Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Devarim 21:10-25:19 – The order of the laws of parashat Ki Teitzei


Devarim 21:10-25:19 records numerous laws, but it is not clear the connections between the different laws. It is possible that the Torah specifically wants there to be no connection, but more likely there is an order but it is not self-apparent.
Amongst Medieval commentators, Rashi, occasionally, and Ibn Ezra and Hizkuni (many times he quotes Ibn Ezra) more frequently, attempt to explain the connection between the laws in Ki Teitzei. Generally, their approach is to find thematic connections between the laws.  Cassuto (1973, pp. 1-6) suggested a different approach that sometimes the order of the laws in the Torah is based on sounds or associations of words and phrases.  This idea was crucial when there were very few sifrei Torah, which meant that people had to memorize the Torah, and it was certainly difficult to memorize lists of laws. The sounds and association are a way to aid people to memorize the Torah. (See Boorstin, 1983, pp. 480-484, who briefly discusses the prodigious memory skills that existed in antiquity, and how people developed tricks to aid their memory.)  
Cassuto did not relate his method to the book of Devarim, but this method had been utilized by Yosef Heinemann (1965) and by Alexander Rofe (1988b, 2002, pp. 55-78) in order to explain the order of the laws in Ki Teitzei. Stephen A. Kaufman (1978, see also Olsen, 1994) also offers some examples of this method as part of his argument that the laws of Devarim follow the order of the Decalogue.  We will review the different suggestions along with some of our own to hopefully shed more light on the order of the laws in 21:10-25:16.
 The first law, 21:10-14, is the laws of the woman captured in war, and this is the last law in the war section that began in chapter 20. 
The next law, 21:15-17, records the law that a father cannot favor a son from a beloved wife as opposed to a son from a hated wife.  Rashi (on 21:11) quotes from the Midrash that this law relates to the previous law of the woman captured in battle since the man will come to hate this captured woman, and this will lead to a disobedient son, the following section. Ibn Ezra (on 21:15) suggests that the connection is that initially the captured woman is loved and then hated, which relates to a man who has a wife he loves and a wife who he hates. Rofe varies this slightly. The law of the captured woman ends with a type of divorce, and 24:3 relates divorce in general to a woman being hated.  Thus, as 21:14 refers to divorcing the captured woman, this leads to the association of the term hatred, and 21:15-17 refer to the hated wife.  Heinemann suggests that the connection is that the two laws concern a man and his household, his wives and kids.  Wenham and McConville (1980, p. 251) note that the section on the captured woman ends with the unloved woman receiving her freedom, and 21:15-17 record that the unloved son receives his inheritance.
Another possibility is that 21:16,17 record that the father must acknowledge the son from his hated wife, and 21:12,13 record that the captured woman must shave her head, cut her nails, change her clothes and be allowed to cry for her parents for one month. After one month, the soldier must decide to either acknowledge the captured woman to be his wife or to disassociate from her and send her away, 21:13,14. Thus, both sections have an element of acknowledgement.
Another possible connection is that the law of not favoring the son of the beloved wife over the son of the hated wife reminds us of the case of Yaakov, Rahel, Leah, Yosef and Reuven, and 21:17 uses the same language, reshit ono, as in Bereshit 49:3 when referring to Reuven. Also, both Rahel (Bereshit 29:17) and Yosef (Bereshit 39:6) are described as yefat toar, the same description as the captive woman, 21:11.  Thus, the law of the captured woman could lead to an association with Rahel and Yosef, which would connect to the sons of beloved and hated wives, the law of 21:15-17.
The next law, 21:18-21, records the law of the disobedient son. Rofe notes that this section begins the same way as the previous section, "if a man has."  Heinemann notes that this law also refers to the household, and more specifically, both laws relate to sons.  Also, within this law, 21:19 uses the word ve-tafsu, and this same word is used in the section on war, 20:19, le-tafsah
The next law, 21:22,23 is that if a person is hung by the court, then he is to be buried by nightfall. Rofe notes that this law relates to the previous law of the disobedient son and to 21:15, since all have a similar opening, "if a man has." In addition, both laws refer to capital punishment.
The next law, 22:1-4, is that one cannot ignore another person's animals if they are lost or have fallen on the road.  Heinemann suggests that the placement of this law is that after the Torah discusses a person's household it discusses his possessions.  Rofe suggests that the connection is due to the word used by the disobedient son, swr, and the word used by the animal, ndh, which are used as synonyms in Devarim in reference to idolatry, see 4:19 and 11:15. Maybe the connection is due to the word "ignore," that just like one cannot ignore another person's animals but must return it (22:1,3,4), so too a person cannot ignore the body that was hanged but it must be buried, even if people want to let the body hang as a way of venting their anger at the deceased. Furthermore, the criminal was hanged, which means a person has fallen down and corresponds to finding an animal that fell down on the road, 22:4.
