The idea of kedusha is highlighted in 19:2 “you shall be kadosh for I, the Lord your G-d am kadosh." Kedusha means separation not holiness, but what is 19:2 referring to? What is a person supposed to separate from?
Rashi explains that the kedusha is to separate from illicit sexual relations, and this idea connects 19:2 with the previous chapter.
Ramban notes that from the Sifra we see that kedusha is more general than just separating from sexual relations. He argues that one must limit some actions that are permitted, such as permitted sexual relations and drinking wine. Ramban argues that if we act in this way we will become attached to G-d, and this is what is meant by the phrase that G-d is kadosh.
Rambam (Moreh, 3:47) quotes a different explanation, (two Sifras- on 11:44 and 19:2) that kedusha develops by doing the commandments, and if one transgresses the law he is tamei. (Again we see the connection between tumah and sin.) I do not know how the Rambam interprets the phrase because “G-d is kadosh.” Maybe it means that just as the Jewish people are separate from the nations of the world due to the commandments, so too G-d is separate from the world.
Possibly the difference between the Ramban and the Rambam is how to understand the relationship between 19:2 and the rest of the chapter. While the verse is an introductory general statement, does it add to the specific laws that follow (Ramban) or does it express the idea of the laws (Rambam, also Rashbam) that by fulfilling the laws of the chapter, a person becomes kadosh?
A second way of understanding the argument is how does one acquire knowledge- objectively or subjectively, with knowledge being the commandments? Ramban follows the subjective approach since subjectively one knows that even some things which are permitted are really forbidden, but each person would have a different notion what is forbidden. Rambam follows the objective approach, as one only knows the commandment from what was commanded, but one does not add to these commandments.
A third approach to understanding the argument is how does one worship G-d, by doing what is commanded (Rambam) or by trying to do more (Ramban)? This argument between the Ramban and the Rambam is identical to their argument by the nazir. Ramban (on Bemidbar 6:11) claims that the nazir brings a hatta’t when he finishes being a nazir since it is a sin to stop being a nazir. Rambam (Shemonah Perakim and Laws of Opinions 3:1) writes that the act of becoming a nazir is a sin. Ramban is claiming that it is meritorious to add restriction and the Rambam thinks it is wrong.
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Thursday, April 30, 2009
Vayikra 17:3-11 (Aharei Mot)– Blood and demons
17:3,4 record, "Every man of the house of Israel who slaughters a bull or a sheep or a goat in the camp or who slaughters outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to bring it forward as an offering to Lord before the Lord's mishkan, it shall be counted as blood for that man- he has spilled blood- and that man shall be cut off from the midst of his people" Alter translation, 2004, pp. 616, 617. The end of 17:4 is unclear: What can be the connection between spilling blood and the place where the sacrifice is offered?
Hoffmann (1953, p. 321) suggests that the spilling of blood referred to in 17:4 means that killing an animal was considered murder unless it was brought as a sacrifice. Milgrom (1991, p. 711) expands upon this idea, and claims that the bringing of a sacrifice is a way of atoning for the murder of the animal and this is the khapparah referred to 17:11. Therefore, as the sacrificing to the satyrs was not an acceptable sacrifice it was considered spilling blood.
N. Leibowitz (1980, pp. 51-56; 1976, pp. 74-78) also follows this vegetarian approach. She quotes from Rav Kook that really mankind was not intended to eat meat, but after the flood it was a temporary dispensation since according to this logic the allowance to kill animals was to stop people from killing people. However, the dispensation was only for eating meat, but no permission was given for eating blood since this was considered the soul of the animal. In addition, because really it is wrong to kill animal, the blood had to be covered to hide the shame of the people for having killed the animals.
This "vegetarian" approach is difficult. It is clear that killing an animal is not murder since there is no prohibition to kill animals in the Torah. On the contrary there are many commandments that involve killing animals. How could G-d command the animal sacrifices, if really it was wrong to kill animals? There could only have been grain sacrifices. Many of the animal sacrifices are not eaten, so why have an obligation to kill an animal if G-d disapproves of killing animals? Why should one be obligated to eat the Passover offering if it is "wrong" to eat meat? Why would G-d approve of Hevel’s animal sacrifice more than Cain’s grain sacrifice (Bereshit 4:3,4) if killing an animal is immoral? The non-eating of blood does not limit the extent of the "murder," as the animal is dead whether the blood is eaten or not. Furthermore, 17:13 permits the killing of animals without blood being offered on the altar, the only proviso being not to eat the blood. If the sprinkling of blood is an expiation for killing the animal, then let a person not bring the sacrifice, and not need the expiation.
It is true that Bereshit 1:29 refers to eating plants, and Bereshit 9:3 seems to imply that the eating of animals after the flood was something new that had previously been forbidden. Yet, as argued by Luzzatto on Bereshit 1:30, these verses do not show that vegetarianism is an ideal of the Torah. My understanding is that only in the Garden of Eden where the animals and the people were somewhat equals (Bereshit 2:20) was mankind forbidden to eat animals, see our discussion on Bereshit 1:29,30 "Is man meant to be a vegetarian?" Similarly, in the time of the flood, when literally Noah and the animals were in the same boat, then again there was a temporary prohibition of eating meat. Thus, after Noah left the ark, he was told that he could eat meat. There is no clue in the Torah that the permission to eat meat after the flood was only temporary. I do not understand the idea of the dispensation. I doubt that vegetarianism would lead people to kill humans since they could not kill animals. Yet, if the Torah allows the killing of animals, why is it forbidden to eat blood? I think to understand 17:4 we need to understand the next verses in the chapter, 17:5-14.
17:5-7 explain that the new law to bring the sacrifices to the mishkan (17:3,4) was to stop the people from offering sacrifices to goat demons, satyrs. How did these sacrifices relate to the idea of spilling blood in 17:4?
Afterwards, 17:10-12 records the prohibition of eating blood. This prohibition is also recorded in Bereshit 9:4, Vayikra 3:17, 7:26,27, and Devarim 12:16,23-25. Note that 17:10-12 is a short section, as 17:10,12, the outer verses of the section record the prohibition of eating blood and 17:11, the inner verse of the section, records the reason why it is prohibited to eat blood, AXA. Vayikra 17:13 then records that not only can blood not be eaten but also the blood of a haya or a bird, which were not brought as sacrifices, had to be covered. Vayikra 17:14 repeats to a large extent 17:11, but this verse is giving the reason for why a person had to cover the blood, while 17:11 records the reason why a person cannot eat blood.
Vayikra 17:11 records, “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have assigned it to you for making expiation for your lives upon the altar” JPS translation in Levine, 1989, p. 115. What does it mean that the "life of the flesh is in the blood?" Also, what is the reference to expiation, khapparah in the verse?
Ramban (on 17:11) first writes that blood is prohibited because it is sprinkled on the altar. This would be similar to the prohibition of eating fat, which also seems to be because the fat of a sacrifice is burnt on the altar (see our discussion above on 3:16,17, "Eat no fat! I"). However, the Ramban notes that this rationale is difficult since it implies that only the blood of animals that are sacrificed should have been forbidden. Ramban answers that maybe there is a desire to keep people away from blood so all blood was forbidden.
However, apparently the Ramban is not happy with this answer since he proceeds to discuss three other reasons for the prohibition. One, from the Rambam (Moreh, 3:46) is that the prohibition of eating blood was because this practice was an element in idolatrous worship, and the Torah wanted to keep people away from any possible idolatry. Ramban rejects this rationale since the Torah repeatedly mentions that the prohibition is due to the fact that blood represents the soul, which seems to have nothing to do with idolatry. Instead, Ramban suggests the vegetarian approach that as the blood represents the soul of the animal it is not right to eat the animal’s soul since all souls belong to G-d. Ramban continues and suggests another rationale that by eating the animal’s blood the person is joining his soul with the soul of the animal, and it is wrong to mix these different types of souls.
I think the Ramban’s last rationale for the prohibition of eating blood is correct, that there is problem of mixing the soul of the animal with the soul of a person. I know this sounds mystical, but once the Torah writes that the blood is the soul of the being, then the Torah has declared that this is a case of mysticism.
This rationale is supported by the first mention of the prohibition. The prohibition of eating blood is mentioned in conjunction with murder in Bereshit 9:4-6. What is the connection between these laws? Bereshit 9:6 explains that it is wrong to kill since man was created in G-d’s image. The idea is that murder diminishes the divine element since there is one less person. Mankind is different than animals since animals do not have this divine element, and hence they can be killed. (This does not necessarily mean that one can be cruel to animals, just that it is not considered murder to kill an animal.) If the blood of the animal represents the soul of the animal, then the eating of the blood mixes a being without the divine element with man who has the divine element. This co-mingling diminishes the divine element within man, and then the eating of the blood is a form of murder, as both diminish the divine element of mankind. This idea that eating blood is a form of murder could explain why the prohibition is recorded several times. Also, this idea might explain why the term eating is used instead of drinking because eating indicates this comingling more than the term drinking.
17:11 should be understood as presenting two reasons for why blood cannot be eaten (see Bekhor Shor on 17:11). The beginning phrase, “the life of the flesh is in the blood,” is the first and primary reason for the prohibition. The phrase harks back to the rationale from Bereshit, that one cannot mix the soul of the animal with the divine element of mankind. The second half of the verse, “and I have assigned it to you for making expiation for your lives upon the altar,” is presenting a second reason for the prohibition. The reference to expiation is to all the sacrifices that are offered on the altar since the sprinkling of the blood is the crucial element in the sacrifices. The reason why this secondary reason is stated is because if one cannot understand the mystical reason, then one should know that eating blood is still forbidden simply since the blood was reserved for the altar.
This double message of 17:11 answers the initial question of the Ramban, why is all blood forbidden? According to the rationale that the blood was brought on the altar, then the blood of animals that were not brought on the altar should have been permitted. Yet, there remains the primary reason of the mixing of the soul of the animal with the divine element in man, which applies to all blood from any animal. Thus, Devarim 12 which allows meat to be slaughtered outside of the mishkan, requires the blood to be spilled on the earth, in order that the blood would not be eaten, Devarim 12:16,24.
Now we can understand 17:4. The sacrifices to the satyrs (17:7) were not only a form of idolatry, but evidently also involved the eating/ drinking of blood. Thus, the people had to offer their sacrifices in the mishkan (17:3-6) in order that the blood would be put on the altar and not eaten. 17:4 then means that if one does not bring a sacrifice to the mishkan, it is feared that one has offered a sacrifice to a demon, which entails drinking blood, and from our discussion above, drinking blood was a form of shedding blood since it diminished the divine element in man.
