25:19 – The elleh toledot unit of Yitzhak

25:19 records elleh toledot Yitzhak the son of Avraham, Avraham begot Yitzhak. The end of this verse is surprising since after the Torah records that Yitzhak was the son of Avraham in the beginning of the verse, why does the Torah need to record that Avraham fathered Yitzhak in the end of the verse?

Several answers have been suggested to explain the end of 25:19. Rashi (on 25:19, based on Baba Metzia 87a) explains that the end of the verse is to stress that Yitzhak was Avraham’s son since he looked like Avraham, and not Avimelekh’s son as claimed by cynics. Ibn Ezra (on 25:19) quotes this idea and adds that maybe the point of the verse is to tell us that Avraham raised Yitzhak. Ramban (on 25:19) suggests that the end of the verse is telling us that only Yitzhak and not Avraham’s other children should be considered Avraham’s successor.

While all of these suggestions are possible, my guess is that the phrase, “Avraham begot Yitzhak,” is recorded as part of the elleh toledot structure of the book of Bereshit, see above our discussion "Introduction: The structure of the book of Bereshit" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/10/structure-of-book-of-bereshit.html

Verse 25:19 is an example of a verse that begins a lengthy elleh toledot narrative section of the book of Bereshit, as does 11:27 and 37:2. 25:19 records elleh toledot of Yitzhak, and the section proceeds to recount the story of Yitzhak’s son, Yaakov. This is also the pattern of 11:27, which records the phrase elleh toledot Terah and the ensuing section recounts the story of Terah’s son, Avraham, and 37:2, which record the phrase elleh toledot Yaakov and the ensuing section recounts the story of Yaakov’s son, Yosef.

Even when the phrase elleh toledot begins a lengthy narrative section, still the section is framed from a genealogical perspective. Thus, the lengthy narrative elleh toledot sections begin with a genealogical reference to of a child or children of the person referred to in the heading, and end with the death of the child. For example, 11:27 records elleh toledot Terah, and then records that Terah begot Avram, Nahor and Haran, and fourteen chapters later, the section ends with Avraham’s death, 25:8-11. 37:2 records elleh toledot Yaakov and that Yosef was 17 years old, and the section ends with Yosef’s death, 50:26.

Our elleh toledot section, also begins with genealogical details. It mentions that Yitzhak was the son of Avraham (the first half of 25:19) and then it records the birth of Yitzhak’s children, 25:20-26. The statement that Yitzhak was Avraham’s son, which is known from 21:2,3, was because this was a new toledot section, and genealogical information is repeated in a new toledot section, as for example by Noah’s sons 5:32 and 6:10 and by Terah’s sons 11:26,27. However, in contrast to the other lengthy toledot sections, this elleh toledot section ends with the death of Yitzhak, 35:28,29, and not with the deaths of Yitzhak’s children, Yaakov or Esav. I believe that this anomaly explains the need for the phrase “Avraham begot Yitzhak” in the second half of 25:19.

The elleh toledot section of Yitzhak should have ended with the death of Yaakov following the usual pattern in Bereshit that the section ends with the death of son of the person referred in the elleh toledot phrase. However, Yaakov could not die at the end of the section of elleh toledot Yitzhak since he also plays a crucial part in the story of Yosef, the following section. Accordingly, somebody else had to die at the end of the toledot section to maintain the genealogical framework of the elleh toledot structure, and this person was Yitzhak. Yet, if Yitzhak’s death ended the section, then the section has to start with his birth. Thus, the phrase, “Avraham begot Yitzhak,” is recorded in 25:19 to mark Yitzhak’s birth, which enables his death to end the section.

If the toledot section starts with Yitzhak’s birth and ends with his death, then why was the section not titled elleh toledot Avraham? This would follow the rule that the death of the person who ends the toledot section is the son of the person in the phrase elleh toledot. The answer is that the son of the person in the phrase elleh toledot is also the main character of the section, and Yitzhak is not the main character of the section from 25:19-35:29, as Yaakov is the main character of the section. Therefore, the section begins elleh toledot Yitzhak, which means the main character in the section will be Yitzhak's son, Yaakov, but as Yitzhak’s death ends the section, his birth also begins the section, which is the phrase, “Avraham begot Yitzhak.” Yitzhak’s birth and death are then the genealogical markers to this elleh toledot section from 25:19 through 35:29.

Bereshit 1:5,8,13,19,23,31; 2:2 and Shemot 20:11 - The seven days of creation

Bereshit 1:5,8,13,19,23,31 and 2:2 refer to the seven days of the creation of the world that G-d created the world in six days and “rested” on the seventh day. These days are a literary framework for the description of the creation of the world in the Torah. 

These seven days are difficult for several reasons. One, according to science the world is around 13.8 billion years and not six/ seven days. Two, the days are unnecessary to the narrative. The Torah could simply have recorded the different items created without stating that they were created on particular days. Three, even if it was desired for the description of the creation of the world to have a literary framework, why was it days and not the phrase “G-d saw that X was good?” The phrase “G-d saw that X was good” appears seven times within the description of the creation of the world, 1:4,12,18,21,23,25,31, and would also seem to be a way of dividing the description of the creation of the world into seven groups. Or, as discussed in the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot 5:1, the creation of the word could have been divided by G-d’s statements, which appear nine times in chapter one. (The Mishnah records that the phrase appears ten times, and commentators to the Mishnah attempt to find the tenth statement by G-d.) Finally, one could ask the question of the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot, why was the world not created complete in one instance? Or, why did the Torah just not record, “G-d created the world” without any of the particular details?

The answer to all these questions is from Shemot 20:11, which is part of the Decalogue, and some people recite this verse as part of kiddush on Shabbat morning. The verse records “For in six days G-d made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in it, and he rested on the seventh day; therefore (al ken) G-d gave the seventh day his blessing, and he hallowed it,” Fox translation, 1995, p. 371. This verse is similar to the last verse in the description of the creation of the world in 2:3, though 2:3 does not have the word, therefore. 

Shemot 20:11 is telling us that the division of the creation of the world into seven days was in order that the seventh day, Shabbat, would be special, which occurred by G-d “resting” on the seventh day. In theory, G-d could have created the word without the framework of days, and then told the Jewish people to rest every seventh day. Yet, if this were true, the resting on the seventh day would not be related to the creation of the world. Instead, the seven day literary framework within the description of the creation of the world is to create a connection between a person resting on Shabbat and the creation of the world.

