Bereshit chapter 40 - Yosef, the chief cupbearer and the chief baker in prison

Bereshit 40:1 records that a cupbearer (butler ?) and a baker who both worked for the king of Egypt sinned against the king of Egypt and then 40:2 records that Pharaoh (who was the king of Egypt) got angry at the chief cupbearer and at the chief baker. 40:2 seems repetitious after 40:1 already informed us that the cupbearer and the baker sinned. 

While many (see for example, Sarna, 1989, p. 276) understood that 40:1 and 40:2 are referring to the same people, more likely, 40:1 is referring to some subordinates who sinned against the king and most likely they were killed, as possibly Pharaoh thought they had tried to kill him. 40:2 is then referring to their superiors that they did not sin directly against the king but Pharaoh was angry at them because he blamed them for their subordinates who sinned. Thus, the chief cupbearer and the chief baker were not killed, but were sent to prison.  Eventually Pharaoh would decide that the chief cupbearer was not responsible for his subordinate’s action while the chief baker was responsible, and hence the chief cupbearer returned to his position, while the chief baker was killed, 40:21,22.

40:3 records that the chief cupbearer and chief baker happened to have been imprisoned in the same prison where Yosef was imprisoned, and 40:4 records that the warden of the prison put Yosef, his second in command, 39:22, in charge of attending his special prisoners, the chief cupbearer and the chief baker.

40:5,6 records that each of the special prisoners had a dream, but they were distraught. In the case of the chief baker, his dream was ominous since it included birds eating from the top of his head, 40:17, but what was ominous about the dream of the cupbearer? The answer is that the dream of the cupbearer included grapes being pressed, va-eschat, 40:11, which might have insinuated that the cupbearer was going to be killed.

40:7,8 records that Yosef asked the two men why they were upset, and when they said it was due to their dreams, Yosef, with his usual self-confidence, told him that he would be able to interpret their dreams.

40:9-11 records the dream of the chief cupbearer, and as occurs in the three sets of dreams in the story of Yosef, the first dream in each set of dreams has two distinct elements that are not in the second dream of the set. 

The first distinct element in the chief cupbearer's dream is that his dream is longer than the chief baker's dream and has apparently extraneous information to the interpretation of the dream. In this dream, the cupbearer saw a vine with three branches, the vine had shoots, then flowers and then the clusters ripened into grapes, 40:11. While the three branches are important to understanding the timing of the dream, the growth of the grapes (the shoots, the flowers and the clusters) is unnecessary for the interpretation of the dream that the chief cupbearer would return to his job. It would have been sufficient for the cupbearer to have dreamt that he took grapes from three branches and squeezed them into Pharaoh’s cup.

Instead, as by the other sets of dreams, this extra information was for Yosef. The three stages in the development of the grapes correspond to the three stages in the development of Yosef. First Yosef developed in his father’s house, then he developed working for Potiphar, and then he developed working in the prison. With these three experiences he was ready to become the leader of Egypt. It could be that Yosef understood this message and this is why he asked the chief cupbearer to remember him to Pharaoh, though of course, he might have asked him anyway.

The second distinct element of the chief cupbearer's dream is that his dream records the dreamer (the chief cupbearer) being active that the chief cupbearer took the grapes, pressed them, and put them in Pharaoh’s cup. (I thank Aaron Israel for pointing out this distinction to me.) The significance of this action is that the first dream is more essential than the second dream in the set of dreams, and in this case, it is essential that the chief cupbearer returns to his work, and recommends Yosef to Pharaoh.

40:12,13 then record that Yosef interpreted the chief cupbearer's dream that the chief cupbearer would return to his previous position with the king. Afterwards, 40:14,15 record that Yosef asked the chief cupbearer to speak on his behalf to Pharaoh.  Evidently, Yosef thought that the chief cupbearer would be able to help him get out prison. The Ralbag (seventh benefit at the end of parashat Va-yeshev), writes that from Yosef’s behavior we learn that a person should not rely on miracles, but must make every possible effort to help one’s self. Accordingly, the Ralbag views Yosef’s behavior very positively. (I thank Adam Klein for pointing out this source to me.) In fact, Yosef repeats this same action, when after interpreting Pharaoh’s dream, he added on that Pharaoh should appoint a person (i.e., himself) to save Egypt, 41:33-36,

However, Chazal view Yosef's request very negatively. The Midrash (Bereshit Rabbah 89:2,3, also see 88:7, quoted in Rashi on 40:23) writes that Yosef had to spend an extra two years in prison because he twice asked the chief cupbearer for help instead of relying on G-d. This Midrash has led to a whole discussion about the proper amount of effort in this world, (see Nachshoni, 1987, pp. 160-164) but did Yosef really sin?

I doubt that Yosef sinned by asking the chief cupbearer for help since Yosef was eventually saved by the chief cupbearer. If Yosef acted inappropriately, then he should have been saved in a different manner. For example, Potifar could have mentioned Yosef to Pharaoh. Furthermore, in total, thirteen years passed from the time that Yosef was sold to Egypt to when he became head of Egypt (37:2, 41:36), is there any reason to think that just the jail time should have been shortened?

Presumably, according to the Midrash, Pharaoh was really supposed to have had his dreams immediately after the chief cupbearer returned to his position. Yet, if Pharaoh had his dreams immediately after the chief cupbearer left prison, maybe the cupbearer would not have mentioned Yosef at that time since telling Pharaoh of Yosef meant reminding Pharaoh of his sins and he would not have wanted to remind Pharaoh about his previous sins so quickly after he was released from prison. There needed to be some time to pass to give the chief cupbearer the gumption to mention Yosef's skills, and hence Pharaoh's dream had to occur after the chief cupbearer deemed it safe to recall his previous time in prison. Thus, while Yosef might have hoped that the chief cupbearer would immediately remember him to Pharaoh, more likely his real hope was that in the future, the chief cupbearer would recall his skills, which is what happened.

Robert Sacks (1990, p. 351) notes that when Yosef asked the chief cupbearer to remember him, Yosef said  “when it goes well with you,” 40:14.  This phrase does not refer to when the chief cupbearer would be restored to his position. Instead, Yosef requested the chief cupbearer to remember him when the right opportunity would arise (also see Siftei Chachamim on 40:14). According to this, Yosef was trusting in G-d that G-d would arraign for an opportunity for the chief cupbearer to remember Yosef, which is what occurred by the dreams of Pharaoh.

40:16,17 then records the dream of the chief baker and 40:18,19 records Yosef's interpretation of this dream. Is this second dream necessary to the story as the chief baker dies without telling anybody about Yosef?

The answer is that both the chief cupbearer and the chief baker had to have dreams in order that Yosef could have both a “good” interpretation that the dreamer went free from prison, and a “bad” interpretation that the dreamer died. The importance of Yosef’s interpretation of the dreams was that the person who went free would help Yosef get out of prison in recognition of Yosef’s help and/ or abilities. Accordingly, one person had to go free from prison. Yet, if there had been only one dream, Yosef would have had to give a “good” interpretation since a “bad” interpretation would have been useless even if correct because the person would have died without being able to tell people of Yosef’s abilities. One might answer that even with one dream, the timing of the dream, three days, showed Yosef’s abilities, but if it was well known that Pharaoh was going to have his celebration in three days, then this would have been an opportune time to either pardon or punish criminals. This means that one “good” interpretation would not have demonstrated Yosef’s abilities. Thus, there was a need for another dream with a "bad" outcome. With one “good” interpretation of the chief cupbearer's dream and one “bad” interpretation of the chief baker's dream, then the chief cupbearer would have known that Yosef could interpret dreams.

We see the need for the dream of the chief baker that when the chief cupbearer told Pharaoh of Yosef, he mentioned both that Yosef correctly interpreted his dream, and that Yosef correctly interpreted the dream of the chief baker, 41:9-13.

40:20-22 then records that Yosef's interpretations came true and 40:23 ends chapter 40 by recording that when the chief cupbearer was restored to his previous post, he forgot Yosef (lo zachar) and that he forgot him (va-yishchachehu). This verse repeats that the cupbearer forgot Yosef.  Sarna (1989, p. 280) writes that the double language "is purely idiomatic and means complete forgetfulness." Yet, from 41:9-13, we see that the chief cupbearer did not forget Yosef as he mentioned Yosef to Pharaoh.

I think the word zachor in the Torah should be understood to mean to act upon some memory, and then the first forgetting in 40:23 means that initially when the chief cupbearer left prison he did not mention Yosef to Pharaoh (see Rashi and the Rashbam on 40:23), which was to be expected since then he would have had to re-call his stay in prison and possible crime. The second forgetting was that he did not tell anybody, his wife, his family, about Yosef in order to help him forget Yosef, but he never really forgot about Yosef.  Accordingly, when he saw that it was to his advantage to mention Yosef to Pharaoh, 41:9 records that he remembered (zachor) his sins, which means that he decided to act upon his memory of Yosef.  This action by the chief cupbearer brought Yosef to Pharaoh's notice and chapter 40 is then crucial to explain the rise of Yosef.

Bibliography:

Nachshoni, Yehuda, 1987, Notes on the parshot of the Torah, Tel Aviv: Sifrati.

Sacks, Robert, 1990, A commentary on the book of Genesis, Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Bereshit 25:25,26 – The basis for the names Esav and Yaakov and one aspect of the treatment of the captive woman in Devarim 21:12

Bereshit 25:25 records that Esav was born red, and he had an aderet of hair all over him, and he was called Esav. How does the name Esav relate to Esav being red and/ or hairy?

Rashi (on 25:25, seemingly based on Targum Yonaton, also see Rashbam on 25:25) suggests that the basis for the name of Esav is that he was born made (the word aseh) and developed (nigmar) as his hair was like a grown up. This idea seems to be based more on the word developed then on the word made, and if true, it would imply that Esav was born with facial hair like a grown developed man has. However, 25:25 describes Esav’s hair as being like an aderet, which seems to imply that the hair was like a cloak that Esav was born covered with the hair on his back and arms (stomach, legs?), which accords with a cloak that covers a person’s body but does not cover a person’s mouth and nose, as a cloak has an opening for the face.

In a fascinating article, David Yellen (1927, pp. 453-455) notes that when Hebrew was a living language, some words which had two meanings were known by everyone who spoke the language, but after Hebrew stopped being spoken on a daily basis, only the main definition of a word was remembered, while the secondary meanings of word were forgotten. Yellin gives twenty-two examples, and one of them is the word aseh. He shows from several passages in Tanakh that the word aseh had a secondary meaning of to cover, and then he explains that the name Esav refers to him being born covered with hair.

