Devarim 16:21,22 (Shoftim) - Asherot and matzevot in the Torah

Devarim 16:21,22 record the following two prohibitions, “You are not to plant yourself an asherah (or) any-kind of tree beside the altar of G-d that you make yourself. And, you are not to raise yourself a matzevah (stone pillar) that G-d hates,” (adaptation of Fox 1995 translation). The asherah would be a carved tree, while the prohibition of any tree would be to a natural tree that had not been worked on.

These prohibitions are troubling since Avraham appears to have planted an ashera, Bereshit 21:33, and Yaakov, Bereshit 28:18, 35:14, and Moshe made matzevot, Shemot 24:4.

Rashi (on 16:22) explains that in the time of the patriarchs G-d liked them, but after the Canaanites adopted them as part of their pagan ritual, G-d hated them. Yet, did the Canaanites really not use these items for idolatry in the times of the patriarchs?

The Ramban (on 16:22, also see comments on Bereshit 26:5) notes that the Canaanites also had altars as part of their pagan worship, but altars did not become prohibited. Ramban suggests that the altars could not have been prohibited since they were essential to offering sacrifices, while the matzevot are not needed to offer sacrifices, which means that they could be abolished once they were adopted by the Canaanites.

Ibn Ezra (on 16:22) suggests that the prohibition of matzevot (also asherot?) was only when the matzevot were made with the intention of using them for idol worship. However, if they were made to worship G-d as by Yaakov (and by Moshe?), then they would be permitted. Yet, there is no indication in 16:21 of a distinction between permitted and forbidden matzevot, or good and bad worship that is associated with the pillars.

My guess is that first one has to distinguish between pillars that are used for worship at all and others that are types of monuments to re-call events, that the latter case would be permitted. Most likely this was the case by the pillars that Moshe put up, the pillar that Yehoshua put up, Yehoshua 24:26,27, and Yaakov’s matzevah for Rahel, Bereshit 35:20. The prohibitions in 16:21,22 are then referring to a pillar or a tree that is used in some ways for religious actions, certainly idol worship but even worship of G-d.

In addition, maybe by Avraham and Yaakov, G-d always hated their ashera and matzevot, but He tolerated them since he knew that they were using them to worship Him. However, before Moshe died the people had to be told that asherot and matzevot were no longer going to be tolerated, even if they were intended to be used for the worship of G-d.

This explanation is similar to the Rambam’s approach by sacrifices, Moreh 3:32, that G-d “suffered the above mentioned kinds of worship (sacrifices) to remain” (Pines, 1963, p. 526) since mankind could not conceive of a worship of G-d without sacrifices. Likewise, in this case, G-d initially did not prohibit the asherot and matzevot since they were used with good intentions. However, by the asherot and matzevot, they were eventually prohibited, possibly because they were not considered by the people as being crucial to the worship of G-d as opposed to sacrifices, and hence the people could accept their prohibition.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Pines, Shlomo, 1963, Translation of Guide to the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Devarim 15:7,8 (Re'eh) - The idea of charity in the Torah

Rambam (Laws of gifts to the poor, 7:1) writes, “It is a positive commandment to give charity to the poor according to what the poor requires…as it says, “You shall open your hand to him, Devarim 15:8, and “When your brother sinks down and his hand falters beside you, than shall you strengthen him as a sojourner and resident-settler, and he is to live beside you… your brother shall live beside you, Vayikra 25:35,36. Whoever sees a poor person and does not give charity violates a negative commandment as it says, “You are not to toughen your heart, you are not to shut your hand to your brother, the needy one, Devarim 15:7.” 

While all the verses quoted by Rambam clearly refer to helping the poor, it is striking that all the verses are referring to lending money to the poor and not to giving money outright as one normally thinks of charity. Rambam quoted Vayikra 25:35,36, but deleted the beginning of Vayikra 25:36 which records that one must not charge the poor interest. This warning shows that the case of helping the poor is a loan, and not an outright gift. Similarly, Devarim 15:7,8 record that one must give to the poor, but the end of 15:8 explains that the giving is through a loan. The following verse, Devarim 15:9, records that one should not think that because the seventh year is coming one will not give to the poor. The concern for the seventh year is only because a loan is annulled in the seventh year. This issue of annulling a loan is irrelevant if one gives a gift to the poor because one has no obligation to return a gift. Accordingly, 15:9 shows that the giving to the poor mentioned in 15:7,8,10 is a loan and that is why the advent of the seventh year is problematic for the giver/ lender since he expects to receive his money back from the poor and now he would not. 

All the verses quoted by the Rambam to support the obligation to give charity as a gift only refer to giving a loan to the poor and not an outright gift. To the best of my knowledge there is no verse in the Torah that requires one to give charity as a gift to the poor on a regular basis. There is an obligation to give to the poor during the festivals, Devarim 16:11,14, and there is an obligation to give ma’aser oni, Devarim 14:28,29, but that is only once every third year. Also, a freed slave receives a gift from his previous owner, 15:12-18 but that is a one time payment to the freed slave. Finally, there are laws that obligate one to let the poor work in the fields, shemitta, gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and the corner of the field, but all these cases are not gifts, since the poor is allowed the opportunity to work. 

The welfare obligation in the Torah is mainly a loan based charity system. This point might not only seem to contradict all standard assumptions about religious practice, but also would seem to make the Torah very callous towards the poor. How could it be that the Torah does not obligate one to give to the poor gifts on a regular basis? One is obligated to give loans to the poor, but why should the poor be under some obligation to return money they received? It is very possible that the poor will not be able to return the money since they need the money for consuming goods, and there is nothing to return. This is a legitimate question, but the loans are annulled every seven years, which means that the poor did not remain in debt forever. Thus, the annulling of the loans is a crucial part of a loan-based system of charity because this law makes the loan into a gift and removes the potentially crushing burden of debt. This is why, as argued above, the annulling of the loans had to be recorded in conjunction with the obligation to lend to the poor. Yet, if the annulling of the loans makes every loan into a gift, why have a loan in the first place, why not just obligate people to give gifts to the poor whenever the poor need money? 