Accordingly, even if scientifically the world is 13.8 billion years, the point of the days within the description of the creation of the world is for people to make the seventh day special. Even if each day in chapter one of Bereshit is really billions or millions of years, still the usage of the word day is for people living after creation to relate the creation of the world to their normal twenty four day and seven day week. The creation of the world could not been recorded by a division of years or even periods since then there would be no connection between Shabbat and the creation of the world. Also, the phrase “and G-d saw that X was good,” could not be used as the literary framework of the description of the creation of the world since it does not relate to people keeping the Shabbat. Possibly to ensure that this phrase is not used as a literary framework, the phrase is not used on days two and seven. For the same reason, the creation of the world could not be framed around G-d’s statements, as again this would not relate the creation of the world to resting on Shabbat. Finally, for the same reason there had to be a division in the description of the creation of the world into seven days and not one instantaneous act or just one verse which stated that G-d created the world. Note this idea might be an example of the principle in the Midrash that G-d looked into the Torah when He created the world, (Bereshit Rabbah 1:1), as the description of the creation of the world in the Torah with regard to the number of days is based on people in the future observing Shabbat.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books

Devarim 26:4,10 – Logistics of the bikkurim ceremony

Devarim 26:1-11 record the bikkurim ceremony that a farmer was to bring some of his new crops to the chosen place and make two declarations, 26:3 and 26:5 through the first half of 26:10, the mikra bikkurim. 26:4 records that after making the first declaration, 26:3, the farmer would give a basket of his new crops to the priest who would put it down by the altar. The farmer would then recite the second declaration, 26:5 through the first half of 26:10, and after finishing this declaration, the second half of 26:10 records that the basket would be put down before G-d. How could the basket be put down twice? Did the farmer pick up the basket when making the second declaration?

The Mishnah (Bikkurim 3:6) quotes two possibilities how the basket was put down during this ceremony. The first opinion, the anonymous tanna kamma, states that the farmer holds the basket on his shoulder the entire time he is reciting the second declaration, and after finishing the declaration he puts the basket down. This opinion seems to understand that the real placing down was at the end of the second declaration, and then the first placing down mentioned in 26:4 is understood to be on the farmer’s shoulders. As noted by David Hoffmann (1961, p. 486), it is hard to reconcile this approach with a simple reading of the Torah.

The second opinion, R. Yehuda, states that when the farmer recites the second declaration, he holds the edge of the basket while the priest holds the bottom of the basket. After the farmer finished reciting the verses, he then placed the basket down. Hoffmann writes that this approach accords with the Torah, but still 26:4 seems to state that only the priest is holding the basket at this point of the ceremony and the priest would place the basket down by the altar, while with R. Yehuda’s approach, the farmer is also holding the basket when making the second declaration and the basket is not placed by the altar prior to the second declaration.

My guess is that this double reference to putting the basket down is to indicate that two actions, the farmer’s declaration and the putting down of the basket, were happening concurrently. If the Torah had only recorded that the basket was to put down once, then one would have thought that it was to be put down either before the farmer started his second declaration (if only 26:4 was recorded) or that the placing was to be done after the farmer had finished his second declaration (if only the second half of 26:10 was recorded). However, with the double reference to putting down, we see that that the basket had to be put down both before and after the second declaration. How could this be?

The crucial point is that it would take some time (a minute? five minutes?) for the priest to take the basket from the farmer and put it down by the altar. This action would begin before the farmer made the second declaration and continue when the farmer was reciting the second declaration, as then the farmer would end the declaration or part of it before the basket was put down. Thus, prior to the farmer’s second declaration, he would hand the basket to the priest, who would then go to place it by the altar. The basket was not yet placed by the altar, but this is referred to as placing it down since once the farmer hands off the basket to the priest, the process of putting the basket down has begun. When the priest was walking over to the altar and putting the basket by the altar, the farmer would recite the verses of the second declaration and at this point he would not be holding the basket at all.

The first half of 26:10 records that the farmer ends the second declaration by stating that he has brought his crops since by finishing the second declaration and by having given his crops (in the basket) to the priest, he has fulfilled his obligation to bring the bikkurim. The second half of 26:10 then records that the basket is placed down before G-d, and this is referring to the action by the priest, who placed the basket down by the altar when the farmer was reciting the verses or depending on how long it took for the priest to place the basket down, after the farmer finished making the second declaration. The putting down in 26:10 is attributed to the farmer since the priest is the messenger of the farmer, but it is the priest who is putting the basket down (see Hoffmann, 1961, p. 486).

In conclusion, the double reference to putting down the basket during the bikkurim ceremony enclose the second declaration of the farmer, and signify that when the farmer was making his second declaration the priest was simultaneously putting down the basket by the altar.

Devarim 13:2-4 – The false prophet and the process of creation of the world

Devarim 13:2-4 records that even if a person gives (predicts, announces) a sign or wonder (ot and mofet) and the sign or wonder occurs, still the people must not listen to this person to worship idolatry since by telling the people to worship idolatry, the person has self-identified him or herself as a false prophet. What is the sign and wonder (ot and mofet) that the false prophet is giving?

The terms ot and mofet appear almost always in reference to the exodus from Egypt, either with regard to proving that Moshe was G-d’s messenger (Shemot 3:12, 4:8,9,17,21,28,30) or proving G-d’s power (Shemot 7:3,9, 10:1,2, 11:10; Bemidbar 14:11,22; Devarim 4:34, 6:22, 7:19, 11:3, 26:8, 29:2). In all of these cases, the ot and mofet are miraculous in nature, but on one occasion, Devarim 28:46, by the curses when the people would not fulfill the laws, the phrase ot and mofet does not refer to the exodus and does not appear to relate to any miraculous event. In addition there are other cases, where the word ot is a non-miraculous sign like by the Shabbat (Shemot 31:13,17) and by tefillin (Shemot 13:9,16; Devarim 6:8, 11:18). The conjunction of both words ot and mofet would then seem to mean that 13:2,3 is referring to a case where the false prophet announced that some miraculous event would happen, and it occurred. This would differ from the case in Devarim 18:21,22, where the person predicts the future but does not forecast any miraculous event, see Tigay, 1996, pp. 129,178. Yet, how could the person be able to give a miraculous sign or wonder if the person was going to tell the people to worship idolatry? Would G-d enable a false prophet to be able to perform miracles as a sign?

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 90a, also in Sifrei 84) quotes an interesting argument regarding the ability of the false prophet to give the signs or wonders. R Yossi ha-Galili explains that G-d grants false prophets the ability to predict or even do these signs, but that people should not pay attention to their powers since G-d gave the person these powers to test the people. Rabbi Akiva responded to this claim by stating "G-d forbid" that G-d would give great powers to false prophets. Instead, R. Akiva explains that initially when the person gave the signs, he/ she was really a true prophet, but then later he/ she became a false prophet.

R. Akiva makes sense that it is incomprehensible that G-d would give a “bad” person the power to predict or do signs or wonders to test other people since that would be entrapment. However, R. Akiva's approach is also difficult since would a true prophet really turn so bad? I once said this explanation in my synagogue and somebody said that R. Akiva knew of Acher (Elisha ben Abuyah) who was a great scholar but he turned into a heretic. Yet, Acher was not a prophet beforehand. (With regard to Bil’am’s status, who was not initially a true prophet but he did become a prophet, see our discussion on Bemidbar chapters 22-25, “The bad, the good and the ordinary?” https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/07/bemidbar-chapters-22-25-balak-bad-good.html)

Another question on R. Akiva’s approach is why would G-d choose to grant these powers to give these signs and wonders to a person of bad character who would turn into a false prophet? Was there nobody else who G-d could have been given the powers to know these signs and was of better character? Presumably, R. Akiva would answer that there must have been a great need to make this particular person a prophet at the particular time even though G-d either knew that the person would become a false prophet (according to the idea that G-d knows the future) or that G-d knew that the person's character was such the person had a good chance of becoming a false prophet (according to the idea that G-d does not know the future). 