Note it might seem odd to modern man that people ate/ drank blood, but it seems this was a common practice in olden times. MacGregor (2012, pp. 41,42) in a discussion of four clay models of cattle in Egypt from 3500 BCE, suggests that the cattle were “walking blood banks.” He writes: "It seems more likely they were tapped for blood, which if it is drunk or added to vegetable stews, provided essential protein. This is something we find in many parts of the world, and it is still done today by the nomadic peoples in Kenya.”
Sunday, April 12, 2009
The structure of chapter 11 in the book of Vayikra: A literary separation of animals
The structure of the chapter 11 demonstrates in a literary manner the idea of separation which is the idea of kedusha and is the theme of the chapter. The chapter can be divided based on whether the animals being discussed are referred to as a sherets (swarming) or not.
The third set of laws, 11:13-20, are about birds, and these are not referred to as sherets.
The fourth set of laws are with regard to flying insects, 11:20-23, and these are sherets, 11:20,21,23. Note that 11:20 and 11:23 form a bookend around 11:21,22, which record which insects can be eaten.
The fifth set of laws, 11:24-28, is about the behamot and the hayyot, and again they are not sherets.
The sixth set of laws, 11:29-38, is about the land animals that swarm and they are sherets, 11:29.
11:2 is an introductory sentence, and the first laws are from 11:3-11:8, and these discuss behamot which are not sherets.
11:9-12 record laws about fishes and the fish that are not allowed are referred to as sherets (11:10).
The third set of laws, 11:13-20, are about birds, and these are not referred to as sherets.
The fourth set of laws are with regard to flying insects, 11:20-23, and these are sherets, 11:20,21,23. Note that 11:20 and 11:23 form a bookend around 11:21,22, which record which insects can be eaten.
The fifth set of laws, 11:24-28, is about the behamot and the hayyot, and again they are not sherets.
The sixth set of laws, 11:29-38, is about the land animals that swarm and they are sherets, 11:29.
The seventh set of laws 11:39,40 is again about behamot, and these are not sherets.
The last set of laws 11:41,42 refers to eating animals that swarm, and these are referred to as sherets four times within the two sentences.
The pattern of the chapter is non-sherets to sherets and back again, and this is written to show in a literary way the idea of separation, kedusha.
Vayikra 11 (Shemini) - The list of kosher animals in the book of Vayikra
Vayikra 11:2-23 records the list and/ or criteria of which animals can be eaten (are kosher). The reasons for these lists and criteria have been debated for centuries. Drazin (2006, pp. 124-128) presents a brief review of this question and he notes that the Rama (16th century, Krakow) relates it to the concept of kedusha since the verses at the end of the chapter, 11:44,45, record that the Jewish people are to be kadosh. While one could understand that the term kedusha in 11:44 and 11:45 as both refer to not becoming tamei, it is also possible to understand that only 11:44 refers to tumah, while 11:45 refers to kedusha from not eating the various creatures listed in the chapter. This duality accords with the double nature of the chapter of referring both to the creatures that cannot or cannot be eaten and the tumah relating to animals, see the concluding sentence to the chapter 11:47.
If the non-eating of certain creatures generates kedusha, the question is how? One possibility is that eating of the forbidden foods themselves causes a person's kedusha to be diminished in some way, see Abarbanel, 2005, p. 127, and comments of the Shach, Yoreh Deah, 81:26 (on the Rama). A different possibility is that act of not eating certain animals causes one to separate between the animals and it is this separation that generates the kedusha. The idea is that kedusha means to separate (see our discussion on chapters 11-25 "To separate") and in the final verse of chapter 11, 11:47. the Torah refers to this act of separation between tumah and taharah and the animals that can be eaten and those that cannot.
A possible underlying idea of the relationship between the act of separating and the dietary laws was articulated by Jean Solar (1979) who wrote, "Here (the prohibition of mixing various items together, such as meat and milk) as elsewhere, it is a matter of upholding the separation between the two classes or two types of relationships. To abolish distinction by means of a sexual or culinary act is to subvert the order of the world. Everybody belongs to one species only, one people, one sex, one category. And in the same manner, everyone has only one G-d… The keynote of this order is the principle of identity, instituted in the law of every being."
Even if the point of not eating certain creatures is just to make a separation, still there might be some benefits that accrue from the non-eating of certain creatures. Luzzatto (footnote on comments to 11:1) suggests three reasons. One, that it causes the Jewish people to be separate from non-Jews, and this stops assimilation. (Drazin writes that this reason was first suggested in the book of Tobit.) Nehama Leibowitz (1980, pp. 83, 85) notes that this idea was rejected by David Hoffmann since he argues that the laws of not eating certain animals is because G-d had separated the Jewish people and it is not the laws of which animals can be eaten causes this separation. However, from my personal experiences, I see that the dietary laws definitely cause a separation between people who keep these laws and people who do not, though still maybe this was not the reason for the laws.
Luzzatto second reason is that by being conscious of which animals a person can eat, this leads to a greater awareness of G-d in one's life, and his third reason is that the fact that some foods are forbidden increases one's self-control. While Luzzatto might have only intended that the benefits of self-control were to help people fulfill the commandments, Mischel (2014) based on his marshmallow test of whether young children can withstand the temptation to eat a marshmallow for a certain period of time, has shown that having self-control enables a person to be more successful in life. (N. Leibowitz seems to like Luzzatto's second and third reasons. Bamberger, 1981, p. 810 notes that Luzzatto's third reason is not novel as he writes that Philo had written that "the dietary laws are to control our bodily appetites" and he claims that the Rambam also understood them this way in the Moreh 3:33.)
If the main point of not eating certain creatures is to make a separation, then the designation of which animals can be eaten and which not is not the crucial issue since with this logic there had to be some animals that are forbidden. Yet, this does not imply that the choice of which creatures are forbidden to be eaten is completely arbitrary since still there can be some reasons, even trivial, for why one animal is forbidden and one is not. My guess is that these reasons also relate to the idea of separation.
The first type of animals is the animals that move on land, 11:2-8. The only animals that can be eaten in this group are animals that are classified as ungulates, hoofed animals, and they must also have split hoofs and chew their cud. The hoof serves to separate the animals from the ground, and the split literally shows the idea of separation. If they walk on their paws, 11:27 or if they crawl on the ground, 11:42, then they are not separated from the ground and they cannot be eaten.
The chewing of the cud has nothing to do with separation, but it has been suggested that this sign was specifically to make the pig a non-kosher animal even though it has split hoofs. Maybe the problem with the pig is that even though it has split hoofs, still its body barely remains above the ground, and this is not enough of a separation from the ground.
The next type of animals is those that move in the water, 11:9-12, and they can be eaten if they have fins and scales, i.e. fish, which means that they do not crawl in the water. Thus, clams are not kosher since they live on the ocean floor. According to this idea, sharks, whales and dolphins should be kosher since they swim and do not live on the bottom of the ocean floor, but they are not kosher since they do not have fins. Yet, why are fins the criteria and not swimming in the water? Maybe these are specific reasons for each one that makes them forbidden. Sharks are part of class of fish called cartilaginous who most of the members inhabit the ocean depths, and hence are not separate from the bottom of the ocean. With regard to whales and dolphins, they are the opposite since they are tied to the surface since they have to breathe. Thus all three are not considered as truly moving in the water.
The next type of animal is animals that fly, such as birds and insects, 11:13-23. According to this idea, all birds that fly should be kosher since by flying they are separated from the land. In fact, all birds except the 20 mentioned in the Torah are kosher. No reason is given for why the particular 20 are forbidden and since we do not know exactly which birds are being described it is hard to guess reasons for their prohibition.
Most likely, the twenty birds were chosen was in order that not all birds would be allowed since this forces one to separate between birds, see 20:25. This logic could apply to the other two categories of animals as well. Maybe the pig is forbidden since then even within animals that have hoofs one must make a separation. Also, maybe then sharks, whales and dolphins are forbidden in order that one has to make a separation even within animals that move in the water.
Finally with regard to insects once they have four legs they are considered land animals, and hence not kosher. (They actually have six legs, see our discussion on 11:19,20 "Do the locomotion.") Also, relative to birds, the insects are land animals since they do not get as high in the air as birds. The exception is grasshoppers, which jump off the ground, and hence they are classified by their movement in air and considered like birds. Also, maybe they can be eaten to be merciful in times when there is a plague of locusts since then at least people can eat the grasshoppers.
If the non-eating of certain creatures generates kedusha, the question is how? One possibility is that eating of the forbidden foods themselves causes a person's kedusha to be diminished in some way, see Abarbanel, 2005, p. 127, and comments of the Shach, Yoreh Deah, 81:26 (on the Rama). A different possibility is that act of not eating certain animals causes one to separate between the animals and it is this separation that generates the kedusha. The idea is that kedusha means to separate (see our discussion on chapters 11-25 "To separate") and in the final verse of chapter 11, 11:47. the Torah refers to this act of separation between tumah and taharah and the animals that can be eaten and those that cannot.
A possible underlying idea of the relationship between the act of separating and the dietary laws was articulated by Jean Solar (1979) who wrote, "Here (the prohibition of mixing various items together, such as meat and milk) as elsewhere, it is a matter of upholding the separation between the two classes or two types of relationships. To abolish distinction by means of a sexual or culinary act is to subvert the order of the world. Everybody belongs to one species only, one people, one sex, one category. And in the same manner, everyone has only one G-d… The keynote of this order is the principle of identity, instituted in the law of every being."
Even if the point of not eating certain creatures is just to make a separation, still there might be some benefits that accrue from the non-eating of certain creatures. Luzzatto (footnote on comments to 11:1) suggests three reasons. One, that it causes the Jewish people to be separate from non-Jews, and this stops assimilation. (Drazin writes that this reason was first suggested in the book of Tobit.) Nehama Leibowitz (1980, pp. 83, 85) notes that this idea was rejected by David Hoffmann since he argues that the laws of not eating certain animals is because G-d had separated the Jewish people and it is not the laws of which animals can be eaten causes this separation. However, from my personal experiences, I see that the dietary laws definitely cause a separation between people who keep these laws and people who do not, though still maybe this was not the reason for the laws.
Luzzatto second reason is that by being conscious of which animals a person can eat, this leads to a greater awareness of G-d in one's life, and his third reason is that the fact that some foods are forbidden increases one's self-control. While Luzzatto might have only intended that the benefits of self-control were to help people fulfill the commandments, Mischel (2014) based on his marshmallow test of whether young children can withstand the temptation to eat a marshmallow for a certain period of time, has shown that having self-control enables a person to be more successful in life. (N. Leibowitz seems to like Luzzatto's second and third reasons. Bamberger, 1981, p. 810 notes that Luzzatto's third reason is not novel as he writes that Philo had written that "the dietary laws are to control our bodily appetites" and he claims that the Rambam also understood them this way in the Moreh 3:33.)