The answer to this question is that while charity is considered a virtuous act, it has at least two negative results. One, charity lowers the dignity of the receiver, but a loan has the minimum amount of loss of dignity. (See Rambam’s eight levels of charity, Laws of gifts to the poor, 10:7-14.) The second problem is that receiving charity tends to induce people to stop trying to help themselves and they remain beneficiaries of further charity. This attitude means that a person will remain permanently poor and always in need of assistance.  Rambam recognizes this problem, as within the laws of charity he writes (Laws of gifts to the poor, 10:18) “A man should always exert himself and should sooner endure hardship than throw himself as a dependent upon the community. The Sages admonished, ‘Make your Sabbath a weekday, sooner than become dependent.” (Translation from Twersky, 1972). Yet, notwithstanding these moral statements, still the tendency remains for people to get too comfortable with receiving charity.

The loan based charity system might be an attempt to remove this problem. Even thought all loans eventually become annulled, when every loan is given, there is an obligation to pay back the money. Clearly if the person receiving the money is physically unable to work and pay back the money, then both parties know there is no way the money will be returned. However, if the receiver is able-bodied, then the obligation to return the money exists, and this obligation serves as a stimulus for the receiver to work to payback the loan. Thus, the Torah requires one to loan freely lend to the poor, but as the money is a loan and not a gift, then the goal is for the poor to use the money to get out of poverty and not to become life-long recipients. The above rationale for the loan based charity system can explain other laws in the Torah relating to charity. 

Why only on festivals and only once every third year by maaser oni is one obligated to give to the poor? Tigay (1996, p.144) writes that the food donated once every third year would “presumably suffice for the intervening years” and that ‘presumably certain public locations were designated for the deposit, distribution and long-term storage of the produce.” These assumptions are because he argues that “it is unlikely that the poor were to be fed only two years out of seven.” His assumptions that the food would suffice for so many years depends on the amount produced and donated versus the number of poor people and their needs. While certainly possible, this would seem to presume large quantities of food being donated. Yet, if it is correct, then the poor should have had no need for food during the shemitta year, which was one of the intervening years, but we know that the during the shemitta year the poor were allowed to work the fields, Shemot 23:11. It seems more likely that the food for the poor would suffice for a short period of time at best, and then one must explain why the poor were only given food once every three years? 

The answer is that the Torah does not want the poor to expect gifts on a regular basis, and thus these obligations are limited. When they are given, they serve as a merciful break to the poor, but as they are limited, the poor know they have to work as they cannot come to depend on these gifts on a regular basis. Similarly, the gifts to the freed slave are one-time gifts to help the slave start again, but since it is one time payment, as the slave cannot depend on more money. Finally, the laws that allow people to work in the fields do not encourage dependency since the people have to work to get their food. 

For a more complete discussion of these issues, see my article, Of biblical interest, brotherhood and charity, International Journal of Social Economics, 2003, vol. 30 pp. 788-797.

Bathing and swimming in the nine days

The Talmud (Pesachim 54b) quotes R. Eleazar that a man is forbidden to dip his finger in water on Tisha B'av, and based on this statement the Tur (1275-1340, Orah Chayyim 554) rules that one cannot bath on Tisha B'av. The Shulchan Arukh (1488-1575, 554:7) follows the Tur, though he allows (554:9,10,14) one to wash to remove dirt, to do netilat yadim in the morning of Tisha B'av, and to wash one's feet if they are sore from travelling.

The Talmud (Ta'anit 30a) also has a discussion about whether it is permissible to bath on erev Tisha B'av after the seudat ha-mafseket, the final meal before the fast. The Rosh (1250-1327, end of paragraph 38) rules that it is permissible to wash one's self after the seudat ha-mafseket. The Meiri (1249-1306) notes that this passage in the Talmud is not recorded by the Rif and that there are people who permit bathing after the meal, but he thinks that is should be forbidden. The Tur (553) quotes the Ramban (1194-1270) who also thinks that it should be forbidden, but he rejects this approach based on his father's (the Rosh's) opinion that it is permitted. The Shulchan Arukh makes no mention of any prohibition and the Rama (16th century, 553:1) rules that it is permitted to wash one's self until sunset.

Accordingly, it would seem from the Talmud that it is permitted to bath during the nine days since it was only forbidden on Tisha B'av and possibly for some short time on erev Tisha B'av. However, in the period of the Geonim (9th, 10th centuries) restrictions on bathing began, and according to Gartner (1983, 1985) this development was due to the influence of the group called the Mourners of Zion who were almost definitely Karaites. The custom from the Geonim of not bathing prior to Tisha B'av developed differently in the Middle Ages between the Sefardim and Ashkenazim.

Rambam (Laws of Fasts 5:6) records that it was the accepted custom not go to a bathhouse during the week of Tisha B'av. Question is whether this custom meant not to bath at all since the bathhouse was the only place where people could bath or was bathing in a bathhouse considered a social event, but bathing in a river by one’s self would be permitted. And/ or was the bathhouse considered a problem since it is bathing in hot water, but there would be no problem with bathing in cold water?

The Maggid Mishnah (Spain, 14th century, comments on the Rambam) writes that while in his time people did not go to the bathhouse the week of Tisha B’av, still the law is that one is permitted to bath even on erev Tisha B'av. The Shulchan Arukh (551:16) does not give a definitive ruling as he writes that some people do no bath starting from Rosh Chodesh, and some do not bath only in the week of Tisha B’av. He leaves the possibility that permitted to bath the entire nine days following the Maggid Mishnah. R. Ovadiah Yosef (1920-2013, Yehaveh Da'at, vol. 1, p.109) writes that the only restriction for Sefardim is to bath with hot water during the week of Tisha B'av, but it is permitted to bath in cold water or to go swimming during the week of Tisha B'av.