Abarbanel (1999, p. 213, also see Luzzatto on 13:4) offers a third approach to explain the person’s ability to give signs and wonders. He writes that it only seems that the person was able give a sign or wonder, but really he/ she had no power at all. Nehama Leibowitz (1982, p. 128) does not like the Abarbanel's explanation since she argues that the simple meaning of the Torah is that the person was able to predict a sign or wonder. Yet, the point of the Abarbanel's explanation is that some people truly believe that the false prophet performed the sign, and the Torah is writing from their perspective, that even if you believe in the powers of the false prophet, still you should not listen to the person to worship idolatry. According to the Abarbanel (and R. Akiva for a different reason), 13:2-4 is not entrapment since no sign or wonder happened, and the statement that G-d is testing you is an explanation for those people who (mistakenly) believe that the false prophet has real powers. However, for the person who knows the act is a charade then this was not a test at all.

N. Leibowitz (1982, pp. 131-133), who follows R. Yossi he-Galili, uses this case to support her general view that miracles are no proof of faith. I disagree with this understanding. My understanding is that in the Torah, miracles are a proof for the belief in G-d and Moshe, but that our verses are telling us that in the future after Moshe dies, then miracles will no longer be a source for faith since people are so easily fooled by charlatans.

The three views concerning the false prophet might also be relevant to questions about the creation of the world. The universe has billion of stars, and the question is why would G-d need to create so many stars? Also there are many animals that existed and went extinct. Why did G-d create these animals?

One "answer" to these questions is that all the stars and extinct animals are to test a person's faith, and this would correspond to R. Yossi ha-Galili's approach by the false prophet. A second answer is that it only appears that there are many stars and that animals became extinct as G-d created the world to appear to be much older and bigger than it really is. These answers would correspond to the Abarbanel's opinion that it only appeared that the false prophet could know and do the signs and wonders. The third opinion is that the billions of stars are real and truly many animals became extinct, but each of the stars and the animals had some necessary reason for being created, even if it is not obvious. This approach would correspond to R. Akiva's approach that for some reason G-d had to give a person of bad character great powers even though later on he/ she would become a false prophet.

In the book Just Six Numbers by Martin Rees (2000), he explains that all the stars and galaxies are necessary for our existence since it was needed for stars (supernovas) to explode over and over again until enough atoms were created to make our world, as initially there were just hydrogen and helium atoms, and though the explosions, carbon, oxygen and iron atoms were created.  Rees writes (pp. 49,52) “These ancient stars made the atoms of which we and our planet are composed… Accounting for the proportion of different atoms- and realizing that the Creator didn’t need to turn 92 different knobs- is a triumph of astrophysics.” Furthermore, he notes that the number of years this exploding, reforming and re-exploding were needed to make our solar system corresponds to how many years are believed to have transpired from the first stars until our solar system was founded. He writes (p. 10):

The very hugeness of our universe, which seems at first to signify how unimportant we are in the cosmic scheme, is actually entailed by our existence! This is not to say that there couldn’t have been a smaller universe, only that we could not have existed in it. The expansion of cosmic space is not an extravagant superfluity; it’s a consequence of the prolonged chain of events, extending back before our Solar System formed, that preceded out arrival on the scene.

In conclusion, I think the Abarbanel is correct in his reading of the Torah regarding the ability of the false prophet to give signs and wonders, but in reference to these questions concerning the creation of the world, I believe that R. Akiva's approach makes the most sense. For more questions on the creation world with regard to the Torah see our discussion on Bereshit chapter one, "Concordism," https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2018/10/bereshit-120-30-description-of-creation.html, and https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/10/bereshit-11-19-bereshit-some-thoughts.html.

Bibliography:

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1982, Studies in Devarim, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Rees, Martin, 2000, Just six numbers: The deep forces that shape the universe, New York: Basic Books.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Bemidbar 35:27 – A cost-benefit calculation by the accidental killer

Bemidbar 35:27 records that if an accidental killer leaves the city of refuge, then the relative of the person killed is allowed to kill the accidental killer.  Yet, Bemidbar 35:25 records that the people are to save the accidental killer from the relative of the victim. Also, Devarim 19:1-10 stresses that the people are obligated to prepare the way to the city of the refuge and to establish even more cities of refugee if their territory becomes larger in order to stop innocent blood from being shed, i.e. to stop the relative from killing the accidental killer. This means the accidental killer is not deserving of death.  Why did the Torah allow the relative of the victim to kill the accidental killer?

Luzzatto (on 35:12, see also N. Leibowitz, 1980a, pp. 189-193) explains that in olden times people believed that they had to avenge the deaths of their relatives even if the person was killed accidentally. The Torah could not change this belief immediately, and if the Torah would have forbidden the relative from killing in revenge, then he/ she would have done so in any event. The net result would have been that another person (the relative who killed) would also die for committing murder. Hence, the Torah limited the right to take revenge to outside the city of refuge with the hope that this would cause this desire to take revenge to end. The idea is that really the Torah does not want people to take revenge and this permission is based on human weaknesses. Yet, just because of human weakness, we allow a person to murder somebody who does not deserve to die? Even if taking revenge was the custom in olden times, if the relative was convicted of murder and punished, then this would eradicate this norm of taking revenge.

My guess is that the allowance of the relative to kill the accidental killer meant that relatives were a type of police to force the accidental murderer to go to the city of refuge and to stay there until the high priest died either as a punishment or as a form of atonement for the accidental killer. The permission for the relative to kill was then a cost-benefit calculation. The benefit of allowing the relative of the victim to kill the accidental killer was that this put pressure on the accidental killer to go to the city of refuge and to stay there. The cost is that if the accidental killer did not succeed in fleeing to the city of refugee or tried to leave the city of refugee and then he/ she would be killed even though he/ she did not deserve to die. The basis for the law is then that the benefit of forcing the accidental killer to flee to the city of refugee and stay in the city of refuge was greater than the chance that the accidental killer would not safely reach the city of refuge.

Bemidbar 17:10,11 – A quick learner

Bemidbar17:10 records that G-d told Moshe that he and Aharon should separate from the people since G-d was about to kill the people who had accused Moshe and Aharon of killing the 250 men (17:6), and the end of 17:10 records that Moshe and Aharon fell on their faces when they heard this threat. I think that G-d did not really intend to kill all the people since then G-d would have killed the people without speaking to Moshe. (This same point can be made in other cases where G-d threatened to kill the people, as for example, after the sin of the golden calf, Shemot 32:10, after the sin of the spies, Bemidbar 14:12, and in the previous chapter, 16:21.) Moshe understood that something could be done to save the people, and then Moshe sent out Aharon to walk between the people with an incense pan to stop the plague that had started to kill the people, 17:11-15.