The next law, 22:5, is that it is prohibited to cross-dress.  Rofe notes that this law is connected with the previous law based on the word clothing, simlah. 22:3 records that that a person must return another person's clothing, and 22:5 records that a man can not wear women's clothing.
The next law, 22:6,7, is that a person cannot capture a mother bird along with her young.  Ibn Ezra (on 22:6) writes that the connection is the word derech, which is recorded in 22:6 and in 22:4, two laws beforehand.  Rofe follows this idea and adds that both the animal and the bird are found on the way. Kaufman (p. 136) notes that both laws refer to falling, the animal fell down, 22:4, and the bird's nest is before you on the road since it too fell down, 22:6.  Another connection is the word tree, etz, mentioned here, 22:6, and in 21:22,23.
The next law, 22:8, is that one must put a railing around a roof. Rofe suggests that the connection is because birds nest on the roof.  However, more likely the connection is that people put bird coops on the roofs of their homes, and this is the opposite of the case of 22:7, where one finds the nest on the road or in the tree since if the coop is on the roof then a person can take the mother and her young together.  Another possibility (Kaufman) is that the law is connected with the law of the animal falling, 22:4, because here the fear is that a person will fall from the roof without a guardrail, 22:8.
22:9 begins the next short section (22:9-11) of laws prohibiting the combining disparate items, when planting, plowing and wearing clothing. Ibn Ezra (on 22:9, also on 22:10,11) suggests that these laws follow the law of the railing since after one builds a house, then one plants fields. Heinemann notes that again we return to a person's possessions, which connects with a person's house in 22:8.  Rofe suggests that the connection is that if a person falls and dies because there is no railing on the house, the house becomes impure and if one violates the law of 22:9, the produce because forbidden.  My guess is that 22:9 is part of the trilogy of a woman, 22:5, house, 22:8, and vineyard, 22:9, as occurs in 28:30 (in the same order), 20:5-7 (different order) and 5:18 (field instead of vineyard).
22:10,11 continue the law of 22:9 of not combining disparate items. In addition, 22:10 refers to an ox and the donkey, who are mentioned in 22:1,3,4.
The next law, 22:12, is to put fringes, tsitsits on one's four corned garment. This law connects with the previous law, 22:11, which also discusses clothing. Furthermore, Rashi and Ibn Ezra (on 22:12) explain that juxtaposition of 22:11,12 is to teach that tsitsit can be made from shantez, the forbidden mixture of wool and linen recorded in verse 22:11, and in ancient times the tsitsit were usually made from wool and linen.  Yet, why should tsitsit be an exception to the law of not wearing wool and linen together?  I would think that the point of the verse 22:12 is to inform us that the fringes are not considered as part of the clothing. The verse states that they are put on the four corners of your garment, and the garment, which covers a person, is considered as clothing but not the fringes. Thus, 22:12 is to inform us that having fringes of wool and linen do not constitute a violation of 22:11, not because they are an exception to the rule, but because fringes are not clothing. 
The next law, 22:13-19, is when a husband falsely accuses his new wife of not being a virgin. Ibn Ezra (on 22:13) writes that the connection is that the law follows the  flow of life, first one has a house, then one finds clothing and then one finds a wife. Tigay (1996, p. 456) writes that the connection is because the proof of the virginity is with a garment, the simlah in 22:17 and this connects to law by cross-dressing in 22:5. Maybe, 22:13-19 also connects back to 22:1-4, the law of returning the lost animal. 22:3 refers to finding, u-metsatah, the animal and 22:14 (also 22:17) records that the husband states that he cannot find, matsati, a sign that his wife was a virgin. In addition, after the false accusation the husband cannot send away his wife, 22:19, which connects with the word send (recorded twice) by the mother bird, 22:7.
The next law, 22:20,21, is when the husband's accusation is correct, and continues the case of 22:13-19.
The next law, 22:22, is the punishment for adultery, and this is thematically the same as the previous law. When the new wife is found not to have been a virgin, then this can be thought of as a type of adultery since the husband was deceived by her sexual misconduct.  Also, both 22:21, and 22:22 end with the phrase, "remove evil from the Jewish people."
The next law, 22:23,24 is that sexual relations between a man and an engaged woman (to another man) is also considered adultery, and again the law ends with the phrase "remove evil from the Jewish people."
The next law, 22:25-27, is where the sexual relations between the man and the engaged woman took place in the field, and then it is assumed not to have been consensual.  This case continues the case of 22:23,24, but differs as to where the sexual relations transpired.
The next law, 22:28, is a case of rape, and this connects with the previous law since in this case it is known for sure that the sexual relations were not consensual.