On the other hand, in medieval Europe, R. Klonimos of Rome (d. 1096 in Worms, Germany, quoted in Gartner, 1985, pp.207-208) wrote that in Ashkenaz the custom was not to bath from the beginning of the month of Av. Similarly, the Tur (551) quotes from the Ravyah (Germany, 1140-1225) that the custom was not to bath from Rosh Chodesh Av, but he did not state whether the custom was just with regard to hot water or also for cold water. In the 15th century, R. Yisrael Isserlin (Terumat ha-Deshen, 1390-1460, Germany, quoted in Bet Yosef, Orah Chayyim, 551, Ketav Avi ha-Ezri) wrote that the language of the Or Zarua (Austria 13th century) and the Mordechai (Germany, 13th century) implied that one was not to bath even in cold water, though he remembered seeing people swimming in the rivers and nobody protested, and he concluded that one who is strict in this matter should be blessed.

This concluding statement by the R. Isserlin that it is preferable not to bath even in cold water became the standard practice of Ashkenazim for the next 400-500 (600?) years. The Rama (16th century, Darkei Moshe, 551) notes that the Ran (Spain, 1290-1375) writes that it is permitted to bath, but that the practice (of Ashkenazim) is that it is forbidden to bath. Similarly, in his comments on the Shulchan Arukh, the Rama (Orah Chayyim 551:16) writes that the custom (of Ashkenazim) was not to bath even in cold water, and that it is forbidden on erev Shabbat to bath except for one's face, head and feet in cold water, though he notes that some permit washing one's head with hot water if one is accustomed to do so.

Accordingly, the Sefardi and Ashkenazi customs with regard to bathing prior to Tisha B'av differ not only with regard to the time period of the restrictions, the nine days (Ashkenazi) as opposed to the week of Tisha B'av (Sefardi), but also with regard to the basic nature of the custom that the present Sefardi custom only precludes bathing in hot water, while the Ashkenazi custom was not to allow bathing even in cold water. The difference in the time of the custom is part of the general difference between Ashkenazim and Sefardim with regard to the prohibitions leading up to Tisha B'av, but why should there be a difference with regard to hot and cold water? Maybe this difference was due to different climates that since the Sefardim lived in more southern and hotter climates than Ashkenazim this made not bathing at all much more problematic in the hot summer. 

Another possibility is that the acceptance by the Ashkenazim not to bath even in cold water was influenced by the cultural norms in Europe. In the end of the Middle Ages, there developed a general custom of not bathing in Western Europe due to a fear of diseases from the water. The Economist (The joy of dirt, 12/19/2009, Vol. 393 Issue 8662, p139-141) writes:
Paradoxically, it was fear of disease, including syphilis and the Black Death, that put water out of favour… By 1538, François I had closed the French bath houses. Henry VIII shut the "stews" of Southwark in 1546. Thus began an era when rich folk and poor rubbed along with dirt just fine. Even private baths were judged suspect. According to meticulous notes kept by Jean Héroard, the French court physician, the young Louis XIII, born in 1601, was not given a bath until he was almost seven…Indeed, bathing, certainly in hot water, was considered a veritable health risk. France's Henri IV was famously filthy, "stinking of sweat, stables, feet and garlic". Upon learning that the Duc de Sully had taken a bath, the king turned to his own physician, André du Laurens, for advice. The king was told that the poor man would be vulnerable for days. So a message was dispatched in forming Sully that he was not to go out, or he would endanger his health. Instead, he was told, the king would visit his Paris home: "so that you come to no harm as a result of your recent bath." In England, Elizabeth I bathed only once a month and James I, her successor, seems to have washed only his fingers. The myth of the danger of water was long-lived, and its demolition during the 18th and 19th centuries protracted. Louis XIV had sumptuous bathrooms built at Versailles but not, explains Mathieu da Vinha in "Le Versailles de Louis XIV", in order to clean the body. Valets rather rubbed his hands and face with alcohol, and he took therapeutic baths only irregularly. During the 19th century, germ theory combined with foreign trade, colonial administration and travel spread all manner of new ideas: hammams from Turkey and north Africa, "champu" (shampoo) from India, or bidets and olive-oil-based savon de Marseille from France. Water, and hygiene, were trickling back, and dirt was the new pest.

A "Jewish" proof of this practice not to bath is from the comments of the Magen Avraham (Poland, 1637-1683, 551:40) who writes that one should not treat this custom of not bathing in the nine days lightly since we are not regular bathers.

In the last two hundred years, even amongst Ashkenazi Jewry the practice has become to be lenient with regard to bathing, and this change accords with the change in western society's outlook on bathing. The Chayyei Adam (R. Avraham Danziger, 1748-1820, 133:19) writes that he thinks that a person who is accustomed to washing one's face, hands and feet with hot water every erev Shabbat can also do so on erev Shabbat in the nine days (Shabbat Hazon). This was a new development since the Rama had only permitted using hot water for washing one's head. Approximately 100 years later, the Arukh Hashulchan (Byelorussia, 1829-1908, 551:36,37) decried that people in his time were bathing in hot water (apparently their entire body) on erev Shabbat, but then he wrote that anybody who was dirty was allowed to bath even in hot water. Approximately 80 years later, R. Moshe Feinstein (US, 1895-1986) and Rav Yosef Henkin (US, 1880-1973, ordained by the Arukh Hashulchan) ruled that today one can bath with hot water on erev Shabbat since today we bath more frequently (quoted by R. Shimon Eider, 1978, p.13).

In addition, authorities have permitted bathing even when it is not erev Shabbat. For example, R. Chayyim David ha-Levi (Israel, Kitzsur Makor Chayyim, 96:21) permits workers who do physical work to bath. Similarly, R. Shimon Eider (p. 12) writes that, "if one is dirty or perspired, he may wash or bath to remove the dirt of perspiration." He also quotes R. Moshe Feinstein that one can swim for a short time to remove dirt and perspiration.  Similarly, R. Hershel Schachter (America, 1994, p. 198) quotes from Rav Soloveitchik that since today mourners for parents, bath in the 30 day period of mourning, then a person can bath during the nine days. 