How did Moshe know that Aharon should take an incense pan and walk amongst the people? Why did he choose this action instead of praying as he did by the sin of the golden calf and by the sin of the spies?

One possibility is the G-d gave the instructions to Moshe to tell Aharon to take the incense pan when Moshe fell on his faces. In a similar situation in the beginning of Korah’s rebellion, when Moshe fell on his face, 16:4, the Rashbam (on 16:4) makes the suggestion that when Moshe fell on his face, G-d gave Moshe instructions what to say to Korah. If G-d did speak to Moshe on that occasion, then here too G-d could have spoken to Moshe when Moshe fell on his face. However, in both cases there is no indication in the Torah that G-d spoke to Moshe when Moshe fell on his face.

Rashi (on 17:11) quotes a second possibility from the Talmud (Shabbat 89a) that when Moshe was on Mount Sinai the angel of death told him that the incense could stop a plague. The Talmud ends that if
this was not true, then how could Moshe have known that the incense would stop the plague?

My guess is that Moshe deduced this information by the first stage of Korah's revolt. 16:21 records that G-d told Moshe and Aharon to remove themselves from the 250 men who had come to do the test of fire pans since G-d was about to kill them. 16:25 then records that Moshe left, but it is not recorded that Aharon left, and according to 16:17 he was supposed to stay with the 250 men since he was part of the test of the fire pans. How then was Aharon protected if he did not leave? Did he have immunity since he was the high priest? This could be, but his two sons, Nadav and Avihu did not have immunity (Vayikra 10:2) and 16:21 and 17:10 imply that he did not have immunity, though maybe one could argue that these were not real threats. Yet, even these if these cases were not real threats, still the basis for the possible threat is that if a plague goes out from G-d then even the innocents can be killed, see Rashi on Shemot 12:22. 

If Aharon did not have immunity, how did he survive the fire that went out and killed the 250 men? It must be that when he brought his incense as part of the test of the 250 men, the incense gave him immunity from the fire that killed the 250 men. This would be similar to the incense that protects the high priest when he goes in the Holy of Holies, the inner room of the mishkan on Yom Kippur, Vayikra 16:2,13. Why then did G-d have to tell Aharon and Moshe to separate from the rebels prior to the incense test in 16:21, if he had this protection? It could be that G-d was just threatening Moshe and Aharon to get Moshe to act or it could be that Aharon had not yet lit the incense so he did not yet have this protection from the incense. In any event, from the fact that Aharon was with the 250 men but was saved when the 250 men died, 16:35, Moshe realized that the incense, if brought correctly, could protect a person from danger, and hence he knew to instruct Aharon to walk through the people with the incense to stop the plague.

Video of lecture at Chabad at Oxford University on Judaism and economics

Hello,

On May 9, 2019, I spoke at a conference on economic history at Oxford University, and when I was in Oxford, the Chabad Rabbi, Rabbi Eli Brackman asked me to speak on Judaism and economics. He videoed the presentation and I have posted it below. (Need to double click.)

Parts of the talk were based on discussions that I have posted in the past, in 2009, “The end of poverty,” (Re’eh), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/08/devarim-15411-reeh-end-of-poverty.html,
in 2010, “Equality vs. efficiency,” (Behar), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2010/05/vayikra-254-18-behar-equality-vs.html and
in 2011, “Shemitta, yovel, communism and capitalism,” (Behar), https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2011/05/vayikra-254-18-shemitta-yovel-communism.html.

Also, during the talk, I was asked questions about slavery in the Torah, and now I realize that I need to correct one of my answers in reference to Vayikra 25:46.

Please feel free to send comments to me, Andrew Schein, ajayschein@gmail.com, and not to the the blog.

Best wishes to all.

https://www.chabad.org/multimedia/media_cdo/aid/4390461/jewish/Does-the-Torah-Support-Any-One-Economic-System.htm

                  

Vayikra 27:2-8 – To give

Vayikra 27:2 records the case where a person donates money, shekalim, to G-d in lieu of him/ herself. The Torah then explains how much the person can donate based on the age and gender of the person, 27:3-7. We can make a table of these donations:

	20 years until 60 years	5 years until 20 years	One month until 5 years	60 years and up
Male	50 shekels	20 shekels	5 shekels	15 shekels
Female	30 shekels	10 shekels	3 shekels	10 shekels
Ratio	50/30= 1.66	20/10 = 2	5/3= 1.66	15/10 = 1.5

Note the term shekel here does not correspond to the modern day shekel. In the Torah the term shekel means a weight of silver, as money in ancient time was weights of metals, usually gold, silver or copper. The word shekel literally means to weigh and this term was/ is used for money since one had to weigh the metal to know what amount of metal a person had to pay for a good. Similarly, the term kesef in Modern Hebrew means both money and silver since in many places money was from silver. This is not unique in Hebrew, as for example the basic unit account of money in the United Kingdom is called pound sterling.

The list of shekels for the different ages and the differences between men and women raises several questions. Why do the donations change with the age of the person being “donated”? Why are there different values for a man and woman? Why should a woman give less than a man? Finally, why does the ratio between what a man gives and what a woman gives change slightly for the different ages? One would have thought that ratio would remain constant, which would mean the change in years would have equal impact on men and women.

Ibn Ezra (on 27:3) writes that the valuations are decrees of the Torah, meaning that they are laws which man does not know their reason. Nonetheless, many commentators have tried to explain these laws based on differences in the levels of skills or productivity of people, which in economics is referred to as human capital (see Kleiman, 1987). According to this approach, in reference to the age categories, the idea would be that a person is most productive between the ages 20 and 60, and hence this age category has the highest valuation. Furthermore, according to this approach, a person between the years 5 and 20 is more productive than a person 60 years and over and a person between one month and 5 years old a person is barely productive at all.

The human capital approach has also been used to explain the different values for men and women. Levine (1989, p. 193) writes, “Gender differentiation may be linked to productivity, it being presumed that a male could earn more than a female.” Similarly, Bulah (1992, p. 245, footnote 2) writes that the different values for men and women are based on the prices in the slave market!

Based on this idea of human capital, suggestions have also been made to explain the change in the ratio between male and females over the years. Rashi (on 27:9) quotes from the Talmud (Arakhin 19a) “that an old man in the house is a nuisance while an old woman is a treasure in the house.” Thus Rashi explains that a man loses relatively more value, human capital, when he is over 60 than a woman, and the ratio from the valuation of men relative to women drops from 1.6 to 1.5. Bekhor Shor (on 27:2) explains slightly differently, that a man’s human capital is based on his physical strength while a woman’s human capital is based on her skills and a man’s strength diminishes more rapidly than a woman’s skills.