This same idea is also relevant to understanding Devarim 21:12, which Yellin did not mention, and which records instructions how the captive woman is to be treated. Devarim 21:12 records that the nails of the captive foreign woman were to be done, asah. What does this mean? Rashi and Ibn Ezra (on 21:12) write that this means that the captive woman was to let her nails grow which would make the woman repulsive. How can the word asah, which refers to doing something, mean to let the nails grow since that is a passive action? It is also not clear how letting the nails grow for a month will make the woman repulsive since they will not grow that much.  Instead, following, Yellen's idea, the idea could be that the nails of the captured woman were to be covered, which might make her less attractive. 

Bereshit 25:26 then records that when Yaakov was born, he was holding onto the heel (ekev) of Esav, and he was called Yaakov. In this case, it seems that the name Yaakov is related to the heel, see Rashi on 25:26. Yet, then the yud in the beginning of the name is left unexplained. Cassuto (1965, p. 717) notes that variations of the name Yaakov, such as Ya-akh-qu-ub-il(um) have been found on tablets in 18th century BCE in Mesopotamia and in Egypt at around the same time when Yaakov was living. He writes that Yaakov is a short version of the term Yaakov-kel, and the name Yaakov has the meaning of a prayer that the person should go with/ follow G-d, which has the idea of a prayer that G-d should protect Yaakov. This beautiful reason for the name Yaakov, as suggested by Cassuto, might explain why the Torah continues to use the name Yaakov, even after G-d gave Yaakov the additional name of Yisrael, 35:10. 

Bibliography:

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1965, Yaakov, in Encyclopedia Mikrait, edited by Naftali Hertz Tur-Sinai, Shmuel Yavin and Binyamin Mazer, Vol. 3, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, pp. 716-722.

Yellin, David, 1927, Forgotten meanings of Hebrew roots in the Bible, in Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams, New York: The Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, Press of the Jewish Institute of Religion, pp. 441-458.

Bereshit (Genesis) 4:1-8 – Why did G-d not accept Kayin's sacrifice? No deal

After Adam and Havva left (were thrown out of) the Garden of Eden, they had two sons, Kayin and Hevel, Bereshit 4:1,2. Hevel became a shepherd and Kayin a farmer, 4:2.

4:3,4 record that Kayin offered a sacrifice from his produce and then Hevel offered a sacrifice from his flock. G-d accepted Hevel's sacrifice but not Kayin's, which made Kayin angry or distressed, 4:4,5. It is not clear how Kayin knew that G-d had accepted his brother's sacrifice and not his (see Cassuto, 1961, p. 207 for various guesses), but the crucial point for the narrative is that he knew as he then went and killed Hevel, 4:8.

Why did G-d not accept Kayin's sacrifice? One would think that since his sacrifice is the first sacrifice recorded in the Torah, he would get a lot of credit for originating the idea of offering a sacrifice to G-d.

One answer is that the Torah is indicating a preference for shepherds, Hevel, over farmers, Kayin. (Kugel, 1997, pp. 88,89, notes that this idea was suggested by Philo, Josephus and Ambrose. In the Middle Ages, the Abarbanel, 2007, was a proponent of this view.) Presumably the proof for this approach is that the Torah makes a point of telling us Kayin and Hevel's professions, and that they had different professions. Yet, in the remainder of the Torah we do not see any negative comments with regard to farming, and it is not clear why one think that the Torah would view farming in a negative fashion when it is so basic to human existence. Instead, the mention that Kayin was a farmer is crucial to understanding his punishment after he killed Hevel, 4:11,12,14, and then once Kayin’s profession was mentioned, Hevel’s was also mentioned. In addition, it could be that the mention of their professions is just to explain what sacrifices they brought. Maybe it was desired that both types of sacrifices, grains and animals, appear in the first case of sacrifices in the Torah. Finally, it is interesting that Kayin was the farmer since later on, he or his son, was credited with founding the first city, 4:17, and it is believed that cities developed as an outgrowth of farming.

A second answer is that Kayin brought an inferior or cheap item for a sacrifice while Hevel brought a more expensive sacrifice. (Kugel, 1997, p. 89, quotes Philo as mentioning this idea, as does Bereshit Rabbah 22:5, Rashi on 4:3, Cassuto, 1961, pp. 205,206 and Sarna, 1989, p. 32). The proof for this idea is that 4:4 records that Hevel brought the firstborn of his flock and the fat thereof, which is considered top quality. Yet, there is no proof that Kayin brought produce that was of poor quality or that he was stingy in the quantity of produce that he offered. Also, even if Hevel brought a superior sacrifice, still one would have thought that Kayin should receive credit for being the first to bring a sacrifice.

Benno Jacob (1974, p. 35) suggests “perhaps an animal sacrifice is regarded as more meritorious than a vegetable offering as it testifies to a correct conception of the dignity of man; he shall stand in opposition to the animal in spite of the likeness between them.” This could be, but the Torah has grain sacrifices, for example, the korban minhah, Vayikra chapter 2, which means that vegetables offerings are legitimate offerings. Also, once Kayin was a farmer, then it would be natural for him to offer items that he worked on and grew.

A fourth approach is that G-d's non-acceptance of Kayin's sacrifice was not related at all to the sacrifice, but was a message to negate the importance of being the firstborn, as Kayin was the older brother. This message is a theme that runs through the book of Bereshit.  Yet, while this episode is an example of this pattern in the book of Bereshit, could it be that Kayin's sacrifice was not accepted because he was the firstborn? Had Hevel not been alive, and there was no issue of who was the firstborn, then Kayin’s sacrifice would have been accepted? Again, one would think that Kayin's sacrifice would have been accepted since it was offered first, unrelated to whether he was the firstborn or not.

A variation of this fourth approach is that the story sets the pattern for the book of Bereshit that there will be a conflict between brothers, and that one brother is favored due to reasons that are not always clear, as with this approach there is no apparent reason why G-d favored Hevel's sacrifice over Kayin's sacrifice. This episode indicates that the crucial aspect is not which son/ brother is favored but how does the rejected son/ brother respond to the favoritism for his brother. In this case, Kayin failed. 4:6,7 record that G-d spoke to Kayin, and seems to have told him that he should not be upset but that he should try harder. Kayin's response was to kill Hevel, which was clearly the wrong response. Yet, was G-d not accepting Kayin's sacrifice just to test his re-action?

Jonathan Sacks (2009, p. 31) follows the understanding that Kayin was angry when G-d did not accept his sacrifices, and he suggests that from this reaction, we see that Kayin offered his sacrifice with bad intentions. He notes a study by Richard Titmuss of gift giving amongst primates that there are two types of gifts. One type is where the giver wants to help the other person, and the second type is when the giver gives the gift in order to receive something in return, quid pro quo. When the gift is given, an outsider cannot know the giver's intention, but the giver’s intention can be discerned if the gift is refused. If the gift is refused, and the giver feels sad or indifferent, then it is known that the person giving the gift genuinely wanted to help the other person. However, if the gift is refused and the person who gave the gift is angry, then we see that the giver was giving the gift in order to get something in return and the person is angry since he/ she will not get anything in return.

In the case here, Kayin offered a gift to G-d, the sacrifice, it was refused, and he responded by getting angry, va-yichar, 4:5. Sacks argues that we see that Kayin offered the sacrificed as part of a deal, which accords with him being a farmer, as possibly he gave the sacrifice in order that G-d would ensure good weather for his crops. With this idea we understand why G-d did not accept Kayin's sacrifice, since it was presumptuous for Kayin to attempt to force a deal on G-d. This is an interesting approach, but Sarna (1989, p. 33) argues that va-yichar in 4:5 means that Kayin was depressed, as if Kayin was angry, then the Torah would have written va-yihar af. Thus, according to Sarna, Kayin’s sacrifice was the first type of gift. In addition, even if va-yichar means angry, why was Kayin angry? Was Kayin angry because G-d did not accept his sacrifice or was he angry since Havel's sacrifice was accepted? Would Kayin have had the same response if Hevel's sacrifice was also not accepted? Maybe Kayin gave the first type of gift, but he was angry since he was jealous of his brother?

A sixth approach, which is a variation of Sacks' approach, is that the non-acceptance of Kayin's sacrifice is a message with regard to the worship of G-d and not specifically related to Kayin's actions or intentions. This is the first recorded sacrifice in the Torah, which is a book about the worship of G-d, and G-d's non-acceptance of Kayin's sacrifice is a message that G-d is not obligated to respond to mankind's sacrifices (and prayers). It could be that Kayin offered the sacrifice with the hope that in return G-d would grant him good weather, which is similar to many of our prayers today, or maybe Kayin offered his sacrifice with no expectations of a quid pro quo from G-d, but still mankind has to know that G-d is under no obligation to heed our prayers and sacrifices. Thus, on the very first occasion of a sacrifice, G-d specifically rejected the sacrifice in order that mankind would understand this message. (I believe this same idea occurs by Shemot 20:21, see our discussion on Shemot 20:21, "G-d's decision.")

Thus, even if Hevel had not offered a sacrifice, then based on this reason, G-d would have rejected Kayin’s sacrifice. Yet, my daughter Talia pointed out to me that this message that G-d does have to respond to our sacrifices was enhanced since G-d accepted Hevel's sacrifice since otherwise the message would be that no sacrifices are ever accepted.  

This sixth approach also suggests an additional message concerning prayer and sacrifices. After Kayin's sacrifice was not accepted, he was angry/ depressed. G-d then attempted to cheer him up, 4:6,7, but was unsuccessful, as Kayin went and killed Hevel, 4:8. We see in this case where G-d accepted one sacrifice and not the other, that the person whose sacrifice was rejected became so angry/ upset that he killed his brother, even when G-d attempted to console him. The second lesson would be that G-d cannot show overt acceptance of sacrifices and prayers since it will enrage/ upset the people whose prayers and sacrifices are not accepted. This anger/ distress could lead to murder, as here by Kayin and Hevel, and society would collapse. 

Thus, from this episode we see that G-d is not required to respond to prayers and sacrifices, as by Kayin’s sacrifice, that G-d answers some prayers and sacrifices, as by Hevel's sacrifice and that G-d cannot show this acceptance of prayers and sacrifices in an overt fashion for society to exist.