The next law, 23:1, is that a person cannot marry his father's former wife (not his mother).  Rofe notes that this law connects with the laws of the tsitsit since 22:12 refers to the corner, kanfot, of the garment, and 23:1 explains that one is not to reveal one's father's kenaf.  Another possibility is that sexual relations between the son and his father's former wife impinges on his father, just as the case of the new wife who was found not to be a virgin impinges on her father, 22:21.  In addition, the father is mentioned prominently in the laws of the bride whose virginity is under question, 22:15,16, and when there is sexual relations between a man and single woman, 22:29, the previous verse to the law of 23:1.  Finally, the law of 23:1 continues the idea of the laws by the engaged woman, 22:23-27, since there the woman is "off-limits" to other men even though she is not married, and so too here, the father's former wife is "off-limits" to the son even though now she is single. 
The next law, 23:2, is that a man who is castrated cannot enter G-d's congregation. Altar (2004, p. 991) notes, "The prohibition, then, is thematically related to the immediately preceding prohibition against uncovering one's father's skirt, both expressing a horror of violation of the body of the father."  Or, to vary this idea, when a son marries his father's former wife, he has in a sense castrated his father.
The next two laws, 23:3-7 begin with phrase "X shall not be admitted, lo yavoh, into G-d's congregation," which is the same opening statement of the previous law of 23:2.  Rofe also suggests that 23:3, the prohibition not to allow a mamzer into G-d's congregation, is connected with 23:1 since a child from a forbidden sexual relationship such as the one recorded in 23:1 is considered a mamzer.
Altar (2004, p. 991) adds another possible connection between the law of 23:4-7 not to marry an Ammonite and Moavite with 23:1. He quotes David Cohen-Zemach that the case of 23:1 of not uncovering a father's garment alludes to Ham seeing his father Noah's nakedness (Bereshit 9:22).  Furthermore, as we discussed on Bereshit 9:18-29, "Fathers and sons," several commentators have related this incident between Ham and Noah to incest, and then 23:1 is associated with 23:4-7 since Moav and Ammon derive from the incestuous relationship of Lot and his daughters, Bereshit 19:30-38. 
The next set of laws, 23:8,9, is not to abhor an Edomite or an Egyptian. These laws follow 23:4-7 since they deal with foreigners, just as 23:4-7 refers to Moavites and Ammonites.  Again the word yavoh, appears, 23:9, that the third generation Edomite and Egyptian can join G-d's congregation, and this word was in 23:2,3,4, though there the phrase is lo yavoh.
The next law, 23:10-13 record that the law of the sanctity of a military camp that a person who has an emission of semen has to leave the camp at night, lo yavoh, and in the morning he can return, yavoh, to the camp after washing.  Rofe notes that the word yavoh in 23:11,12 connects this law with the laws of 23:2-9, which also use this word, as mentioned above.
The next law, 23:14,15, is that when a person is in the military camp, he must go to the bathroom outside the camp.  This law connects with the previous law since both refer to the laws of the sanctity of the military camp, and the word machaneh, camp, appears seven times in these two laws.   
The next law, 23:16,17, is that a person must grant asylum to an escaped slave. Ibn Ezra (on 23:16) claims that this case is also dealing with war, that the slave is running away during the war, which connects the law with the previous laws of the military camp.  Rofe notes that 23:14 refers to sitting outside, shavta, and 23:17 also refers to sitting with you, yeshev.  This same sound, albeit with a different meaning, shav, also appears in 23:15.  In addition, there is the contrast that one must go outside the camp to go to the bathroom, while the slave stays with you.  Another connection is that the same word save, tsl, appears in both laws.  23:15 states that "G-d moves in the camp to save you, le-hatsilcha," and 23:16 records that you are to not to return the slave who has turned to you to be saved, "yenatsel."
The next set of laws, 23:18,19, forbid prostitution, and prohibit the prostitute to donate her (and his?) income to the worship of G-d. Ibn Ezra (on 23:18) suggests that the connection with the previous law is due to the connection between slaves and prostitutes. (I am not sure if he means that slaves become prostitutes or that slavery and prostitutes are similar actions of selling one's body for money.) Rofe notes that 23:18,19 refer to a prostitute with the word kadesh, and this word is mentioned in 23:15, though in a completely different context. However, he thinks a more likely connection is that the previous law, 23:17, ended by stating that one is not to ill-treat the slave, lo tonenu, and 23:17 uses the same three letters, taf, nun, nun, in reference to the prostitute's gift, etnan.
The next law, 23:20,21, is the prohibition of charging interest to a Jew.  Rofe and Kaufman (p. 139) connect this law to the previous verse, which records that a person cannot donate money to the worship of G-d that is derived from a dog (a male prostitute?), and 23:20,21 records seven times, the word neshek, which literally means to bite.
The next law, 23:22-24, is that a person must fulfill his vows.  Ibn Ezra (on 23:22) and Rofe notes that this section connects with the law by the prostitute (two laws prior, 23:19) which also uses the word vow, neder. (Note the word neder in 23:19, is recorded after the reference to the dog, and the laws of interest, which are connected to the word dog, precede the law of fulfilling one's vow.) In addition, the obligation to fulfill one's vows contrasts with the case of the prostitute whose donations are not accepted, while for other people the Torah encourages the people to fulfill their donations.
