Bemidbar 1:2 (Bemidbar) - Significant data

1:2 records G-d's command to Moshe to count the people on the 1st day of the 2nd month of the 2nd year of the people’s stay in the desert. Why was the count necessary?

Rashi (on 1:1) explains that the count showed G-d’s love of the people and G-d counted the people in conjunction with important events such as the exodus from Egypt, the sin of the golden calf and here with the completion of the mishkan in the first month of the second year.

Ramban (on 1:45) mentions three reasons. One (see also Rashbam on 1:2), it was to muster an army for the coming invasion of the land of Israel. Two, the census was to show G-d’s goodness to the people that they started from 70 people when Yaakov went to Egypt, Bereshit 46:27, and now they were a large nation. I think this is a likely reason for the count in Bemidbar 26, as the count in Bemidbar 26 follows the exact order of Bereshit 46, but the count in chapter l does not have any literary affinities with the count in Bereshit 46, see our discussion on 26:1-51, "To count again." Three, the count was to show the importance of each person, and this would show that each person/ family was part of the covenant, which was just completed with the laws of the book of Vayikra. (This counting by families might also explain why twenty years was chosen to be youngest age included in the count, as maybe the age marked the person as being a separate household from his parents.)

Another possibility is that this count was to know the census of each tribe, as the previous population data (Shemot 12:37, 38:26) did not provide the population of each tribe. Even thought the count of each tribe could have been calculated from the donations of the shekalim (see our discussion below on 1:46, "Significant data"), this calculation was not simple and not known. Thus, maybe the point of the census in Bemidbar 1 was to publicize the census of each tribe that each person would know how many people were from each tribe.

Why was there a need for people to know the census of each tribe? The information would be important according to the Ramban's first idea that the census was to muster the army. Yet, if the count was for mustering troops, then why was there no upper age limit or exemption from the count for those unable to fight? The lack of an upper age limit is more conspicuous since the Levites had an upper age limit by their work requirements, 4:3. Milgrom (1990, p. 5) claims that the lack of an upper age limit was because everybody had to fight. However, still if a person was too old they could not fight and according to this rationale, the conscription could have started at a younger age. Two, when the people fought with Arad, Sihon and Og (21:1-3,23-25) there is no mention of another count of the people even though these battles happened 39 years after this count. Three, N. Leibowitz (1980, p.12) rejects the military explanation because if that was the reason for the count the Torah could have simply given the total population number without recording all the details of the count.

The answer to these questions depends on how the army was to be organized. From chapter two it seems that the army was based on tribal affiliations, but how was the number of soldiers from each tribe to be chosen. It could not be that everybody went to fight since surely some people stayed on the home front. A different possibility is that each tribe was to supply a fixed number of people, as occurred by the war with Midyan, 31:4, but since the land of Israel was going to be divided based on the number of people this would not be the fairest way. Thus, my guess is that the army was to be organized as a certain percentage from each tribe, for example 90%, 50% or 10% from each tribe.

This idea that the army was a percentage of each tribe can explain why it was important to publicize the census of each population since then it would be known how many soldiers each tribe had to supply. Furthermore, the whole nation had to know these numbers in order that nobody would think that one tribe was providing more or less than other tribes.

In addition, there was no need to have an upper limit since the count was the potential pool of soldiers from each tribe, and then each tribe would choose which soldiers based on the percentage of the total pool of soldiers. The particular soldiers would be chosen based on various factors such as willingness and ability to fight, and then the age cut off would be different for each tribe. However, with the minimum age being twenty, no tribe was allowed to choose soldiers who were less than twenty.

Finally, this system of a percentage of each tribe was appropriate when there was enough time to do a census and /or the goal of the war was to split the land/ booty according to the total number of people in each tribe. However if there was a sudden danger, such as by the war with Arad, Sihon and Og, then a census could not be taken. Also, by Midyan it was sufficient to send a thousand from each tribe since the goal was to stop Midyan from attacking them and not to settle the land of Midyan, see our discussion on 25;14,15 "Ongoing hostilities."

