Devarim 1:9-18 - The appointment of judges when the Jewish people were in the desert

The book of Devarim consists mostly of Moshe speaking to the Jewish people in the 40th year the people were in the desert, and Devarim 1:9-18 records that one thing that Moshe spoke about was his recollection of the appointment of judges when the people first came to the desert. The appointment of judges is also recorded in Shemot 18:13-26, and there are several differences between the description of this process of appointing the judges as recorded in Shemot 18:13-26 with Moshe’s recollection of this process in Devarim 1:9-18.

The major difference between these two descriptions of the process of appointing judges is that in Devarim 1:9-18, the aspects of the judicial system that Moshe stresses is that a judicial system punishes people for their misdeeds as a type of warning to the people not to sin again by refusing to enter the land of Israel. On the other hand, in Shemot 18:13-27, the stress is on the need for a judicial system, and not on the punitive aspects of the system. This distinction can be discerned by analyzing the differences between the sections. In addition, while Shemot 18:13-23 records Yitro’s suggestions concerning the judicial system, which was in the third month of the first year of the people’s stay in the desert, the actual appointment of the judges was only at later time, see our discussion on Shemot 18:13-27, “Yitro’s visit to Moshe and the need for a judicial system.” When Moshe implemented the system, he made several changes from Yitro’s suggestions.

One difference between Shemot 18:13-27 and Devarim 1:9-18 is that in Shemot 18:13-27 it is Yitro who suggested to Moshe to establish a legal system while Yitro is not mentioned in Devarim 1:9-18. Why was Yitro's role excluded in Devarim 1:9-18? Yitro was included in Shemot 18:13-27 since he was a foreigner, and the fact that he knew of how a judicial system should function showed that the existence of a legal system is a universal need. However, in Devarim 1:9-18, Moshe wanted to recall the punitive role of the judicial system, and was not concerned with who suggested the establishment of a judicial system. Thus, the fact that Yitro suggested the system could be excluded from the recollection of the event. In addition, it could be that Moshe did not mention Yitro’s name in Devarim since Moshe had made several changes when he implemented the judicial system in the desert.

A second difference between the sections is that Shemot 18:13-27 records that prior to the appointment of the judges, Moshe sat all day in judgment but without complaining, while Devarim 1:12 records that Moshe complained that the work was too difficult due to the people's fights. Why was this difficulty not mentioned in Shemot 18? The answer is that in Shemot 18, the objective was to show how laws are necessary which is shown by the numerous conflicts that existed amongst the people. The important fact is that Moshe had to sit all day, not how difficult the job was for Moshe. However, in Devarim 1:9-18, Moshe recalls the fights of the people as a warning for them to behave. Just as the people should not fight amongst themselves, they should not fight with G-d by refusing to enter the land of Israel. In addition, in Devarim 1:12 when Moshe recollected the complaints of the people this was referring to the time after Yitro’s advice and prior to the implementation of the system, as we know from Bemidbar 11:11-15 that the complaints of the people wore him down by the second year of the people’s stay in the desert.

A third difference between the sections is that Devarim 1:13-15 records that the people had a role in selecting the judges, while Shemot 18:25 records that Moshe seems to chosen the judges by himself. Presumably, Moshe received help in selecting the judges, and this was a change he made to Yitro’s suggestions, but why was this information excluded from Shemot 18? Again, in Shemot 18, the stress is on the existence of the conflicts, while the discussion about the judges themselves can be minimized. However, in Devarim 1:9-18, Moshe was also recalling the implementation of the judicial system, which had involved the people. Moshe’s recollection of the people’s involvement in the choosing the judges might also have been a message to the people to remind them that they accepted the idea of the judicial system, that people are to be held accountable for their actions. Moshe was then hinting to the people that as you accept this idea on the human plane so too this idea applies on the divine plane.

A fourth difference between the sections is that the qualification of the judges in Devarim 1:15 is their intellectual ability, while Shemot 18:21 records Yitro’s suggestion that the qualification of the judges is that they should be morally upright. These qualifications are not contradictory because judges should have both characteristics, and the need for intellectual abilities is one of the changes that Moshe made to Yitro’s suggestions when he implemented the system, that he appointed judges who he thought were both honest and smart. Maybe Yitro only mentioned the need for honest judges since he was worried that people might think that Moshe was choosing cronies. Furthermore, Moshe did not have to recall that the judges who were chosen were thought to be honest since in Devarim 1:17 he recalled that he told the judges to judge honestly.

A fifth difference between the sections is that Devarim 1:17,18 records that Moshe recalled that he instructed the judges to judge each individual on the merits of the case, while in Shemot 18 no instructions are given to the judges except to bring hard cases to Moses. Why were these instructions mentioned in Devarim 1:17,18 not recorded in Shemot 18? Again, the point in Shemot 18 is not how the system functioned, just that there is a need for a legal system. Thus, Shemot 18:26 can simply state, that the judges judged. However, in Devarim 1, the idea is to show how a legal system functions, and thus, the specific instructions of how to judge shows that the system is functioning. In addition, the judicial rules mentioned in Devarim 1:17,18 correspond to the laws mentioned in Vayikra 19:15, and then Moshe can refer to these rules in Devarim since in the 40th year these rules were known by the people.

A sixth difference between the sections is that Devarim 1:15 refers to shotrim but this term does not appear in Shemot 18. Shotrim appear to be the enforcers of the legal system. Again, in Shemot 18, they could be excluded because the enforcement of the judicial decision was not the important message at that point. However, in Devarim 1, the fact that shotrim are mentioned demonstrates that with a judicial system people are punished for their misdeeds. In addition, this was one of the changes that Moshe added when he implemented the judicial system that he added the shotrim.

Consequently, the two recordings of the establishment of a judicial system have two different purposes. In Shemot 18, the message is that a legal system is needed, but the performance of the system was not crucial at that time. Instead, the message is that there is a need for laws as prelude to the Decalogue and the laws of the covenant, the ensuing chapters in the book of Shemot. On the other hand, in Devarim 1, the message was that a judicial system punishes people for their sins, and thus, it was important for the system to function since only a functioning judicial system can punish people. This message would serve as a warning for the people not to sin by refusing to enter the land of Israel since they would be punished for their actions if they sinned again.

Bemidbar 35:28 - The death of the high priest and the accidental killer: Something unpredictable

Bemidbar 35:28 records that if a person kills accidently, then he must remain in the city of refuge until the high priest dies. What is the connection between the death of the high priest and the permission for the accidental killer to leave the city of refuge?

Rambam (Moreh 3:40) explains that the death of the high priest will abate the desire of the relatives of the victim for revenge. This idea follows the approach that the city of refuge was an asylum.

