him as a sojourner and resident-settler, and he is to live beside you… your brother shall live beside you, Vayikra 25:35,36. Whoever sees a poor person and does not give charity violates a negative commandment as it says, “You are not to toughen your heart, you are not to shut your hand to your brother, the needy one, Devarim 15:7.” 

While all the verses quoted by Rambam clearly refer to helping the poor, it is striking that all the verses are referring to lending money to the poor and not to giving money outright as one normally thinks of charity. Rambam quoted Vayikra 25:35,36, but deleted the beginning of Vayikra 25:36 which records that one must not charge the poor interest. This warning shows that the case of helping the poor is a loan, and not an outright gift. Similarly, Devarim 15:7,8 record that one must give to the poor, but the end of 15:8 explains that the giving is through a loan. The following verse, Devarim 15:9, records that one should not think that because the seventh year is coming one will not give to the poor. The concern for the seventh year is only because a loan is annulled in the seventh year. This issue of annulling a loan is irrelevant if one gives a gift to the poor because one has no obligation to return a gift. Accordingly, 15:9 shows that the giving to the poor mentioned in 15:7,8,10 is a loan and that is why the advent of the seventh year is problematic for the giver/ lender since he expects to receive his money back from the poor and now he would not. 

All the verses quoted by the Rambam to support the obligation to give charity as a gift only refer to giving a loan to the poor and not an outright gift. To the best of my knowledge there is no verse in the Torah that requires one to give charity as a gift to the poor on a regular basis. There is an obligation to give to the poor during the festivals, Devarim 16:11,14, and there is an obligation to give ma’aser oni, Devarim 14:28,29, but that is only once every third year. Also, a freed slave receives a gift from his previous owner, 15:12-18 but that is a one time payment to the freed slave. Finally, there are laws that obligate one to let the poor work in the fields, shemitta, gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and the corner of the field, but all these cases are not gifts, since the poor is allowed the opportunity to work. 

The welfare obligation in the Torah is mainly a loan based charity system. This point might not only seem to contradict all standard assumptions about religious practice, but also would seem to make the Torah very callous towards the poor. How could it be that the Torah does not obligate one to give to the poor gifts on a regular basis? One is obligated to give loans to the poor, but why should the poor be under some obligation to return money they received? It is very possible that the poor will not be able to return the money since they need the money for consuming goods, and there is nothing to return. This is a legitimate question, but the loans are annulled every seven years, which means that the poor did not remain in debt forever. Thus, the annulling of the loans is a crucial part of a loan-based system of charity because this law makes the loan into a gift and removes the potentially crushing burden of debt. This is why, as argued above, the annulling of the loans had to be recorded in conjunction with the obligation to lend to the poor. Yet, if the annulling of the loans makes every loan into a gift, why have a loan in the first place, why not just obligate people to give gifts to the poor whenever the poor need money? 

The answer to this question is that while charity is considered a virtuous act, it has at least two negative results. One, charity lowers the dignity of the receiver, but a loan has the minimum amount of loss of dignity. (See Rambam’s eight levels of charity, Laws of gifts to the poor, 10:7-14.) The second problem is that receiving charity tends to induce people to stop trying to help themselves and they remain beneficiaries of further charity. This attitude means that a person will remain permanently poor and always in need of assistance.  Rambam recognizes this problem, as within the laws of charity he writes (Laws of gifts to the poor, 10:18) “A man should always exert himself and should sooner endure hardship than throw himself as a dependent upon the community. The Sages admonished, ‘Make your Sabbath a weekday, sooner than become dependent.” (Translation from Twersky, 1972). Yet, notwithstanding these moral statements, still the tendency remains for people to get too comfortable with receiving charity.

The loan based charity system might be an attempt to remove this problem. Even thought all loans eventually become annulled, when every loan is given, there is an obligation to pay back the money. Clearly if the person receiving the money is physically unable to work and pay back the money, then both parties know there is no way the money will be returned. However, if the receiver is able-bodied, then the obligation to return the money exists, and this obligation serves as a stimulus for the receiver to work to payback the loan. Thus, the Torah requires one to loan freely lend to the poor, but as the money is a loan and not a gift, then the goal is for the poor to use the money to get out of poverty and not to become life-long recipients. The above rationale for the loan based charity system can explain other laws in the Torah relating to charity. 

