Wednesday, October 20, 2010

Bereshit 18:17-22:19 (Va-yera) - Human Knowledge and the Theodicy Question

I believe there is one theme that underlies all of the events in chapters 18–22, the question of evil in the world. This is the most difficult challenge to the belief in G-d. How can G-d allow evil to exist in the world? As the Torah is a religious document it would be surprising if this question is not dealt with in the Torah, but the question is where? Many (due to Milton?) believe that the story of the Garden of Eden is the Torah's answer to evil in the world, that mankind sinned. However, as discussed above, I believe that Adam and Chava were supposed to eat from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and hence their sin could not have doomed mankind. Instead, it is the events of chapters 18-22 that deal with the presence of evil in the world, and this is an appropriate place in the Torah for such a discussion as it follows chapter 17, which records the religious covenant of Avraham with G-d.

The question of evil begins with the discussion between Avraham and G-d concerning the fate of Sedom. However, prior to this discussion, 18:19 records that G-d wanted to explain to Avraham what was about to happen since Avraham's children would follow the ways of G-d to do what is just and right (JPS translation). This concern is not just with the judgment of Sedom, but rather G-d wanted Avraham to understand how G-d judged the world since only with this knowledge would Avraham's children be willing to follow in the ways of G-d.

18:20,21 record that G-d informed Avraham that the people of Sedom and Amora were evil and hinted that they were to be severely punished. G-d knew that Avraham would be concerned about the fate of the people of Sedom since he had saved them from the four kings, 14:21-23. Avraham presented two separate arguments to save the people of Sedom. The first, 18:23,25 is that the righteous should be saved, and the second, 18:24, is that even the evil people should be saved on the account of the righteous people. 18:25 ends the questions with an explicit challenge to G-d, "Shall then the judge of the whole earth not do justice?" Note the first question is the stronger question, as this is the theodicy question how come bad things happen to good people.

G-d responded to Avraham that if there were fifty righteous people then the city of Sedom would be spared, 18:26. This would seem to be the end of the discussion because G-d had even agreed to save the bad people on account of the presence of the good people. However, Avraham then continued to whittle down the number of required righteous people, from 50 to 45 to 40 to 30 to 20 to 10, and each time G-d agreed not to destroy the city based on Avraham's request. Why did Avraham start at fifty and stop at ten?

Avraham knew the people of Sedom. After he liberated them from the four kings, they had traveled together from Damascus down to the Dead Sea. In addition, most likely the people of Sedom would have been very grateful to Avraham. Furthermore, their behavior was probably more restrained when traveling on the road than when they were at home. Thus, Avraham did not think that all of the people of Sedom were sinners, and he thought for sure that there were fifty people who were not evil.

Avraham might have thought that G-d would respond by agreeing to a higher number 150, and then they would compromise at 100. However, G-d surprised Avraham by agreeing to 50, and then Avraham wondered maybe he could reduce the number to be sure that Sedom would not be destroyed. He stopped at ten, as Wenham (1994) notes that, "the tone of G-d's replies conveys the feeling that He cannot be pushed much further." Thus, Avraham was uncomfortable to keep reducing the number, but as he thought that for sure there were fifty innocent people in Sedom, then he was extremely confident that there were at least ten innocent people in Sedom.

The point of the discussion is not the numbers themselves, but to show the abyss between G-d's knowledge and man's knowledge. G-d knew how many righteous people there were in Sedom while Avraham had no idea. Avraham thought he knew the people of Sedom, but 19:4 records that all were evil since they all attacked the malakhim who came to visit Lot. Avraham's challenge to G-d was based on the idea that man can judge G-d, but through this discussion G-d showed that man is unable to judge G-d since man's knowledge cannot compare to G-d. Once this fact is established, the theodicy question is effectively answered; man cannot judge G-d.

The episodes after the destruction of Sedom also continue with the theodicy question. The next episode is the encounter between Avraham and Avimelekh, and this has two parts, 20:1-18 and 21:22-34. This episode explains that some of the people who suffer only appear to be innocent. 20:2 records that Avimelekh had his servants take Sara because he had been told that she was Avraham's sister. Yet, even if Sara was Avraham's sister, he still abducted her, and there is no mention that Sara agreed to be taken.