The next law, 23:25,26, is permission to eat grapes and grain from a neighbor's field if one is passing through the field.  Rofe suggests that the connection is that 23:25 uses the phrase, kenafeshecha, your soul can be satiated from eating the grapes and he points out that the word nefesh can also mean throat.  Thus, he suggests that this word connects with the previous law which records that one must fulfill the vows uttered by one's lips in 23:24. My guess is that the connection is between the reference to the lips, 23:24, and to eating in 23:25, similar to the association between a dog and biting in 23:19,20, that the lips are used for eating.
The next law, 24:1-5, is that while people can get divorced, they cannot remarry their first spouse if they re-married somebody else in the interim. Ibn Ezra (on 24:1, see Weiser, 1976, vol. 3, p. 283, footnote 2) seems to connect this law with the previous law as he writes that the woman is also considered a field that she has children like fields have fruits. Rofe suggests the connection is that 24:1 refers to the wife he does not find favor in her husband's eyes, and this connects to the references to other parts of a person's head, the throat in 23:25 according to his suggestion of the word kenafeshecha, and the mouth in 23:24. Altar (p. 996) notes that the connection between 24:1 and 23:15 is that both verses have the phrase of ervat davar.  In addition, maybe the connection is based on the word hands.  23:26 records that when you go through the fields, you can pluck the grain with your hands, and 24:1,3 state that the bill of divorce must be placed in her hands.
The next law, 24:5, is that a person is exempt from going to the army the first year of his marriage. Rofe notes that this law begins with the same opening as the previous 24:1, "if a man takes a wife."  In addition, the laws are connected by the word davar in 24:1 and 24:5.
The next law, 24:6, is that a lender cannot take a millstone or even just the upper part of the millstone from the borrower as a pawn since the borrower needs it to grind his wheat. Ibn Ezra (24:6) notes that the Karaites claim that grinding and the separation of the upper part of the millstone from the bottom part of millstone have a sexual imagery, and this is why the law is recorded after the law to not separate the husband and wife the first year of their marriage.  Ibn Ezra rejects this idea but Rofe and Kaufmann follow it.  Another possibility following the literal idea of grinding is that 24:5 records that the husband should be naki, which literally means clean, but here is used figuratively that the husband should be free for the year, a strange use of the word naki. This word, naki, corresponds to the process of grinding wheat, which was the use of the millstone referred to in 24:6, to produces clean flour.
The next law is, 24:7, prohibits kidnapping. Ibn Ezra (on 24:6), Rofe and Kaufman all connects this law with the previous law based on the word nefesh in 24:6 and 24:7.
The next law, 24:8,9, is that a person must listen to the priest when they have leprosy. Ibn Ezra (on 24:6) suggests the connection is that if one does not listen to the priest then he/ she will harm other people, and this connects with several of the previous laws and all of the ensuing laws that violations of the laws harm others.  Heinemann suggests that the connection with the previous laws is because the leper must leave his house and the camp. This is similar to the divorcee who leaves the house, 24:1, and contrasts with the husband in the first year of his marriage who cannot leave his house, 24:5.  My guess is that the connection is based on the story of Yosef who is the only case in the Torah of a person being kidnapping and sold. 24:6 even uses the word your brother, and that the victim is made into a slave, just like what occurred to Yosef.  The law by leprosy refers to the case by Miryam who spoke badly about Moshe, and this brings to mind the case of Yosef who spoke badly about his brothers, Bereshit 37:2.
The next law, 24:10-13, is that a lender cannot enter the borrower's house to seize a pledge, and if the borrower is poor and needs the pledge, then the lender must return the pledge at night. Heinemann and Rofe connect this law with the leprosy since here the lender has to stay outside the borrower's house, 24:11, just like the leper had to stay outside the camp, Vayikra 13:46.
The next law, 24:14,15, is that a worker must be paid on time. Rofe notes that this law is connected with the previous law through the word shemesh, the sun. 24:13 records that the pledge must be returned by sundown, and 24:15 records that the worker must be paid by sundown.
The next law, 24:16 is that judges (see Rashbam on 24:16) cannot inflict capital punishment on people for the sins of their relatives. Rofe notes that this law is connected with the previous law by the word chet, sin.  24:15 records that if a person does not pay his wages on time, then it will be accounted as a sin, and 24:16 records that each person is to be punished for his own sins.