A popular approach (see Rashi and Luzzatto on 35:25) is that the death of the high priest serves as a form of atonement for the accidental murderer. Just as the actions of the high priest, as for example on Yom Kippur, bring atonement to people, so too his death brings atonement for the accidental murderer. This approach follows the idea that the city of refuge was for the accidental murderer to attain atonement.

Seforno suggests that as the responsibility for the accidental murder differs in each case due to the "degree of accident" involved in the particular case, so then the stay in the city of refuge also differs. This leaves the judgment to G-d to ensure that those accidental murderers who are relatively guiltier will stay in the city of refuge for longer time periods. This approach follows the idea that the city of refuge is to punish the accidental murderer.

My guess is that the conditioning of the release of the accidental killer from the city of refuge upon the death of the high priest is to make the accidental killer's stay in the city of refuge indeterminate since who knows how long the high priest will live. This indeterminacy matches the accidental nature of the murder since both are unpredictable. The "punishment" for killing accidentally then follows the usual formula of being a measure for measure. With this idea, the death of the high priest is ad hoc. There is a need for some unpredictable event to end the period of asylum, and the death of the high priest serves this purpose. As discussed in our commentary on Shemot 2:11-23 "An accidental killing," I believe that the death of Pharaoh served the same purpose to enable Moshe to return to Egypt.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 26:1-51 - Counting the Jewish people towards the end of their fortieth year in the desert

Bemidbar 26:1 records that after the plague due to the sin of Baal Peor ended, G-d commanded Moshe and Elazar to count the people. 26:1-51 records the census of the people at the end of their 40 years stay in the desert, and it is interesting to compare it with the count in the 2nd year in the desert. First, the total number of people counted is very similar. In the 1st count, there were 603,550 men over the age of 20, 1:46, while in the 2nd count there were 601,730, men over the age of 20, 26:51. Thus after 40 years of living in a protected environment, the population actually declined. While 24,000 people died in the plague immediately prior to the count, even including these people the growth would only have been a growth of 22,180 men, or 3.6%. Why was there a need to count the Jewish people at this time?

Rashi (on 25:19) suggests two reasons for the count. One, just as a shepherd counts his flock after the flock is attacked, so too G-d counted the people after the plague recorded in 25:9. This is a difficult answer since G-d would not need to count the people to know how many people survived the plague. Rashi’s second answer is that the count in chapter 26 parallels the count of the people in the beginning of the book of Bemidbar. Again, using an analogy from a shepherd, the people were counted when they were entrusted to Moshe when they left Egypt, so too when Moshe was about to die, he handed them back with a number. This answer is appealing as it connects this count with the earlier count, but why is the census recorded in chapter 26?

Moskovitz (1988, p. 320) quotes two other reasons. One reason is that the census was for mustering the troops since the people were going into the land of Israel where they would have to fight. However, by the war with Midyan (chapter 31) the census was not relevant since a thousand people from each tribe went to fight, 31:4. Also, there is no mention that a census was taken prior to the wars by Sihon and Og. A second reason is that the count was to be able to divide the land of Israel evenly amongst the people. Thus, immediately after the count, 26:52-56 record how the land was to be parceled out. Yet, it is possible that this division of the land was a result of the census but was not the reason for the census. Thus, the Ramban (on 26:57) is hard pressed to explain why the Levites were counted since they did not receive any land.

Dennis Olson (1985) suggests a fifth reason that the census has a literary purpose to unify the book of Bemidbar. He argues that the censuses in chapters 1 and 26 divide the book of Bemidbar into two units, chapters 1-25 refer to the generation who left Egypt and chapters 26-36 refer to the new generation who would enter the land of Israel. The censuses then form the structure of the book, and the census of chapter 26 would signal that the old generation has died out and the generation has been born. Thus, he writes the name of the book, Numbers, is very appropriate. Olsen notes that with this idea the two censuses in the book of Bemidbar function similar to the toledot language in the book of Bereshit, that both provide the structure to the book. (For a discussion of the toledot structure in the book of Bereshit, see our discussion, “Introduction to the book of Bereshit.”)

There is only one toledot section in the Torah not in the book of Bereshit and it occurs in Bemidbar 3:1, the toledot of Aharon and Moshe, immediately after the count of the people. Olsen argues that the last toledot of Bereshit, 37:2, the toledot of Yaakov continue for the remainder of the Torah, and Bemidbar 3:1 introduces another toledot section of Aharon and Moshe. This last point seems difficult since in Bereshit each toledot section ends with a genealogy, or the death of cenral figure in the section, and then either Bereshit 46, which records the genealogy of Yaakov’s family, or Bereshit 50, which records  the death of Yosef, ends the toledot section from Bereshit 37:1.

Yet, the connection Olsen makes between the census and the toledot framework is interesting. Maybe a toledot section cannot exist when dealing with the details of an entire nation since the tracking of the genealogy is too lengthy. Thus, Bemidbar 3:1 just uses the toledot section with regard to Moshe and Aharon because that is one small family. However, the conjunction of the toledot of Bemidbar 3:1 with the census in chapters 1 and 2 informs us that the toledot and census serve similar purposes as suggested by Olsen. Both the toledot sections of Bereshit and the two censuses mark the movement from one generation to the next. In the other three books of the Torah, there is no movement of generations, so there is no need either for the toledot language or a census. 

A sixth way to understand the count in Bemidbar chapter 26 is to examine how it differs from the count in Bemidbar chapter one. Bemidbar chapter one just lists the population of each tribe, while Bemidbar chapter 26 also lists the family branches and includes various historical information. Olsen (p. 87) explains that this change “expresses the further development of the tribal families into a new generation which has now branched into various sub-clans.” Yet, the various sub-clans existed even during the first census. Instead, the sub-clans make the count of Bemidbar 26 parallel to the count of Bereshit 46, which occurred before Yaakov’s family went into Egypt. In Bereshit 46 there are seventy individuals, and in Bemidbar 26 there are seventy clans. In addition, Bemidbar 26:19,46 refer to individuals, Er, Onan, Serah, who are mentioned in Bereshit 46, but who were not part of any family sub-clan in the desert. The counts are even symmetric in their time frame. In Bereshit, the Jews were leaving Israel and going to Egypt, and in Bemidbar the Jews are leaving the desert and going to Israel.