G-d appeared to Avimelekh in a dream to warn him that he was going to die for kidnapping Sara. Avimelekh responded by claiming that he was innocent, tam levavi ve-nekayon kapay, since neither Sara nor Avraham had stated that she was a married woman, 20:3-5. G-d responded that Avimelekh had acted with tam levavecha, but as pointed out by Rashi (on 20:6), G-d did not say that Avimelekh acted with nekayon kapay (clean hands). Many translators (see for example JPS) explain that tam levavecha means blameless and then Avimelekh is understood as being innocent. However, tam here means whole (see Fox) that Avimelekh's heart was whole as he had no doubts in his heart (see Hirsch) that he was innocent. Avimelekh's logic was that as long as a woman is not married, then the ruler of the area has a right to have sexual relations with her. Thus, he believed that he was acting in an appropriate manner, and hence he was whole with his heart. However, just because he thought rape with an unmarried woman is permitted, this does not make it morally right. Thus, when G-d responded to Avimelekh's claim of innocence, G-d did not state that Avimelekh acted with nekayon kapay, clean hands, since Avimelekh's hands were not clean, as he had wanted to rape Sara. We see that human knowledge (Avimelekh's) cannot equal the knowledge of G-d.

Avraham understood that Avimelekh was a fraud, and this can be seen on two occasions. When Avimelekh questioned Avraham, Avraham responded by accusing Avimelekh of being a potential murderer and of being a leader of a lawless place, 20:11. Avraham was arguing that while Avimelekh claimed to be innocent really he was guilty since an upright person would not be the leader of an evil population. Second, in 21:22, Avimelekh came to make a treaty with Avraham, and yet at the same time his servants were stealing the wells of Avraham, 21:25. Avraham reproached Avimelekh about the theft, but Avimelekh denied all knowledge of his servants' actions since as usual he claimed he was innocent, 21:25,26.

Meir Sternberg (1985) points out that the impression that Avimelekh is innocent is enhanced by the fact that the Torah waits until the end of the incident, 20:18, to relate that immediately after Avimelekh took Sara he was punished by becoming impotent. 20:4 records that Avimelekh did not approach Sara as part of his claim of innocence. The fact that he did not force himself upon Sara might lead one to think that he was acting honorably, but in reality he did not approach Sara since he was unable physically to have sexual relations with her. As Sternberg notes "His spirit was willing enough, only the flesh turned weak," and in 20:6 we learn that it was only G-d's intervention which stopped him from raping Sara. Thus, again the story of Avimelekh is where a person appears and claims to be innocent, but in reality is guilty.

The ensuing episode is the banishment of Hagar and Yishmael in order that Yishmael would not challenge Yitzhak's inheritance, 21:1-21. The banishment caused both Yishmael and Hagar to suffer, but it is difficult to argue that they deserved this punishment since the threat to Yitzhak was Yishmael's existence in the house and not something he had done. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Torah refers to him as a child, 21:14-16, even though he was at least fourteen years old. Avraham was worried about Yishmael, 21:11, but G-d told Avraham not to worry since Yishmael would found a nation. In the end the banishment was good for Yishmael because had he stayed in Avraham's house he still would have lost out to Yitzhak and he would not have founded a nation. This is a third answer to the presence of evil in the world. It is true that people sometimes suffer, but sometimes in the end the person is led to a better situation then previously, gam zu le-tovah. Furthermore, this episode again shows the abyss between human knowledge and G-d's knowledge. Avraham was worried about Yishmael, but G-d who knows the future knew that everything would be good with Yishmael.

The final episode is the akedah, 22:1-19. In this case, while Yitzhak was not killed he must have suffered when he realized that Avraham intended to kill him, and it is a possible that his passive behavior was an outcome of the akedah. Yitzhak clearly did not deserve to be punished since G-d was testing Avraham (22:1), and we never read that Yitzhak received any rewards for the akedah, only that Avraham was rewarded, 22:17-18. In this case, the Torah gives no explanation for Yitzhak's suffering, but we know that the entire incident was orchestrated by G-d as G-d decided to test Avraham and G-d stopped Avraham from killing Yitzhak, 22:1,11. This is the final response to the question of evil that sometimes there is no explanation but still this is not grounds to question G-d's existence. Again, we see that human knowledge is not comparable to G-d's knowledge as Avraham really believed that G-d wanted him to kill Yitzhak when really it was all a test. In addition, Avraham did not protest G-d's command to sacrifice Yitzhak as he did when G-d punished Sedom since he learned that his knowledge was not comparable to G-d's knowledge. Therefore, Avraham could no longer judge or question G-d.

