Bemidbar 22:23-35 – Bil'am's amazing donkey

Bemidbar 22:22-35 record Bil’am’s interaction with his donkey. (The donkey was a female donkey, a jenny, but we will refer to it as a donkey and not a jenny since it seems that most people when discussing this incident use the term donkey and not jenny.) 

First, the donkey veered off the road and Bil’am hit it, then the donkey pushed Bil'am against a wall and Bil’am hit it a second time, and then the donkey stopped altogether when it saw a malakh in front of it and Bil’am hit it a third time. These actions by the donkey did not have to be contemporaneous. They night have occurred a few hours apart or even on different days. After the donkey stopped (the donkey’s third unusual action) and Bil'am hit the donkey a third time, the donkey spoke and questioned Bil'am for why he hit her. After their short conversation, a malakh spoke directly to the Bil'am, 22:31-35. (Note, 22:22 and 22:35 function as a bookend to this section based on the phrase “Bil’am went with the messengers.”)

There are two miracles in this incident, the donkey and later Bil'am were able to see the malakh, and the donkey spoke. 

In reference to the first miracle, Robert Alter (1981, pp. 104-107) notes that the word to see is one of the main words in the entire Bil'am story, as for example, in 22:2,41; 23:3,9,13,21; and 24:1,2,20,24. Alter suggests that the incident between Bil'am and the donkey parallel Bil'am and Balak with Bil'am in reference to Balak being the donkey and Balak being Bil'am in the incident with the donkey. The parallelism is that the donkey sees while Bil'am does not, and then Bil'am sees by each one of the prophecies (22:41, 23:9, 23:13, 23:28?, 24:1,2) while Balak does not. Bil'am went to three different places to curse the Jewish people and in each place he instructed Balak to offer sacrifices to be brought, 23:2,13,14,27-29, but on third occasion, the "spirit of G-d" descended on Bil'am, 24:2. This change in Bil'am on the third occasion parallels the donkey speaking after he had been hit three times, 22:28. After the donkey spoke, then G-d opened Bil'am eyes for him to understand what was going on, 22:31, and similarly after Bil'am's third prophecy, Balak realized it was hopeless to try to curse the Jewish people and he told Bil'am to go home, 24:11. (With regard to Bil'am's fourth prophecy, see our discussion on his fourth blessing.)  Also, just as Bil'am was angry at the donkey, Balak was angry at Bil'am for blessing the Jewish people, and just like the donkey defended himself to Bil'am so too Bil'am defended himself from Balak's accusations. These literary connections show that the incident with the donkey is integral to the narrative of Balak and Bil’am.

The second miracle that the donkey spoke is considered more unusual, and the Mishnah (Pirkei Avot 5:6) writes that this ability for the donkey to speak was “programmed” into the creation of the world. Evidently, the Mishnah believes that the donkey spoke, but later commentators have argued that it did not.

Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (Kapach, 1984, p. 159, footnote 8, also see Ibn Ezra on 22:28) explains that the donkey did not really speak but rather the malakh spoke, but Bil'am thought that it was the donkey speaking. I am not sure how this changes the great miracle, as even a malakh speaking would seem to be quite extraordinary, and also it not clear why the Torah would relate the speaking to the donkey when this speaking, according to this idea, was really from the malakh.

The Rambam (Moreh 2:42) argues that the entire incident was a dream and did not really occur. Rambam adopts this approach because of his general approach that whenever a malakh is mentioned in the Torah this means that its appearance was in a vision of prophecy or in a dream. Hertz (1960, p. 671) "modernizes" this approach to claim that the dream was “the subconscious plane of the mental and moral conflict in Bil’am’s soul.” I doubt this idea since having the donkey talk in a dream diminishes the effect of the donkey talking. Hertz's variation also seems unlikely because there is no indication of Bil’am having any conflict as he seemed very desirous of cursing the Jewish people.

Luzzatto (on 22:2, introduction to the chapter) offers a fourth approach. His idea is that the donkey did not actually speak but just made sounds which Bil’am interpreted as recorded in the text. Luzzatto suggests that it was likely that Bil’am was considered to have an ability to talk to animals so then his servants would not have been surprised when he spoke to the donkey. He claims that if the donkey had really spoken then Bil’am and his servants would have been scared to death and Bil'am would have been unable to answer the donkey. Also, he wonders why the donkey did not defend himself by saying that the malakh was standing before him instead of just saying that she had never endangered Bil’am in the past, 22:30. This last question is not strong since the donkey was not speaking of its own free mind but just what G-d wanted it to say. Yet, the question how come a talking animal did not scare the servants and Bil'am is compelling.

I think one must say the donkey spoke since this is what 22:28 records, but the Torah does not state that other people besides Bil’am heard the donkey. Just like, only the donkey and later Bil'am saw the malakh, 22:31, so too only Bil’am heard the donkey and the malakh speak. Thus, the servants and the messengers from Balak who were accompanying Bil'am did not hear the donkey or the malakh speak so none of them were frightened by the incident. With regard to Bil'am he was not scared out of his mind by the donkey speaking either because he had to pretend that he was not shocked to keep up the appearance that he was a real magician or because his anger overwhelmed the shock, 22:27.