The next law, 24:17,18 is not to pervert the justice of the unfortunate people in society or to take a pledge from a widow. Rofe writes that this connects to the law to pay the worker's wages, 24:14,15, and to protect the poor person who borrows money, 24:10-13.  More likely, following the idea that 24:16 is referring to judges who cannot punish a person for another person's sins, then 24:16 connects with the beginning of 24:17 which records that judges are to judge all people equally.
The next set of laws, 24:19-22 records that a person must leave over some of his crops, olives and grapes for the poor. This set of laws is connected through the almost identical motive statement to follow these laws in 24:18 and 24:22, and the reference to the stranger, orphans and widows in 24:17 and 24:19.
The next law, 25:1-3, is that a person cannot be flogged more than 40 times (39 times according to accepted opinion in the Mishnah, Makkot 3:10).  Rofe notes the similarity between flogging and the harvesting of olives referred to in 24:20 since in antiquity (still today?) olives were harvested by beating the trees with long sticks. Another connection is that 24:16-18 was addressed to judges as is 24:1-3.
The next law, 25:4, is that one may not muzzle an ox while it is threshing.  Rofe writes that the connection with the previous verse is that word used for muzzle, tachasom, also has the understanding of beating. My guess is that the connection is with the laws of 24:19-22 that one must leave over some of the crops for the poor, and 24:4 is telling us that one must also allow the animal to have some of the crops.
The next law, 25:5-10, is that if a man dies without children, then the dead man's brother can marry the widow.  Rofe writes that this law connects thematically with the law of 25:1-3. 25:3 records that one cannot excessively flog a person since this would degrade the victim, and 25:9,10 records that if the brother of the dead man refuses to marry the widow then he is to be embarrassed. My guess is that 25:5-10 is also connected with 25:1-3 but through the word ben.  25:1 records that there is a fight ben, between people, 25:2 refers to the guilty persons in the strange way as a ben hacot, and 25:5 states that the law only applies if the dead man does not have a ben, son.
The next law, 25:11,12, records that a woman should not improperly intervene in a fight.  Ibn Ezra (on 25:11) notes that the opening of the law is the opposite from the opening of 25:5, as 25:5 records, "if  brothers live together," while 25:11 records "if men fight together." Heinemann and Rofe also note the common word, together, in 25:5 and 25:11.  Rofe also adds that both in this case and by the brother-in-law who refuses to marry the widow, the women embarrass a man.  Furthermore, Eslinger (1984) notes that the end of 25:12, do not pity the woman, lo tachos, has the same sound as the prohibition to muzzle the animal in the law prior to yibbum, 25:4, lo tachasom.  In addition, Altar (p. 1002) notes that the case of 25:12 could be where the woman injuries the man's testicles. And, "if an impairment of reproductive function is involved, this would be grave, and would link this law to the concern for the continuation of man's name in the levirate marriage." 
The next law, 25:13-16, is that one must have accurate weights in order not to deceive people.  Rofe (1988b, p. 276) suggests that this law is connected with the previous law since the weights are stones, avanim, and this word is a double entendre for women's genitals, which then connects with the previous law where the woman grabbed the man's genitals, 25:11. (Rofe argues that this understanding of the word avanim also applies to Shemot 1:16.)
A different approach can be suggested based on Hoffmann's (1961, p. 481) insight that the law to have accurate weights is also recorded in Vayikra 19:35,36, and there too it serves as the last law in a series of laws.  The basis for the laws of false weights is the requirement to be honest. When there were no coinage people paid for items by giving various amounts of metals such as gold, silver and copper, and then these metals had to be weighted. Correct weights and measures were an indication that a person was honest in his economic transactions, and this is a very suitable theme to conclude the law section.
In addition, the last two verses of this section, 25:15,16 record, “You must have completely honest weights and completely honest measures, if you are to endure long on the soil that the Lord your G-d is giving you. For everyone who does things, everyone who deals dishonestly, is abhorrent to the Lord your G-d, (JPS translation in Tigay, 1966, p. 235).  Tigay (1996, p. 235) notes that these exhortations are “a fitting conclusion to the civil and criminal laws in the book of Devarim.” Thus, according to this possibility, this law of having accurate weights is not connected to the previous law, but is the law that ends law sections.
The next and last law, 25:17-19, is for the Jewish people to wipe out Amalek. Altar (2004, p. 1003) quotes from Luzzatto (I did not see this in Luzzatto) that this law is connected with the previous law since both laws involved deception, the false weights and Amalek's attack on the Jewish people, 25:18. Altar also notes that the word to remember Amalek, zekher, 25:19, "is strongly linked with zakhar, male," and the case of the levirate marriage was where there was no son, 25:5, and where the goal was to prevent a name from being lost, 25:6.  In addition, the word wipe out, timcheh, appears in both 25:6 and 25:19. My thought is that this law concerning Amalek begins a new section relating to the establishment of the covenant in chapter 28, see our discussion on 26:3-19, "Verbal declarations."      