All four episodes discussed above answer the question that Avraham asked of G-d in 18:25, "Shall then the judge of the whole earth not do justice?" Three episodes showed that in some cases, the existence of evil with a good G-d can be understood, but the fourth episode shows that at times the existence of evil is inexplicable as R. Yannai states "It is not in our hands (to understand) the security of the wicked or the suffering of the righteous," (Pirkei Avot 4:19). However, man cannot judge G-d since human knowledge is not comparable to divine knowledge.

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Bereshit 15:9-21 (Lekh Lekha) - To cut the gap

Bereshit 15:9 records that G-d told Avram to take a three year old calf, a three year old goat, a three year old ram, and two birds. (This follows Ibn Ezra, but Rashi and Ramban explain that Avram was to take three calves, three goats and three rams.) Avram was to cut the mammals in half and lay each half facing each other, but the birds were not to be cut, 15:10. Vultures descended on the animals, but Avram chased them away, 15:11. Avram was then told a prophecy that his descendants would suffer in a foreign land but the fourth generation would return to the land, 15:12-16. After this prophecy, a fire (a smoking oven and a fiery torch), which symbolized G-d's presence, passed between the pieces, and G-d made a covenant that Avram's children would inherit the land, 15:17-21. Accordingly, this covenant is referred to as the covenant of (between) the pieces. This ceremony raises several questions.

Is there any significance to the type of animals chosen? One answer (see Genesis Rabbah 44:14,15, Rashi on 15:6,9 and Rambam on 15:10), is that prior to the ceremony Avram has asked by what merit would his descendants would inherit the land and G-d answered him by the merit of the sacrifices. Thus, the choice of animals was because G-d was instructing Avraham which animals would be suitable for sacrifices. Benno Jacob (quoted by N. Leibowitz, 1976, p.149) argues that the ceremony here has no connection with sacrifices since there was no altar, no blood was poured out and nothing was burnt. Instead, he suggests that the animals were simply chosen because they were available. Another possibility is that though the animals were not meant as sacrifices still they had to be pure animals since the fire that passed through them symbolized G-d's presence.

Why were the mammals divided? Rashi (on 15:10) explains that the ancient way to make a covenant was for an animal to be split and for the partners in the covenant to pass through the divided animal. Thus, in Hebrew the description for making a covenant is literally called to cut a covenant. Rashi quotes Jeremiah 34:18-20 which records that the princes of Yehuda and Yerushalayim passed between a divided calf in order to impress upon them that if they did not keep the covenant, then they would be punished and would become food for the animals. The passing through the animals was a type of self-imprecation, where the person accepts upon himself a potential punishment for not upholding his part of the covenant.

The idea would then be that the mammals were divided in order for the fire to pass through them, and this passing through established the covenant. Yet, can the passing of the fire through the animals signify the idea of self-imprecation as occured by Jeremiah 34? Was G-d calling upon Himself a future punishment? Gerhard Hasel (1981) argues that one cannot compare Jeremiah 34 to Bereshit 15 since it cannot be that G-d is making a self-imprecation. Instead, he points out that ancient treaties from the second millennium BCE invoke the killing of an animal as a "rite of treaty ratification, symbolizing the binding status of the covenanting parties," and by these treaties there was no evidence that one or both parties to the treaty passed through the animals. Thus, just the cutting of the animals signified the making of the covenant. Why then did the fire pass through the pieces? Hasel suggests that this act was a divine ratification of the covenant that G-d "irrevocably pledged the fulfillment of His covenant promise to the patriarchs." Another possibility is from the Rashbam (on Shemot 33:18) that the fire was an example of a theophany which accompanies all the covenants with G-d.

Why did Avram not pass through the animals either before or after the fire? Maybe Avram did not need to pass between the animals since the covenant did not obligate him in anyway because the covenant was G-d's promise that Avram's descendants would inherit the land. In addition, as explained by Hasel, there was no need for Avram to pass through the animals since the covenant was made just with the cutting up of the animals.

Why were the birds not divided? Ramban (on 15:10, also see Hizkuni) explains that since there were two birds one could be placed facing the other, and then there was no need to cut up the birds. Thus, in total there were two columns (or rows) with each column having half a calf, half a goat, half a ram and a bird.