We can now explain the sequence of events of 22:23-35. 22:23-27 records that the donkey started to wander due to the malakh, but nobody else, Bil'am, Bil'am's servants and the accompanying messengers from Balak, saw the malakh, so they could not understand what was going on. All they could see was that Bil'am was unable to control his donkey. Afterwards the donkey spoke, 22:28, and the other people only heard Bil'am's response, 22:29. From their perspective, they would think that Bil'am was ranting, almost like a crazy person. The donkey then spoke again, and Bil'am just said no, which again the other people would not understand, 22:30. At this point, G-d let Bil'am, and only Bil'am, see the malakh, and Bil'am bowed down to the malakh, 22:31. Again, this action would have seemed bewildering to the other people. The malakh then spoke, 22:32,33,35, which the other people did not hear, but they heard Bil'am's response, 22:34. They would have been confused at what Bil'am was saying, but then after the malakh finished speaking to Bil'am, Bil'am returned to travel with Balak's messengers, apparently pretending that nothing extraordinary had happened, and the incident with the donkey ended, 22:35. 

Most likely, Bil'am was embarrassed by the donkey, which might be the point of the episode, to humble Bil'am, see Numbers Rabbah 20:14, and our discussion on Bil'am character, but this cannot be know definitively. For an additional reason for this miracle and the entire incident, see our discussion on the change in Bil'am before his third blessing.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 1981, The art of biblical narrative, New York: Basic Books.

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press.

Kapach, Yosef, 1984, Commentary of Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon on the Torah, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Bemidbar 3:1,2 – A true legacy

Bemidbar 3:1 records, “These are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai.” 3:2 then records “These are the names of the children of Aharon, the eldest Nadav, Avihu, Elazar and Itamar.” These verses raise two questions. One, the word toledot is usually translated as the descendants of a person and hence after the phrase "these are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe" we would expect that the Torah would list Moshe's children (see Shemot 18:3,4), but only Aharon's sons are mentioned. Two, how is the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai” relevant to the toledot of Aharon and Moshe? Several answers have been suggested.

Rashi (on 3:1) quoting the Talmud (Sanhedrin 19b) explains that the children of Aharon were also considered as the children of Moshe since Moshe taught them Torah, and this is why the Torah records the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" since after Moshe spoke to G-d, then he taught Aharon's children. This explanation is difficult for two reasons. One, just because Moshe taught Aharon's children, this does not end Moshe's connection with his own children, as Moshe's sons still should have been mentioned. Two, did not Moshe teach his own children as well? My son, Binyamin, suggested that Rashi’s idea is that Torah is just focusing on Aharon's sons, and Moshe is mentioned because he is also to be considered as their progenitor since he taught them Torah.

The Rashbam (on 3:1, also see Ramban on 3:1) offers a second explanation that the Torah is following the order of the general population, the priests, and then the Levites. Thus, in chapters one and two there is a discussion of the general population, 3:1-4 then discusses the genealogy of Aharon, the priestly family, and then Moshe's family is recorded in 3:27. Furthermore, he suggests that the phrase, "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" in mentioned in 3:1 because 3:2 records that Aharon had four sons, which was true at the time of the Decalogue, but not afterwards. This approach is difficult since 3:27 does not refer to Moshe's sons, and hence cannot be seen as the reference to toledot Moshe in 3:1. Furthermore, if 3:27 is really the reference to the phrase "toledot Moshe" in 3:1, then the phrase “elleh toledot Moshe” should have been recorded by 3:27 and not in 3:1.

A third approach (Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon and Ha-ketav ve-Hakabbalah both on 3:1) is that the phrase "these are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe" does not refer to the ensuing text but to the count of the people in chapters one and two which was done by Aharon and Moshe. Furthermore, the Ha-ketav ve-Hakabbalah suggests that the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" is to inform us that the count of the people was based on their numbers before the mishkan was built. This approach is difficult since when the phrase "these are the toledot" appears in the book of Bereshit in reference to people (Bereshit 6:9, 10:1, 11:10,27, 25:12,19, 36:1,9, 37:2) it always is in connection to the ensuing text, which mentions at least one descendant of the person, and not to the previous narrative. In addition, how does the phrase "these are the toledot of Aharon and Moshe" relate to the counting of the people? Were the people considered the descendants of Aharon and Moshe?

In our discussion on Bereshit, "Introduction: The structure of the book of Bereshit, " I suggested that the word toledot should be interpreted as legacy, and not descendants  (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/10/structure-of-book-of-bereshit.html). A person's legacy can be one's children, descendants, but it can also be one's actions in the world.

This idea suggests a fourth approach to understanding Bemidbar 3:1. In Moshe's case, while he had children, his legacy was that he spoke to G-d, and transmitted the Torah to the people. This legacy is so important that it eclipsed his children, and hence in 3:1, Moshe's children are not mentioned but instead the Torah records, "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai" since on that day, Moshe was established as the true messenger of G-d to transmit the Torah.

With this idea, the structure of 3:1,2 is in the form of ABBA with A referring to Aharon and B referring to Moshe. 3:1 beings by referring to the toledot of Aharon (A), then mentions Moshe (B) and then records the phrase "on the day that G-d spoke to Moshe at Mount Sinai (B), which is the toledot or legacy of Moshe. 3:2 then lists the children of Aharon (A), the toledot of Aharon.

