Shemot 3:11-4:24 - Moshe’s hesitancy to take the Jewish people out of Egypt

Shemot 3:11 records that Moshe did not jump on G-d’s offer to take the people out of Egypt, and instead Moshe stated that he was not worthy of being the emissary. G-d did not take no for an answer and told him not to worry since G-d would accompany him, 3:12. Moshe continued with three other questions, which G-d answered, 3:13-4:12. However, Moshe continued in his refusal and stated that G-d should send whoever He wanted, 4:13. Moshe was no longer giving any excuses, but declining the mission. G-d was now angry and Moshe was not given a choice, 4:14-24, see our discussion on 4:24-26, “Moshe and Tzippora by the inn”  It is interesting that Moshe never officially agreed to go on the mission, just like the people had to be forced to leave Egypt, 6:1,12:33.

Why did Moshe not want to go on the mission to free the Jewish people from Egypt? Was he just being modest? Or, did he not want to be the leader of the Jewish people?

The answer is that Moshe was atypical of leaders of nations. Leaders are self-motivated to become leaders. This drive comes about due to their ego or because of their belief in their particular cause. Moshe initially did not have this self-motivation, but why did he not respond more positively to G-d’s request? Was it just his sense of humility? Why was he not concerned about the fate of the Jewish people? Also, one would also have thought that the honor of being chosen by G-d and the opportunity to be G-d’s messenger would be enough of a reason to accept the mission. Yet, Moshe clearly did not want to go on the mission. Here goes for some speculation for why Moshe did not initially accept G-d’s request for him to take the Jewish people out of Egypt.

One possibility is that initially Moshe did not fully comprehend G-d’s power, and he might have thought that the mission would fail, as he stated after his first encounter with Pharaoh, 5:22,23. Also, afterwards G-d told Moshe that the people who were seeking his life were dead, 4:19, which indicates that Moshe was worried that he could die from the mission, though maybe this was just an excuse for Moshe. With this approach, the miracles of the burning bush (3:2) and the three signs (4:2-9) were not enough to convince him of G-d's powers. Could this be?

A second possibility is that Moshe's hesitancy was due to his feelings for the Egyptian royal family, if not to Pharaoh. We see from the reason for the name of Moshe’s son, Gershom, that Moshe thought of Egypt as being his home, 2:22. With this approach, Moshe would have realized that taking the Jewish people out of Egypt would have meant using force against Egypt (3:20), and maybe he did not want to destroy the people and the home where he had grown up.

Also, with this approach, Moshe was not sure of his ultimate loyalty: To the Jewish people or to the Egyptian royal family? I once suggested this in a class, and my daughter Talia and Annie Rosen suggested, that maybe because of this problem, G-d responded that Aharon your brother was coming to meet you, 4:14, to stress that his true identity was with the Jewish people, his family. In addition, the actions of the Jewish taskmasters who yelled at Moshe (and Aharon, 5:20,21) might have helped sway Moshe to identify with the Jewish people and not the Egyptians. 

A third possibility is that while Moshe did not have much feelings for the Egyptian royal court he also did not have enough feelings for the Jewish people. All decisions are based on cost/ benefit analysis and maybe Moshe thought that the cost of the mission was greater than the benefits. The costs were a huge amount of work, separation from his family for a long period of time, and possibly the loss of a comfortable life in Midyan. The benefits would be the feeling that he helped save the Jewish people from slavery. However, that feeling would only be powerful enough to overcome the costs involved if Moshe felt a strong connection with the Jewish people. Did Moshe initially have this strong emotional bond? Maybe not. Moshe had been raised separate from the Jewish people and had lived outside of Egypt for many years. Also, maybe his bad encounter with the two Jewish men fighting, 2:13,14, soured him on his feelings towards the Jewish people. Therefore, for Moshe to want to be the leader of the Jewish people it was necessary for him to develop an emotional attachment to the Jewish people, and this is what occurred in chapter five through the intentional failure of his first mission to Pharaoh and the criticism by the taskmasters. 

Bereshit 34:25-35:5 - The brothers of Dina go amok

Bereshit 34:2 records that Shekhem took (raped?) Dina, Yaakov’s daughter. Afterwards, he decided that he loved Dina, and his father Hamor made a deal with Dina’s brothers (also Yaakov?) that they would agree to the marriage if the all the men in the town of Shekhem would circumcise themselves, which they did, 34:3-24. 34:25-28 then record that on the third day after the men of Shekhem circumcised themselves, Shimon and Levi massacred the male population of the town and Yaakov’s sons pillaged the town. Note, as I discuss on 34:1-35:5, "How old was Dina when Shekhem wanted to marry her?" I believe that Yosef and probably also Yehuda were not living with the family at this time, and hence they were not involved in the plunder of the town.

A side point: 34:29 adds that as part of this plunder of the town, the sons of Yaakov took many captives from the town, but we never hear of these captive again. Could this mean that Yaakov forced his children to let the captives go?

How can one understand this massacre and plunder? 34:7 records that Shekhem the son of Hamor had done a nevelah be-Yisrael, a deplorable act, by having sex with Dina. Thus, the Torah condemned his action whether it was technically rape or not, but did he and the men of Shekhem deserve to die and the city be plundered especially after they had made a deal with the sons of Yaakov to circumcise themselves (34:18-24)? Many answers have been suggested to understand the behavior of Shimon, Levi and the other sons of Yaakov.

One: Rambam (Laws of Kings 9:14) writes that the people of Shekhem were guilty of not following the seven laws of Noah, and thus they deserved to die. Their guilt was that Shekhem the son of Hamor had kidnapped Dina (34:26, see below argument by Sternberg) and the people did not act as judges to punish him.

Two: Ibn Kaspi (1278-1340, quoted by N. Leibowitz, 1976, p. 387) argues that 34:27, which records “they (Yaakov’s sons) looted the city which defiled their sister,” implies that all the population of Shekhem were guilty of raping Dina. He writes, “This ends any moral objection since the Lawgiver Himself testifies they all had a hand in the crime.” Furthermore, the fact that the rapist had the same name as the town, Shekhem, also highlights the guilt of the town. Yet, at most the people of Shekhem were accomplices to the rape and kidnapping, did they deserve to die after they agreed to circumcise themselves? Also, the penalty for rape in the Torah is for the rapist to marry the victim, Devarim 22:28,29, which is what Shekhem offered to do, 34:12. It is interesting that this phrase, “which defiled their sister” in 34:27 is stated in reference to the plunder of the city but not in reference to the massacre. This might imply that the plunder of the town was justified since the people of the town were accomplices in some way to Shekhem’s (the son of Hamor) deplorable act but the defilement of Dina did not justify the killing of the men of Shekhem.

Three: The Gur Aryeh (on 34:13, Maharal of Prague, see also Ramban on 34:13) criticizes the Rambam’s approach since the people of Shekhem could not have been responsible for not judging their leader when presumably they were in no position to have done so. He suggests that the episode should be viewed as a war between the people of Shekhem and the brothers of Yaakov, and once there is a war, then the entire population of the town, even those who were not directly involved in the rape were responsible since they were part of the town. This idea might explain why Yaakov’s sons decided to plunder the town, but this war seems to be one-sided since the people of Shekhem thought they made a treaty with Yaakov and his family.

Four: Meir Sternberg (1985, p. 445) notes “that mass slaughter does not balance against rape according to conventional normative scales,” but the goal of the narrative is to make the punishment fit the crime.

One argument for this idea is that 34:26 records that after Shimon and Levi massacred the town, they took back Dina. Sternberg claims that this shows that Dina had also been kidnapped, and by placing this information after the massacre, we see that the people of Shekhem “largely brought down that violence on themselves by seeking to impose their will on Jacob’s family” (p. 468). Yet, as pointed out by Fewell and Gunn (1991) all 34:26 states is that Dina was staying in Shekhem’s house, but we cannot know conclusively that she was detained, as maybe she agreed to stay with him. Or, maybe after the people of Shekhem circumcised themselves, then she went to live with Shekhem following the deal that the brothers of Yaakov made with Shekhem and Hamor.

Sternberg's second argument is from the last verse of chapter 34, 34:31, which records that after Yaakov accused Shimon and Levi of endangering the family, Shimon and Levi defended their actions by claiming “should our sister be treated like a whore?” Sternberg argues that Shimon and Levi acted out of idealism to defend their sister’s honor, and as they are given the last word “- and what a last word!-” (p. 475), this shows that the Torah believes that their action to redress the wrong done to their sister was justified. Yet, how does this idealism accord with their plunder of the city?  Also, as I argue below, they do not have the last word since the last word is Yaakov’s statement in 35:3.

Five: Leon Kass (2003, p. 481) argues that Shimon and Levi were claiming that “their failure to defend their sister’s honor would be tantamount to regarding her as a harlot," as he notes that Roman law did not recognize rape of a harlot as a punishable crime. Yet, defending their sister’s honor did not necessitate killing the male population of Shekhem. Thus, Kass writes (p. 497) that “fair minded readers of the story are left with nagging questions... The potential – in this case - actual extremism to which proper vengeance can grow troubles us." However, he concludes (p. 498), “we are moved by the suggestion that a community culture that will make war to defend the virtue of its women, against a community that dishonors other people’s women, proves itself- by this very fact of its willingness to fight and die for its daughters and sisters- to be not only more fit to survive and flourish but also superior in justice.” This is at best a relative defense of Yaakov’s sons, and going to war when the people of Shekhem agreed to the deal of Yaakov’s sons to circumcise themselves does not seem to be “superior in justice.”

Six: The sons of Yaakov were acting based on the culture of their times. The best proof for this approach is that, as noted by many, this story has many parallels to the Greek story of the sack of Troy by Agamemnon, which was because Paris, the prince of Troy, took/ abducted Helen, the wife of Agamemnon’s brother Menelaus.

Seven: A completely different approach is that there was no justification for the massacre. S. R. Hirsch (1989, p. 523, on 34:25) writes:  "Now the blameworthy part begins, which we need in no wise excuse. Had they killed Shekhem and Hamor, there would be scarcely anything to say against it. But they did not spare the unarmed men who were at their mercy, yea, and went further and looted, altogether made the inhabitants pay for the crime of the landowner. For that there was no justification."