This leniency to bath to be clean marks a new development since previously the only exemptions from the prohibition had been if one had to go to the mikvah since this is a religious obligation. However, there was no permission to bath to remove dirt and most likely that would have been considered bathing for pleasure. However, today because people bath more frequently, regular bathing is no longer considered as bathing for pleasure. 

If the custom not to bath is annulled, then this would be similar to another custom that the Shulchan Arukh records in conjunction with his mention of the custom of not bathing. In 551:16, the Shulchan Arukh writes that some people fast (during the day) for three weeks from the 17th of Tammuz until Tisha B’av. To the best of my knowledge, nobody today fasts for three weeks, even though it was once a common practice (see Rama on 562:2 and Mishnah Berurah on 562:14), and then just as this custom of fasting for three weeks has lapsed, so too the custom of not bathing in the nine days can also be annulled.

The question remains with regard to swimming that is not to become clean. My impression (2026) is that most modern Orthodox and dati leumi do not swim in the nine days. Yet, if people bath, then swimming should also be permitted. I have been told that swimming is different since it is dangerous, but if it is really dangerous, as when swimming in the ocean (?), then it should be forbidden all year round. Or, is there some belief that in the nine days, somehow dangers increase? If this is believed, then any activity such as driving, which has some danger, should be forbidden. A better differentiation between swimming and bathing is that today bathing is something that cannot be postponed, while swimming can be postponed. (Maybe can also say that swimming is many times a social experience, “hanging out at the pool,” and the goal is to reduce happiness in this period, though this claim opens many questions about many activities.) This differentiation raises the question of whether swimming that is for exercise should be allowed, as certainly if for medical reasons, it is permitted. I was asked this question, and answered that while technically, following the Maggid Mishnah, is it permitted, but to keep the custom that has developed, it is preferable in the week of Tisha B’av to skip swimming that is for exercise. Note, I think I am influenced by the practice in Camp Morasha, which I went to as a child, not to have free swim during the entire nine days, but to have instructional swim when it was not the week of Tisha B’av.

 

Bibliography:

Eider, Shimon, (d. 2007) 1978, A summary of halachos of the three weeks, Lakewood, NJ.

Gartner, Yaakov, 1983, The Influence of the Mourners of Zion on Tisha B’av customs in the Geonic period, Bar Ilan University Annual, 20,21, pp. 128-144.

-----, 1985, Mourners of Zion consciousness as a factor in the development of Tisha B’av customs,  Milet, pp. 201-24.

Halevi, Chayyim David (1924-1998), 975, Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, Mekor Chayyim, Tel Aviv.

Schachter, Hershel, 1994, Nefesh Harav, New York: Flatbush Beth Hamedrosh.

Bemidbar 24:16 – Was Bil'am prophesying when he said his fourth blessing

Bemidbar 24:14-24 records Bil'am fourth and last blessing. After Bil’am’s third blessing, Balak yelled at Bil’am, 24:10,11. This caused Bil’am to turn on Balak, and he announced that in the future Jewish people would smash (destroy?) Moav, 24:17. Bil’am then continued and spoke about Edom, Amalek, and the Kenites, 24:18-24. Was Bil'am prophesying when he made these statements?

I believe that the basis for thinking that Bil'am was a prophet when he said his fourth blessing is the third introductory verse of the fourth set of blessings, 24:16, where Bil’am states about himself that he, “Utters the hearer of Godly sayings, who knows the knowledge of Most-High envisaging a vision of Shaddai, bowed, but with eyes uncovered,” Fox translation (1995).  

Based on 24:16, Ramban (on 24:16, in other versions end of 24:14) writes that Bil’am’s declaration in 24:17-24 were prophecies from G-d. To support this contention, Chavel (1993, footnotes on Ramban) points out that the phrase “utters the hearer of Godly sayings” also appears in the third blessing, 24:4, and then just as the third blessing was a prophecy so too Bil’am's declarations in 24:17-24 were prophecies. Furthermore, the phrase “knowledge of Most-High,” as noted by the Ibn Ezra (on 24:16) also seems to refer to Bil’am’s prophetic abilities.

I doubt that 24:16 implies that Bil’am was speaking as a prophet of G-d by his fourth blessings since the verse is a statement from Bil’am. The Torah does not state that Bil’am’s fourth blessing were prophecies or from G-d. This is in contrast to Bil’am's first three blessings, where the Torah specifically states that Bil’am was speaking G-d’s word, 23:5,16 or that the spirit of G-d came upon him, 24:2. Furthermore, as we noted in our discussion on Bemidbar 22:23-35, "Bil’am’s amazing donkey," there is a parallelism between the episode with the donkey and Bil'am's prophecies, but the parallelism is only until the third blessing since by the fourth blessing, Bil'am is speaking his own mind.

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 105b, Berakhot 7a, see Rashi on 24:16) states that it is preposterous that Bil’am could have knowledge of G-d when he was bested by a donkey, and the Talmud concludes that he had a limited ability to know when to curse the people. Yet, even this seems to be giving him too much credit. With regard to Bil’am’s first three blessings, he wanted to curse the Jewish people, so G-d intervened to change the curse to a blessing (see Devarim 23:6), but by Bil’am’s fourth declaration, he never intended to curse the people, so G-d did not have to intervene. Bil’am claimed he was talking as a prophet, but this was just part of his act. As we discuss on Bemidbar 22:8-35, "Bil’am: The wizard of Petor," Bil’am was a big talker. When Balak first sent him messengers, he claimed to speak to G-d, and so too here, by his fourth blessing, he was a big talker that he claimed in 24:16 to know G-d’s knowledge.

Accordingly, my understanding is that as the Torah does not state that Bil’am’s last statements/ blessings were from G-d, then they were not, and 24:17-24 records Bil’am personal thoughts. Bil’am was a temporary prophet from the time of the incident with the donkey until his third blessing, and afterwards he reverted back to his usual personality of pretending to be a prophet.

With this approach, after reciting three blessings, Bil’am was in a good mood thinking a lot of himself since he had become a temporary prophet, and then when Balak got angry at him, he decided to continue the role of being a prophet. He made predictions about Moav’s future (24:17, 19?) since Balak was the king of Moav, and then for good measure he added on predictions about Edom, Amalek and the Kenites. These statements were based on his general knowledge, and after seeing that G-d intervenes in this world he was sure that the Jewish people would prevail with Moav. 