While the human capital approach is appealing, it does not offer a complete explanation. For example, for the 5 until 20 age category, why does the man/ boy have a relatively higher donation than a woman/ girl? Is a five year old boy more productive than a five year old girl? Also, if the donation levels are based on productivity, then there should be different values according to the productivity of each person. With regard to this question, the Abravanel (2005, p. 328) answers that the Torah did not want to make differences between people since some people who would have a low valuation might feel bad. Yet, then why then should women have lower valuations than men, will they not feel bad? In addition, the human capital approach seems only to give credit to earnings potential but not to work at home. Also, was the earnings potential of men really exactly 50 shekels in the time of the giving of the Torah and how could the Torah fix the level of donations if over time due to increases in technology a person’s productivity could increase to be much more than 50 or 30 shekels? Finally, if the values are based on people’s earnings potential, is the Torah sanctioning that a woman should earn less than a man? With all these questions, even though I am an economist, I have to reject the human capital approach.

Instead of focusing on the different valuations, one can ask why did the Torah give these donation levels altogether? Why not let a person decide on his/ her own how much to donate in lieu of him or herself? The answer is that the Torah was trying to protect the giver. There is a danger that a person could donate such large sums of money that it could impoverish the person. If the person is donating money to G-d due to guilt or due to religious feelings, there could be cases where a person would feel that there is no amount of money that is too much. Bulah (1992, p. 247) points out that usually the value (earnings potential) of a person is much more than the levels specified in the Torah, and had the Torah not set limits a person would have had to donate more money. Thus, the valuation levels in the Torah is to set maximum levels that a person can donate in lieu of him or herself. Proof of this idea is that after the list of valuation levels, 27:8 records that if a person cannot afford the levels in the Torah, then the priest estimates what the person can afford and this lower amount is sufficient. This shows that really one can give less, but nobody can give more. This means that the donation levels in 27:3-7 are maximums levels.

The maximum levels are to ensure that a person is not impoverished by the donations, and the levels then are based on the person’s ability to pay. A person has the largest ability to pay during the ages 20-60, and accordingly this category has the highest donation level. After this category the level of donations drop significantly. The next highest level is from 5-20 years, where the donation by a man is 60% less than for the years 20-60. This is because the level of income is lower for this age group. For the 60 years and over age category not only is the income lower than for the 20 year until 60 years age category, but also there is less hope of future income so here the donation level is also lower than by the 5 years until 20 years age category. In the case of one month to 5 years, the person has no income at all, but as pointed out by Rashi (on 27:5) the person doing the donating is an adult who is donating based on a child. Presumably the person would be “donating” their children, and as one could “donate” many children, the Torah made the donation level the smallest again to reduce the possibility that one would become impoverished by many of these donations. This fear of a person being impoverished by these donations can also explain why the valuation rate for women is less than for men. Historically (and still today) women have earned less money than men, and would thus be less able to donate the same amount as men. Thus to protect women from their greater danger of becoming impoverished from the donations the Torah set a lower limit for women. Even if in the future women will have equal earnings with men, still the laws are for all time and had to protect women when they earned less.

The differences in the ratio of the donation levels of men and women over the years is because of the desire to have donations end with a 5 or 10. My guess is that the determining age group was the 20 years until 60 years age category since not only was this the first age category recorded in the Torah, but also these are the years when the donations are most likely to be made. Once the ratio was 5/3 in this group, then all the groups followed this ratio either exactly (the one month until five years age category) or closely. By the 5 years until 20 years age category, the woman’s donation should have been 12 shekels to maintain a ratio of 5/3 but the Torah set the value at 10 to have the donation level be at the round number 10. Similarly, by the 60 years and over age category group, the woman’s donation level should have been 9 to keep the ratio of 5/3 but again the Torah used 10 since this is a round number.

The last question would be why should the ratio be 5/3 for the age category of 20 years until 60 years? Here one can only surmise. Again to help women who have earned less money than men historically, the Torah set their donation levels lower than men, but the question is how much lower? If the ratio (man/woman) was 2 (for example 50/25), then one might have claimed (as the Abravanel did) that a woman’s value was half of a man’s. In order to negate this possibility, the Torah set a higher value to women and hence a lower ratio between men and women, and the next highest level based on the donation being a 5 or 10 digit was a ratio of 5/3 or 1.66 (50/30).

Vayikra 20:27 – Ghostbusters

Vayikra 20:27, the last verse in parashat Kedoshim, records, “And any man or woman who has within themselves a ghost or a familiar spirit is to be killed by stoning.” (Are ghosts unfamiliar or scary spirits?)

20:27 is difficult for two reasons. One, the placement of this verse is difficult since it appears after the concluding sentences of chapter 20, 20:22-26, but also it is not part of the next chapter that begins with the phrase, "G-d spoke to Moshe," 21:1. A possible answer is that Devarim 18:11 refers again to this prohibition and Devarim 18:13 records that one is to be tamim with G-d. While the word tamim in Devarim 18:13 is understood to mean that a person should be whole with G-d and not turn to ghosts or spirits, still the literal idea of tamim is to be physically whole. In the following chapters in the book of Vayikra, 21:16-23 records the law of the priest who is physically blemished, and 22:19,21 refers to being tamim by the sacrifices, that one cannot offer a blemished sacrifice. Thus, maybe 20:27 is connected with the ensuing laws through the idea of being tamim by not turning to ghosts and spirits and that both the priests and the animals being sacrificed have to be physically whole.

A second difficulty in 20:27 is that this law of a person attempting to contact ghosts or spirits is mentioned twice within chapters 19,20. 19:31 records that one should not turn to ghosts or familiar spirits since they cause one to become tamei, and 20:6 records that if one turns to these ghosts or familiar spirits, then the person receives the punishment of karet. The fact that the Torah repeats this injunction in 20:27 is not surprising because people need to understand the severity of not turning to ghosts and spirits, as apparently many people believed (still?) in ghosts and spirits. However, why in 20:6 is the punishment for turning to ghosts and spirits karet, while in 20:27 it is death by stoning? Several answers have been suggested to answer this question. 

Rashi (on 20:27) explains that 20:6, where the penalty is karet, is the case where the person willfully turned to ghosts or spirits, but was not warned about the prohibition. On the other hand, 20:27 is the case where the person turned to ghosts and spirits when he or she was warned and there were witnesses that saw the person violate this law. Similarly, Ibn Ezra (on 20:27) writes that 20:27 is dealing with the case where one turns to ghosts or spirits publicly.

Abravanel (on 20:27, 2005, p. 224) notes that 20:27 records the phrase “within themselves,” which leads him to suggest that 20:27 is referring to a person who claims that the ghost or spirit is within him or herself. I understand the Abravanel to mean that 20:6 differs from 20:27 that 20:6 (also 19:31) is the prohibition for a client, a person who goes to another person for that person to make contact with ghosts and spirits and who would then act based on the information “learned” from this contact, while 20:27 is referring to the “service provider,” of the client who (pretends) makes the actual “contact” with the ghost and spirits, and who does not necessarily act based on this “contact.” For example in the case of Shaul and the witch of Endor, Samuel I 28:3-25, Shaul was the client as he went to the witch, the “service provider” in order to use her “powers” so that he could speak to Shmuel’s ghost. According to this understanding of 20:6,27, Shaul would have violated 20:6 and the witch who made the contact would have violated 20:27. The difference in penalties in the verses is that 20:27 records the death penalty for those people who claim to make contact with ghosts and spirits since killing them would end the problem of people turning to ghosts and spirits since then there would be no more “service providers” (see also Shemot 20:27), while the penalty of karet would be for the clients. (Note, in this field of making contact with ghosts and spirits, there are many fewer people who are “service providers” than there are clients.) This understanding of 20:27 also suggests an answer to the first difficulty of 20:27.

