Why is there no law/ custom to have a festive meal on Hanukkah?

One curiosity of Hanukkah is that there is no obligation to eat a festive meal in honor of the holiday. Shulchan Arukh (Orah Chayyim 670:2) writes that extra meals on Hanukkah are voluntary since it was never decreed that one is obligated to have festive meals to celebrate Hanukkah. Rama (670:2, 16th century) adds that that some people say there is a "small" commandment to have extra meals in honor of Hanukkah. (See article by Meir Rafled, 1995, for a discussion of the sources for having a festive meal on Hanukkah.)

This lack of a festive meal is surprising since the most typical way that people celebrate a happy occasion is by having a festive meal, and on all other holidays there is an obligation to have a festive meal. Why is there no obligation to have a festive meal for Hanukkah? It is true that Hanukkah is not mentioned in the Torah, but Purim is also not mentioned in the Torah and there is an obligation to have a festive meal on Purim. Four different answers have been suggested based on differences between Purim and Hanukkah.

The Levush (published from 1590-1604, quoted in the Mishnah Berurah, 670:6), who seems to have been the first to ask this question, suggests that the difference between Purim and Hanukkah is that on Purim the people were in danger of being killed, but on Hanukkah the people's freedom to practice religion was threatened but not their lives. Thus, since on Purim the danger to the people was physical, then we eat which is a physical act to celebrate our salvation, but on Hanukkah the danger was spiritual so there is no need to celebrate by eating.

The Taz (670:3, 1586-1667) rejects this rationale since he points out that religious freedom is just as important as physical freedom. Instead, he slightly varies the idea of the Levush. He suggests that on Purim, a festive meal was instituted since on Purim there was a clear miracle to save the people's lives, but on Hanukkah the military victory over the Greeks was not an obvious miracle. Instead, the miracle of Hanukkah was that the oil lasted eight days, but this was a "spiritual" miracle that would not have provided as much happiness as by a miracle that saved people's lives. This distinction between the nature of the miracles of Purim and Hanukkah is difficult since one could just as easily argue that the Hasmoneans victory over the much larger Greek armies was a more obvious case of divine intervention than Esther's actions to save the Jewish people. Also, the miracle of the oil was a physical event and presumably made the people happy who saw it.

The Taz's father-in-law, the Bach (1561-1640, comments on the Tur, 670) suggests a different distinction between Purim and Hanukkah. He notes that according to Chazal, on Purim the decree that the Jews were supposed to die was in response to the people's sin of enjoying Achashverosh's party in the first chapter of Megillat Esther (Talmud Bavli, Megillah 12a). Hence, the people had to fast as part of their repentance, and the meal we have on Purim is to "fix" the initial sin of the people. However, by Hanukkah, he writes the sin of the people that caused the Greek decrees was the people's negligence by the sacrifices, and hence the "fixing" of the sin is the just the lighting of the menorah, which is related to the Bet ha-Mikdash.

A fourth suggestion is from the Maamar Mordechai (Mordechai Karmi, 1749-1825, France, commentary on the Shulchan Arukh 670:2) who notes that on Purim the people were saved by Esther's meal with Achashverosh and Haman, and hence the meal on Purim recalls the salvation of the people. However, on Hanukkah, the people's salvation was not related to eating so no meal was established.

Other possible reasons can be suggested. One reason is that it would have been difficult (expensive and time consuming) for people to have large festive meals every day for eight days. On the other hand it was not desired to institute a requirement to have a festive meal just on one day since that would have made the day more important than the other seven days. With this idea, Chazal did not institute a festival meal for practical reasons.

Another possibility is that had a meal been instituted then this might have generated discussions about the war between the Greeks and the Hasmoneans, which in turn might have led the people to try to rebel again. However, after the disastrous rebellions against the Romans in 66-70 and then by Bar Kokhba, 132-135, the idea was just to stress the candle lighting aspect of the holiday without having a meal. However, this idea would not explain why a festival meal was not made obligatory from the time of the Hasmoneans.

A final possibility for the lack of an obligatory festive meal on Hanukkah might be due to the time in the year when the holiday falls. Hanukkah can occur from the end of November to the beginning of January, which means that in certain years (as in 2016) it occurs near the time of the winter solstice, which was a time of festivals of other nations. In Greek times there were festivals for Dionysius and in Roman times the pagan holiday Saturnalia was celebrated in the end of December, for many years, on December 17-23. (The Mishnah, Avodah Zarah 1:3 refers to Saturnalia and another Roman holiday, Kalends, which apparently was celebrated a few days after Saturnalia.) On these holidays there were large feasts and hence maybe Chazal did not institute a mandatory meal on Hanukkah in order to separate Hanukkah from these other holidays. Accordingly, Chazal just instituted the reciting of Hallel (to G-d), and that the candle lighting should be in the homes (Talmud Bavli, Shabbat, 21b) to keep the celebrations of the holiday within the family and the Jewish community. This idea would accord with the notion that Hanukkah was part of the battle to remove the Greek influence from the Jews.

Bibliography:

Rafled, Meir, 1995, Eating and happiness on Hanukkah, in Minhagei Yisrael, edited by Daniel Sperber, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, Vol. 5, pp. 85-101.