Why is the count of Bemidbar 26 modeled after the count in Bereshit 46? The parallelism establishes a historical continuity between the generation about to enter the land of Israel and the people who left Israel. This is important in reference to the people's claim to the land of Israel, which is from Avraham, Yitzhak and Yaakov. Yet after all these years in Egypt, who knew if these were the descendants of Avraham? Thus, the parallelism shows that these people who are about to enter the land of Israel were the descendants of Avraham and had a right to land of Israel. Also, Avraham was told that his descendants would go into exile (Bereshit 15:13-16) and that his descendants would return to the land of Israel. The parallelism shows that the same people who went into exile are the people who have returned to the land of Israel. In addition, the count in Bereshit 46 showed how the blessing to Avraham that he would have numerous children had started to come true, that there were seventy descendants of Avraham who were part of the covenant. By modeling the count in Bemidbar 26 on Bereshit 46, we see that this blessing has continued to come true, as now there were seventy families who numbered more than 600,000 people. Furthermore, the count in Bereshit was the beginning of the journey, when the family left the land of Israel, and the count of Bemidbar 26 signals that the people are at the end of the journey.

A seventh possibility for the count of the people in Bemidbar chapter 26 is that it was due the covenant the new generation was going to make on the plains of Moav, Devarim 28:69, as there need to delineate which people are part of the covenant.  The new generation really begins from chapter 20, since from 33:38 we know that chapter 20 must be recording events in the 40th year. It is true that some people of the old generation were alive in chapter 20, but the overwhelming majority of people were from the new generation, and chapter 19 is the dividing chapter between the generations. However, the new census could not have been done in chapter 20 since it was only when the people were passing by Moav did the entire first generation die, Devarim 2:14. In addition, if the census is related to the covenant, then it should have been done in the place where the covenant was established, the plains of Moav, which means the count could not have been before 22:1, which records that the people arrived at the plains of Moav. Yet, due to the plague that killed 24,000 people at Baal Pe’or, it did not make sense to count the people before the plague since the plague occurred soon after the people arrived at the plains of Moav. Thus 26:1 stresses that the census was only done after the plague was over. Hence, maybe chapter 26 was the earliest time a census of the new generation, who were to be part of the covenant on the plains of Moav, could have taken place.

Bibliography:

Moskovitz, Yehiel Tzvi, 1988, Commentary on the book of Bemidbar, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Olson, Dennis, 1985, The Death of the Old and the Birth of the New, Chico, California: Scholar’s Press.

The law/ custom of not cutting one's hair in the nine days and three weeks

The Mishnah, Ta’anit 4:6 records that when the month of Av begins one is to reduce one’s happiness. The Mishnah does not specify what this entails, but the Talmud (Ta’anit 29B, Yevamot 43A) records that one should not go to court with a non-Jew in this period, one should reduce one’s business dealings, building, and planting, and one does not get married. (Are all these restrictions due to mourning for the Bet ha-Mikdash or due to the fear that the period is one of bad luck so all these enterprises will be unsuccessful?)

The Mishnah, Ta’anit 4:7, continues and writes that one is not to cut one’s hair or do laundry during the week when Tisha B’av occurs, but if Tisha B’av falls on Friday, then one can cut one’s hair and do laundry on Thursday, erev Tisha B'av, out of respect for Shabbat. (With our present day calendar, Tisha B’av cannot be on Friday, but in the time of the Mishnah, the calendar was based on witnesses, and then it was possible that Tisha B’av could be on Friday.)

This Mishnah is surprising since once the previous Mishnah stated that one reduces one’s level of happiness from the beginning of the month, why does the second Mishnah state that the prohibition to cut one’s hair and do laundry is only for the week of Tisha B’av and not from the beginning of the month? Also, if the prohibition of cutting the hair and doing laundry is for the week of Tisha B’av why does the Mishnah allow one to cut their hair and due laundry on erev Tisha B’av when Tisha B’av is on a Friday?

The laws of the Mishnah relate to two conflicting goals. One, a person is supposed to mourn in the period leading up to Tisha B’av, and two, a person is supposed to prepare for Shabbat. These goals conflict when Tisha B’av is on Friday since if the person does not cut his/ her hair or do laundry during the week, then the person will be in mourning for Tisha B’av, but will not be prepared for Shabbat. On the other hand, if a person cuts his/ her hair and does laundry on Thursday, then the person is not entering Tisha B’av in a state of mourning, but will be prepared for Shabbat. When the Mishnah rules that one can cut one’s hair and do laundry on Thursday, then the Mishnah is stating that the preparations for Shabbat take precedence over the mourning in the period leading up to Tisha B’av. This rationale explains why the prohibition to cut one’s hair and do laundry only began during the week of Tisha B’av and not from the beginning of the month since when one starts the prohibitions on the week of Tisha B’av, Sunday, one has not infringed on Shabbat. Furthermore, the idea of reducing one's level of happiness from the beginning of the month of Av and all the prohibitions listed in the Talmud that start from the beginning of the month do not infringe on the celebration of Shabbat.

The Talmud (Ta’anit 29B) quotes a Baraita that if one forgot to do one’s laundry (and apparently cut one’s hair) on Thursday when Tisha B’av falls on Friday, then one can do the laundry on Tisha B’av itself in the afternoon in order to prepare for Shabbat. (However, Abaye criticizes a person who does the laundry on Tisha B’av since he should have done it beforehand.) This Baraita extends the principle of the Mishnah with regard to the importance of Shabbat since according to the Baraita it is more important to prepare for Shabbat then to mourn for Tisha B’av, even on Tisha B’av itself! Similarly, the Talmud continues and states that if Tisha B’av falls out on Sunday, then one eats regular Shabbat meals, even though the rule of the Mishnah (Ta’anit 4:6) is that on erev Tisha B’av one limits one’s consumption. Again, the principle is that Shabbat takes precedence over the mourning for Tisha B’av.

The Talmud then quotes an argument that appears to contradict the ruling that Shabbat is more important than Tisha B’av. The Talmud quotes R. Meir that the prohibition of doing laundry and cutting one’s hair is from the beginning of the month until the fast, Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel that the prohibition is only the week of Tisha B’av and R. Yehuda that the prohibition is for the entire month. The opinions of R. Meir and R. Yehuda imply that the prohibitions of mourning would infringe on Shabbat, but the Talmud concludes that the law is that the prohibitions are only during the week of Tisha B’av and only until Tisha B’av. Thus, the Talmud upholds the principle that Shabbat is more important that Tisha B’av. 

Another example of this rule that Shabbat takes precedence over Tisha B'av is the Yerushalmi (4:6) quotes that Rebbi ba bar Cohen said before R. Yosi, Rebi Aha in the name of R. Abahu, that when Tisha B'av falls of Shabbat, which means the fast is on Sunday, there is no mourning the week of Tisha B'av and the week afterwards. Thus, celebrating Shabbat removes all of the mourning leading up to Tisha B'av. 