Vayikra 25:4-18 (Behar) - Shemitta, yovel, communism and capitalism

The special years, shemitta and yovel, have been cited within the great debate between communism/ socialism vs. capitalism by Jewish proponents of socialism in the last 150 years. (We will use the terms socialism and communism interchangeably.) For example, Aron Libermann, 1845-1880, wrote "Socialism is not alien to us. The community is our existence; the revolution – our tradition; the commune – the basis of our legislation as quite clearly indicated by the ordinances forbidding the sale of land, by those on the Jubilee and sabbatical years, on equal rights, fraternity, etc." (Quoted in Frankel, 1981, p. 33.) Similarly, Nachman Syrkin, 1868-1924, stated, (quoted in Frankel, p. 306) "The Jewish people is a socialist people not because it lives in want but because the revolution was declared on Mount Sinai… It was this people that thousands of years ago said that 'there shall be no poor amongst you' and made social laws such as the Jubilee, the sabbatical year and all the laws of gleaning in order that justice rules in the world."

North (1951) notes that a scholar named Lurje from the former Soviet Union, also argued that the Torah supports communism, and one "proof" was that the return of the land in the yovel year was to ensure that people could not have large land holdings (latifunds) and that all people would have some property. Lurje argued (and North agreed) that these two results accord with communist ideals, as opposed to the capitalist system, which can lead to large disparities of income. However, one could argue that the breakup of large land holdings accords with the capitalist idea of not allowing monopolies, and the fact that everybody gets a new start accords with the idea of economic mobility, that everybody should have the opportunity to elevate themselves out of poverty, which capitalism agrees wholeheartedly with.

Does the Torah really support communism/ socialism? It would seem that the answer is no. The two most basic conditions for socialism, a state apparatus to direct the production and distribution of goods in the economy and a prohibition of private property, are completely absent from the Torah. It is true that land becomes quasi-public property during the shemitta and yovel years since all people can enter the land to harvest the land, Vayikra 25:6, but still this only occurs once every seven years. The law of yovel prohibiting one from selling one's land also reduces the owner's control of his or her land but no other person gains from this loss of power. Instead, the land always remains the private possession of the family that initially received the land when Yehoshua parceled out the land. As Robert North (1951, p. 330) writes, "What renders Vayikra 25:23 instantly untenable as a Communist manifesto is that the land is precisely said to be inalienable private property… The biblical formulation is everyone shall have property."

The existence of private property is supported by the fact that Devarim 5:18 prohibits one from coveting another person's land, and that Devarim 19:14 records an additional prohibition of stealing land. Finally, we see that many laws in the Torah are predicated on the existence of a market economy. For example, Devarim 14:22-27 records that if a person lives far from the chosen city, he can sell his ma`aser sheni, and then take the money to the chosen city and buy whatever food he desires.

Yet, if the Torah is not in accord with communism/ socialism, this does not imply an acceptance of capitalism. There are several prohibitions in the Torah which limit a person's freedom to use his property in an unfettered manner. For example, one cannot work one's land during the shemitta and yovel years, Vayikra 25:4,11, and one cannot permanently sell land, Vayikra 25:15,16. Also one must leave over some of the land to the poor to harvest, Vayikra 19:8, one cannot charge interest when one lends money, Shemot, 22:24, and loans are annulled in the seventh year, Devarim 15:2,3.

These restrictions have led Yehudah Levi (1993) to argue that "the Torah adopts the capitalist apparatus, but negates in principle the capitalist ideal of encouraging competition… In other words, the economic system of the Torah is based on a capitalist apparatus and a socialist ideology."

I doubt that the Torah rejects the competitive ideal since there are no restrictions in the Torah against competition. In fact, I think that Bereshit 6:5, 8:21 support the capitalist understanding of human nature that man is selfish, which means that the Torah accepts the competitive nature of mankind, see our discussion on Bereshit 8:21, "Is man evil?" http://www.lobashamayim.blogspot.co.il/2010/10/bereshit-821-noah-is-man-evil.html (Note the idea of Adam Smith's invisible hand is that the market system channels man's competitive nature to productive means, while the communist system is predicated on people acting selflessly.)

In 1913, a German, Werner Sombart, argued that Jews and Judaism were behind the rise of capitalism in Europe. As Sombart eventually joined the Nazi party, it appears that this book was intended to denigrate Jews and Judaism, but still we can review his discussion of Judaism. (On the question of Sombart's anti-Semitism see Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, 1976, and Milton Friedman, 1984. With regard to the contribution of Jews to the rise of capitalism, see Johnson, 1987, pp. 281-287.)