Bibliography:

Abravanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 2007, Commentary on Bereshit, Jerusalem: Horev.

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1961, A commentary on the book of Genesis, part one: From Adam to Noah, Jerusalem: Magnes Press.

Jacob, Benno (1869-1945), 1974, The first book of the Bible: Genesis, commentary abridged, edited and translated by Earnest I. Jacob and Walter Jacob, New York: Ktav Publishing House.

Kugel, James L. 1997, The Bible as it was, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Sacks, Jonathan (1948-2020), 2009, Covenant and Conversation: Genesis: The Book of Beginnings, Jerusalem: Maggid Books.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1989, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Devarim 16:18-21:9 – The order and connections of the laws of parashat Shoftim

Parashat Shoftim, 16:18-21:9, continues the law section that began in 12:1, and a question, just like by the other laws section in the Torah, is whether there is an order to the laws and/ or what is the connection between the laws in the section, in this case parashat Shoftim? We will try to answer this question by looking both at the content of the laws and the literary connections between the laws via words that appear in the various laws or even words that sound similar that are mentioned in the various laws, see Rofe (1988a, pp. 159-177, 1988b and 2002) and Cassuto (1973, pp. 1-6). We have used this methodology to suggest the order and connections of the laws of parashat Mishpatim, parashat Re’eh and parashat Ki Teitzei.

Parashat Shoftim begins with laws referring to judges, that the people need to appoint judges and the judges are to judge righteously, 16:18-20. The word tsedek, righteously, appears in 16:18 and 16:20 (twice) to frame 16:19, and the word tsadikim, the righteous, appears in the end of 16:19. These verses begin a section which runs through chapter 18 that deals with the leadership roles (political, theological and judicial) of the people, and seems to be necessary with the impending death of Moshe.

Tigay (1996, p. 453) suggests that maybe this administrative section is recorded at this point since some of the laws in the section refer to the chosen place, 17:8,10 and 18:6, which relate to laws from chapters 12, 14:22-27, and 15:19-16:17. Other possible connections just with reference to 16:18-20 are that 16:18 refers to shaarecha, your gates, and this word appears in 15:22, 16:5,11,14. Also, 16:18, 20 have the phrase, that G-d gave you, noten lecha/ natan lach, and the same phrase appears in the last verse of parashat Re’eh, the previous verse, 16:17, natan lach, and in 16:5. In addition, 16:19 refers to bribes that blind the judge, ye-aver, and this relatively rare word in the Torah (8 times) appears by the law of the firstborn animal, 15:21, e-ver. Note, 15:21 refers to two specific types of disabilities to the firstborn animal that make the animal inadmissible as a sacrifice, and the first type connects the law of firstborn animal to the law of the korban pesach in the beginning of chapter 16, peseach (see Tigay, 1996, p. 453) and the second type, e-ver, the blind animal, connects the law of the firstborn animal to the laws in reference to judges, the end of chapter 16.

Another more distant connection is that 16:18-20 might refer back to the laws of idolatry in chapter 13. The prime idea in 16:18-20 is to pursue justice, and by the last case in chapter 13 to kill the inhabitants of the wayward city, the Torah stresses that one must make a thorough investigation, 13:15. This thorough investigation must be based on the principle of pursing justice, as stressed in 16:18-20, and not by falsifying the evidence. Going even further back, the end of 16:20, refers to the people inheriting the land and this idea appears in 12:1 and 12:29(?).

The next laws in parashat Shoftim, 16:21,22 record the prohibitions of asherot and matzevot. What is the connection between 16:18-20 and 16:21,22? Why are the prohibitions of asherot and matzevot recorded after the injunctions to appoint judges and for judges to judge objectively?

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 7b) quotes Resh Lakish that the conjunction of 16:18-20 with 16:21 teaches us that whoever appoints a judge who is unworthy is like one who planted an ashera. The Abravanel (1999, p. 59) extends this idea, and claims that 16:21,22 and 17:1, all teach lessons concerning the appointment of judges.

Ibn Ezra (on 16:21) suggests that the conjunction of the verses is because a judge’s first job is to eliminate public idolatry. Similarly, Bekhor Shor (on 16:21) notes that Gideon (Shoftim 6:28) destroyed the pagan altar and asherot when he became a judge.

Dennis Olsen (1994, pp. 81,82) argues that all of the laws of Deuteronomy (chapters 12-26) are based on the order of the Decalogue. In this case, he argues that the appointment of judges relates to the fourth commandment concerning parents and authority, and the conjunction of the law of appointing judges with the laws prohibiting asherot and matzevah is join the first commandment not to have other gods with the fourth commandment. He writes, “One can properly understand the issue of honoring authorities and leaders only in conjunction with the laws prohibiting false worship of other gods… no human leader is infallible and worthy of worship.”

In class, Meir Mor Yosef suggested that the laws by not making an asherah and matzevah, 16:21,22, were akin to not giving bribes by the judges, 16:19, since the asherah and matzevah can be considered as an attempt to bribe G-d.

Rofe makes the striking literary point that by the instructions to the judges to judge righteously, 16:19 records three prohibitions, lo tateh, lo takir, and lo tikah and then 16:21,22, by the asherot and matsevot, and 17:1, the next law not to sacrifice an animal with a blemish, have a similar pattern and almost identical language, lo titah, lo takim and lo tizbah. This suggests that the conjunction of the verses 16:12,22 and 17:1 with the appointment of the judges is due to this triple association of words. However, Rofe himself argues that this association is insufficient to explain the conjunction of verses since he believes that 16:21,22 and 17:1 should really have been recorded in the end of chapter 12.

The connections between 16:21,22 and 17:1 and chapter 12, the beginning of the law section, is that 16:21,22 is similar to the law in 12:3, which records the requirement to destroy the pagan matzevot and asherot. In addition, 12:31 has the word saneh, which appears in 16:22, and 17:1 (and 17:4) has the word toevah, which also appears in 12:31. However, the matzevot and asherot referred to in chapter 12 are not the same matzevot and asherot referred to in chapter 17. 12:3 refers to matzevot and asherot that were used for idolatry, while 16:21,22 refer to matzevot and asherot in reference to worshipping G-d (also prohibited). This difference might be why the two sets of laws were not recorded together (to answer Rofe’s question).

The next set of laws in parashat Shoftim, 17:2-7, record laws about punishing a person who does idolatry, and is associated with 17:1 since both sections have the phrase, davar ra (17:1,5) and toevah (17:1,4), see Tigay (1996, p. 453). 17:2-7 is also connected with 16:18-20 since 17:2,5 have the word shaarecha, which appears in 16:18, and this word connects 17:2-7 to the laws starting from the firstborn animal, 15:22. Also, 17:2 has the phrase noten lach as in 16:18,20. In addition, 17:2-7 discusses judging and investigating people, which is thematically connected to the laws by the justices of 16:18-20 based on the goal of arriving at a correct judgement. Going further back, 17:2-7 is also similar to the laws of chapter 13, which also has laws relating to idolatry through the similar verses 17:4 and 13:15, the phrase u-berata hara mi-kirbecha in 17:7 and 13:6, the phrase u-sekaltem ba-avanim va-metu in 17:5 and 13:11 (in the singular), the phrase tehiyeh bo barishonah in 17:7 and 13:10.

The ensuing section, 17:8-13, record laws about the high court, which continues with the judicial theme of 17:2-7, and has several similar words with 17:2-7, drashata, 17:4,9; al pi, 17:6(2),10,11, u-bearta hara, 17:7,12, and shaarecha, 17:2,5,8. (This last literary connection connects 17:8-13 to all the previous laws going back to the firstborn animal). In addition, both sections refer to capital punishment, 17:5 and 17:12. Also, 17:9,12 have the word shofet, judge, which appears in 16:18 and 17:9,11 have the word mishpat and this word appears in 16:18,19. Again, 17:8,10 refer to the chosen place, which associates with the references to the chosen place in chapters 12, 15 and 16. Also, the end of this section, 17:13, concludes the section with the words, yishmiu ve-yirau, and this phrase appears in 13:12. Finally, 17:8-13, also points forward to the ensuing leadership section by referring to national judges of the people, 17:9.

The next set of laws, 17:14-20, record laws relating to kings, and these laws continue the section on leadership that previously was focused on the judges. This section is connected with the previous section, 17:8-13, since that section refers to the necessity of people to listen to judicial authorities, which is also a form of leadership. In addition, there is the connecting word, sur, in 17:11 and in 17:17,20, and the connecting phrase, yamin or semol in 17:11 and 17:20. Also, 17:8 and 17:15 have the same phrase, asher yivchar Hashem your G-d bo. Furthermore, 17:18 has the phrase ha-cohanim ha-Leviiim and this phrase appears in 17:9 by the section on the high court. In addition, 17:14, the first verse in this section about kings, has the phrase, noten lach as in 17:2 (the first verse in the section on idolatry) and in 16:5,17,18, 20. Also, 17:14 has the word, ve-rishtaha, which is similar to the word, ve-yarashata in 16:20.

The following section, 18:1-8, refers to laws about the priests and Levites since they were also leaders in reference to the work in the mishkan/ ohel moed. Note the word helek appears both in reference to the priests, 18:1 and in reference to the Levites, 18:8 (twice). Ibn Ezra (on 18:1) suggests that this section follows the section on kings since the king is a judge (not mentioned in the Torah) and the priests are the teachers of the Torah. Alter (2004, p. 968) varies this slightly that the king is required to write a Torah, 17:18, and the priests and the Levites are to teach the Torah.

18:1-8 also have a literary connection with the previous section through the phrase cohanim ha-Leviim that appears in 17:18 and in 18:1 (and 17:9). Also, the ending phrase in the sections concerning the kings and the priests is hu u-banav, 17:20 and 18:5. In addition, this section connects with the section 17:8-13, through the words le-sheret and omed in 17:12 and 18:5, and the word mishpat, 17:9,11 and 18:3. Furthermore, the phrase bachar Hashem your G-d, appears in 18:5, similar to, but in a different word order, to 17:8,15.

The next section, 18:9-14, is that one is not to listen to various magicians, and this means that they are not to be considered as leaders. The beginning of 18:9 is almost identical with the beginning section by the laws with regard to kings, 17:14, and the word ba, appears in 18:6 by the Levi and in 18:9. In addition, 18:8 ends the section on the priests and the Levites by using the word avot, fathers, and 18:10 refers to (horrible) actions by a parent in reference to their son or daughter. Also, a little further back, 18:9 has the phrase noten lach and 18:14 has the similar phrase natan lecha, which corresponds to 17:2, 14; 16:5, 17, 18 and 20.