Thursday, August 20, 2009

Devarim 19:1-10 (Shoftim) - How many cities of refuge?

19:1-10 records laws concerning the establishment of the cities of refuge. These cities were discussed in Bemidbar 35:9-34, which raises the question, why is there another discussion of these cites?

A possible answer is that the sections have different purposes. One clue of the difference purposes of Devarim 19:1-10 and Bemidbar 34:9-34 are the concluding verses to the two sections. Devarim 19:10 records that the accidental killer must be able to get to the city of refuge in order that he will not be killed by the relative of the victim because the community is responsibility for his life. On the other hand, Bemidbar 35:33 records that the accidental killer must go to the city of refuge in order that the land will not be polluted with his presence. The concern in Bemidbar 35:9-34 is to punish the accidental killer while in Devarim 19:1-10 the goal is to protect the accidental killer from the relative of the victim. Therefore, Devarim 19:3 stresses the importance of preparing the roads and dividing the country evenly in order to facilitate access to the city of refuge. Also, 19:4 includes the word “live” in reference to the accidental killer.

This duality of the city of refuge explains why the laws are recorded separately. The punishment of the killer, the theme of Bemidbar 35:9-34, is to ensure the sanctity of the land, and Bemidbar 35 is recorded within a discussion of the people's inheritance of the land, Bemidbar 33 and 34. Conversely, the leaders of the nation are responsible for ensuring that the accidental killer is not killed, and hence Devarim 19:1-10 is recorded within the section that refers to the political, religious and judicial leaders of the people.

One difficulty in Devarim 19:1-10 is that it is unclear how many cites of refuge were to be established. Bemidbar 35:13,14 record that there were to be six cities, three on the eastern side of the Jordan River and three on the western side of the River. Devarim 4:41-43 record that Moshe designated three cities on the eastern side, which would mean that only another three more cities were to be established. Thus, 19:2 records that the people were to establish another three cities, which makes six. Afterwards, 19:8,9 records that when the people would receive more land, another three cities would be established apparently making nine in total, see Rashi on 19:9. Were there supposed to be six or nine cities of refuge?