Why only on festivals and only once every third year by maaser oni is one obligated to give to the poor? Tigay (1996, p.144) writes that the food donated once every third year would “presumably suffice for the intervening years” and that ‘presumably certain public locations were designated for the deposit, distribution and long-term storage of the produce.” These assumptions are because he argues that “it is unlikely that the poor were to be fed only two years out of seven.” His assumptions that the food would suffice for so many years depends on the amount produced and donated versus the number of poor people and their needs. While certainly possible, this would seem to presume large quantities of food being donated. Yet, if it is correct, then the poor should have had no need for food during the shemitta year, which was one of the intervening years, but we know that the during the shemitta year the poor were allowed to work the fields, Shemot 23:11. It seems more likely that the food for the poor would suffice for a short period of time at best, and then one must explain why the poor were only given food once every three years? 

The answer is that the Torah does not want the poor to expect gifts on a regular basis, and thus these obligations are limited. When they are given, they serve as a merciful break to the poor, but as they are limited, the poor know they have to work as they cannot come to depend on these gifts on a regular basis. Similarly, the gifts to the freed slave are one-time gifts to help the slave start again, but since it is one time payment, as the slave cannot depend on more money. Finally, the laws that allow people to work in the fields do not encourage dependency since the people have to work to get their food. 

For a more complete discussion of these issues, see my article, Of biblical interest, brotherhood and charity, International Journal of Social Economics, 2003, vol. 30 pp. 788-797.

Bathing and swimming in the nine days

The Talmud (Pesachim 54b) quotes R. Eleazar that a man is forbidden to dip his finger in water on Tisha B'av, and based on this statement the Tur (1275-1340, Orah Chayyim 554) rules that one cannot bath on Tisha B'av. The Shulchan Arukh (1488-1575, 554:7) follows the Tur, though he allows (554:9,10,14) one to wash to remove dirt, to do netilat yadim in the morning of Tisha B'av, and to wash one's feet if they are sore from travelling.

The Talmud (Ta'anit 30a) also has a discussion about whether it is permissible to bath on erev Tisha B'av after the seudat ha-mafseket, the final meal before the fast. The Rosh (1250-1327, end of paragraph 38) rules that it is permissible to wash one's self after the seudat ha-mafseket. The Meiri (1249-1306) notes that this passage in the Talmud is not recorded by the Rif and that there are people who permit bathing after the meal, but he thinks that is should be forbidden. The Tur (553) quotes the Ramban (1194-1270) who also thinks that it should be forbidden, but he rejects this approach based on his father's (the Rosh's) opinion that it is permitted. The Shulchan Arukh makes no mention of any prohibition and the Rama (16th century, 553:1) rules that it is permitted to wash one's self until sunset.

Accordingly, it would seem from the Talmud that it is permitted to bath during the nine days since it was only forbidden on Tisha B'av and possibly for some short time on erev Tisha B'av. However, in the period of the Geonim (9th, 10th centuries) restrictions on bathing began, and according to Gartner (1983, 1985) this development was due to the influence of the group called the Mourners of Zion who were almost definitely Karaites. The custom from the Geonim of not bathing prior to Tisha B'av developed differently in the Middle Ages between the Sefardim and Ashkenazim.

Rambam (Laws of Fasts 5:6) records that it was the accepted custom not go to a bathhouse during the week of Tisha B'av. Question is whether this custom meant not to bath at all since the bathhouse was the only place where people could bath or was bathing in a bathhouse considered a social event, but bathing in a river by one’s self would be permitted. And/ or was the bathhouse considered a problem since it is bathing in hot water, but there would be no problem with bathing in cold water?

The Maggid Mishnah (Spain, 14th century, comments on the Rambam) writes that while in his time people did not go to the bathhouse the week of Tisha B’av, still the law is that one is permitted to bath even on erev Tisha B'av. The Shulchan Arukh (551:16) does not give a definitive ruling as he writes that some people do no bath starting from Rosh Chodesh, and some do not bath only in the week of Tisha B’av. He leaves the possibility that permitted to bath the entire nine days following the Maggid Mishnah. R. Ovadiah Yosef (1920-2013, Yehaveh Da'at, vol. 1, p.109) writes that the only restriction for Sefardim is to bath with hot water during the week of Tisha B'av, but it is permitted to bath in cold water or to go swimming during the week of Tisha B'av.