If the main point of not eating certain creatures is to make a separation, then the designation of which animals can be eaten and which not is not the crucial issue since with this logic there had to be some animals that are forbidden. Yet, this does not imply that the choice of which creatures are forbidden to be eaten is completely arbitrary since still there can be some reasons, even trivial, for why one animal is forbidden and one is not. My guess is that these reasons also relate to the idea of separation.
The first type of animals is the animals that move on land, 11:2-8. The only animals that can be eaten in this group are animals that are classified as ungulates, hoofed animals, and they must also have split hoofs and chew their cud. The hoof serves to separate the animals from the ground, and the split literally shows the idea of separation. If they walk on their paws, 11:27 or if they crawl on the ground, 11:42, then they are not separated from the ground and they cannot be eaten.
The chewing of the cud has nothing to do with separation, but it has been suggested that this sign was specifically to make the pig a non-kosher animal even though it has split hoofs. Maybe the problem with the pig is that even though it has split hoofs, still its body barely remains above the ground, and this is not enough of a separation from the ground.
The next type of animals is those that move in the water, 11:9-12, and they can be eaten if they have fins and scales, i.e. fish, which means that they do not crawl in the water. Thus, clams are not kosher since they live on the ocean floor. According to this idea, sharks, whales and dolphins should be kosher since they swim and do not live on the bottom of the ocean floor, but they are not kosher since they do not have fins. Yet, why are fins the criteria and not swimming in the water? Maybe these are specific reasons for each one that makes them forbidden. Sharks are part of class of fish called cartilaginous who most of the members inhabit the ocean depths, and hence are not separate from the bottom of the ocean. With regard to whales and dolphins, they are the opposite since they are tied to the surface since they have to breathe. Thus all three are not considered as truly moving in the water.
The next type of animal is animals that fly, such as birds and insects, 11:13-23. According to this idea, all birds that fly should be kosher since by flying they are separated from the land. In fact, all birds except the 20 mentioned in the Torah are kosher. No reason is given for why the particular 20 are forbidden and since we do not know exactly which birds are being described it is hard to guess reasons for their prohibition.
Most likely, the twenty birds were chosen was in order that not all birds would be allowed since this forces one to separate between birds, see 20:25. This logic could apply to the other two categories of animals as well. Maybe the pig is forbidden since then even within animals that have hoofs one must make a separation. Also, maybe then sharks, whales and dolphins are forbidden in order that one has to make a separation even within animals that move in the water.
Finally with regard to insects once they have four legs they are considered land animals, and hence not kosher. (They actually have six legs, see our discussion on 11:19,20 "Do the locomotion.") Also, relative to birds, the insects are land animals since they do not get as high in the air as birds. The exception is grasshoppers, which jump off the ground, and hence they are classified by their movement in air and considered like birds. Also, maybe they can be eaten to be merciful in times when there is a plague of locusts since then at least people can eat the grasshoppers.
Vayikra 11 (Shemini) – Tumah of the animals and separation
Chapter 11 of the book of Vayikra discusses which animals can be eaten and which animals are tamei. Why are animals tamei and why was their tumah recorded in conjunction with the laws of eating? There are at least four possible ways of understanding this apparent connection between tumah of the animals and the laws of eating.
One possibility is that these are two separate laws that happened to be recorded together. However, just the fact that two concepts are recorded together indicates that these are not unrelated ideas. This juxtaposition also occurs in Devarim 14:3-21, which records the animals that can be eaten and again refers to the animals as being tamei though without mentioning the consequences of the tumah.
The second possibility is that the animals cannot be eaten because they are tamei. With this possibility, the tumah of the animals is independent of the laws of eating and is the cause why some animals can be eaten and some cannot. A possible support for this approach is that Nachshoni (1987, p. 440) writes that Chazal understand that eating forbidden foods damages the soul of the person. Why should a soul be so damaged? One possibility is that this damage is from the tumah that resides in the forbidden animals.
Samet (2002, p. 44) also follows this idea that tumah causes animals to be forbidden as food. He claims that all the animals that creep cannot be eaten, 11:41,42, but only eight of them are tamei, 11:29-38, which leads him to argue that the prohibition of eating an animal does not cause the animal to be tamei. Yet, 11:43,44 explicitly record that all beings that creep on the ground are tamei, even though the Torah does not specify in which situation does the tumah exist. The eight animals are animals that creep have more cases of tumah than the other animals that creep.
This approach that tumah is the independent variable implies that there is something intrinsically wrong with the animals that are tamei and this is difficult. As noted by Hoffmann (1953, Introduction to chapter 11, p. 217) the Torah repeatedly writes that they are tamei to you, (11:4-8,27-29,28), and the term “you” implies that their tumah is not intrinsic to the animals. Also, in Vayikra 11, the forbidden fish and birds are referred to as shekets but not as being tamei. In Devarim 14, they are referred as being tamei, but if their tumah was the cause of their being forbidden to be eaten, than this fact should have been mentioned in Vayikra 11, which is the first mention of the laws, and includes an explanation, albeit cryptic, 11:45, for the laws.
The third possible connection between the laws of eating animals and their tumah is the opposite of reason two: The animals are tamei because they cannot be eaten. With this possibility, the independent factor is that animals cannot be eaten for some reason (see our discussion on 11:1-23, "The kosher animals"), and this causes the animals to be tamei. The proof for this approach is that chapter 11 first begins with laws of eating and then discuss the laws of tumah. Also, the fact that the forbidden birds and fishes are only referred to as tamei after chapter 11 (Vayikra 20:25 and Devarim 14:10) implies that they are tamei since they are forbidden to be eaten. The tumah would then be so that one will not come to eat the animals. With this idea, even an animal that is permitted to be eaten, but it dies without being slaughtered (nevelah) is tamei, 11:39,40, since it would be forbidden in the future (Devarim 14:21), in the desert it was forbidden to the priests (22:8) and even for the general population in the desert it was not desired for people to eat such meat, see our discussion on 22:8, "Dead meat I."
The fourth possible connection between the two sets of laws is that both are based on the identical rationale. The concluding sentences to chapter 11, 11:46,47, record “This is the law… that there may be-separation between the tamei and the pure, between the living-creatures that can be eaten and the living-creatures that you are not to eat.” These verses imply that both the laws of eating and the tumah of animals relate to the idea of separation. What does this mean?
The two verses prior to the concluding sentences, 11:44,45, while apparently just referring to laws by the animals that creep and swarm, really provide an explanation for the whole chapter, and they state that the people are to be kadosh and that one should not become tamei. Kedusha is to separate, and tumah is indicative of a lack of separation, see our discussion above on chapters 11-25 "To separate." This separation here is between people and animals that most animals cannot be eaten and a person becomes tamei if one touches them after they died. Eating forbidden animals ends this separation between people and animals and hence reduces the kedusha of the individual. Similarly, when animals are alive there is a natural division between people and animals since animals can move, but when they are dead the animals are tamei to keep them separate from people.
Thus, maybe the reason for both the laws relating to eating and tumah is that since the Jewish people are a separated people they must separate in some way from the animals. This separation between animals and mankind is because man was created in the image of G-d (Bereshit 1:26,27) and animals were not.
Note, one could claim that the third and fourth possibilities are complementary that according to the third possibility, the point of the tumah of the animals is to stop people from eating animals, and it leads to a separation between mankind and the animals, the fourth possibility.
One possibility is that these are two separate laws that happened to be recorded together. However, just the fact that two concepts are recorded together indicates that these are not unrelated ideas. This juxtaposition also occurs in Devarim 14:3-21, which records the animals that can be eaten and again refers to the animals as being tamei though without mentioning the consequences of the tumah.
The second possibility is that the animals cannot be eaten because they are tamei. With this possibility, the tumah of the animals is independent of the laws of eating and is the cause why some animals can be eaten and some cannot. A possible support for this approach is that Nachshoni (1987, p. 440) writes that Chazal understand that eating forbidden foods damages the soul of the person. Why should a soul be so damaged? One possibility is that this damage is from the tumah that resides in the forbidden animals.
Samet (2002, p. 44) also follows this idea that tumah causes animals to be forbidden as food. He claims that all the animals that creep cannot be eaten, 11:41,42, but only eight of them are tamei, 11:29-38, which leads him to argue that the prohibition of eating an animal does not cause the animal to be tamei. Yet, 11:43,44 explicitly record that all beings that creep on the ground are tamei, even though the Torah does not specify in which situation does the tumah exist. The eight animals are animals that creep have more cases of tumah than the other animals that creep.
This approach that tumah is the independent variable implies that there is something intrinsically wrong with the animals that are tamei and this is difficult. As noted by Hoffmann (1953, Introduction to chapter 11, p. 217) the Torah repeatedly writes that they are tamei to you, (11:4-8,27-29,28), and the term “you” implies that their tumah is not intrinsic to the animals. Also, in Vayikra 11, the forbidden fish and birds are referred to as shekets but not as being tamei. In Devarim 14, they are referred as being tamei, but if their tumah was the cause of their being forbidden to be eaten, than this fact should have been mentioned in Vayikra 11, which is the first mention of the laws, and includes an explanation, albeit cryptic, 11:45, for the laws.
The third possible connection between the laws of eating animals and their tumah is the opposite of reason two: The animals are tamei because they cannot be eaten. With this possibility, the independent factor is that animals cannot be eaten for some reason (see our discussion on 11:1-23, "The kosher animals"), and this causes the animals to be tamei. The proof for this approach is that chapter 11 first begins with laws of eating and then discuss the laws of tumah. Also, the fact that the forbidden birds and fishes are only referred to as tamei after chapter 11 (Vayikra 20:25 and Devarim 14:10) implies that they are tamei since they are forbidden to be eaten. The tumah would then be so that one will not come to eat the animals. With this idea, even an animal that is permitted to be eaten, but it dies without being slaughtered (nevelah) is tamei, 11:39,40, since it would be forbidden in the future (Devarim 14:21), in the desert it was forbidden to the priests (22:8) and even for the general population in the desert it was not desired for people to eat such meat, see our discussion on 22:8, "Dead meat I."
The fourth possible connection between the two sets of laws is that both are based on the identical rationale. The concluding sentences to chapter 11, 11:46,47, record “This is the law… that there may be-separation between the tamei and the pure, between the living-creatures that can be eaten and the living-creatures that you are not to eat.” These verses imply that both the laws of eating and the tumah of animals relate to the idea of separation. What does this mean?
The two verses prior to the concluding sentences, 11:44,45, while apparently just referring to laws by the animals that creep and swarm, really provide an explanation for the whole chapter, and they state that the people are to be kadosh and that one should not become tamei. Kedusha is to separate, and tumah is indicative of a lack of separation, see our discussion above on chapters 11-25 "To separate." This separation here is between people and animals that most animals cannot be eaten and a person becomes tamei if one touches them after they died. Eating forbidden animals ends this separation between people and animals and hence reduces the kedusha of the individual. Similarly, when animals are alive there is a natural division between people and animals since animals can move, but when they are dead the animals are tamei to keep them separate from people.