 
The most astonishing support for the principle that Shabbat takes precedence over Tisha B’av is from Tosafot (Ta’anit, 30A, traveihu) who writes that even when Tisha B’av was on Thursday, it is permitted to cut one’s hair and do a laundry on Tisha B’av afternoon since there would not be enough time on Friday to prepare for Shabbat. Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein (www.vbm-torah.org/shavuot/20shavin.htm, Daf Kesher #133, vol. 2, pp. 54-56, Yom Yerushalayim 5748) notes that, "Although the Beit Yosef (551, also see comments of the Bach) was astounded by this radical opinion and therefore ascribed it to a mistaken student, the fact that the same comment appears in Tosafot ha-Rosh makes his doubts implausible." Also, Tosafot is just following the rule of the Mishnah that Shabbat has precedence over Tisha B'av. While today Tosafot’s ruling is not applicable since with modern appliance there is enough time on Friday to do a laundry and cut one’s hair, the principle that Shabbat takes precedence over the mourning of Tisha B’av should still apply. Thus, if according to Tosafot, one can cut one’s hair on Tisha B’av for Shabbat, then certainly one is supposed to cut one’s hair (shave) in preparation for Shabbat in the weeks leading up to Tisha B’av.

We see that the practice of French Jewry as of the 11th century was that the prohibition of cutting one’s hair was only for the week of Tisha B’av. Apparently, this remained the practice of all of Jewry up to the 13th or 14th century since the Tur (1275-1340, b. Germany, d. Spain, 551), writes that the prohibition of cutting one’s hair was just the week of Tisha B’av. However, the Tur does add one extra point from the Ramban (1194-1270), that the prohibition to cut one’s hair during the week of Tisha B’av includes facial hair, i.e., shaving.

The Tur also discusses what to do if Tisha B’av falls out on Sunday. He first writes that even if Tisha B'av was really on Shabbat, the prohibitions of cutting one’s hair and doing laundry do not apply since there is no week of Tisha B’av. This is the opinion mentioned above in the Yerushalmi and quoted by the Rosh (the Tur's father, in Ta'anit, 29b, column one 34b) and the Ran (Ta'anit, pages of the Rif 9b). The Tur continues and quotes the Sefer Mitzvot Hagadol (Semag, R. Moshe of Coucy, northern France, 1247) who argued that when the fast of Tisha B'av is pushed off from Shabbat to Sunday, then one should keep the prohibitions of not cutting one's hair and doing laundry in the week prior to Tisha B’av. This might be the first authority who rules that these prohibitions exist before the week of Tisha B'av, and that the mourning for the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash supersedes the celebration of Shabbat. The Tur continues and quotes the Sefer Mitzvot Katan (Semak, R. Yitzhak Corbeil, France, 1277) who argued that even according to the Sefer Mitzvot Hagadol, one must be able to cut one’s hair and do laundry on Thursday and Friday when Tisha B’av is on Sunday since the Mishnah (Ta'anit 4:7) allowed cutting hair and doing laundry when Tisha B’av was on Friday. He also wrote that even keeping mourning for the beginning of the week was a redundant astringency.

 
The Haghot Maimonides (13th century, Germany, on Rambam Mishnah Torah, Laws of Fasts 5:6, comment 5) quotes in the name of Rokeach a compromise between the Semag’s and the Semak’s view that the practice of the rabbis of Germany when Tisha B'av was pushed off to Sunday was to mourn on Sunday through Wednesday but not on Thursday and Friday. Again, from the Sefer Mitzvot Katan and the Rokeach, we see the principle that preparing for Shabbat takes precedence over the mourning leading up to Tisha B’av.

A little bit after the Semag we read of a similar practice from the Sefer Hamichtam (on Ta’anit, Laws of Tisha B’av, R. David ben Levi, Provence, latter half of the 13th century). The Sefer Hamichtam records that when Tisha B’av is on Sunday, according to the law it is permitted to cut one’s hair in the preceding week, but the custom of the elders of Narbonne was not to cut one’s hair in order that one would enter Tisha B’av "disgusting," and the elders criticized a person who wanted to cut his hair. (R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yalkut Yosef, vol. 5, p. 564, follows this opinion.) Was this practice the source for the Semag’s view or was the practice in southern France influenced by the Semag or did the two views develop independently? 

In two interesting articles, Yaakov Gartner (1983 and 1985) argues that the movement called Mourners of Zion led to new customs and expansions of old customs of mourning relating to Tisha B’av from what is recorded in the Talmud. This group mourned all year for the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash by wearing sack cloths, wailing, and not drinking wine or eating meat. Gartner claims that this latter custom led to a custom amongst non-Mourners of Zion in the Geonic period not to eat meat or drink wine for the entire three week period from the 17th of Tammuz to Tisha B’av (see Shulchan Arukh, 551:9). This group developed in the ninth century, their base was in Jerusalem, they were messianic, and they were almost definitely Karaites. Gartner argues that the influence of the Mourners of Zion spread, first to the Rabbinate community in Israel, and then in the Middle Ages to Italy, Germany and France, and this influence can explain the extension of the prohibition to cut one’s hair in the period leading up to Tisha B’av.

 

We are now able to answer our question, how is that the elders of Narbonne could claim that a person should not cut one’s hair in the week preceding Tisha B’av when Tisha B’av was on Sunday when this contradicted the rule of the Mishnah that Shabbat takes precedence over the mourning for Tisha B’av? The answer is that most likely the elder of Narbonne were knowingly or unknowingly influenced by the Karaite Mourners of Zion, for whom the Mishnah was not authoritative, and hence they gave precedence to the mourning on Tisha B’av over preparing for Shabbat.

Gartner (1985, p. 216) notes that the Mourners of Zion saw no reason not to mourn fully on Shabbat. This accords with the Karaite understanding of Shabbat since they believe that one could not have any fire on Shabbat, which meant that for them Shabbat was cold, dark and miserable, see our discussion, "Lighting candles before Shabbat." Finally, the idea of looking disgusting accords with the practice of the Mourners of Zion to wear sack clothes all year round.

Interestingly, another custom of mourning in this period comes from Narbonne. Sperber (1995, p. 44) writes that the custom of not getting married during the three weeks from the 17th of Tammuz to Tisha B'av was first mentioned by a scholar from Narbonne, Meir ben Shimon ha-Meili in the same period, the 13th century. Thus, maybe the Mourners of Zion movement had specific success in influencing the Jews of Narbonne.