The following law is that one is to listen to proper prophets, 18:15-22, since they are true religious leaders. This section connects thematically with the previous section through the contrast of not listening to magician/ false prophets but yes listening to true prophets. The end of the section, 18:19-22 refers directly to this contrast. Some literary connections of this section with previous sections are that the last verse of this section, 18:22, has the word ya-ba which appears in 18:6,9, the two previous sections. Also, in this section the word dibber figures prominently, 18:17,18(twice), 19(twice), 20(three), 21(three) and the word appears in 18:2. There is also a literary connection between 18:22 and 17:12,13 through the word zadon.

Chapter 19 records laws that relate to the functioning of the law system. The first set of laws is the establishment of cities of refuge, 19:1-13. This section is connected with chapter 18 based on the words, goyim, 18:9, and 19:1 and the phrase noten lach, in 18:9,14 and 19:1,2,10. Again this phrase noten lach also appears in 17:2, 14; 16:5, 17, 18 and 20. The phrase noten lecha in 19:2 continues with the word le-rishtaha, and this word also appears in 17:14.

The next section is just one verse, 19:14, the law of moving a boundary marker. Why is the law of moving landmarks recorded at this particular place in the Torah?

Ibn Ezra (on 19:14) suggests that the law relates to the ensuing law of witnesses since moving landmarks will lead to fights and the claimant will need to bring witnesses to support his claim. In addition, the ensuing law of witness ends with a reference to violence, "an eye for an eye."

Tigay (1996, p. 454) quotes three possible reasons for the placement of 19:14. One, the law relates to the division of land, which is also mentioned in 19:3. Two (see Rofe, 1988, p. 271), the word gevul, boundary, appears in 19:14 and twice in the previous section, 19:3,8. Three, the moving landmarks is a way to steal land and hence there is a law of murder (the city of refuge), theft (moving landmarks) and perjury (witnesses) which corresponds to the order of these laws in the Decalogue.

Abravanel (1999, p. 309) suggests two other reasons for the placement of the law of not moving landmarks. One, the possibility of moving landmarks necessitates judges who know the division of land and are able to ensure that people do not lose their land. The law then relates to both the city of refuge (the previous section, 19:1-13) and laws concerning witnesses (the following section, 19:15-21) since these laws also necessitate judges. Two, by the city of refuge, there was a danger that a person would move the landmarks of the city of refuge to steal "public land" or that after the designation of the city of refuge, the public would steal land from individuals.

One could vary Abravanel's first reason from judges to the legal system. The landmarks were a proof of ownership of land in ancient times, and a person who moved landmarks destroyed the way society documented ownership of the land. The landmarks were part of the formal property system of society, which allows for legally enforceable transactions with regard to property, and hence the landmarks were elements of the legal system. Similarly, the city of refuge and laws concerning witnesses were also part of the legal system of the Torah.

Other literary connections, beside the word gevul, between 19:14 and the previous section is the phrase noten lach le-rishtah in 19:2 and 19:14. Also the word nachlah in 19:10 is similar to the words nachlatcha and tinchal in 19:14.

The third section in chapter 19 records laws concerning false testimony, 19:15-21. This relates to the law of the city of refugee through the words, lo tachos in 19:13,21, and the word u-bearta, 19:13,19. Also, the word three, shalosh, in 19:15 and 19:2,7,9 (2). A further back reference is the word ha-riv in 19:17 and rivot in 17:8, and the phrase yishmioo ve-yiraoo in 19:20 and 17:13 (and 13:12). Also, 19:17,18 have the word shoftim, which re-calls the first word of the parasha, shoftim (in 16:18 and in the singular in 17:8,12).

The next section, 20:1 through 21:14 records laws relating to war. Both 20:1, by the beginning of the section of warfare, and 21:10, the first verse by the last set of laws on warfare, begin with the same words, ki tezet la-milchama al ovecha, when you go out to war with your enemy. Also, 20:1 and 21:11, the second verse is the last set of laws of the war section, both have the word ve-raita, “and when you see.”

Why is this section on laws relating to wars recorded after the laws of witnesses, 19:15-21? Rashi (on 20:1) suggests two reasons for the connection between chapters 19 and 20. One reason is that the end of chapter 19, 19:21, records that if a person maimed somebody so then the person is also maimed, “an eye for an eye.” The juxtaposition of this law with the drafting of soldiers is then to tell us that a person missing a limb does not go out to fight. The second reason is that the act of maiming the guilty person is part of the execution of justice, and the juxtaposition of two sections teaches us that if a person executes just judgments, then he will be victorious in war.

Ibn Ezra suggests a different reason based on the same law as mentioned by Rashi. 19:21 records that a person must not take pity on the guilty person, but must punish the person. This is juxtaposed with the drafting of soldiers to teach us that one should not take pity on somebody who is supposed to go fight and exempt the person from being a soldier.

Tigay (1996, p. 454) suggests three reasons for the connection between the section of warfare and the previous sections. One, war involves military leadership, and this is a primary role of government along with judging, chapter 19. Two, 19:12, refers to capital punishment, and war is another case where the taking of human life is permitted. Three, the law of the cities of refugee refers to cutting down trees with an axe, 19:5, and within the war section, there is the prohibition of cutting down trees with an axe during a siege, 20:19.

There is also an association of words between the first set of laws relating to warfare and the laws of a false witness, the previous section. 19:20 records that people should not continue (yosefu) to do evil and 20:8 records that shotrim will continue (yasfu) to speak to the people. Also, 19:20 has the word, yiraoo and the word appears in 20:2, tiraoo. Furthermore, 19:16 refers to a fight (riv) between people, and this is what happens on a larger scale when two nations fight.

In addition, the first set of laws relating to warfare, the drafting of soldiers, connects to the beginning of parashat Shoftim, as within the drafting of soldiers, a priest and certain officials, shotrim, had to make pronouncements to the people, 20:8,9, and these shotrim are referred to in 16:18. After the drafting of the soldiers, 20:9 records that officers were appointed to command the soldiers. The priest, shotrim and officers were assuming some of the leadership roles of the people, and then the war section, also relates to the leadership section in 16:18-18:22.

The laws of the war section follows the order of conducting a war. First, the troops are mustered, 20:1-9, and then there are laws to offer or not to offer peace before beginning the battles, 20:10-18. Afterwards, there are laws how to act during the battles, a siege, 20:19,20, and then there are laws after the battle is over, 21:10-14 (in parashat Ki Teitzei). Yet, breaking up this section on war, 21:1-9 records the ceremony of the broken neck heifer, eglah arufa.

Why is the law of eglah arufa recorded within the laws of warfare? Tigay (1996, p. 534) quotes Rofe that there is a literary connection between the word sadeh (field) in 20:19 and in 21:1. This connection is not just that the word appears in both verses, but 20:19 refers to cutting down the tree in the sadeh and 21:1 refers to the dead person who fell in the sadeh. Tigay also quotes a person, C. Carr that both verses have similar sounds, 20:19, ki ha-adam etz ha-sadeh and 21:1, ki…ba-adamah...nofel ba-sadeh.

My thought is that the connection between the laws of eglah arufa and warfare is conceptual. War entails killing, which sometimes is necessary, but other times is just murder. The case of eglah arufa, where the murderer is unknown and the body is found in the field, is similar to many of the deaths that occur in wartime. At the end of the law of eglah arufa the people call upon G-d to punish the murderer, 21:9, and this law then serves as a warning to soldiers that even in wars one can only kill when it is necessary. With this understanding, the laws of eglah arufa accord with the order of conducting a war as recorded in the laws of the war section, as after a siege, 20:19,20, there is the actual fighting, 21:1-9, and then 21:10-14 records laws after the fighting is over.

Note this connection between 21:10-14 and parashat Shoftim raises the question why 21:10-14 was not included in parashat Shoftim. Possibly the answer is that Chazal based the division of the parashot on the drasha quoted by Rashi on 21:11.  Now (2024) think that more likely it was desired to end the parasha on the very nice phrase, ki ta’aseh ha-yashar be-enyei Hashem, for we will do what is right in the eyes of G-d. Two very similar phrases are also the end of the second and third aliyot of parashat Re’eh, 12:28 and 13:19.

Bibliography:

Abarbanel, Yitzhak (1437-1508), 1999, Commentary on Devarim, Jerusalem: Horev Publishing.

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Cassuto, Umberto (1883-1951), 1973, Biblical and oriental studies, vol. 1, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, pp. 1-6. Initially printed in Hebrew in 1952, Connections of sections and their order in Tanakh, World Congress of Jewish Studies, vol. 1, pp. 165-169.

Olsen, Dennis, 1994, Deuteronomy and the death of Moses, Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Rofe, Alexander, 1988a, Introduction to Deuteronomy, Hebrew, Jerusalem: Akademon Publishing House.
-----, 1988b, The arrangement of the laws in Deuteronomy, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 64:4, December, pp. 265-287.
-----, Deuteronomy: Issues and Interpretation, London: T & T Clark, 2002.

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Devarim 11:26 -16:17 – The order and connections of the laws of parashat Re'eh

Parashat Re’eh (Devarim 11:26-156:17)  begins with Moshe’s instructions to the people that when the people get to the land of Israel, they are to recite blessings on Mount Gerizim and curses on Mount Eval, 11:26-30. These verses form a bookend with the corresponding verses 27:11-13, later in the book of Devarim. The large intervening section consists of laws that are the laws of the covenant of the book of Devarim.

Prior to the large list of laws, there are two verses, 11:31,32, which conclude chapter 11. 11:31 records that the people will inherit the land, using the words la-reshet and ve-rishtem, and the same words appear in the end of parashat Ekev, 11:23, which form a mini-bookend around the instructions to recite the blessing and the curses and 11:24,25.

The next verse, 11:32, is the final verse from the exhortation part of Moshe’s speech to the Jewish people that began in 5:1, as after 11:32, Moshe continues with his speech but focuses on telling the Jewish people various laws. As the summary sentence of the speech, Moshe tells the people to shamor (remember) and do the hukim and mishpatim, see our discussion, “The definition of the word shamor in Moshe’s speeches in the book of Devarim - To remember.”  (Note that according to the division of the reading of the Torah on Monday and Thursday morning and Shabbat afternoon, 11:32 is the opening verse to the law section of Moshe’s speech.)