Thus, maybe the reason for both the laws relating to eating and tumah is that since the Jewish people are a separated people they must separate in some way from the animals. This separation between animals and mankind is because man was created in the image of G-d (Bereshit 1:26,27) and animals were not.
Note, one could claim that the third and fourth possibilities are complementary that according to the third possibility, the point of the tumah of the animals is to stop people from eating animals, and it leads to a separation between mankind and the animals, the fourth possibility.
The laws of eating matzah and sitting (eating) in the sukkah for seven days
According to the Torah and our Siddur the holiday that we celebrate from the 15th of Nisan until the 21st of Nisan (22nd in the Diaspora) and usually refer to Pesach or Passover is called the holiday of Matzot. As implied by the name, the point of the holiday is to eat matzot. On seven occasions the Torah records that one is to eat matzot for seven days. Shemot 12:15, 13:6,7 23:15, 34:18, Vayikra 23:6 and Bemidbar 28:18. Shemot 12:18 records that one is to eat matzot from the 14th at night to the 21st at night which is also seven days, but the Torah does not use the word seven. Similarly, by the holiday of Sukkot, the Torah says that one is to be in the sukkah for seven days, Vayikra 23:42.
On the other hand, Devarim 16:18 seems to imply that one is only obligated to eat matzot for six days. Hoffman (on Devarim 16:8) and Luzzatto (on Shemot 13:6) explain that Devarim 16:8 is not contradicting the usual rule of eating matzah for seven days since the verse is referring to the 15th of Nisan, the first day of the holiday, and then there are only an additional six full days left to the holiday. With this understanding, it would appear that one is obligated from the Torah to eat matzot on all seven days of the holiday of Matzot.
However, the Talmud (Pesachim 120a) quotes a barita that argues that Devarim 16:8 requires one to re-interpret all the other verses that refer to eating matzot for seven days to mean that the eating of matzot is just permissive but not obligatory for all the days of the holiday of Matzot, except on the first night (second night in the Diaspora) by the Seder. The logic is that as Devarim 16:8 refers to eating matzot for six days, this excludes the seventh day, which means that one is not required to eat matzot on the seventh day, only that one is allowed to eat matzah on the seventh day. Furthermore, once eating matzah on the seventh day is only permissive, then the law of eating matzah for the other six days of the holiday is based on the law for the seventh day of the holiday. With this logic, then one would not even have to eat matzah at the Seder, but the Talmud quotes another verse, Shemot 12:18, that one has to eat matzah on the first night of the holiday.
This derivation of Devarim 16:8 is difficult. Why do we not learn that one is eat matzah all seven days from the obligation to eat to matzah on the first night of the holiday, and why should we not learn to eat matzah for seven days from the seven times it is recorded in the Torah to eat matzah for seven days? Why would the Torah have to state that eating matzah is permissive on the holiday of Matzot, when one can eat matzah all year round? Regardless of the difficulty in the derivation of Devarim 16:8, according to the halakhah one is only obligated to eat matzah on the first night of the holiday, Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim, 575:7.
Chazal's understanding of Devarim 16:8 has several implications. One, many people use hand shemurah matzah (watched from the time of harvesting) on the Seder, while for the remainder of the holiday they eat machine regular matzot (only watched from the time of grinding) since one is only obligated to eat matzah by the Seder. Two, on Sukkot, Vayikra 23:42 also requires one to be in the sukkah for seven days and R. Eliezer (Sukkah, Mishnah 2:6, Talmud 27a) states that one is obligated to eat 14 meals in the sukkah, two a day. However, Chachamim maintain that one is only obligated to eat in the sukkah on the first night of the holiday, and the basis for their opinion is that the laws of sukkah is derived from the laws of matzah since both holidays begin on the 15th of the month. Three, we only recite a blessing to eat matzah at the Seder night since this is the only eating of matzah which is obligatory.
This absence of making a blessing when eating matzah on the holiday of Matzot (Pesach), except by the Seder, differs from the law on Sukkot where one is obligated to recite a blessing, le-shev ba-Sukkah, whenever one eats in the sukkah enough food to qualify as a meal (bread), Shulchan Arukh, 639:2, Mishnah Berurah 639:16. Why should there be a difference between the blessings on eating matzah and eating in a sukkah if the laws that eating in a sukkah is permissive, but not obligatory, for the days of the holiday except the first night, is derived from the laws of matzah?
The Baal Maor (1125-1186, Provence, Pesachim, pages of Rif 26b, 27a) and the Meiri (1249-1306, Provence, Pesachim 120a, Sukkah 27a) explain that the difference is that one does not have to eat matzah for seven days, while on Sukkot one cannot go seven days without sleeping in the sukkah. Thus, on Sukkot one must enter the sukkah and hence one recites a blessing when eating bread in the sukkah.
Another possibility is based on two different understandings of the term permissive. One definition of the term is that a person is not obligated to do the action, but if he does it, then it is considered a good dead and he expects to be rewarded for his action. A second definition is that not only is one not obligated to do the action, but if one does the action then it is inconsequential and hence the person should not expect to be rewarded for his actions. With regard to eating in the sukkah, the Rambam (Laws of sukkah, 6:6) and the Shulchan Arukh (639:2) write that one who eats in the sukkah all the time is to be praised. Accordingly, the law that eating in the sukkah is permissible is the first type of understanding of the term since the eating is a praiseworthy act, and maybe this is why one recites a blessing by eating in the sukkah all the days of the holiday. However, by eating matzah, neither the Rambam nor the Shulchan Arukh claim it is praiseworthy to eat matzot all seven days. This is the second understanding of the term permissible, and as the act is inconsequential no blessing is said.
Yet, why should there be a difference between the definition of permissibility by eating in the sukkah and eating matzah? A possible answer is that since the initial derivation that eating matzah is permissible but not obligatory is from Devarim 16:8 which refers to matzah, the derivation is enough to transform the obligation to eat matzah to be completely voluntary, and no blessing is recited on eating matzah during the holiday except by the Seder. However, by eating in the sukkah, since the law that it is permissible and not obligatory is a double derivation (from Devarim 16:8, and then the connection from eating matzah to eating in the sukkah), the derivation is not strong enough to completely transform the simple reading of the Torah that one is obligated to eat in the sukkah for seven days. The double derivation makes the eating in the sukkah only permissible but still the ideal of eating in the sukkah remains, which means that one makes the blessing when one eats bread in the sukkah.
Note there is an approach that attempts to combine the simple sense of the Torah that one is required to eat matzah for seven days and Chazal's understanding that the eating of matzah is not obligatory except on the Seder night. Hizkuni (on Shemot 12:18) writes that even though there is no obligation to eat matzah outside of the Seder on Pesach, if one eats matzah then one has fulfilled a mitzvah to eat matzot for seven days. This approach has been associated with the Gra (1720-1797, Vilna) in Maaseh Rav (185), see Mishnah Berurah 475:45 and 639:24, and Sperber, 1991, Vol. 2, p. 143. Arukh Hashulchan 475:18 also quotes this idea but not in the name of the Gra. (The Mishnah Berurah, Biur Halacha 453, tov and Biur Halacha 460, matzot, also quotes that the Gra ate shemurah matzah throughout the week, though maybe this was to follow the Rambam's ruling that the law of shemurah matzah applies to all matzah on Pesach, and not because he thought the eating of matzah was the fulfillment of the verses to eat matzah for seven days.)
In conclusion, my understanding is that a person should make an effort to have some matzah each day of the holiday of Matzot (what we call Pesach), and a person should eat some bread in a sukkah to recite the blessing of leshev ba-Sukkah each day of the holiday of Sukkot.
Bibliography:
Sperber, Daniel, 1991 (vol. 2), Minhagei Yisrael: Sources and history, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
On the other hand, Devarim 16:18 seems to imply that one is only obligated to eat matzot for six days. Hoffman (on Devarim 16:8) and Luzzatto (on Shemot 13:6) explain that Devarim 16:8 is not contradicting the usual rule of eating matzah for seven days since the verse is referring to the 15th of Nisan, the first day of the holiday, and then there are only an additional six full days left to the holiday. With this understanding, it would appear that one is obligated from the Torah to eat matzot on all seven days of the holiday of Matzot.
However, the Talmud (Pesachim 120a) quotes a barita that argues that Devarim 16:8 requires one to re-interpret all the other verses that refer to eating matzot for seven days to mean that the eating of matzot is just permissive but not obligatory for all the days of the holiday of Matzot, except on the first night (second night in the Diaspora) by the Seder. The logic is that as Devarim 16:8 refers to eating matzot for six days, this excludes the seventh day, which means that one is not required to eat matzot on the seventh day, only that one is allowed to eat matzah on the seventh day. Furthermore, once eating matzah on the seventh day is only permissive, then the law of eating matzah for the other six days of the holiday is based on the law for the seventh day of the holiday. With this logic, then one would not even have to eat matzah at the Seder, but the Talmud quotes another verse, Shemot 12:18, that one has to eat matzah on the first night of the holiday.
This derivation of Devarim 16:8 is difficult. Why do we not learn that one is eat matzah all seven days from the obligation to eat to matzah on the first night of the holiday, and why should we not learn to eat matzah for seven days from the seven times it is recorded in the Torah to eat matzah for seven days? Why would the Torah have to state that eating matzah is permissive on the holiday of Matzot, when one can eat matzah all year round? Regardless of the difficulty in the derivation of Devarim 16:8, according to the halakhah one is only obligated to eat matzah on the first night of the holiday, Shulchan Arukh, Orah Chayyim, 575:7.
Chazal's understanding of Devarim 16:8 has several implications. One, many people use hand shemurah matzah (watched from the time of harvesting) on the Seder, while for the remainder of the holiday they eat machine regular matzot (only watched from the time of grinding) since one is only obligated to eat matzah by the Seder. Two, on Sukkot, Vayikra 23:42 also requires one to be in the sukkah for seven days and R. Eliezer (Sukkah, Mishnah 2:6, Talmud 27a) states that one is obligated to eat 14 meals in the sukkah, two a day. However, Chachamim maintain that one is only obligated to eat in the sukkah on the first night of the holiday, and the basis for their opinion is that the laws of sukkah is derived from the laws of matzah since both holidays begin on the 15th of the month. Three, we only recite a blessing to eat matzah at the Seder night since this is the only eating of matzah which is obligatory.