Chapter 15 of the book of Vayikra: Equality of male and female tumot?

Chapter 15 of the book of Vayikra records the tumah of the zav, shikhvat zera, the niddah and the zavah. These tumot all refer to emissions from the body, with two in reference to men (zav and shikhvat zera) and two in reference to women (zavah and niddah). Also, for both men and women, there is a normal emission, shikhvat zera and niddah, and an abnormal emission, zav and zavah. Yet, there are significant differences between the male and female types of tumah.

The zav and the zavah even share the same name, but it appears that the tumah of the zav is more severe than the tumah of the zavah. With regard to the zav, anything he sits on becomes tamei, and a person who touches such an item also becomes tamei for one day, 15:4-6. This law also applies to the zavah, 15:26,27. Also it appears that just like touching a zav makes one tamei so too touching a zavah makes one tamei, 15:7,19. However, the zav has additional secondary effects from his tumah that do not apply to a zavah as for example only the spit of a zav causes tumah, 15:8. Also by a zav, anything below where he sits, such as a saddle, becomes tamei, not just the items that come in direct contact with him, 15:9,10. Also, if a zav touches something with his hands but he did not wash them, then the touched item also becomes tamei, 15:11,12. (15:11 has generated much discussion, but I do not see why it cannot be understood as referring to a case where the zav touches an inanimate object with his hands, as before the Torah only refers to where the zav sits and if he was touched by a person.)

Accordingly, the zav has many more secondary effects from his tumah than the zavah has from her tumah. In addition, it appears that the purification of the zav also differs from the zavah, as the zav requires mayim chayyim, running water, 15:13, while this requirement is not mentioned by the zavah. The fact that the zav has more secondary effects from his tumah and undergoes a more burdensome purification process suggests that the tumah of the zav is considered more severe than the tumah of the zavah.

The tumot of the niddah and the shikhvat zera, the cases of the normal emissions, have the opposite pattern than that of the zav and zavah, since the tumah of the female, the niddah, is more severe than the tumah of the male, shikhvat zera. The tumah of the niddah has the same secondary effects as the zavah, and a woman who is a niddah is tamei for seven days, 15:19,25. However by the man, the only secondary effect of the tumah of the shikhvat zera is when the semen touches an item, and the man is only tamei for one day, 15:16,17.

Consequently, by the tumah due to normal emissions, the tumah of a man is less severe than the tumah of a female, while by the tumah of the abnormal emissions, the tumah of the man is more severe than the tumah of the woman. While it is possible that there are some underlying rationales that differentiate the reasons for the different tumot, the Torah does not posit any such differences. Possibly, the idea is that the net tumah of the male and females are roughly equal, as the combined tumah of the shikhvat zera and the zav would equal the combined tumah of the niddah and the zavah.

In addition, maybe the frequency of the occurrence of each tumah is also relevant to the levels of tumah. If one assumes that the zavah condition was more frequent than the zav, and that the tumah of shikhvat zera was more frequent than the tumah of a niddah, then maybe the reason for the different levels of severity of tumah is due to the differing frequencies of the tumah. (See Milgrom, 1991, p. 953, who writes “in ancient times, and indeed until the present age, women did not menstruate frequently during their childbearing years.”)

The tumah of the shikhvat zera is the most frequent tumah and hence it has the lowest level of tumah. Afterwards, the next most frequent tumah is the niddah, and her level of tumah is less than the zavah, as the niddah does not have to bring a sacrifice when she becomes tahor. The zavah has the third level of tumah, more than the niddah but less than the zav, and her tumah is more frequent than the niddah but less frequent than the zav. The zav then has the most severe level of tumah, but the most infrequent occurrence. If this is idea is correct, then the expected value of tumah (frequency * level of tumah) could be approximately equal in all four cases or maybe the total expected value of male and female tumot might be roughly equal.

Commentary on the Haggadah 2018

Hello,

While admittedly it is a little late, the 2018 version of my commentary on the Haggadah (67 pages) is now available. It has some additions/ corrections/ revisions from the previous versions. If you are interested in receiving the commentary, please send me an email, ajayschein@gmail.com, and I will send you the file. I wish everybody a chag kasher ve-samaech.

Andrew Schein

Vayikra 3:16,17; 7:23-25 – The shelamim sacrifice: Fats, smoke and fire

Vayikra 3:17 records that in all places and in all times it is prohibited for a person to eat the helev, fat, of an animal and the blood of the animal. 7:23-25 repeats the prohibition of eating fat and adds more details regarding the prohibition: 7:23 explain that the prohibition is limited to three types of animals, ox (cows), sheep and goats, 7:24 explains that a person can use the fat of a nevelah and a trefah and 7:25 explains that the punishment for transgressing the law is karet. What is the definition of fat? Why is eating fat forbidden?