Bereshit 24:50-55 – Lavan and Betuel holding their tongues

Bereshit 24:50 records that after Avraham's servant presented his marriage proposal that Rivka should marry Yitzhak, both Lavan, Rivka's brother, and Betuel, Rivka's father, agreed to the proposal saying, "The matter comes from G-d, we cannot speak anything to you bad or good. Here is Rivka before you, take her and go, she may be a wife for the son of your lord, as G-d had spoke," (Fox, 1995, translation).

After this acceptance, the servant gave gifts to Rivka, her mother and her brother, but not to her father, 24:53. The following morning, Rivka's mother and brother tried to delay the marriage by requesting that Rivka stay at home for some time, and again Betuel is absent, 24:55. Where was Betuel in the morning and why did the servant not give him presents?

Rashi (on 24:55) quotes from the Midrash that Betuel died during the night, while the Bekhor Shor (on 24:55, also see Luzzatto on 24:55) explains that he did not speak in the morning since he did not want to delay the marriage.

Perry (2007) suggests that it is possible to explain Betuel's disappearance based on idea that Rivka's mother and father had separate houses. He suggests that Rivka was always in her mother's house (24:28), and that Lavan went back and forth between her mother's house and her father's house. When Rivka came home after meeting the servant, she went to her mother's house, but the servant went with Lavan to her father's house. After Lavan and Betuel agreed to the match, the servant went back to the mother's house, where he gave presents to Rivka and to Lavan who went with him but Betuel stayed in his house so he did not get any presents. Finally, in the morning, when the servant went to take Rivka, he went to Rivka's mother's house and Betuel was not there.

While these approaches are possible, I do not understand why there is even a question why Betuel did not speak in 24:55. After Betuel heard the servant's tale he said that the marriage was destined by G-d, and that "he would not say anything bad or good," 24:50. This means he would keep quiet. Why should one expect him to say something the following morning?

One might then wonder why 24:55 records that Rivka's brother asked for Rivka to stay at home for some time if Lavan had also said in 24:50, that "he would not say anything bad or good"? Did Lavan go back on his word? More likely, the reference to Rivka's brother in 24:55 is not to Lavan but to a different brother of Rivka. The proof is that had 24:55 been referring to Lavan, then the text would have referred to him by his name, as occurs throughout the chapter. Instead, 24:55 is referring to another brother of Rivka who is referred to anonymously as Rivka's brother, and this anonymous brother asked for Rivka to remain at home for some time.

With this understanding, maybe we can also understand why the servant did not give any gifts to Betuel in 24:53. The servant already had the agreement from Lavan and Betuel for the match, and they had indicated that they did not want to have anything more to do with the servant as they said, "here is Rivka before you, take her and go," 24:51. Thus, the servant did not give them any gifts. However, the servant must have sensed that not everybody else in the family was so thrilled with the match. Thus, he gave Rivka's mother and her anonymous brother (not Lavan) gifts to get them to be more supportive of the match, but in this effort he did not succeed since the following morning they tried to stop the match by requesting that Rivka not leave right away, 24:55.

Bibliography:

Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.

Perry, Menachem, 2007, Counter-stories in the Bible: Rebekah and her bridegroom, Abraham's servant, Prooftexts, 27, 2007, pp. 275-323.

Bereshit 11:1-9 (Noah) – The tower of Bavel: To boldly go, not?

Bereshit 11:1-9 records the story of the Tower of Babel. The people of the world gathered together to build a city and a tower, but G-d disapproved of their efforts and stopped them by dispersing them all over the world. What was wrong in building the city and the tower that G-d had to intervene in the world? Also, this episode is recorded between two sets of genealogies, elleh toledot of the children of Noah, 10:1-32 and the elleh toledot of Shem, 11:10-11:26. How does this episode relate to these genealogies?

One approach to understanding the building of the city and the tower is that the tower was meant to be used for idolatrous practices. Bereshit Rabbah 38:6 explains that the people said "Come let us build a tower at the top of which we will set an idol holding a sword in its hand, which will thus appear to wage war against Him." (This same idea appears explicitly in the piyyut atah konnata and hinted to in the piyyut amitz koah, both of which are recited in the avodah prayer in the repetition of the chazzan’s Shemoneh Esrei on Musaf of Yom Kippur.)  This approach is based on the idea that the word shamayim in 11:4 means the heavens, but really this word in all of the Torah just means air. 11:4 then means that the people wanted to build a tower or building high in the air.

Seforno (on 11:4, see Sanhedrin 109a and Haketav Vehakabbalah on 11:4) varies this idea and suggests that when the Torah records that the people wanted to make a name for themselves this meant they wanted to worship idolatry.

Modern archeological might support this approach, as large towers, called ziqqurat, have been found in many ancient Mesopotamian (Bavel, modern day Iraq) cities. Sarna (1970, pp. 63-80) notes that the Torah specifically records that the bricks for building the tower were baked in an oven and bitumen was used for mortar, 11:3, and this was the method for building in Mesopotamia. Also, the idea of making a name, 11:4, could correspond to the ancient practice of inscribing names of kings on bricks and depositing the bricks in the foundations of the ziqqurat. Ziqqurat were a central part of the Mesopotamian religion that it was believed that by going up to the tower the people would contact god.