12:1 marks a transition in Moshe’s speech that instead of focusing on exhorting the people to follow the laws, Moshe informs the people of many laws, and this part of his speech continues until 27:10. The connections between the laws in this large section is sometimes based on the content of the laws and sometimes a literary connection based on similar words and sounds. For a similar discussion on the connection of the laws in parashat Mishpatim, see our discussion “The order and connection of the laws in parashat Mishpatim” on parashat Ki Teitzei, see our discussion “The order and connections of the laws of parashat Ki Teitzei” and on parashat Shoftim, see our discussion, "The order and connections of the laws of parashat Shoftim." 

The first law recorded in 12:1-3 is that the Jewish people were to destroy the places of idolatry in the land of Israel when they would come to the land of Israel. This law connects with the warning not to worship idolatry in the land of Israel in the previous chapter, 11:16. Also, 12:1 has the phrase, tishmerun la-asot, which appears in 11:32, and the words hukim and mishpatim which also appear in 11:32. In addition, 12:1 has the word li-rishta and 12:2 has the word yorshim, which appear in 11:31. These literary connections connect this new section of laws with the end of Moshe’s speech from 5:29 to 11:32.

The next set of laws is 12:4-14, the law of the chosen place(s?), which is in contrast to the need to destroy the idolatrous places of worship that existed in the land of Israel prior to the Jews coming into the land, 12:4. The next set of laws, 12:15-28, relate to the implication of the law of the chosen place. 

The next set of laws is 12:29-31 again relate to idolatry and these verses are linked to the opening laws of chapter 12, 12:1-3. These two small sections form a type of bookend around the laws of the chosen place.

13:1 records an introductory section to a set of three laws all of which relate to idolatry in some form, and this connects to the laws of idolatry at the end of chapter 12, see Ibn Ezra on 13:2. The first three cases in chapter 13, 13:2-6, 13:7-12 and 13:13-18, all begin with the work, ki, and build upon each other. Note the word ki appears numerous times in the parasha: 11:29, 31, 12:5, 9, 12, 14, 18, 20 (twice), 21, 23, 25, 28, 29 and 12:31 (twice). In the ensuing chapters in the parasha, the water ki appears in 14:2, 7, 8, 21, 24 (twice), 27, 29; 15:2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 (twice), 18, 21; 16:1, 3, 6, 12.

The first case in chapter 13 is the wayward prophet who tells people to worship idolatry, the second case is a person who also gets people to worship idolatry but the person was never considered a prophet and the third case is when the whole city decides to worship idolatry. Chapter 13 ends with a concluding sentence, 13:19, which with 13:1 frames the intervening laws in the chapter. Also 13:19 refers to do what is right, yashar, and this same word appears in 12:8,25,28.

14:1, the following verse, refers to the Jewish people as G-d's son, and records two laws, one a prohibition to gash one’s self and two, a prohibition to remove hair on the head to make one’s self bald. Ibn Ezra (on 14:1, in some versions on 13:18) suggests that this reference to sons connects with chapter 13 where sons are referred to three times, 13:7(2) and 13:14, and then in 14:1 the idea is that one cannot mourn for these relatives since they committed idolatry. My guess is that 14:1 is connected with 12:31, which notes that some of the inhabitants of the land of Israel would burn their sons and daughters as part of their religious worship (the worship of Molech). In contrast, 14:1 records that because the Jewish people are G-d’s sons, they cannot damage their bodies. These verses, 12:31 and 14:1, are the immediate verses surrounding chapter 13.

The two laws in 14:1 relate to each other since they involve a person damaging their body, and the following verse, 14:2, explains the law in the second half of 14:1.14:2 explains that the people are not to remove their hairs on their head as part of mourning, the law in the second half of 14:1, since they are a kadosh nation, and this corresponds to the rationale for this law by the priests in Vayikra 21:6,7.

The next set of laws, 14:3-21, record laws relating to eating, which relate to the laws of eating that were discussed in chapter 12. For example, 12:15,22 refer to eating the deer and the gazelle and these animals are referred to in 14:5. The last verse in this section on eating, 14:21 also refers to the Jewish people as a kadosh nation, and this phrase in 14:2,21 frame the laws relating to eating. Furthermore, the theme of kedusha relates both to the laws of eating, 14:3-12, and to not plucking out one’s hair in mourning, 14:1. Similarly in the book of Vayikra these laws are part of the large sections relating to kedusha, Vayikra 11:44-47; 20:25, 21:1-22:33.

The next set of laws, 14:22-29 record the laws of ma'aser (tithes), and these laws refer to eating, 14:23,26,29, and to the law of the chosen place(s?)14:23, which relate the laws of ma’aser to the laws of chapter 12. These two concepts, eating and the chosen place, are mentioned in 12:5,7,11,14,15,18,20,21. Even more explicitly, 12:6,11,17, refer to bringing ma’aser to the chosen place or not eating ma’aser by the local city gates. Furthermore, 14:27,29 refer to remembering the Levi and the Levi is also referred to in 12:12,18,19.

Tigay (1996, p. 453) notes that starting from 14:22 through 16:17, the laws all relate to a certain number of years or times during the year. The word shanah, year, appears in 14:22 (twice), 14:28, 15:1, 15:9 (twice), 15:12 (twice), 15:18, 15:20 (twice), and 16:16.

The following set of laws is the law to abolish loans after seven years, 15:1-6. The Torah makes a literary connection between the laws of ma'aser and law of annulling loans, as 14:28 records the phrase, miktseh shalosh shanim, and 15:1 records the phrase, miketz sheva shanim. Ibn Ezra (on 15:1) also notes that the law of abolishing loans helps the poor and the law of ma'aser (sheni) is also to help the poor.

The next set of laws, 15:7-11 records the laws of lending to the poor. These laws are connected to 15:1-6 since the Torah (15:9) is concerned that a person may not lend to the poor because of the law of annulling debts in 15:1-6. Furthermore, the same word evyon, the poor, is used in both sections, 15:4,9,11. Also, 15:9 refers to a person who does not want to lend as bli-yaal and this relatively rare word, is also in 13:14.

Afterwards, 15:12-18 records the laws that slaves must be given a gift, severance pay, when they are freed, and this also relates to helping the poor. In addition, both in the previous section, 15:9, and this section, 15:18, there is reference to the eye of the person who is supposed to give the money, eincha. Also, both 15:10 and 15:18 refer to G-d blessing the person who gives the money either to the poor or to the newly freed slave. Finally, both 15:1 and 15:12 refer to the seventh year, and these references to the seventh year by the law of abolishing loans and giving money to the poor might be considered a type of envelope to the law of lending to the poor.

The next set of law is the law of the bekhor, the firstborn animal, 15:19-23. This law connects with the law of giving gifts to the freed slave, the previous law, because 15:15 records that a person should give money to the slave since a person should remember that the Jewish people were once slaves in Egypt and G-d freed them, and the law of bekhor, is to remember the exodus from Egypt, Shemot 13:14,15, see our discussions on Shemot 11:5; 12:29, “The deaths of the firstborn Egyptians in the tenth plague.”  The laws of chapter 12 are also relevant to the laws of bekhor, since if the animal is not blemished, then it is to be brought as a sacrifice to the chosen place, 15:20. Finally, the laws of ma'aser and bekhor are referred together in 12:6,17, and the two sections, 14:22-29 and 15:19-23 can be viewed as a bookend around 15:1-18. Accordingly, 14:22-15:23 form one unit. The outer envelope is the laws of ma’aser, 14:22-29, and bekhor, 15:19-23, who both relate to laws of chapter 12. The inner units are the three laws of charity, with main focus being the middle law to lend to the poor. Thus, in 14:22-15:23 there is a chiasmus structure of ABXBA.

The next set of laws, 16:1-8, records laws of the holidays of Pesach and Matzot. 16:2,6,7 refer to the chosen place, which is also mentioned by the law of bekhor, 15:20, and as noted above, numerous times in chapter 12. The word shaar, gate, also appears by the laws of bekhor and the korban pesach, 15:22 and 16:5. Also, the word zevach appears by both laws, 15:21 and 16:2,5,6. In addition, as noted above, the law of bekhor is due to the Exodus from Egypt, and hence relates to holidays of Pesach and Matzot. Probably for that reasons, the laws are recorded together also in Shemot 34:18-20. Tigay (1996, p. 453) also notes that in the laws of bekhor, 15:21 refers to the animal being lame, piseach, and this is the same sound of the pesach sacrifice in 16:1,2,5,6. See Ibn Ezra on 16:1 (or in some versions on 15:22) for other connections.

The next set of laws are the laws of two other festivals, Shavuot, 16:9-12, and the laws of Sukkot, 16:13-15, who are described in very similar manner of celebrating, 16:11 and 16:14. These laws also connect to the law of chosen place, 16:11,15, and they refer to helping the Levites, the orphans and the widows, like by the laws of ma'aser, 14:27,29, and 16:11,14. Also, they both have the word, shaarecha, your gates, 16:11,14, which connects both with the laws of the firstborn animal, 15:22, and the korban pesach, 16:5. In addition, the number seven is referred to by the end of the laws of the holiday of Matzot, 16:8, and this number is referred to twice both by the law of Shavuot, 16:9 (twice), and by the holiday of Sukkot, 16:13 and 16:15.

The final two verses in parashat Re'eh, 16:16,17, are concluding verses to the festivals discussed in the chapter, and refer to the three holidays mentioned in the chapter 16, chag ha-Matzot, chag Shavuot and chag Sukkot. The final verse, 16:17, also refers to G-d’s blessings, berakah, which also appears by the holiday of Shavuot, 16:10, and by the holiday of Sukkot, 16:15.

Bibliography:

Tigay, Jeffrey H. 1996, The JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

The kinah, zekhor Hashem meh hayah lanu - הקינה זכר ה' מה היה לנו

On Tisha B'av we recite kinot (dirges) at night and during the day. At night the first kinah that we recite begins with the phrase, zeckor Hashem meh hayah lanuu, please G-d what has happened to us.