Bibliography:

Chavel, Hayyim Dov, 1993, Commentary of the Ramban, revised edition, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Bemidbar 17:27,28 (Korah) - The people’s state of mind after the rebellion of Korah and the miracle of the blossoming of the staffs: Hopeless in the desert

After Korah's rebellion and its aftereffects, 17:27,28 record, “And the Israelites said to Moshe, saying, “we gavanu, we are lost, all of us are lost. Whoever so much as comes near to the mishkan of G-d will die. Ha-im tamnu legvoah? (variation on Alter’s 2004, p. 772, translation). The words gavanu and legvoah are translated by Alter as to perish, while Fox (1995, p. 746) translates them to expire. Why did the people think that they were dying? There was no plague at that moment, and even the test of the staffs (the previous narrative, 17:16-26) did not involve any plague.

I believe the standard explanation of verses 17:27,28 is that these verses are an introduction to chapter 18. The next verses (chapter 18) record that G-d spoke to Aharon to tell him about his work in the mishkan to guard the mishkan. Rashi (on 18:1) explains that this message to Aharon at this point was for him to ensure that the priests and Levites would stop the general public from improperly entering the mishkan since the people just said they would die if they entered the mishkan. Similarly, Ibn Ezra (on 17:27) explains that the people had just seen the 250 men die by the rebellion of Korah when they attempted to offer an incense offering, and they were worried that they too would die if they came to the mishkan. This approach is difficult since if the people were scared of entering the mishkan, then why was there a need for the priests and the Levites to keep them out since they would stay out on their own?

Yet, maybe there was a fear that one person would enter the mishkan improperly since he/ she was not scared, and the entire nation would be punished due to that person. The basis for this idea could be that 18:5 refers to the Levites saving the people from a ketsef and a ketsef could mean a punishment for the entire nation. Yet, ketsef can also refer to punishments that are focused just on the sinners, and the term negef in 8:19 indicates that the potential danger here to the people was only to the person would enter the mishkan improperly and not to the entire nation.

Rashi (on 17:28, also see Rashbam and Bekhor Shor on 17:28) explains that in 17:27,28, the people were expressing their fear that they would accidentally enter the mishkan and die. This is also difficult. The people stated in 17:27,28 that they were gavenu and all lost, but if they were referring to a person who accidentally entered the mishkan, then this would be a few people, and does not relate to the fears of everybody dying.

There is also a discontinuity between the statements of 17:27,28 and chapter 18. The people complained to Moshe in 17:27, and there is no record in chapter 18 that Moshe responded to them. In the beginning of chapter 18, G-d spoke to Aharon and there is no indication that the message was to be immediately passed on to the people in response to their fears expressed in 17:27,28.

My guess is that the people’s statement in 17:27,28 is a conclusion to the rebellion of Korah, and not an introduction to chapter 18.

My understanding is that Korah's rebellion occurred after the sin of the spies. (This follows the Ramban's position, on 16:1, and not the Ibn Ezra's position, also on 16:1.) The sin of the spies caused the people to be punished that they would die in the desert. This decree must have been pretty depressing because it meant that their lives were literally going nowhere. After the people heard this decree they tried to go to Israel on their own, but this failed, 14:40-45. What was left for the people to do?

Maybe they thought that if they would increase their worship of G-d, then the decree could be rescinded. The desire of the 250 men to be priests was an expression of this desire to increase their worship of G-d. However, this was also unsuccessful when the 250 men died (16:35) since man is to worship G-d as G-d commands and not as man chooses. Afterwards, the test of the staffs showed that the people could not even become helpers in the mishkan like the Levites, 17:16-26. Thus, the people were now at a complete loss since they realized that they could not become priests or Levites, which meant that the decree of dying in the desert was not going to be rescinded. 

17:27,28 expresses the people's realization of the hopelessness of their situation. The word gavah (twice) in these verses does not refer to death, but to a condition where a person is alive but something (in this case, G-d’s decree) is impacting the person that he/ she will die because of this thing, the person understands that the thing will kill him, and a person has no ability to reverse this thing, see our discussion on Bemidbar 20:29 and Devarim 10:6, "Where did Aharon die?" and Bereshit 47:18. This was the situation of the people once they realized that they were doomed to die, 17:27. This dying is referring to the decree of death for their initial refusal to enter the land of Israel. They also said (the first half of 17:28) that if they went to the mishkan they would die since this shows that they understood that they could not increase their worship of G-d to have the decree rescinded since they would die if they entered the mishkan. There is nothing left for them to do other than to state, the second half of 17:28, Ha-im tamnu legvoah, which can be understood as the people saying “Is there no way to stop G-d’s decree from being fulfilled?” This was a rhetorical question with the answer being no. The people understood that they would have to accept the punishment of dying in the desert, and there was nothing for Moshe to say.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Bemidbar 10:34 (Beha`alothekha) - On the road again

Bemidbar 10:34 record (adaptation of Fox, 1995, translation), “Now the cloud of G-d is over them by day, as they march from the camp.”

This passage raises at least two questions. 10:34 implies that the cloud of G-d traveled above the aron to lead the people. Why were both the aron and the cloud necessary? Two, where was the cloud when the people marched? 9:15,16 record that the cloud floated above the Holy of Holies in the mishkan (Ramban on 9:15), and apparently the cloud was always on top of the Holy of Holies. Furthermore, 10:21 records that the mishkan was located in the middle of the people when they traveled, and then the cloud would be in the middle of the people. However, 9:17 records that when the cloud lifted up this was the signal to the people that they should march, and when the cloud “settled,” then this signaled to the people where they should camp. Also, 10:34 records that the cloud traveled with the aron leading the way. Thus, these verses imply that the cloud was in front of the people when the people marched.