Once the break from the Mishnah occurred, then it was not long before the custom of not cutting one’s hair before Tisha B’av expanded. The Kol Bo (anonymous, end of 13th century, beginning of 14th century, quoted in the Bet Yosef, u-mah sh-katuv demi sh-takfuhu, and the lengthy Darkei Moshe) in almost a direct quote from the Sefer Hamichtam (does not mention the city Narbonne), writes that while the prohibition of cutting one hair is only the week of Tisha B’av, still the custom of the elders was not to cut their hair even the week before the week of Tisha B'av.

This custom of the Kol Bo was either not known by the Tur or he disregarded it (unlikely) since the Tur only mentions not cutting the hair in the week of Tisha B’av. It is mentioned again in the Maharil (Germany, 1365-1427, Laws of Tisha B’av, p. 239) who first records that cutting the hair is only prohibited in the week of Tisha B’av, and then a second opinion that one should not cut one’s hair from the beginning of the month. Thus, by the 15th century, in Ashkenazi Jewry there had developed a second stage to the prohibition of cutting one’s hair that it began from the beginning of the month of Av instead of the week of Tisha B’av.

The third stage developed just slightly after the second stage. R. Yeshayah of Trani (Trani, Italy, 1235-1300, Piskei HaRiaz, Ta’anit, pp.118,119) first quotes the law as stated in the Mishnah, that the prohibition of cutting one’s hair was only the week of Tisha B’av, but then he notes that in some places the custom was not eat meat or cut one’s hair for the three week period from the 17th of Tammuz to Tisha B’av. This later custom is almost definitely related to the Mourners of Zion since it was their influence that led to the custom of not eating meat for the three weeks, and Trani is located in southern Italy.

Again, the Tur and the Maharil either did not know of this custom or disregarded it, but the custom is quoted again in the period right after the Maharil. R. Isaac Tirna (1385-1450?, Trnova, Czech Republic, Sefer Haminhagim, Laws of Tammuz) writes that one does not cut one’s hair for the entire three week period, and then he mentions the custom of not eating meat during the three weeks.

The Shulchan Arukh (1488-1575), 551:3 writes that one is only prohibited from cutting one’s hair and doing laundry in the week of Tisha B’av. This follows the Mishnah Ta'anit 4:7, and I believe this is the Sefardi custom to this day.

However, the Rama (on 551:4) adds that the custom (amongst Ashkenazim) is to not do haircuts from the 17th of Tammuz through Tisha B'av (based on R. Isaac Tirna) and not to do laundry from Rosh Chodesh Adar through Tisha B'av. The Rama's custom makes the mourning leading up to Tisha B'av more important that celebrating Shabbat, and this was practice that developed amongst Ashkenazim after the big change in the 13th century.

The Arukh Hashulchan (Russia, 1829-1908, 551:16) wonders why the Rama prohibited hair cutting from the 17th of Tammuz while he only prohibited doing laundry from the beginning of the month of Av? He answers that hair cutting is not done as frequently as the laundry, and hence if the prohibition of hair cutting was just from the beginning of the month of Av, it would not be apparent that it is forbidden. This question and answer shows the arbitrariness of the extension of the laws of the Mishnah to nine days for not doing laundry and three weeks for not cutting one's hair.

While usually it is not a big deal not to cut one’s hair for three weeks, for those people who shave every day, or at least every Friday for Shabbat, the expansion of the mourning from the week of the Tisha B’av to the 17th of Tammuz is problematic since they will look disgusting after just a few days of not shaving. It should be noted that if a person chooses not to shave, from the 17th of Tammuz and/ or from Rosh Chodesh Av, then he is making a double expansion, once in reference to the days of mourning and also the Ramban’s expansion from hair cutting to shaving, as the Ramban only proscribed that people should not shave in the week of Tisha B’av. 

I think that a person who shaves everyday must shave before Shabbat during the three weeks, even by Shabbat Hazon, since otherwise one is making the mourning for Tisha B'av more important than Shabbat, which contradicts the Mishnah and all Ashkenazi practice until the 13th century. If a person makes an effort to look nice on Shabbat Hazon by showering and wearing clothing of Shabat, then how can the person not shave and look disgusting?

To summarize, we see that the initial prohibition of cutting one’s hair was only during the week of Tisha B’av, which starts from Sunday, since this gave greater precedence to preparing for Shabbat than for the mourning for Tisha B’av. This approach has remained the Sefardi position, and it was also the Ashkenazi custom until approximately the 13th, 14th centuries. However, at that time, probably due to unknown Karaite influence, some Ashkenazim began to give greater priority to the mourning leading up to Tisha B’av than to Shabbat. With this development, amongst Ashkenazim there first began the custom of not cutting the hair from the beginning of the month of Av, and then the custom developed (middle 15th century?) not to cut one’s hair for the entire three week period. Yet, if one shaves every day, then one must shave on erev Shabbat for Shabbat throughout the three week period following the opinion of the Mishnah, Talmud, Tosafot, the Rosh, the Ran, the Tur, the Sefer Mitzvot Katan and the Rokeach that Shabbat has precedence over the mourning of Tisha B’av.

Bibliography:

Gartner, Yaakov, 1983, The Influence of the Mourners of Zion on Tisha B’av customs in the Geonic period, (Hebrew) Bar Ilan University Annual, 20,21, pp. 128-144.

-----, 1985, Mourners of Zion consciousness as a factor in the development of Tisha B’av customs, (Hebrew) Milet, pp. 201-24.

Bemidbar (Numbers) 22:8-35 - Bil'am: The wizard of Petor - Did G-d (three times) change His decision to let Bil'am curse the Jewish people?

Bemidbar 22:8 records that when Bil'am first heard Balak's offer to curse the Jewish people, he told Balak's messengers that they should wait the night, and Bil'am would speak to G-d. That night G-d spoke to Bil'am and told him that he should not accompany Balak's messengers since the Jewish people were to be blessed and not cursed, 22:9-12. Bil'am relayed this message to the messengers, but Balak sent additional set of messengers to convince Bil'am to curse the people, 22:15-17. Bil'am told the second set of messengers that he would again speak to G-d, 22:19. This time, surprisingly, G-d allowed Bil'am to travel with Balak's messengers, 22:20. Yet, when Bil'am started to travel, G-d became angry with him and sent a malakh to block his donkey's way, 22:21,22. At the end of the incident with the donkey, G-d again allowed Bil'am to travel with the messengers, 22:34,35. It seems that G-d changed His mind three times within this episode: First G-d did not allow Bil'am to travel, then G-d allowed him to travel, then G-d was angry with Bil'am for accompanying the messengers, and then after the incident with the donkey, G-d allowed Bil'am to go with the messengers. Did G-d want Bil'am to travel with the messengers or not?