The Rambam (Laws of Forbidden foods, 7:5, see also Levine, 1989, p. 16) defines the forbidden fat as the fat on the inner organs that relate to the digestive track. This definition is from the context of verse 3:17 within the laws of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:1-16. Within the discussion of the shelamim sacrifice, 3:3,4,9,10,14,15, record that the fat of the kidneys, intestines, liver, stomach(?), from cows, sheep or goats which are offered as shelamim sacrifices is to be burnt on the altar. Thus, as the prohibition of eating fat is recorded at the end of the laws of the shelamim sacrifices, it is reasonable that the prohibition of fat is referring to the fat mentioned by the laws of sacrifices. This connection is strengthened since 7:23-25 explains that the prohibition of eating fat is only by animals that can be offered as a sacrifice, and this implies that the definition of the fat that is prohibited is related to the fat by the sacrifices.

Why is eating fat of cows, sheep and goats prohibited? The Rambam (Moreh 3:48, Maimonides, 1963, p. 598) explains that the prohibition is for health reasons that "the fat of the intestines makes us full, spoils the digestion and produces cold and thick blood." Ignoring the factual question of whether fat is medically bad, it is unlikely that this was the reason for the prohibition. From 7:25, we learn that a person can eat fat from animals that are not able to be sacrificed. Why would the Torah only forbid a person from eating unhealthy fat from some types of animals and not others?

Hoffmann (1953, p. 123, on 3:17, see also Alter, 2004, p. 555) notes that the prohibition of fat has to be related to the sacrifices, and he explains that the prohibition is because what is offered as a sacrifice cannot be eaten as a fear of G-d. Levine (1989, p. 45) varies this slightly. He explains that the prohibition of fat is a gezirah, "a fence around the law. Once the fat of sacrificial animals was forbidden, the fat of all pure animals was forbidden as well, whether or not the animals in question were actually sacrificed." Yet, by the olah sacrifice, the entire animal is sacrificed, and still the meat of animals is permitted to be eaten? Even in reference to the shelamim sacrifice, the kidneys, which are offered on the altar, 3:4,10,15, can be eaten by non-sacrificial meat. Why was there no gezirah by the kidneys? Why was the fat of animals that are sacrificed so important that even the fat by animals that are potential sacrifices but are not brought as sacrifices also forbidden to be eaten?

My guess is that the fat is the crucial part of the shelamim sacrifice, and other sacrifices, while the meat in the sacrifices is incidental. Thus, the shelamim sacrifice was essentially an offering of the fat of the animal as almost no meat except the kidneys was offered on the altar. (Maybe the kidneys were offered due to the difficulty and/ or time needed to remove the fat from them.)

The fat is the crucial part since this is what makes the sacrifice into a smoke (3:5,11,16 and 7:31) and/ or a "fire offering," 3:3,5,9,11,14,16. 6:5 refers to putting wood on the fire but this was just to keep the fire going or to start it, as during the day it was the fat that the was principle combustible item in the sacrifices. The smoke from the fat recalls the image of the cloud of G-d (Shemot 13:21,22) and fire from the fat is the imagery of glory of G-d (Shemot 24:17). Thus, 3:16 records that all the fat is to G-d since the fat is what generated these symbols of G-d. Maybe the imagery was for a person to realize that the sacrifice he/ she was offering was to G-d and not to some demons.

Once fat had this important role by the sacrifices to create an image of the cloud/ fire of G-d, then the Torah instituted a gezirah (“fence”) with regard to the animals that potentially could be brought as sacrifices but were not offered as sacrifices that it was forbidden to eat the fat of these animals. This gezirah was limited in several ways. One, the fat from an animal that could not be brought as a sacrifice since the animal had become a nevelah or a trefah could be used though not eaten, 7:24, and two, the fat of an animal that could not be offered as a sacrifice was permitted to be eaten, i.e. no double gezirah. Finally, even though the oil by the minhah sacrifices (2:1,4-7,15, and Bemidbar 5:15) probably had a similar role in creating smoke and fire by the minhah sacrifice, no gezirah was instituted on all oils, possibly since oil was not intrinsic to the minhah sacrifice unlike the fat which was intrinsic to the animal being sacrificed.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company

Hoffmann, David Tzvi (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Levine, Baruch A., 1989, Leviticus: The JPS Torah Commentary, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Maimonides, Moses, 1963, The Guide to the Perplexed (Moreh Nevukhim), translated by Shlomo Pines, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shemot (Exodus) 28:6-29 - The efod and hoshen: Stones of remembering

Shemot 28:6-12 records that one of the garments of the high priest was the efod. The efod appears to have been a type of apron or vest and it had a stone inserted into both of its shoulder straps. The names of six of the tribes of the Jewish people were engraved on each stone. (Does this mean that each stone was relatively large or was the engraving very small?) In addition, the high priest also wore the hoshen, the breastpiece, which was attached to the efod, and the hoshen contained twelve stones, 28:13-29. The names of each tribe were also engraved on these stones, as each stone was inscribed with the name of one tribe.

The Torah appears to give a similar rationale for both sets of stones. With regard to the stones on the efod, 28:12 records "You are to place the two stones on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel. Aharon is to bear their names before the presence of G-d on his two shoulders for remembrance." Similarly, 39:7 records, "They placed them (the stones) on the should-pieces of the efod, as stones of remembrance for the Children of Israel." This idea of remembrance also appears by the stones of the hoshen. 28:29 records, "So Aharon is to bear the names of the children of Israel on the hoshen ha-mishpat over his heart, whenever he comes into the Holy-Shrine for remembrance, before the presence of G-d, regularly." (All translations from Fox, 1995.) 