Hertz (1960, pp. 128,129, see also N. Leibowitz, 1976, p. 385) also follows this approach and writes, “the sons of Jacob certainly acted in a treacherous and godless manner.” 

This seventh approach vilifies the brothers, and exonerates Yaakov because he criticized Shimon and Levi both here, 34:30, and in his final testament, 49:5-7.

However, in 34:30, Yaakov only gave a practical reason for why Shimon and Levi should not have murdered the men of Shekhem that their actions had endangered the entire family: “You have stirred up trouble for me, making me stink among the land's inhabitants, among the Canaanite and Perizzite, when I am handful of men. If they gather against me and strike me, I shall be destroyed, I and my household,” (Altar, 2004, p. 193, translation).  Why did Yaakov only give a practical reason when he criticized Shimon and Levi and why did he not respond to their declaration in 34:31?

Prior to trying to understand Yaakov’s statement, it should be kept in mind that even if Yaakov was not sufficiently critical of Shimon and Levi this still would not justify their actions. With that proviso, the most reasonable reason why Yaakov gave a practical reason was because he hoped that this reason would make Shimon and Levi and the rest of his sons understand that they were wrong. Maybe, he thought that if he called them murderers, then for sure they would not listen to him. In addition, maybe he thought that Shimon and Levi would try to justify their killing of the town since they might have claimed that if they just killed Shekhem, then the people of the town would have come after them. Thus, Yaakov was pointing out that this logic did not solve their problem since still the neighboring people could come after them and the family. Also, it could be that while Yaakov was directing his fury at Shimon and Levi, the worst culprits, he still wanted to reproach his other sons who also nullified the agreement with the people of Shekhem by plundering the town. Thus, his statement that “you made me stink amongst the land’s inhabitants” included all of his sons who had participated in making and then breaking the deal with Shekhem, Hamor and the people of Shekhem.

Whatever was Yaakov’s logic, his statement seems to have made no impression, as Shimon and Levi responded by claiming that if they had not killed the town, then they would have made their sister Dina into a whore. How did this statement respond to Yaakov’s statement that they had endangered the entire family? Were they claiming that it was more important to protect Dina’s honor than the lives of the entire family? It seems that Shimon and Levi were so fixated on the family's honor that they were unconcerned about the effects of their actions. Were they depending on miracles? Their lack of concern for the consequences of their actions shows that they were acting irrationally.

In addition, the family's honor had not been impinged. Shekhem had agreed to marry Dina and he and the whole town had circumcised themselves to make a deal with Yaakov and his sons (see Luzzatto on 34:31). Accordingly, Dina was not being treated like a whore. While Sternberg and others believe that Shimon and Levi’s justification for murdering the people of Shekhem shows idealism, their declaration in 34:31 indicates that they had become raving lunatics.

The brother’s desire to kill Yosef, 37:20 (except for Reuven), also contradicts the defense of idealism. Not only do we see a consistent pattern of violence (whether the incident in Shekhem was before or after they expressed their desire to kill their brother), but also, here they claimed to be acting for concern for their sister, while there they were trying to kill their brother? Instead, in both cases, they had become enraged (for different reasons) and this caused to murder or express their desire to murder.

Yaakov understood from Shimon and Levi’s response in 34:31 that nothing he could say would make them comprehend the terrible actions that they had done, and then there was no point for him to respond to their ranting. The idea being that when people are screaming irrationally there is nothing a person can do to answer them. (I have seen this behavior in my lifetime.) Instead, Yaakov waited until his death bed when he criticized their actions on moral grounds, 49:5-7.

In addition, it could be that G-d intervened even before Yaakov had a chance to respond, as 35:1 records that G-d spoke to Yaakov, and we have no idea how soon after the conversation between Yaakov and Shimon and Levi this conversation between G-d and Yaakov transpired.

I think most people think that the incident here ended with Shimon and Levi’s statement in 34:31, but the incident did not end until 35:5 which records that the family left the town of Shekhem and went to Bet-El. This misconception that Shimon and Levi had the last word might because there is a parasha petucha after 34:31, and/ or because in the 13th century, Archbishop Stephen Langton decided that 34:31 would be the last verse in the chapter. If one reads the Torah that that incident ended in 35:5, then it is clear that the Torah is not trying to justify the actions of the brothers of Dina.

35:1 records that G-d told Yaakov to go to Bet-El to offer sacrifices to the G-d who appeared to you when you were running away from Esav. While Rashi (on 35:1) claims that this message was a warning to Yaakov that if he did not offer the sacrifices, then he would suffer more, from 35:3 we see that this was not how Yaakov understood the message.

35:3 records that Yaakov told his family that they were to go to Bet-El, and he would offer sacrifices to the G-d who answered him in his troubles, and who was with him in his travels. What is the reference to “his troubles?” Which troubles? Abarbanel (2007, p. 629) suggests two possibilities: One, the time when he had the fight in the middle of the night and meet Esav or two, the incident in Shehkem with Dina. The first possibility is not possible since in 35:3 Yaakov refers to G-d speaking to him in his troubles, and G-d did not speak to Yaakov after Yaakov fought at night and after Yaakov met with Esav. Instead, in 35:3 Yaakov is referring to G-d speaking to him in 35:1 with regard to his troubles with Dina, his sons and the people of Shekhem, which shows that that the conversation in 35:1 was right after Shimon and Levi shouted in 34:31. In addition, the fact that Yaakov referred to G-d answering him means that the conversation in 35:1 was for Yaakov’s benefit that G-d was telling him to go to Bet-El to help Yaakov. Furthermore, the end of the verse connects this going to Bet-El with G-d’s appearance to Yaakov when he was running away from Esav, and just like in that case, the vision at Bet El was to help Yaakov survive, so too in this case the going to Bet El would be to help Yaakov survive.

The following verse, 35:2, records that Yaakov told his family to remove all of their foreign gods, to purify themselves and to change their clothing. These foreign gods are quite a shock, and most commentators (see Rashi on 35:2) claim that these gods were part of the booty that Yaakov’s children took from Shekhem. This could be true, but it could be that they had these idols from before. The purifying and changing the clothing is similar to the preparations of the Jewish people before the Decalogue, Shemot 19:10, but there the people were to me-kadesh themselves, while here the family was to purify themselves. Also, there the people were to wash the clothing while here the people were to change their clothing. What was the need for this change of clothing here? Was it due to their worship of idolatry or because they needed to atone for their terrible actions by Shekhem?

The next verse 35:3 records that Yaakov told the family that they were to go to Bet El, which could be an explanation for why they had to get rid of their foreign gods or it could be that the removal of the foreign gods was independent of the family going to Bet El. In any event, in this verse, Yaakov first begins by stating that everybody was to go to Bet El, but then he states that only he would offer a sacrifice there. We see again that the going to Bet-El and offering a sacrifice was for Yaakov’s benefit, and should not be thought of as a reward for the terrible actions by Yaakov’s sons since they would not participate at all in the sacrifice. Furthermore, in 35:3 Yaakov stresses (four times) how G-d saved him. Yaakov is trying to make clear that G-d’s saving of the family now by telling them to go to Bet-El was because G-d was saving him and should not be interpreted as G-d acting to save his sons. This statement by Yaakov is the last word in the incident of Dina. Alas, the apologetic readers who defend Shimon and Levi seem to ignore 35:3.

The following verse, 35:4, is that the family gave to Yaakov all of the foreign gods, even their earrings, and Yaakov buried these items by Shekhem. This is the first action of the family since the conversation between Yaakov and Shimon and Levi, and everybody bowed to Yaakov’s authority. One curiosity about this verse is the reference to the earrings. It must be that the earrings had idolatrous figures within them, as otherwise why would Yaakov have to bury them (see Luzzatto on 35:4).

Why did the Torah have to mention the earrings? Once the Torah recorded that Yaakov’s family gave him all of their foreign gods, why is there a need to specify that they even gave him their earrings? The answer is that the verse does not only state that they gave him their earrings but also that they took the earrings from their ears. This reminds us of the Jewish people by the making of the golden calf, who also took off their earrings from their ears to make the golden calf, Shemot 32:2,3. This taking of the earrings from their ears by Yaakov’s family shows that even if the foreign gods were from the booty from Shekhem, they had not just taken the idols but that they had adopted them by attaching them to their ears. Even without this reference to the idolatry of the people by the sin of the golden calf, these earrings show that Yaakov’s family worshiped idolatry in some sense.

The following verse, 35:5, the last verse in the incident with Dina and Shekhem, records that in the aftermath of the massacre, G-d stopped the people who lived around Shekhem from attacking Yaakov and his family. Thus, Yaakov’s fear that he expressed in 34:30 did not happen, but could Yaakov have known that G-d would do a miracle to save him and his family? 

Could one understand that G-d did a miracle to support Shimon and Levi and the brothers of Dina? We already saw from 35:1,3 that the going to Bet-El was for Yaakov and hence G-d’s protection of the family when they went to Bet-El was because of Yaakov, and the members of Yaakov’s family were incidentally protected.  Can one claim that Shimon and Levi worthy of G-d doing a miracle for them? The information from 35:2,4 that Yaakov family had idols precludes this possibility. Specifically, the extra information about the earrings in 35:4 indicates that Shimon and Levi and the brothers were not righteous people who acted in Shekhem out of religiosity and who were worthy of G-d doing miracles for them, but idol worshippers who killed and robbed like regular people sometimes do. G-d would not intervene to save people who worshipped idols but G-d intervened to save Yaakov.