Ibn Ezra suggests that G-d did not want Bil'am to go, as G-d said initially, but when Bil'am asked a second time, G-d let him go if he wanted to. (See N. Leibowitz, 1982, pp. 311-315.) This approach follows the idea in the Midrash that G-d allows people free will to go the way they choose. Yet, as G-d did not want him to go, G-d was angry at him for choosing to go. Ramban rejects Ibn Ezra's view for two reasons. One, just because a person is a nudnik and repeats his question this is no reason for G-d to change his mind. And, two, if G-d allowed Bil'am to go, then how he could have punished him for choosing to go. Furthermore, in the end Bil'am was not free to curse the people, 23:5,16.

Ramban (on 22:20,35) suggests that G-d wanted Bil'am to go with the messengers but this was only after Bil'am had heard that he was not to curse the Jewish people. Thus, on the first occasion, G-d told Bil'am that he could not curse the Jewish people, and on the second occasion, G-d allowed Bil'am to go in order to bless the Jewish people. G-d was angry with Bil'am not because he went but because he did not inform the messengers that he was not going to curse the Jewish people but to listen to G-d. Furthermore, G-d was angry since Bil'am gave the messengers the impression that G-d gave him permission to curse the Jewish people. After G-d sent the malakh, G-d gave permission to Bil'am to continue with the messengers, according to the Ramban since Bil'am understood that he was to tell Balak that he was only going to say what G-d told him, and this is what he did, 22:38. N. Leibowitz (1982, pp. 308-311) quotes various commentators who find textual support for this approach, but I wonder that if G-d really wanted Bil'am to bless the people, why did He not tell Bil'am in the first conversation that he could go with the messengers. G-d could have said on the first occasion do not curse the Jewish people but say everything that I want, instead of having two separate conversations.

Isaac Arama (quoted by N. Leibowitz, 1982, pp. 311,312) offers a third approach. He argues that Bil'am request to curse the Jewish people was reprehensible, but on the first occasion, G-d answered without getting angry due to G-d's goodness. G-d told him that the people are to be blessed (22:12) and Bil'am was supposed to understand that his request was inappropriate. However, when Bil'am asked a second time, G-d was angry at him for having the nerve to ask again. G-d said he could go but this was to make a fool of him and to punish him. With this approach, G-d never changed His mind, but G-d does not seem to be angry with Bil'am when G-d responded to Bil'am's second request, 22:20.

I agree with Isaac Arama that Bil'am's requests to curse the Jewish people were incomprehensible if Bil'am was really a prophet of G-d. Was Bil'am really a prophet of G-d? Midrash Rabbah (20:1) explains that Bil'am was the exception to the rule, that really there were no non-Jewish prophets, but there had to be one in order that the nations of the world could not make a claim that G-d had not given them a prophet. Thus, Bil'am was the single non-Jewish prophet and he was to teach the non-Jews not to commit idolatry. Yet, we never hear of Bil'am's works in this area, and all we know of him is that a "prophet of G-d" wanted to curse the Jewish people. I doubt that Bil'am was a prophet.

If Bil'am was not a prophet, how can we understand this episode as Bil'am told the messengers that G-d would speak to him that night, and G-d spoke to him? One clue is from S. R. Hirsch's insight who writes, (1989, on 22:9) “it is by no means necessary to assume that Bil’am expected or even asked for this communication from G-d. What Bil’am said “what G-d will say to me” seems entirely just a phrase in the mouth of Bil’am. At least the messengers of Balak and especially Balak himself took G-d’s refusal as having no other meaning than: I will not go with you, my ambitions and interest are not yet satisfied.” S. R. Hirsch understands that Bil'am would always put on a show, but this time G-d really spoke as opposed to his usual acts where Bil'am just pretended that G-d was speaking to him. I think one can extend this idea that Bil'am was pretending to speak to G-d.

The two conversations recorded in 22:9-12 and 22:20 were part of Bil'am’s act as a magician. Could Bil’am really be able say that G-d would speak to him at night (22:8,19)? No. These claims show that he was faking these conversations. It is possible that Bil'am lied to the messengers and told them that G-d had spoken to him and what is recorded in 22:9-12, and 22:20. Or, it is also possible that the first set of messengers heard the whole discussion but thought that G-d was really speaking to Bil'am. Bil'am told them to stay with him that night, as 22:8 ends by recording that "they sat with Bil'am." This is usually understood that they just spent the night with Bil'am, but literally it means that they were seating together, which means that they heard the conversation between G-d and Bil'am. Thus, 22:9 records that when "G-d" spoke to Bil'am, "He" asked, "Who are these people with you?" meaning the people sitting next to you. Bil'am explained what the messengers wanted and "G-d" told Bil'am that he could not curse the people since they were blessed (22:12). With this possibility, the messengers experienced a great performance by the master magician Bil'am.

In the morning, Bil'am told the messengers that he could not go with them, 22:13, which meant to the messengers that he wanted more honor (Rashi on 22:13) or more money (S. R. Hirsch). Even though the messengers might have thought that they heard that "G–d" said not to curse the Jewish people, this was not the end of the story for them since they believed that Bil'am could change G-d's mind. One of the "beliefs" of pagan magic is that magician can change the wishes of the divine. For example, Balak had Bil'am try to curse the Jewish people in different places, even though he had already given a blessing.

The second set of messengers returned with more promises, 22:15-17. Bil'am told them that if they gave him great wealth, he could not do anything contrary to G-d, but he would speak to G-d again, 22:18,19. This statement by Bil’am was part of the bargaining process, and was no sign of Bil'am's virtuousness. If Bil’am had really spoken to G-d by the first set of messengers, then he would have just rejected the second set of messengers without saying that he would speak to G-d that night. Instead, Bil'am now wanted to accept Balak’s offer, and thus, he needed "permission" from G-d. He told the messengers to stay the night, 22:19, but here the Torah does not record that they were "sitting with Bil'am." Bil'am was then told by "G-d" that he could accompany the messengers, 22:20. In this case, the messengers probably did not hear this "conversation" between G-d and Bil'am. This change of G-d was not surprising to them since this was the belief of the pagan magic. Bil'am had no problem arranging these two conversations with G-d since he invented the conversations. G-d did not change His mind, since G-d had never spoken to Bil'am.

(Note, most likely Bil’am told Balak’s messengers the “conversation” recorded in 22:20 since in 24:12,13, Bil’am tells Balak that he had told Balak’s messengers that he would only do what had G-d had told him to do and this message is recorded in reference to 22:20.)

A proof that Bil’am made up these two conversations is that the Torah never refers to them as a dream. If they had been a real conversation between G-d and Bil’am, then the Torah would have recorded that G-d spoke to Bil’am in a dream, as in Bereshit 20:3 by Avimelek and in Bereshit 31:24 by Lavan. In addition, in the first “conversation,” while one can understand 22:9 as G-d making an introductory question, still it should have been Bil’am speaking first to G-d if this was a real conversation.