On the other hand, in medieval Europe, R. Klonimos of Rome (d. 1096 in Worms, Germany, quoted in Gartner, 1985, pp.207-208) wrote that in Ashkenaz the custom was not to bath from the beginning of the month of Av. Similarly, the Tur (551) quotes from the Ravyah (Germany, 1140-1225) that the custom was not to bath from Rosh Chodesh Av, but he did not state whether the custom was just with regard to hot water or also for cold water. In the 15th century, R. Yisrael Isserlin (Terumat ha-Deshen, 1390-1460, Germany, quoted in Bet Yosef, Orah Chayyim, 551, Ketav Avi ha-Ezri) wrote that the language of the Or Zarua (Austria 13th century) and the Mordechai (Germany, 13th century) implied that one was not to bath even in cold water, though he remembered seeing people swimming in the rivers and nobody protested, and he concluded that one who is strict in this matter should be blessed.

This concluding statement by the R. Isserlin that it is preferable not to bath even in cold water became the standard practice of Ashkenazim for the next 400-500 (600?) years. The Rama (16th century, Darkei Moshe, 551) notes that the Ran (Spain, 1290-1375) writes that it is permitted to bath, but that the practice (of Ashkenazim) is that it is forbidden to bath. Similarly, in his comments on the Shulchan Arukh, the Rama (Orah Chayyim 551:16) writes that the custom (of Ashkenazim) was not to bath even in cold water, and that it is forbidden on erev Shabbat to bath except for one's face, head and feet in cold water, though he notes that some permit washing one's head with hot water if one is accustomed to do so.

Accordingly, the Sefardi and Ashkenazi customs with regard to bathing prior to Tisha B'av differ not only with regard to the time period of the restrictions, the nine days (Ashkenazi) as opposed to the week of Tisha B'av (Sefardi), but also with regard to the basic nature of the custom that the present Sefardi custom only precludes bathing in hot water, while the Ashkenazi custom was not to allow bathing even in cold water. The difference in the time of the custom is part of the general difference between Ashkenazim and Sefardim with regard to the prohibitions leading up to Tisha B'av, but why should there be a difference with regard to hot and cold water? Maybe this difference was due to different climates that since the Sefardim lived in more southern and hotter climates than Ashkenazim this made not bathing at all much more problematic in the hot summer. 

Another possibility is that the acceptance by the Ashkenazim not to bath even in cold water was influenced by the cultural norms in Europe. In the end of the Middle Ages, there developed a general custom of not bathing in Western Europe due to a fear of diseases from the water. The Economist (The joy of dirt, 12/19/2009, Vol. 393 Issue 8662, p139-141) writes:
Paradoxically, it was fear of disease, including syphilis and the Black Death, that put water out of favour… By 1538, François I had closed the French bath houses. Henry VIII shut the "stews" of Southwark in 1546. Thus began an era when rich folk and poor rubbed along with dirt just fine. Even private baths were judged suspect. According to meticulous notes kept by Jean Héroard, the French court physician, the young Louis XIII, born in 1601, was not given a bath until he was almost seven…Indeed, bathing, certainly in hot water, was considered a veritable health risk. France's Henri IV was famously filthy, "stinking of sweat, stables, feet and garlic". Upon learning that the Duc de Sully had taken a bath, the king turned to his own physician, André du Laurens, for advice. The king was told that the poor man would be vulnerable for days. So a message was dispatched in forming Sully that he was not to go out, or he would endanger his health. Instead, he was told, the king would visit his Paris home: "so that you come to no harm as a result of your recent bath." In England, Elizabeth I bathed only once a month and James I, her successor, seems to have washed only his fingers. The myth of the danger of water was long-lived, and its demolition during the 18th and 19th centuries protracted. Louis XIV had sumptuous bathrooms built at Versailles but not, explains Mathieu da Vinha in "Le Versailles de Louis XIV", in order to clean the body. Valets rather rubbed his hands and face with alcohol, and he took therapeutic baths only irregularly. During the 19th century, germ theory combined with foreign trade, colonial administration and travel spread all manner of new ideas: hammams from Turkey and north Africa, "champu" (shampoo) from India, or bidets and olive-oil-based savon de Marseille from France. Water, and hygiene, were trickling back, and dirt was the new pest.

A "Jewish" proof of this practice not to bath is from the comments of the Magen Avraham (Poland, 1637-1683, 551:40) who writes that one should not treat this custom of not bathing in the nine days lightly since we are not regular bathers.