Starting with the latter question, if we think of the cloud of G-d as literally a cloud, then it was able to expand and contract. Even though the cloud of G-d probably was in a form of a pillar still it functioned as a usual cloud whose elements can join together and split up. The cloud could have expanded to cover both the camp of the people, and the marching of the aron. This might have occurred in two ways. One, a small section of the cloud could have broken off to lead and cover the aron, while the main cloud remained on top of the camp of the people. When the people would join up with the Yehoshua and the aron (see above), then the small cloud would also re-join the main cloud. Two, the cloud over the people could have expanded to include a path to lead the way (see Rashi on 9:18) and cover Yehoshua and the aron, and then as the people traveled towards the aron, the path would contract. With either approach, the cloud was always over both the aron marching before the people and the people, as stated in 10:34. It is also possible that the cloud that split or extended out could have been in front of both the aron that was leading the way and of the people.

With regard to the first question, why was there a need for both the aron and the cloud to lead the way? The cloud showed that G-d was leading the way as indicted in 9:18 (also see Shemot 23:20 and 33:2), but even when G-d performs miracles, still mankind must attempt to contribute what he can. The aron with Yehoshua and his men marching before the people, follows a typical pattern of armies, that a scouting party goes ahead to lead the way. This was the people’s role in their journey, but ultimately it was the cloud that directed the people when and where to march and camp.

The idea that the cloud of G-d split up can explain the relationship between the verses 10:12 and 12:16. 10:12 records that the people left Mount Sinai, and the cloud camped in the desert of Paran. (It seems that the desert of Paran was in the northeastern part of the Sinai desert and/ or in the western part of the Negev desert.) Afterwards, 11:3 records that people camped in Taverah, which was re-named Kivrot ha-Taavah, 11:34. 11:35 then records that the people went to Hatzeirot, and from Hatzeirot they went to the desert of Paran, 12:16. How could it be that the people only made it to the desert of Paran in 12:16 when 10:12 already records that they reached the desert of Paran?

Ibn Ezra (on 10:33, also see Hizkuni on 10:12) explains that Taverah, Kivrot ha-Taavah and Hatzeirot were located in the desert of Paran. Yet, if this is true, why would 12:16 state that the people camped in the desert of Paran after leaving Hatzeirot, if Hatzeirot was part of the desert of Paran? Could it be that initially they camped in known locations in the desert of Paran, and afterwards they camped in a non-descript part of the desert, so it was just called the desert of Paran?
Ibn Ezra (on 12:16) quotes a different answer in the name of the many that initially only the cloud of G-d was already in the desert of Paran. This approach accords with a literal reading of 10:12. 10:12 states that the people started to travel away from Mount Sinai, but the verse does not record that the people reached the desert of Paran, only that the cloud settled by the desert of Paran. Ibn Ezra dismisses this answer without giving a reason, but I think it accords with the idea of the splitting and re-joining ability of the cloud of G-d.

The idea would be that when the people started to move as recorded in 10:12, the cloud of G-d went ahead of them to lead the way but only the cloud immediately reached the desert of Paran. Again, this does not mean the entire cloud reached the desert of Paran. Only a part of the cloud of G-d reached the desert, as the main part of the cloud was on top of the Holy of Holies in the middle of the people. The aron followed the path of the cloud of G-d marching in the direction of the desert of Paran, and the people followed the aron. On the way, the aron and the people stopped in Taverah, Kivrot ha-Taavah and Hatzeirot. Thus, the people only reached the desert of Paran after being in Hatzeirot, which was not part of the desert of Paran, as recorded in 12:16. When the people finally reached the desert of Paran, the two parts of the cloud of G-d were re-united.

Vayikra 25:4-22: Some economic implications of the laws of shemitta and yovel

Vayikra 25:4-18 records the laws of the special years, shemitta and yovel, where people were forbidden from working the lands to grow grains and wine and the land returned to is original owners in the yovel year. Regardless of the rationale for the laws, what are the economic implications of the laws? 

With regard to the law of not working the land during the shemitta and yovel years, what would the people do during the year?  Also, a more basic question is whether the lack of grains would lead to the people starving?

Vayikra 25:6 records that the people could eat the natural produce of the land that grew without being cultivated, but the question is how much food would that give? Apparently not too much, since 25:20-22 record that G-d was going to bless the people with bountiful crops in the sixth year which would hold the people over until the people could harvest the crops from the eighth year. This blessing would help landowners, but poor people who did not own lands, could have seen severe food depravation during the shemitta and yovel years. It is true that they would have greater access to the fields, but if there was limited produce, then this access would not have been helpful. In addition, if the blessing was not fulfilled, possibly since a person was not worthy of receiving this blessing, then even landowners could have faced a problem of food deprivation.

The implication of this possible food depravation is that people would go hunting and fishing during the shemitta and yovel years. In addition, instead of people raising grains in the six non-shemitta years, they might have dedicated more of their land to growing vegetables, which could be grown in the shemitta and yovel years and raising sheep and cattle. While a person had to allow some animals to enter one’s field, 25:7, there is no prohibition of killing one’s animals that were not in the fields. For example, the shemitta year did not annul the korban pesach or other animal sacrifices, which means that people killed their sheep, goats and cows during the shemitta year to celebrate various holidays. Thus, if there was a problem of not having enough food during the shemitta and yovel years, then the people would have reverted back to being hunter/ gatherers.

Even if there was enough food to survive and there was no food depravation, then still the people could have gone hunting and fishing during the year. They might also have “wasted” the year by playing games and sports. Another possibility is that the people could have spent the year on building and upgrading their homes. Another possibility is that Soss (1975, p. 338) suggests that since a person could not work in the fields during the year, this would free time which “would act to stimulate technical inventiveness and innovation.”

Are there any possible economic gains from the land resting? One, as mentioned by the Rambam (Moreh 3:39), is that the resting of the land could be considered a form of crop rotation. Would this lead an overall gain in productivity in the other six years?