Another proof (if needed) that the Torah disapproved of the murder of the men of Shekhem by Shimon and Levi is that afterwards, in the entire Yosef story, Levi is not mentioned at all, and Shimon is only mentioned incidentally when Yosef locked him up to force his brothers to bring Binyamin to Egypt, 42:24. Yaakov referred to Shimon being locked up, 42:36, but he made no effort to free Shimon. Their silence and anonymity are in contrast to chapter 34 where Shimon and Levi stand out amongst the brothers, and suggest that after what they did to the men of Shekhem they were sidelined in the family and lost any power, prestige they might have had. This would mean that the Torah gave Yaakov the last word, and their fall in the family can be the reason why the incident is recorded altogether since it serves as the background for the rise of Yehuda in the family.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Fewell, Danna Nolan and David M. Gunn, 1991, "Tipping the balance: Sternberg's reader and the rape of Dinah," Journal of Biblical Literature, 110:2, Summer 1991, pp. 193-211.

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Kass, Leon, 2003, The Beginning of wisdom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Sternberg, Meir, 1985, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Camels in the book of Bereshit

Bereshit 12:16 records that Pharaoh gave camels to Avram (Avraham) as a present. Later when Avraham sent his servant to find a wife for Yitzhak, camels are mentioned repeatedly, 24:10-64. Yaakov also had camels, 30:43, 31:17,34, 32:8,16 and camels are referred to when the Yishmaelites took Yosef to Egypt, 37:25. All of these references to camels have been questioned since Albright (1960) claimed that the camel was only domesticated in the land of Israel around 1000-1100 BCE, long after the lives of the patriarchs. This claim has been buttressed by a study from Sapir-Hen and Ben-Yosef (2013) who using radiocarbon dating argue that the first significant appearance of camels in the Aravah Vallay (an area a little north of Eilat) was not earlier than the 10th century BCE. How could Avraham, his servant and Yaakov have had camels?

Before reviewing some of the evidence not referred to in the above studies, it should be mentioned that, as pointed out by Sarna (1989, p. 96), in the book of Bereshit, the camel is not the main animal used for travelling, but rather it was a sign of prestige, as for example Avraham’s servant took the camels to impress the family of the prospective bride to Yitzhak. In the book of Bereshit, when an animal is needed for regular work, then a donkey was used: Avraham travelled to the akedah with a donkey, 22:3, Yosef's brothers travelled with donkeys to Egypt, 42:26, and Yosef sent supplies to his father with donkeys, 45:23.

Landa (2016, p. 107) notes that if the camels were added anachronistically to the Torah, then one would certainly have expected camels to be referred to when the brothers went to Egypt to get supplies and when Yosef sent back supplies. One can add that when Avimelekh gives Avraham presents after abducting Sara, he gave sheep and oxen, but not camels, 22:14. Again if camels were added to the Torah anachronistically, then one would certainly have expected that Avimelekh would have given camels to Avraham just like Pharaoh had given camels to Avraham in similar circumstances. Landa also points out that horses are first mentioned in Egypt when the Egyptians were offering their animals to Yosef to get food, 47:17, but Pharaoh did not give Avraham horses since horses seem not to have yet arrived in Egypt. However, if one claims that camels were added to the Torah anachronistically, then why were horses not added as well?

What is the archeological evidence concerning camels? Bulliet (1975) has an extensive discussion on the history of the camel, and he discusses Albright’s dating of camels. Bulliet notes (pp. 45,56) that the camel was most likely in Somalia between the years 2500-1500 BCE, and "that the domestication process first got under way between 3000 and 2500 BCE,” which is before the time of Avraham. Furthermore, he notes (p. 60) that camel hair was found in a cord in an Egyptian gypsum work from around the year 2500 BCE. Also, a bronze figurine from before 2182 BCE which was on a foundation which had "strong Egyptian influence" appears to have a picture of a camel. In addition, he notes (p. 62) that there are drawings of camels on a pot found in Greece and on a seal found in Crete both of which date to around 1500 BCE. Furthermore, (p. 64) in a list of rations found in a northern Syria, Alalakh, from around the 18th century BCE there is a reference to food for camels. Bulliet concludes (p. 65):

The most satisfactory explanation of this circumstance is that the camel was known because it was brought into the area by traders carrying goods from southern Arabia but that it was not bred or herded in the area. It is worthy of note whereas the citations from the Bible associating camels with Abraham and his immediate descendants seem to fit the generalized pattern of later camel use in the area, they could also fit a pattern in which camels were very uncommon. The largest number of animals mentioned in those episodes is ten, and those ten are probably most of what Abraham had since they were sent with his servant with the apparent intention of creating a sufficiently wealthy impression to entice the father of a woman of good family into letting his daughter cross the desert to marry Isaac. No man, incidentally, is described as riding a camel, only women, who seem to have perched atop camp goods instead of riding in an enclosed women's traveling compartment as was later to be the norm.

This does not mean, necessarily, that Abraham or his descendants were mixed up in the Arabian incense trade, although they lived in such great proximity to the main route from Syria to Arabia that such involvement might have been possible. It means simply that in the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries BCE when Abraham and his immediate descendants appear to have lived, camels were already known in small numbers in the northwestern corner of the Arabian desert the western Arabian trade route branched out to go to Egypt or further into Syria. Local tribes in the area may have owned a few of the animals, perhaps as articles of prestige, without being heavily involved in breeding them….

(pp. 66,67) The probable sequence of events seems to have been that by 2000 BCE incense was reaching Syria with some regularity along the western Arabian land route. Some Semitic speaking tribes saw the potential benefits of this trade and became interested in it at its northern extremity. In Biblical parlance these would be the Ishamaelites who appear in the story of Joseph as traders of incense. Other tribes, probably later, undertook to follow the trade back to its source and this became the nucleus of Semitic settlement in southern Arabia. Again in Biblical parlance these would seem to be the children of Abraham's son Jokshan (Bereshit 25:2, Arabic Yuqtan progenitor of the south Arabian tribes). When the Semites had arrived in sufficient numbers, they overwhelmed the indigenous inhabitants of southern Arabia, and became themselves masters of the land and the incense trade.

 

The entire process, it has been argued, took place without the benefit of camel transport, the camels making their appearance only at a much later date from parts unknown. But it has been demonstrated that the camel was already in use during the period in question and that its probable homeland was southern Arabia. It is much more reasonable, therefore, to assume that the camel was the main carrier of the incense route from the very beginning, or nearly so, and the Semitic tribes came to know the camel in this way in very small numbers. In other words, the presence of camels in the Abraham story can be defended and story treated as primary evidence of camel use without disrupting Albright's contention that camel-breeding nomads did not exist in Syria and northern Arabia at that time.

A short time after Bulliet's study, Compagnoni and Tosi (1978) reported finding camel bones, camel dung and camel hair in ruins of a settlement in southeastern Iran, Shahr-I Sokhta (today province of Sistan in eastern Iran) that dates to around 2500-2600 BCE. They also provide a table (p. 98) which lists findings of camel bones in southern Turkmenia and representation of camels in Kashan (central Iran) from 3000-3500 BCE. They also note (p. 100) that in a finding off the coast of Abu Dhabi "representations in relief on tombstones and osteological finds of camels are dated as early as 2500 BCE, have revealed a convergence between Iran and Oman, in the more highly evolved farming communities, in the domestication process of C. bactrianus (two-humped camel) and C. dromedaries (one humped camel)." They write, (p. 99) "In conclusion, in the third millennium all archaeological evidence points to the fact that the dromedary (one humped camel) occupied an area lying between Oman and Sind (eastern Pakistan) to the east and North Africa and Palestine to the west."

Potts (2004) reviews the presence of the two humped camels in the Middle East (Camelus Bactrianus) and he concludes (p. 161), "in view of the ever increasing body of evidence for ties between Central Asia and Elam (western Iran), and between Elam and Assyria and Mari (eastern Syria on the Euphrates) in the early 2nd millennium BCE (between 2000 BCE and 1500 BCE), it is entirely possible that this was the period in which the peoples of the Near East first became aware of Camelus Bactrianus."

These two findings show that camels would have been known in Haran (northern Syria) when Avraham’s servant came and would explain how Yaakov acquired camels.

A more recent finding is from Steinkeller (2009) who discusses a tablet that has been dated to Ur III period, during the reign of Shulgi (approximately 2094-2047 BCE), maybe 100-200 years before Avraham. The tablet records a gift to the King of Ur of various animals, and Steinkeller (p. 416) writes that there is a "strong possibility that the herbivore (on the tablet) in question is the two-humped Bactrian camel." Avraham was from Ur, and we see that camels existed in his locale. Furthermore, the fact that the camel was given as a gift accords with the references to camels as being animals of prestige in the book of Bereshit.

An even more recent finding is Maria Guagnin et al (2023, p. 2) who write:

A tradition of large, naturalistic camel engravings has recently been documented across northern Saudi Arabia. This tradition is represented at sites such as the Camel Site in Jawf Province, where life-sized camels were carved in high relief. Analyses of the reliefs at this site, coupled with archaeological 

surveys and excavation show that use of the site overlapped with the mid-sixth millennium BCE.

These engravings would indicate that camels lived in northern Saudi Arabia several thousand years before Avraham lived, and from the figures in the article, it looks like the camels were one humped camels. 

Accordingly, these new finds show that camels (one humped and probably two humped) were known and used by humans, though probably not on an extensive scale, and not in all places, in the time of Avraham. Avraham could then have received camels as a gift from Pharaoh, and it was from these camels that his servant had camels to take to find a wife for Yitzhak.

Bibliography:

Albright, William Foxwell, 1960 (first published, 1949), The archaeology of Palestine, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Bulliet, Richard W., 1975, The camel and the wheel, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Compagnoni, Bruno and Maurizio Tosi, 1978, The Camel: Its distribution and state of domestication in the Middle East during the third millennium B.C. in light of finds from Shahr-I Sokhta, in Approaches to Faunal Analysis in the Middle East, edited by Richard H. Meadow and Melinda A. Zeder, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 91-103.

Guagnin, Maria, Ceri Shipton, Finn Stileman, Faisal Jibreen, Malek Al Sulaimi, Paul S. Breeze, Mathew Stewart, Amy Hatton, Nick Drake, Deepak Kumar Jha, Fahad Al-Tamimi, Mohammed Al-Shamry, Mishaal Al-Shammari, Andrea Kay, Huw S. Groucutt, Abdullah M. Alsharekh, Michael Petraglia, 2023, Before the Holocene humid period: Life-sized camel engravings and early occupations on the southern edge of the Nefud desert, Archaeological Research in Asia, Vol. 36, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ara.2023.100483.