We see that both sets of stones relate to remembering, but who was to remember? What was to be remembered? Furthermore, why was there a need for two sets of stones to cause something to be remembered?

One approach (Rashi on 28:12, Seforno on 28:12,29) is that the stones were for G-d to remember the righteousness of the Jewish people. Rashbam (on 28:36) explains that due to this remembering, G-d would forgive the people for their sins. This approach is difficult theologically since it hard to understand why G-d would need to see the stones to be reminded of the righteousness of the Jewish people.

A second approach is that the stones were for the high priest to remember the Jewish people. Benno Jacob writes (1992, p. 918) with regard to the stones of the hoshen that "the high priest did not pray for his people through words in this service, but the names placed upon his heart told G-d what lay in his heart and for whom he sought healing." Similarly with regard to the stones of the efod, he writes (p. 921), that "the two shoulder stones led him to bear the worries of the individual Israelites upon his shoulder."

Cassuto suggests a similar rationale. He writes (1967, p. 374) that the stones of the efod "were a memorial and symbol that the priest ministers in the name of the tribes of Israel." Similarly, with regard to the stones of the hoshen, Cassuto writes (p. 378), "the priest will come before the Lord as the representative of Israel with the names of those whom he represents engraven for remembrance on the pouch (hoshen) that he wears on his heart."

Hertz (1960, pp. 340, 342) follows this idea as he writes by the efod that the "names denoted in concrete form that the high priest was the messenger and representative of the entire community,” and by the hoshen he quotes Benno Jacob’s explanation for the stones. However, by the stones of the efod, he adds another approach that the stones were "to remind the children of Israel of their unity of descent, and unity of service to G-d."

This idea that the high priest was/ is the messenger of the people might seem to be obvious, but as the high priest had relatively limited contact with the people since he was always in the mishkan/ ohel moed, Vayikra 21:12, it was possible that he would forget that he was the messenger of the people. The stones on his clothing with the names of the tribes could then have served as a reminder to him that he was a messenger of the people. Furthermore, the idea that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people makes sense since the high priest could see the stones on the hoshen which was on chest/ stomach. However, the stones on the efod were on the high priest's shoulders (28:12) and it would have been very hard for him to see them.

Another difference between the two sets of stones is that with regard to the stones on the hoshen, 28:29 records that the stones were to be on his heart, lev. The word lev in the Torah refers to thinking and then the idea of 28:29 is not just the placement of the stones, but also that they are to cause the high priest to think or to remember. However, this reference to the heart/ thinking by the high priest is not recorded in reference to the stones on the efod.

A third difference is that by the efod, the Torah refers to the stones as a zichron le-bnei yisrael, 28:12, 39:7, but this phrase does not appear by the hoshen. The phrase zichron le-bnei yisrael also appears in Bemidbar 17:5, which records that the fire-pans used in the test by the 250 rebels against Moshe and Aharon were to be a covering on the altar to be a lesson for the Jewish people. We see from this case that the phrase, zichron le-bnei yisrael, can refer to the Jewish people, and this implies that the stones on the efod were the Jewish people to remember.

These three differences between the sets of stones imply that the remembering by each set of stones differs. A possible distinction is that the remembering by the stones of the efod was for the Jewish people to remember, while the remembering by the stones of the hoshen was for the high priest, Aharon, to remember.

The question then is what were the Jewish people to remember when they saw the stones on the efod/ shoulders of the high priest? A possible answer is that the stones on the high priest's shoulders would look like a type of pillar of stones, and this could recall the pillars, matzevah, that Moshe put up by the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant, 24:4, as the pillars were a pile of stones. Furthermore, it might be that the matzevah in 24:4 was to re-call the people standing at the foot of Mount Sinai, 19:17, by the Decalogue. Thus, the stones on efod/ shoulders of the high priest might have been to re-call the ceremony by the establishment of the covenant or the Decalogue.

Accordingly, I believe that the stones on the hoshen were for the high priest to remember that he was a messenger of the people, and the stones on the efod were for the Jewish people to either re-call the covenant or the Decalogue.

Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1967, A commentary on the book of Exodus, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Hertz, J. H. (1872-1946), 1960, The Pentateuch and Haftorahs, second edition, London: Soncino Press

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1992, The second book of the Bible: Exodus, translated with an introduction by Walter Jacob, Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House.

Shemot 12:30 (Bo) - Deaths in the Egyptian homes during the tenth plague

Shemot 12:30 records that during the tenth plague, "there was a great outcry in Egypt for there was no household in which there was no death" (Alter translation, 2004, p. 381). How could this be if only the firstborn Egyptian males were killed? How could it be that every house in Egypt had a firstborn male? Even if three generations lived together, there must have been some homes with no firstborn males. Ibn Ezra (on 12:30) explains that the verse only means the majority of homes had a death during the plague but not literally every home. Was there even a majority of homes with firstborn males?

Rashi (on 12:30) quotes two explanations from the Midrash. One, if there was no firstborn males, then the oldest male was considered a firstborn male. Two, the firstborn could refer to either the firstborn to the father or to the mother, and since there was a great deal of promiscuity in Egypt, there could be many firstborn males.