Buchholz (1988) suggests that maybe the shemitta year increased the capital stock by forcing people to save in the intervening six years. However, as noted by Soss (1975) most of the savings would be for food, which would literally be eaten in the 7th year. One other consideration is that the loss of production in the seventh year would naturally have been partially offset by people working harder in the six intervening years to compensate for being unable to work in the seventh year. In fact, one could understand the verses that introduce the shemitta year as obligating a person to work in the intervening years. Thus, Shemot 23:10 and Vayikra 25:2 record, “For six years you are to sow your land,” Fox, 1995 translation. (Note this idea could also apply to the Shabbat that a person is supposed to work for six days, see Shemot 20:9 and Devarim 5:19, and Avot de-Rav Natan, 11:1.) Furthermore, as mentioned above, the prohibition of the shemitta year would likely induce people to enter fields least effected by shemitta, such as tending sheep or cattle, crafts, or services instead of farming. Would these activities lead overall to increases in production in the economy?

The return of the ancestral land in the yovel year has more potential gains than the law of not working the fields in the shemitta and yovel years, though again these gains are not obvious. When the people would return to their ancestral fields this would decrease the inequality in society since each person would have the opportunity to start over again and there would be an increase of the assets of the poor people. However, if there was some particularly valuable land, then one family would own this land for perpetuity which can make them permanently wealthy. Also, over time normal demographic changes would nullify the initial attempt at equality when the land was divided in the time of Yehoshua. People from larger families would have less land than people from smaller families since their fixed share would be divided between more people. Furthermore, over time some families die out, and the land would be inherited by close relatives who would end up with “double” plots. (I heard this last point from Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, in a discussion with him in 2000.) Thus, the equality of the division of the land was just a starting point that people started from the same point, but there was no guarantee of future equality, and the return of the land would not necessarily increase equality.

There are definite losses in the efficiency of the economy from the return of the land in the yovel year since there is less incentive for a buyer to develop the land in the intervening 49 years. Buchholz (1988, p. 422) also argues that the subdivision of plots “limits the ability to exploit economies of scale” by the farming. Yet, unless there are large transaction costs, this problem could be surmounted since adjacent farmers could work together to attain economies of scale.

On the other hand, there are some potential gains in efficiency from the return of the land. While one generation might have worked hard to become wealthy and accumulate large tracts of land, the continued possession of the land by future generations if there were no laws of yovel, could have reduced the level of competition and efficiency in the economy. The inheritors of the land might tend to “satisfice” as opposed to maximizing the value of the fields. Instead, the redistribution of the land means that the descendants of the previous large landowners would have to re-earn their wealth, and the people who returned to their ancestral land would have resources that would enable them to compete. Accordingly, by the return of the land in the yovel year, it is possible that there would be economic benefits to the economy, but the potential gains or losses in equality and in efficiency from the law cannot be known unless one actually can measure a real-life case of the land periodically returning to its original owners. (I think these possibilities are similar in some ways to arguments about inheritance taxes if they lead to more or less efficiency and equality in an economy.)

Bibliography:

Buchholz, Todd, 1988, “Biblical Laws and the Economic Growth of Ancient Israel,” Journal of Law and Religion, 6:2, pp. 389-427.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Soss, N., 1975, Old Testament Laws and Economic Society, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34, pp. 323-344.

Vayikra 19:11,12 – The prohibition of lying in the Torah

Vayikra 19:11,12 record, "You shall not steal, you shall not deal falsely (lo tichahashu) or lie (ve-lo tishakroo). You shall not swear falsely (le-shaker)…." What is the difference between dealing falsely and lying?

The Rashbam and Ibn Ezra (on 19:11) explain that dealing falsely means denying that you have money that was given to you and the Rashbam quotes as a proof 5:22 which also has the phrase not to deal falsely (ve-kichesh) in reference to a pledge. Ibn Ezra adds that dealing falsely is also when somebody knows some information but does not testify.

With regard to lying, the Rashbam writes that it refers to lying about a loan, while the Ibn Ezra writes that the lying refers to making a false claim for money. These commentators seem to be explaining that the difference between dealing falsely and lying is whether the case concerns a pledge or a loan. This is a difficult distinction since the verse does not refer to different items but to different prohibitions.

This same term for dealing falsely also appears by Sara when she was accused of laughing and she denied laughing, va-tichachesh, Bereshit 18:15. Similarly, the case in Vayikra 5:21 is when a person denies having a pledge. 

I would suggest that the prohibition in 19:11 of dealing falsely is passive lying, that a person is falsely denying an accusation, while the prohibition of lying is active lying, to fabricate something that never happened or is not true.

Rashi (on 19:11) quotes from Torah Cohanim, that the prohibitions recorded in 19:11,12 form a sequence of events: if one steals, then this will lead one to deal falsely, then to lie and then to swear falsely. In our discussion on Vayikra 5:21,22, “False claims, gezel and genevah,” I propose that genevah was where one stole an item and could not claim ownership of the item, as opposed to gezelah where one stole an item and also falsely claimed ownership of the item. Following this idea, maybe one could understand the sequence of prohibitions in 19:11,12 in the following manner. First one steals and as he/ she cannot claim ownership of the item, then one "deals falsely" that he/ she denies that he/ she stole the item. Afterwards he/ she lies by fabricating a story to show that he/ she could not have stolen the item, a false alibi, and then finally he/ she swears to "prove" that he/ she did not steal the item.

Vayikra 19:16 – The prohibition of lo telekh rakhil

ויקרא יט:טז - לא תלך רכיל בעמיך ולא תעמוד על דם רעך אני ה'.

19:16 records that "lo telekh rakhil among your countryman. Do not stand over the blood of your fellow. I am G-d." What is the prohibition of lo telekh rakhil?

The standard translation of the word rakhil is talebearer, that a person should not be a talebearer, but this is a difficult translation. Rashi (on 19:16, also see Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon and Hoffmann) bases this translation on the word spying. Rashi argues that one changes the letter kf to a gimil, and then the phrase becomes not to spy. Yet, changing letters is a difficult approach. Rashi also quotes, as does the Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Ramban, that the word rakhil is from rokhel which means a merchant. Yet, not only are these two separate words, but also there is no obvious connection between merchants and talebearing. Finally, what is the connection between this prohibition and the following prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow? Ibn Ezra, Bekhor Shor and Rambam (Laws of opinions, 7:1) explain that people have died due to talebearing, yet this is quite a stretch.