Sarna argues that the episode is an anti-pagan polemic since it shows G-d's superiority that G-d could easily stop the building of the tower. This episode could then relate to the birth of Avram, which is recorded at the end of the elleh toledot of Shem, 11:26, because prior to the development of a new religion the Torah shows the meaninglessness of the pagan religion of Avram's time.

While this approach seems reasonable, P.J. Harland (1998) doubts this approach since "there is no reference to any image on the tower,… there is no mention made by the people that they intended any improper worship,"… and he claims the word tower, migdal, should be understood as a fortress and not a tower. 

N. Leibowitz (1976, pp. 100-108, see also Ramban on 11:2 though he is very cryptic) proposes a second approach that the purpose of building the tower was "to make man forget his insignificance and transientness, to delude him with his greatness and immortality, in short to make for himself a name." The sin was then of hubris that the people thought they could become like G-d. With this idea, the people's dispersal was a punishment to cut them down to size and reduce their pride. N. Leibowitz further writes that "only when there will be an end to man's pride which takes advantage of the wisdom implanted in him by G-d in order to turn himself into a deity and worship the work of his own hands" will people be able to truly worship G-d. One could then suggest that humankind's pride had to be reduced before Avram was to spread his religious message.

I do not like this approach for two reasons. One, as noted by Sarna, "the desire for fame is perfectly human and not in itself reprehensible. Indeed, the granting thereof is part of the divine promise to Avram, 12:2" (see also Cassuto, 1964, p. 243). Two, is there really a need for G-d to intervene to reduce man's pride? Lemekh (4:23,24) and others since him have been proud and G-d did not intervene explicitly in the world to reduce their pride.

According to the above approaches, the dispersal of the people was a punishment, but there are other approaches which understand the dispersal as a beneficial action. One of these approaches is to argue that the sin of building the tower and the city was that the people were setting up an inappropriate political system. S.R. Hirsch (1989, p. 207) writes that the building was "to make something that should serve as a perpetual reminder of the power of the community over the individual." (I wonder if these comments relate to Hirsch's fight to separate from the Reform community in Germany.) Similarly, Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1990, p. 18) writes that the sin of the building of the city and the tower was not the building per se, but "the aim to use these artificial means to ensure a situation of 'one language and one speech' of centralization, which in modern parlance would be known as totalitarianism." Thus, Y. Leibowitz argues that when G-d dispersed the people, G-d was helping the people by giving them back their freedom. This approach could also relate to the birth of Avram since as Avram was going to start a new nation there was need for political freedom. Yet, while this approach is interesting, I doubt the Torah here is trying to teach us political lessons.

Another approach which views the dispersal of mankind in a positive vein is that the dispersal was part of the fulfillment of the blessing to humankind in 1:28 and 9:1 to "fill the world." (Ibn Ezra end of comments on 11:7, Rashbam on 11:4, Radak on 11:5, Bekhor Shor on 11:4, Hizkuni on 11:1, Luzzatto on 11:4 and Cassuto, 1964 p. 243, all follow this approach.  See also Hiebert 2007.) The idea here is that the people wanted to build the tower and the city to ensure that everybody would live in one place since the tower was to be a central point that people would return to. Similarly, the idea of making a name was that if people left the city they would remember the city and return to it (Radak on 11:4). Ibn Ezra (on 11:4) notes that according to this approach there is no issue with the height of the tower, as the phrase "until the heavens" was just meant to imply a tall building (see Devarim 1:28). 

According to this approach, the problem here was that G-d did not want people to live in one place since humankind was blessed to spread throughout the world (1:28, and 9:1), and hence G-d dispersed the people. The people were not being punished since it was always part of their destiny to spread out all over the world. Furthermore, according to this approach it is not even clear if the people sinned, as Ibn Ezra (on 11:4) points out that maybe they did not know that they were supposed to spread out all over the world.

This "dispersal" approach accords with the text as 11:4 explicitly records that the people said that they were building the city and the tower "lest we be dispersed over the face of all the earth." The same word for dispersed, nafutz, occurs again in 11:8, va-yafatz, which records G-d's dispersal of the people, and in the last sentence of the description of this incident, which summarizes the incident, 11:9, he-fitzam. We see that this was the main issue that the people did not want to disperse since they wanted everybody to live in some large metropolis, and G-d wanted them to disperse.

Yet, why was there a need for G-d to intervene and disperse the people, as human nature will lead people to go out, travel and explore, and eventually after building the tower, people would have left to go to other places. Furthermore, chapter 10 already recorded that the people had dispersed throughout the world, 10:5,32, which seemed to occur without G-d intervening. Thus, the phrase "all the earth" in 11:1 most likely signifies many people in the world were involved in this project to build the city and the tower, but not that literally every person in the world was involved in building the tower since some people had already dispersed from the area. 

People will naturally spread out throughout the world, but the episode here shows that this action is part of G-d's will. G-d's dispersal of the people by the Tower of Babel was then one example of the spreading out of people throughout the world as recorded in chapter 10, and hence this episode is part of the elleh toledot section of chapter 10.