20:27 is clearly connected to chapters 19,20 based on 19:31 and 20:6, but now we can suggest another reason how it can be related to the ensuing chapters. As suggested above, 20:27 is referring to the person who pretended to contact the ghosts and spirits and in many societies this person was (is?) frequently thought of as being a religious figure. The ensuing laws, 21:1-22:16 record laws relating to the priests. The priests are the legitimate religious figures in contrast to the people who claim to speak to ghosts and spirits who are illegitimate religious figures. Thus, 20:27 rules out the illegitimate religious figures, who are to be killed, and then chapter 21 continues with a discussion of the laws concerning the true religious figures. Similarly, Devarim 18:1-8 records laws about priests and Levites, Devarim 18:15-22 records the laws of the prophets, and sandwiched between these two sections, Devarim 18:9-14, records the prohibitions of magicians and people who turn to ghosts and spirits. Again, the Torah contrasts the legitimate religious figures with the illegitimate religious figures. Vayikra 20:27 would then be a connecting sentence between chapters 19 and 20 (also chapter 18 which is part of the same unit as chapters 19 and 20) and the following chapters, 21 and 22.

Bibliography:

Abravanel (Abarbanel), Yitzhak, (1437-1508), 2005, Commentary on Vayikra, Jerusalem: Horev.

Commentary on Haggadah 2019 version is now available

Hello,

The 2019 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (70 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions.  Below is the table of contents to enable people to check how this version differs from previous versions.  The numbers are the page numbers in the file. If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file.  I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein  

Introduction to the Haggadah  p.    3

Bedikat hametz p.             3

Two systems: Burning and annulling p.       3

Hiding bread in the house before doing the bedikat hametz p.       4

The blessing on bedikat hametz p.             5

The Seder plate p.             6

The history of the Seder plate  p.    6

How many matzot? p.        11

The mnemonic of the Seder p.       12

Kiddush p.             13

The four cups of wine  p.    13

The four words or verses of redemption (parshanut) p.     14

Leaning p.             15

Karpas p.   17

Why is karpas part of the Seder? p.            17

How much karpas is one to eat?  p.             18

Dipping the karpas  p.         19

Yachatz and ha lachma anya  p.       20

Maggid  p.  23

The obligation to re-tell the story of the exodus from Egypt p.        23

Structure of the Maggid  p.             25

Mah nishtanah: Covering the matzah by the mah nishtanah  p.       25

Mah nishtanah: Popularity and source  p.    26

Mah nishtanah: Who says the mah nishtanah?  p.   27

Mah nishtanah: How many questions compromise the mah nishtanah? p.  28

Mah nishtanah: The order of the mah nishtanah?  p.           29

Mah nishtanah: The answers  p.     29

Lowly states: We were slaves and our forefathers were idolaters  p.           31

The four sons: Why four? p.           32

The four sons: How can one identify the traits of each son? p.         33

The four sons: The answers to evil son’s question  p.          33

The four sons: The answer/ statement to the son who cannot ask a question p.     34

The four sons: Two plus two p.      34

The drush: Introduction p.             35

The drush: Connections between the mikra bikurim and other verses in the Torah p.         35

The drush: Arami oved avi (parshanut) p.   36

The drush: Va-yered Mitzraymah  p.           37

The drush: And the Egyptians with evil intent treated us harshly (parshanut) p.      37

The drush: We cried to G-d (parshanut) p.             39

The drush: And G-d saw our affliction and our burdensome suffering (parshanut) p.          40

The drush: And G-d took us out Egypt (parshanut)  p.         41

The drush: The plague of the firstborn (parshanut)  p.         42

The drush: Sixteen drops  p.           42

The drush: The ten plagues  p.        44

The drush: Dzakh adash beachav (parshanut) p.     44

R. Yosi ha-Galilee, R. Eliezer and R. Akiva  p.            46

Dayenu  p.             46

Rabban Gamliel  p.             47

Matzah (parshanut)       p. 48

Maror p.    49

Dividing Hallel p.    51

Differences between Hallel all year round and by the Seder p.       52

The blessing at the end of the Maggid p.    52

Matzah  p.  54

How much matzah does one need to eat by the Seder?p.             54

Shemurah matzah p.         55

Charoset p.           57

Eating eggs by the beginning of the meal p.            59

Afikoman p.          60

The history of the term afikoman p.           60

Eating the afikoman before midnight p.     62

Shefokh hamatcha p.         63

Conclusion of Hallel in the Haggadah p.      65

Songs at the end of the Seder p.    66

Bibliography p.      68

Vayikra Chapters 13,14 - Tsara`at by a person

Vayikra chapter 13 records the details of the tumah of the person (and clothing) with tsara`at. Regardless of the exact definition of the term tsara`at, why or how is this phenomena related to tumah? And, why does the Torah record a process of a person becoming tamei and then tahor by this ailment more than other sicknesses that people have?

One understanding of tsara`at is that it was a disease, which required quarantine to stop the spread of the disease. Similarly, tsara`at of clothing required the clothing to be either washed or burnt (13:47-58) since this disinfects the clothes from the disease (see Hertz, 1960, p. 459). With this approach, the tumah is due to the person or the clothing having this disease. Following this approach, Dunin and Sutcliff write (1992, p. 15) that “Hebrew medicine excelled in the area of public health,” see also Rambam (Moreh 3:47) and Ralbag's interpretation of chapters 13 and 14.

Many commentators were bothered by this approach because it makes the Torah into a health manual. S. R. Hirsch (comments at the end of chapter 13) has a lengthy discourse against this public health approach. Amongst the questions he raises is that 13:12,13 record that if the entire body has tsara`at then the person is tahor. Yet, if the reason for the tumah is because tsara`at is a disease so if the person has tsara`at on all the body he should certainly be tamei. Also by tsara`at in the house, 14:36 record that one is to empty the house before the priest declares it tamei. Yet if tsara`at is due to disease, why allow the house to be emptied if the items might contain the disease?

Accordingly, it has been suggested that tsara`at is punishment for some sin. The Talmud (Arakhin 16a) quotes Rav Shmuel ben Nachmani in the name of Rav Yochanon that there are seven sins that are due to tsara`at: loshen hara (slander) murder, perjury, sexual immorality, pride, robbery and unkind selfishness. Preuss (1993, pp. 337,338) notes that even more sins have been proposed in the Talmud and the Midrash. Of all the sins, traditionally the most prominent was that tsara`at occurred because a person spoke loshen hara, slander (see Sifra 5:7 and Talmud Arakhin, 15b, 16a). The Talmud (Arakhin 16b) explains that just as slander causes people to separate, the slanderer must also be separated from people.