Why was there a need for three mammals and two birds? In the ceremony recorded in Jeremiah 34 only one calf was divided. Why here was one animal not sufficient? Many commentators have viewed the number of animals as having a symbolic message. For example, Rashi (on 15:10, also see Radak) suggests that the mammals were symbolic of the nations of the world, while the Jewish people were symbolized by the birds.

Benno Jacob (also see S.R. Hirsch) writes that the divided animals represented three generations that would suffer slavery in Egypt, while the birds which were not divided symbolized the generation that would go free. N. Leibowitz likes this approach since it provides a connection between Avram's action with the animals and the prophecy of the slavery in Egypt. Yet, this symbolism is difficult since it is not clear how the division of the animals relates to the suffering in Egypt and we have no knowledge how many generations actually were slaves in Egypt. Furthermore, the end and the crucial point of the prophecy is that the fourth generation would return to the land of Israel, but according to this symbolism the birds just symbolize that the fourth generation goes free from Egypt and do not indicate that the generation would return to the land of Israel. However, the idea of relating the symbolism to the numbers three and four is logical because in total there were four animals in each column and the number three is stressed both by the age of the mammals and by the fact that there were three mammals.

My guess is that the four sets of animals relate to the history of the generations of Avram and his immediate descendants. In each of the first three generations, there was a split in the family, Avram and Lot, Yitzhak and Yishmael, and Yaakov and Esav. These separations in Avram's family were symbolized by the division of the mammals. The fourth generation began as two families, the sons of Lea and Rahel, which is symbolized by the two birds, but in the end this generation joined together when Yehuda risked his life for Binyamin (45:18-34), and this is symbolized by the fact that the birds were not divided.

The unity of the fourth generation explains an anomaly of the text. 15:9 refers to two birds, but 15:10 uses the singular term bird. It is true that the singular can function as a collective noun, but why not use the plural? Radak writes that the use of the singular symbolizes that all the Jewish people would be unified even when they were dispersed throughout the world, but I think it signifies the unity of the fourth generation, the children of Yaakov.

In addition, I believe that the prophecy of the return of the fourth generation refers to Yosef and his generation (see discussion below). Thus, there is a parallelism between the symbolism of the number of animals and the ensuing prophecy, that both refer to the set of same four generations that begins with Avram.

15:11 records that vultures attempted to eat the animals, and Avram chased them away. It seems that the vultures attempted to eat all of the animals, but Radak argues that the vultures only attacked the birds. In any event, why is this action by the vultures and Avram recorded in the Torah? Again, these actions are viewed as being symbolic; see for example comments of the Ramban and Radak (on 15:11).
My guess is that the symbolism is that the covenant is unconditional. If the vultures just attempted to eat the birds, who according to my understanding refer to the fourth generation, then the message is that the promise that the fourth generation would return to the land of Israel was unconditional. On the other hand, if the vultures attempted to eat all the animals, then the idea is that the promise of land to all of the four generations was unconditional. Thus, the Jewish people were forbidden from taking the land of Lot's children, Moav and Ammon, and Esav's children when they marched towards the land of Israel, Devarim 2:5,9,19. With regard to the Yishmael 17:20 and 21:13 record G-d's promise that his children would become a separate nation and 25:18 records that they lived in a wide expanse of land.

Monday, October 4, 2010

Bereshit 8:21 (Noah) - Is man evil?

At the end of the flood, Noah left the ark and offered sacrifices to G-d, Bereshit 8:20. 8:21 records G-d’s response: “The Lord smelled the pleasing odor, and the Lord said to Himself, ‘Never again will I doom the earth because of man, since the devisings of man’s mind are evil from his youth; (ki yetser lev ha-adam ra me-neurav) nor will I ever again destroy every living being, as I have done (JPS translation, Sarna 1989).”

The phrase “the devisings of man are evil” is difficult within the overall story of the flood. Cassuto (1964, p.120, see also Hizkuni) notes that the phrase has been understood to mean that since man is by nature evil, man cannot be responsible for his actions. This clemency would explain the two promises of 8:21 that the earth will not be cursed again due to mankind and that there will never again be universal retribution upon humanity. However, the idea that man is evil not only appears after the flood in 8:21, but also before the flood. 6:5 records, “The Lord saw how great was man’s wickedness on earth, and how every plan devised by his mind was nothing but evil all the time.” As Sarna (1989, p.59) notes the repetition of the evil of man’s mind “makes for an inclusion, or envelope structure,” from the beginning to the end of the flood narrative. Yet, Sarna also notes the difficulty of this repetition since in 6:5 the idea that man’s thoughts were evil was apparently the reason for the flood while the same idea in 8:21 is apparently a justification for why there will be no future destruction either of mankind or of the earth.