Landa, Judah, 2016, Camels in the Bible, Jewish Bible Quarterly, 44:2, pp. 103-115.

Potts, D.T., 2004, Camel hybridization and the role of Camelus Bactrianus in the ancient Near East, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 47:2, pp. 143-165.

Sapir-Hen, Lidar and Erez Ben-Yosef, 2013, The introduction of domestic camels to the southern Levant: Evidence from the Aravah Valley, Journal of the Institute of Archaeology of Tel Aviv University, 40:2, pp. 277-285.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Steinkeller, Piotr, 2009, Camels in Ur III Babylonia, in Exploring the longue durée: Essays in honor of Lawrence E. Stager, edited by J. David Schloen, Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, pp. 415-419.

Bereshit 1:20-30 - The description of creation in the Torah and evolution

Day five: 1:20-23: The creation of organisms that move

1:20 records that G-d said that the waters should swarm with sheretz nefesh chaya and ohf that would fly to penei rekia ha-shamayim. This saying by G-d means that G-d created or caused to evolve organisms that lived in the water and organisms that could fly. I believe that the term nefesh chaya implies movement, which means that the first half of 1:21 is recording the creation of creatures that could move in the water. This could be Cnidarians and/ or Deuterostomes which appeared around 500-600 million years ago. 1:20 then means that the Torah skipped many stages in the development of life. Also, the verse indicates that life began in the water, which corresponds to modern science. Note, this verse seems not to be referring to fish since they would not be considered as sheretzim, crawling organisms, though Rashi (on 1:20) labels the fish as sheretzim. Yet, there is no need for the Torah to mention the creation of every organism, as just a select few are mentioned.

The second half of 1:20 refers to ohf that would fly to penei rekia ha-shamayim. This phrase raises at least two questions. One, what is meant by the term ohf, birds or insects, and two, what does it mean that they could fly to penei rekia ha-shamayim?

Aviezer (1990, pp. 85, 127) suggests that insects (and marine animals) were created on day five and that the day corresponds to the time from approximately 635 million years ago to 250 million years ago. He notes (pp. 82-84) that there were giant insects in the period and that one type of dragonfly had a wing span of 30 inches. The end of the period according to Aviezer was the Paleozoic era, which was marked by a very large extinction. Rashi (on 1:20) also writes that ohf here means flies.

Slifkin (2006, p. 185, footnote 3) critiques Aviezer's chronology for day five since he argues that the word ohf in 1:20-22 refers just to birds and not to flying insects, as Vayikra 11:21 uses the words sherets ohf when the reference is to insects. Also, 1:28 records that mankind was blessed to have dominion over the ohf in the sky and it is doubtful that this blessing was to dominate insects.

A clue to understanding what the term ohf means in 1:20 is to compare it with the term winged ohf in 1:21. The added term winged shows that the ohf in 1:20 and the ohf in 1:21 are different. 1:20 is referring to insects which are not referred to as winged organisms, even though most insects have wings, and 1:21 is referring to the creation of birds, where the wings are more prominent. (See our discussion on 1:6,7; 1:11,12 and 1:14,16, https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/10/bereshit-11-19-bereshit-some-thoughts.html that when the Torah records that G-d spoke and later that G-d created, as in 1:20,21 this is referring to two different acts of creation. Thus, one has to distinguish between the acts of creation of 1:20 with those recorded in 1:21.)

With this understanding, one could still agree with Slifkin that the blessing in 1:28 is referring to birds, and that Vayikra 11:21 is referring to insects. In 1:21 the Torah modified the term ohf to be winged ohf to distinguish the birds from the insects in 1:20, but afterwards the Torah would not have to use this extra term, winged. Instead, ohf becomes birds and when dealing, relatively rarely, with insects, that term is modified to be sheretz ohf.

What does it mean that the insects (or if one wants, birds) could fly to penei rekia ha-shamayim? Above in our discussion on day two, we explained that rakia means either the galaxy or the solar system, but no insects or birds could fly into either the solar system or the galaxy. However, the word penei qualifies the area of their flying, to be either towards the rakia or before the rakia, but 1:20 does not state that they flew into the rakia.

1:21 then records that G-d bara, created, the tanninim ha-gadolim, the nefesh chaya ha-romeset, which the water had swarmed forth of each kind (Altar, 2004, p. 8), and the winged ohf of each kind. What are the tanninim ha-gadolim and what does it mean the nefesh chaya ha-romeset which the water had swarmed forth?

Rashi (on 1:21) explains that the tanninim ha-gadolim were giant fish. Cassuto (1961, pp. 49-51 and Sarna, 1989, p. 10) notes that people have understood tanninim ha-gadolim as being sea monsters, and then the verse states that G-d created these sea monsters to demonstrate that these monsters were under G-d's control. Yet, it is difficult to argue that tanninim ha-gadolim really means sea monsters, unless one believes that sea monsters actually exist or existed. If one does not accept their existence, then it cannot be that the Torah states that G-d created a non-existent animal, even if it is to correct erroneous beliefs. However, I would agree that the Torah uses the word bara, create, because if a person mistakenly believes in sea monsters, and thinks that tanninim ha-gadolim are sea monsters, then the person should know that the sea monsters were created by G-d. (This would be similar to the use of the term azazel on Yom Kippur, see our discussion on Vayikra 16:7,8, "To azazel" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2016/04/167-10-aharei-mot-to-azazel.html.)

Aviezer (1990, pp. 81-86) writes that the tanninim ha-gadolim were aquatic creatures in the Ediacaran period (approximately 635 million years ago to 540 million years) which were large relative to the aquatic creatures in the following period the Cambrian age (approximately 540 million years ago to 490 million years ago). Aviezer quotes from Rashi that the tanninim were killed shortly after they were created and he claims this accords with his identification of the tanninim since the Ediacaran creatures became extinct. (Another possibility according to Aviezer's chronology is synapsids, which were the dominant terrestrial animals, up to ten feet in length, in the period up to the massive extinction at the end of the Paleozoic era.)

Schroeder (1997, p. 193) suggests that tanninim ha-gadolim were dinosaurs since he understands that the word tannin is reptiles, and then dinosaurs would be the biggest or the greatest reptiles. Slifkin (2006, pp. 232, 233) disputes this identification for several reasons. One, he claims that tannin are "serpentine creatures" not "the general category of reptiles," and dinosaurs were not serpentine. Two, he claims that 1:20,21 implies that tanninim ha-gadolim were aquatic creatures, while the "overwhelming majority of dinosaurs were terrestrial." These questions are answerable. If the Torah wanted to refer to dinosaurs, then it is unclear what term would have been more appropriate than tannin since the Torah could not use the word dinosaur, which would have been incomprehensible to all people until the 19th century. Thus, once tannin refers to some reptiles, it could refer to dinosaurs. Furthermore, in 1:21, the tanninim ha-gadolim are distinct from the animals that swarm (romes) in the water, and hence the tanninim ha-gadolim need not be aquatic creatures.

All these suggestions are possible but there exists a simpler explanation. Tanninim ha-gadolim can be referring to large crocodiles, which is the usual definition of the word tannin, as for example in Shemot 7:9-12. In 2005 there was a finding of a large sea dwelling crocodile that lived 135 million years ago, and who was been nicknamed by scientists, Godzilla, see Chang (2005).

What does it mean in 1:21 the nefesh chaya ha-romeset which the water had swarmed forth?  Does the phrase ha-romeset mean that the animals were swarming in the water? With this understanding, the phrase is referring to larger animals from 1:20, such as crustaceans (lobsters?). Or, does the word remes mean all movement in the water, not specifically crawling, and then the reference would include fish.  A support for this is that the same term in Vayikra 11:46 seems to be referring to fish. Another possibility is that the phrase also refers to animals that came from the water, but now were able to crawl on land. With this third possibility, the phrase could be referring to amphibious animals or even early mammals that evolved from animals that had lived at sea.  The final set of animals referred to in 1:21 is winged ohf, which as mentioned above are birds.  The fact that birds are recorded last in the verse might accord with the idea that birds derive from dinosaurs, though of course the order could not be significant.  In any event, both 1:20 and 1:21 are not referring to all animals, but the verses are describing a gamut of animals that were created, from creatures who swarm to creatures who fly, and maybe including creatures that swim.

With regard to the timing of day five, it could be that 1:20 is referring to the Paleozoic era, 540 million years ago to 252 million years ago, while 1:21 is referring to the Mesozoic eras, 252 million years ago to 66 million years ago.

The following verse, 1:22 records G-d's blessing to the animals created on day five. This verse raises two questions. One, this blessing appears after, the phrase "and G-d saw that it was good" (the end of 1:21), but one would have expected the blessing to be before the phrase "and G-d saw that it was good" as occurs in day six, 1:28-31. Two, who is being blessed to fill the waters?

With regard to the first question, maybe the order of the blessing in reference to G-d’s seeing was changed since many of the animals created on day five became extinct. For example, both the Paleozoic and the Mesozoic eras ended with great extinctions. Possibly then when these animals were alive, G-d said that it was good (the end of 1:21) that they had existed, and then after they died, G-d was blessing the survivors of the extinctions that they would continue to exist.

With regard to the second question, many understand the blessing to fill the water to be to the fish, and this would depend on understating the word romeset in 1:21 to refer to fish or that fish are included within the gamut of animals created on day five. Or if one believes that romeset in 1:21 is only to crawling creatures, then one can understand that the blessing in 1:22 with regard to filling the water was to the crustaceans and/ or amphibians, who might be referred to on day five.

To summarize, day five probably refers to the years from 540 million years ago to 66 million years ago, and the dominant animals in this period were the giant reptiles, the tanninim ha-gadolim. In addition, the Torah also refers to the creation of flying insects, birds, and possibly amphibians and small mammals that were early types of rodents.