Why is slander usually singled out as the cause of tsara`at? Avot de-Rav Natan (9:2,3) has an extensive discussion of the negative consequences of loshen hara. First, it notes that the people had many sins in the desert, but they were only punished for the sin of the spies, which was because the spies slandered the land of Israel. Afterwards, it discusses Miryam's and Aharon's slander of Moshe, and Miryam was punished with tsara`at, Bemidbar 12:1-10 and Devarim 24:9. Afterwards, it quotes Rav Shimon Ben Elazar who notes the connection between tsara`at and slander from the story of Gehazi (Kings II, 5:27). One other case, not in Avot de-Rav Natan, is that Rashi (on Shemot 4:6) writes that Moshe had temporary tsara`at as a punishment because he spoke ill of the Jewish people, Shemot 4:1,6.

Meir Gruzman (1997) notes that there are other cases in Tanakh (Shmuel I 22, Kings 1,19 and Isaiah 6) where he believes there is also slander but no mention of tsara`at. He suggests that tsara`at occurs because of slander, but not all the time is slander punished with tsara`at. He argues that slander is only punished with tsara`at when a person speaks a complete falsehood. Thus, he argues Moshe said the people would not listen, when in reality this was false since the people would listen to Moshe.

Notwithstanding the popularity of this explanation for tsara'at, I have never liked it for several reasons. One, I assume that people today are pretty much like people of yesteryear, and if in modern times, loshen hara, slander is rampant, so then in olden times there would have been a large number of people with tsara`at. More people could have been outside the camp, than inside the camp! Maybe people would have realized the consequences of loshen hara and then not spoken it, but from Jeremiah 9:3,4 and Psalms 12:3-5 it seems that slander was as common in olden times as it is today. Two, even though slander is a terrible sin, I cannot accept that it is worse than murdering a person. Why would G-d choose to intervene in the world for the sin of slander but not for murder? If tsara'at would be for murderers, then the murderer's skin would change, and then murderers could easily be identified and apprehended. Three, why does the priest not warn the person to repent from his ways instead of just telling him to wait another seven days to see if the tsara'at spreads (13:4,5)? Four, the case of the person who is completely covered with tsara'at but is considered as being pure, 13:12,13, remains inexplicable, as according to this approach that tsara'at is due to sin, this person should certainly be tamei.

In a fascinating article, Rav Soloveitchik (1933) argued that Miryam was punished with tsara`at because Miryam was denying the uniqueness of Moshe as a prophet, when she claimed equal status with Moshe. One of the fundamental ideas in our faith is that Moshe received the Torah from G-d and was able to transmit the Torah to the Jewish people since he was the greatest prophet, see Shemot 14:31 and 19:9. Miryam was then punished for contributing to a lack of faith in G-d and the Torah and not due to slander.

This understanding of Miryam's sin suggests that maybe tsara`at is a religious punishment when someone says something that might reduce other people’s faith in G-d or the Torah. With regard to Moshe getting tsara’at, it is not clear that Moshe was being punished since the tsara`at was only a demonstration and very temporary. Yet, if one believes that Moshe was punished by the tsara`at, then maybe it was because by refusing to take the people out of Egypt, Moshe was contributing to a lack of faith in G-d. (This idea could also explain why Gehazi was punished with tsara`at since his actions could have reduced Naaman’s faith in G-d.) According to this idea, maybe a person with tsara`at has to leave the camp in order to isolate the person so that he/ she could not influence other people’s faith in G-d and the Torah or to give the person time to contemplate and return to G-d. Also, this idea accords with the idea that tumah represents a potential estrangement from G-d, which in this case would be due to the person's issues of faith.

A different approach to tsara'at is to recognize that while some people are punished with tsara'at, this does not mean that everybody who has tsara'at has sinned. Thus, the tsara'at is not a sign that a person has sinned, but that a person has a physical ailment that his/ her skin is marked somehow. These marks are probably not contagious or a sign of any sickness. What then can be the reason for this tumah? Maybe the purification process of the metsora suggests a way to understand the metsora's tumah.

The purification process of the metsora involves two stages. The first stage is that two birds are taken, and the blood of one bird is sprinkled on the metsora, while the second bird is sent free, 14:4-7. After this ritual the person is tahor, 14:8, but he/ she undergoes another ritual the following week. In the second ritual, blood is sprinkled on the person just like what was done with Aharon and his sons when they were invested as priests, 14:14 and 8:23,24. Afterwards, oil is poured on the same spots on the former metsora as was the blood, and then more oil is poured on the former metsora's head, 14:17,18. This appears to be more oil than was done with Aharon whose his head was poured with oil when he was invested as the high priest, 8:12, and more than when Aharon and his sons with their priestly clothing were sprinkled with oil, 8:30. Furthermore, before the oil was poured on the former metsora's head, the oil was sprinkled before G-d, 14:17. This pouring of oil on the former metsora's head is surely very significant, and generally oil is sprinkled as a way to consecrate the item or person. This sprinkling of oil suggests that the end of the process, the former metsora has a superior status, equal or even greater than the high priest!

With this understanding, we can view the metsora process in a positive perspective. A person has various skin ailments, which are not harmful physically, but psychologically the person could feel alienated from society and/ or from G-d. For example, Luzzatto (on 12:2) writes that in ancient times, a bodily disfigurement was considered a sign that G-d was angry at the person.

The person with these spots then goes before the priest, the religious representative, who either tells the person that he/ she is tahor or tamei. If the person is tahor, then that should improve his/ her self-confidence, even if he/ she still has tsara’at as when the tsara’at just stopped from spreading, 13:6. On the other hand if the person is tamei, then he/ she goes through a difficult process of moving outside the camp and shaving the body, but he/ she returns as a new person with a status equal or higher than the priests. This should certainly boost the person’s self-confidence and should move the person to be closer to G-d.

This positive approach might explain the case where a person is completely covered with tsara’at but is considered tahor, 13:12,13. In this case, there is no way to make this person tahor later on if he/ she is declared tamei because how can one say the tsara’at has not spread? Instead, if the idea is that tsara`at is meant to be helpful to the person, then this person is told that he/ she is tahor.

This lesson by the metsora would apply to all people that a person's look are not important with regard to their relationship with G-d. All people, even people who think of themselves as being unattractive can be closer to G-d than the high priest.

Shemot 35:4-40:33 – The repetition of the details of the building of the mishkan

Shemot 35:4-40:33 record the details of the construction of the mishkan. These details were already recorded by the instructions to build the mishkan, 25:1-31:11. Why was it not sufficient for the Torah to simply say the people did as Moshe commanded?