This kinah is recited after reading Eicah at night, and it forms a continuation with Eicah since it is based on the fifth chapter of Eicah, as the first half of each line of the kinah is from the fifth chapter and the kinah follows the order of the verses in the chapter. Yet, the unknown paytan (the author of the kinah) changed the second half of the verse, with the exceptions of verses 5:1,2 and 5:19-22, and this change highlights one of the changes in Hebrew poetry from the biblical period to the first millennium. In Tanakh, poetry is not defined by rhymes, and any rhymes that do occur are unintentional. However, in the first millennium, the paytanim (cantors) began to create piyyutim, of which the kinot is one example, based on rhyme. Benjamin Hrushovski (1981, p. 62) writes, "The rhyming system of the Hebrew piyut was the earliest known massive, systematic and obligatory use of rhyme in poetry, and it is very plausible that through the Christian Syriac church employing Aramaic (a cognate language to Hebrew), and via Latin liturgy, the principle of rhyme was transferred to European poetry."

Why did this stress on rhyme begin with the paytanim in the first millennium? My guess is that since they were creating new prayers that the congregation did not recognize, they used rhyme to get the listener’s attention.

Returning to our piyyut, maybe the paytan had a “problem.” On the one hand, the paytan wanted to base the entire piyyut on the fifth chapter of Eicah, but he also wanted that the piyyut would rhyme. His solution was to keep some verses, such as 5:1,2, which happen to have a rhyme, and he kept the last four verses of Eicah chapter 5 without making any changes. However, for all the intervening verses, Eicah 5:3-18, the paytan changed the second half of the verse even though some verses such as 5:15,16,17 have a rhyme. 

We will now go through these intervening verses to see that either the paytan changed the verse to introduce a rhyme, to improve the rhyme, or to give what apparently, he thought was a better explanation or a more appropriate explanation to the beginning of the particular verse. In addition, in many lines, the paytan changed the idea of chapter five, which is to show how sad the situation was with the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, to blaming the people for their sins which caused the tragedy. Furthermore, at the end of half of each line, the paytan added the word oy, and the end of the second half of each line, he added the word oy meh hayah lanu, “what has become of us” which is from Eicah 5:1.

The first example of this change is by the third line of the kinah. The second half of Eicah 5:3 records that because of the destruction by the first Bet ha-Mikdash, “our mothers are like widows,” while the paytan changed the phrase to “our mothers lament in the month of Av.” Presumably, this change was to create a “full” rhyme (the same word) with the word av in the end of the two halves of the verse. Note the word lament in the piyyut is mekkonnot. The Mishnah Moed Katan 3:9 explains that this was a special type of mourning practice, where apparently one woman cried out and other women joined in to also cry out. I do not think this is done today at funerals.

The next line in the kinah changes the idea in the second half of Eicah 5:4 that after the destruction of the first Bet ha-Mikdash, the people had to pay a lot for their wood (people hate inflation) to “because we dishonored the water libation.” This change relates to the mention of water in the first half of the verse, adds a rhyme to the two parts of the line, and now blames the people for the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, that the people sinned by the water libations.

The fifth line of the kinah changes the idea in the second half of Eicah 5:5 that “our enemies were exhausting the people giving them no rest” to “we hated other people for no reason.” This change gives a “full” rhyme since the same word, radafnu, which now ends both parts of the line, and again places blame on the people for the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash.

The sixth line of the kinah changes the idea in the second half of Eicah 5:6 that the people were dependent on hand outs from the Assyrians for their bread, to “Assyrians hunted us as a hunter does his pray.” This change keeps the reference to the Assyrians from the verse in Eicah 5:5, but makes the plight of the Jews much worse and it adds a “full” rhyme with the word yad in the end of first half of line and the word yad again in the end of the second half of the line.

The seventh line of the kinah barely changes the second half of the Eicah 5:7, just the order of the words. Eicah 5:7 has the words, “And we suffer for their sins” and the kinah has “And we for their sins suffered.” This does not change the meaning of the verse in Eicah, but with the change, the two parts of the seventh line in the kinah rhyme.

The eighth line of the kinah changes the second half of Eicah 5:8 that the people have no hope of coming free from their masters who had been (or still?) slaves to blaming the people for why slaves ruled over them that the Jewish people had not freed their slaves, presumably in the yovel year, see Yirmiyahu 34:13-17. This change not only blames the people for their sins, which is not in Eicah 5:8, but also adds a rhyme between the first half of eighth line of the kinah with the second half of the eighth line of the kinah.

The ninth line of the kinah changes the second half of Eicah 5:9 in a similar manner to the eighth line of the kinah. Eicah 5:9 records that the people barely have bread since they are in fear of being robbed, while the kinah records that the people barely have bread since they did not give bread to the poor when they had the chance. Again, the paytan blames the people for their sins as he claimed the people sinned due to a lack of ethics, just like in the fifth and eighth lines, and he made a rhyme between the two parts of the ninth line of the kinah. Goldschmidt (2002, p. 24, footnote 9) notes that the word used by the paytan to describe the people not giving to the poor comes from Devarim 15:7.

The tenth line of the kinah changes the second half of the Eicah 5:10 from a description of the people withering from famine to that the people had switched the glory of G-d, which Goldschmidt (footnote 10) suggests means that the people did not follow the Torah, for a scandal. The paytan seems to be insinuating some sexual impropriety, which would connect this line to the following lines in the kinah since this change does not seem to relate either to the beginning of the verse or to the words that were replaced, the second half of Eicah 5:10. Again, the paytan is blaming the people, when there is no blame mentioned in the verse in Eicah, and he added a rhyme to the kinah.

The eleventh line of the kinah changes the second half of Eicah 5:11 that young women in Yehuda were raped like other women in Jerusalem, the first half of the verse, to saying that the women were raped since the people had regularly committed adultery. Again, the paytan blames the people and again he added a rhyme to the kinah, which is not in Eicah 5:11.

The twelfth line of the kinah replaces the second half of Eicah 5:12 which states that the Jewish elders were shown no respect, presumably by the non-Jews, to explaining the first half of Eicah 5:12 that the leaders of the people were hung. The paytan explains that the leaders were hung because they acted unethically by stealing and robbing from the poor. Again, the paytan is saying that the people sinned, again unethically, but here the gain in rhyme is somewhat minor, as Eicah 5:12 has a rhyme between the two parts of the verse based on the sound, oo, but now with the change, the rhyme of the twelfth line of the kinah is based on the sound loo.

The thirteenth line of the kinah, as usual quotes the first half of Eicah 5:13, which refers to the difficulty of young men carrying heavy millstones, but does not quote the second half of the verse, which refers to the young men failing by some wood, which is not that clear. Instead, the paytan changes the second half of the Eicah 5:13 to refer to young men going to a house of prostitutes based on Yirmiyahu 5:7 and this connects with the millstone in beginning of the verse which is used for grinding wheat. Again, the paytan is blaming the people and there is some improvement in the rhyme, from oo and loo in Eicah 5:13 to oo and oo in the thirteenth line of the kinah.

The fourteenth line of the kinah changes the second half of Eicah 5:14 from referring to an absence of music by young people to explaining the first half of Eicah 5:14 that the elders were no longer judging the people since the paytan explains that they perverted justice of the orphans and widows. Again, the paytan is saying that the people sinned, and he added a rhyme to the fourteenth line of the kinah when there is no rhyme in Eicah 5:14.

The fifteenth line of the kinah changes the words in second half of Eicah 5:15 “our dancing has turned into mourning” which relates to the loss of joy expressed in the first half of the verse to “because we did not go on the pilgrimages to Jerusalem,” which explain the loss of joy in the first half of the verse/ kinah. In this case, there is no change in the rhyme at all from Eicah 5:15, but the paytan has changed the verse from being a description of sadness to blaming the people for the sad state. Did the paytan think that this was a more appropriate explanation to the beginning of the particular verse than what is recorded in Eicah 5:15?

The sixteenth line of the kinah as usual changes the second half of Eicah 5:16, but it is surprising. Eicah 5:16 begins by stating that our crown (the Bet ha-Mikdash) has fallen and the second half of the verse is that this happened due to our sins. Accordingly, this verse blames the people and also the two parts of the verse happen to rhyme based on the sound noo. One might have thought that the paytan would have accepted this verse as is, but no, he changed the second half of the verse to “because the Bet ha-Mikdash was burnt.” These words explain the crown falling in the first half of the verse, but do not blame the people, which breaks the pattern in this piyyut. Instead, maybe the paytan changed the second half of Eicah 5:16 since he improved the rhyme to now be based on she-noo (instead of just noo) in the end of both halves of the sixteenth line of the kinah.

The seventeenth line of the kinah changes the second half of Eicah 5:17 from “our eyes are dimmed” to “because the honor of the Bet ha-Mikdash is gone.” The second half of Eicah 5:17 is a parallelism to the first half of the verse which expresses the sadness of the people, but with the change in the kinah the second half of the seventeenth line of the kinah explains the first part of the verse that we are sad since the Bet ha-Mikdash is gone. Presumably, the paytan thought that this change was a more important message since this again, as in Eicah 5:15, is a case where his change did not alter the rhyme that happened to be in Eicah 5:17.

The eighteenth and last line that the paytan changes from Eicah chapter 5, seems also to be due to his desire to add a rhyme to the verse which does not exist in Eicah 5:18. Eicah 5:18 begins by stating that the Bet ha-Mikdash is desolate and then explains that this is because foxes roam over it. The paytan changes this to explain that the Bet ha-Mikdash is desolate since an idol was placed in it. This might make the desolation seem greater, and for sure it adds a rhyme of the sound mem to the end of the first and second halves of the eighteenth line of the kinah.

The next four lines of the kinah are exactly the same as the last four lines of Eicah chapter five, Eicah 5:19-22, and maybe the paytan did not changes these lines since he did not want to change Eicah 5:19, which speaks about G-d.

Bibliography:

Goldschmidt, Daniel (1895-1972), 2002, first printed 1972, The kinot of Tisha B’av: Following the custom of Poland and Ashkenazi communities in the land of Israel, 2nd edition, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Hrushovski, Benjamin, 1981, Note on the systems of Hebrew versification, in The Penguin Book of Hebrew verse, edited and translated by T. Carmi, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: England, pp. 57-72.

Bemidbar 31:26-47 and 32:1-4 – The unequal split of the spoils from the war with Midyan: Efficiency over equality?

Bemidbar 31:12 records that the soldiers brough back many women and animals from the war with Midyan and gave them to Moshe and Elazar. While in modern times, it is considered wrong to keep booty from a defeated enemy, the Torah here is following the convention of the rules of warfare of antiquity that the spoils of war, the women and animals in this case, were considered the legitimate possession of the victors, see Bereshit 14:24. (Maybe the idea of getting booty was so ingrained to the soldiers that if the Torah had not given the soldiers the booty, then nobody would have been willing to fight in future wars?)