This absence of making a blessing when eating matzah on the holiday of Matzot (Pesach), except by the Seder, differs from the law on Sukkot where one is obligated to recite a blessing, le-shev ba-Sukkah, whenever one eats in the sukkah enough food to qualify as a meal (bread), Shulchan Arukh, 639:2, Mishnah Berurah 639:16. Why should there be a difference between the blessings on eating matzah and eating in a sukkah if the laws that eating in a sukkah is permissive, but not obligatory, for the days of the holiday except the first night, is derived from the laws of matzah?
The Baal Maor (1125-1186, Provence, Pesachim, pages of Rif 26b, 27a) and the Meiri (1249-1306, Provence, Pesachim 120a, Sukkah 27a) explain that the difference is that one does not have to eat matzah for seven days, while on Sukkot one cannot go seven days without sleeping in the sukkah. Thus, on Sukkot one must enter the sukkah and hence one recites a blessing when eating bread in the sukkah.
Another possibility is based on two different understandings of the term permissive. One definition of the term is that a person is not obligated to do the action, but if he does it, then it is considered a good dead and he expects to be rewarded for his action. A second definition is that not only is one not obligated to do the action, but if one does the action then it is inconsequential and hence the person should not expect to be rewarded for his actions. With regard to eating in the sukkah, the Rambam (Laws of sukkah, 6:6) and the Shulchan Arukh (639:2) write that one who eats in the sukkah all the time is to be praised. Accordingly, the law that eating in the sukkah is permissible is the first type of understanding of the term since the eating is a praiseworthy act, and maybe this is why one recites a blessing by eating in the sukkah all the days of the holiday. However, by eating matzah, neither the Rambam nor the Shulchan Arukh claim it is praiseworthy to eat matzot all seven days. This is the second understanding of the term permissible, and as the act is inconsequential no blessing is said.
Yet, why should there be a difference between the definition of permissibility by eating in the sukkah and eating matzah? A possible answer is that since the initial derivation that eating matzah is permissible but not obligatory is from Devarim 16:8 which refers to matzah, the derivation is enough to transform the obligation to eat matzah to be completely voluntary, and no blessing is recited on eating matzah during the holiday except by the Seder. However, by eating in the sukkah, since the law that it is permissible and not obligatory is a double derivation (from Devarim 16:8, and then the connection from eating matzah to eating in the sukkah), the derivation is not strong enough to completely transform the simple reading of the Torah that one is obligated to eat in the sukkah for seven days. The double derivation makes the eating in the sukkah only permissible but still the ideal of eating in the sukkah remains, which means that one makes the blessing when one eats bread in the sukkah.
Note there is an approach that attempts to combine the simple sense of the Torah that one is required to eat matzah for seven days and Chazal's understanding that the eating of matzah is not obligatory except on the Seder night. Hizkuni (on Shemot 12:18) writes that even though there is no obligation to eat matzah outside of the Seder on Pesach, if one eats matzah then one has fulfilled a mitzvah to eat matzot for seven days. This approach has been associated with the Gra (1720-1797, Vilna) in Maaseh Rav (185), see Mishnah Berurah 475:45 and 639:24, and Sperber, 1991, Vol. 2, p. 143. Arukh Hashulchan 475:18 also quotes this idea but not in the name of the Gra. (The Mishnah Berurah, Biur Halacha 453, tov and Biur Halacha 460, matzot, also quotes that the Gra ate shemurah matzah throughout the week, though maybe this was to follow the Rambam's ruling that the law of shemurah matzah applies to all matzah on Pesach, and not because he thought the eating of matzah was the fulfillment of the verses to eat matzah for seven days.)
In conclusion, my understanding is that a person should make an effort to have some matzah each day of the holiday of Matzot (what we call Pesach), and a person should eat some bread in a sukkah to recite the blessing of leshev ba-Sukkah each day of the holiday of Sukkot.
Bibliography:
Sperber, Daniel, 1991 (vol. 2), Minhagei Yisrael: Sources and history, Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook.
Monday, April 6, 2009
We were slaves and our forefathers were idolaters
After reciting the mah nishtanah, we state that "we were slaves and now we are free." This follows Shmuel's explanation of the Mishnah (Pesachim 10:4) that the father answers the mah nishtanah by instructing his son by starting from a lowly state and moving to a high state.
The paragraph continues that even though we are wise, we still have to review the Exodus, and whoever reviews more of the story is to be praised. As noted, by Goldschmidt (p.17) the end of the paragraph is not connected to the beginning of the paragraph that "we were slaves and now we are free." Instead, the point of the end of the paragraph is that one must review more of the story. Afterwards we record two narratives from Tannaim that demonstrates this idea to review the story all night.
Afterwards, the Haggadah records the four sons and Rav's explanation of the Mishnah of our change in status, from idolaters to worshipping G-d. The four sons not mentioned in the Mishnah. Why are the four sons recorded in the Haggadah? Furthermore, even if they are mentioned, one would have thought that they would be recorded in conjunction with the mah nishtanah to join all the questions together. Furthermore, why is Rav's explanation of the Mishnah not juxtaposed with Shmuel's explanation?
Maybe the answer is that just as Shmuel's explanation of the change in status is after a set of questions, so too Rav's explanation of the change in status must also follow a set of questions. Thus, we first read about the four sons, and these are the questions prior to the statement "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d." With regard to each son, there is short answer, but the answer of "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d," is a general answer to all four sons. (Note, the paragraph of yachol is part of the response to the one who cannot ask, see Abarbanel.)
In both cases, the mah nishtanah and the four sons, we have four questions. By the mah nishtanah, we have one set of four questions, while by the four sons, each son asks one question. Furthermore, the types of question correspond to the answers of Rav and Shmuel. Shmuel's explanation of the changeover from a lowly status to a good status was a physical change, and the four question of the mah nishtanah refer to physical issues of eating and leaning. However, by the four sons, all the questions refer to the religious obligation of the people, and this corresponds to Rav's explanation of the changeover of the people as being a religious transformation. Thus, the general answer to all four sons is that we do all these actions because we worship G-d.
Finally, prior to the four sons we have the sentence, barukh hu, "Blessed be He" and similarly this phrase re-appears after we read the verses in the book of Yehoshua of the transformation of the people. According to Goldschmidt (p.22,38) both instances of the phrase are from the time of the Geonim. These two instances of the phrase "Blessed be He" serve as a bookend to the four sons and our statement that "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d." They show that the four sons and the statement "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d" are one unit.
The paragraph continues that even though we are wise, we still have to review the Exodus, and whoever reviews more of the story is to be praised. As noted, by Goldschmidt (p.17) the end of the paragraph is not connected to the beginning of the paragraph that "we were slaves and now we are free." Instead, the point of the end of the paragraph is that one must review more of the story. Afterwards we record two narratives from Tannaim that demonstrates this idea to review the story all night.
Afterwards, the Haggadah records the four sons and Rav's explanation of the Mishnah of our change in status, from idolaters to worshipping G-d. The four sons not mentioned in the Mishnah. Why are the four sons recorded in the Haggadah? Furthermore, even if they are mentioned, one would have thought that they would be recorded in conjunction with the mah nishtanah to join all the questions together. Furthermore, why is Rav's explanation of the Mishnah not juxtaposed with Shmuel's explanation?
Maybe the answer is that just as Shmuel's explanation of the change in status is after a set of questions, so too Rav's explanation of the change in status must also follow a set of questions. Thus, we first read about the four sons, and these are the questions prior to the statement "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d." With regard to each son, there is short answer, but the answer of "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d," is a general answer to all four sons. (Note, the paragraph of yachol is part of the response to the one who cannot ask, see Abarbanel.)
In both cases, the mah nishtanah and the four sons, we have four questions. By the mah nishtanah, we have one set of four questions, while by the four sons, each son asks one question. Furthermore, the types of question correspond to the answers of Rav and Shmuel. Shmuel's explanation of the changeover from a lowly status to a good status was a physical change, and the four question of the mah nishtanah refer to physical issues of eating and leaning. However, by the four sons, all the questions refer to the religious obligation of the people, and this corresponds to Rav's explanation of the changeover of the people as being a religious transformation. Thus, the general answer to all four sons is that we do all these actions because we worship G-d.
Finally, prior to the four sons we have the sentence, barukh hu, "Blessed be He" and similarly this phrase re-appears after we read the verses in the book of Yehoshua of the transformation of the people. According to Goldschmidt (p.22,38) both instances of the phrase are from the time of the Geonim. These two instances of the phrase "Blessed be He" serve as a bookend to the four sons and our statement that "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d." They show that the four sons and the statement "in the beginning our forefathers worshipped idols, and now we worship G-d" are one unit.
Dayenu
After we discuss the plagues, we recite the hymn dayenu. Dayenu lists 15 ways that G-d helped the Jewish people and for 14 of them we say that if G-d did not help us in that particular way it would have been enough what G-d had already done for us. The hymn raises several questions.
One, the sixth act is that G-d split the Yam Suf and the seventh act is that G-d brought us safely through the Yam Suf. How we can say that it was enough for G-d to have split the Yam Suf and not to have helped us pass through the Yam Suf? What would have been the point of splitting the Yam Suf if we had remained stuck on one side? The Haggadah Torat Chayyim (Mossad Harav Kook) quotes a commentary which is ascribed to the Rashbam that the benefit of the seventh act is that we passed comfortably through the Yam Suf. After G-d split the Yam Suf, we could have passed through to the other side, but it would have been muddy. Thus, G-d performed an additional miracle to dry up the Yam Suf.
Two, the ninth and tenth acts are that G-d provided us with our needs and that G-d gave us the mahn in the desert. What is the difference between these actions and could the people have really survived without G-d's help in the desert? With regard to the latter question, the commentary that is ascribed to the Rashbam says yes, that the people could have bought food and supplies from the nations that lived near the desert. With regard to the difference between the ninth and tenth actions, Shibolei ha-Leket (Rome, 13th century, quoted in Haggadah Torat Chayyim) explains that the reference is to the clothing of the Jewish people that G-d ensured that their clothing did not get worn out. However, dayenu follows the order of parashat Beshalach, and hence it is more likely that the reference of the ninth act is that G-d provided the people with water, Shemot 15:25, as this occurred before the giving of the mahn, Shemot 16:15, and according to tradition, G-d provided the people with water for forty years until Miryam died.
Three, the 13th act was that G-d gave us the Torah, but then how can we say after the 12th act, that it was enough that G-d did not have to give us the Torah? The commentary ascribed to the Rashbam offers two suggestions. One, that it was not necessary for G-d to have told us the Decalogue, but we could have been told the entire Torah by Moshe. Yet, even if Moshe transmitted the Torah, still it was G-d who gave us the Torah. Two, that it was not necessary for G-d to have given us all of the commandments as he could have given us just a half or a third of the laws! My guess is that the word dayenu, its enough, is not referring to the 14 ways that G-d helped the people, but rather to a person’s obligation to thank G-d. The first item on the list, for which we do not say dayenu, is that G-d took us out of Egypt. Once G-d took us out of Egypt one has an obligation to thank G-d, even if G-d had not done for us the other 14 favors. Even if G-d had not given us the Torah, we still would have had an obligation to thank G-d for taking us out of Egypt. Thus, dayenu means it is enough that G-d took us out of Egypt for us to be obligated to thank G-d.