Hizkuni (on 12:31) quotes two other explanations from the Midrash. One, from R. Natan that the Egyptians used to make a memorial to their dead, and during the plague the memorials were destroyed, which was equivalent to having the person killed. Two, the Egyptians used to bury their dead by their homes, and during the plague the dogs dug up the graves. This act was considered by the Egyptians as being equivalent to having the person killed.

Amos Chacham (1991, p. 202) suggests that the Egyptians used to live together as clans, and then the verse means that there was no clan that did not have at least one firstborn male who died. Yet, even if one accepts that house means clan, then still the clans would have to have been quite large that every clan would have a firstborn son. 

A different possibility is that reference to the dead in every Egyptian household in 12:30 includes the animals that died in the plague. The previous verse, 12:29, records that the plague "killed all the firstborn in Egypt, from the firstborn who was to inherit the throne to the firstborn in prison and all the firstborn animals." Also, when Moshe warned Pharaoh about the tenth plague, he mentioned the death of the firstborn animals, 11:5, and the death of the animals is the source for the later law that a person has to redeem his firstborn donkey, 13:14,15. We see that that the death of the animals was an intrinsic element of the tenth plague and maybe then the idea that there was no Egyptian home without a death also includes the animals that died in the plague. 12:30 does not specify that the reference is only to humans, and people cry about the death of their animals. Note, I doubt that the firstborn animals died in order that the Torah could state that in each house there was a death, but once the firstborn animals died, then this led to the result that there was a death in each Egyptian house during the tenth plague.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company

Chacham, Amos, 1991, Da'at Mikra: Commentary on Shemot, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Bereshit 42:25,27,35 – The middle of the game between Yosef and his brothers: A double dose of fear

Bereshit 42:25 records that Yosef instructed his servant to secretly return to his brothers the silver (money) they had spent on buying the food. Why did Yosef do this? To be nice? 

Most likely, Yosef was trying to re-create the situation which he thought had occurred when he was sold as the brothers would now be returning home without one brother (Shimon) and with money. Note that Yosef also gave the brothers food for the trip, 42:25, maybe in order that they would not have to open their bags right away which meant that they would only find the silver when it was too late for them to return to Egypt.

Bereshit 42:27 then records that when the brothers stopped at some place on the road home, one brother found the silver that he had used to buy the food. When he told this to the other brothers, they were all scared, and they stated, “what has G-d done to us?" 42:28. The brothers then continued on their way home, and upon arrival they told Yaakov about Yosef’s accusations and that Shimon was being kept as a hostage, 42:29-34. They did not mention anything about the silver. Instead, they opened their sacks, found the silver and they and Yaakov were scared, 42:35. What does it mean that they found the silver in 42:35, as they already knew about the silver in 42:27? Why were they scared a second time?

The traditional answer (see Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Ramban, Radak on 42:27, Luzzatto on 42:35) is that initially only one brother found the silver and it was only when the brothers came home did all the other brothers find their silver. This approach is difficult for three reasons. One, 43:21 records that when the brothers returned to Egypt they returned the silver, and they told Yosef’s steward that they found the silver on their way home. Why should they have lied to the steward about where they found the silver? Two, it is more logical to assume that once one of the brothers found his silver, the other brothers would have searched their sacks as well. Three, this approach does not explain why the brothers did not mention to Yaakov that at least one of them had found the silver.

Sarna (1989, p. 296) suggests that the brothers “had prearranged to tell their father nothing of the money and to stage the discovery in his presence.” Similarly, Robert Altar (2004, p. 244) writes that maybe “the brothers deliberately acted out a discovery in the presence of their father in order to impress upon him how they were all at the mercy of a superior power.” With this idea, one of the brothers found the money in his amtahat, 42:27, and after he told the other brothers they also checked their packs and found the money in their respective amtahot, 43:21. The brothers then put the silver back in the bottom of the sacks with their food for the animals. Once they came home and reported to Yaakov what happened, they deliberately emptied their sacks in front of him to have Yaakov “find” the silver, 42:35.

A possible reason for this explanation is that this was the second time the brothers were returning home without a brother. On the first occasion, they returned home without Yosef, and now they returned home without Shimon. The brothers were very aware of this parallelism since when Yosef told them of his plan to hold one of them hostage, they immediately associated this with their actions with regard to Yosef, 42:19-22.  Hence maybe they thought that it was better for Yaakov to “find” the money instead of them showing him the money since this would increase the chance that he would believe this crazy story that they had been accused of spies and Shimon was being held hostage. Or, maybe the brothers staged the discovery of the money instead of showing the money to Yaakov to break the parallelism between this return home and their previous return home without Yosef. The idea being that they thought that if they showed Yaakov the silver it would appear that they had sold Shimon, and this might have led Yaakov to suppose that they had sold or caused Yosef to be sold.

These ideas can explain why the brothers did not inform Yaakov about the silver they had found, but there is a simpler explanation as to how the brothers found the silver twice and were scared twice. When they were home speaking to Yaakov, the Torah, 42:35, does not state that the brothers found their silver, but that they found their money bag or purse/ wallet. One can simply understand that 42:35 means that the brothers found an empty money bag, and then 42:27 and 42:35 refer to two separate findings, one the brothers found their silver, 42:27, and one the brothers found their empty money bags, 42:35.