In the last two hundred years, even amongst Ashkenazi Jewry the practice has become to be lenient with regard to bathing, and this change accords with the change in western society's outlook on bathing. The Chayyei Adam (R. Avraham Danziger, 1748-1820, 133:19) writes that he thinks that a person who is accustomed to washing one's face, hands and feet with hot water every erev Shabbat can also do so on erev Shabbat in the nine days (Shabbat Hazon). This was a new development since the Rama had only permitted using hot water for washing one's head. Approximately 100 years later, the Arukh Hashulchan (Byelorussia, 1829-1908, 551:36,37) decried that people in his time were bathing in hot water (apparently their entire body) on erev Shabbat, but then he wrote that anybody who was dirty was allowed to bath even in hot water. Approximately 80 years later, R. Moshe Feinstein (US, 1895-1986) and Rav Yosef Henkin (US, 1880-1973, ordained by the Arukh Hashulchan) ruled that today one can bath with hot water on erev Shabbat since today we bath more frequently (quoted by R. Shimon Eider, 1978, p.13).

In addition, authorities have permitted bathing even when it is not erev Shabbat. For example, R. Chayyim David ha-Levi (Israel, Kitzsur Makor Chayyim, 96:21) permits workers who do physical work to bath. Similarly, R. Shimon Eider (p. 12) writes that, "if one is dirty or perspired, he may wash or bath to remove the dirt of perspiration." He also quotes R. Moshe Feinstein that one can swim for a short time to remove dirt and perspiration.  Similarly, R. Hershel Schachter (America, 1994, p. 198) quotes from Rav Soloveitchik that since today mourners for parents, bath in the 30 day period of mourning, then a person can bath during the nine days. 

This leniency to bath to be clean marks a new development since previously the only exemptions from the prohibition had been if one had to go to the mikvah since this is a religious obligation. However, there was no permission to bath to remove dirt and most likely that would have been considered bathing for pleasure. However, today because people bath more frequently, regular bathing is no longer considered as bathing for pleasure. 

If the custom not to bath is annulled, then this would be similar to another custom that the Shulchan Arukh records in conjunction with his mention of the custom of not bathing. In 551:16, the Shulchan Arukh writes that some people fast (during the day) for three weeks from the 17th of Tammuz until Tisha B’av. To the best of my knowledge, nobody today fasts for three weeks, even though it was once a common practice (see Rama on 562:2 and Mishnah Berurah on 562:14), and then just as this custom of fasting for three weeks has lapsed, so too the custom of not bathing in the nine days can also be annulled.

The question remains with regard to swimming that is not to become clean. My impression (2026) is that most modern Orthodox and dati leumi do not swim in the nine days. Yet, if people bath, then swimming should also be permitted. I have been told that swimming is different since it is dangerous, but if it is really dangerous, as when swimming in the ocean (?), then it should be forbidden all year round. Or, is there some belief that in the nine days, somehow dangers increase? If this is believed, then any activity such as driving, which has some danger, should be forbidden. A better differentiation between swimming and bathing is that today bathing is something that cannot be postponed, while swimming can be postponed. (Maybe can also say that swimming is many times a social experience, “hanging out at the pool,” and the goal is to reduce happiness in this period, though this claim opens many questions about many activities.) This differentiation raises the question of whether swimming that is for exercise should be allowed, as certainly if for medical reasons, it is permitted. I was asked this question, and answered that while technically, following the Maggid Mishnah, is it permitted, but to keep the custom that has developed, it is preferable in the week of Tisha B’av to skip swimming that is for exercise. Note, I think I am influenced by the practice in Camp Morasha, which I went to as a child, not to have free swim during the entire nine days, but to have instructional swim when it was not the week of Tisha B’av.

 

Bibliography:

Eider, Shimon, (d. 2007) 1978, A summary of halachos of the three weeks, Lakewood, NJ.

Gartner, Yaakov, 1983, The Influence of the Mourners of Zion on Tisha B’av customs in the Geonic period, Bar Ilan University Annual, 20,21, pp. 128-144.

-----, 1985, Mourners of Zion consciousness as a factor in the development of Tisha B’av customs,  Milet, pp. 201-24.

Halevi, Chayyim David (1924-1998), 975, Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, Mekor Chayyim, Tel Aviv.

Schachter, Hershel, 1994, Nefesh Harav, New York: Flatbush Beth Hamedrosh.

Bemidbar 24:16 – Was Bil'am prophesying when he said his fourth blessing

Bemidbar 24:14-24 records Bil'am fourth and last blessing. After Bil’am’s third blessing, Balak yelled at Bil’am, 24:10,11. This caused Bil’am to turn on Balak, and he announced that in the future Jewish people would smash (destroy?) Moav, 24:17. Bil’am then continued and spoke about Edom, Amalek, and the Kenites, 24:18-24. Was Bil'am prophesying when he made these statements?