Why was it important to show that the spreading out of people throughout the world was G-d's will? The answer relates to the ensuing narrative, which records the genealogy leading up to Avram. G-d was going to establish a covenant with Avram and his descendants (15:18, 17:7), but did that mean that G-d was no longer the G-d of the other nations? No, and this is seen by the episode of the Tower of Babel. The other nations of the world would not be part of the covenant of Avram, but they were still part of the blessing in Bereshit 1:28, that they should fill the world and conquer it. The episode of the Tower of Babel shows that G-d cares about all people in the world as G-d was helping the people of the world to fill and conquer the world, and hence G-d was also their G-d. To highlight this connection between humankind and G-d, the Torah uses anthropomorphic words, that G-d came down to see the building (11:5) and the use of the royal we in 11:7. The message of 11:1-9 is then to show that G-d is involved with the affairs of all of humankind, even if G-d was about to make a covenant with one nation.

Bibliography:

Harland, P.J. 1998, Vertical or horizontal: The sin of Babel, Vetus Testamentum, 1998, pp. 515-533.

Hiebert, Theodore, 2007, The tower of Babel and the origins of the world's cultures, Journal of Biblical Literature, 126:1, pp. 29-58.

Hirsch, S. R. (1808-1888), 1989, The Pentateuch, rendered into English by Isaac Levy, second edition, Gateshead: Judaica Press.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976, Studies in Bereshit, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Leibowitz, Yeshayahu, 1990, Notes and remarks on the weekly parashah, translated by Shmuel Himelstein, Brooklyn: Chemed Books.

Sarna, Nahum (1923-2005), 1970, Understanding Genesis, New York: Schocken Books.

Devarim 32:11 (also Shemot 19:4) – On the wings of eagles

דברים לב:יא - כנשר יעיר קנו, על גוזליו ירחף, יפרש כנפיו יקחהו, ישאהו על אברתו. 

Devarim 32:11 records that just like a nesher (a bird) protects its young so too G-d protected the Jewish people, and as an example of this protection, the second half of the verses states that the nesher would put is young on its wings. This imagery is also mentioned in Shemot 19:4, but it is difficult since physically it is not clear that birds can put their young on their wings. Thus, Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon (on Shemot 19:4, also see Luzzatto on Shemot 19:4), writes that the phrase should be understood figuratively that G-d took care of the people. However, it seems that the imagery can be understood literally.

Driver (1955) discusses the identity of the nesher and he concludes that "the vulture is probably commonly intended, if only because it is the most easily and often seen of the great birds of prey. At the same time, the nesher undoubtedly includes the eagle." Three years later, (1958), he wrote that he "wrongly ascribed Shemot 19:4 and Devarim 32:11 to the vulture because of the great span of its wings, forgetting that instances of the eagle carrying its young on its back or wings had been recorded." He then recorded two observers of birds who noted that when the eagle teaches its young to fly it pushes the little bird out of the nest and then when the young bird falls down, the eagle swoops underneath the young bird. The eagle will repeat the process until its young learns how to fly. Thus, the eagle does not put its young on its back but it does carry its young on its back, as recorded in Shemot 19:4 and Devarim 32:11. Driver notes that both of these cases were with a golden eagle, and he concludes that "in the two passages, the nesher will be the golden eagle."

N. Leibowitz (1976a, pp. 295,296) compares the two verses, Shemot 19:4 and Devarim 32:11, and she claims that the verses present different images. One reason is that she claims that in Devarim 32:11, "it is doubtful if the idea of training and education can be read into it and the surrounding verses." Yet, as pointed out to me by my son Alon, this idea that the eagle carries its young when it is teaching them to fly, implies that the imagery of Devarim 32:11 refers both to G-d protecting the Jewish people and to G-d teaching the people.

Bibliography:

Driver, Godfrey Rolles, 1955, Birds in the Old Testament: I. Birds in laws, Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 86, pp. 5-20.

-----, 1958, Once again birds in the Bible, Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 90, pp. 56-58.

Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1976a, Studies in Shemot, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.

Devarim 15:19-23 (Re'eh) – Two types of firstborn animals

Devarim 12:6 records that a firstborn animal, bekhor, is sacrificed and Devarim 12:17,18 and 14:23 record that the bekhor is to be eaten before G-d in the chosen place. Devarim 15:19-23 clarifies that this requirement is only for a firstborn animal that has no blemishes. If a firstborn animal has a blemish, then it can be eaten anywhere like regular meat. These laws about the firstborn animal are surprising since they make no distinction between priests and regular people, and the implication is that non-priests are the ones eating the firstborn animal. However, Bemidbar 18:18 states that the priests eat the firstborn animal. How can Devarim 12-15 allow a regular person to eat the firstborn animal?