This means that when Yosef ordered a person to return the brother's silver to them, 42:25, this was done in two different ways, the silver was placed in their amtahat and the money bag was placed in the sack. Yosef had only said to put the silver in the sack, but either the person on his own separated the silver from the money bags or maybe it was obvious that this is what Yosef wanted.

How would Yosef have attained the brother's money bags, as when people pay for items they give their money/ silver but not their purses? While it could be that they handed over their bags of silver when they paid for the grain, it could also be that Yosef got the bags when he had the brothers in jail, 42:17.

The double finding, first of the silver and then of the empty money bags increased the effect of Yosef scaring his brothers. Furthermore, it is possible that had the money bag not appeared, the brothers would never have told Yaakov about the silver, but once the money bag appeared, then they had to explain that their silver had mysteriously returned to them. Maybe, this is why the money bag was separated from the silver to increase the chance that Yaakov would find out about Yosef returning the silver.

After discussing this idea in my synagogue, Oded Walk noted to me that the following verse, 42:36, records that Yaakov bewailed, "Me you have bereaved, Yosef is no more, Shimon is no more and Binyamin you would take!" (Altar, 2004 translation, pp. 244, 245). Yet, all the facts about Shimon and Binyamin was known before the brothers found their money bags, and hence Yaakov should have made this statement before the finding of the money bags, i.e. after 42:34 and before 42:35. Thus, it is clear that it was the finding of the empty money bags that caused Yaakov to make his statement in 42:36. Oded suggested that maybe the money bags had some relation to the special coat that Yosef had, as somehow it brought back a memory of the brothers showing Yaakov the coat when they returned home without Yosef, 37:32. My wife, Yonina, suggested that this could have happened if there was a family mark or insignia on the money bags.

It is also possible that the fear that resulted from the finding of the empty money bags was not related to the sale of Yosef but to the present predicament of the brothers and Yaakov. My son in law, Yuri Lubomirsky, suggested that when they found the silver, they might have thought that it was a mistake but when they found their money bags, then it was obvious that the returning of the silver was not a mistake. My son, Binyamin, suggested that if Yosef really got the brother's money bags when the brothers were in prison, then the finding of the money bags meant that Yosef was behind the return of the silver.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Bereshit 28:11- Yaakov going to Haran: The wealth test

28:11 (also 28:18) records that one night when Yaakov was on his way to Haran he used a rock as a pillow.  This surely must have been uncomfortable, and this indicates that he did not have a pack with him with any clothing which could have been used as a pillow.  We know that Esav had at least two pairs of clothing (27:15), so presumably Yaakov also had at least two pairs of clothing. Why did Yaakov not use some of his clothing as a pillow?

During the night, Yaakov had an amazing dream, 28:12-15, and when he awoke in the morning, he made a vow. However, Yaakov made several conditions to the vow, one of which was that G-d would give him food and clothing, 28:20. This condition implies that Yaakov was lacking both items.

Later, when Yaakov was returning home he prayed to G-d before meeting Esav, and in the prayer he mentioned that when he left the land of Israel, all he had was his walking stick, 32:11.

These three verses (28:11, 28:20 and 32:11) indicate that Yaakov left home with nothing, and raises the question, why did his parents, Yitzhak and Rivka, not give Yaakov at least some clothing when he left to go to Haran?

One might answer that Yitzhak did not offer Yaakov any assistance since Yitzhak was angry at Yaakov for lying to him and tricking him (27:18-30). However, the Torah never informs us that Yitzhak desired to punish Yaakov for tricking him. When Yitzhak first realized that he had been tricked, he trembled that he had been fooled, but he still said that Yaakov was to be blessed, 27:33. A few seconds later, Yitzhak stated that Yaakov had tricked him, 27:35, but he made this statement matter-of-factly with no apparent anger. Afterwards, Yitzhak gave Yaakov another set of blessings, 28:3,4.

Rashi (on 29:11) quotes from Bereshit Rabbah (70:12) another answer. According to this approach, really Yitzhak and Rivka gave Yaakov lots of material assistance when he left home, but Elifaz the son of Esav was sent by Esav to kill Yaakov. When Elifaz caught up with Yaakov, Yaakov convinced him to rob him of everything (except his staff?) since a poor person can be considered as if he was dead. If this did happen, then it must have occurred almost immediately when Yaakov left home since it seems that Yaakov's dream was on the very first night that he left home.

Ibn Ezra (on 25:34) suggests a third answer that Yitzhak was generally poor even though he inherited great wealth from Avraham (25:5) and became wealthy from his planting (26:13). One of his proofs is the fact that Yaakov came penniless to Haran since he argues that surely Yitzhak or Rivka would have helped Yaakov out if they could have. However, were they so poor not to give Yaakov anything?