I believe that the basis for thinking that Bil'am was a prophet when he said his fourth blessing is the third introductory verse of the fourth set of blessings, 24:16, where Bil’am states about himself that he, “Utters the hearer of Godly sayings, who knows the knowledge of Most-High envisaging a vision of Shaddai, bowed, but with eyes uncovered,” Fox translation (1995).  

Based on 24:16, Ramban (on 24:16, in other versions end of 24:14) writes that Bil’am’s declaration in 24:17-24 were prophecies from G-d. To support this contention, Chavel (1993, footnotes on Ramban) points out that the phrase “utters the hearer of Godly sayings” also appears in the third blessing, 24:4, and then just as the third blessing was a prophecy so too Bil’am's declarations in 24:17-24 were prophecies. Furthermore, the phrase “knowledge of Most-High,” as noted by the Ibn Ezra (on 24:16) also seems to refer to Bil’am’s prophetic abilities.

I doubt that 24:16 implies that Bil’am was speaking as a prophet of G-d by his fourth blessings since the verse is a statement from Bil’am. The Torah does not state that Bil’am’s fourth blessing were prophecies or from G-d. This is in contrast to Bil’am's first three blessings, where the Torah specifically states that Bil’am was speaking G-d’s word, 23:5,16 or that the spirit of G-d came upon him, 24:2. Furthermore, as we noted in our discussion on Bemidbar 22:23-35, "Bil’am’s amazing donkey," there is a parallelism between the episode with the donkey and Bil'am's prophecies, but the parallelism is only until the third blessing since by the fourth blessing, Bil'am is speaking his own mind.

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 105b, Berakhot 7a, see Rashi on 24:16) states that it is preposterous that Bil’am could have knowledge of G-d when he was bested by a donkey, and the Talmud concludes that he had a limited ability to know when to curse the people. Yet, even this seems to be giving him too much credit. With regard to Bil’am’s first three blessings, he wanted to curse the Jewish people, so G-d intervened to change the curse to a blessing (see Devarim 23:6), but by Bil’am’s fourth declaration, he never intended to curse the people, so G-d did not have to intervene. Bil’am claimed he was talking as a prophet, but this was just part of his act. As we discuss on Bemidbar 22:8-35, "Bil’am: The wizard of Petor," Bil’am was a big talker. When Balak first sent him messengers, he claimed to speak to G-d, and so too here, by his fourth blessing, he was a big talker that he claimed in 24:16 to know G-d’s knowledge.

Accordingly, my understanding is that as the Torah does not state that Bil’am’s last statements/ blessings were from G-d, then they were not, and 24:17-24 records Bil’am personal thoughts. Bil’am was a temporary prophet from the time of the incident with the donkey until his third blessing, and afterwards he reverted back to his usual personality of pretending to be a prophet.

With this approach, after reciting three blessings, Bil’am was in a good mood thinking a lot of himself since he had become a temporary prophet, and then when Balak got angry at him, he decided to continue the role of being a prophet. He made predictions about Moav’s future (24:17, 19?) since Balak was the king of Moav, and then for good measure he added on predictions about Edom, Amalek and the Kenites. These statements were based on his general knowledge, and after seeing that G-d intervenes in this world he was sure that the Jewish people would prevail with Moav. 

Bibliography:

Chavel, Hayyim Dov, 1993, Commentary of the Ramban, revised edition, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Bemidbar 17:27,28 (Korah) - The people’s state of mind after the rebellion of Korah and the miracle of the blossoming of the staffs: Hopeless in the desert

After Korah's rebellion and its aftereffects, 17:27,28 record, “And the Israelites said to Moshe, saying, “we gavanu, we are lost, all of us are lost. Whoever so much as comes near to the mishkan of G-d will die. Ha-im tamnu legvoah? (variation on Alter’s 2004, p. 772, translation). The words gavanu and legvoah are translated by Alter as to perish, while Fox (1995, p. 746) translates them to expire. Why did the people think that they were dying? There was no plague at that moment, and even the test of the staffs (the previous narrative, 17:16-26) did not involve any plague.

I believe the standard explanation of verses 17:27,28 is that these verses are an introduction to chapter 18. The next verses (chapter 18) record that G-d spoke to Aharon to tell him about his work in the mishkan to guard the mishkan. Rashi (on 18:1) explains that this message to Aharon at this point was for him to ensure that the priests and Levites would stop the general public from improperly entering the mishkan since the people just said they would die if they entered the mishkan. Similarly, Ibn Ezra (on 17:27) explains that the people had just seen the 250 men die by the rebellion of Korah when they attempted to offer an incense offering, and they were worried that they too would die if they came to the mishkan. This approach is difficult since if the people were scared of entering the mishkan, then why was there a need for the priests and the Levites to keep them out since they would stay out on their own?