In Jewish law, (Rambam, Laws of Firstborns, 1:1,2) the firstborn animal of a pure unblemished animal (cow, sheep) is offered as a sacrifice and the priests eat the part of the animal that is not put on the altar. This law accords with Bemidbar 18:18, but what about the laws from Devarim 12-15? The traditional answer is that all the cases in Devarim 12-15 that refer to a person eating a sacrificed firstborn animal are only addressed to the priests and not to the general population (Rashi on 12:17, 15:20, Ibn Ezra on 12:17, 14:23 and 15:20). This is difficult since there is no indication in the Torah that the laws in Devarim 12-15 are only for priests. In addition, even in Jewish law, a non-priest can eat the blemished firstborn animal. The blemished firstborn animal must still be given to the priest, but based on 15:21,22, the priest can give it away or sell it to anybody (Rambam, Laws of firstborns, 1:3, Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 306:5). This means that 15:21,22, the law of a blemished firstborn animal, is understood as being addressed to the general population, and hence it is difficult to argue that the previous verse, 15:20, concerning the unblemished firstborn animal was only addressed to the priest.

Ibn Ezra (on 12:17) quotes a logical answer from the Karaites, but he rejects it without providing a reason. He writes that the deniers (Karaites) explain that there are two types of firstborn animals in the Torah, the firstborn animal of the womb and the firstborn animal each year of the flock. The law in Bemidbar 18:18 is referring to the firstborn animal of the womb, which goes to the priest, while Devarim 12-15 refer to the annual firstborn animal of the flock, which was eaten by the general population.

Alexander Rofe (1988a, p. 34), writes that this distinction between the two types of firstborn animals is from the Karaite work, Keter Torah. He calls it elegant since there is textual support for it, but he also does not accept it, again without providing a reason. The textual support is that Bemidbar 18:14 uses the word womb when discussing the firstborn animal, while Devarim 15:19 does not mention the term womb. Also Devarim 12-15 refer to firstborn of all the animals, which could mean from the entire flock. This explanation of the Karaites clearly contradicts normative Jewish law, but this is not a reason to reject it as an explanation of the text. The Rashbam (Introduction to parashat Mishpatim) writes that while the traditional interpretation is primary and is how we practice, still one can interpret the text differently.

There is another proof for this distinction between two types of firstborn animals, which I do not know if the Karaites already mentioned. Devarim 15:20 records that the firstborn animal is to be eaten “year after year.” What does it mean “year after year?” Rashi (on 15:20) writes that the phrase requires the unblemished firstborn animal to be brought as a sacrifice in its first year. However, this does not seem to be the sense of the phrase “year after year.” Also, it contradicts Shemot 22:29 that the firstborn animal should be brought to G-d on its 8th day. The traditional answer (Rambam, Laws of Firstborns, 1:8) is that the firstborn animal can be given to G-d from the 8th day onwards until it is one year old.

With the distinction between the two types of firstborn animals, the phrase "year after year" is not difficult at all. If Devarim 12-15 is referring to the firstborn of the entire flock, then each year there would be a new firstborn something that does necessarily occur when the firstborn is the first of the womb. Thus, Devarim 15:20, just means simply that each year the sacrifice is to be offered, and is not referring to how soon after the animal was born is it offered as a sacrifice.

This distinction between the two types of firstborn animals also better explains the change in the law from a non-blemished firstborn animal to a blemished firstborn animal that a non-priest can eat the blemished firstborn animal, 15:21,22. This law of the blemished firstborn animal is in reference to the annual firstborn of the flock, which has a lower level of kedusha than the firstborn of the womb. The annual firstborn of the flock has a lower level of kedusha, that even when the firstborn animal is non-blemished a regular person can eat it, just in the chosen place, so when the animal is blemished, a regular person can eat it anywhere ("one jump down"). However, for the a firstborn animal of the womb, which can only eaten by priest when it is non-blemished, so one would think that if blemished, while it cannot be offered as a sacrifice, it could also not be eaten by a non-priest ("two jumps down").

Finally, Rashi (on 15:19) notes that the word to dedicate, takdish, the firstborn animals in 15:19 seems to contradict Vayikra 27:26, which records that the firstborn animal is not to be dedicated since it already G-d's. An answer based on the distinction between the two types of firstborn animals could be that Vayikra 27:26 is referring to a firstborn animal from the womb and this firstborn animal cannot be dedicated, while 15:19 is referring to the annual firstborn of the flock and these firstborn animals can be dedicated.

Bemidbar 32:33 (Mattot) - Menashe and the east bank of the Jordan River

Bemidbar 32:1-32 record negotiations between Moshe and the tribes of Gad and Reuven for land on the east bank of the Jordan River (see our discussion http://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2011/07/bemidbar-chapter-32-other-side.html). Bemidbar 32:33 then records that Moshe gave some of the land on the east bank not just to the tribes of Gad and Reuven but also to half the tribe of Menashe. This is surprising since the tribe of Menahse had never been mentioned before in chapter 32 and had not requested land on the east bank. Why did Menashe get land on the east bank if they were not involved in the negotiations between Moshe and the tribes of Reuven and Gad? Why did only half the tribe of Menahse get land? Why was the tribe of Menashe divided by the Jordan River?

Ramban (on 32:33) explains that when the tribes of Reuven and Gad were granted land on the east bank, it was recognized that the land was too much for two tribes. Volunteers were asked who would want to live there and then some of the tribe of Menashe requested the land.