This understanding of the hymn explains why it is recorded in the Haggadah, even though most of the actions referred to do not relate to the Exodus. The answer is that our obligation to thank G-d derives from the first act of the hymn, the Exodus itself, and all the other actions are just additional reasons why we have to thank G-d.
(After writing this explanation, Ari Zivotofsky wrote to me that Rav Amital had developed this idea and related it to Yom Ha-azmaut, that we are obligated to thank G-d for the land of Israel. Afterwards saw that Menachem Leibtag, 1995, p.7, also suggested this understanding of the word dayenu.)
One, the sixth act is that G-d split the Yam Suf and the seventh act is that G-d brought us safely through the Yam Suf. How we can say that it was enough for G-d to have split the Yam Suf and not to have helped us pass through the Yam Suf? What would have been the point of splitting the Yam Suf if we had remained stuck on one side? The Haggadah Torat Chayyim (Mossad Harav Kook) quotes a commentary which is ascribed to the Rashbam that the benefit of the seventh act is that we passed comfortably through the Yam Suf. After G-d split the Yam Suf, we could have passed through to the other side, but it would have been muddy. Thus, G-d performed an additional miracle to dry up the Yam Suf.
Two, the ninth and tenth acts are that G-d provided us with our needs and that G-d gave us the mahn in the desert. What is the difference between these actions and could the people have really survived without G-d's help in the desert? With regard to the latter question, the commentary that is ascribed to the Rashbam says yes, that the people could have bought food and supplies from the nations that lived near the desert. With regard to the difference between the ninth and tenth actions, Shibolei ha-Leket (Rome, 13th century, quoted in Haggadah Torat Chayyim) explains that the reference is to the clothing of the Jewish people that G-d ensured that their clothing did not get worn out. However, dayenu follows the order of parashat Beshalach, and hence it is more likely that the reference of the ninth act is that G-d provided the people with water, Shemot 15:25, as this occurred before the giving of the mahn, Shemot 16:15, and according to tradition, G-d provided the people with water for forty years until Miryam died.
Three, the 13th act was that G-d gave us the Torah, but then how can we say after the 12th act, that it was enough that G-d did not have to give us the Torah? The commentary ascribed to the Rashbam offers two suggestions. One, that it was not necessary for G-d to have told us the Decalogue, but we could have been told the entire Torah by Moshe. Yet, even if Moshe transmitted the Torah, still it was G-d who gave us the Torah. Two, that it was not necessary for G-d to have given us all of the commandments as he could have given us just a half or a third of the laws! My guess is that the word dayenu, its enough, is not referring to the 14 ways that G-d helped the people, but rather to a person’s obligation to thank G-d. The first item on the list, for which we do not say dayenu, is that G-d took us out of Egypt. Once G-d took us out of Egypt one has an obligation to thank G-d, even if G-d had not done for us the other 14 favors. Even if G-d had not given us the Torah, we still would have had an obligation to thank G-d for taking us out of Egypt. Thus, dayenu means it is enough that G-d took us out of Egypt for us to be obligated to thank G-d.
This understanding of the hymn explains why it is recorded in the Haggadah, even though most of the actions referred to do not relate to the Exodus. The answer is that our obligation to thank G-d derives from the first act of the hymn, the Exodus itself, and all the other actions are just additional reasons why we have to thank G-d.
(After writing this explanation, Ari Zivotofsky wrote to me that Rav Amital had developed this idea and related it to Yom Ha-azmaut, that we are obligated to thank G-d for the land of Israel. Afterwards saw that Menachem Leibtag, 1995, p.7, also suggested this understanding of the word dayenu.)
Friday, April 3, 2009
Maror
In the Seder, we state that we eat maror to remind ourselves of the bitterness of the slavery. This is a quote from Rabban Gamliel, in the Mishnah Pesachim 10:5, and is based on the similar word, va-yimareru, in Shemot 1:14, which records/ describes how the Egyptians treated the Jews ruthlessly. Yet, the eating of maror today is a Rabbinic law since there is no longer the korban pesach, Passover offering (Pesachim 120a). If the maror is to remember the slavery, then it is independent of the pesach sacrifice, and then why should it be that the Torah law of maror was annulled just because one cannot offer the korban pesach?
The answer is that the requirement to eat maror is from Shemot 12:8 not Shemot 1:14, and Shemot 12:8 records the obligation to eat maror in conjunction with the eating of matzah and the korban pesach. Thus, maror is related to the korban pesach, and hence once there is no longer the korban pesach, then maror is no longer a biblical requirement. Yet, if the maror is not to remember the slavery, what is its rationale? How does it relate to the korban pesach?
Ibn Ezra (lengthy comments on 12:8) quotes an anonymous person that the bitter herbs were condiments that were normally eaten at meals in Egypt. Ibn Ezra rejects this possibility but the Or Hachayyim (on 12:8, see also Breuer, 1993, p. 163) accepts this idea. With this idea, the eating of the maror is to enhance the eating of the pesach sacrifice, and this suggests that the eating of the matzot and the bitter herbs was to make the eating of the korban pesach into a complete meal, meat, a type of bread, and vegetables.
This idea that maror was a type of condiment accords with the list of vegetables in the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:6) that can be used for maror, as all are either lettuce or endives, see Schaffer, 1981, pp. 218-222. The Talmud (Pesachim 39a) in its discussion of the Mishnah notes that first item on the Mishnah's list, chazeret is lettuce.
The Mishnah, Pesachim 10:3, states twice that chazeret is brought to the Seder, once for karpas and once for maror. Thus, according to the Mishnah, at the Seder, the people ate lettuce twice in the meal, once after kiddush, as an appetizer, and once after the matzah, as maror. We see that karpas and maror are equivalent and this equivalency is also evident in the question in the Talmud (Pesachim 114b) that when a person just has lettuce for both karpas and maror, should one make the blessing on maror by karpas or wait? We see again that lettuce is maror and the use of maror for karpas shows that maror is a regular vegetable and not something bitter to remember the slavery.
The Talmud Yerushalmi 2:5, 18a, (also see Talmud Bavli, Pesachim 39a) questions the use of lettuce since it is not bitter, and answers that while initially it is sweet, it eventually turns bitter. This is a difficult answer since if the use of lettuce is because of its status when it is old, then one should only be allowed to use “old” lettuce for maror. More likely, the use of lettuce follows the understanding that maror was a condiment to enhance the eating of the korban pesach, and hence lettuce did not have to be bitter. However, the Yerushalmi was following Rabban Gamliel's understanding of maror.
A similar question arises from a statement of Rava (Pesachim 115b). Rava states that if a person swallows maror at the Seder without tasting it, then he/ she has not fulfilled the requirement to eat maror. The Rashbam in his comments on the Talmud explains that by maror one has to taste the bitterness since the maror is to remember the bitterness of the slavery. With this explanation, Rava was following Rabban Gamliel's understanding of maror, but Rava did not state his reason for why a person has to taste maror just that one has to taste the maror. This same obligation accords with the idea that maror was a type of condiment as then too the taste of the maror was crucial.
It seems that lettuce was used for maror by everybody until the Late Middle Ages. Schaffer (1981) writes that only in the 14th century was horseradish clearly mentioned as being used for maror, and he explains that this was because the Jews had moved to eastern Germany, and in that climate it was difficult to find lettuce by Pesach. This is not a new idea as the Be'er Hetev, Orah Chayyim 473:11, quotes the Chacham Tzvi, 1660-1718, who wrote that since in the lands of Ashkenaz lettuce is not found by Pesach, people use horseradish instead. (Schaffer notes that the custom could have started in even colder climates like Poland and Russia and then moved to Germany. Also, he notes that horseradish is first mentioned in the 12th century but then it was mentioned as an ingredient to charoset!)
With this change from lettuce to horseradish by the Ashkenazim there has developed the idea that horseradish, is the true maror, and lettuce is only for "wimps." However, really lettuce is the true maror, and horseradish is very problematic since one is eating the root of the vegetable, which is not allowed, see Shulchan Arukh 473:5. The Mishnah Berurah (473:36) defends the use of horseradish but he also acknowledges that its use was because it was the only vegetable available by Pesach.
We see that there are two explanations for the maror, one that it was a condiment and two, Rabban Gamliel's explanation, that it was to remember the slavery. Yet, was Rabban Gamaliel's statement that the maror was to remember slavery an explanation for the Biblical requirement to eat maror? Shmuel Safrai and Zev Safrai (1998, pp. 28, 35, 36, 227) write that the Rabban Gamaliel here is the one who lived after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash. Similarly, Encyclopedia Judaica (1971, 7:298), states that Rabban Gamaliel of the Mishnah is the second Rabban Gamaliel who lived after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, and he made many takkanot "with the aim being to face up to the new reality created by the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash."
Goldschmidt (1960, p. 52) notes that it has been suggested that Rabban Gamaliel's statement was to repudiate Christians who claimed that the eating of the pesach, matzah and maror was to remember Jesus's last supper. Goldschmidt thinks this idea is reasonable, but Safrai and Safrai (1998, p. 156) doubt that the Christians had such a custom.
A different possibility is that Rabban Gamaliel's statement concerning maror was to offer a rationale for the rabbinic ruling to continue eating maror after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash. While one could argue that the people should continue to eat maror even without the korban pesach to remember the Biblical requirement, still it is preferable to have a rationale that is independent of the korban pesach. Maybe then Rabban Gamaliel suggested that the maror was to remember the slavery, and this rationale would be particularly appropriate for the people who were suffering under the Roman rule after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash. His message was that on Pesach night we should remember that in Egypt the Jewish people went from slavery to freedom, and this would give hope to the people that their suffering from the Romans would soon end. With this idea (or that his statement was to counter Christian beliefs) Rabban Gamaliel would not necessarily disagree that the rationale for the Biblical requirement to eat maror was to enhance the eating of the korban pesach. Instead, he was providing a rationale for the rabbinic law and not the Biblical law. (I believe this approach accords with the argument of Rabbi Soloveitchik, Haggadah, by korach, that today the eating of bitter herbs is not a rabbinic law based on 12:8, but is a separate rabbinic law.)