Day six: 1:24-31: The creation of modern mammals and humans

Day six records two acts of creation. One, the creation of hayyot, behamot and all remes ha-adamah, 1:24,25, and two, humans, 1:26-30. Both of these creations refer to land animals, and this raises a question with regard to the relationship between days five and six of creation. Carl Feit (1990, pp. 31,32) notes that there is some affinity between science and the description of creation in Genesis since in the Torah "these is a gradual ascent from chaos to order, whether from inorganic to organic matter or from lifeless to vegetable or animal matter." However, he notes there are some inconsistencies, as for example the question of how could plant life precede the sun, which we tried to answer at https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/10/bereshit-11-19-bereshit-some-thoughts.html, and how could it be that flying creatures (day five) existed before land animals (day six).

As discussed above, Aviezer attempted to answer this question by claiming that day five only refers to flying insects and flying insects preceded land animals. However, I cannot accept this answer since I think that 1:21 was referring to the creation of birds. There are two other ways to explain how the animals mentioned in day six could have been created after the birds in day five.

One, as mentioned above, 1:21 could be understood to refer to animals that swarmed from the water, and these could be early mammals who left the seas. Thus, mammals would have existed on day five, and birds who are mentioned later in the verse, would have been created after land animals such as those early mammals and other reptiles.

Two, while many understand that 1:24,25 refer to all land animals or all mammals, this is not what the verses state. The verses records that G-d created or caused to evolve chaya nefesh according to its kind: behamot, va-remes and chayot. These are very specific land animals, and the verse is not referring to all mammals that ever existed.

The traditional view (Rambam, Laws of forbidden foods, 1:8, also see Ibn Ezra on 1:24) is that behamot are just ox, sheep and goats. My understanding is that behamot are the class of mammals called ungulates. With either view, the creation referred to in day six is to animals who began to exist way after birds first existed.

With my understating that behamot mean ungulates, 1:24,25 can only be referring to a time when ungulates existed, which was approximately 65 million years ago, the beginning of the Cenozoic era. Furthermore, animals that could eventually be domesticated, such as horses, are even later, approximately 50 million years ago. With the traditional definition of the word behamot, the verses are referring to an even later period, as the Ruminantia suborder, which includes goats and cattle, is estimated to have begun to develop approximately 46 million years ago.

Accordingly, 1:24,25 are then referring only to new types of animals from between 65-46 million years ago until the present. It is not clear what are the other two types of animals in 1:24,25. My guess is that the three categories of creatures in 1:24,25 correspond roughly to the three categories of land animals in Vayikra 11:26-30. One, the behama, Vayikra 11:26, which we just mentioned, two, the chayat ha-aretz is to animals that walk on their paws high off the ground, Vayikra 11:27, and three, the remes would be the types of animals specified in Vayikra 11:29,30, animals that seem to move closer to the ground, like rabbits, shrews, or rodents. These types of animals would be the animals that entered Noah's ark, 7:14, and those that were killed by the flood, 7:21, "modern mammals," as the Torah refers to these animals with the same words used in 1:24. New reptiles could be included in this list as either wild animals or as animals that crawl on the ground, but this would only be reptiles that developed in the last 50 million years. If someone (see Sarna, 1989, p. 11) believes that the word remes in 1:24,25 refers to insects, then still the verse would only refer to new insects from the Cenozoic era.

Consequently, day six of creation refers to the period when mammals became the dominant type of creature on the earth. Mammals existed on day five but their existence is not explicitly recorded or not recorded at all in verses 1:21,22, just like there is no mention of the creation of fish on days five or six, even though fish existed in both of these periods, and their existence is referred to in 1:28. Accordingly, there is no contradiction between the order of the development of animals based on science and that recorded in the Torah on days five and six of creation.

One other question about 1:24,25 is whether the verses are referring to the same act of creation or two separate acts? My inclination is to view the verses as referring to two different events. 1:24, with the word tosei, indicates a more natural process, and would be that G-d caused the natural forces of evolution to work, and then 1:25 refers to G-d intervening in the evolution process since there was a need to ensure that the process would lead to mankind.

1:26,27 refer to the creation of humans, the genus homo, but not specifically to homo sapiens. While mankind is physically similar to all mammals (and all animals) he/ she is intrinsically different since G-d intervened in the evolutionary process to endow him/ her with the image of G-d, "tselem Elokim." The blessings in 1:28-30 are indicative of homo's potential, and it would only be homo sapiens that would later actualize these blessings. This development is recorded in the story of the Garden of Eden in chapters two and three of the book of Bereshit.

We have tried to show that chapter one in Bereshit can be understood to accord with modern scientific theories, modest concordism. The creation of the world could not have been a random process, as based on current scientific theories it is mathematically impossible for the world and humans to have come about randomly. Thus, as some stages G-d intervened in the process to move things along and G-d established the laws of science that enabled the process of evolution to occur. I believe this is what Reuben Gross (quoted in Carmell and Domb, 1978, p. 238) had in mind, when he wrote:

Assuming that the Darwinists have correctly described the mechanism of creation, all they have done is to dis-establish the Creator as mechanic-mason-carpenter of a static world, but at the same time they have unwittingly re-established Him as an engineer-architect, kiv'yochol, of a self-adjusting complex, dynamic world and the Creator or legislator of the fitness standards and rules of adaptability.

A final point is that the interpretations offered here are subject to change based on new developments in parshanut and in science, but it is hoped that they will be persuasive to some of the readers and/ or inspire readers to suggest other interpretations.

Devarim 28:69, 29:3-5 (Ki Tavo) – Full covenantal knowledge of G-d

Devarim 28:69 records that G-d made a covenant with the Jewish people in the land of Moav, or more specifically on the plains of Moav (Bemidbar 36:13, Devarim 34:8), and this covenant was in addition to the covenant that was established at Horev, (Sinai). Why was there a need for another covenant between G-d and the Jewish people?

The most logical reason why another covenant is needed is because the previous covenant had been nullified, and in fact, this might have occurred by the covenant at Mount Sinai. It is possible that the sin of the golden calf nullified the first covenant made at Sinai, and hence a second covenant was made at Sinai, see Shemot 34:10. However, this second covenant (or the first if the sin of the golden calf did not nullify the covenant) at Mount Sinai was never nullified. Even by the sin of the spies (Bemidbar 13,14), the Torah does not mention that the covenant had been nullified. Immediately after the sin of the spies, G-d commanded the people about laws they had to keep in Israel, Bemidbar 15:1-41, which shows that the covenant had not been abrogated. Furthermore, 28:69 explicitly records that the covenant in Moav was in addition to the covenant at Sinai, so why was there a need for another covenant on the plains of Moav?

I believe the most popular answer, based on the views of R. Akiva (Sotah 37b), is that the new covenant on the plains of Moav was not new but was a repetition of the covenant from Mount Sinai since R. Akiva maintains that Moshe was taught all of the Torah when he was on Mount Sinai. However, R. Yishmael argues with R. Akiva and claims that new laws were taught to Moshe after he came down from Mount Sinai. Yet, even if one accepts R. Akiva’s opinion that Moshe was taught all the laws of the Torah on Mount Sinai, this does not mean that he told the people the laws of Devarim until the 40th year.  If Moshe did not teach the people the laws of Devarim, then it is quite amazing that the generation who experienced the Decalogue did not receive the complete Torah.

26:18, 27:9 and 29:12 imply that the covenant on the plains of Moav was to complete the covenant of Sinai, and not just a repetition of the first covenant. These three verses record that the people were going to become G-d's nation on that day. What happened on that particular day? As R. Yehuda (Berachot 63b) asks, “Was it on that day that the Torah was given to the Jewish people?” Ibn Ezra (on 27:9) explains that 27:9 means that on that day the covenant between G-d and the Jewish people was established, and it was the covenant that made the people G-d's nation. Yet, were not the people already G-d's nation since they already had made a covenant with G-d at Mount Sinai forty years earlier? The answer is that the covenant at Sinai was only a partial covenant, and hence the people were not yet fully G-d's nation. Only when both covenants, the covenants of Mount Sinai and of Moav, were established did the people truly become G-d's nation.

29:8,11,13, also imply that some new covenant was established on that day, and not that the covenant on the plains of Moav was just a repetition of the covenant from Mount Sinai. This new covenant was the completion of the covenant that began at Mount Sinai, as stated in 28:69.

If the covenant on the plains of Moav completed the covenant made at Mount Sinai, why did G-d make the first covenant at Mount Sinai a partial covenant, which necessitated an additional covenant? This enters the realm of speculation, but here goes.

Maybe the first covenant at Mount Sinai was only a partial covenant since the goal was to establish the complete covenant in the land of Israel, see our discussion above on 3:23-28, "A private prayer?" However, Moshe was needed to establish the covenant since he was G-d’s messenger to transmit the covenant, and hence once Moshe was unable to enter the land of Israel, 3:27, then the additional covenant could not have been done in Israel. Instead, the covenant on the plains of Moav was established as close as possible to the people's entrance to the land of Israel. In addition, the ceremony on Mount Gerizim and Mount Eval was to take place immediately (27:2,4) when the people entered the land of Israel, and this ceremony was part of the establishment of the covenant of the book of Devarim.   

A second possible explanation for why G-d initially only imparted part of the covenant to the people at Mount Sinai is from 29:3, which records that Moshe told the people “But G-d has not given you a mind (lev) to know, or eyes to see or ears to hear until this day,” (Fox, 1995, p. 987, translation). This verse is perplexing. What was it that the people did not know? Why did G-d not let the people have this knowledge? Also, what was happening that day that would give the people the knowledge that they had been lacking?

I believe the standard explanation of the verse is that the people did not understand G-d due to their intransigence or sins (see N. Leibowitz, 1980, pp. 289-293), but the verse refers to G-d as being the cause of their misunderstanding. Thus, this lack of knowing was not because the people who left Egypt had a slave mentality.