Another question is that 19:3 and 19:9 appear to ignore the three cities designated by Moshe. 19:3 states that the accidental killer could run to the three cites that were to be established on the western side of the Jordan River, but if Moshe had already designated three cites of refuge then the accidental killer really had a choice of six cities. 19:9 seems to states that the last three cities would be in addition to the three cities that were to be established when the people would come into the land of Israel, as recorded in 19:2. Yet, 19:9 should have stated that these three cities would be in addition to the six cities, the three designated by Moshe and the three that were to be established when the people would come into the land of Israel.

In order to answer these questions we need to understand 19:6. This verse states the rationale for establishing the three cities of refugee on the western side of the Jordan River was because without these cities it would be difficult for the accidental killer to reach asylum because the distance would be too great. What does the phrase “a great distance” refer to? A great distance from where?

Some modern Bible scholars have suggested that the altar was also to serve as a place of refuge, and then the phrase “a great distance” means too far away from the altar. However, the Torah never states that the altar was a place of refuge, see Jeffrey Stackert (2006). For example, 19:3 states that the accidental killer could run to the three cities, but if the altar was also a place of refuge, then the verse should have stated that the accidental killer could run to four places, the three cities and the altar.

The reference of the phrase “a great distance” in 19:6 is to the three cities of refuge established by Moshe on the eastern side of the Jordan River. When the people would come into the land of Israel, on the western side of the river, it would be too far and difficult to cross the river to get to the three cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River. (Today the Jordan River is barely a creek because Israel and Jordan stop water from flowing down the Jordan. However, in the past it was a much more powerful river. In 1848, the head of a US Naval expedition of the river, William Frances Lynch (1849, p.264) reported to the Secretary of the US Navy, "Too my consternation, I soon found that Jordan was interrupted in its course by frequent and most fearful rapids.") Thus, another three cites had to be established on the western side of the Jordan River as indicated by 19:6.

Once it is recognized that the three cities established by Moshe were not accessible to the overwhelming majority (80%) of the people, then they were irrelevant to most of the people. Thus, 19:3 only states that the accidental killer could run to the three cities that were to be established on the western side of the Jordan River since these were the only relevant cities.

Even when the people would receive more land, 19:8, still the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River would remain geographically inaccessible since the increase in land was to be in north and a little in the south, but not in the east, which is all desert. Thus, 19:6-9 state that just as the people were to establish three cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River since the three cities designated by Moshe on the eastern side of the Jordan river were not accessible, so too another three cities would have to be established in the future on the new land since the three accessible cities of refuge on the western side of the Jordan River would no longer be accessible with the new land. 19:9 means that when the people received more land they would need three more accessible cities of refuge in addition to the three already existing accessible cities. The verse ignores the cities established by Moshe since these were geographically inaccessible to all the people living on the western side of the Jordan River. There would be nine cities of refuge, but only six would be relatively accessible. In addition, the reference to the six cities of refuge in Bemidbar 35:13,14 could be to the cities that were to be established upon the conquest of the land which would be the three that Moshe established and the three referred to in 19:2.

The net result is that altogether there would be nine cities of refuge. This number was not based on an equal division of the country but on the three zones of the country that each zone had three cities. The first zone was the land of Israel proper, the second zone was the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River, and the third zone was the land that eventually would become part of the land of Israel in the north.

Note, it is possible that within each zone the land was divided equally. According to 19:3, the land in the first zone was to be divided equally (see Ibn Ezra on 19:3), and the Talmud (Makkot 9B) states that the land on the eastern side of the Jordan River, zone two, was also to be divided evenly. Yet, it is also possible that the cities on the eastern side of the Jordan River were not divided geographically, and instead each tribe “received” a city.

Bibliography:

Lynch, William Francis, 1849, Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, Reprint in 1977, New York: Arno Press.

Stackert, Jeffrey, 2006, Why Does Deuteronomy legislate Cities of Refuge? Asylum in the Covenant Collection (Exodus 21:12–14) and Deuteronomy (19:1–13), Journal of Biblical Literature, 125:1, pp. 23-49.

Thursday, August 13, 2009

Devarim 15:4,11 (Re`eh) - The end of poverty?

Devarim 15 records several laws with regard to one’s obligation to the poor. One example is 15:4, which records that a lender should not be upset with the law of remission of loans since G-d has blessed the people that there would be "no needy among the people." Possibly the idea is that nobody should claim that the remission of loans will make the lender poor as there will be no poor.