Nehama Leibowitz (1976a, pp. 644-653, see also Josipovici, 1988) reviews various answers to this question. She quotes the Ramban (on 36:8) that the repetitions “reflect the love and esteem with which the mishkan was viewed by G-d, the numerous recapitulations being designed to increase the reward of those engaged in (the study of) it.” However, she is not satisfied with this answer, and she wonders, “Why should this particular narrative be more highly valued than those conveying the very fundamentals of Judaism?” For example, was the mishkan more esteemed than the korban pesach? By the korban pesach, the Torah records all the instructions and afterwards just records that the people did as commanded, 12:28, without detailing all of their actions. A second approach is from the Ralbag (comments after chapter 40) and Cassuto (1967, p. 453) that the repetitions are just following the literary style of ancient times. N. Leibowitz is not satisfied with this approach and instead she prefers Moshe Mendelssohn’s approach in the Biur, who suggests that just as man dedicates his first fruits to G-d, so too the work in the mishkan represents the Jewish people’s “first fruits of their thoughts and abilities.” N. Leibowitz concludes that the repetition “was done in order to stress the symbolic significance of each detail, the dedication of each labor to G-d in preparation for life in the Promised Land.”

A different approach is that the repetitions have two messages and this can be seen by dividing the repetitions into two sections. The first section is from 35:4-36:7, and focuses on the donations to the mishkan, while the second section is from 36:8-40:33, and focuses on the actual construction of the mishkan.

The first section, 35:4-36:7, can be further divided into four smaller sub-units. The first of these sub-units, 35:4-19, records Moshe’s request to the people to donate materials to the mishkan, and includes a repetition of the list of the components of the mishkan including a mention of the priests’ clothing, 35:11-19. The Ramban (on 35:5) points out that the people had to be told this information before they were asked to make donations, as otherwise they would not have known what to donate, and usually when people know what the donations will be used for they give more generously.

The second sub-unit of the first section is 35:20-29 records in detail all the donations of the people. The third sub-unit of first section is 35:30-36:1, records the appointments of Betzalel and Oholiav to be in charge of building the mishkan. This seems to essentially repeat 31:1-11, but this is the first time the people are hearing about Betzalel and Oholiav. The people had to hear that G-d selected Betzalel and Oholiav in order that they would accept them as being in charge, and 36:1 records that everybody worked together. The fourth sub-unit is 36:2-36:7, which records that Moshe found out that the people had donated more materials than were needed for the mishkan, and he told them to stop donating.

The point of the section from 35:4-36:7 is the bigheartedness of the people in their donations to the mishkan. As noted by the Midrash (Shemot Rabbah 48:6, see also N. Leibowitz, pp. 666-668) through these donations the people expiated their sin by the golden calf. The people had donated gold to the make the golden calf, and the people redeemed themselves by donating much greater quantities of metals and other materials to the mishkan. This lesson was so important that the Torah had to dwell at length on the donations, as it does by the donations of the people after the war with Midyan, Bemidbar 31:25-54. This lesson might have been missed if the Torah simply stated that the people donated what they had been asked to donate. (Note even though the donations to the mishkan expiated the sin of the golden calf, this does not mean that the mishkan itself was because of the sin of the golden calf, see our discussion on 30:1-10, "The barriers arise," https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2011/02/shemot-301-10-tetsavveh-barriers-arise.html)

The second large section is from 36:8-40:33 and can be further divided into five sub-units. One, 36:8-38:20 records the construction of the items and the walls of the mishkan. Two, 38:21-31, gives an accounting of the metals used in constructing the mishkan. Three, 39:1-32, records the making of the priests’ clothes. (Note, 39:1 is a connecting sentence between the accounting section of 38:21-31 with the making of the priest’s clothing, as it gives an accounting of the dyes used to make the priests’ clothing.) Four, 39:33-43 records that after all the items of the mishkan were finished the people brought them to Moshe. (Are 39:32 and 39:43 bookends?) Five, 40:1-15 records, for the first time, G-d’s instruction to Moshe to assemble the mishkan and 40:16-33 records that Moshe fulfilled these instructions. Note, 40:16 functions both as a concluding sentence to the instructions that they were fulfilled and as an introduction to 40:17-33, which records in detail how Moshe followed the instructions. Also, 40:16-33 does not record that Moshe fulfilled all of G-d’s instructions in 40:1-15, as some of this fulfillment is recorded in Vayikra chapter 8 and some in Bemidbar chapter 7, see our discussion on 40:1-33, “The anointing of the mishkan” (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2010/03/shemot-401-33-pekudei-anointing-of.html).

One phrase that appears repeatedly in the section 36:8-40:33 is "he built" or "they built." This suggests that the crucial aspect of the repetition is to stress the work that was done. This section focuses on the work of the people, and the last sub-unit even records that Moshe, the man who came closest to G-d of any human being, also participated in building the mishkan. The fact that the Torah records with such details the building of the mishkan must surely indicate the importance the Torah attaches to this activity. Thus, Ramban (end of comments on 36:8) explains that the Torah recorded the details of the people’s work to show how much G-d desired their work.

Rabbi Tarfon (end of 1st century) made this same point regarding the importance of work from a different perspective. He stated (Avot de-Rav Natan, 11:1) "Even the Holy One, blessed be He, did not cause His Presence to dwell in Israel until they had performed some work (translation from Cashdan, 1965, p. 67). Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1990, pp. 85,91) explains that the “dwelling” of G-d came about as the result of the work of men since there was no overt Divine intervention or miracles in the construction of the mishkan.

Furthermore, there are several literary connections between the mishkan and the creation of the world both by the instructions to build the mishkan and by the conclusion of the building of the mishkan. With regard to the instructions, they can be divided into seven sections based on the opening phrase, G-d spoke to Moshe, 25:1, 30:11, 30:17, 30:22, 30:34, 31:1 and 31:12, see Sarna, 1999, p.201. The seventh section discusses the laws of Shabbat and references the creation of the world, 31:17. The sixth section records the appointment of Betzalel and Oholiav to build the mishkan, and this corresponds to the sixth day of creation since in both cases the focus is on humankind. There is even a similarity between the blessings, as on the sixth day man is created in the image of G-d, Bereshit 1:27, and 31:3, within the sixth section, records that G-d filled Betzalel with the spirit of G-d.

With regard to the completion of the mishkan, Cassuto (1883-1951, pp. 476, 477, 483) points out four parallels between the mishkan and the creation of the world. One, 39:32 records that all the work of the mishkan was completed and this is similar to Bereshit 2:1 which records that on the seventh day, the world was completed. Two, 39:43 records that “Moshe saw all the work” and this seeing is reminiscent of the seeing of G-d by creation, Bereshit 1:31. Three, 39:43 also records that Moshe blessed the people, which parallels that G-d blessed the seventh day after the creation of the world, Bereshit 2:3. Four, 40:33 records that Moshe completed the work, which is parallel to Bereshit 2:2 that on the seventh day G-d completed His work in creating the world.

The creation of the world and the building of the mishkan are the two great creative acts in the Torah, the first by G-d and the second by mankind. These literary connections between these two acts indicate the importance of the work of the Jewish people in building the mishkan.

Accordingly, maybe the point of the section, 36:8-40:33, is to emphasize the importance of working and creating. The mishkan is the great building project of the Torah where the people took all the different materials and fashioned them into a purposeful construct. The building of the mishkan was a fulfillment of the prime directive to humankind to conquer the world in Bereshit 1:28. The building of the mishkan is the only, or the best opportunity, in the entire Torah to stress this point, and this lesson would have been lost if the Torah had merely stated the people did as they were commanded without recording all the details of the work.