sacrifice from the ceremony of the eighth day had been burnt, and this made him angry since he thought the sacrifice should have been eaten. Aharon defended the burning of the
offerings, before G-d, and such things as these happened to me! Had I eaten the
today, would it have pleased G-d?” (Variation of Fox, 1995, translation.) 10:20 records that Moshe accepted Aharon’s response.
Why did Moshe believe that the sacrifice should have been eaten, and why did Aharon disagree? In 10:19, Aharon was referring to the deaths of his sons, but why should their deaths have caused him not to eat the
? Finally, why did Moshe accept Aharon’s response? (My understanding of this section began with a conversation with David Linzer in March 1992, though since then, notably in March 2014, I have changed some of my views of this section.)
is being argued about. 10:16 describes the
as being a goat, and 9:3 records that as part of the sacrifices of the eighth day the people were to bring a hatta’t that was a goat. This would seem to be the only possible reference to the
in 10:16, see Luzzatto on 10:16. R. David Hoffmann (on 10:16) notes that R. Akiva follows this understanding. However, Rashi (on 10:16) quotes the majority view of Chazal that the sacrifice was the
that was brought on the new moon (Bemidbar 28:5), which was an additional sacrifice to the sacrifices for the ceremony of the eighth day. Rashi (on 10:17) notes that Moshe said that the eating of the
was to bring atonement for the people (10:17) and the approach of Chazal is that the
of the new moon was to bring atonement for causing tumah in the Mikdash. Luzzatto rejects this "proof" since 9:7 records that the
of the people was to bring atonement for the people.
Rashi's explanation is based on the understanding that eighth day of the initiation of the priests was also the first day of the first month of the second year of the people’s stay in the desert. I doubt that the ceremony of the eighth day was on the first day of the first month in the second year of the people's stay in the desert since I believe that the seven day initiation process of the priests began on either the 15th or the 22nd of the first month of the second year, see our discussion on Shemot 40:1-33, "
The next point to clarify is what type of
hatta't was the
hatta't of the people. There are two types, the inner
hatta't and the outer
hatta't. By the inner
hatta’t, the blood of the animal is sprinkled on the
parokhet within the
mishkan proper, and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are burnt, 4:1-21, 7:23. By the outer
hatta’t, the blood is only sprinkled on the altar outside the
mishkan proper and the parts of the animal that are not offered on the altar are eaten by the priests, 4:22-35, 7:17-22. The
hatta't of the people was an outer
hatta't since the blood was sprinkled on the outer altar, 9:9,15. Accordingly, Moshe stated that the
hatta't was to be eaten since the blood of the sacrifice had not been brought into the
mishkan proper where the inner altar was located, 10:18.
Moshe was worried that there was a danger that because the sacrifice had not been eaten, all the people would be punished. 10:6 records that Moshe told Eleazar and Itamar, Aharon’s two surviving sons, that they should not engage in any mourning rites since they could die and there could be a
ketsef on the people. The term
ketsef indicates that G-d is angry and that there can be an ensuing punishment, see Bemidbar 17:11. Thus, just like Moshe was concerned that mourning rites could cause G-d to punish the people, so too he was worried that the non-eating of the sacrifice could also cause G-d to punish the people. We now understand Moshe's argument, but why did Aharon disagree if it was so important for the sacrifices to be eaten?
Rashi (on 10:16) quotes two opinions of Chazal to explain Aharon’s response. One, Aharon maintained that since he and his sons were mourners for Nadav and Avihu, they were not allowed to eat the sacrifice. The idea being that the law of mourning would override the usual law that the outer hatta’t was to be eaten. Luzzatto (on 10:17) rejects this approach since Moshe had already told Aharon and his sons that they were not to act as mourners (10:6,7), which means that in all cases they were not to follow the laws of mourning. Luzzatto (on 10:19) also adds that Aharon began his argument by referring to the hatta’t and the olah, 10:19, but this reference is irrelevant if the rationale was that they were mourners. In addition, how did Aharon know that the laws of mourning precluded eating from the sacrifices, something clearly unknown to Moshe?
Rashi's (on 10:16) second approach for understanding Aharon’s argument is that there was some
tumah attached to the hatta’t and thus Aharon did not want to eat the sacrifice. Milgrom (1991, pp. 635-640) develops this approach. He argues that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu transformed the
hatta’t of the people from an outer
hatta’t to an inner
hatta’t since their deaths raised the level of
tumah of the
hatta’t that the sacrifice had to be burnt. This understanding accords with his view that in general a
hatta’t is to remove
tumah, and the reason why an inner
hatta’t is burnt is because the level of
tumah the sacrifice is removing is so large that the
hatta’t cannot be eaten.
I doubt that Aharon did not eat the
hatta't since it was
tamei because there is no connection between this explanation and Aharon's response to Moshe. According to Milgrom's explanation, why did Aharon refer to his sacrifices that he had offered beforehand? According to Milgrom, Aharon was not permitted to eat the
hatta’t, so why did Aharon not simply say something like "I cannot eat it since it is
tamei."
Also, how did the sacrifice become
tamei? Milgrom writes that “that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu in the midst of sacred precincts polluted the entire sanctuary.” Yet, according to the laws of
tumah (Bemidbar 19) death only causes
tumah, when the body is in a tent with a roof, but this did not occur here as Nadav and Avihu died outside of the
mishkan proper, 10:4, and see our discussion on Vayikra 10:1,2 "
Nadav and Avihu," In addition, the
hatta’t sacrifice should not have become
tamei because the supposed cause of the
tumah (Nadav and Avihu's sin) occurred after the sacrifice was offered and its blood was sprinkled, and there is no indication that Nadav and Avihu died when touching the
hatta’t.