The answer is that the requirement to eat maror is from Shemot 12:8 not Shemot 1:14, and Shemot 12:8 records the obligation to eat maror in conjunction with the eating of matzah and the korban pesach. Thus, maror is related to the korban pesach, and hence once there is no longer the korban pesach, then maror is no longer a biblical requirement. Yet, if the maror is not to remember the slavery, what is its rationale? How does it relate to the korban pesach?
Ibn Ezra (lengthy comments on 12:8) quotes an anonymous person that the bitter herbs were condiments that were normally eaten at meals in Egypt. Ibn Ezra rejects this possibility but the Or Hachayyim (on 12:8, see also Breuer, 1993, p. 163) accepts this idea. With this idea, the eating of the maror is to enhance the eating of the pesach sacrifice, and this suggests that the eating of the matzot and the bitter herbs was to make the eating of the korban pesach into a complete meal, meat, a type of bread, and vegetables.
This idea that maror was a type of condiment accords with the list of vegetables in the Mishnah (Pesachim 2:6) that can be used for maror, as all are either lettuce or endives, see Schaffer, 1981, pp. 218-222. The Talmud (Pesachim 39a) in its discussion of the Mishnah notes that first item on the Mishnah's list, chazeret is lettuce.
The Mishnah, Pesachim 10:3, states twice that chazeret is brought to the Seder, once for karpas and once for maror. Thus, according to the Mishnah, at the Seder, the people ate lettuce twice in the meal, once after kiddush, as an appetizer, and once after the matzah, as maror. We see that karpas and maror are equivalent and this equivalency is also evident in the question in the Talmud (Pesachim 114b) that when a person just has lettuce for both karpas and maror, should one make the blessing on maror by karpas or wait? We see again that lettuce is maror and the use of maror for karpas shows that maror is a regular vegetable and not something bitter to remember the slavery.
The Talmud Yerushalmi 2:5, 18a, (also see Talmud Bavli, Pesachim 39a) questions the use of lettuce since it is not bitter, and answers that while initially it is sweet, it eventually turns bitter. This is a difficult answer since if the use of lettuce is because of its status when it is old, then one should only be allowed to use “old” lettuce for maror. More likely, the use of lettuce follows the understanding that maror was a condiment to enhance the eating of the korban pesach, and hence lettuce did not have to be bitter. However, the Yerushalmi was following Rabban Gamliel's understanding of maror.
A similar question arises from a statement of Rava (Pesachim 115b). Rava states that if a person swallows maror at the Seder without tasting it, then he/ she has not fulfilled the requirement to eat maror. The Rashbam in his comments on the Talmud explains that by maror one has to taste the bitterness since the maror is to remember the bitterness of the slavery. With this explanation, Rava was following Rabban Gamliel's understanding of maror, but Rava did not state his reason for why a person has to taste maror just that one has to taste the maror. This same obligation accords with the idea that maror was a type of condiment as then too the taste of the maror was crucial.
It seems that lettuce was used for maror by everybody until the Late Middle Ages. Schaffer (1981) writes that only in the 14th century was horseradish clearly mentioned as being used for maror, and he explains that this was because the Jews had moved to eastern Germany, and in that climate it was difficult to find lettuce by Pesach. This is not a new idea as the Be'er Hetev, Orah Chayyim 473:11, quotes the Chacham Tzvi, 1660-1718, who wrote that since in the lands of Ashkenaz lettuce is not found by Pesach, people use horseradish instead. (Schaffer notes that the custom could have started in even colder climates like Poland and Russia and then moved to Germany. Also, he notes that horseradish is first mentioned in the 12th century but then it was mentioned as an ingredient to charoset!)
With this change from lettuce to horseradish by the Ashkenazim there has developed the idea that horseradish, is the true maror, and lettuce is only for "wimps." However, really lettuce is the true maror, and horseradish is very problematic since one is eating the root of the vegetable, which is not allowed, see Shulchan Arukh 473:5. The Mishnah Berurah (473:36) defends the use of horseradish but he also acknowledges that its use was because it was the only vegetable available by Pesach.
We see that there are two explanations for the maror, one that it was a condiment and two, Rabban Gamliel's explanation, that it was to remember the slavery. Yet, was Rabban Gamaliel's statement that the maror was to remember slavery an explanation for the Biblical requirement to eat maror? Shmuel Safrai and Zev Safrai (1998, pp. 28, 35, 36, 227) write that the Rabban Gamaliel here is the one who lived after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash. Similarly, Encyclopedia Judaica (1971, 7:298), states that Rabban Gamaliel of the Mishnah is the second Rabban Gamaliel who lived after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, and he made many takkanot "with the aim being to face up to the new reality created by the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash."
Goldschmidt (1960, p. 52) notes that it has been suggested that Rabban Gamaliel's statement was to repudiate Christians who claimed that the eating of the pesach, matzah and maror was to remember Jesus's last supper. Goldschmidt thinks this idea is reasonable, but Safrai and Safrai (1998, p. 156) doubt that the Christians had such a custom.
A different possibility is that Rabban Gamaliel's statement concerning maror was to offer a rationale for the rabbinic ruling to continue eating maror after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash. While one could argue that the people should continue to eat maror even without the korban pesach to remember the Biblical requirement, still it is preferable to have a rationale that is independent of the korban pesach. Maybe then Rabban Gamaliel suggested that the maror was to remember the slavery, and this rationale would be particularly appropriate for the people who were suffering under the Roman rule after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash. His message was that on Pesach night we should remember that in Egypt the Jewish people went from slavery to freedom, and this would give hope to the people that their suffering from the Romans would soon end. With this idea (or that his statement was to counter Christian beliefs) Rabban Gamaliel would not necessarily disagree that the rationale for the Biblical requirement to eat maror was to enhance the eating of the korban pesach. Instead, he was providing a rationale for the rabbinic law and not the Biblical law. (I believe this approach accords with the argument of Rabbi Soloveitchik, Haggadah, by korach, that today the eating of bitter herbs is not a rabbinic law based on 12:8, but is a separate rabbinic law.)
Labels:
Pesach: Haggadah,
Pesach: Laws/Customs,
Shemot: Bo
The fast of the firstborn son on erev Pesach
The Tur (Orah Chayyim 429, 470), and the Shulchan Arukh (1488-1575, Orah Chayyim 470) record the custom/ law that firstborn sons fast on erev Pesach. The Shulchan Arukh also quotes that some say that firstborn girls also fast. The Bach (1561-1640, Poland, 470) records that this is the correct practice, but the Rama (16th century, Poland, 470) writes that this is not the custom.
This fast is unique since it has no apparent biblical source unlike the six other fasts during the year. In addition, Daniel Goldschmidt (1996, pp. 384-386) notes that the timing of this fast is difficult. In the time of the Bet ha-Mikdash, the people were offering the korban pesach and celebrating, while the firstborn sons were fasting? Thus, the fast could only have started after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, but why? What is the reason for this fast?
The Tur writes that the reason for the fast is to remember the miracle that the firstborn sons were saved from the tenth plague when G-d killed the Egyptian firstborn sons. (Shemot Rabbah 18:3 writes that even the firstborn Egyptian girls died, except for Batya, Pharaoh's daughter who saved Moshe, and this is claimed as the reason why the firstborn girls should also fast.) Goldschmidt notes that this reason is also difficult. We fast to remember bad things (Tisha B'av) or for penitence (Yom Kippur), but not to remember miracles. Furthermore, Goldschmidt wonders how the firstborn suddenly developed this feeling of gratitude for having been saved for the tenth plague 1,000 years (at least) after the plague?
Goldschmidt quotes from the Orchot Chayim (R. Aharon ha-Cohen of Lunel, 14th century) that the reason for the fast is because the firstborn sons participated in idolatry in Egypt! The Midrash (Shemot Rabbah 16:2) records that the Jewish people practiced idolatry in Egypt, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no source that states that the firstborn sons did anything worse than the rest of the people.
Goldschmidt concludes that there must have been a folk belief that erev Pesach was a day of suffering for the firstborn sons, and hence they fasted to remove this danger. Goldschmidt argues that this fear can explain a unique law by this fasting, that the parents, father or mother, fast if they have a firstborn child who cannot fast (Rama, 470:2). Only this fear of danger could explain why it is necessary for there to be a fast for a child who is exempt from fasting. This would be similar to the Ashkenazi custom that one does kapporet even for the unborn child, see Rama 605. Yet, his suggestion begs the question, where did this folk belief come from? Also, it seems that the custom of the parents fasting for the young child only began in the end of the Middle Ages. The Darkei Moshe (Rama) quotes the idea from the Maharil (1365-1427, Germany), but the Tur does not mention this fasting by a parent for their child.
In order to understand the reason for the fast we need examine the source for this fast. The custom is not mentioned in the Talmud Bavli, but the Yerushalmi (10:1, 68B) quotes that R. Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat matzah or hametz on erev Pesach. The Talmud offers a suggestion that he did not eat since he was a firstborn. However, the Talmud quotes that Rav Yonah Abba was a firstborn son and he ate on erev Pesach, and hence the Talmud concludes that R. Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat to enter Pesach hungry for matzah. The Mordechai(13th century, Germany, Pesachim on 107B) and Arukh Hashulchan (1829-1908, Russia, 470:1) write that this Yerushalmi contradicts the idea of a fast by the firstborn since it rejects the idea that Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat since he was a firstborn. However, Rosh (1250-1327, the Tur's father, Pesachim 10:19) writes that the Yerushalmi is a support for the custom of the firstborn to fast since just the fact that the Talmud raised the possibility that the reason why R. Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat matzah or hametz was because he was a firstborn shows that there was an idea that firstborns do not eat on erev Pesach. Hence, maybe in the time of the Talmud in Israel there was a custom for the firstborn to fast on erev Pesach though this was clearly not the custom of all of the people since Rav Yonah Abba ate on erev Pesach.
The next source that mentions this fast is Masekhet Soferim (9th century?) which quotes customs from the Jews living in Israel. Masekhet Soferim (21:3) quotes that while a person is not supposed to fast in the month of Nisan, the firstborn fasts on erev Pesach as well as pious people who want to enter the holiday with a desire to eat matzah. This is the first definitive source for the custom, but no reason is provided for the fast. In order to understand this custom to fast, we need to re-call that our fast of Esther on the 13th of Adar is first recorded in the period of the Geonim in Bavel, as it used to be forbidden to fast on the 13th of Adar, the day of Nicanor, see our discussion above, “A brief history of Ta'anit Esther.”
Amongst the Jews in Israel, there were different customs from Bavel as to when to observe the fast of Esther. Masekhet Soferim (17:4 and 21:1, see also Shulchan Arukh 686:3) records that there was a custom in Israel to fast on three separate days after Purim in Adar to remember Esther's fast. This fast was three days since Esther fasted for three days, and Masekhet Soferim (21:2) explains that while really the fast should have been in Nisan since this is when Esther fasted, the fast was moved to Adar since one does not fast in Nisan. Sperber (1990, pp. 192-199) notes that this was not the only custom amongst the Jews in Israel as to when to do the fast of Ether. He argues that the fast of "Behab," a three day fast in the beginning of Iyar, was also a variant of this custom as in this case the three day fast was moved to Iyar after Nisan.