Luzzatto (on 32:33) suggests that after the deal with the tribes of Gad and Reuven was made, some members of the tribe of Menashe on their own took the initiative to conquer more land on the east bank, 32:39.

My guess is that since the deal with the tribes of Reuven and Gad separated these tribes from the other tribes due to the Jordan River, there was a desire to re-connect the tribes of Gad and Reuven with the other tribes. This was done by splitting another tribe that half of the tribe would be on the east side of the Jordan and half of the tribe would be on the west side. With this idea, we can apply the principle of transitivity. The tribes of Reuven and Gad would be connected with the split tribe on their side (the eastern side) of the Jordan River, the split tribe would be connected with its other half on the other side (the western side) of the Jordan River, and this half of the tribe would be connected with the remaining tribes who all lived on the western side of the Jordan River.

This same idea can also explain, why Moshe designated three cities of refuge on the east side of the Jordan River, see our discussion on Bemidbar 35:13,14 "Three and three."

Bemidbar 20:6-13 (Hukkat) - Moshe and the people's request for water in the desert: The "sin?"

Bemidbar 20:2-13 record the people's complaint for water and the ensuing “sin” of Moshe and Aharon that caused them to be punished that they would not make it to the land of Israel. What was Moshe's and Aharon’s sin? For various reviews of this question, see Ibn Ezra on 20:8, Abravanel, 2008, pp. 167-176, and N. Leibowitz, 1982, pp. 236-247. I will review some of the explanations of the "sin" and offer two possible explanations.

I believe the most popular explanation is Rashi's explanation (on 20:11,12) that Moshe was supposed to speak to the rock, 20:8, but instead Moshe hit the rock, 20:11. The idea of speaking to the rock is understood to mean that Moshe was supposed to give an order to the rock to exude water, for example to say to the rock "give the people water." This approach has raised various questions.

The Ramban (on 20:7) criticizes Rashi's approach. He notes that 20:12 records that Moshe and Aharon showed a lack of faith in G-d, lo heehmanetem, but how did Moshe show a lack of faith in G-d by hitting the rock instead of speaking to the rock? When Moshe hit the rock he had faith that water would flow from the rock. It could be that Moshe was not following G-d's command (according to Rashi) and that the miracle would have been more impressive if Moshe had spoken and not hit the rock, but still Moshe did not demonstrate any lack of faith in G-d. The Ramban also notes that Moshe spoke about the rock, 20:10, which he argues was the fulfillment of G-d's command to Moshe to speak to the rock.

Abravanel attempts to answer the Ramban's question by arguing that hitting the rock instead of speaking to the rock was not the real source of Moshe and Aharon’s punishment, but rather Moshe and Aharon were being punished for previous sins. Aharon was punished for his role in building the golden calf. Moshe was punished for requesting more information from the spies than what was needed and it was the spies' answers to these questions that caused the people to refuse to enter the land of Israel. Abravanel claims his approach explains why in Devarim 1:37 Moshe mentioned his punishment in conjunction with the sin of the spies since his real sin was by the sending of the spies. Also, this approach appears to explain why Aharon was punished here even though he had almost no role here.

The Abravanel's approach is appealing but not convincing since 20:24 states that Aharon sinned here as well, and thus he was not being punished for his role in the sin of the golden calf. Similarly, as Rashi (on 20:12) points out that the sense of 20:12 is that Moshe was being punished for his action here not for something many years earlier. Also, I do not think that Moshe sinned in any way by the sending of the spies, see our discussion on 13:1,2,26, "A test" http://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/06/bemidbar-131-20-shelah-test.html.

A different answer is that the words lo heehmanetem in 20:12 does not mean that you showed a lack of faith, but that you were not steadfast, see Shemot 17:12. (I heard this idea from Nathaniel Helfgot.) The idea being that Moshe was not steadfast in listening to G-d, but not that Moshe evidenced any lack of faith here.

Another question on Rashi's approach is how could Moshe have misunderstood what G-d told him to do? Luzzatto (end of comments on 20:12) suggests that the misunderstanding was because Moshe was angry, but still it seems problematic to say that Moshe misunderstood G-d's command to speak to the rock.

A third question on Rashi's approach is why was Aharon punished here? Aharon did not speak to the rock, but did he have a chance to do so? 20:10 records that Moshe spoke to the people, said rhetorically could the rock exude water and then Moshe hit the rock. Was Aharon supposed to jump in and shout "exude water" to the rock?

I think the Ramban in correct that Moshe's statement in 20:10 about the rock with Aharon standing next to him was the fulfillment of G-d's command to him and Aharon in 20:8 to speak to the rock. What then were their sins?

One possibility is that after Moshe made his statement in 20:10 he was supposed to wait until the water started to gush from the rock, but he got impatient and he hit the rock twice. This impatience was the lack of faith since the water was going to go forth in a few more seconds. Aharon's sin here was that he did not stop Moshe from hitting the rock. 20:11 records that Moshe raised his arm to lift his staff to hit the rock and at the time, Aharon could have grabbed Moshe's arm and stopped him from hitting the rock. Moshe even hit the rock twice, and my son Binyamin believes that this means that Moshe raised his arm a second time, which would have given Aharon a second chance to stop Moshe from hitting the rock. (Note this idea could also be Aharon's sin if one believes that the sin was not ordering the rock to exude water, Rashi's approach.)

