Vayikra 19:11,12 – The prohibition of lying in the Torah

Vayikra 19:11,12 record, "You shall not steal, you shall not deal falsely (lo tichahashu) or lie (ve-lo tishakroo). You shall not swear falsely (le-shaker)…." What is the difference between dealing falsely and lying?

The Rashbam and Ibn Ezra (on 19:11) explain that dealing falsely means denying that you have money that was given to you and the Rashbam quotes as a proof 5:22 which also has the phrase not to deal falsely (ve-kichesh) in reference to a pledge. Ibn Ezra adds that dealing falsely is also when somebody knows some information but does not testify.

With regard to lying, the Rashbam writes that it refers to lying about a loan, while the Ibn Ezra writes that the lying refers to making a false claim for money. These commentators seem to be explaining that the difference between dealing falsely and lying is whether the case concerns a pledge or a loan. This is a difficult distinction since the verse does not refer to different items but to different prohibitions.

This same term for dealing falsely also appears by Sara when she was accused of laughing and she denied laughing, va-tichachesh, Bereshit 18:15. Similarly, the case in Vayikra 5:21 is when a person denies having a pledge. 

I would suggest that the prohibition in 19:11 of dealing falsely is passive lying, that a person is falsely denying an accusation, while the prohibition of lying is active lying, to fabricate something that never happened or is not true.

Rashi (on 19:11) quotes from Torah Cohanim, that the prohibitions recorded in 19:11,12 form a sequence of events: if one steals, then this will lead one to deal falsely, then to lie and then to swear falsely. In our discussion on Vayikra 5:21,22, “False claims, gezel and genevah,” I propose that genevah was where one stole an item and could not claim ownership of the item, as opposed to gezelah where one stole an item and also falsely claimed ownership of the item. Following this idea, maybe one could understand the sequence of prohibitions in 19:11,12 in the following manner. First one steals and as he/ she cannot claim ownership of the item, then one "deals falsely" that he/ she denies that he/ she stole the item. Afterwards he/ she lies by fabricating a story to show that he/ she could not have stolen the item, a false alibi, and then finally he/ she swears to "prove" that he/ she did not steal the item.

Vayikra 19:16 – The prohibition of lo telekh rakhil

ויקרא יט:טז - לא תלך רכיל בעמיך ולא תעמוד על דם רעך אני ה'.

19:16 records that "lo telekh rakhil among your countryman. Do not stand over the blood of your fellow. I am G-d." What is the prohibition of lo telekh rakhil?

The standard translation of the word rakhil is talebearer, that a person should not be a talebearer, but this is a difficult translation. Rashi (on 19:16, also see Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon and Hoffmann) bases this translation on the word spying. Rashi argues that one changes the letter kf to a gimil, and then the phrase becomes not to spy. Yet, changing letters is a difficult approach. Rashi also quotes, as does the Rashbam, Ibn Ezra and Ramban, that the word rakhil is from rokhel which means a merchant. Yet, not only are these two separate words, but also there is no obvious connection between merchants and talebearing. Finally, what is the connection between this prohibition and the following prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow? Ibn Ezra, Bekhor Shor and Rambam (Laws of opinions, 7:1) explain that people have died due to talebearing, yet this is quite a stretch.

It seems to me that Jeremiah 9:3 offers an explanation for the word rakhil. The verse records that a person should be careful of other people/ and one should not trust one's brother/ because brothers act with guile/ and other people go with rakhil. The parallelism of the verse suggests that the definition of rakhil is guile. Furthermore, from Jeremiah 6:28 and Ezekiel 22:9 we see that rakhil is not referring to some innocent pranks but deceit that leads to murder. Accordingly, 19:16 prohibits one from being maliciously deceitful and devious.

How does this prohibition relate to the prohibition of not standing over the blood of your fellow, the following phrase in the verse? Levine (1989, p.129) notes that this phrase "do not stand over the blood of your fellow" has been explained in three ways. One (see Rashi), is not to be inactive when another person's life is in danger, two, is not to conspire against others, and three, is not to "pursue one's livelihood in a manner that endangers another or at the expense of another's well-being." Levine likes the third approach since it "best fits the immediate context" which I understand to mean the approach that rakhil refers to a merchant. Yet, as pointed out above rakhil has nothing to do with being a merchant. The third approach does not fit into the context at all, and seems to be based on some anti-capitalist feelings. Levine notes that the second approach has support in several biblical verses and is the Ibn Ezra's explanation that "one should not join forces with murderers." I prefer the second approach and it accords with the suggestion above concerning rakhil. 19:16 would then mean that one is not to go about being maliciously deceitful and one should not join other people (gangs) who act in such a manner even if one does not participate (just stands around) in their evil acts.