Sombart argues that there are several connections between Judaism and capitalism as for instance both depend on the "rationalization of life," but his most interesting point is with regard to the idea of rewards and punishment in Judaism. Sombart writes, (1913, p. 216) "Look through Jewish literature, more especially through the Holy Writ and the Talmud, and you will find, it is true, a few passages wherein poverty is lauded as something higher and nobler than riches. But on the other hand you will come across hundreds of passages in which riches are called the blessing of G-d, and only their misuse or their dangers warned against." He provides two examples from the Torah, Devarim 7:13-15 and Devarim 15:16, but one could add the blessings in Vayikra 26:4,5, that G-d will bless a person materially if he upholds the covenant.

From this brief review, we see that the Torah accepts a market economy, private property, and the competitive nature of mankind. In addition, wealth is viewed positively, but there are restrictions on private property, which are usually intended to mitigate poverty in society. The answer to the question of whether the Torah accepts capitalism depends on how one defines capitalism and how limiting are the restrictions on the economy. I would view the restrictions on property as being akin to progressive income taxes, which as long as they are not overwhelming would not disqualify a modern market based economy from being considered capitalist.

Vayikra 22:27 – An animal that is sacrificed must be at least eight days old

ויקרא כז:כב - שור או כשב או עז כי יולד והיה שבעת ימים תחת אמו ומיום השמיני והלאה ירצה לקרבן אשה לה'.

Vayikra 22:27 records that an animal must be at least eight days old to be acceptable as a sacrifice, as for the first week it should be with its mother. Similarly, Shemot 22:29 records that the firstborn animal can only be offered as a sacrifice when it is eight days old. Why does an animal have to be at least eight days old to be a sacrifice?

Milgrom (2000, p. 1883) writes that the most popular rationale is that the law is based on humanitarian concerns not to be cruel to the animal. However, he rejects this since the animal can be offered as a sacrifice on the eight day. Why is killing the animal on the eighth day more humane than on the seventh day?

I prefer R. Shimon ben Gamliel’s approach (Shabbat 135b, quoted by the Bekhor Shor on 22:27) that if the animal lives eight days then it is not considered an aborted fetus. Why should it matter whether the animal is considered an aborted fetus or not? The Hinukh (positive mitzvah 267, also quoted by N. Leibowitz, 1980, pp. 206,207) writes that prior to eight days the animal has no value. The Abravanel (2005, p. 239) writes that prior to the eighth day, the animal is considered as blemished.

I would slightly vary this idea. During the animal's first week there is a higher probability that that it will not live, as opposed to after the first week. Even if the animal appears to be healthy from the outside, maybe there are some internal problems that will cause it to die. Accordingly, if a person is not sure whether the animal is viable maybe he is offering it as a sacrifice since he thinks it will die anyway. This is an unacceptable sacrifice, just like when a person offers a blemished animal as a sacrifice since then possibly the animal is being offered to remove a “defective animal.” However, once the animal has lived a full week, then the animal is considered viable, and the person is not trying to offer a “free” sacrifice.

Vayikra 22:28 (Emor) – One cannot sacrifice a mother and her young on the same day

Vayikra 22:28 records that an animal and its mother (also father? see Rambam, Laws of Slaughter 12:11) cannot be sacrificed on the same day. This law continues the previous law, 22:27, as after one waited eight days to offer the newborn animal, one cannot offer the mother as a sacrifice on the same day. This law is not just by sacrifices, as even by “regular” meat, one cannot kill an animal and its mother on the same day, see Rambam, Laws of Slaughter 12:1,2. 

What is the rationale for this prohibition? A popular answer is that the law is for humanitarian reasons just the question is whose feelings are being taken into consideration. According to the Rambam (Moreh 3:48) the concern is for the feelings of the animals, while the Ramban (on Devarim 22:6) and Luzzatto (on 22:28) suggest it is the feelings of the person killing the animal since the goal is to “cultivate human pity,” see N. Leibowitz, pp.208-210. However, Milgrom (2000, p. 1884) rejects this approach since is it any less cruel to kill the animals on two consecutive days?

My guess is that the requirement to kill the animals on different days is because this law forces one to separate the animal from its mother (and father?). The need to separate is one of the principles of numerous laws, such as kashrut, and this is one more example of the application of the principle of separation. (Is this also the principle in sending away the mother bird in Devarim 22:6,7?)