Yet, maybe there was a fear that one person would enter the mishkan improperly since he/ she was not scared, and the entire nation would be punished due to that person. The basis for this idea could be that 18:5 refers to the Levites saving the people from a ketsef and a ketsef could mean a punishment for the entire nation. Yet, ketsef can also refer to punishments that are focused just on the sinners, and the term negef in 8:19 indicates that the potential danger here to the people was only to the person would enter the mishkan improperly and not to the entire nation.

Rashi (on 17:28, also see Rashbam and Bekhor Shor on 17:28) explains that in 17:27,28, the people were expressing their fear that they would accidentally enter the mishkan and die. This is also difficult. The people stated in 17:27,28 that they were gavenu and all lost, but if they were referring to a person who accidentally entered the mishkan, then this would be a few people, and does not relate to the fears of everybody dying.

There is also a discontinuity between the statements of 17:27,28 and chapter 18. The people complained to Moshe in 17:27, and there is no record in chapter 18 that Moshe responded to them. In the beginning of chapter 18, G-d spoke to Aharon and there is no indication that the message was to be immediately passed on to the people in response to their fears expressed in 17:27,28.

My guess is that the people’s statement in 17:27,28 is a conclusion to the rebellion of Korah, and not an introduction to chapter 18.

My understanding is that Korah's rebellion occurred after the sin of the spies. (This follows the Ramban's position, on 16:1, and not the Ibn Ezra's position, also on 16:1.) The sin of the spies caused the people to be punished that they would die in the desert. This decree must have been pretty depressing because it meant that their lives were literally going nowhere. After the people heard this decree they tried to go to Israel on their own, but this failed, 14:40-45. What was left for the people to do?

Maybe they thought that if they would increase their worship of G-d, then the decree could be rescinded. The desire of the 250 men to be priests was an expression of this desire to increase their worship of G-d. However, this was also unsuccessful when the 250 men died (16:35) since man is to worship G-d as G-d commands and not as man chooses. Afterwards, the test of the staffs showed that the people could not even become helpers in the mishkan like the Levites, 17:16-26. Thus, the people were now at a complete loss since they realized that they could not become priests or Levites, which meant that the decree of dying in the desert was not going to be rescinded. 

17:27,28 expresses the people's realization of the hopelessness of their situation. The word gavah (twice) in these verses does not refer to death, but to a condition where a person is alive but something (in this case, G-d’s decree) is impacting the person that he/ she will die because of this thing, the person understands that the thing will kill him, and a person has no ability to reverse this thing, see our discussion on Bemidbar 20:29 and Devarim 10:6, "Where did Aharon die?" and Bereshit 47:18. This was the situation of the people once they realized that they were doomed to die, 17:27. This dying is referring to the decree of death for their initial refusal to enter the land of Israel. They also said (the first half of 17:28) that if they went to the mishkan they would die since this shows that they understood that they could not increase their worship of G-d to have the decree rescinded since they would die if they entered the mishkan. There is nothing left for them to do other than to state, the second half of 17:28, Ha-im tamnu legvoah, which can be understood as the people saying “Is there no way to stop G-d’s decree from being fulfilled?” This was a rhetorical question with the answer being no. The people understood that they would have to accept the punishment of dying in the desert, and there was nothing for Moshe to say.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Bemidbar 10:34 (Beha`alothekha) - On the road again

Bemidbar 10:34 record (adaptation of Fox, 1995, translation), “Now the cloud of G-d is over them by day, as they march from the camp.”

This passage raises at least two questions. 10:34 implies that the cloud of G-d traveled above the aron to lead the people. Why were both the aron and the cloud necessary? Two, where was the cloud when the people marched? 9:15,16 record that the cloud floated above the Holy of Holies in the mishkan (Ramban on 9:15), and apparently the cloud was always on top of the Holy of Holies. Furthermore, 10:21 records that the mishkan was located in the middle of the people when they traveled, and then the cloud would be in the middle of the people. However, 9:17 records that when the cloud lifted up this was the signal to the people that they should march, and when the cloud “settled,” then this signaled to the people where they should camp. Also, 10:34 records that the cloud traveled with the aron leading the way. Thus, these verses imply that the cloud was in front of the people when the people marched.