After these two “conversations,” Bil’am left with Balak’s messengers to curse the Jewish people, and G-d was angry, 22:22. Not only did Bil'am pretend to speak to G-d, but also, he was going to curse the Jewish people! G-d sent the malakh to threaten Bil'am, and Bil'am got the message. Bil'am then sincerely asked G-d whether he should continue with the messengers, 22:34. G-d agreed since Bil'am had been transformed by the donkey and G-d wanted the people to be blessed. This was the only time that G-d had granted permission for Bil'am to go on the mission.

When Bil'am met Balak, he told him that he would only say what G-d would tell him, 22:38. Balak understood this statement as part of Bil'am's act, and hence he wanted Bil'am to attempt to curse the Jewish people. However, Bil'am was speaking sincerely this time (also in 23:12, 23:26, but not in 22:18), but as he was still not a prophet he did not understand what G-d wanted. (In 24:12,13, Bil'am was being disingenuous. He refers to his conversation with the messengers, that he said he would only say, what G-d wanted, but at that time this statement was part of the act.)

After the incident with the donkey, Bil'am no longer claimed with absolute confidence that G-d would speak to him, as he had previously claimed with the first and second set of messengers. Thus, Bil'am told Balak, "Perhaps G-d will grant me a manifestation, and whatever he reveals to me I will tell you," 23:3. After really speaking to G-d after the incident with the donkey, he could only say perhaps G-d will speak to me, and 23:4,16 record that G-d chanced to appear to Bil'am since G-d was not "obligated" to speak to Bil'am (Milgrom, 1990, p. 195).

If Bil'am made up these conversations with the messengers, why are they recorded in the Torah? The answer is that the following story with the donkey makes a mockery of pagan magic and the messengers set the stage for this mockery since they show the belief and respect for pagan magic, see Alter, 1981, pp. 104-107, and our discussion on 22:23-35, "The amazing donkey."

I have been questioned that one cannot maintain that the two conversations recorded in 22:9-12, and 22:20 did not occur. My answer would be that this idea is similar to the Rambam's (Moreh, 2:42) claim that all cases by a malakh, such as by the talking donkey, were visions and did not occur. In this case, it is part of the act of magicians to claim that they speak to G-d, and thus 22:9-12 and 22:20 do not mean that G-d really spoke to Bil'am on these two occasions. In addition, The Torah describes events as the people who are experiencing the events understand them and as the messengers believed that G-d really spoke to Bil'am, the Torah states that G-d spoke to Bil'am. Another example of this phenomenon is by Yaakov when he referred to his adversary in the middle of the night as a malakh, and even though he later learned that it was Esav, the Torah maintained Yaakov's initial perspective when recording the episode, see our commentary on Bereshit 32:25-31 "Who fought with Yaakov?")

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 1981, The art of biblical narrative, New York: Basic Books.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Leibowitz, Nehama, 1982, Studies in Bemidbar, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society

Bemidbar 20:2-5 (Hukkat) - The source of water for the Jewish people when they were in the desert

Bemidbar 20:1-5 records that the people came to the desert of Tzyn, Miryam died, there was no water and the people complained. Moshe supplied the people with water by hitting a rock, 20:11, but again in 21:5 the people complained that there was no water. Afterwards, 21:16-18 records that the people came to some well, and this was such a momentous event that they composed a song about the well. It is obvious that in a desert, the water supply will be a crucial issue, but the complaints here for water are surprising. Why at this point did the people complain for water?

The people complained about water when they left Egypt, Shemot 15:22, and 17:1, but presumably the water supply problem had been solved since we do read of any complains about water from then until Bemidbar 20.  Furthermore, it is generally assumed that chapters 20 and 21 in the book of Bemidbar are recording events at the end of the people's 40th year in the desert, and if so, why in the 40th year did the water supply problem reemerge? If the people had water for 39 years, what happened in the 40th year?

Bekhor Shor notes that the water crisis in chapter 20 is very similar to the water crisis in Shemot 17:1-7 since in both cases the people asked for water and they got water by Moshe hitting a rock. This similarity led Bekhor Shor (on 20:8) to claim that these narratives are describing the same incident, just like the sending of the spies is recorded twice, Bemidbar 13 and Devarim 1. In one place some of the details of the incident are recorded, and the remaining details are recorded in the second instance.

Bekhor Shor quotes two proofs for his position. One, Shemot 17:7 records that the place where the incident occurred is called Massa and Meriva and Bemidbar 20:13 also refers to the Waters of Meriva. Furthermore, Devarim 33:8 records “whom you tested at Massa, who you quarreled with by the Waters of Meriva.” This is a poetic text using parallelism and Bekhor Shor argues that the place names Massa and the Waters of Meriva are referring to the same incident. A second proof is that Bemidbar 20:1 records that the people came to the desert of Tzyn while Shemot 17:1 refers to the desert Syn, whose similarity also leads Bekhor Shor to argue that the both chapters refers to the same incident.

Milgrom (1990, p. 449) adds another proof for the Bekhor Shor's approach. Devarim 9:22 records three places where the people sinned, Tav’era, Massa, and Kivrot ha-Taava. The 1st and 3rd places are from Bemidbar 11, so Milgrom argues that Massa, which is only mentioned in Shemot 17, must also be from Bemidbar.

If this approach is correct, then we must determine when the actual incident occurred. Was it when the people left Egypt or in the 40th year? If the complaint was when the people left Egypt, then we have an answer to our question since then there was no new complaint about water in chapter 20, as the Torah is only recording the incident that occurred when the people left Egypt.

I doubt that Shemot 17 and Bemidbar 20 describe the same event. First, the names of the desert while close are not identical. Secondly, the parallelism in Devarim 33:8 could be because the incidents were similar without them being the same incident. It could be that the names Meriva and the Waters of Meriva are almost identical since the complaints were similar, and not that the names are referring to the same incident. Third, Milgrom’s proof is not convincing since according to his argument, Massa should have been listed last because it occurred after Kivrot ha-Taava. In fact, one could argue that Devarim 9:22 proves that there were two separate incidents. In Devarim 9:22, Moshe was warning the people not to sin by recounting their errors in the past but he would not mention the Waters of Meriva since that was his sin. If Massa was the same story as the Waters of Meriva, then Moshe would not have referred to Massa.

Finally, if really there was only one complaint for water, why should it be recorded twice? The second telling of the story is not presented as a reference to the past but as a new episode, and there are small differences between the episodes. If the incident happened when the people left Egypt, then Moshe would have been punished even before the people had been told they would not enter the land of Israel. On the other hand, if one argues that the incident only happened after 40 years, why should the complaint have been recorded when the people left Egypt?