The question was then what was to happen with all these people and animals? Should the animals have all gone to the mishkan/ ohel moed? Should the women and animals have been equally divided amongst the people?

31:25,26 record that G-d said that all the people and animals from the spoils of the war should be counted. 31:27 then records that G-d told Moshe to split up the young women and animals that had been captured in the war with Midyan, that half would go to the soldiers who fought in the war (12,000 out of 601,700 men, Bemidbar 26:51 and 31:4) and half would be distributed amongst the rest of the population (589,700 men). 31:28,29 then records that of this booty, the soldiers had to give one five hundredth (0.2% or 0.002) of their spoils to the priests, and 31:30 records that the people had to give one fiftieth (2% or 0.02) of their spoils to the Levites. With this distribution, the Levites as a whole received ten times more than the priests as a whole, which roughly matches up with the difference in giving of terumah (if it was 1%) and ma’aser by the people, and also that each Levite would give 10% of the ma’aser he received to a priest, 18:12,21,26, see Milgrom (1990, p. 263). 31:31-47 records that the people fulfilled these instructions, and below we go through the calculations referred to in 31:32-47.

This division of the spoils means that the soldiers who went to fight received more spoils, around 33 animals per fighter as opposed to 0.67 animals for rest of the population, and more women captives since the soldiers were a small group within the population and their gifts (taxes?) to the priests were a smaller percentage than the general population's gifts (taxes?) to the Levites. In addition, the soldiers also got other assets from the war besides women and animals that the general population did not get a share of, 31:20(?), 50-54. 

The Jewish people were about to go into the land of Israel, and this unequal division of the spoils of the war meant that the people were not going to start living in the land of Israel from an equal economic base since the soldiers in the war with Midyan would have been wealthier and had a “first start” advantage over the rest of the population. While a person might claim it is fair that the soldiers should receive more of the spoils than the people who did not go to fight, still this meant that the people were not entering the land of Israel with equal wealth since the soldiers from the war with Midyan were wealthier than the rest of the population.

This question of the division of the wealth of the spoils relates to a general question, should society prioritize efficiency (production of goods) or equality? In general, if a society chooses to prioritize efficiency, then there will be less equality in society, while if society chooses to prioritize equality, then the economy will be less efficient, that is to say, there will be less goods overall for the people in society. In broad terms, capitalistic economics prioritize efficiency while socialist/ communist economies prioritize equality.

In this case, the unequal distribution of the spoils of the war would have led to greater efficiency since it would have encouraged more people to fight in the upcoming wars for the land of Israel in order to get more spoils, and historically in all societies, soldiers were rewarded for their fighting by being able to take spoils from the war, The fact that the Torah followed this practice with just a symbolic gesture to give the people who stayed behind some of the spoils, shows that here the Torah was favoring efficiency at the expense of equality.

This same question of equality vs. efficiency might also be applicable to the request of the tribes of Gad and Reuven for land on the east side of the Jordan River, 32:1-4. Moshe did not respond to them that the land that they were requesting was inferior to the land in Israel, which implies that the land on the east side of the Jordan river was fertile, so why should these tribes have gotten the land? This would seem to be an unequal distribution of land that these tribes were getting superior land. However, on the other hand, it was more efficient to give the two tribes land since then there would be more land for all the other tribes, which would lead to a greater production of goods. Also, in the end the tribes agreed to be the first fighters, which can be considered an increase in efficiency.

In conclusion, by the distribution of the spoils from the war with Midyan, and maybe by the agreement to give the tribes of Gad and Reuven the land on the east side of the Jordan River, the Torah was showing a preference for efficiency over equality in society.

Calculations:

The total number of women captives: 32,000 (31:35). The soldiers received half of these captive, 16,000 women, 31:40. Of these 16,000 women, 0.002 had to be given to the priests. This would be 16,000 times 0.002 = 32 women (31:40). This means that the soldiers received 15,968 women, and then each soldier received 15,968/12,000 = 1.33 women captives. It is not clear how the fraction of a person was distributed. The Torah does not give the calculation of the distribution of the women amongst the general population, but it should have been 16,000 times 0.02 = 320 women who were given to the Levites. The remaining women, 15,680 were then in theory divided amongst the civilian population, 15,680/589,700 = 0.027 women, which again has the problem of distributing a fraction of a person.

The total number of sheep was 675,000 sheep (31:32). For the soldiers’ share, this was divided in half, 337,500 sheep (31:36). 0.002 of this number of sheep (337,500*0.002), 675 sheep were given to the priests, 31:37, which means that 337,500*0.998 = 336,825 sheep remained to the fighters. This number of sheep is then divided by 12,000 (the number of soldiers), 336,825/12,000 = 28, which means that each soldier got 28 sheep. For the rest of the population, their share of the sheep that was given to the Levites, was 0.02 times 337,500, which is 6,750 sheep (10 times more than was given to the priests). The remainder of their share of the sheep was 337500*0.98 = 330,750 sheep. These sheep were then divided by the civilian population 589,670, and then each person who did not fight received 330,750/589,670 = 0.56 sheep.

This same calculation can be done for the distribution of the of captured cattle and donkeys (mules?). The total number of cattle was 72,000 (31:33) and then half of the cattle was 36,000 (31:38,44). We can multiply 36,000 by 0.002, 36.000*0.002 = 72, which means 72 cows were given to the priests by the soldiers, 31:38. The soldiers were then left with, 36,000 times 0.998 = 35,928 cattle. If we divide this number by the total number of soldiers, 12,000, then each soldier received, 35,928/12,000 = 2.99 cows. With regard to the general population, in total they received 36,000 cattle, of which they gave 36,000 times 0.02 =720, which means 720 cows were given by the general population to the Levites, ten times what the priests received. There remained 35,280 cows for the remainder of the population, and then on average each of the non-soldiers (35280/589700 = 0.06), received 0.06 cows.

With regard to the donkeys, the total amount of donkeys taken from Midyan was 61,000, 31:34. Again this number was split between the soldiers and the general population. The soldiers received 30,500 donkeys (31:39), and this number need to be multiplied by 0.002, 30,500*0.002 = 61, which means the soldiers gave 61 donkeys to the priest, 31:39. This left the soldiers with 30,500*0.998 = 30,439 donkeys, and if this number is divided by the number of soldiers, 30,439/12,000 = 2.54, then each soldier received 2.54 donkeys. With regard to the general population, as a group they received 30,500 donkeys (31:45). They gave 2% of this total to the Levites, 30,500 times 0.02, which equals 610 donkeys (again ten times the number of donkeys the priests received). The remaining donkeys, 30,500 times 0.98 = 29,890 donkeys, were then divided by the general population, 29,890/589,700 = 0.05 donkeys. This means that each person from the general population received 0.05 donkeys.

Altogether the people who went to fight received 28 sheep + 2.99 cows + 2.54 donkeys = 33.53 animals per fighter, and 1.33 women. The people who did not go fight received 0.56 sheep + 0.06 cows + 0.05 donkeys = 0.67 animals per person and 0.027 of a woman captive. Note, it is not clear which people from the population that did not fight received an animal and which type of animal since there were not enough animals for everybody.

Bibliography:

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Bemidbar 11:4-34 - The clamoring of the Jewish people in the desert for meat: Be careful what you ask for

Bemidbar 11:4 (also 11:13) records that the Jewish people clamored for meat when they were in the desert. Bemidbar 11:18-20 records that in response to the people’s request for meat, G-d told Moshe that He would supply the people with meat for thirty days until it "comes out of their nostrils." G-d was angry with the people’s request, but Shemot 16:2,3 records that the people also asked for meat, and G-d did not seem to have been angry with the people at that time. (Maybe because the people were not punished in Shemot 16, the people believed they could complain here.) Why was G-d angry with the people here?

Nehama Leibowitz (1982, pp. 118,119) suggests that in Shemot the people had just come out of Egypt so these complaints could be expected while in Bemidbar the people had been living with the protection of G-d for more than a year. Also, she writes that the “second occasion was no longer the first offense, they had been warned (?) and they should have known better.”

In the Anchor Bible Dictionary (Freedman, 1992, topic: covenant), they explain that in Shemot, the people had not yet made a covenant with G-d, while in Bemidbar the people had made a covenant that made them responsible for their actions.

Another possibility is that after the sin of the golden calf, G-d was less forgiving. The idea being that really the people should have been wiped out for the sin of the golden calf (Shemot 32:10), but G-d accepted Moshe's prayers to let them live. However, now G-d's tolerance for their sins was much lower so when they complained after the sin of the golden calf they were punished. Maybe this is the idea of Shemot 32:34 that when the people would sin, then it will be considered as being more grievous due to the sin of the golden calf.  

A fourth possibility is that from Vayikra 17:3 it appears that the people had meat, and most likely the laws recorded in Vayikra 17 were told to Moshe just a month or so before the people are complaining for meat. Maybe the people’s complaint for meat was because Vayikra 17:5,6 required the people to bring their slaughtered animals to the mishkan/ ohel moed, and then the people would have had to give some of their meat to the priest. The meat was then no longer free, and maybe this was a reason for their complaints that they did not want to share their meat with the priests.  Following this approach, G-d was angry here since the people were complaining since they did not want to bring the meat as sacrifices in the mishkan/ ohel moed, though they had been willing to offer sacrifices to satyrs, Vayikra 17:7. According to this idea, their complaints for meat also showed a desire not to worship G-d.

A fifth answer is that in Shemot 16:3 they had yet received the mahn, and they honestly thought they were going to die of starvation, but here they had been receiving the mahn for a year, and they were not on the verge of starvation.

Regardless of why G-d was angry with the people's request, their request was apparently fulfilled. 11:31 records that a wind, ruah, came and brought copious quantities of birds, which fell/ landed outside the camp. 11:32 then records that the people went out and collected the birds for thirty-six hours (continuous?), day, night and day, and then they placed and the birds around the camp in order to cure the meat to last a month (see Milgrom, 1990, p. 92 and Alter, 2004, p. 740) or to store the birds in an orderly fashion.  However, then 11:33 records that the meat (birds) was in between their teeth and G-d killed the people.

Why were the people killed when they ate the birds? 11:18-20 records that G-d was upset with the people, but G-d did not say the people were going to die from eating meat, but that the people would loath the meat. 11:18-20 records that the people would eat meat for thirty days, but in the end, the people ate meat for less than one day. In addition, why would G-d provide huge quantities of birds if the people would barely eat the birds? If the request for meat was inappropriate, why did G-d agree to grant the meat?