It seems to me that Jeremiah 9:3 offers an explanation for the word rakhil. The verse records that a person should be careful of other people/ and one should not trust one's brother/ because brothers act with guile/ and other people go with rakhil. The parallelism of the verse suggests that the definition of rakhil is guile. Furthermore, from Jeremiah 6:28 and Ezekiel 22:9 we see that rakhil is not referring to some innocent pranks but deceit that leads to murder. Accordingly, 19:16 prohibits one from being maliciously deceitful and devious.

How does this prohibition relate to the prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow, the following phrase in the verse? Levine (1989, p.129) notes that this phrase "do not stand over the blood of your fellow" has been explained in three ways. One (see Rashi), is not to be inactive when another person's life is in danger, two, is not to conspire against others, and three, is not to "pursue one's livelihood in a manner that endangers another or at the expense of another's well-being." Levine likes the third approach since it "best fits the immediate context" which I understand to mean the approach that rakhil refers to a merchant. Yet, as pointed out above rakhil has nothing to do with being a merchant. The third approach does not fit into the context at all, and seems to be based on some anti-capitalist feelings. Levine notes that the second approach has support in several biblical verses and is the Ibn Ezra's explanation that "one should not join forces with murderers." I prefer the second approach and it accords with the suggestion above concerning rakhil. 19:16 would then mean that one is not to go about being maliciously deceitful and one should not join other people (gangs) who act in such a manner even if one does not participate (just stands around) in their evil acts.

Bibliography:

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Vayikra 10:1,2 – The deaths of Nadav and Avihu

Vayikra 10:1,2 record, “Now, Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, took each-man his pan, and placing coals in them, put smoking-incense on it, and brought near, before the presence of G-d, foreign fire, such as he had not commanded them. And the fire went out from the presence of G-d and consumed them, so they died, before the presence of G-d” (adaptation of Fox’s 1995 translation). It seems clear that Nadav and Avihu died because they did what they were not commanded, but what were they trying to do? Numerous theories have been offered to explain their sin. We will review some of them and then offer our own.

Rashbam (on 10:1) suggests that Nadav and Avihu wanted to offer the incense sacrifice since they thought the regular daily law of offering incense was part of the ritual of the eighth day ceremony and they entered into the mishkan/ ohel moed proper to offer the incense even before the fire devoured the sacrifices. Their mistake according to the Rashbam was that on the special day (the eighth day), the fire for the sacrifices was to come from G-d and not from a regular human fire. This approach is problematic since not only does the Rashbam argue that Nadav and Avihu were killed prior to the fire devouring the sacrifices which contradicts the order of the Torah, but also as pointed out by David Tzvi Hoffmann (1953) and Shmuel David Luzzatto, they could not have been following the regular law of incense offering since that offering was brought by one priest and not two.

Seforno (on 10:1) proposes that Nadav and Avihu were acting based on the special character of the day. They thought that it was appropriate to offer an incense offering after the fire devoured the special sacrifices of the eighth day, and they were killed when attempting to offer this incense offering on the inner altar in the mishkan/ ohel moed proper. According to Seforno, Nadav and Avihu sinned by making this decision to add an incense offering without consulting Moshe. This approach is also difficult because the Torah records that the problem was that their fire was not commanded by G-d and not that the incense offering was not commanded.

Hoffmann (1953, p. 204) writes that Nadav and Avihu wanted to bring the incense offering to show their happiness about the appearance of the fire devouring the sacrifices. He claims that with their pans they brought the incense into the Holy of Holies, like the high priest does on Yom Kippur, though at this point this type of sacrifice had not yet been commanded. Hoffmann explains that while the Torah refers to their foreign fire, this really mean a sacrifice of fire that had not been commanded.

This idea that Nadav and Avihu went into the Holy of Holies is very popular, and it is claimed that 16:1, which refers to Nadav and Avihu’s sin in connection with the command to Aharon to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, supports this understanding. Yet, one can understand that in 16:1 the reference to Nadav and Avihu’s sin was to remind Aharon to follow G-d’s command exactly as he was commanded unlike Nadav and Avihu, and does not imply that Nadav and Avihu entered the Holy of Holies. Or, as pointed out by the Ramban (on 16:1), the reference to Nadav and Avihu in 16:1 could be to inform us that the laws regarding Yom Kippur were taught to Moshe immediately after the deaths of Nadav and Avihu.  Independent of 16:1, there is no reason to think that Nadav and Avihu would have thought to enter the Holy of Holies on the ceremony of the eighth day since the ceremony of the eighth day was focused on the outer altar which was situated in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed. Thus, it is more likely that they died in the courtyard of the mishkan/ ohel moed in front of the special building of the mishkan/ ohel moed (the word kadosh in 10:4).

In order to understand the sin and deaths of Nadav and Avihu we have to connect their actions to 9:24. 9:24 records that a fire went out from the glory of G-d and consumed the sacrifices that were offered as part of the ceremony of the eighth day.  After this fire appeared, Nadav and Avihu took their pans, and were walking around the outer altar with their incense offering. It could be that they did this out of joy (Hoffmann) or they thought it was appropriate to have an incense offering at that time (Seforno), but this was not commanded. The gravity of their sin was not the incense offering but the fire used to create the incense offering, the eish zarah, foreign fire, 10:1. The point of the ceremony of the eighth day was that G-d had sanctified the outer altar by sending a fire to devour the sacrifices, and now Nadav and Avihu were walking around the outer altar with a regular human fire. Their fire, which was not commanded by G-d, weakened the boundary between G-d and man since both the human fire and G-d’s fire were spatially co-existent, see our discussion on Shemot 19:12, 21-25, "Establishing boundaries I" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/02/shemot-2019-23-yitro-establishing.html. Nadab and Avihu were then killed by another fire that went out from the glory of G-d.

Bibliography:

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.