The traditional answer (Ta’anit 9a and Rashi on 20:2) for the sudden water crises in chapter 20 is that it was due to the death of Miryam, which was recorded in 20:1. The idea is that for all the years in the desert the people had water from a traveling well which was due to the merit of Miryam and when Miryam died the well disappeared. This answers the question why the sudden complaint for water, and explains the conjunction between the record of Miryam’s death in 20:1 with the lack of water in 20:2.

Yet, there is no mention at all in the Torah of this traveling well. When did it begin? In Shemot 17, Moshe had to hit a rock to supply water to the people, so it must have begun afterwards, but when (see Ramban on 20:8)? Also, if the well disappeared in the 40th year, what did the people do for water for the rest of the year? The Ramban (on 20:8) explains the rabbinic position that after the death of Miryam, the people got water from Moshe hitting the rock for the remaining period in the desert. Why then did they complain for water in 21:5? Netziv (on 20:8 and 21:5) explains that the people complained since the water from the rocks in the 40th year was of a lower quality than what they had received from the well. This seems ad hoc, how would we know that the water from the rock was a lower quality? Furthermore, the text never indicates that Moshe continued to hit the rock to supply water, as 20:11 seems to record a temporary measure. Finally, if the well disappeared, then the people would have had a legitimate need for water so why was Moshe angry with the people, 20:10, and considered their request a quarrel with G-d, 20:13? As for the mentioning of the death of Miryam in 20:1, Ibn Ezra (on 20:2) explains that this was in conjunction with the ensuing punishments of Moshe and Aharon that they also would die in the desert.

Moskovitz (1988, p. 229) offers a different answer to the water crises in chapters 20 and 21. He suggests that these two complaints for water were symptomatic of the perennial water problem the people had in the desert. According to this the people really complained on numerous occasions in the 40 years for water, but only these incidents were recorded. This seems unlikely. Why should the Torah have recorded the two cases here (plus the two cases in Shemot 15 and 17) and left out the other cases? Also, as the food problem was solved permanently by the mahn, why should the water problem be left without a permanent solution requiring periodic stopgap measure? Furthermore, how was the water problem solved on these other occasions? By the well? By Moshe hitting the rocks? Finally, if it was solved on other occasions, then again why now was there a shortage of water?

I believe that the mahn provided all the liquid requirements of the people. One proof of this idea is that 21:5 records that the people complained, “For there is no food and no water. And our throats loathe the despicable food.” The people are not satisfied with the mahn and request both food and water. Yet they only complain about the mahn, there is no complaint about their water source. It must be that the mahn was the source both for food and water providing them with their solid and liquid nutritional needs. Furthermore, by this complaint Moshe did not provide them with water because they did not need water since they had the mahn. A second possible proof that the mahn also provided their liquid needs can be seen in Bemidbar 11:8, which records that if one made a cake from the mahn then it tasted as a cake baked with oil. This means that cake would have a moist taste, which implies some amount of liquids within the solids.

This idea can explain why the people complained for water in Shemot 17:1. In Shemot 16, the people had just received the mahn, but they wanted regular water in addition to the mahn. This complaint was unjustified, and that is why Moshe was angry with them in Shemot 17:2. They got water that one time but then they had to adjust to getting their liquid needs from the mahn.

One could also maintain that even if there was a well that traveled with the people, then still the mahn was an additional source of water. The well would have provided tasty water, while the mahn supplied the liquid nourishment that was necessary. Also, if not everybody could get water from the well, then still the people would be able to get water from the mahn.

Yet, if the mahn provided all the liquid needs of the people, why did the people complain in Bemidbar 20:2-5 for water? The answer is due to the travels in the desert after the sin of the spies. From Bemidbar 33:34-36, we see that before the people came to the desert of Tzyn in 20:1, they had camped in Etzyon Gever, which is assumed to be Eilat and two stops before that they camped at Yotvata. While we cannot identify exactly where Yotvata is today, Devarim 10:7 describes it as a “land of streams of water.” This means that in these places, the people had additional sources of water besides the mahn. (Devarim 8:15 “that they went in a desert without water” means the first stage of their travels in the desert, before they reached these areas.)

Thus, after the sin of the spies, the people had settled down for almost 38 years and had become comfortable. Now, in the 40th year of the people's stay in the desert, the people marched north to the desert of Tzyn, which is probably the Arava desert. The phrases “this wilderness” and “this evil place” in 20:4,5 are in reference to the Arava desert, which is a harsh desert.

We can know postulate that there were two problems that caused the complaints of 20:3-5. One, the simplest, is that in the desert of Tzyn the people had no natural water, as they said in the end of 20:5, "there is no water to drink." However, before coming to the desert of Tzyn, they had become accustomed to natural water, and hence they thought they might die if they only had the mahn. Two, 20:3 refers to "our brothers" who died many years earlier, which suggests that the people complaining, at a minimum in this verse, was the generation who left Egypt. This generation knew that they were not going to make into the land of Israel, and hence they were upset since they saw no reason why they had to leave a place they had been for 38 years just to end up dying in a harsh desert. From their point of view, they could have died, and then the new generation would start to march towards the land of Israel.

In response to the complaints, G-d temporarily gave the people regular water, 20:11, possibly because this was the first complaint of the new generation or a recognition that the people had become used to regular water.

From the desert of Tzyn the people could have traveled through Edom, but Edom refused to let them pass so they have to detour around Edom, 20:14. This detour meant marching south back to the Red Sea, 21:4, (area near Eilat, see also Devarim 2:8) which returned the people to their additional water sources. However, the people had to continue marching turning east and north to go around Edom to the desert of Moav (21:11, Devarim 2:8,9) which meant leaving any sources of water, and they complained again.  It is true that Devarim 2:29 records that Moshe said that Edom sold the people water, but this was for money, probably not in great quantities and most likely after the complaints in Bemidbar 21:4,5. Edom initially met the people with force (20:20,21), and only after the Jewish people passed by would Edom have sold them water. The fact that the people bought water from Edom indicates that they were not happy with getting their liquid needs from the mahn. Shortly after passing around Edom and Moav, the people reached the well referred to in 21:16, and they sang a song because they were very happy since they again had water in great quantities without having to purchase it.  Possibly from that point on, the people always had access to water supplies, and then the song signals the end of the water problem in the desert, but even if not, they still had the mahn to give them their liquid needs.

Bibliography

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Moskovitz, Yehiel Tzvi, 1988, Commentary on the book of Bemidbar, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.