A second law is that one must lend to the poor, 15:7-11, and within this law, 15:11 records that "there will never cease to be poor people." The idea here is that a person cannot decline to lend money to the poor by denying that there are poor people. Thus, the Torah states there will always be poor people, that one is always obligated to lend money as a form of charity.
 
Both verses, 15:4,11, are consistent with the respective laws that they refer to, but, as has long been noted, they appear to contradict each other. How can 15:4 state that there will be no needy amongst the people while 15:11 records that there will always be poor people?

The standard answer (see Rashi on 15:4) to understanding 15:4,11, is that the blessing that there will be no poor amongst the people is conditional on the behavior of the people. If the people obey the laws, then there will be no poor people. However, as there will never be a time when all the people will follow all the laws, then the blessing that there will be no poor people will not be fulfilled, and hence 15:11 is correct that there will always be poor people. This answer is troubling since it means that the blessing of 15:4 will never be actualized, as there will always be poor people.

Furthermore, the Ramban (on 15:11) is bothered that this answers implies that the people are always destined to sin, and hence he modifies the approach to suggest that 15:11 means that only sometimes in the future the people will sin and then there will be poor people. This modification is difficult since 15:11 seems to imply that there will always be poor people, while according to the Ramban, 15:11 only means that there is always the potential for there to be poor people. In addition, I am bothered by this approach as it stigmatizes the poor that they are sinners, and this would encourage people not to lend to the poor.

In order to understand 15:4,11, one must define the term poor. Poverty can be defined into two ways, absolute poverty or relative poverty. Absolute poverty is when a person does not have enough money to live according to some minimum standard, as for example the World Bank commonly uses 2$ and 1$ a day as its standard. Relative poverty is when a person has less money to purchase goods than other people in society. For example, in Israel the poverty line is 50% of the median income, which means the poverty line fluctuates based on the income of the total population. Thus, in year one A can be considered not poor, but in year two, even with no change in A's income or prices in Israel, an increase in the median income of the country can put A below the poverty line. These two definitions lead to different implications whether a person is considered poor. For example, if everybody in a country lives on less than 2$ a day, then using an absolute standard every person in the country is poor, but from a relative perspective there are no poor people in the country. Or, it could be that the income level of the country is unequal, but nobody in the country has an income level of less than 2$ a day. In this case, there would be relative poverty in the country, but no absolute poverty. I believe this latter case is the key to understanding 15:4,11.

15:4 refers to absolute poverty, while 15:11 refers to relative poverty. 15:4 means that if a person follows the laws, then a person will never be reduced to absolute poverty that one cannot purchase the minimum amount of goods needed to survive. Thus, a person should not be bothered by the remission of loans in the seventh year. 15:4 concludes by recording that G-d would bless the land that it would be fruitful enough that no person would be poor, but there is no promise of equality. On the other hand, 15:11 means that there will always be relative poverty, as the national income will never be distributed completely equal in society, and hence there is an obligation to lend to the poor who are less fortunate even if the poor have enough money to survive on a minimal basis. Thus, 15:8 records that one must lend "for whatever he needs," which means that the lending is for all the needs of a person and not just to maintain a minimum level of subsistence.

The Talmud (Ketuvot 67b) explains that while 15:8 does not obligate one to make a person wealthy, yet one is required to give a person whatever he needs, which includes a horse to ride on and to a slave to run before the horse. The horse and the runner are not needed for the poor person to reach a minimal level of existence, and hence we see that the Talmud understands 15:8 as referring to relative poverty.

In the glory days of communism, many people were (still are?) enchanted by the claim that communism would lead to complete equality in society and the end of poverty. I have also heard it claimed that the communist ideal is in accordance with the Torah. The approach suggested above completely rejects this supposed connection between communism and the Torah. If there will always be relative poverty, then the communist ideal of complete equality will never be attained. Furthermore, there is no indication in the Torah that the goal is to remove all inequality in society. The blessing of 15:4 is that there will be no absolute poverty, but there would remain different income levels. This outcome accords better with a capitalist system where income differences are needed as an incentives for people to work harder, and it would be hoped that there would be sufficient economic growth to eradicate absolute poverty for all people.

For a more complete discussion of these issues, see my article, "The vision of Deuteronomy 15 with regard to poverty, socialism and capitalism" in Markets and Morality, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 2006, pp.251-259.