In addition, Sperber quotes the possibility that some people in Israel fasted the three day fast in Nisan itself. This last possibility is most likely the basis for the fast of the firstborn on erev Pesach. The idea being that as Esther fasted in Nisan, Nisan was the proper time to fast to remember her fast. However, people did not want to fast for three days in Nisan since the month is not a time for fasting, so they made the fast one day. Why on erev Pesach? The answer is that Esther Rabbah (8:6) records that Esther's three day fast was on the 13th, 14th and 15th of Nisan, which means that erev Pesach was the middle day in her fast. (Rashi, on Megilat Esther 4:17, writes that Esther's fast was on the 14th, 15th and 16th of Nisan, which also includes erev Pesach.) Furthermore, by fasting on erev Pesach a person was also entering the holiday hungry to eat matzah.
Why just the firstborn fast? First, the fast was not initially limited to the firstborn as Masekhet Soferim quotes that those people who want to enter the fast hungry for matzah also fasted (see also Shulchan Arukh 470:3). However, my guess is that even if the fast began as a general fast, due to the difficulty of fasting and getting ready for Pesach, it quickly became the practice that the firstborn sons fasted as representatives of the family. In addition, following the Tur's rationale for the fast, the fast by the firstborn would be similar conceptually to Esther's fast. She fasted to avert Haman's decree, and according to the Tur, the firstborn sons fast since they were saved from the tenth plague.
The fast spread from Israel to Ashkenazi communities in the early Middle Ages, (Tosafot Pesachim 108A, Rav) though according to the Meiri (Provence, 1249-1306, on Pesachim 107B, p.230) only some places in France and Germany accepted the fast. It appears that the Sefardim did not accept this fast until the time of the Shulchan Arukh, since as noted by Goldschmidt, the fast is not mentioned by the Geonim, the Rif or the Rambam. (This is an example of the strong connection between the practices in Israel and Ashkenazim in the Middle Ages.)
This idea that the fast of the firstborn originated to remember Esther's three day fast can explain a unique aspect of the fast. As mentioned above, within this custom there is the idea that the firstborn girl should also fast, and that the mother fasts for her son who cannot fast. This feminine aspect is relatively rare in Jewish law, but accords with the idea that the fast is to remember Esther's fast.
In addition, this idea might explain why today the fast of Esther is only one day, on the 13th of Adar. If we fast to remember Esther's fast, then we should fast three days like she (and all the people) did. In fact, we see from Masekhet Soferim that people fasted three days, so why do we only fast one day? According to the idea above, the fast in Nisan was changed from three days to one day in order to limit the fasting on Nisan. Maybe, afterwards, when the people in Bavel began to fast to remember Esther's fast, they combined two ideas from Israel, one to have a one day fast, and two, to move the fast to Adar from Nisan. Once this occurred, then the most logical one day fast was the 13th of Adar, the day before Purim.
This fast is unique since it has no apparent biblical source unlike the six other fasts during the year. In addition, Daniel Goldschmidt (1996, pp. 384-386) notes that the timing of this fast is difficult. In the time of the Bet ha-Mikdash, the people were offering the korban pesach and celebrating, while the firstborn sons were fasting? Thus, the fast could only have started after the destruction of the Bet ha-Mikdash, but why? What is the reason for this fast?
The Tur writes that the reason for the fast is to remember the miracle that the firstborn sons were saved from the tenth plague when G-d killed the Egyptian firstborn sons. (Shemot Rabbah 18:3 writes that even the firstborn Egyptian girls died, except for Batya, Pharaoh's daughter who saved Moshe, and this is claimed as the reason why the firstborn girls should also fast.) Goldschmidt notes that this reason is also difficult. We fast to remember bad things (Tisha B'av) or for penitence (Yom Kippur), but not to remember miracles. Furthermore, Goldschmidt wonders how the firstborn suddenly developed this feeling of gratitude for having been saved for the tenth plague 1,000 years (at least) after the plague?
Goldschmidt quotes from the Orchot Chayim (R. Aharon ha-Cohen of Lunel, 14th century) that the reason for the fast is because the firstborn sons participated in idolatry in Egypt! The Midrash (Shemot Rabbah 16:2) records that the Jewish people practiced idolatry in Egypt, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no source that states that the firstborn sons did anything worse than the rest of the people.
Goldschmidt concludes that there must have been a folk belief that erev Pesach was a day of suffering for the firstborn sons, and hence they fasted to remove this danger. Goldschmidt argues that this fear can explain a unique law by this fasting, that the parents, father or mother, fast if they have a firstborn child who cannot fast (Rama, 470:2). Only this fear of danger could explain why it is necessary for there to be a fast for a child who is exempt from fasting. This would be similar to the Ashkenazi custom that one does kapporet even for the unborn child, see Rama 605. Yet, his suggestion begs the question, where did this folk belief come from? Also, it seems that the custom of the parents fasting for the young child only began in the end of the Middle Ages. The Darkei Moshe (Rama) quotes the idea from the Maharil (1365-1427, Germany), but the Tur does not mention this fasting by a parent for their child.
In order to understand the reason for the fast we need examine the source for this fast. The custom is not mentioned in the Talmud Bavli, but the Yerushalmi (10:1, 68B) quotes that R. Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat matzah or hametz on erev Pesach. The Talmud offers a suggestion that he did not eat since he was a firstborn. However, the Talmud quotes that Rav Yonah Abba was a firstborn son and he ate on erev Pesach, and hence the Talmud concludes that R. Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat to enter Pesach hungry for matzah. The Mordechai(13th century, Germany, Pesachim on 107B) and Arukh Hashulchan (1829-1908, Russia, 470:1) write that this Yerushalmi contradicts the idea of a fast by the firstborn since it rejects the idea that Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat since he was a firstborn. However, Rosh (1250-1327, the Tur's father, Pesachim 10:19) writes that the Yerushalmi is a support for the custom of the firstborn to fast since just the fact that the Talmud raised the possibility that the reason why R. Yehuda ha-Nasi did not eat matzah or hametz was because he was a firstborn shows that there was an idea that firstborns do not eat on erev Pesach. Hence, maybe in the time of the Talmud in Israel there was a custom for the firstborn to fast on erev Pesach though this was clearly not the custom of all of the people since Rav Yonah Abba ate on erev Pesach.
The next source that mentions this fast is Masekhet Soferim (9th century?) which quotes customs from the Jews living in Israel. Masekhet Soferim (21:3) quotes that while a person is not supposed to fast in the month of Nisan, the firstborn fasts on erev Pesach as well as pious people who want to enter the holiday with a desire to eat matzah. This is the first definitive source for the custom, but no reason is provided for the fast. In order to understand this custom to fast, we need to re-call that our fast of Esther on the 13th of Adar is first recorded in the period of the Geonim in Bavel, as it used to be forbidden to fast on the 13th of Adar, the day of Nicanor, see our discussion above, “A brief history of Ta'anit Esther.”
Amongst the Jews in Israel, there were different customs from Bavel as to when to observe the fast of Esther. Masekhet Soferim (17:4 and 21:1, see also Shulchan Arukh 686:3) records that there was a custom in Israel to fast on three separate days after Purim in Adar to remember Esther's fast. This fast was three days since Esther fasted for three days, and Masekhet Soferim (21:2) explains that while really the fast should have been in Nisan since this is when Esther fasted, the fast was moved to Adar since one does not fast in Nisan. Sperber (1990, pp. 192-199) notes that this was not the only custom amongst the Jews in Israel as to when to do the fast of Ether. He argues that the fast of "Behab," a three day fast in the beginning of Iyar, was also a variant of this custom as in this case the three day fast was moved to Iyar after Nisan.
In addition, Sperber quotes the possibility that some people in Israel fasted the three day fast in Nisan itself. This last possibility is most likely the basis for the fast of the firstborn on erev Pesach. The idea being that as Esther fasted in Nisan, Nisan was the proper time to fast to remember her fast. However, people did not want to fast for three days in Nisan since the month is not a time for fasting, so they made the fast one day. Why on erev Pesach? The answer is that Esther Rabbah (8:6) records that Esther's three day fast was on the 13th, 14th and 15th of Nisan, which means that erev Pesach was the middle day in her fast. (Rashi, on Megilat Esther 4:17, writes that Esther's fast was on the 14th, 15th and 16th of Nisan, which also includes erev Pesach.) Furthermore, by fasting on erev Pesach a person was also entering the holiday hungry to eat matzah.
Why just the firstborn fast? First, the fast was not initially limited to the firstborn as Masekhet Soferim quotes that those people who want to enter the fast hungry for matzah also fasted (see also Shulchan Arukh 470:3). However, my guess is that even if the fast began as a general fast, due to the difficulty of fasting and getting ready for Pesach, it quickly became the practice that the firstborn sons fasted as representatives of the family. In addition, following the Tur's rationale for the fast, the fast by the firstborn would be similar conceptually to Esther's fast. She fasted to avert Haman's decree, and according to the Tur, the firstborn sons fast since they were saved from the tenth plague.
The fast spread from Israel to Ashkenazi communities in the early Middle Ages, (Tosafot Pesachim 108A, Rav) though according to the Meiri (Provence, 1249-1306, on Pesachim 107B, p.230) only some places in France and Germany accepted the fast. It appears that the Sefardim did not accept this fast until the time of the Shulchan Arukh, since as noted by Goldschmidt, the fast is not mentioned by the Geonim, the Rif or the Rambam. (This is an example of the strong connection between the practices in Israel and Ashkenazim in the Middle Ages.)
This idea that the fast of the firstborn originated to remember Esther's three day fast can explain a unique aspect of the fast. As mentioned above, within this custom there is the idea that the firstborn girl should also fast, and that the mother fasts for her son who cannot fast. This feminine aspect is relatively rare in Jewish law, but accords with the idea that the fast is to remember Esther's fast.
In addition, this idea might explain why today the fast of Esther is only one day, on the 13th of Adar. If we fast to remember Esther's fast, then we should fast three days like she (and all the people) did. In fact, we see from Masekhet Soferim that people fasted three days, so why do we only fast one day? According to the idea above, the fast in Nisan was changed from three days to one day in order to limit the fasting on Nisan. Maybe, afterwards, when the people in Bavel began to fast to remember Esther's fast, they combined two ideas from Israel, one to have a one day fast, and two, to move the fast to Adar from Nisan. Once this occurred, then the most logical one day fast was the 13th of Adar, the day before Purim.
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