With this possibility, while Moshe was told to take the staff, 20:8,9, this was just to point out the rock when he spoke in 20:10, but he was not supposed to use it to hit the rock. However, one could argue, as the Ramban does, that when Moshe was commanded to take the staff, this meant that he was supposed to both speak about the rock and to hit the rock. If this is true, then maybe there is another possible "sin."

Luzzatto (on 20:12) has a lengthy review of Moshe's "sin" and he begins with a disclaimer that for many years he did not try to examine this question since he did not want to add another sin to Moshe. Instead, initially he accepted Moshe Mendelssohn’s (1729-1786, Germany) approach that the sin was Moshe and Aharon's reaction to the people when the people complained for water that Moshe and Aharon ran away from the people, 20:6, also see Ibn Ezra on 20:6. Luzzatto notes that three other commentators (R. Avraham ben Shem Tov Bibago, Spain 15th century, Derekh Emunah; R. Avraham Menachem ben Jacob haKohen Porto, Verona, 16th century, Minhah Belulah; and the book Avat Nefesh a commentary on Ibn Ezra) also followed this approach.

After quoting these other commentators, and noting that he taught their explanation for 15 years, Luzzatto rejected it for the following reasons. One, G-d did not criticize Moshe and Aharon for not speaking to the people, but for showing a lack of faith. Two, the statement in the Torah words that “you (Aharon) rebelled against Me,” 20:24, implies that Moshe and Aharon did not do something that they were commanded. Three, the language in the Torah that Moshe and Aharon left the people, 20:6, does not imply that they ran from the people.

Luzzatto writes that he now accepted Rashi’s explanation that the sin was they were supposed to speak to the rock, but a variation of the idea of the four commentators that the "sin" was Moshe and Aharon's reaction to the people's demand for water could answer Luzzatto's questions.

Was the people’s complaint about water justified? The traditional explanation (see Rashi on 20:2) for the people’s complaint for water is that previously they had been getting water from a well which traveled with the people, but after Miryam died, the well disappeared. With this explanation, the complaint of the people would seem to be justified since they truly needed water to live (see Hizkuni on 20:2). Yet, why then was the people’s complaint considered a fight against G-d (20:13)? Also after Miryam died, how were the people supposed to get water, as the incident here appears to be a onetime event?

As we discuss on 20:2-5 "Water in the desert," (http://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/06/bemidbar-202-5-hukkat-water-in-desert.html) my understanding is that the mahn was able to supply the people with all their nutritional needs in the desert, both solids and liquids. I doubt there was a well that traveled with the people since it is never mentioned in the Torah, but even if there was a well and it disappeared after Miryam died, the people did not need regular water. Thus, the peoples' complaints for water in 20:5 and 21:5, were unjustified, and maybe this understanding offers a new perspective on Moshe's and Aharon's "sin."

The people stated that they were going to die in the desert and that they never should have left Egypt, 20:3-5. This was a denial of G-d’s goodness to them, and hence the Torah calls it a rebellion against G-d, 20:13. Moshe and Aharon should have told the people that they were not going to die because they would live by eating the mahn. It is possible that the people were so worked up, that they would not have listened to Moshe and Aharon, but then Moshe and Aharon should have ignored the people’s complaint for water. (Note by the sin of the spies, Moshe and Aharon did not run to the ohel moed, but fell on their faces before the people, 14:4.)

When Moshe and Aharon went to G-d after hearing the people's complaint for water, this gave the impression that they were going to ask G-d to give the people water, which implied that Moshe and Aharon accepted the people’s complaint. Thus, when Moshe and Aharon went to the ohel moed it was a partial negation of the great miracle of the desert, the mahn. If Moshe and Aharon gave the impression that they were even just partially negating the miracle of the mahn then this would be considered as showing a lack of faith in G-d. Note this still seems like a small sin since Moshe and Aharon were trying to help the people, but for both Moshe and Aharon this was their second sin, as Moshe already sinned in 11:21-23 and Aharon sinned by the golden calf. In addition, if Moshe and Aharon gave the impression that they were praying for the people to get water then in some sense they were joining the people’s fight with G-d. This could then be considered as rebelling against G-d, and this would explain the language in 20:24 (also see 27:14), that “you (Aharon) rebelled against Me.”

Bemidbar 3:39-43 (Bemidbar) - A baby boom

The first three chapters of the book of Bemidbar record various population data of the people. 1:46 and 2:32 record that as of the second month of the 2nd year of the people's stay in the desert there were 603,550 men age twenty years and up. 3:39 records that there were 22,000 Levites, and 3:43 records that there were 22,273 firstborn sons more than one month old.

One question that arises with these figures is how could there have been just 22,273 firstborn sons out of an adult male population of more than 600,000? If one assumes that that there were an equal number of adult females, and that the population of the people under twenty, both male and female, was equal to half the total adult population, then the population of the people one year after the Exodus was approximately 1.8 million people. If there were 22,273 first born males, then presumably there were also 22,273 firstborn females, which would mean that that there were approximately 45,000 families. The ratio of the total population to the number of families means that each family would have averaged 40 children, which is incredible.