Starting with the latter question, if we think of the cloud of G-d as literally a cloud, then it was able to expand and contract. Even though the cloud of G-d probably was in a form of a pillar still it functioned as a usual cloud whose elements can join together and split up. The cloud could have expanded to cover both the camp of the people, and the marching of the aron. This might have occurred in two ways. One, a small section of the cloud could have broken off to lead and cover the aron, while the main cloud remained on top of the camp of the people. When the people would join up with the Yehoshua and the aron (see above), then the small cloud would also re-join the main cloud. Two, the cloud over the people could have expanded to include a path to lead the way (see Rashi on 9:18) and cover Yehoshua and the aron, and then as the people traveled towards the aron, the path would contract. With either approach, the cloud was always over both the aron marching before the people and the people, as stated in 10:34. It is also possible that the cloud that split or extended out could have been in front of both the aron that was leading the way and of the people.

With regard to the first question, why was there a need for both the aron and the cloud to lead the way? The cloud showed that G-d was leading the way as indicted in 9:18 (also see Shemot 23:20 and 33:2), but even when G-d performs miracles, still mankind must attempt to contribute what he can. The aron with Yehoshua and his men marching before the people, follows a typical pattern of armies, that a scouting party goes ahead to lead the way. This was the people’s role in their journey, but ultimately it was the cloud that directed the people when and where to march and camp.

The idea that the cloud of G-d split up can explain the relationship between the verses 10:12 and 12:16. 10:12 records that the people left Mount Sinai, and the cloud camped in the desert of Paran. (It seems that the desert of Paran was in the northeastern part of the Sinai desert and/ or in the western part of the Negev desert.) Afterwards, 11:3 records that people camped in Taverah, which was re-named Kivrot ha-Taavah, 11:34. 11:35 then records that the people went to Hatzeirot, and from Hatzeirot they went to the desert of Paran, 12:16. How could it be that the people only made it to the desert of Paran in 12:16 when 10:12 already records that they reached the desert of Paran?

Ibn Ezra (on 10:33, also see Hizkuni on 10:12) explains that Taverah, Kivrot ha-Taavah and Hatzeirot were located in the desert of Paran. Yet, if this is true, why would 12:16 state that the people camped in the desert of Paran after leaving Hatzeirot, if Hatzeirot was part of the desert of Paran? Could it be that initially they camped in known locations in the desert of Paran, and afterwards they camped in a non-descript part of the desert, so it was just called the desert of Paran?
Ibn Ezra (on 12:16) quotes a different answer in the name of the many that initially only the cloud of G-d was already in the desert of Paran. This approach accords with a literal reading of 10:12. 10:12 states that the people started to travel away from Mount Sinai, but the verse does not record that the people reached the desert of Paran, only that the cloud settled by the desert of Paran. Ibn Ezra dismisses this answer without giving a reason, but I think it accords with the idea of the splitting and re-joining ability of the cloud of G-d.

The idea would be that when the people started to move as recorded in 10:12, the cloud of G-d went ahead of them to lead the way but only the cloud immediately reached the desert of Paran. Again, this does not mean the entire cloud reached the desert of Paran. Only a part of the cloud of G-d reached the desert, as the main part of the cloud was on top of the Holy of Holies in the middle of the people. The aron followed the path of the cloud of G-d marching in the direction of the desert of Paran, and the people followed the aron. On the way, the aron and the people stopped in Taverah, Kivrot ha-Taavah and Hatzeirot. Thus, the people only reached the desert of Paran after being in Hatzeirot, which was not part of the desert of Paran, as recorded in 12:16. When the people finally reached the desert of Paran, the two parts of the cloud of G-d were re-united.

Vayikra 25:4-22: Some economic implications of the laws of shemitta and yovel

Vayikra 25:4-18 records the laws of the special years, shemitta and yovel, where people were forbidden from working the lands to grow grains and wine and the land returned to is original owners in the yovel year. Regardless of the rationale for the laws, what are the economic implications of the laws? 

With regard to the law of not working the land during the shemitta and yovel years, what would the people do during the year?  Also, a more basic question is whether the lack of grains would lead to the people starving?

Vayikra 25:6 records that the people could eat the natural produce of the land that grew without being cultivated, but the question is how much food would that give? Apparently not too much, since 25:20-22 record that G-d was going to bless the people with bountiful crops in the sixth year which would hold the people over until the people could harvest the crops from the eighth year. This blessing would help landowners, but poor people who did not own lands, could have seen severe food depravation during the shemitta and yovel years. It is true that they would have greater access to the fields, but if there was limited produce, then this access would not have been helpful. In addition, if the blessing was not fulfilled, possibly since a person was not worthy of receiving this blessing, then even landowners could have faced a problem of food deprivation.