What knowledge did G-d withhold from the people and why? A possible answer is that the withholding was that G-d only partially transmitted the covenant until that day. On this particular day they established the covenant on the plains of Moav, and then the people would have full covenantal knowledge of G-d. 29:3 means that not only did the people lack full knowledge of the covenant until that day, but also they lacked the full ability to comprehend G-d since G-d had not given them the complete covenant.

29:4,5 explain that G-d withheld from the people the complete covenant since they had to undergo the process of living in the desert and depending on the mahn for food every day. Thus, 29:5 ends by stating that the experience of not having real food but living on the mahn was to give the people the knowledge of G-d. The people had to know on a daily basis that their life was dependent on G-d, see 8:3. Also, the people had to know that G-d was with them even if they did not see G-d doing miracles, as the people did not see the mahn when it came down in the nighttime. This process was to teach the people what is means to believe in G-d and this was necessary for the people to be able to receive the complete covenant. Thus, the mahn was to be stored forever to show the people this important miracle, Shemot 16:32. Accordingly, the first covenant at Mount Sinai was not a complete covenant since the people had to experience living based on the mahn until they could receive the complete covenant.

The mahn parallels the ten plagues since both were to give the people a knowledge of G-d, 29:5 and Shemot 9:14-16; 10:1,2. The experience of the ten plagues was necessary for the first part of the covenant at Mount Sinai, and the experience of the mahn was necessary for the second part of the covenant on the plains of Moav.

It could be that the two reasons for why the covenant at Mount Sinai was a partial covenant, the desire to have the complete covenant in the land of Israel and the need for the people to experience the mahn, are complimentary. The people began to receive the mahn on the 15th day of the second month (Shemot 15:1), and they left Mount Sinai, a little more than a year later, on the 20th of the second month, Bemidbar 10:11. (It is striking that the Torah records these days, when it is very sparing with dates, and maybe the reason is that we should know that a year passed from when they first started to get the mahn.) Thus, the people had a year to receive the mahn, which should have been enough time for the lesson of the mahn to be instilled in the people. The covenant that was later established on the plains of Moav was not told to the people at that time since very shortly afterwards they were supposed to get to the land of Israel, and then they could complete the covenant in the land of Israel. However, after the sin of the spies, it was clear that the people needed more time to learn the lesson of the mahn. It is not clear if they needed exactly forty years, but they still had to wait until they were on the verge of reaching the land of Israel. Thus, in the 40th year, when the lesson of the mahn had been instilled in them and they were on the verge of entering the land of Israel, the covenant could be completed on the plains of Moav and the people then had full covenantal knowledge of G-d.

Devarim 4:41-43 - To designate three cities of refuge

Devarim 4:41-43 record that Moshe designated three cites of refuge for the accidental murderer on the eastern side of the Jordan River. This designation is puzzling since it seems to interrupt Moshe's address to the people in chapters four and five. While most commentators (see Rashi on 4:41) understand that Moshe just designated the cities, and hence the designation can also be considered as part of Moshe's speech, still the designation differs from the remainder of chapter four where Moshe exhorted the people to follow all the laws. Why does the Torah record Moshe's designation of the cities of refuge in the end of chapter four? Why did Moshe not do this in Bemidbar 35:9-34 which record the laws of the cities of refuge? Also, Moshe could have designated the cities of refuge in chapter three, 3:1-17, where Moshe discussed the conquest of the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River.

Rashi (on 4:41) quoting from the Talmud (Makkot 10a) and the Midrash (Deuteronomy Rabbah 2:26) writes that Moshe did not want to miss an opportunity to perform a commandment. Thus, even though the cities of refuge on the eastern side of the Jordan River would not function until after the cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River were established, still at least Moshe could designate the future cities. This idea that Moshe would designate the cities even prior to their use is logical, yet this does not explain why the designation is recorded in chapter four.

The Ramban and Seforno (on 4:41) suggest a different rationale. They note that in chapter four Moshe had been exhorting the people to follow the laws and Moshe was about to teach numerous laws to the people. Accordingly, Moshe designated the cities to show the people that he was fulfilling all the commandments that he possibly could. This approach also makes sense, but why did Moshe choose this particular commandment concerning the cities of refuge to demonstrate his ardor to fulfill the commandments?

The Rashbam (on 4:41) offers a compelling reason why Moshe designated the cities of refuge. Bemidbar 35:9-34 record the laws of the cities of refuge, and Bemidbar 35:14 records that there were to be three cities of refuge on the eastern side of the Jordan River, and three cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River. The laws of the city of refuge are recorded again in the book of Devarim, 19:1-11, but in that section there is no mention of the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River. The Rashbam explains that since Moshe referred to these cities in 4:41-43 there was no need to refer to them again in chapter 19. This explanation also makes sense, but again it does not explain the placement of 4:41-43 since Moshe could still have referred to the cities of refuge on the eastern side of the Jordan River in chapter 19 or any point prior to chapter 19.

While each approach on its own has some difficulties, all of them could be combined as follows. Moshe wanted to show his fulfillment of the laws and then he had to perform one commandment, and then he designated the cities of refuge on the eastern side of the Jordan River as an example of his performance of the law and in order to save him from mentioning them in chapter 19.

While this combination approach is possible, my guess is that the designation of the cities of refuge relate to the establishment of the covenant in the book of Devarim, which is the theme of the book of Devarim.  How do the cities of refuge relate to the covenantal theme?

4:5 records, "See, I am teaching you laws and regulations as G-d has commanded me to do amid the land that you are entering to possess” (Fox, 1995, p. 865, translation). We see that the main emphasis of the covenant is the observance of the laws in the land of Israel, but what about those tribes, Reuven, Gad, and Menashe, that were going to live outside the land of Israel proper, were they also part of the covenant? The covenant was binding on the Jewish people before they reached the land of Israel, but maybe some people thought that once the people reached the land of Israel, then only those people living in Israel proper would be part of the covenant. Moshe's declaration of the cities of refuge in the eastern side of the Jordan River, outside of the land of Israel proper, is a statement that the laws and hence the covenant applied outside of the land of Israel proper. Specifically because the cities of refuge on the eastern side of the Jordan River would only function after the land of Israel was settled, Moshe's declaration was informing the tribes of Gad, Reuven and Menashe that they were part of the covenant even after the majority of the population had settled in the land of Israel. Accordingly, the designation of the cities of refuge could be considered as part of the introduction to the establishment of the covenant since it taught that the inhabitants of the East Bank of the Jordan River were also part of the covenant, and then chapter four of the book of Devarim is an appropriate place to record this designation.

Bemidbar 22:23-35 – Bil'am's amazing donkey

Bemidbar 22:22-30 record Bil’am’s interaction with his donkey. (The donkey was a female donkey, a jenny, but we will refer to it as a donkey and not a jenny since it seems that most people when discussing this incident use the term donkey and not jenny.) 

First, the donkey veered off the road and Bil’am hit it, then the donkey pushed Bil'am against a wall and Bil’am hit it a second time, and then the donkey stopped altogether when it saw a malakh in front of it and Bil’am hit it a third time. These actions by the donkey did not have to be contemporaneous. They night have occurred a few hours apart or even on different days. After the donkey stopped (the donkey’s third unusual action) and Bil'am hit the donkey a third time, the donkey spoke and questioned Bil'am for why he hit her. After their short conversation, a malakh spoke directly to the Bil'am, 22:31-35. (Note, 22:22 and 22:35 function as a bookend to this section based on the phrase “Bil’am went with the messengers.”)

There are two miracles in this incident, the donkey and later Bil'am were able to see the malakh, and the donkey spoke. 

In reference to the first miracle, Robert Alter (1981, pp. 104-107) notes that the word to see is one of the main words in the entire Bil'am story, as for example, in 22:2,41; 23:3,9,13,21; and 24:1,2,20,24. Alter suggests that the incident between Bil'am and the donkey parallel Bil'am and Balak with Bil'am in reference to Balak being the donkey and Balak being Bil'am in the incident with the donkey. The parallelism is that the donkey sees while Bil'am does not, and then Bil'am sees by each one of the prophecies (22:41, 23:9, 23:13, 23:28?, 24:1,2) while Balak does not. Bil'am went to three different places to curse the Jewish people and in each place he instructed Balak to offer sacrifices to be brought, 23:2,13,14,27-29, but on third occasion, the "spirit of G-d" descended on Bil'am, 24:2. This change in Bil'am on the third occasion parallels the donkey speaking after he had been hit three times, 22:28. After the donkey spoke, then G-d opened Bil'am eyes for him to understand what was going on, 22:31, and similarly after Bil'am's third prophecy, Balak realized it was hopeless to try to curse the Jewish people and he told Bil'am to go home, 24:11. (With regard to Bil'am's fourth prophecy, see https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2010/06/bemidbar-2414-25-balak-fourth-blessing.html) Also, just as Bil'am was angry at the donkey, Balak was angry at Bil'am for blessing the Jewish people, and just like the donkey defended himself to Bil'am so too Bil'am defended himself from Balak's accusations. These literary connections show that the incident with the donkey is integral to the narrative of Balak and Bil’am.

The second miracle that the donkey spoke is considered more unusual, and the Mishnah (Pirkei Avot 5:6) writes that this ability for the donkey to speak was “programmed” into the creation of the world. Evidently, the Mishnah believes that the donkey spoke, but later commentators have argued that it did not.

Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (Kapach, 1984, p. 159, footnote 8, also see Ibn Ezra on 22:28) explains that the donkey did not really speak but rather the malakh spoke, but Bil'am thought that it was the donkey speaking. I am not sure how this changes the great miracle, as even a malakh speaking would seem to be quite extraordinary, and also it not clear why the Torah would relate the speaking to the donkey when this speaking, according to this idea, was really from the malakh.

The Rambam (Moreh 2:42) argues that the entire incident was a dream and did not really occur. Rambam adopts this approach because of his general approach that whenever a malakh is mentioned in the Torah this means that its appearance was in a vision of prophecy or in a dream. Hertz (1960, p. 671) "modernizes" this approach to claim that the dream was “the subconscious plane of the mental and moral conflict in Bil’am’s soul.” I doubt this idea since having the donkey talk in a dream diminishes the effect of the donkey talking. Hertz's variation also seems unlikely because there is no indication of Bil’am having any conflict as he seemed very desirous of cursing the Jewish people.