Bibliography:

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Vayikra 10:1,2 (Shemini) – Nadav and Avihu

Vayikra 10:1,2 record, “Now, Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, took each-man his pan, and placing coals in them, put smoking-incense on it, and brought near, before the presence of G-d, foreign fire, such as he had not commanded them. And the fire went out from the presence of G-d and consumed them, so they died, before the presence of G-d” (adaptation of Fox’s 1995 translation). It seems clear that Nadav and Avihu died because they did what they were not commanded, but what were they trying to do? Numerous theories have been offered to explain their sin. We will review some of them and then offer our own.

Rashbam (on 10:1) suggests that Nadav and Avihu wanted to offer the incense sacrifice since they thought the regular daily law of offering incense was part of the ritual of the eighth day ceremony and they entered into the mishkan proper to offer the incense even before the fire devoured the sacrifices. Their mistake according to the Rashbam was that on the special day (the eighth day), the fire for the sacrifices was to come from G-d and not from a regular human fire. This approach is problematic since not only does the Rashbam argue that Nadav and Avihu were killed prior to the fire devouring the sacrifices which contradicts the order of the Torah, but also as pointed out by David Tzvi Hoffmann and Shmuel David Luzzatto, they could not have been following the regular law of incense offering since that offering was brought by one priest and not two.

Seforno (on 10:1) proposes that Nadav and Avihu were acting based on the special character of the day. They thought that it was appropriate to offer an incense offering after the fire devoured the special sacrifices of the eighth day, and they were killed when attempting to offer this incense offering on the inner altar in the mishkan proper. According to Seforno, Nadav and Avihu sinned by making this decision to add an incense offering without consulting Moshe. This approach is also difficult because the Torah records that the problem was that their fire was not commanded by G-d and not that the incense offering was not commanded.

Hoffmann (1953, p. 204) writes that Nadav and Avihu wanted to bring the incense offering to show their happiness about the appearance of the fire devouring the sacrifices. He claims that with their pans they brought the incense into the Holy of Holies, like the high priest does on Yom Kippur, though at this point this type of sacrifice had not yet been commanded. Hoffmann explains that while the Torah refers to their foreign fire, this really mean a sacrifice of fire that had not been commanded.

This idea that Nadav and Avihu went into the Holy of Holies is very popular, and it is claimed that 16:1, which refers to Nadav and Avihu’s sin in connection with the command to Aharon to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur, supports this understanding. Yet, one can understand that in 16:1 the reference to Nadav and Avihu’s sin was to remind Aharon to follow G-d’s command exactly as he was commanded unlike Nadav and Avihu, and does not imply that Nadav and Avihu entered the Holy of Holies. Or, as pointed out by the Ramban (on 16:1), the reference to Nadav and Avihu in 16:1 could be to inform us that the laws regarding Yom Kippur were taught to Moshe immediately after the deaths of Nadav and Avihu.  Independent of 16:1, there is no reason to think that Nadav and Avihu would have thought to enter the Holy of Holies on the ceremony of the eighth day since the ceremony of the eighth day was focused on the outer altar which was situated in the courtyard of the mishkan. Thus, it is more likely that they died in the courtyard of the mishkan in front of the mishkan proper (the word kadosh in 10:4).

In order to understand the sin and deaths of Nadav and Avihu we have to connect their actions to 9:24. 9:24 records that a fire went out from the glory of G-d and consumed the sacrifices that were offered as part of the ceremony of the eighth day.  After this fire appeared, Nadav and Avihu took their pans, and were walking around the outer altar with their incense offering. It could be that they did this out of joy (Hoffmann) or they thought it was appropriate to have an incense offering at that time (Seforno), but this was not commanded. The gravity of their sin was not the incense offering but the fire used to create the incense offering, the eish zarah, foreign fire, 10:1. The point of the ceremony of the eighth day was that G-d had sanctified the outer altar by sending a fire to devour the sacrifices, and now Nadav and Avihu were walking around the outer altar with a regular human fire. Their fire, which was not commanded by G-d, weakened the boundary between G-d and man since both the human fire and G-d’s fire were spatially co-existent, see our discussion on Shemot 19:12, 21-25, "Establishing boundaries I" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.com/2009/02/shemot-2019-23-yitro-establishing.html. Nadab and Avihu were then killed by another fire that went out from the glory of G-d.