The implication of this possible food depravation is that people would go hunting and fishing during the shemitta and yovel years. In addition, instead of people raising grains in the six non-shemitta years, they might have dedicated more of their land to growing vegetables, which could be grown in the shemitta and yovel years and raising sheep and cattle. While a person had to allow some animals to enter one’s field, 25:7, there is no prohibition of killing one’s animals that were not in the fields. For example, the shemitta year did not annul the korban pesach or other animal sacrifices, which means that people killed their sheep, goats and cows during the shemitta year to celebrate various holidays. Thus, if there was a problem of not having enough food during the shemitta and yovel years, then the people would have reverted back to being hunter/ gatherers.

Even if there was enough food to survive and there was no food depravation, then still the people could have gone hunting and fishing during the year. They might also have “wasted” the year by playing games and sports. Another possibility is that the people could have spent the year on building and upgrading their homes. Another possibility is that Soss (1975, p. 338) suggests that since a person could not work in the fields during the year, this would free time which “would act to stimulate technical inventiveness and innovation.”

Are there any possible economic gains from the land resting? One, as mentioned by the Rambam (Moreh 3:39), is that the resting of the land could be considered a form of crop rotation. Would this lead an overall gain in productivity in the other six years?

Buchholz (1988) suggests that maybe the shemitta year increased the capital stock by forcing people to save in the intervening six years. However, as noted by Soss (1975) most of the savings would be for food, which would literally be eaten in the 7th year. One other consideration is that the loss of production in the seventh year would naturally have been partially offset by people working harder in the six intervening years to compensate for being unable to work in the seventh year. In fact, one could understand the verses that introduce the shemitta year as obligating a person to work in the intervening years. Thus, Shemot 23:10 and Vayikra 25:2 record, “For six years you are to sow your land,” Fox, 1995 translation. (Note this idea could also apply to the Shabbat that a person is supposed to work for six days, see Shemot 20:9 and Devarim 5:19, and Avot de-Rav Natan, 11:1.) Furthermore, as mentioned above, the prohibition of the shemitta year would likely induce people to enter fields least effected by shemitta, such as tending sheep or cattle, crafts, or services instead of farming. Would these activities lead overall to increases in production in the economy?

The return of the ancestral land in the yovel year has more potential gains than the law of not working the fields in the shemitta and yovel years, though again these gains are not obvious. When the people would return to their ancestral fields this would decrease the inequality in society since each person would have the opportunity to start over again and there would be an increase of the assets of the poor people. However, if there was some particularly valuable land, then one family would own this land for perpetuity which can make them permanently wealthy. Also, over time normal demographic changes would nullify the initial attempt at equality when the land was divided in the time of Yehoshua. People from larger families would have less land than people from smaller families since their fixed share would be divided between more people. Furthermore, over time some families die out, and the land would be inherited by close relatives who would end up with “double” plots. (I heard this last point from Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, in a discussion with him in 2000.) Thus, the equality of the division of the land was just a starting point that people started from the same point, but there was no guarantee of future equality, and the return of the land would not necessarily increase equality.

There are definite losses in the efficiency of the economy from the return of the land in the yovel year since there is less incentive for a buyer to develop the land in the intervening 49 years. Buchholz (1988, p. 422) also argues that the subdivision of plots “limits the ability to exploit economies of scale” by the farming. Yet, unless there are large transaction costs, this problem could be surmounted since adjacent farmers could work together to attain economies of scale.

On the other hand, there are some potential gains in efficiency from the return of the land. While one generation might have worked hard to become wealthy and accumulate large tracts of land, the continued possession of the land by future generations if there were no laws of yovel, could have reduced the level of competition and efficiency in the economy. The inheritors of the land might tend to “satisfice” as opposed to maximizing the value of the fields. Instead, the redistribution of the land means that the descendants of the previous large landowners would have to re-earn their wealth, and the people who returned to their ancestral land would have resources that would enable them to compete. Accordingly, by the return of the land in the yovel year, it is possible that there would be economic benefits to the economy, but the potential gains or losses in equality and in efficiency from the law cannot be known unless one actually can measure a real-life case of the land periodically returning to its original owners. (I think these possibilities are similar in some ways to arguments about inheritance taxes if they lead to more or less efficiency and equality in an economy.)

Bibliography:

Buchholz, Todd, 1988, “Biblical Laws and the Economic Growth of Ancient Israel,” Journal of Law and Religion, 6:2, pp. 389-427.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Soss, N., 1975, Old Testament Laws and Economic Society, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34, pp. 323-344.