While it is possible that G-d performed a miracle that enabled women to have such large families (see Rashi on Shemot 1:7), it is odd that by any list of children in a family in the Torah, there is a much smaller number of children. For example, Moshe had two siblings, and he had two children while Aharon had four sons. 3:17-20 records the families of the Levities, and there is no family listed with more than four sons. Similarly, Bemidbar 26:9 records that the family of Eliav had three sons. Bemidbar 27:1-3 records that Tzelofhad had five daughters and no sons. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how there could have so few firstborn sons in 3:43. (One might claim that the firstborn sons died due to disease or due to the Egyptian decrees, but then there would be a corresponding increase in the number of non-firstborn sons who died, and the estimated family size would remain problematic.)

The Ramban (on 3:45) makes an interesting suggestion though he rejects his own suggestion. He writes that one cannot say that the firstborn sons were only those firstborn sons born after the Exodus, in the first year of the people's stay in the desert, since the population did not increase at such a rapid rate. This rejected suggestion is based on the very reasonable idea that the firstborn sons only acquired their special status as firstborn sons after the Exodus. Prior to the Exodus, there were firstborn sons, but there was no special status to being a firstborn son. However, after the tenth plague, when the firstborn sons were saved, then the firstborn sons had a special status (Shemot 13:15, see also Bemidbar 3:13; 8:17). Ramban's suggestion is that the special status was not applied retroactively to the firstborn sons who had already been born but only to the future firstborn sons. Ramban rejects this idea due to the technical problem that this rationale would sharply increase the growth rate of the Jewish population. If 22,000 firstborn sons were born just in the first year of the people's stay in the desert, then this implies that over forty years, the population was booming, but the male population at the end of the forty years in the desert, 601,730, Bemidbar 26:47, had decreased by 1,820 men.

Beller (1992) presents a mathematical model that builds on the Ramban's suggestion and gives a plausible outcome to explain the ratio of firstborn sons to the general population. However, the model, as by all models, is only as good as the assumptions that are the basis for the model, and some of the assumptions as to the growth rate and the length of years are difficult to accept. (For a discussion of the model, see Samet, 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 156-167.) Instead, we will suggest a different variation on the Ramban's suggestion.

In our commentary on Shemot 1:8-22, "Population dynamics," http://lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2009/01/shemot-18-22-population-dynamics.html, we suggested that Pharaoh did not intend to kill the entire male Jewish population, but that his goal was to control the male Jewish population in order to allow him to benefit from their work as slaves without having to fear that they would rebel. Thus, his decree to kill all the male children (Shemot 1:22) was a temporary recurring decree that was enacted whenever the male population passed some threshold level.

Overall Pharaoh's plan existed for at least eighty years since Moshe was 80 at the time of the Exodus, Shemot 7:7, but how long would the decree have been in effect each time? It would have to have been for a sufficient amount of time that the growth rate stopped, and this suggests that each set of parents was only allowed to have a limited amount of time to have male children. A possible system could have been that for ten years, all male children were killed, and then for five years the male children were allowed to live. In the "permitted" five years, a family could have had a few sons, but by the time another cycle of "permitted" years came around, the family might not have had more children. (One could lengthen the number of forbidden years or shorten the number of permitted years, but this would have no effect on the argument here.)

What was the reaction of the Jewish people to this decree? A rational response was to wait for the "permitted" years, in order not to have children during the forbidden years that would be killed. (This seems to be the initial response of Moshe's parents, see our discussion on Shemot 2:1, "Moshe’s parent’s marriage." Some parents might have succeeded in having children in the "forbidden" years, as by Moshe's parents, but these successes would have been rare.)

If our assumptions are correct, then the Jewish population at the time of the Exodus was not uniform, but consisted of discrete groups based on certain ages, with almost no population at all for most age groups. A possible example is an adult population consisting of four age groups, 20-24, 35-39, 50-54, and 65-69, with approximately 150,000 males in each age group. In addition, there would be another set of male children between the ages of 5-9, whose parents would be from the age group of 35-39. With such a system, the Exodus could have transpired in the middle of the "forbidden" years, meaning that the group of 20-24 year olds had no children prior to the Exodus. If this is true, then after the Exodus, when the restrictions on having children were abrogated, then the people compromising the age group 20-24 would have had children for the first time. Thus, almost all the children born in the first year after the Exodus were firstborn children. If there were 150,000 males in the age group 20-24, then the birth of 45,000 children (22,000 males) in the first year of the people's stay in the desert is very reasonable.

Thereafter the population would not have increased at a rate of 45,000 children a year since there were many age groups (for instance 10-19) with zero population. In some years of the people's stay in the desert there would have been large increases in the number of children, while in other years few children would have been born. If there were 20 years, of "high" population growth of 20,000 males, and 20 years of "low" population growth, then the adult male population would have been approximately 600,000 after forty years in the desert. Accordingly, the understating of Pharaoh's plan as being a temporary recurring decree not only provides a coherent explanation for chapter one in the book of Shemot but also explains the number of firstborn sons in the first year of the desert and the lack of population growth of the people in the desert.