Ramban (on 25:34) strongly disagrees with Ibn Ezra, as nothing in the Torah indicates that Yitzhak lost his wealth. Ramban notes that G-d thrice blessed Yitzhak, 25:11; 26:3,24 and what kind of blessing could it have been if Yitzhak was to lose all his wealth? Instead, Ramban suggests a fourth answer that Yitzhak did not want to give Yaakov money when Yaakov went to Haran in order not to increase Esav’s hatred of Yaakov. Yet, Yitzhak had told Esav that Yaakov was to be blessed, 27:33, and had given Yaakov another set of blessing, 28:3,4, which Esav was aware of, 28:6. It is unlikely that letting Yaakov take some clothing would have enraged Esav even more.

My guess is that Yitzhak purposely sent out Yaakov with nothing and did not allow Rivka to supply Yaakov as a test whether Yaakov was truly to be the blessed son. After Yitzhak realized that Yaakov had tricked him, he stated that Yaakov was still to be blessed, 27:33, and he gave Yaakov another blessing, 28:3,4. However, after initially desiring to bless Esav, and then being lied to by Yaakov, Yitzhak must have wondered if Yaakov really deserved to be blessed. Yaakov’s leaving to go to Haran was an opportunity for Yitzhak to test whether Yaakov was truly to be the blessed son. The test was that Yitzhak sent Yaakov away with nothing to see if Yaakov could succeed and flourish completely on his own. It seems that G-d even responded to this test by making Yaakov fabulously successful, 30:43.

I discussed this idea in my synagogue, Yakir Efrayim in Modiin, and some people (including my son Binyamin) questioned me whether a father would really act in this way. One friend, Efrayim Chotam, even called this idea akedat Yaakov. Yet, Yitzhak had experienced the real akedah when G-d tested Avraham, 22:1, and also Yitzhak knew (saw?) that his father sent out his brother Yishmael, with almost nothing, 21:14. Thus, this idea of testing a son by sending him away with nothing would not have seemed foreign or bizarre to Yitzhak. (Later Yaakov would act similarly, also sending out his son, Yosef, 37:14, though in a different context, see our discussion on 37:2-14, "Parenting" https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2013/11/bereshit-372-14-va-yeshev-parenting.html)

Beating the willows

One of the stranger customs in Judaism is that on the seventh day of Sukkot, Hoshana Rabbah, we takes some aravot (willow branches) and beat them on the ground, havatat aravot. The Rambam (Laws of lulav 7:22) writes that a person is to take one or more branches and to hit them on the floor or on an item, two or three times without reciting a blessing. The Shulchan Arukh (664:4) follows this ruling, while the Mishnah Berurah (664:19) quotes the Ari that one should hit the branches five times on the floor. What is the point of this custom?

The Mishnah (Sukkah 4:5,6, Talmud Sukkah 45a) records the ceremony in the Bet ha-Mikdash of hoshannot, that people circled around the altar with aravot on each of the seven days of the holiday of Sukkot, but it does not mention beating the aravot. Instead, at the end of its discussion of the hoshannot ceremony, the Mishnah quotes Rebbi Yochanon ben Berokah that the seventh day of Sukkot was called the day of the beating of the palm branches since the people would beat palm branches on the ground by the side of the altar. Why all of a sudden is the Mishnah referring to palm branches in the middle of the ceremony of the aravot?

The Tosefta (Sukkah 3:1, also Talmud Sukkah 43b) records that when Hoshana Rabbah was on Shabbat there was an argument between the Rabbis and the Boethusians whether the aravot could be beaten, the Rabbis said yes while the Boethusians said no. This source indicates that really it was aravot that were beaten on the seventh day and not palm branches. (Maybe to cover up this argument the Mishnah switched the aravot to palm branches.) Note that because of this argument the calendar was fixed that Hoshana Rabbah could not come out on Shabbat, which suggests that the Rabbis agreed with the Boethusians that it was wrong to beat the aravot on Shabbat but that they allowed it due to the demand of the people. Yet, still what is the reason for beating the aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash?

Bradley Shavit Artson (1996) reviews several reasons that have been suggested for beating the aravot. One reason he quotes from Abraham Milligram that is that beating was connected with rain bringing rituals. Artson rejects this reason since "there is nothing extant to indicate why the willow beating would symbolize rain." Instead, he suggests that the beating was to make the aravot pasul, no longer usable. A proof for this idea is that the following Mishnah (Sukkah 4:7) records that after the hoshannot ceremony, the children would separate the lulav from the other items and eat the etrogim. Yet, why only beat the aravot and not the hadasim or lulavim?

My guess is that the beating of the aravot is related to the prayers for rain during Sukkot and it must be connected with the hoshannot ceremony of circling the altar.  In our discussion, "Aravot in the Bet ha-Mikdash," (https://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2017/09/aravot-in-bet-ha-mikdash.html) I suggested that the circling of the aravot was to make the Bet ha-Mikdash green. The idea was that by making the altar green, this was a prayer that there should be rain to make the land green. I suspect that the beating of the willows had the same purpose, to make the altar green, as the beating was a  way of painting the altar green. This was done on the last day of Sukkot to leave the altar green since the people would no longer be circling the altar with aravot. This explanation offers a reason why the Boethusians objected to this practice only on Shabbat since this beating was a form of painting the altar, and then they would argue that it was forbidden to paint on Shabbat.  Also, maybe the Mishnah switched the beating from aravot to palm branches since palm branches would not leave stains.