The Ramban (on 11:19, also see Seforno on 11:33) suggests that there were two groups of people who desired to eat meat, but not everybody died. One group, the wicked, the asafsuf, died immediately, while the not as bad, ate the meat for a month until they became sick of it. This approach is problematic since 11:33,34 records that the people died, ha-am, and does not distinguish between the asafsuf, who are only mentioned in 11:4, and the rest of the nation.

Instead, the answer to all the questions is that G-d was going to give sufficient meat/ birds for the people to eat for a month, as stated in 11:18-20, and that is why such large quantities of birds fell outside the camp. However, the people sinned after the birds fell near the camp, and this is why they were killed. 11:32 records three actions by the people, which apparently caused G-d to punish them.

One action relates to the people’s response to G-d’s instructions to Moshe. When G-d responded to the people’s request, he told Moshe to tell the people that the people were to mekadesh the following day and eat meat, 11:18. This command to be mekadesh was presumably for people to separate from their spouses (see Shemot 19:10-15), which would show their ability to control their desires. We do not know if they did this, but we do know that the people did not follow G-d’s instructions with regard to the birds since they did not eat the birds the following day, but two days later.

After Moshe told the people G-d’s instruction in 11:18, the prophesizing of the seventy people outside of the camp occurred, 11:24-29, and only afterwards the birds descended by the camp. We know this since 11:30 records that Moshe, who had been outside the camp in his personal tent with the seventy people, went into the camp after being informed that Eldad and Medad were prophesying as he could not have remained outside the camp when the numerous birds were descending outside the camp.

Accordingly, at best, these birds began arriving in the afternoon after G-d had given the instructions to the people, or maybe they only came later at night, as by the first occurrence of the birds, Shemot 16:13 records that they came at night. Also, such large quantities of birds would have taken quite some time to descend. In addition, 11:32 records that the people got up, va-yakam, which would refer to the people getting up in the morning.  We see that the birds fell during the night after Moshe had told the people G-d’s instructions as recorded in 11:18.  Yet, the people did not eat the birds that day as 11:32 records that the people spent the entire day, the night and the following day gathering birds. It was only a day after the birds fell (two days after hearing G-d’s instructions) did the people start to eat the birds. Thus, the first possible sin of the people was that people did not follow G-d’s instructions after G-d had agreed to give them meat since they ate the meat two days after hearing G-d’s instructions, while they were supposed to have eaten the meat on the day after hearing the instructions.

The second possible sin was that the people had complained that they had such a craving for meat that they remembered Egypt in a positive manner, 11:4,5. Yet, when the meat came and they had a chance to eat the meat, they waited a full day, as we explained above, to eat the birds/ meat. What happened to their craving for meat? Just like they were able to hold back from eating meat for one day, they could have held back for a month or so until they got to the land of Israel. The people’s actions showed that the craving for meat was just a pretext for complaining about the Exodus from Egypt.

The third possible sin in 11:32 is that by gathering all the quantities of birds, the people were showing a lack of faith in G-d. G-d had told them that they would have meat for thirty days, which means that they only had to gather enough birds to eat that day, and then the next day they could go out to gather more birds. This would have been like the mahn as each day they went out to get the mahn, Shemot 16:16-21. Accordingly, by gathering the birds in such large quantities, this showed that the people did not believe that G-d would provide more birds if needed.

Note, the people died when the meat was still in the teeth which means that they did not swallow the food or have a chance to enjoy the taste of the birds. This would be a measure for measure punishment since the people had complained about the taste of the mahn, 11:6.

Did all the people eat the birds at the exact same time? Presumably no. What then happened to the people who were not the first people to eat the birds? Would they have eaten the birds after seeing that other people died had died immediately when eating the birds? I'm guessing no, who would take that chance? This means that some of the people who gathered the birds to eat, had to sit and stare at the birds. I doubt that that they were even willing to burn the birds since they would have been scared of what would happen to them. This group of people even knew that the birds were tasty since they had eaten them before in Shemot 16, but this just increased their punishment. For these people, G-d did not kill them and they suffered by having to stare and smell the meat for a month.

With this understanding, the phrase in 11:20 that the meat "would come out of their nostrils" is not referring to the meat itself but to the smell of the meat that either the meat smelled good or the meat became rancid, see Ibn Ezra on 11:20. In either event, the birds/ meat became loathsome to those people who had to hold back from eating the birds. Note, had the people not sinned, then the people would have eaten meat for a month, and eating so much meat would have made the meat loathsome to them (diminishing marginal utility).

In addition, 11:34 records that the people who had not eaten the birds had to bury the people who had begun to eat the birds, “the cravers.” Maybe this burying was also a punishment since the survivors would have realized that had they eaten first they would have died. Also, this burying might have been a way to remind the people what Egypt was really like, a place where they had to bury their male children who had been killed by the Egyptians.

Bibliography:

Alter, Robert, 2004, The five books of Moses: A translation and commentary, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Freedman, David Noel, 1992, The Anchor Bible Dictionary, New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.

Leibowitz, Nehama, 1982, Bemidbar, translated and adapted by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization

Milgrom, Jacob, 1990, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society.

Shemot 21:4-6 and Vayikra 25:10 – Can a Jewish slave voluntarily remain a slave forever?

Shemot 21:4 record that a slave owner can give his single slave a wife, who is apparently a non-Jewish slave, and then after the end of six years of slavery, the slave goes free, while the wife and if there are any children, stay with the slave owner. 21:5 then records that the slave can say that that he loves his master, wife and/ or children, and that he does not want to go free. The idea being that if he would go free, then he would not see his wife and children again, or that he prefers life as a slave than being a free person. 21:6 then records that his request is granted. The master puts a hole in his ear, and the person would remain a slave forever, le-olam. (One wonders if the master has to agree to the slave remaining?) A similar law is recorded in Devarim 15:17, but Vayikra 25:10 records that all Jewish slaves go free in the yovel year, which seems to mean that there is no such thing as a permanent Jewish slave.

The traditional answer to reconcile Shemot 21:6 and Vayikra 25:10 is that when the Torah uses the word le-olam in Shemot 21:6 and Devarim 15:17, the meaning is until the yovel year because fifty years is a long period of time (Talmud Kiddushin 21b, quoted by Rashi on 21:6 and on Devarim 15:17). Yet, this is not the meaning of the word le-olam, and the Rashbam (12th century, France, on Shemot 21:6, also see Rashba, towards the end of Responsa 9) writes that the simple reading of 21:6 is that a slave could choose to remain a slave forever. Furthermore, when a slave chose to be a slave "forever" a hole was bored in his ear, which Rashbam (on 21:6) explains was a sign that the person was a slave. This sign only makes sense, if the person was a slave until he died, as otherwise he would have a mark that he was a slave when he would be free.

The Rashbam is following his revolutionary idea that he states in his introduction to parashat Mishpatim, that he intends to explain the simple reading of the Torah, even when it does not accord with the halachik understanding of the Torah. To the best of my knowledge, this change only began with the Rashbam, as for instance, Rashi and Ibn Ezra do not offer explanations that counter the halachik interpretations. Prior to the Rashbam, there were many opinions that one does not have to follow Midrashim in reference to non-halachik texts, but not to follow the halachik interpretations is potentially more dangerous since people can argue that one can act based on the person’s understanding of the text. To counter this possibility, the Rashbam in his introduction to parashat Mishpatim, writes that the primary interpretation is the halachik interpretation. Touitou (2005, pp. 177-188) suggests that the Rashbam developed his new approach due to arguments with Christians in 12th century France. While many people do not accept the Rashbam’s approach, this blog (commentary) adheres to it.

Hoffmann (1953, p. 236, on Vayikra 25:40) notes that the Gra (1727-1797) wrote that this case is one of the instances where the legal tradition uproots the simple reading of the text. The idea being that we follow the tradition that a Jewish slave cannot be a permanent slave even though the simple reading of the Torah is that a slave could choose to remain a slave forever. Yet, while this rule tells us how to practice, still the contradiction would remain for understanding the Torah, as Shemot 21 and Devarim 15 imply that it is possible for a Jewish slave to be a slave forever while Vayikra 25 rules out this possibility as all Jewish slaves became free during the yovel year. I did not see that the Rashbam addressed this question.

Hoffmann (1953, pp. 236, 237) suggests that the meaning of le-olam in Shemot 21:6 and Devarim 15:17 is that the slave can never claim his freedom from his owner. However, during the yovel year, all slavery is ended without the slave having to claim his freedom and hence even a slave who cannot claim his freedom goes free in the yovel due to the national abolishment of slavery.

Barry Eichler (1985) seems to suggest that the laws of Shemot and Devarim refer to slaves who are sold because of debt, and these slaves could remain forever slaves, while the laws of Vayikra refers to slaves who choose to be slaves because of poverty, and these slaves cannot remain as slaves forever. I am not sure if this distinction between the types of slaves in the different chapters accords with the simple reading of the Torah since the Torah does not state or even imply that the slave being referred to in Shemot 21:4-6 was sold into slavery due to debt. Also, while Vayikra 25 refers to a person who is so poor that he/ she sells himself to be a slave, these passages (Vayikra 25:39-44) are after the Torah stated that all slaves go free in the yovel year (Vayikra 25:10).

I would suggest that when the slave declares that he wants to stay a slave, then he has annulled the possibility of going free in the yovel year. The reason is that Vayikra 25:10 states that all slaves are to be freed to return to their ancestral property and to their family. However, by the case of the slave who wants to remain a slave for more than six years, he is stating that his family is the wife the master gave him, his children, and/ or the master. This statement by the slave means that he is legally replacing his biological family from his birth and his claim to the ancestral property with his new family, the wife, his biological children or the master. Thus, the slave does not go free in the yovel years since in his case to return to his family means to stay a slave.  

Note the word kol, all, in Vayikra 25:10, does not mean literally all, but a majority, and this is the definition of the word kol in many verses in the Torah. 

Bibliography:

Eichler, Barry, 1985, On slavery, Harper's Bible Dictionary. edited by Paul J. Achtemeier, San Francisco: Harper & Row, p. 959.

Hoffmann, David (1843-1921), 1953, Leviticus, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.

Touitou, Elazar, 2005, Exegesis in perpetual motion: Studies on the Pentateuchal commentary of Rabbi Samuel ben Meir, Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press.