Luzzatto (on 22:2, introduction to the chapter) offers a fourth approach. His idea is that the donkey did not actually speak but just made sounds which Bil’am interpreted as recorded in the text. Luzzatto suggests that it was likely that Bil’am was considered to have an ability to talk to animals so then his servants would not have been surprised when he spoke to the donkey. He claims that if the donkey had really spoken then Bil’am and his servants would have been scared to death and Bil'am would have been unable to answer the donkey. Also, he wonders why the donkey did not defend himself by saying that the malakh was standing before him instead of just saying that she had never endangered Bil’am in the past, 22:30. This last question is not strong since the donkey was not speaking of its own free mind but just what G-d wanted it to say. Yet, the question how come a talking animal did not scare the servants and Bil'am is compelling.

I think one must say the donkey spoke since this is what 22:28 records, but the Torah does not state that other people besides Bil’am heard the donkey. Just like, only the donkey and later Bil'am saw the malakh, 22:31, so too only Bil’am heard the donkey and the malakh speak. Thus, the servants and the messengers from Balak who were accompanying Bil'am did not hear the donkey or the malakh speak so none of them were frightened by the incident. With regard to Bil'am he was not scared out of his mind by the donkey speaking either because he had to pretend that he was not shocked to keep up the appearance that he was a real magician or because his anger overwhelmed the shock, 22:27.

We can now explain the sequence of events of 22:23-35. 22:23-27 records that the donkey started to wonder due to the malakh, but nobody else, Bil'am, Bil'am's servants and the accompanying messengers from Balak, saw the malakh so they could not understand what was going on. All they could see was that Bil'am was unable to control his donkey. Afterwards the donkey spoke, 22:28, and the other people only heard Bil'am's response, 22:29. From their perspective, they would think that Bil'am was ranting, almost like a crazy person. The donkey then spoke again, and Bil'am just said no, which again the other people would not understand its significance, 22:30. At this point, G-d let Bil'am, and only Bil'am, see the malakh, and Bil'am bowed down to the malakh, 22:31. Again, this action would have been seemed strange to the other people. The malakh then spoke, 22:32,33,35 which the other people did not hear, but they heard Bil'am's response, 22:34. They would have been confused at what Bil'am was saying and Bil'am would have been embarrassed, which might be the point of the episode, to humble Bil'am, see Numbers Rabbah 20:14, and our discussion https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2014/07/bemidbar-chapters-22-25-balak-bad-good.html.

For an additional reason for this miracle and the entire incident see our discussion https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2017/06/bemidbar-241-balak-duh.html.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 1981, The art of biblical narrative, New York: Basic Books.

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press.

Kapach, Yosef, 1984, Commentary of Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon on the Torah, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Bemidbar 3:1,2 – A true legacy

Bemidbar 3:1 records, “These are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai.” 3:2 then records “These are the names of the children of Aharon, the eldest Nadav, Avihu, Elazar and Itamar.” These verses raise two questions. One, the word toledot is usually translated as the descendants of a person and hence after the phrase "these are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe" we would expect that the Torah would list Moshe's children (see Shemot 18:3,4), but only Aharon's sons are mentioned. Two, how is the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai” relevant to the toledot of Aharon and Moshe? Several answers have been suggested.

Rashi (on 3:1) quoting the Talmud (Sanhedrin 19b) explains that the children of Aharon were also considered as the children of Moshe since Moshe taught them Torah, and this is why the Torah records the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" since after Moshe spoke to G-d, then he taught Aharon's children. This explanation is difficult for two reasons. One, just because Moshe taught Aharon's children, this does not end Moshe's connection with his own children, as Moshe's sons still should have been mentioned. Two, did not Moshe teach his own children as well? My son, Binyamin, suggested that Rashi’s idea is that Torah is just focusing on Aharon's sons, and Moshe is mentioned because he is also to be considered as their progenitor since he taught them Torah.

The Rashbam (on 3:1, also see Ramban on 3:1) offers a second explanation that the Torah is following the order of the general population, the priests, and then the Levites. Thus, in chapters one and two there is a discussion of the general population, 3:1-4 then discusses the genealogy of Aharon, the priestly family, and then Moshe's family is recorded in 3:27. Furthermore, he suggests that the phrase, "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" in mentioned in 3:1 because 3:2 records that Aharon had four sons, which was true at the time of the Decalogue, but not afterwards. This approach is difficult since 3:27 does not refer to Moshe's sons, and hence cannot be seen as the reference to toledot Moshe in 3:1. Furthermore, if 3:27 is really the reference to the phrase "toledot Moshe" in 3:1, then the phrase “elleh toledot Moshe” should have been recorded by 3:27 and not in 3:1.

A third approach (Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon and Ha-ketav ve-Hakabbalah both on 3:1) is that the phrase "these are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe" does not refer to the ensuing text but to the count of the people in chapters one and two which was done by Aharon and Moshe. Furthermore, the Ha-ketav ve-Hakabbalah suggests that the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" is to inform us that the count of the people was based on their numbers before the mishkan was built. This approach is difficult since when the phrase "these are the toledot" appears in the book of Bereshit in reference to people (Bereshit 6:9, 10:1, 11:10,27, 25:12,19, 36:1,9, 37:2) it always is in connection to the ensuing text, which mentions at least one descendant of the person, and not to the previous narrative. In addition, how does the phrase "these are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe" relate to the counting of the people? Were the people considered the descendants of Aharon and Moshe?

In our discussion on Bereshit, "Introduction: The structure of the book of Bereshit, " I suggested that the word toledot should be interpreted as legacy, and not descendants  (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/10/structure-of-book-of-bereshit.html). A person's legacy can be one's children, descendants, but it can also be one's actions in the world.

This idea suggests a fourth approach to understanding Bemidbar 3:1. In Moshe's case, while he had children, his legacy was that he spoke to G-d, and transmitted the Torah to the people. This legacy is so important that it eclipsed his children, and hence in 3:1, Moshe's children are not mentioned but instead the Torah records, "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" since on that day, Moshe was established as the true messenger of G-d to transmit the Torah.

With this idea, the structure of 3:1,2 is in the form of ABBA with A referring to Aharon and B referring to Moshe. 3:1 beings by referring to the toledot of Aharon (A), then mentions Moshe (B) and then records the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai (B), which is the toledot or legacy of Moshe. 3:2 then lists the children of Aharon (A), the toledot of Aharon.

Chapter 15 of the book of Vayikra: Equality of male and female tumot?

Chapter 15 of the book of Vayikra records the tumah of the zav, shikhvat zera, the niddah and the zavah. These tumot all refer to emissions from the body, with two in reference to men (zav and shikhvat zera) and two in reference to women (zavah and niddah). Also, for both men and women, there is a normal emission, shikhvat zera and niddah, and an abnormal emission, zav and zavah. Yet, there are significant differences between the male and female types of tumah.

The zav and the zavah even share the same name, but it appears that the tumah of the zav is more severe than the tumah of the zavah. With regard to the zav, anything he sits on becomes tamei, and a person who touches such an item also becomes tamei for one day, 15:4-6. This law also applies to the zavah, 15:26,27. Also it appears that just like touching a zav makes one tamei so too touching a zavah makes one tamei, 15:7,19. However, the zav has additional secondary effects from his tumah that do not apply to a zavah as for example only the spit of a zav causes tumah, 15:8. Also by a zav, anything below where he sits, such as a saddle, becomes tamei, not just the items that come in direct contact with him, 15:9,10. Also, if a zav touches something with his hands but he did not wash them, then the touched item also becomes tamei, 15:11,12. (15:11 has generated much discussion, but I do not see why it cannot be understood as referring to a case where the zav touches an inanimate object with his hands, as before the Torah only refers to where the zav sits and if he was touched by a person.)

Accordingly, the zav has many more secondary effects from his tumah than the zavah has from her tumah. In addition, it appears that the purification of the zav also differs from the zavah, as the zav requires mayim chayyim, running water, 15:13, while this requirement is not mentioned by the zavah. The fact that the zav has more secondary effects from his tumah and undergoes a more burdensome purification process suggests that the tumah of the zav is considered more severe than the tumah of the zavah.

The tumot of the niddah and the shikhvat zera, the cases of the normal emissions, have the opposite pattern than that of the zav and zavah, since the tumah of the female, the niddah, is more severe than the tumah of the male, shikhvat zera. The tumah of the niddah has the same secondary effects as the zavah, and a woman who is a niddah is tamei for seven days, 15:19,25. However by the man, the only secondary effect of the tumah of the shikhvat zera is when the semen touches an item, and the man is only tamei for one day, 15:16,17.

Consequently, by the tumah due to normal emissions, the tumah of a man is less severe than the tumah of a female, while by the tumah of the abnormal emissions, the tumah of the man is more severe than the tumah of the woman. While it is possible that there are some underlying rationales that differentiate the reasons for the different tumot, the Torah does not posit any such differences. Possibly, the idea is that the net tumah of the male and females are roughly equal, as the combined tumah of the shikhvat zera and the zav would equal the combined tumah of the niddah and the zavah.

In addition, maybe the frequency of the occurrence of each tumah is also relevant to the levels of tumah. If one assumes that the zavah condition was more frequent than the zav, and that the tumah of shikhvat zera was more frequent than the tumah of a niddah, then maybe the reason for the different levels of severity of tumah is due to the differing frequencies of the tumah. (See Milgrom, 1991, p. 953, who writes “in ancient times, and indeed until the present age, women did not menstruate frequently during their childbearing years.”)

The tumah of the shikhvat zera is the most frequent tumah and hence it has the lowest level of tumah. Afterwards, the next most frequent tumah is the niddah, and her level of tumah is less than the zavah, as the niddah does not have to bring a sacrifice when she becomes tahor. The zavah has the third level of tumah, more than the niddah but less than the zav, and her tumah is more frequent than the niddah but less frequent than the zav. The zav then has the most severe level of tumah, but the most infrequent occurrence. If this is idea is correct, then the expected value of tumah (frequency * level of tumah) could be approximately equal in all four cases or maybe the total expected value of male and female tumot might be roughly equal.