The phrase “the devisings of man’s mind are evil” also seems to be in disaccord with the beginning of 8:21 which records that G-d smelled the pleasing odor of Noah’s sacrifices. It is clear that G-d’s smelling is an anthropomorphic term, and that the verse is just telling us that G-d approved the sacrifices, see Ibn Ezra on 8:21. Yet, how can the idea that G-d was pleased relate to the idea that the “devisings of man’s mind are evil?” Furthermore, Noah seems to have acted in a positive manner, yet we are then told that man’s mind always thinks evil thoughts.

Finally, the phrase “the devisings of man’s mind are evil” is also difficult as a general description of mankind independent of the textual issues. Is man intrinsically good or not? Most people would want to believe yes, as who wants to think of themselves as evil? Also, why would G-d create mankind if by nature man is evil? Also, after the creation of man, G-d declared that everything was good, 1:31, yet how could that be if man is evil?

Yehuda Nachshoni (1987, p.31) quotes the Bina la-Ettim (R. Azarya Figo, Venice, 1579-1647) that 8:21 refers to the evil desire, which can have a positive aspect in causing man to develop his world. This idea is based on a comment by Nahman in R. Shmuel's name (Bereshit Rabbah 9:7 on Bereshit 1:31) who states that man was considered very good because he was created with the evil desire. The Midrash explains that if there was no evil desire, then no man would build a house, take a wife and beget children. Thus, G-d had to create mankind with this evil desire for the world to exist. The Bina la-Ettim suggests that before the flood, the evil desire was only used for evil, but after the flood, when Noah offered his sacrifices then the evil desire was being used for good. Yet, how can Noah's sacrifices be considered as emanating from his evil desire?

The term yester in 8:21 should be understood based on Adam Smith's invisible hand, see Ohrenstein and Gordon, 1992, pp.35-45. Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations, (1776, p.423), “He (any person) generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it… He intends only for his own gain, and he is in this… led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” The idea of the invisible hand is that even though man is selfish still in a competitive market the selfishness leads to the most efficient outcome.

The reference to man's evil nature in 6:5 and 8:21 is to man’s selfishness, which can prompt mankind to act evil but also can cause man to act good. In 6:5, mankind's selfishness prompted man to act wickedly, but in 8:21 the same selfishness prompted Noah to offer sacrifices. Why did Noah offer sacrifices when he left the ark? Cassuto explain that it was to thank G-d for saving him. It was Noah’s selfish instincts to want to survive and the satisfaction of his instincts led him to thank G-d, a good deed. Yet, this was a selfish act since he was thanking G-d that he was saved, as opposed to the other people who were killed.

Man’s selfishness is a test. One can be concerned about good causes and then selfishness is “a good thing” or one’s selfishness can lead one to run amuck and then it is negative. Due to this second possibility, there was a need for laws to suppress the negative consequences of man’s selfishness. The introduction of laws is the new situation after the flood. Prior to the flood, mankind existed without any laws, but after the flood there would be laws, 9:4-6, which hopefully would prevent the wickedness that existed prior to the flood from re-occurring. (Possibly, G-d did not just start the world with laws to answer the anarchist’s (Rousseau's) claim that the world would be better with no laws. G-d initially allowed the world to exist with no laws and it was a disaster.)

When 6:5-8 records that the world was to be destroyed but Noah was to live, this meant that the world was to be destroyed in order to start the world again. Yet, the conditions in the world were to be changed because the new world would have a system of laws. The flood was to enable the world to start anew, with a new set of conditions. 8:21, the envelope of 6:5, is telling the reader that man's selfishness can be used for good, and G-d states that He will not destroy the world again since man can be good. The question is just how to increase the chance that man's selfish nature would lead to good outcomes and this is through the laws that follow. Furthermore, with the introduction of laws, there was no reason to destroy humanity or the world again (8:21, 9:1) in order to establish a new system.

In conclusion, 8:21 is telling us that man is intrinsically selfish from birth, which is usually considered a negative characteristic, but it can lead a person to be good. It remains to one’s education and the laws to encourage the positive aspects of selfishness to assert itself.