Finally, why did Moshe not know that the deaths of Nadav and Avihu generated so much
tumah that the
hatta’t could not be eaten? It seems to me that Milgrom is forcing his theory of
hatta’t and
tumah into this episode.
These two approaches are legal arguments as to why Aharon and his sons burnt the
hatta't, and instead two psychological arguments have been suggested.
Rashbam (on 10:19) suggests that Aharon was claiming that after the deaths of his sons, he and his remaining sons were too sad to eat the sacrifice. N. Leibowitz (1980, p. 74) likes this approach. She explains that sacrifices must be offered in the proper state of mind, and Aharon could not fulfill this requirement in his state of grief. This approach is similar to the mourning approach but it stresses personal feelings as opposed to a point of law. Yet, where does this idea come from that one cannot be in a state of grief when one eats sacrifices? If there was a need to eat the sacrifices to help the people, then why were the personal feelings of Aharon and his sons relevant? How did Aharon know that G-d would not accept his eating if he was sad? Also, Luzzatto points out that this explanation does not explain why Aharon referred to his personal sacrifices, his
hatta’t and his
olah? According to this idea, Aharon should have just said "After the events of the day, I am too sad to eat the
hatta't."
Luzzatto suggests that the argument between Moshe and Aharon was whether the eating of the
hatta’t could lead to atonement for the people. Moshe wanted the
hatta’t to be eaten in order for the people to attain atonement, 10:17. Aharon responded that he and his sons had already offered sacrifices that day, and still his sons died. Thus, he understood that his sacrifices did not lead to atonement for himself. Aharon continued and said, “Had I eaten the
hatta’t today, would it have pleased G-d?” Aharon doubted that his eating of the
hatta’t of the people could lead to atonement for the people once he was not able to bring atonement for himself from his own sacrifices.
This explanation accords with all of Aharon’s statement in 10:19 and makes Aharon’s statement a rebuttal to Moshe’s argument in 10:16-18. Yet, how did the deaths of Nadav and Avihu show that Aharon did not attain atonement from his sacrifices since it seems that they died for their own sins? Luzzatto writes that Aharon felt that he was out of favor with G-d, but from the death of his sons he should only have known that his sons had fallen out of favor with G-d not himself. Perhaps he was a father feeling guilty about his children’s deaths, as maybe he felt that it was his actions by the sin of the golden calf which caused his sons to die, see Rashi on Devarim 9:20. Moshe did not have this feeling so he initially wanted Aharon to eat the sacrifices following the law of the outer
hatta’t. However, after Moshe heard Aharon’s claim, he accepted the idea that Aharon felt that he had not attained atonement from his sacrifices and hence he could not help the people attain atonement.
N. Leibowitz (p. 73) likes Luzzatto’s approach in that it accords with the idea that Aharon was giving expression to his personal feelings, but she rejects the explanation since she claims that “a sense of guilt does not free a man from responsibility to perform his duties.” This is similar to the question on the Rashbam's approach, that if it was Aharon and his son's responsibility to eat the
hatta't and they were not allowed to mourn, then they had to eat it, whether they felt guilty or sad.
Maybe the argument between Aharon and Moshe is a basic argument about the value of sacrifices, akin to the argument many years later between the Rambam and the Ramban, see our discussion on Vayikra 1:9, "
How can one understand sacrifices in the Torah?" Aharon was pointing out that the events of the day showed that sacrifices were ineffective. Aharon noted that he and his sons had just offered a
hatta't and an
olah, and yet his sons were killed almost immediately afterwards. What point was there for him to eat the
hatta't? Aharon was rebutting Moshe's claim that the non-eating of the
hatta't would lead to a
ketsef not due to sadness or guilt but because he doubted that his eating of the sacrifices would please G-d to stop a
ketsef if G-d decided to send
ketsef. This would be analogous to the Rambam's view of sacrifice in the Moreh, 3:32, that sacrifices were only commanded since the people could not envisage a religion with sacrifices.
With this idea, Moshe had initially thought that sacrifices had to be eaten since either he thought that sacrifices were effective to bring atonement (like the Ramban) or because one had to do what was commanded, but he agreed to Aharon's point. This could be because he accepted that sacrifices are not effective in general or that in this case they were ineffective.
A reason why in this particular case they were meaningless is that if the point of offering sacrifices is because one is demonstrating one's devotion to G-d, then here where Nadav and Avihu acted not according to G-d's will (10:1), then any sacrifice that they did would also become meaningless. Note that according to this idea, once Moshe accepted Aharon's opinion, then Aharon and his sons would not have eaten the
minhah and the
shelamim, 10:12-15.
If this is understanding is correct, then this episode supports the Rambam's opinion that really G-d does not want our sacrifices. If this is the message of this episode, then this would have been the most appropriate place to make this point, right after the laws of the sacrifices and the initiation of the priests. Furthermore, it is telling that it is the high priest, Aharon, who rejects sacrifices.
Bibliography:
Fox, Everett, 1995, The Five Books of Moses: A new translation, New York: Schocken Books.
Leibowitz, Nehama (1905-1997), 1980, Studies in Vayikra, translated by Aryeh Newman, Jerusalem: The World Zionist Organization.
Milgrom, Jacob, 1991, 2000, 2001, Leviticus: The Anchor Bible, New York: Doubleday