Commentary on the Haggadah 2018

Hello,

While admittedly it is a little late, the 2018 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (67 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions. If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file. I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein

Vayikra 3:16,17; 7:23-25 – Fats, smoke and fire

Vayikra 3:17 records that in all places and in all times it is prohibited for a person to eat the helev, fat, of an animal and the blood of the animal. 7:23-25 repeats the prohibition of eating fat and adds more details regarding the prohibition: 7:23 explain that the prohibition is limited to three types of animals, ox (cows), sheep and goats, 7:24 explains that a person can use the fat of a nevelah and a trefah and 7:25 explains that the punishment for transgressing the law is karet. What is the definition of fat? Why is eating fat forbidden?

The Rambam (Laws of Forbidden foods, 7:5, see also Levine, 1989, p. 16) defines the forbidden fat as the fat on the inner organs that relate to the digestive track. This definition is from the context of verse 3:17 within the laws of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:1-16. Within the discussion of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:3,4,9,10,14,15, record that the fat of the kidneys, intestines, liver, stomach(?), from cows, sheep or goats which are offered as shelamim sacrifices is to be burnt on the altar. Thus, as the prohibition of eating fat is recorded at the end of the laws of the shelamim sacrifices, it is reasonable that the prohibition of fat is referring to the fat mentioned by the laws of sacrifices. This connection is strengthened since 7:23-25 explains that the prohibition of eating fat is only by animals that can be offered as a sacrifice, and this implies that the definition of the fat that is prohibited is related to the fat by the sacrifices.

Why is eating fat of cows, sheep and goats prohibited? The Rambam (Moreh 3:48, Maimonides, 1963, p. 598) explains that the prohibition is for health reasons that "the fat of the intestines makes us full, spoils the digestion and produces cold and thick blood." Ignoring the factual question of whether fat is medically bad, it is unlikely that this was the reason for the prohibition. From 7:25, we learn that a person can eat fat from animals that are not able to be sacrificed. Why would the Torah only forbid a person from eating unhealthy fat from some types of animals and not others?

Hoffmann (1953, p. 123, on 3:17, see also Altar, 2004, p. 555) notes that the prohibition of fat has to be related to the sacrifices, and he explains that the prohibition is because what is offered as a sacrifice cannot be eaten as a fear of G-d. Levine (1989, p. 45) varies this slightly. He explains that the prohibition of fat is a gezirah, "a fence around the law. Once the fat of sacrificial animals was forbidden, the fat of all pure animals was forbidden as well, whether or not the animals in question were actually sacrificed." Yet, by the olah sacrifice, the entire animal is sacrificed, and still the meat of animals is permitted to be eaten? Even in reference to the shelamim sacrifice, the kidneys, which are offered on the altar, 3:4,10,15, can be eaten by non-sacrificial meat. Why was there no gezirah by the kidneys? Why was the fat of animals that are sacrificed so important that even the fat by animals that are potential sacrifices but are not brought as sacrifices also forbidden to be eaten?

My guess is that the fat is the crucial part of the shelamim sacrifice, and other sacrifices, while the meat in the sacrifices is incidental. Thus, the shelamim sacrifice was essentially an offering of the fat of the animal as almost no meat except the kidneys was offered on the altar. (Maybe the kidneys were offered due to the difficulty and/ or time needed to remove the fat from them.)

The fat is the crucial part since this is what makes the sacrifice into a smoke (3:5,11,16 and 7:31) and/ or a "fire offering," 3:3,5,9,11,14,16. 6:5 refers to putting wood on the fire but this was just to keep the fire going or to start it, as during the day it was the fat that the was principle combustible item in the sacrifices. The smoke from the fat recalls the image of the cloud of G-d (Shemot 13:21,22) and fire from the fat is the imagery of glory of G-d (Shemot 24:17). Thus, 3:16 records that all the fat is to G-d since the fat is what generated these symbols of G-d. Maybe the imagery was for a person to realize that the sacrifice he/ she was offering was to G-d and not to some demons.

Once fat had this important role by the sacrifices to create an image of the cloud/ fire of G-d, then the Torah instituted a gezirah (“fence”) with regard to the animals that potentially could be brought as sacrifices but were not offered as sacrifices that it was forbidden to eat the fat of these animals. This gezirah was limited in several ways. One, the fat from an animal that could not be brought as a sacrifice since the animal had become a nevelah or a trefah could be used though not eaten, 7:24, and two, the fat of an animal that could not be offered as a sacrifice was permitted to be eaten, i.e. no double gezirah. Finally, even though the oil by the minhah sacrifices (2:1,4-7,15, and Bemidbar 5:15) probably had a similar role in creating smoke and fire by the minhah sacrifice, no gezirah was instituted on all oils, possibly since oil was not intrinsic to the minhah sacrifice unlike the fat which was intrinsic to the animal being sacrificed.

Shemot 28:6-29 - Stones of remembering

Shemot 28:6-12 records that one of the garments of the high priest was the efod. The efod appears to have been a type of apron or vest and it had a stone inserted into both of its shoulder straps. The names of six of the tribes of the Jewish people were engraved on each stone. (Does this mean that each stone was relatively large or was the engraving very small?) In addition, the high priest also wore the hoshen, the breastpiece, which was attached to the efod, and the hoshen contained twelve stones, 28:13-29. The names of each tribe were also engraved on these stones, as each stone was inscribed with the name of one tribe.

The Torah appears to give a similar rationale for both sets of stones. With regard to the stones on the efod, 28:12 records "You are to place the two stones on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel. Aharon is to bear their names before the presence of G-d on his two shoulders for remembrance." Similarly, 39:7 records, "They placed them (the stones) on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel." This idea of remembrance also appears by the stones of the hoshen. 28:29 records, "So Aharon is to bear the names of the children of Israel on the hoshen ha-mishpat over his heart, whenever he comes into the Holy-Shrine for remembrance, before the presence of G-d, regularly." (All translations from Fox, 1995.) 

We see that both sets of stones relate to remembering, but who was to remember? What was to be remembered? Furthermore, why was there a need for two sets of stones to cause something to be remembered?

One approach (Rashi on 28:12, Seforno on 28:12,29) is that the stones were for G-d to remember the righteousness of the Jewish people. Rashbam (on 28:36) explains that due to this remembering, G-d would forgive the people for their sins. This approach is difficult theologically since it hard to understand why G-d would need to see the stones to be reminded of the righteousness of the Jewish people.

A second approach is that the stones were for the high priest to remember the Jewish people. Benno Jacob writes (1992, p. 918) with regard to the stones of the hoshen that "the high priest did not pray for his people through words in this service, but the names placed upon his heart told G-d what lay in his heart and for whom he sought healing." Similarly with regard to the stones of the efod, he writes (p. 921), that "the two shoulder stones led him to bear the worries of the individual Israelites upon his shoulder."

Cassuto suggests a similar rationale. He writes (1967, p. 374) that the stones of the efod "were a memorial and symbol that the priest ministers in the name of the tribes of Israel." Similarly, with regard to the stones of the hoshen, Cassuto writes (p. 378), "the priest will come before the Lord as the representative of Israel with the names of those whom he represents engraven for remembrance on the pouch (hoshen) that he wears on his heart."

Hertz (1960, pp. 340, 342) follows this idea as he writes by the efod that the "names denoted in concrete form that the high priest was the messenger and representative of the entire community,” and by the hoshen he quotes Benno Jacob’s explanation for the stones. However, by the stones of the efod, he adds another approach that the stones were "to remind the children of Israel of their unity of descent, and unity of service to G-d."

This idea that the high priest was/ is the messenger of the people might seem to be obvious, but as the high priest had relatively limited contact with the people since he was always in the mishkan, Vayikra 21:12, it was possible that he would forget that he was the messenger of the people. The stones on his clothing with the names of the tribes could then have served as a reminder to him that he was a messenger of the people. Furthermore, the idea that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people makes sense since the high priest could see the stones on the hoshen which was on chest/ stomach. However, the stones on the efod were on the high priest's shoulders (28:12) and it would have been very hard for him to see them.

Another difference between the two sets of stones is that with regard to the stones on the hoshen, 28:29 records that the stones were to be on his heart, lev. The word lev in the Torah refers to thinking (see our discussion on Devarim 6:5-9, 11:18-20, "Expressions of love") and then the idea of 28:29 is not just the placement of the stones, but also that they are to cause the high priest to think or to remember. However, this reference to the heart/ thinking by the high priest is not recorded in reference to the stones on the efod.

A third difference is that by the efod, the Torah refers to the stones as a zichron le-bnei yisrael, 28:12, 39:7, but this phrase does not appear by the hoshen. The phrase zichron le-bnei yisrael also appears in Bemidbar 17:5, which records that the fire-pans used in the test by the 250 rebels against Moshe and Aharon were to be a covering on the altar to be a lesson for the Jewish people. We see from this case that the phrase, zichron le-bnei yisrael, can refer to the Jewish people, and this implies that the stones on the efod were the Jewish people to remember.

These three differences between the sets of stones imply that the remembering by each set of stones differs. A possible distinction is that the remembering by the stones of the efod was for the Jewish people to remember, while the remembering by the stones of the hoshen was for the high priest, Aharon, to remember.

The question then is what were the Jewish people to remember when they saw the stones on the efod/ shoulders of the high priest? A possible answer is that the stones on the high priest's shoulders would look like a type of pillar of stones, and this could recall the pillars, matzevah, that Moshe put up by the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant, 24:4, as the pillars were a pile of stones. Furthermore, it might be that the matzevah in 24:4 was to re-call the people standing at the foot of Mount Sinai, 19:17, by the Decalogue. Thus, the stones on efod/ shoulders of the high priest might have been to re-call the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant or the Decalogue.

Accordingly, I believe that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people, and the stones on the efod were for the Jewish people to either re-call the covenant or the Decalogue.